Neither Cameroon nor Malaysia has made progress in tackling illegal logging since 2010, according to new reports from Chatham House. Corruption, lack of political will and a lack of transparency pose problems in both countries. 

Illegal logging is much more widespread in Cameroon, where entrenched corruption, weak institutions and unclear and inappropriate laws are all impeding reform. Although Malaysia does not have such high levels of illegality, problems remain, particularly in the state of Sarawak.

Alison Hoare, Senior Research Fellow at Chatham House, said: 'Illegal logging has a devastating impact on some of the world’s most valuable remaining forests and on the people who live in them and rely on the resources they provide.'

'It is disappointing how little progress Cameroon and Malaysia have made in tackling illegal logging, which exacerbates deforestation, climate change, and poverty. In both countries corruption is a major issue, and the governments need to do much more to address the problem and its underlying drivers.' 

In Cameroon, the principle of transparency has not been accepted within the government, enforcement is weak and information management systems are inadequate. The misuse of  small permits, often granted to allow clearance of forests for infrastructure projects or agricultural expansion, is particularly problematic and could be increasing.

Meanwhile, a huge amount of illegal production takes place in the informal artisanal sector – accounting for around half of all timber produced in the country. Artisanal loggers mainly supply the domestic market, but their timber is also exported.

In Malaysia, governance varies significantly from region to region but there are high levels of deforestation across the country. Expansion of timber, pulp and agricultural plantations is the primary cause of forest loss, with the area of plantations expected to double by 2020. 

Adequate recognition of indigenous peoples’ land rights is also a serious challenge in Malaysia and has held up the negotiation of a Voluntary Partnership Agreement with the European Union. Recent enhanced efforts to tackle corruption, including in Sarawak, could mark a turning point. 

Alison Hoare: 'In both countries, more concerted efforts are needed to tackle corruption, increase consultation, and improve transparency and availability of information. The Cameroonian government also needs to pay more attention to the informal sector and the domestic market.'

Lire en français >

阅读中国 >

Efforts to address illegal logging and reduce the trