united states The United States Is Getting Infected With Dictatorship By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Apr 13, 2020 Apr 13, 2020The coronavirus pandemic has provided an opening for Donald Trump to attack transparency, voting rights, and accountability. Full Article
united states Why is the United States So Bad at Foreign Policy? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Jan 13, 2020 Jan 13, 2020Stephen Walt writes that the United States' unusual historical experience, geographic isolation, large domestic market, and general ignorance have weakened its ability to make viable foreign-policy strategies. Full Article
united states The United States Forgot Its Strategy for Winning Cold Wars By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: May 5, 2020 May 5, 2020Stephen Walt writes that arguments against U.S. offshore balancing misunderstand history. The strategy that worked against the Soviet Union can work against China. Full Article
united states The United States Forgot Its Strategy for Winning Cold Wars By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: May 5, 2020 May 5, 2020Stephen Walt writes that arguments against U.S. offshore balancing misunderstand history. The strategy that worked against the Soviet Union can work against China. Full Article
united states The United States Forgot Its Strategy for Winning Cold Wars By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: May 5, 2020 May 5, 2020Stephen Walt writes that arguments against U.S. offshore balancing misunderstand history. The strategy that worked against the Soviet Union can work against China. Full Article
united states Why is the United States So Bad at Foreign Policy? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Jan 13, 2020 Jan 13, 2020Stephen Walt writes that the United States' unusual historical experience, geographic isolation, large domestic market, and general ignorance have weakened its ability to make viable foreign-policy strategies. Full Article
united states The United States Can Still Win the Coronavirus Pandemic By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Apr 3, 2020 Apr 3, 2020The Trump administration has made one mistake after another—and, with some foreign-policy changes, could emerge with more global power anyway. Stephen Walt details those recommended foreign policy changes. Full Article
united states The United States Forgot Its Strategy for Winning Cold Wars By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: May 5, 2020 May 5, 2020Stephen Walt writes that arguments against U.S. offshore balancing misunderstand history. The strategy that worked against the Soviet Union can work against China. Full Article
united states Why is the United States So Bad at Foreign Policy? By www.belfercenter.org Published On :: Jan 13, 2020 Jan 13, 2020Stephen Walt writes that the United States' unusual historical experience, geographic isolation, large domestic market, and general ignorance have weakened its ability to make viable foreign-policy strategies. Full Article
united states Who said what after the United States Grand Prix By en.espnf1.com Published On :: Mon, 19 Nov 2012 01:15:54 GMT Read what the teams and drivers had to say after the United States Grand Prix Full Article
united states The United States Is Getting Infected With Dictatorship By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Apr 13, 2020 Apr 13, 2020The coronavirus pandemic has provided an opening for Donald Trump to attack transparency, voting rights, and accountability. Full Article
united states Why is the United States So Bad at Foreign Policy? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Jan 13, 2020 Jan 13, 2020Stephen Walt writes that the United States' unusual historical experience, geographic isolation, large domestic market, and general ignorance have weakened its ability to make viable foreign-policy strategies. Full Article
united states Why is the United States So Bad at Foreign Policy? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Jan 13, 2020 Jan 13, 2020Stephen Walt writes that the United States' unusual historical experience, geographic isolation, large domestic market, and general ignorance have weakened its ability to make viable foreign-policy strategies. Full Article
united states The United States Is Getting Infected With Dictatorship By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Apr 13, 2020 Apr 13, 2020The coronavirus pandemic has provided an opening for Donald Trump to attack transparency, voting rights, and accountability. Full Article
united states The United States Forgot Its Strategy for Winning Cold Wars By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: May 5, 2020 May 5, 2020Stephen Walt writes that arguments against U.S. offshore balancing misunderstand history. The strategy that worked against the Soviet Union can work against China. Full Article
united states The United States Forgot Its Strategy for Winning Cold Wars By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: May 5, 2020 May 5, 2020Stephen Walt writes that arguments against U.S. offshore balancing misunderstand history. The strategy that worked against the Soviet Union can work against China. Full Article
united states Why is the United States So Bad at Foreign Policy? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Jan 13, 2020 Jan 13, 2020Stephen Walt writes that the United States' unusual historical experience, geographic isolation, large domestic market, and general ignorance have weakened its ability to make viable foreign-policy strategies. Full Article
united states The United States Forgot Its Strategy for Winning Cold Wars By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: May 5, 2020 May 5, 2020Stephen Walt writes that arguments against U.S. offshore balancing misunderstand history. The strategy that worked against the Soviet Union can work against China. Full Article
united states Taiwan’s January 2020 elections: Prospects and implications for China and the United States By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: EXECutive Summary Taiwan will hold its presidential and legislative elections on January 11, 2020. The incumbent president, Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), appears increasingly likely to prevail over her main challenger, Han Kuo-yu of the Kuomintang (KMT). In the legislative campaign, the DPP now has better than even odds to retain its… Full Article
united states Getting better: The United States and the Panama Summit of the Americas By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 14 Apr 2015 16:45:00 -0400 At the previous Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia in April 2012, President Barack Obama was badly roughed up by his Latin American counterparts (and embarrassed by his Secret Service for entertaining sex workers). Happily, the president and his entourage did much better at last week’s Summit in Panama, but the United States still has a way to go before the Summits once again become the productive vehicle for U.S. foreign policy that they once were, at their founding in Miami in 1994. In Cartagena, leader after leader criticized the United States for allegedly heavy-handed counter-narcotics policies; oppressive treatment of immigrants; a weak response to crime and poverty in Central America; and monetary policies that supposedly harmed their economies. Most pointedly, speakers denounced the decades-old economic sanctions against Cuba. But given the upcoming Congressional elections, Obama and his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton did not want to do anything to endanger their Democratic Party’s chances. Obama was reduced to affirming, uncharacteristically, “I am here to listen, but our policies will not change.” Once the November 2012 mid-term elections were over, policies did, in fact, change as the United States took a more relaxed approach to counternarcotics; the administration announced immigration policy reforms, including negotiating agreements with Central American nations to reduce the outflow of children and promote economic growth and jobs at home; and Vice President Joseph Biden met repeatedly with Central American leaders, and offered $1 billion in economic and security assistance. In Cartagena, the Latin Americans threatened to boycott the Panama Summit if Cuba was not invited. But last December 17, President Obama and Cuban President Raúl Castro announced their agreement to negotiate the normalization of diplomatic relations, and in one blow, the United States transformed a thorn in relations with Latin America into a triumph of inter-American diplomacy that significantly enhanced U.S. prestige in the region. So in Panama, most of the Latin American and Caribbean leaders, rather than berate the U.S. president, praised him for his courage and generally treated him with courtesy and respect. The three leaders of Central America’s Northern Tier (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador—whose president is a former guerrilla commander) were effusive in their praise. The president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, who in Cartagena had sharply criticized U.S. monetary policies and had cancelled a visit to the White House to protest NSA spying, was pleased to announce that her visit had been rescheduled for this June. Obama’s own performance was more spirited than it had been in Cartagena. In response to a harsh polemic by Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa, Obama shot back: “The U.S. may be a handy excuse for diverting attention from domestic political problems, but it won’t solve those problems.” After listening politely through Raúl Castro’s extended remarks—during which Castro praised him as a man of honesty and authenticity—Obama departed to avoid having to sit through the predictable harangues of Argentine President Cristina Kirchner and Bolivian leader Evo Morales. Few could blame him. At the parallel CEO Summit of business executives, Obama delivered thoughtful responses to questions posed by several entrepreneurs including Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg, distinguishing himself from the facile rhetorical answers of the other presidents on the panel. At a Civil Society Forum where delegates affiliated with Cuban government organizations engaged in disruptive tactics, Obama lectured firmly on the virtues of civility and tolerance. Together with two other presidents (Tabaré Vasquez of Uruguay and Guillermo Solis of Costa Rica), Obama met privately with a dozen leaders of nongovernmental organizations, took notes, and incorporated at least one of their suggestions into his later public remarks. But Obama’s Panama experience was marred by an inexplicable misstep by his White House aides a month earlier—the very public sanctioning of seven Venezuelan officials for alleged human rights violation and corruption, and the declaration that Venezuela was a “threat to U.S. national security.” To Latin American ears, that language recalled Cold War-era justifications for CIA plots and military coups. The State Department claims it warned the White House against Latin American blowback, but perhaps not forcefully enough. Once Latin American anger become apparent, the White House tried to walk the “national security” language back, saying it was just a formality required by U.S. legislation, but the damage was done. Speaker after speaker condemned the “unilateral sanctions” and called for their repeal. The ill-timed sanctions announcement provided Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his populist allies with a ready stick to beat the United States. For whileObama’s diplomacy had managed to peel off most of the Central Americans and win over or at least diminish the antagonism of other leaders, it had not found a way to tranquilize the rejectionist states (Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Argentina) tied to Venezuela in an “anti-imperialist” alliance. Although a relatively small minority, these spoilers seriously disrupt plenary meetings with long and vituperative monologues, and small minorities of “veto” players can block the signing of otherwise consensus documents such that in Panama, as in Cartagena, no consensus declaration was issued; rather the host leader signed brief “mandates for action” that lacked full legitimacy. The problem of the rejectionist minority will be partially alleviated when Kirchner is shortly replaced, likely by a more moderate government in Argentina, and political turnover will eventually come in Venezuela, but the hemisphere needs new rules that protect majority rights to get things done. Some simple procedural innovations, such as a more forceful chair, or even the simple system of red-yellow-green lights that alert speakers to their time limits, would help. Notwithstanding the misstep on Venezuela sanctions and the disruptive tactics of the rejectionist minority, the overall mood in Panama was upbeat, even celebratory. Leaders made reference to the xenophobic violence and religious intolerance plaguing other continents, and remarked with some pride that, in comparison, Latin America was a zone of peace that was also making progress, however inadequate, on human rights, poverty alleviation, and clean energy. With some procedural fixes, favorable political winds, and continued progress on concrete issues of mutual interest, inter-American relations could well continue their upward trajectory. Read more about the Summit with Richard Feinberg's post on Cuba's multi-level strategy at the Seventh Summit of the Americas. Authors Richard E. Feinberg Full Article
united states (Un?)Happiness and Gasoline Prices in the United States By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 19 Oct 2010 16:08:00 -0400 Gasoline purchases are an essential part of the American way of life. There were about 250 million motor vehicles in the United States in 2008 – just under a vehicle per person. Americans drive an average of more than 11,000 miles per year and gasoline purchases are an essential part of most households’ budgets. Between 1995 and 2003, gasoline prices in the U.S. averaged about $1.49 a gallon, with average prices rising above $2.00 in 2004. By the summer of 2008, gasoline prices had reached a national average of $4.11 per gallon. At that time, Americans earning less than $15,000 a year were spending as much as 15 percent of their household income on gasoline – double the proportion from seven years earlier. In addition, unpredictable fuel costs make planning monthly household expenditures difficult, which can be detrimental to individual welfare and even to the overall economy. Gasoline prices fell in the aftermath of the 2009 economic crisis. Prior and during the financial crisis, rising gasoline prices were seen as a symptom of an uncertain economic situation, as well as evidence of the questionable sustainability of our future oil supply. Gasoline prices abated along with the decrease of economic activity that accompanied the onset of the recession, reaching their minimum in late December 2008. A few months later, as the economy entered a gradual recovery phase, gasoline prices also trended upward. In contrast to the previous period of great uncertainty about future oil supplies, however, these price trends were considered more positively as signs of the U.S. economic recovery. Downloads Read the full report Authors Soumya ChattopadhyayJames CoanCarol GrahamAmy Myers JaffeKenneth Medlock III Full Article
united states Is the United States positioned to lead in the Arctic? By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 24 Apr 2015 10:30:00 -0400 As the United States readies to assume chairmanship of the Arctic Council today, it is timely to assess where the United States stands in terms of its ability and commitment to lead in the region. While there are many important elements of Arctic leadership outlined in the U.S. National Arctic Strategy, the ultimate metric of state leadership comes not from policy alone but also willingness to commit the resources needed to advance national interests and shape favorable global norms for peace, stability, and responsibility. In this context, the United States has yet to demonstrate a strong commitment to 21st century Arctic leadership. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the decaying state of the U.S. heavy icebreaking “fleet”—currently consisting of just one operational heavy icebreaker—and the lack of a credible national strategy to expand, much less sustain, this capacity. Although the Arctic Council framework focuses specifically on shared, non-military interests, it would be a mistake to assume the region will be immune from future incidents, whether from eventual increases in tourism and shipping, energy development, or even limited geopolitical conflict. The United States must sustain heavy icebreaking capability to assure year-round access to the region and to be ready to respond in the event of a safety, security, or environmental threat. Commercial activity in the Arctic While commercial activity in the Arctic remains limited today, signs of increased economic investment are on the rise, including Royal Dutch Shell’s announcement of intent to resume Arctic drilling later this year and Crystal Cruises’ planned 2016 traverse of the Northwest Passage with its 820 foot, 1,000 passenger cruise ship Crystal Serenity. The Arctic’s vast untapped resources and opening sea lanes are beginning to drive previously-unheard of levels of human activity. Some have suggested companies like Shell can and will invest in their own icebreaking and emergency response capabilities for Arctic drilling, rendering a U.S. government asset superfluous. This is a shortsighted view that fails to recognize the fundamental risks associated with abdicating prevention and response capabilities solely to the private sector. While a single icebreaker obviously has neither the capacity nor capability to clean up a large oil spill in the Arctic, or anywhere else for that matter, in certain scenarios it could help prevent a spill from happening in the first place, mitigate the severity of a spill, and provide a means to ensure on-scene government oversight and command of any incident. In the case of Arctic tourism, it is important to recognize that a mass rescue operation involving hundreds of passengers on a cruise ship—already one of the most difficult scenarios for search and rescue professionals—becomes exponentially more difficult in the remote and harsh Arctic environment. Finally, although unlikely in the near-term, a future scenario can also be envisioned in which U.S. Navy surface ships need access to the Arctic, and icebreaking capacity is necessary to execute the mission. This is perhaps a distant possibility in the context of today’s Arctic but is a contingency for which the nation should be prepared in the future. Access to the polar regions The Coast Guard’s nearly 40-year old and recently reactivated Polar Star is the only U.S. icebreaker with the size and horsepower to provide unfettered access to the polar regions. The reactivation of this vessel, built in the 1970s, cost nearly $60 million and is estimated to have extended its lifetime by only 7 to 10 years. This presents a difficult and unique challenge in an emergency; if for example, the aging Polar Star has a machinery failure and gets stuck in the ice, the United States does not have the means to extract it and may have to resort to assistance from a foreign country. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Paul Zukunft recently put it bluntly, saying the Coast Guard “has no self-rescue for its Arctic mission, for its Antarctic mission." While dozens of small and medium sized icebreakers operate successfully in other parts of the world, heavy icebreakers—generally classified as those that exceed 45,000 horsepower—are needed to assure unrestricted access to the Arctic at any time of the year. Additionally, for the United States, heavy icebreaking capacity is also needed for missions like the annual resupply of McMurdo Station in Antarctica, an operation sponsored by the National Science Foundation and executed by the Coast Guard. Sustaining the capability to access any region of the globe has been a fundamental tenet of U.S. national security policy for decades, and the Arctic should be no exception. The United States is falling behind other Arctic nations, like Russia, that have demonstrated an enduring commitment to maintaining access to the Arctic with heavy icebreakers. These investments may be considered consistent with the size of Russia’s Arctic coastline and associated Exclusive Economic Zone, both of which are substantially larger than those of the United States or any other Arctic Nation. Indeed, there is certainly room to debate how many heavy icebreakers the United States will ultimately need in the future. A 2011 Coast Guard study concluded that meeting the tenets of the 2010 Naval Operations Concept—which calls for constant, year-round presence in both polar regions—would require six heavy and four medium icebreakers. Likewise, the study indicated three heavy and three medium icebreakers are needed for Arctic presence. Putting the debate in perspective, the Obama administration’s special representative for the Arctic, retired Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Robert Papp, recently gave a keynote address at the Brookings Institution stressing that “we should at least build one,” acknowledging the critical state of U.S. capability. Replacing the Polar Star presents a unique challenge. Such vessels have not been built in four decades in the United States, and most estimates suggest a 10-year, $1 billion program to build just one in a U.S. shipyard under the federal government’s arduous acquisitions process. This places delivery of a new heavy icebreaker beyond the Polar Star’s remaining service life and adds to the urgency of the current situation. U.S. engagement in the Arctic In short, the United States must have the ability to access and engage in the polar regions on its own terms. No entity is better positioned to fulfill this national security imperative than the United States Coast Guard, which has the authority and organizational ethos to advance high latitude safety, security, and environmental interests without a corresponding threat of excessive militarization. The Coast Guard also remains one of few governmental entities capable of collaborative engagement with the Russians, built on years of maritime cooperation with their border guard. While the case for icebreaker investment is clear, the Coast Guard lacks the resources to move forward on its own. For the Coast Guard, a new icebreaker is at best a distant runner-up to other recapitalization imperatives within the chronically underfunded service. The Coast Guard’s Medium Endurance Cutters are the cornerstone of the service’s offshore presence in the Western Hemisphere and are even older than the icebreakers. Replacing these 1960s-era cutters is justifiably the service’s top acquisition priority. The question here is not whether the Coast Guard wants new icebreaking capability, but rather how a new icebreaker stacks up against other, more urgent priorities in the context of current budget constraints. The most appropriate funding solution is one that reflects the full breadth of inherently governmental interests in the Arctic, including safety, security, environmental protection, facilitation of maritime commerce and responsible economic development, national defense, and scientific research. In other words: funding from across the government to deliver a national, multi-mission asset. The United States is considered an “Arctic Nation,” a term proudly used by policymakers to highlight our intrinsic national interests in the region and a profoundly basic yet important acknowledgement that Alaska and its associated territory above the Arctic Circle are indeed part of the United States. Unfortunately, the United States has yet to advance from this most basic construct of high latitude stakeholder to a proactive leadership and investment posture for the future. Not because of a lack of “skin in the game,” the United States has a legacy of well-documented interests in the Arctic, but a lack of consensus to make it a national priority in the context of the current budget environment. Whether via national crisis or a comprehensive budget deal, polar icebreakers must eventually become the subject of serious resource discussions, and should ultimately garner broad bipartisan support. At that time, additional funding should be appropriated to the Coast Guard to support the acquisition of the much-needed heavy icebreakers, but not at the expense of its other, more pressing recapitalization programs. Until then, let’s be more realistic about our ability and commitment to lead in the Arctic. Authors Jason TamaHeather GreenleyDavid Barata Image Source: © STR New / Reuters Full Article
united states Redistricting and the United States Constitution By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 22 Mar 2011 00:00:00 -0400 Thomas Mann joins Sean O’Brien and Nate Persily on the Diane Rehm Show to examine what the U.S. Constitution says about drawing congressional and legislative districts and how court decisions have further shaped those guidelines. DIANE REHM: Thanks for joining, us I'm Diane Rehm. The framers of the U.S. Constitution did not use the word district when they outlined how Congressional representatives would be chosen. Article 1, Section 2 of the document states only how to choose the number of lawmakers. Today, the redistricting process has become at times contentious and blatantly partisan. As part of our "Constitution Today" series, we look at what the document says about the process of redistricting and how court cases have furthered shaped those guidelines. Joining me here in the studio are Sean O'Brien of the Center for the Constitution at James Madison's Montpelier, Thomas Mann of the Brookings Institution and joining us from Columbia Law School where he is The Beekman Professor of Law and Political Science, is Nate Persily. Throughout the hour, we'll welcome your calls, questions, 800-433-8850. Send us your e-mail to drshow@wamu.org. Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for joining me. SEAN O'BRIEN: Good morning. THOMAS MANN: Good morning. NATE PERSILY: Good morning. REHM: Sean O'Brien, let me start with you. What does the constitution actually say about legislative districts and I'm glad that you have a copy of the constitution right in front of you, good. Nate Persily has his as well. O'BRIEN: As you indicated in the opening it's very, very vague, as are many things in the constitution, and we have to figure out how to implement what this constitution says. Really what they did initially was set up the initial representation and came up with the number of representatives that each state would have before they knew how many people lived there and set up a minimum number of representatives that each state could have and the maximum size, which they could be. And so they basically -- it just says here the actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States and within every subsequent term of 10 years, in a manner as they shall by law direct. The number of representatives shall not exceed one for every 30,000, but each state shall have at least one representative. And until such enumeration shall be made and then they lay out which states get how many members of Congress in the first Congress. And that gets into an interesting story that Tom and I were talking about out in the lobby, but again, it's pretty open and that's why we have a lot of opportunities to continue to talk about this issue right now. REHM: All right. And turning to you, Nate Persily, when did the word district first come into play? PERSILY: Well, for hundreds of years now, we've had districts, but as Sean said, there's no constitutional requirement that we have it. We have since the Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s abided by a rule of population equality for congressional and other districts and are drawn but Congress then has passed statutes, various apportionment statutes over time that have required single member districts and the one that currently exists today is about 90 years old. REHM: Ninety years old? Tom Mann. MANN: It's important to remember the other provision of the constitution that is relevant here is Article 1, Section 4, the times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof. So it was the states that were given the authority to decide how those representatives would be elected. They could have set up a proportional representation system, everyone running at large statewide in which case redistricting would never have arisen as a problem. Listen to the interview or read the full transcript at thedianerehmshow.org » Authors Thomas E. MannSean O'BrienNate Persily Publication: The Diane Rehm Show Image Source: © Jonathan Ernst / Reuters Full Article
united states Australia and the United States: Navigating strategic uncertainty By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 13 Jul 2016 20:21:18 +0000 In these times of growing uncertainty in the global and Asian strategic environments, the U.S.-Australian security alliance seems a pillar of stability. Even so, it requires a reality check if it is to stay resilient and durable in the difficult times ahead. Taking an Australian perspective, this brief report sheds some light on these key… Full Article
united states 2004 CUSE Annual Conference: The United States and Europe One Year After the War in Iraq By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 21 Apr 2004 08:30:00 -0400 Event Information April 21, 20048:30 AM - 3:00 PM EDTFalk AuditoriumBrookings Institution1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.Washington, DC 20036 Register for the EventTo build on its longstanding interest in the evolving transatlantic relationship and to address the serious differences that have emerged between America and Europe after the September 11 terrorist attacks and throughout the ongoing war on terrorism, Brookings announces the launch of its new Center on the United States and Europe. The center offers a forum for research, high-level dialogue, and public debate on issues affecting U.S.-Europe relations.At the inaugural conference to launch the new center, experts discussed the theme "The United States and Europe: One Year after the War in Iraq." Panelists at this special event included Javier Solana, Robert Kagan, Charles Grant, Klaus Scharioth, Andrew Moravcsik, Martin Indyk, Ulrike Guerot, Pascale Andreani, Cesare Merlini, Reuel Marc Gerecht, Gilles Andreani and others. Transcript Transcript (.pdf) Event Materials cuse20040421 Full Article
united states 2008 CUSE Annual Conference: The Evolving Roles of the United States and Europe By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 20 May 2008 09:00:00 -0400 Event Information May 20, 20089:00 AM - 5:00 PM EDTFalk AuditoriumThe Brookings Institution1775 Massachusetts Ave., NWWashington, DC On May 20, 2008, the Center on the United States and Europe held its fifth annual conference. As is in previous years, the Conference brought together leading scholars, officials, and policymakers from both sides of the Atlantic to examine issues shaping the transatlantic relationship and to assess the evolving roles of the United States and Europe in the global arena.Gary Schmitt of the American Enterprise Institute; Sir Lawrence Freedman of King’s College, London; Gideon Rachman of the Financial Times; former Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Petersen; and Strobe Talbott, President of The Brookings Institution joined other prominent panelists and CUSE scholars for this year’s sessions. The series of panel discussions explored transatlantic relations beyond the Bush presidency, Sarkozy’s plans for France’s EU presidency, and the future of Russia under Medvedev. Transcript Transcript (.pdf) Event Materials 0520_europe Full Article
united states Korea, Colombia, Panama: Pending Trade Accords Offer Economic and Strategic Gains for the United States By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 27 Jul 2011 16:14:00 -0400 Editor's Note, Oct. 12, 2011: Congress has passed a trio of trade agreements negotiated during the George W. Bush administration and recently submitted by President Obama. The authors of this policy brief say the pacts with South Korea, Colombia and Panama will boost U.S. exports significantly, especially in the key automotive, agricultural and commercial services sectors. Policy Brief #183 A trio of trade agreements now pending before Congress would benefit the United States both economically and strategically. Carefully developed accords with South Korea, Colombia and Panama will boost U.S. exports significantly, especially in the key automotive, agricultural and commercial services sectors. Among the other benefits are: increased U.S. competitiveness enhancement of U.S. diplomatic and economic postures in East Asia and Latin America new investment opportunities better enforcement of labor regulation and improved transparency in these trading partners’ regulatory systems. The pacts are known as Free Trade Agreements, or FTAs. The Korean agreement (KORUS) was negotiated in 2006-2007 and revised in 2010. The Colombian agreement (COL-US, sometimes known as COL-US FTA) was signed in 2006. The agreement with Panama (PFTA, sometimes known as the Panama Trade Promotion Agreement) was signed in 2007. All have the support of the Obama administration. RECOMMENDATIONS The three FTAs will substantially reduce these trading partners’ tariffs on U.S. goods, opening large markets for U.S. commerce and professional services. In combination, they will increase the size of the U.S. economy by about $15 billion. Furthermore, they will help reverse a slide in U.S. market influence in two important and increasingly affluent regions of the globe. Approval of all three agreements is in the national interest. To move forward, both Congress and the administration should take these appropriate steps: Congress should approve the trade agreements with Korea (KORUS), Colombia (COL-US) and Panama (PFTA) without additional delays. To maximize the trade and investment benefits of KORUS, the administration should actively engage in the KORUS working groups, such as the Professional Services Working Group. Similarly, the U.S. Trade Representative should participate in the Joint Committee’s scheduled annual meetings, in order to maintain a highlevel focus on U.S.-Korea trade, drive further trade liberalization and enable the committee to serve as a forum for broader discussions on trade in East Asia. The Colombia-U.S. Joint Committee should include representatives of Colombia’s Trade and Labor Ministers with their US counterparts. The presence of the Labor minister should facilitate progress under the FTA through strengthened labor standards and timely implementation of all elements of the agreed-upon action plan. This Committee and specialized working groups could increase the pace of bilateral interaction and help officials identify important areas for discussion, negotiation and agreement. Panama has ratified the Tax Information and Exchange Agreement which entered into force on April 2011. Panama and the US should strengthen bilateral communication so that collaboration in the battle against money laundering is pushed even further with greater cooperation. Economic Effects of the Korea Agreement The economic benefits to the United States from KORUS are especially significant, as the agreement will provide preferential market access to the world’s 11th largest—and a fast-growing—economy. In 2010, U.S.-Korea trade was worth $88 billion, comprising U.S. exports of $39 billion and imports of $49 billion, making Korea the United States’ seventh largest trading partner. According to the independent, quasi-judicial U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), exports resulting from KORUS will increase the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) by up to $12 billion. This constitutes a remarkable gain in both real and percentage terms. To the United States, KORUS offers diverse economic advantages. Most strikingly, KORUS will open Korea’s service market to U.S. exports, allowing the United States to exploit its competitive advantages in financial services, education and information and communications technologies. The agreement also will lead to increased imports from Korea, which in turn will help the United States achieve greater economic specialization. The likely effects of more specialization—and of increased Korean investment in the United States—include greater U.S. efficiency, productivity, economic growth and job growth. Meanwhile, U.S. investors will gain new opportunities in the increasingly active Asia-Pacific region. Lately, passage of KORUS has assumed enhanced importance with the impasse in the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round. No longer can the United States reasonably anticipate that Doha will lead to improved access to the Korean market. Moreover, an FTA between Korea and the European Union (EU) that took effect July 1st confers preferential access to European exporters, undermining the competitiveness of U.S. businesses in Korea. Even before the European FTA, the United States had been losing valuable ground in Korea. Between 2000 and 2010, the United States fell from first to third in the ranking of Korea’s trading partners (reversing positions with China), as U.S. products declined from 18 to only 9 percent of Korean imports. Failure to approve the agreement can be expected to lead to a further decline. These moves will strongly assist U.S. producers of electronic equipment, metals, agricultural products, autos and other consumer goods. For example, agricultural exports are expected to rise $1.8 billion per year. On the services front, KORUS will increase U.S. businesses’ access to Korea’s $560 billion services market. Financial services providers, the insurance industry and transportation firms stand to benefit substantially. KORUS usefully builds on the link between investment and services by improving the ability of U.S. law firms to establish offices in Korea. In addition, the agreement establishes a Professional Services Working Group that will address the interests of U.S. providers of legal, accounting and engineering services, provided that U.S. representatives engage actively in the group. KORUS also requires that regulations affecting services be developed transparently and that the business community be informed of their development and have an opportunity to provide comments, which the Korean government must answer. On the investment front, KORUS affords a chance to strengthen a bilateral investment relationship that probably is underdeveloped. In 2009, the U.S. foreign direct investment flow to Korea was $3.4 billion, while there was a net outflow of Korean foreign direct investment to the United States of $255 million. KORUS supports market access for U.S. investors with investment protection provisions, strong intellectual property protection, dispute settlement provisions, a requirement for transparently developed and implemented investment regulations and a similar requirement for open, fair and impartial judicial proceedings. All this should markedly improve the Korean investment climate for U.S. business. It will strengthen the rule of law, reducing uncertainty and the risk of investing in Korea. On the governance side, KORUS establishes various committees to monitor implementation of the agreement. The most significant of these is the Joint Committee that is to meet annually at the level of the U.S. Trade Representative and Korea’s Trade Minister to discuss not only implementation but also ways to expand trade further. KORUS establishes committees to oversee the goods and financial services commitments, among others, and working groups that will seek to increase cooperation between U.S. and Korean agencies responsible for regulating the automotive sector and professional services. These committees and working groups, enriched through regular interaction between U.S. and Korean trade officials, should increase levels of trust and understanding of each county’s regulatory systems and help officials identify opportunities to deepen the bilateral economic relationship. Strategic Effects of the Korea Agreement Congressional passage of KORUS will send an important signal to all countries in the Asia-Pacific region that the United States intends to remain economically engaged with them, rather than retreat behind a wall of trade barriers, and is prepared to lead development of the rules and norms governing trade and investment in the region. KORUS will provide an important economic complement to the strong, historically rooted U.S. military alliance with Korea. It also will signal a renewed commitment by the United States in shaping Asia’s economic architecture. The last decade has seen declining U.S. economic significance in Asia. Just as the United States has slipped from first to third in its ranking as a trading partner of Korea, similar drops are occurring with respect to Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia and other Asia-Pacific economic powers. In all of Northeast and Southeast Asia, the United States has only one FTA in effect, an accord with the Republic of Singapore. Passage of KORUS now would be particularly timely, both as a sign of U.S. engagement with Asia and as a mechanism for ensuring robust growth in U.S.-Asia trade and investment. To illustrate how KORUS might affect U.S. interests throughout the region, consider regulatory transparency. The KORUS transparency requirements could serve as a model for how countries can set and implement standards. They might for example, influence the unfolding Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, talks that could set the stage for a broader Asia-Pacific FTA. U.S. producers, investors and providers of commercial and professional services could only benefit from a regional trend toward greater transparency and the lifting of barriers that would ensue. Other KORUS provisions favorable to the United States could function as similar benchmarks in the development of U.S. relations with Asia-Pacific nations and organizations. Effects of the Colombia Agreement COL-US will also strengthen relations with a key regional ally and open a foreign market to a variety of U.S. products. Bilateral trade between Colombia and the United States was worth almost $28 billion in 2010. COL-US is expected to expand U.S. GDP by approximately $2.5 billion, which includes an increase in U.S. exports of $1.1 billion and an increase of imports from Colombia of $487 million. COL-US offers four major advantages: It redresses the current imbalance in tariffs. Ninety percent of goods from Colombia now enter the United States duty-free (under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act). COL-US will eliminate 77 percent of Colombia’s tariffs immediately and the remainder over the following 10 years. It guarantees a more stable legal framework for doing business in Colombia. This should lead to bilateral investment growth, trade stimulation and job creation. It supports U.S. goals of helping Colombia reduce cocaine production by creating alternative economic opportunities for farmers. It addresses the loss of U.S. competitiveness in Colombia, in the wake of Colombian FTAs with Canada and the EU as well as Latin American sub-regional FTAs. With respect to trade in goods, U.S. chemical, rubber and plastics producers will be key beneficiaries of COL-US, with an expected annual increase in exports in this combined sector of 23 percent, to $1.9 billion, relative to a 2007 baseline according to the ITC. The motor vehicles and parts sector is expected to see an increase of more than 40 percent. In the agriculture sector, rice exports are expected to increase from a 2007 baseline of $2 million to approximately $14 million (the corresponding increases would be 20 percent for cereal grains and 11 percent for wheat). These and other gains will result from the gradual elimination of tariffs and from provisions that reduce non-tariff barriers as well. Among the latter, the most important changes would be increased transparency and efficiency in Colombia’s customs procedures and the removal of some sanitary and phytosanitary (or plant quarantine) restrictions. With respect to trade in services, Colombia has agreed to a number of so-called "WTO-plus" commitments that will expand U.S. firms’ access to Colombia’s $166 billion services market. For instance, the current requirement that U.S. firms hire Colombian nationals will be eliminated, and many restrictions on the financial sector will be removed. On the investment front, the potential advantages to the United States also are substantial. In 2009, the U.S. flow of foreign direct investment into Colombia was $1.2 billion, which amounted to 32 percent of that nation’s total inflows. COL-US improves the investment climate in Colombia by providing investor protections, access to international arbitration and improved transparency in the country’s legislative and regulatory processes. These provisions will reduce investment risk and uncertainty. COL-US presents significant improvements in the transparency of Colombia’s rule-making process, including opportunities for interested parties to have their views heard. COL-US also requires that Colombia’s judicial system conform with the rule of law for enforcing bilateral commitments, such as those relating to the protection of intellectual property. In addition to access to international arbitration for investors, COL-US includes dispute settlement mechanisms that the two governments can invoke to enforce each other’s commitments. Taken as a whole, these provisions offer an important benchmark for further developments in Colombia’s business environment. The transparency requirement alone could reduce corruption dramatically. Labor rights have been a stumbling block to congressional approval of COL-US. The labor chapter of the agreement guarantees the enforcement of existing labor regulations, the protection of core internationally recognized labor rights, and clear access to labor tribunals or courts. In addition, in April 2011, Colombia agreed to an Action Plan strengthening labor rights and the protection of those who defend them. In the few months the plan has been in effect, Colombia has made important progress in implementation. It has reestablished a separate and fully equipped Labor Ministry to help protect labor rights and monitor employer-worker relations. It has enacted legislation authorizing criminal prosecutions of employers who undermine the right to organize or bargain collectively. It has partly eliminated a protection program backlog, involving risk assessments. And, it has hired more labor inspectors and judicial police investigators. Besides economic benefits, COL-US offers sizable strategic benefits. It would fortify relations with an important ally in the region by renewing the commitment to the joint struggle against cocaine production and trade. Under the agreement, small and medium-sized enterprises in labor-intensive Colombian industries like textiles and apparel would gain permanent access to the U.S. consumer market. With considerable investments, Colombia would be able to compete with East Asia for these higher quality jobs, swaying people away from black markets and other illicit activities. While Congress deliberates, the clock is ticking. Colombia is also looking at other countries as potential trade and investment partners in order to build its still underdeveloped infrastructure and reduce unemployment. Complementing its FTAs with Canada, the EU, and several countries in the region, Colombia has initiated formal trade negotiations with South Korea and Turkey and is moving toward negotiations with Japan. A perhaps more telling development is China’s interest in building an inter-oceanic railroad in Colombia as an alternative to the Panama Canal: on July 11th President Juan Manuel Santos signed a bilateral investment treaty with China (and the UK) and is expected to meet Chinese President Hu Jintao in the fall. Effects of the Panama Agreement Although Panama’s economy is far smaller than Korea’s or even Colombia’s, the PFTA will deliver important economic and strategic benefits to the United States. Considerable gains will take place in U.S. agriculture and auto manufacturing. Moreover, the PFTA will strengthen the U.S. presence in the region, allowing for the stronger promotion of democratic institutions and market-based economies. U.S. merchandise exports to Panama topped $2.2 billion in 2009. The PFTA’s elimination of tariffs and reduction in non-tariff barriers will cause this figure to grow. For example, rice exports are expected to increase by 145 percent, pork exports by 96 percent and beef exports by 74 percent, according to the ITC. Exports of vehicles are expected to increase by 43 percent. The PFTA also guarantees access to Panama’s $21 billion services market for U.S. firms offering portfolio management, insurance, telecommunications, computer, distribution, express delivery, energy, environmental, legal and other professional services. Panama’s trade-to-GDP ratio in 2009 was 1.39, highlighting the preponderance of trade in Panama’s economy and the international orientation of many of its sectors. Following passage of the PFTA, Panama will eliminate more than 87 percent of tariffs on U.S. exports immediately. The remaining tariffs will be removed within 10 years for U.S. manufactured goods and 15 years for agricultural and animal products. PFTA protections to investors—similar to protections accorded under KORUS and COL-US—are especially valuable, as Panama receives substantial investments associated with sectors that will benefit from both from the expansion of the canal and from other infrastructure projects. A fair legal framework, investor protections and a dispute settlement mechanism, all features of the PFTA, are almost certain to increase U.S. investments in Panama. Panama’s Legislature also recently approved a Tax Information Exchange Agreement with the United States and amended current laws to foster tax transparency and strengthen intellectual property rights. These are crucial steps in preventing the use of Panamanian jurisdiction as a haven for money laundering activities. Panamanian laws and regulations prohibiting strikes or collective bargaining were a concern that initially delayed implementation of the PFTA. But, these laws have been changed, with the exception of a requirement that 40 workers (not the recommended 20) are needed to form a union; the 40-worker requirement has been kept partly because labor groups in Panama support it. The PFTA’s labor chapter protects the rights and principles outlined in the International Labor Organization’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Besides offering economic advantages to the United States, the PFTA is a strategic agreement. Strengthening economic links with Panama should bolster the U.S. capacity to address cocaine trafficking in the region, in light of Panama’s location as Colombia’s gateway to North America. The importance of the canal, now undergoing an expansion that will double its shipping capacity, further underscores the U.S. need to strengthen bilateral relations with Panama. The time to act is now. Like Colombia, Panama has been negotiating with economic powerhouses other than the United States. It recently signed a trade agreement with Canada and an Association Agreement with the EU. Delaying passage of the PFTA would generate a loss of market share for a variety of sectors of the U.S. economy. Conclusion All three FTAs encourage trade by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers. All the agreements provide access to large services markets, foster transparency and offer significant strategic advantages to the United States. Congress should approve each of them now. The authors would like to thank Juan Pablo Candela for his assistance with this project. Downloads Download Policy Brief Authors Mauricio CárdenasJoshua P. Meltzer Full Article
united states Walk the line: The United States between Israel and the Palestinians By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 26 May 2016 13:30:00 -0400 In a lively and wide-ranging debate that aired earlier this month on Al Jazeera English, Brookings Executive Vice President Martin Indyk sparred with Head to Head presenter Mehdi Hasan about American efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the United States’ relationship with Israel. Indyk began by stressing that American support for Israel is what gives the United States an influential role in the peace process and the leverage to encourage Israel to move towards peace. Indyk added that this does not mean that the United States should act as “Israel’s attorney” in the negotiations, and cited a promise he made to Palestinian leaders during the 2013-2014 peace talks led by Secretary of State John Kerry that Washington would not coordinate positions with Israel in advance. Brookings Executive Vice President Martin Indyk in a Head to Head interview with Al Jazeera English's Mehdi Hassan. He pointed out that the United States has traditionally relied on its close relationship with Israel to encourage its leaders to take steps for peace and make offers to the Palestinians, and that no other potential mediator has been able to produce serious offers from Israel. “[The United States is] not neutral, we don't claim to be neutral. We have an alliance with Israel,” Indyk said. “But in order to achieve another interest that we have, which is peace in the region…and a settlement that provides for the legitimate national rights of the Palestinians, we need to be able to influence Israel.” In responding to questions from Hasan and the audience, Indyk explained that he believes that both Israelis and Palestinians had made important concessions for peace, citing Israel’s acceptance of the Clinton Parameters in 2000, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s historic recognition of Israel as part of the Oslo Accords. Indyk also described the dramatic shifts in the way the United States has addressed the Palestinian issue over the past few decades, “from treating it only as a refugee issue and insisting that it be dealt with through Jordan to recognizing Palestinian national rights.” When asked about U.S. support for Israel at the United Nations, Indyk responded that this support is definitely warranted given the history of hostility towards Israel at the UN. However, he added that he personally wouldn’t oppose a carefully-worded resolution condemning Israeli settlements “so that the settlers in Israel understand that [settlement expansion] isn’t cost free.” Indyk rejected the notion that Israel has turned from a U.S. strategic asset in the Middle East into a burden, but explained that “making progress on the Palestinian issue enhances America’s credibility in the region and failing to make progress…hurts America’s credibility in the region.” Indyk concluded the discussion by reiterating his commitment to achieving Israeli-Palestinian peace and emphasizing that he would “never give up on trying to resolve this conflict in a way that meets Palestinian legitimate national aspirations to an independent and viable contiguous state living alongside Israel, a Jewish state, in peace.” Authors Nadav Greenberg Image Source: © Jason Reed / Reuters Full Article
united states The Wall: The real costs of a barrier between the United States and Mexico By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 13:00:25 +0000 The Wall:The real costs of a barrier between the United States and MexicoLeer en EspañolEl MuroTopic:Price tagSmugglingCrimeU.S. EconomyCommunities & EnvironmentAlong the U.S. Mexico near Nogales, Arizona Getty ImagesVanda Felbab-BrownAugust 2017The cheerful paintings of flowers on the tall metal posts on the Tijuana side of the border fence between the U.S. and Mexico belie the sadness of… Full Article
united states Natural gas in the United States in 2016: Problem child and poster child By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000 Over the last few years, the image of natural gas has deteriorated within the United States, particularly within the environmental community. In a new policy brief, Tim Boersma analyzes public sentiment surrounding natural gas production and the important role natural gas can play globally as a stepping stone towards a low-carbon economy. Full Article
united states Natural gas in the United States in 2016 By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 25 Jul 2016 00:00:00 -0400 What do Americans think about U.S. natural gas? The answer depends on who you ask. Presidential candidates, Washington think tank analysts, and ordinary citizens all give widely different answers to that question. In the United States, natural gas is sure to play an important role in the energy mix for the foreseeable future and has yielded several major economic, environmental, and health benefits in the short- and medium-term. Despite this, the image of natural gas has deteriorated in recent years, particularly within the environmental community. In a new policy brief, "Natural gas in the United States in 2016: Problem child and poster child," Tim Boersma discusses the various sentiments surrounding the debate over natural gas, analyzing the data supporting or refuting these varied points of view. Additionally, Boersma discusses the role that natural gas can play as a bridge fuel to a low-carbon economy, outlining a policy and research agenda for the utilization of natural gas going forward. Downloads Natural gas in the United States in 2016 Authors Tim Boersma Full Article
united states The United States and Turkey: Sakip Sabanci Lecture with Philip H. Gordon By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: On March 17, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) hosted Assistant Secretary of State and former Brookings Senior Fellow Philip Gordon for the sixth annual Sakip Sabanci Lecture. In his lecture, Assistant Secretary Gordon offered the Obama administration’s perspective on Turkey, its relations with the United States and the European… Full Article
united states Lord Christopher Patten: The Challenges of Multilateralism for Europe, Turkey and the United States By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: On May 5, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) hosted Lord Christopher Patten for the fifth annual Sakip Sabanci Lecture. In his address, Lord Patten drew on his decades of experience in elected government and international diplomacy to discuss how Turkey, Europe and the United States can realize opportunities for… Full Article
united states Taiwan’s January 2020 elections: Prospects and implications for China and the United States By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: EXECutive Summary Taiwan will hold its presidential and legislative elections on January 11, 2020. The incumbent president, Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), appears increasingly likely to prevail over her main challenger, Han Kuo-yu of the Kuomintang (KMT). In the legislative campaign, the DPP now has better than even odds to retain its… Full Article
united states A Congressional Oversight Office: A proposed early warning system for the United States Congress By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 03 Jun 2016 00:00:00 -0400 A central function of the United States Congress is oversight of the executive branch. Congressional oversight, as exercised from the beginning of the nation, is an essential tool in making the separation of powers real by empowering Congress to check the executive. In recent years, however, as polarization has reached paralyzing levels, Congress has largely gotten out of the business of routine and prospective “police-patrol” oversight. In the absence of the will and the capacity to do prospective oversight, Congress is at risk of losing its power to the executive branch and thus failing one of its most important constitutional roles. This paper assesses whether or not anything can be done to get Congress back into the oversight business. Specifically, author Elaine Kamarck examines the following question: Assuming that future Congresses develop the political will to conduct oversight, do they have the capacity to do oversight of a large, modern, and complex executive branch? As Kamarck illustrates, mismatched resources may make it difficult for Congress to resume its oversight function. The modern federal government is a complex and enormous enterprise. But as the executive branch has grown considerably over the past decades, Congress has adopted budget cuts that make the legislative branch less and less capable of undertaking the kinds of systemic oversight that can solve or prevent problems. Congress employs a mere 17,272 professional staff to oversee an executive branch consisting of 4.2 million civil servants and uniformed military. “The existing infrastructure that is supposed to help Congress be on top of the executive branch has fallen prey to a mindless dumbing down of Congress,” Kamarck states. She details the five entities that are meant to support Congress in its oversight role: committee staff, the Congressional Research Service, the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Inspectors General, all of which are understaffed and under-budgeted. Kamarck recommends the first thing Congress should do to fix its oversight problem is to properly staff the agencies it already has and to stop nickel and diming and degrading its own capacity. Furthermore, Kamarck calls for a “Congressional Oversight Office,” a body charged with evaluating governmental performance before a crisis arises. This office should be staffed by implementation professionals who can gather the signals from all the other oversight organizations annually and in sync with the budget cycle. “Congress needs to get back into the business of productive executive branch oversight,” concludes Kamarck. A Congressional Oversight Office is certainly a step in that direction. Downloads Download the paper Authors Elaine Kamarck Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters Full Article
united states UNITED STATES — The Global Rebalancing and Growth Strategy Debate By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 11 Apr 2011 13:20:00 -0400 Publication: Think Tank 20: Macroeconomic Policy Interdependence and the G-20 Full Article
united states The United States and Nigeria’s struggling democracy By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 27 Apr 2017 14:06:25 +0000 Full Article
united states Retirement Savings in Australia, Asia and Beyond: What are the Lessons for the United States? By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 17 Sep 2013 13:30:00 -0400 Event Information September 17, 20131:30 PM - 4:00 PM EDTSaul and Zilkha RoomsThe Brookings Institution1775 Massachusetts Ave., NWWashington, DC Register for the EventAustralia's mandatory Superannuation Guarantee requires its citizens to save at least 9 percent of their income towards retirement. In many Asian nations, economic growth has spurred reexamination of pension systems to meet the needs of rapidly evolving societies. Would a mandatory savings plan be more effective than the current U.S. voluntary system? How have Asian nations have restructured their pension systems to deal with legacy costs? And what can Americans learn from the way Australia uses both employer and employee representatives to shape investment choices? On September 17, the Retirement Security Project at Brookings and the AARP Public Policy Institute hosted a discussion of what the United States might learn from retirement savings systems in Australia and Asia. Opening speakers included Nick Sherry, who helped shape the Australian system as a cabinet minister and ran a Superannuation fund in the private sector, and Josef Pilger, an advisor on pension reform to both the Malaysian and Hong Kong governments and many industry providers. Steve Utkus, David Harris and Benjamin Harris, retirement experts from both the United States and the United Kingdom, considered how reforms in Australia and Asia can shape the American debate and whether this country should adopt key features from those foreign systems. Audio Retirement Savings in Australia, Asia and Beyond: What are the Lessons for the United States? Transcript Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf) Event Materials 20130917_retirement_savings_transcript Full Article
united states New UK annuity reforms – lessons from the United States By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 24 Feb 2015 00:00:00 -0500 American experience strongly suggests that the coming UK pension freedoms sound better in theory than they will work in practice. After nearly a decade where the UK has been the gold standard for retirement savings policy, it is about to take a step that it may regret. As annuity purchases are not required, very few Americans buy them, feeling that they are spending a great deal of money for a comparatively small monthly income. Even those in traditional DB pension plans usually take a lump sum if they are allowed to do so. As a result, many US retirees spend unwisely, trust the wrong financial advisor, or make other financial mistakes. Many people greatly overestimate how long their savings will last. Most others assume (often wrongly) that they can manage their own money as well as anyone else or that they can live comfortably on Social Security alone. U.S. Social Security pays a benefit that depends on the retirees’ individual income history. The average annual amount is about $13,000 (GBP 8,700). One survey found that in West Virginia, a state with a relatively low average income, 78% of those near retirement and 67% of those at retirement would likely outlive their financial assets. Workers with lower incomes are most at risk. A recent national study found that by the 20th year of retirement, more than 81% of Americans with incomes up to $27,000 would run short of money, as would 38% of those earning up to $42,000, and 19% of those with incomes up to $65,000. Even 8% of those with the highest incomes could not meet their expenses. Advice alone is not likely to help. US experience shows that literally every minute that passes after general advice is given reduces the chance that the consumer will act on it – even when they have decided to do so. And even a significant number of those who consult with a financial planner fail to act on that guidance. What does show promise is income illustration. In a 2014 U.S. survey, 85% of plan participants found estimates of the income they could anticipate from their retirement savings useful, and 35% said that they would save more. Income illustrations change the framing of retirement saving from gross amounts saved to retirement income. Annuity-like products become insurance against running out of money, something Americans are increasingly concerned about. Two other potential developments may help. One is longevity insurance, an annuity that provides income only after a set age. Purchasing a policy defines how long one must make retirement savings last, and the retiree is protected against running out of money. Because longevity insurance is deferred, one can receive higher amounts of monthly income for a lower cost. In 2014, $50,000 would buy $275 a month at age 65 or $1200 a month starting at age 80. Another idea is an automatic enrollment trial annuity. As developed by several Brookings Institution colleagues and me, new retirees would automatically use part of their savings for a two year annuity unless the retiree refused it. The rest of their savings would be available as a lump sum. After the trial period, the annuity would become permanent if they did nothing or they could cancel it and take the rest of their money as a lump sum. The many annuity horror stories from the UK show a definite need for change, but the coming reforms go too far. US experience suggests that too many UK retirees are likely to see their savings exhausted all too quickly. There are alternatives that could do a better job of protecting retirees. Authors David C. John Publication: Age UK Image Source: © Kai Pfaffenbach / Reuters Full Article
united states Paying for success in education: Comparing opportunities in the United States and globally By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 24 Jun 2016 15:00:00 -0400 “This is about governments using data for performance rather than compliance” was a resounding message coming out of the U.S. Department of Education’s conference on June 10 on the use of Pay for Success contracts in education. These contracts, known globally as social impact bonds, continue to be at the forefront of global conversations about results-based financing mechanisms, and have garnered significant momentum this week with passage of the Social Impact Partnerships for Pay for Results Act in the U.S. While limitations certainly exist, their potential to revolutionize the way we fund social projects is tremendous. A social impact bond (SIB) is a set of contracts where a government agency agrees to pay for service outputs or outcomes, rather than funding defined service inputs, and an investor provides upfront risk capital to the service provider. The investor is potentially repaid principal and interest contingent on the achievement of the predetermined outputs or outcomes. In our research on impact bonds at the Center for Universal Education, we have analyzed the use of SIBs for education in the U.S., other high-income countries, and low- and middle-income countries. Practitioners in each of these contexts are having far more similar conversations than they may realize—all are united in their emphasis on using SIBs to build data systems for performance. There is tremendous potential for lessons learned across these experiences and across the broader discussions of results-based financing mechanisms for education globally. Current SIBs for education globally There are currently five SIBs for education worldwide: two in the U.S. for preschool education, one in Portugal for computer science classes in primary school, and one each in Canada and Israel for higher education. In addition, a number of countries have used the SIB model to finance interventions to promote both education and employment outcomes for teens—there are 21 such SIBs in the U.K., three in the Netherlands, and one in Germany. There is also a Development Impact Bond (DIB), where a donor rather than government agency serves as the outcome funder, for girls’ education in India. The Center for Universal Education will host a webinar to present the enrollment and learning outcomes of the first year of the DIB on July 5 (register to join here). U.S. activities to facilitate the use of SIBs for education At the June 10 conference at the Department of Education, the secretary of education and the deputy assistant to the president for education said that they saw the greatest potential contribution of SIBs in helping to scale what works to promote education outcomes and in broadening the array of partners involved in improving the education system. Others pointed out the value of the mechanism to coordinate services based on the needs of each student, rather than a multitude of separately funded services engaging the student individually. In addition to using data to coordinate services for an individual, participants emphasized that SIBs can facilitate a shift away from using data to measure compliance, to using data to provide performance feedback loops. The interest in data for performance rather than compliance is part of a larger shift across the U.S. education sector, represented by the replacement of the strict compliance standards in the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002 with the new federal education funding law, the Every Student Succeeds Act, signed into law in December of 2015. The law allows for federal outcome funding for SIBs in education for the first time, specifically for student support and academic enrichment programs. The recently passed Social Impact Partnerships for Pay for Results Act also allows for outcome funding for education outcomes. The Department of Education conference explored potential applications of SIBs across the education sector, including for early home visiting programs, programs to encourage completion of higher education programs, and career and technical education. The conference also analyzed the potential to use SIBs for programs that support specific disadvantaged populations, such as dual language learners in early education, children of incarcerated individuals, children involved in both the child protection and criminal justice systems, and Native American youth. Overall, there was a focus on areas where the U.S. is spending a great deal on remediation (such as early emergency room visits) and on particular levers to overcome persistent obstacles to student success (such as parent engagement). To help move the sector forward, the Department of Education announced three new competitions for feasibility study funding for early learning broadly, dual language learners in early education, and technical education. The department is also facilitating connections between existing evaluation and data system development efforts and teams designing SIBs. The focus on early childhood development by the Department of Education is reflective of the national field as a whole: Programming in the early years is becoming a particularly fast-growing sector for SIBs in the U.S. with over 40 SIBs feasibility and design stages. SIBs for education in low- and middle-income countries There is only one DIB for education in low- and middle-income countries; however, there are a number of SIBs and DIBs for education in design and prelaunch phases. In particular, the Western Cape Province of South Africa has committed outcome funding for three SIBs across a range of health and development outcomes for children ages 0 to 5. Though the number of impact bonds may be relatively small, a significant amount of work has been done in the last 15 years in results-based financing for education. The U.K. Department for International Development (DfID), the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the Global Partnership for Output-Based Aid, and Cordaid had together funded 24 results-based financing initiatives for education as of 2015. Of particular interest, DfID is funding results-based financing projects through a Girls Education Challenge and the World Bank launched a new trust fund for results-based financing in education in 2015. As with impact bonds in the U.S., a primary aim of results-based financing for education in low- and middle-income countries is to strengthen data and performance systems. Early childhood development programs and technical and vocational and training programs have also been identified as sub-sectors of high potential. Here are a few final takeaways for those working on results-based financing for education in low- and middle-income countries from the U.S. Department of Education conference: The differences between the No Child Left Behind Act and the Every Student Succeeds Act should be analyzed carefully to ensure other data-driven education performance management systems promote both accountability and flexibility. In building data systems through results-based financing, ensure services can be coordinated around the individual, feedback loops are available for providers, and data on early education, child welfare, parent engagement, and criminal justice involvement are also incorporated. There are potential lessons to be learned from the U.S. Department of Education’s effort to conduct more low-cost randomized control trials in education and the U.S. Census Bureau’s data integration efforts. SIBs provide an opportunity to work across agencies or levels of government in education, which could be particularly fruitful in both low- and middle-income countries and the U.S. As the global appetite for results-based financing continues to grow and new social and development impact bonds are implemented throughout the world, we’ll have an opportunity to learn the true potential of such financing models. Authors Emily Gustafsson-WrightSophie Gardiner Full Article
united states Preparing the United States for the superpower marathon with China By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 27 Apr 2020 13:45:50 +0000 Executive summary The U.S. is not prepared for the superpower marathon with China — an economic and technology race likely to last multiple generations. If we are to prevail, we must compete with rather than contain China. While this competition has many dimensions — political, military, diplomatic, and ideological — the crux of the competition… Full Article
united states Saban Forum 2015—Israel and the United States: Yesterday, today, and tomorrow By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 04 Dec 2015 19:45:00 -0500 Event Information December 4-6, 2015Online OnlyLive Webcast On December 4 to 6, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted its 12th annual Saban Forum, titled “Israel and the United States: Yesterday, today, and tomorrow.” The 2015 Saban Forum included webcasts featuring remarks by Israel’s Minister of Defense Moshe Ya’alon, Chairman of the Yesh Atid Party Yair Lapid, National Security Adviser to President George W. Bush Stephen Hadley, Secretary of State John Kerry, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (via video), and former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. The forum’s webcast sessions focused on the future for Israelis and Palestinians, Iran’s role in the Middle East, spillover from the war in Syria, and the global threat posed by the Islamic State and other violent jihadi groups. Over the past twelve years, the Saban Forum has become the premier platform for frank dialogue between American and Israeli leaders from government, civil society, business, and the media. As a result, the Saban Forum is a seminal event, generating new ideas and helping shape the future of the U.S.-Israel relationship. Join the conversation on Twitter using #Saban15 Video A conversation with Moshe Ya’alon, Israel’s minister of defenseHow to restore order in the Middle EastKeynote address: U.S. Secretary of State John KerryAddress by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (via video)Keynote address: Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton Audio Saturday, December 5, 8:00pm - How to preserve Israel as a Jewish and Democratic state Transcript Uncorrected Transcript--Keynote address: Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton (.pdf)Uncorrected Transcript--Address by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (.pdf)Uncorrected Transcript--How to preserve Israel as a Jewish and Democratic state (.pdf)U.S. Department of State Release--Remarks by Secretary of State John Kerry (.pdf)Uncorrected Transcript--How to restore order in the Middle East (.pdf)Uncorrected Transcript--A conversation with Moshe Ya'alon, Israel's minister of defense (.pdf) Event Materials Uncorrected TranscriptKeynote addressFormer Secretary of State Hillary Rodham ClintonUncorrected TranscriptAddress by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin NetanyahuUncorrected TranscriptHow to preserve Israel as a Jewish and Democratic stateUS Department of State ReleaseRemarks by Secretary of State John KerryUncorrected TranscriptHow to restore order in the Middle East 2Uncorrected TranscriptA conversation with Moshe Yaalon Israels minister of defense Full Article
united states The United States can’t save Egypt from itself By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 04 Apr 2016 08:44:00 -0400 Editors’ Note: On March 23, the Working Group on Egypt sent a letter to President Obama urging him to publicly and privately object to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi’s accelerating crackdown on human rights and civil society organizations. Brookings senior fellow and director of the Center for Middle East Policy Tamara Wittes was among the letter’s signers, and she explains her decision to do so. The letter was originally published by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED). Tamara Wittes: In a disordered Middle East, America needs anchors of stability and reliable partners to help it achieve its goals. Both are in sadly short supply. For more than thirty years, Egypt was an anchor of stability and a reliable American partner in regional security. From the time Sadat expelled Soviet advisers and broached peace with Israel, ties with Egypt have been a core pillar of American Middle East policy. But, as my colleague Steven Cook presciently noted way back in February 2012, Egypt’s revolution accelerated the launch of what he calls a “long goodbye” between these two formerly indispensable partners. He argued back then that shifting from a “special relationship” to something more transaction would have four concrete benefits for Washington: First, Washington will no longer be in the unseemly position of providing taxpayer largesse—however small in the grand scheme of things—to a government that resents the United States and clearly does not share its values. Second, it will provide an opportunity for a much-needed change in military-to-military relations in which the United States merely pays for the services it needs like expedited transit through the Suez Canal. Third, it is consistent with this moment of empowerment and dignity for Egyptians many of whom do not want U.S. assistance either because they believe it actually stands in the way of a democratic transition or accept Aboul Naga’s argument along with those who couldn’t care less about U.S. assistance because it doesn’t touch their lives. Finally, it will free up funds for the United States to help others who actually might want Washington’s help, perhaps the Tunisians, Moroccans, or some sub-Saharan African countries would be grateful for development assistance. Since that blog post went up, Egypt has had three different governments and lost its place as a diplomatic and security leader in the region; while the United States has withdrawn from Iraq and begun to do the same in Afghanistan, while emphasizing burden-sharing in its new fight against ISIS. All of these shifts strengthen the argument for a more distant and transactional U.S.-Egyptian relationship. Moreover, since his accession to power (first in a military coup in July 2013 and then in a highly constrained election in 2014), President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has made decisions that are undermining both Egypt’s domestic stability and key American policy goals in the region. Sisi’s failure to move forward on economic reforms (recommended by leading Egyptian voices, regional supporters, and international donors) has left his country in a spiral of shrinking cash reserves, capital flight and currency devaluation that together threaten the government’s ability to import needed food and medicine and to carry out core government functions. Sisi’s counterterrorism campaign in the Sinai has succeeded in “making the sand jump,” as one regional security official told me, but it seems to have stoked more than tamped down the fire of violent extremism threatening both Egypt and Israel; meanwhile, its alleged military abuses have sparked a Senate request for investigation. The intense political polarization and relentless repression of post-coup Egypt are producing other destabilizing effects, which are detailed in the Egypt Working Group’s newest letter to President Obama posted below (I am a member of the Working Group). To top it all off, the Egyptian government continues to throw obstacles in the road of U.S.-Egyptian cooperation. Its military resists learning from the hard-won American experience in effective counterinsurgency. Its leadership has resolutely refused to allow core bilateral aid programs, like those supporting higher education, to move forward. And at the same time, the Egyptian government continues to promote conspiracy theories about the United States to its public through media smears and show trials, and now, apparently, to its newly elected parliamentarians. It’s long past time for the United States to undertake a strategic review of its approach to the Middle East, one focused on building anchors of stability and sustaining reliable partners in pursuit of American priorities. Egypt, as I told The New York Times, no longer qualifies as either one. That doesn’t mean the two countries can’t continue to work together in those narrow areas where they agree on interests, priorities, and approaches. But Secretary of State Kerry’s public embrace last week of Egyptian Foreign Minister Shoukry cannot hide the facts—there is no “back to business” option for the U.S.-Egyptian relationship, and it seems increasingly clear that even direct White House engagement would not shift Egypt’s leadership off of its self-destructive trajectory. Egypt's looming instability demands that the United States take steps now to safeguard itself from reliance on a country we cannot rescue, not least from its own leaders' worst impulses. March 23, 2016 Dear Mr. President, We are writing to urge you to speak directly with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi and to express both publicly and privately your objection to his accelerating crackdown on human rights, including recent moves to prosecute civil society organizations. You were correct to declare in September 2014 that “America’s support for civil society is a matter of national security,” and nowhere is that more true than in Egypt today. President el-Sissi’s campaign against civil society takes place against the backdrop of unprecedented abuses by Egyptian security forces, including extrajudicial killings, the detention of tens of thousands of political prisoners, the widespread documented use of torture, and the forced disappearances of hundreds of Egyptians. The killing of Italian student Giulio Regeni, whose tortured body appeared on a roadside near Cairo a week after his abduction in late January, has come to international attention, but many Egyptians have shared his fate since President el-Sissi came to power. On March 24, an Egyptian court will hear a request to freeze the bank accounts and other assets of two internationally-respected human rights defenders, Hossam Bahgat and Gamal Eid, along with members of Eid’s family. Mr. Bahgat and Mr. Eid and other activists may soon be indicted and face trial for illegally accepting foreign funding—a criminal charge that violates their right to free association and could carry a sentence of up to 25 years in prison. The imminent proceedings are a major step in Egyptian authorities’ campaign to crush the last remnants of Egypt’s independent civil society and human rights community. Egypt’s media has recently reported that dozens of organizations are under criminal investigation, essentially for their peaceful work to monitor abuses and to hold Egypt’s government accountable to its own constitution and international human rights commitments. In recent weeks, Egyptian authorities have ordered the closure of a prominent anti-torture organization, the Nadeem Center; summoned staff from several human rights organizations for interrogation; banned prominent rights activists and advocates from traveling outside Egypt in violation of the Egyptian constitution; and harassed and threatened human rights activists with arrest and violence. The media regularly propagate vitriol against human rights defenders, portraying them as traitors and security threats. If this crackdown is allowed to reach its conclusion, it will silence an indigenous human rights community that has survived more than 30 years of authoritarian rule, leaving few if any Egyptians free to investigate mounting abuses by the state. The current attacks on Egypt’s rights advocates are a continuation of the same criminal prosecution of American and German NGO workers in Egypt that began in 2011. That prosecution, driven by senior members of the Egyptian government still in high office today, resulted in the June 2013 criminal convictions, in a deeply flawed trial, of 43 Egyptian and international NGO staff, including 17 American citizens. President el-Sissi, who was the head of military intelligence in 2011 when Egypt’s military government launched the investigation, has refused repeated requests to overturn the convictions. While the current crackdown is primarily targeting domestic organizations, there are indications that international NGOs may also face increased pressure, including some that currently do not even have offices or staff working in Egypt. On March 20, the newspaper Al Masry Al Youm published the names of more than 150 individuals and civil society organizations reportedly under investigation for receiving foreign funding, including prominent American and European organizations such as the Center for International Private Enterprise, the Solidarity Center, Transparency International, Save the Children, Catholic Relief Services, CARE, AMIDEAST, the National Democratic Institute, and the International Republican Institute. Mr. President, in your September 2014 Presidential Memorandum on Civil Society, you pledged that the United States government—including you personally—would stand firmly with those in civil society facing pressure or harassment from their governments. While the past five years have been tumultuous and challenging for U.S. policy toward Egypt, this is another defining moment for the United States, a moment that tests your pledge to “stand with civil society.” Secretary Kerry’s March 18 statement of concern was welcome, but further action is urgently needed. Past practice demonstrates that when the United States government speaks clearly, in one voice, and consistently on NGO freedom and human rights in Egypt, the government in Cairo listens. It is essential that you act to stand up for human rights, freedom of association, and the rights of both Egyptian and international civil society organizations to work together on behalf of common goals. You must make crystal clear to President el-Sissi that continued assaults on civil society, including harassment of U.S. organizations, will make it difficult for the administration to cooperate across a range of issues, including your administration’s efforts to promote American investment in Egypt and to provide financial assistance to the Egyptian government and military. If Egypt’s government continues down a path to destroy its own civil society, American support and assistance will become, in both principled and practical terms, impossible. Sincerely, The Working Group on Egypt Authors Tamara Cofman Wittes Publication: Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) Full Article
united states The United States must resist a return to spheres of interest in the international system By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 19 Feb 2015 14:06:00 -0500 Great power competition has returned. Or rather, it has reminded us that it was always lurking in the background. This is not a minor development in international affairs, but it need not mean the end of the world order as we know it. The real impact of the return of great power competition will depend on how the United States responds to these changes. America needs to recognize its central role in maintaining the present liberal international order and muster the will to use its still formidable power and influence to support that order against its inevitable challengers. Competition in international affairs is natural. Great powers by their very nature seek regional dominance and spheres of influence. They do so in the first instance because influence over others is what defines a great power. They are, as a rule, countries imbued with national pride and imperial ambition. But, living in a Hobbesian world of other great powers, they are also nervous about their security and seek defense-in-depth through the establishment of buffer states on their periphery. Historically, great power wars often begin as arguments over buffer states where spheres of influence intersect—the Balkans before World War I, for instance, where the ambitions of Russia and Austria-Hungary clashed. But today’s great powers are rising in a very different international environment, largely because of the unique role the United States has played since the end of the Second World War. The United States has been not simply a regional power, but rather a regional power in every strategic region. It has served as the maintainer of regional balances in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The result has been that, in marked contrast to past eras, today’s great powers do not face fundamental threats to their physical security. So, for example, Russia objectively has never enjoyed greater security in its history than it has since 1989. In the 20th century, Russia was invaded twice by Germany, and in the aftermath of the second war could plausibly claim to fear another invasion unless adequately protected. (France, after all, had the same fear.) In the 19th century, Russia was invaded by Napoleon, and before that Catherine the Great is supposed to have uttered that quintessentially Russian observation, “I have no way to defend my borders but to extend them.” Today that is not true. Russia faces no threat of invasion from the West. Who would launch such an invasion? Germany, Estonia, Ukraine? If Russia faces threats, they are from the south, in the form of militant Islamists, or from the east, in the form of a billion Chinese standing across the border from an empty Siberia. But for the first time in Russia’s long history, it does not face a strategic threat on its western flank. Much the same can be said of China, which enjoys far greater security than it has at any time in the last three centuries. The American role in East Asia protects it from invasion by its historic adversary, Japan, while none of the other great powers around China’s periphery have the strength or desire now or in the foreseeable future to launch an attack on Chinese territory. Therefore, neither Chinese nor Russians can claim that a sphere of influence is necessary for their defense. They may feel it necessary for their sense of pride. They may feel it is necessary as a way of restoring their wounded honor. They may seek an expanded sphere of influence to fulfill their ambition to become more formidable powers on the international stage. And they may have concerns that free, nations on their periphery may pass the liberal infection onto their own populaces and thus undermine their autocratic power. The question for the United States, and its allies in Asia and Europe, is whether we should tolerate a return to sphere of influence behavior among regional powers that are not seeking security but are in search of status, powers that are acting less out of fear than out of ambition. This question, in the end, is not about idealism, our commitment to a “rules-based” international order, or our principled opposition to territorial aggression. Yes, there are important principles at stake: neighbors shouldn’t invade their neighbors to seize their territory. But before we get to issues of principle, we need to understand how such behavior affects the world in terms of basic stability On that score, the historical record is very clear. To return to a world of spheres of influence—the world that existed prior to the era of American predominance—is to return to the great power conflicts of past centuries. Revisionist great powers are never satisfied. Their sphere of influence is never quite large enough to satisfy their pride or their expanding need for security. The “satiated” power that Bismarck spoke of is rare—even his Germany, in the end, could not be satiated. Of course, rising great powers always express some historical grievance. Every people, except perhaps for the fortunate Americans, have reason for resentment at ancient injustices, nurse grudges against old adversaries, seek to return to a glorious past that was stolen from them by military or political defeat. The world’s supply of grievances is inexhaustible. These grievances, however, are rarely solved by minor border changes. Japan, the aggrieved “have-not” nation of the 1930s, did not satisfy itself by swallowing Manchuria in 1931. Germany, the aggrieved victim of Versailles, did not satisfy itself by bringing the Germans of the Sudetenland back into the fold. And, of course, Russia’s historical sphere of influence does not end in Ukraine. It begins in Ukraine. It extends to the Balts, to the Balkans, and to heart of Central Europe. The tragic irony is that, in the process of carving out these spheres of influence, the ambitious rising powers invariably create the very threats they use to justify their actions. Japan did exactly that in the 30s. In the 1920s, following the Washington Naval Treaty, Japan was a relatively secure country that through a combination of ambition and paranoia launched itself on a quest for an expanded sphere of influence, thus inspiring the great power enmity that the Japanese had originally feared. One sees a similar dynamic in Russia’s behavior today. No one in the West was thinking about containing Russia until Russia made itself into a power that needed to be contained. If history is any lesson, such behavior only ends when other great powers decide they have had enough. We know those moments as major power wars. The best and easiest time to stop such a dynamic is at the beginning. If the United States wants to maintain a benevolent world order, it must not permit spheres of influence to serve as a pretext for aggression. The United States needs to make clear now—before things get out of hand—that this is not a world order that it will accept. And we need to be clear what that response entails. Great powers of course compete across multiple spheres—economic, ideological, and political, as well as military. Competition in most spheres is necessary and even healthy. Within the liberal order, China can compete economically and successfully with the United States; Russia can thrive in the international economic order uphold by the liberal powers, even if it is not itself liberal. But security competition is different. It is specifically because Russia could not compete with the West ideologically or economically that Putin resorted to military means. In so doing, he attacked the underlying security and stability at the core of the liberal order. The security situation undergirds everything—without it nothing else functions. Democracy and prosperity cannot flourish without security. It remains true today as it has since the Second World War that only the United States has the capacity and the unique geographical advantages to provide this security. There is no stable balance of power in Europe or Asia without the United States. And while we can talk about soft power and smart power, they have been and always will be of limited value when confronting raw military power. Despite all of the loose talk of American decline, it is in the military realm where U.S. advantages remain clearest. Even in other great power’s backyards, the United States retains the capacity, along with its powerful allies, to deter challenges to the security order. But without a U.S. willingness to use military power to establish balance in far-flung regions of the world, the system will buckle under the unrestrained military competition of regional powers. Authors Robert Kagan Full Article
united states Exploring High-Speed Rail Options for the United States By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 09 Mar 2010 12:29:00 -0500 When President Obama unveiled his budget allocation for high-speed rail, he said, “In France, high-speed rail has pulled regions from isolation, ignited growth [and], remade quiet towns into thriving tourist destinations.” His remarks emphasize how high-speed rail is increasing the accessibility of isolated places as an argument for similarly investments. So, what’s the source of this argument in the European context?In November 2009, the European Union’s ESPON (the European Observation Network for Territorial Development and Cohesion) released a report called “Trends in Accessibility.” ESPON examined the extent to which accessibility has changed between 2001 and 2006. ESPON defines accessibility as how “easily people in one region can reach people in another region.” This measurement of accessibility helps determine the “potential for activities and enterprises in the region to reach markets and activities in other regions.” ESPON’s research concluded that in this five-year period, rail accessibility grew an average of 13.1 percent. The report further concludes that high-speed rail lines have “influenced positively the potential accessibility of many European regions and cities.” In particular, the research found that the core of Europe--Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland--has the highest potential accessibility. Europe’s core produces the highest levels of economic output and has the highest population densities. ESPON argues that with such densities, the core has found reason to link their economic hubs (cities) with high-speed rail. These are the places in Europe where they have the greatest returns on investment. But ESPON also found that high speed rail is starting to increase the accessibility of isolated places such as France’s Tours, Lyon, and Marseille. This is a very important finding for Europe. They have a long-standing policy of social cohesion and balance, striving to create economic sustainability and population stability across Europe. The objective is for areas well beyond core to thrive economically and to dissuade people from migrating in search of jobs. Fiscally, social cohesion translates into investing disproportionately more money into areas not producing sufficient levels of economic output. High-speed rail is but one of the many strategies intending to produce “economic and social cohesion,” states a European Commission report on high-speed rail. But we are not Europe. While their thesis underpinning high-speed rail is social cohesion, what is our underlying thesis for high-speed rail? And what does this look like spatially? What was the logic behind the selection of Florida over other possible corridors? Is this line going to strengthen our national economy and GDP? Clarity on this score will help ensure the project is a success and offers a high return on investment. Lessons from this accessibility study say that places with high population levels and GDP output offer the greatest accessibility and therefore success. It would be a pity if the U.S. finally jumped on the high-speed bandwagon but still missed the train. Authors Julie Wagner Publication: The Avenue, The New Republic Image Source: © Franck Prevel / Reuters Full Article
united states The Metropolitan Future of Brazil and the United States By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 30 Nov 2012 09:33:00 -0500 Editor’s Note: During the Global Cities Initiative’s international forum in São Paulo, Bruce Katz delivered remarks on metropolitan areas and their potential to power national economies worldwide. The remarks were written by Katz and Julie Wagner. The Metropolitan Future of Brazil and the United States (This presentation is also available in Portuguese) Good morning everyone. It is a pleasure to be back in Sao Paulo with JP Morgan Chase, our partner in the Global Cities Initiative. I am grateful for their support and leadership. I first want to thank Governor Alckmin and Mayor-elect Haddad for their participation today and we fully welcome the opportunity to work with both of them and the city and state in the coming months and years. This has been an extraordinary week for our delegation of mayors and business, civic, and university leaders from 10 major American cities and metropolitan areas. We have seen firsthand the proud history and infectious energy and vibrancy of this great city and macro-metropolis. We are grateful to Luiz Felipe D’Avila and the Centre for Public Leadership for co-sponsoring this forum today. We also owe a debt to others who have hosted and guided us this week—the State of Sao Paulo, particularly the State Secretariat for Metropolitan Development, Insper, the Commercial Association of Santos and the Port of Santos and the Brazil-U.S. Business Council, and the U.S. Embassy and Ambassador Shannon. As Aod said at the outset, São Paulo is the first stop outside the United States in our five year Global Cities Initiative. That is a deliberate choice. The relationship between the United States and Brazil is a critical one. Despite barriers, the economic and social ties between our two countries are strong and growing stronger. Trade is booming. Investment is up. Tourism and business travel have never been higher. And the recent state visits by presidents Obama and Rousseff send a clear signal that this is a partnership of the highest order. Yet there is hard work to do in both our countries. The U.S. and Brazil are undergoing major economic transitions. By global standards, both of us under-perform on exports, far trailing other countries. The U.S. is shifting slowly back towards a more productive, sustainable economy after our worst downturn in 80 years; Brazil is moving forward towards a more open, outward looking economy. Against this complex backdrop, our delegation comes bearing a simple proposition. The answers to national challenges lie, in great part, below the national level. We live in a century where cities and metropolitan areas are driving national economies and the global economy. The U.S. and Brazil have 84 and 85 percent of our respective populations living in our cities and metropolitan areas … and these communities generate 91 percent of the GDP in the U.S. and 88 percent of the GDP in Brazil. There is, in essence, no American or Brazilian—or German or Chinese—economy; rather our national economies represent networks of powerful city and metropolitan economies. Today, I will make three main points. As the world urbanizes, cities and metropolitan areas have emerged as the engines of national economies. As our economies globalize, cities and metropolitan areas act as the centers of international trade and investment. To prosper today, cities and metropolitan areas need to drive their economic destiny. In our federal republic, where power is shared across national, state and local governments, that requires new thinking about who does what. But, first things first; we cannot put forward a metropolitan playbook without first understanding what a metropolis is. And the best way to do that is from the ground up. On the right side of the screen you see the São Paulo metropolis, 20 million strong, 10th most populous in the world. On the left side of the screen you see Chicago, Mayor Daley’s hometown, with a population of 9.5 million, 26th largest in the world. Both of these metro areas cluster around core cities but cover large land masses and encompass multiple jurisdictions. The São Paulo metro is more than 8,000 square kilometers in size, with more than half of your population living in the city proper and the remainder residing in 38 other municipalities. Chicago is close to 19,000 square kilometers in size with one third of the population living in the central city and the remainder spread across, incredibly, three states, 14 counties encompassing hundreds of separate municipalities and townships. The assets São Paulo and Chicago need to compete nationally and globally are spread across their regions: Clusters of workers; Key colleges and universities; Major hospitals and health care facilities; A network of urban green space; and The infrastructure—roads, rail and transit and airports—needed to move people, and freight In other words, metro areas are the natural, organic geographies of the economy, clustered around central cities for sure, but also benefitting from the assets offered by satellite cities and suburban, exurban and rural areas. With that background, let me start with an irrefutable observation: cities and metropolitan areas are the 21st century engines of national economies. Since 1950, the world’s urban population has more than quadrupled in size. Now sized at 3.6 billion people, it is expected to surpass 5 billion by 2030. In 1950, 29 percent of the world’s population lived in cities and their metropolitan areas. By 2009, the share surpassed 50 percent. By 2030, urban settlements will harbor more than 60 percent of the world’s population. In many respects, the world is becoming more like us. The United States and Brazil are two of the most highly urbanized countries with city and metro concentrations surpassing those of both mature economies in Germany, Britain, and Spain and emerging economies like China, India, and South Africa. Cities and metros do not just house people; they power economies. Today Brookings released our annual Global Metro Monitor that tracks the economic performance of the world’s top 300 largest metropolitan economies. Incredibly, we find that these metropolitan areas house a little under one fifth of global population but generate nearly half its total output. Put simply: Metros around the world punch way above their weight. Why are they so powerful? Because they cluster and connect firms, large and small, with ports and airports, transport and energy infrastructure, and a broad range of supportive institutions that supply skilled labor, advanced research and customized capital. And when that happens, productivity improves, entrepreneurship rises, employment and wages increase. The dominance of metros holds true for both our countries, which house 13 and 76 of the top 300 global metros, respectively. Your thirteen top metropolitan areas are home to one third of Brazil’s population, concentrate half of Brazil’s manufacturing output and your population with college education and account for 56 percent of national GDP and 63 percent of financial services output. These metros range from Sao Paulo, 11th largest economy in the world, to Baixada Santista, 295th largest. Eleven of your metro areas are state or national capitals; this state is home to three of the 13 large metro areas. Metro São Paulo takes its place among the world’s most populous and economically powerful metros. You are home to one tenth of Brazil’s population, account for one-fifth of Brazil’s GDP and generate 57 percent of the GDP of this state. For America’s part, our top 76 metros form the real heart of the U.S. economy. Housing 61 percent of our population, they concentrate a majority of our manufacturing output, gather our most educated people, and generate more than 68 percent of our national GDP. They also make an outsized contribution on financial services and the production of patents. In the U.S., the top 76 metros range from New York, L.A., and Chicago to less well known communities like Allentown, Little Rock, and Harrisburg. This leads to my second point: as economies globalize, cities and metropolitan areas act as the centers of international trade and investment. Metros and trade are inextricably linked, and have been for millennia. The Silk Road that connected Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Northern Africa. The Hanseatic League that grew from Hamburg and Lubeck to include 170 cities that monopolized trade in Northern Europe between the 13th and 15th centuries. The great Italian city-states of Venice, Pisa, Genoa, and Amalfi. These historic networks offer essential lessons: As a recent Brookings report concluded: “Trade is essential to metros—it is how they grow their economies. And metros are essential to trade—they provide the specialization and market access that facilitates exchange among producers and consumers.” The top Brazilian and U.S. metros are our nations’ logistical hubs, concentrating the movement of goods and people by sea and by air. In Brazil, 61 percent of foreign waterborne trade, measured by tonnage, passes through the seaports of the top metros; in the United States the equivalent share is over 66 percent. Passenger travel is even more concentrated; in both countries, close to 82 percent of international air travel passes through the airports of the top metropolitan areas. Significantly, the top cities and metros in both our countries are magnets for foreign direct investment, particularly “greenfield FDI” where foreign entities invest in new facilities or expansions of existing facilities rather than just purchase domestic companies. From 2003 through September 2012, Brazil’s 13 accounted for 77 percent of greenfield FDI projects in Brazil and 59 percent of the jobs created through this key growth vehicle. The top 76 U.S. metros also accounted for 77 percent of Greenfield FDI projects and 70 percent of the jobs created. Brazil’s 13 are responsible for a third of all national goods exports; the share is substantially higher for the top U.S. metros. Brookings research on U.S. exports shows that our top U.S. metros dominate the trade in manufacturing and services … and, given their edge in sectors like chemicals, consulting and computers, are on the front lines of commerce with China, Brazil, and India. In sum, our research has shown the collective centrality of our top cities and metros to the trading position of our nations. Yet metro economies do not exist in the aggregate; they have distinctive starting points and vary considerably in their trading prowess and intensity. What makes São Paulo special on the global stage—your distinctive offer, your special investment potential—is different from what defines and drives Rio or Curitiba or Salvador. São Paulo is Brazil’s premier global metropolis and the numbers reflect that. Your metro houses 10 percent of Brazil’s population but: Your airports handle 26 percent of all passenger traffic in Brazil and 33 percent of all air cargo. Your macro metro neighbor, Santos, which we visited yesterday, is the busiest container port in South America and 43rd in the world. You are Brazil’s largest metropolitan exporter, producing 27 percent of all metropolitan exports of goods And from 2003-2011 you received 19 percent of all greenfield FDI in Brazil … in fact, more FDI than New York, LA, Chicago, Houston and San Francisco combined. You trade with the world’s most prosperous cities, in the United States and elsewhere, but in particular ways given your distinctive industry clusters and sectors. Given your substantial concentration in financial services (with 19 of the 25 top international banks present and the world’s third largest financial exchange), you interact naturally with New York and Miami in the U.S., London, Madrid, and Frankfurt in Europe and Shanghai, Tokyo and Hong Kong in Asia. Despite the outward movement of industry, you still serve as Brazil’s main global platform for advanced manufacturing sectors like automotive, linking you closely with Detroit in the U.S., Milan and Stuttgart in Europe, and Nagoya in Japan. The shape and structure of your economy puts São Paulo in an exclusive club of “global cities,” a definition drawn in the 1990s when the process of trade, investment, and globalization was seen as empowering a few command and control finance metros of the world. But today, our notions of “globalizing cities” are more expansive, recognizing that all cities are fueled, to different degrees, by global investment and connected, in distinctive ways, via global commerce and exchange, global product and labor supply chains. The energy cluster in Rio finds common interest with the energy cluster in Houston through investments by Exxon Mobil, Chevron and Petrobras … and then further with energy firms in Amsterdam, Dar es Salaam, and Bogota. Campinas’ hi-tech sector naturally links with the hi-tech cluster in San Jose’s Silicon Valley via elite universities, advanced R&D institutions, and global tech giants like IBM, Hewlett-Packard and Dell … and then further with tech clusters in Tokyo, Bangalore and Dublin. As headquarters of Embraer, São Jose dos Campos links via supply chains to Palm Bay, Florida, Harbin, China and Lisbon, Portugal. In short, a new global map is being drawn in the world, not of nation to nation trade but of metro to metro exchange. That leads to my final point: To prosper in the global economy today, metros need to drive their global economic destiny. We have a three part playbook: The playbook starts at home, with cities innovating locally to exploit their distinctive competitive advantages in the global economy. In the U.S., cities and metropolitan areas are acting with intentionality in the aftermath of the Great Recession to devise and implement what we call “metropolitan business plans.” The purpose: build on their distinctive competitive advantages in the traded sectors of the economy, given the crippling effect on housing and consumption. The elements of business planning are fairly simple and straightforward Each metropolis does a market assessment of their unique economic profile and potential … what goods and services they trade, which nations they trade with, where trade trends are likely to head given market dynamics here and abroad. Armed with this information, metros then set goals and objectives that build on their distinct advantages, devise strategies to meet those goals and establish metrics to gauge progress. All these efforts are undertaken by a consortium of corporate, government, university and civic institutions that cut across jurisdictions, sectors, and disciplines and “collaborate to compete” globally. Let me give you an example of how these business plans are helping cities and their metros grow jobs and restructure their economies. Los Angeles, represented here by Mayor Antonio Villaragoisa, has devised an ambitious plan to grow exports by identifying and proactively supporting export ready firms in leading trade sectors like aerospace, computers, professional services, and film and television. The L.A. system of trade is moving from a story of fragmentation, where no clear institution defines or drives decision-making, to a reality of coordination and collaboration, responsiveness and flexibility under one Los Angeles Regional Export Council. The result: More firms will export more goods and services to more places producing more and better jobs. We believe business planning holds great potential for São Paulo and other Brazilian metros. Obviously, fixing the basics is a critical first step for economic growth: safe streets, quality schools, efficient transport and sound governance. But a business plan might focus on increasing foreign direct investment in infrastructure necessary to reduce congestion, improve mobility, and enhance accessibility to jobs. The key is not what you focus on … but to decide your focus based on evidence and in a collaborative manner and then to hold yourself accountable through continuous assessment and measurement. Having innovated locally, cities must network globally—creating and stewarding close relationships with trading partners in both mature economies and rising nations. The new global reality is leading to intricate networks of trading cities which grow together by linking together and learning together. These networks obviously start with firms and ports that do business with each other. But, over time, networks extend to supporting institutions—governments, universities, business associations—that provide support for companies at the leading edge of metropolitan economies. The city of Houston and the city of São Paulo, for example, executed a formal agreement earlier this year that commits each city to increase commercial relations, intensify scientific and technological connections, and facilitate information to tackle shared challenges. Enterprise Florida, the principal export and investment organization in that state, opened an office in São Paulo in 2011 to help Florida companies expand trade. APEX-Brasil, Enterprise Florida’s Brazilian counterpart, has its only U.S. location in Miami’s free trade zone. There it executes projects like providing clean and renewable fuels to IndyCar, the American based auto racing body. The Ohio State University and the University of São Paulo have partnered to support the exchange of students and collaborative research. Areas of recent focus: natural and mathematical sciences, medicine, and teacher training. In 2014 Ohio State anticipates opening its third “Global Gateways” office in the world in São Paulo to further capitalize on these linkages. Here is the simple message: We can see a network of trading cities emerging right here in São Paulo and it is a future characterized by multi-layered relationships across multiple dimensions and disciplines, interests and institutions. Finally, having innovated at home and networked globally, cities and metros must advocate nationally for federal and state policies and practices that will support metro growth. Metros are engines, but they do NOT act alone. Only national governments can set the rules of the road: enhancing access to foreign markets, enforcing trade agreements, opening up borders to immigrants and protecting intellectual property. They can also help match domestic firms with potential global customers, provide export promotion support, and commit resources to modernizing logistics hubs. As the world evolves as a network of trading cities, it is only natural that cities become more articulate and aggressive about the support they need from higher levels of government. In the United States, cities have found a receptive partner in the Obama Administration. Key federal agencies—the International Trade Administration, the Ex-Im Bank, the Small Business Administration—have been central partners in guiding business plans with a particular focus on boosting exports. Similar alliances could be built here. As part of the Global Cities Initiative, the ESADE Business School mapped the trading system in São Paulo. Their research clearly shows the central role of your federal and state governments in advancing the internationalization of your economy. True success will come when these higher level entities align closely with your distinct assets and advantages. Going forward, the advocacy of cities must extend beyond accessing the export promotion and finance programs of federal and state governments. They must get to the heart of the matter. The United States has had a North American Free Trade Agreement in place for 20 years with our partners, Mexico and Canada. We have recently concluded important Free Trade Agreements with Colombia, Panama, and Korea. President Obama was in Southeast Asia this month discussing the possibilities of a Trans-Pacific Partnership. The 2011 Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation signed by President Obama and President Rousseff provides a platform to build on. As they have expressed, we need a new vision for our Hemisphere … and for our two countries. We are both growing with healthy demographics. We both have an enormous pool of natural assets. We both have a shared imperative to reorient our economies. Empowered with the right policies, enabled with the right frameworks, we have the potential to grow together this century, powered by our major population and economic centers. So that’s our playbook: Innovate locally. Network globally. Advocate nationally. Let me end where I began. From the beginning of time, cities have been centers of commerce, formed along the roads and routes of trade. And so it is today. The cities of our nations are powering our nations. They are giving physical shape to the globalizing economy, seamlessly integrating the exchange of people, goods, services, energy, capital, ideas, and culture. The promise of the Global Cities Initiative broadly is to capture and channel this energy into lasting, sustained networks and partnerships. Our pledge as we leave here today is to work with you, partner with you, and ensure that the United States and Brazil bind together not just as two nations but as living, vibrant, powerful networks of trading cities and metropolitan areas. Authors Bruce KatzJulie Wagner Publication: Global Cities Initiative, São Paulo, Brazil Image Source: © Nacho Doce / Reuters Full Article
united states The UN, the United States and International Cooperation: What is on the Horizon? By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: To coincide with President Obama’s twin addresses to the UN, the Managing Global Insecurity project at Brookings (MGI) hosted a panel discussion in New York on September 22 with Brookings President Strobe Talbott, former head of UN peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guehenno, MGI Director Bruce Jones, Brookings Senior Fellow Homi Kharas, and Jim Traub of The New… Full Article
united states Is the United States losing China to Russia? By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 26 Jul 2016 10:00:00 -0400 Event Information July 26, 201610:00 AM - 12:00 PM EDTFalk AuditoriumBrookings Institution1775 Massachusetts Avenue NWWashington, DC 20036 Register for the EventLast month, Russian President Vladimir Putin made his fourth visit to China since President Xi Jinping became top party leader in 2012. During this latest meeting, the two countries inked more than 30 deals, including an oil supply contract, and issued numerous joint statements, one of which criticized the United States for its plans to deploy missile defense systems on the Korean Peninsula and in the Balkans. Chinese state media speculate that this year’s China-Russia joint naval exercises, held annually since 2005, will likely be led by the South China Sea Fleet, reinforcing a general perception in China and elsewhere that U.S. policies are pushing Chinese leaders to consolidate ties with Russia. On July 26, the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings hosted a discussion on the U.S.-China-Russia trilateral relationship, the shape and scope of which carries far-reaching consequences for international order and global economic growth. Brookings President Strobe Talbott, who served as deputy secretary of state and ambassador-at-large on the new independent states following the Soviet breakup, provided an introduction. A panel of experts—J. Stapleton Roy, Fiona Hill, Yun Sun, and Cheng Li—discussed the current and historical dynamics at play, including expectations and recommendations for the future. Video Is the United States losing China to Russia? Audio Is the United States losing China to Russia? Transcript Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf) Event Materials 20160726_china_russia_us_transcript Full Article
united states Is The United States A ‘Dispensable Nation’? By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000 In an interview with NPR's Steve Inskeep, Vali Nasr looks at how the U.S. has reduced its footprint in the world, and how China is primed to fill the void, especially in the Middle East. Full Article
united states Why the United States can't make a magazine like ISIS By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 10:07:00 -0500 Editors' Note: How can the U.S. government better counter ISIS propaganda? As the State Department overhauls its counter messaging program, Will McCants and Clint Watts examine what makes ISIS’s online magazine, Dabiq, so successful, and the obstacles to the U.S. government producing a publication that effective. This piece originally appeared on The Daily Beast. The Obama administration attributes much of ISIS’s success at communicating to its technological savvy, which has elevated the group to a global media and terrorist phenomenon. The president has gone so far as to say that the Paris attackers were a “bunch of killers with good social media.” Despite the praise heaped on the so-called Islamic State for its cutting-edge propaganda online, one of its most effective products is decidedly low tech. Dabiq, ISIS’s online news magazine, has a small but devoted readership that spans the globe. News of advances on the battlefield excite them—more evidence that God’s kingdom on earth has returned and grows. Stories of fighters inspire them—more models to emulate as they contemplate what role they can play in the divine drama unfolding. Journalists and analysts read it with almost the same intensity as ISIS fans; the contents of each volume fill newspapers and think-tank reports soon after it’s released. And no wonder: the magazine clearly states the organization’s goals; provides news of its activities that advance those goals; showcases personal stories of the people engaged in the activities; and announces major developments in the organization’s fight against its enemies. It’s a wealth of information presented between two covers every few months. Can you name a single U.S. government publication or online platform devoted to the anti-ISIS fight that is as informative or as widely-read as Dabiq? Is there anything that tells us what all these air sorties are for? Who’s fighting this fight on the ground? What advances the coalition has made and why we should we care? We couldn’t come up with one either. That got us to thinking: why can’t the U.S. government publish something like Dabiq online? Lack of imagination isn’t the reason. A news magazine isn’t a very creative idea—Americans perfected the form, which ISIS copied. And if anything, folks inside the government have too many overly-imaginative ideas, most of them involving whiz-bang technology. If you’ve thought it, they’ve thought it. A social media campaign for youth to come up with ways to counter violent extremism? Check. Sock-puppetry? Check. The only real obstacle impeding the U.S. government is itself. The executive branch’s complicated bureaucracy, legal strictures, and sensitivity to criticism from media and Congress make it tough to publish a Dabiq-style magazine. To see what we mean, let’s look at two of Dabiq’s regular features and see what would happen if the U.S. government tried to mimic them: Attack Reports: Each issue of Dabiq details its attacks on its enemies. One entry in issue 12 chronicled ISIS’s efforts to capture an airbase in Dayr al-Zawr, Syria. Another described four suicide attacks on the Saudi-led coalition fighting southern Yemen. Pictures accompany most entries, some quite gruesome. The U.S. government routinely writes these types of reports for internal consumption. But when they’re public—and thus under the scrutiny of Congress that holds the pursestrings and the media that holds the careerstrings—routine gives way to caution and quarreling. If the president asks his government to write attack reports for the public, the U.S. Department of State and the Department of Defense will quarrel about who will take the lead in writing and publishing them. Then they and the intelligence agencies will quarrel over which reports should be included. Will this report counter the president’s insistence that we have no boots on the ground? Will that report make it look like our Iraqi partners aren’t carrying their weight? Does this one tell the enemy too much about our game plan? Does that picture make U.S. soldiers look too menacing? Will this report later be discredited by the media? Will these battlefield successes be reversed in the future? Does anyone know if another agency has said this or its opposite? Will anyone trust what we’re saying? Shouldn’t someone else be saying this? When something finally slides off the serpentine conveyor belt months later, it will be a bland blob devoid of detail and relevance. Meanwhile, ISIS will have added twelve more volumes to its shelves. Biographies of Fighters: Dabiq sometimes profiles its fighters, including the young men on the front lines dying for ISIS’s cause. The fighters tell their stories and explain their reasons for fighting. In issue 8, for example, there is a Q&A with the man who murdered a prominent politician in Tunisia. He explains why he did it and how it advances the greater goals of the Islamic State. The United States military used to feature these sorts of stories, too—back when the American war in Iraq was a massive, overt affair. Now, that’s not the case. The identities of the Americans fighting in Syria and Iraq are a well-guarded secret because the government does not want them or their families to become targets. The government would also frown on them for nonchalantly talking about killing lest the American public get upset. And then there’s that boots on the ground thing. Without personal stories, we’re left with drones buzzing in the sky, and buzz-cut officers droning through stale Pentagon briefings. The human cost on both sides is reduced to numbers on slides, which means Americans can’t appreciate the true costs of war and foreigners can’t appreciate the sacrifices Americans are making on their behalf. Some readers might feel that the U.S. government should be constrained in these ways. They want the government to be sensitive to public opinion and exceedingly cautious when talking about war and violence. If so, they shouldn’t complain when the U.S. government explains its anti-ISIS fight in the vaguest possible terms—that’s the outcome of extreme caution compounded by bureaucratic bargaining on a mind-boggling scale. Others might feel we need to reform the way government does messaging. If so, don’t propose to change the system first. Rather, ask the system to perform a simple task like the one we’ve described and see where it breaks down. Then you’ll know what to fix. Making a news magazine probably isn’t the high tech solution the government is looking for, at least judging by Friday’s pilgrimage of senior security officials to Silicon Valley and the revamping of State Department’s online counter messaging campaign. But if our byzantine, poll-sensitive government can’t do something so basic, it won’t perform better when it’s tasked with something more complicated no matter how much technology it uses. Authors William McCantsClint Watts Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters Full Article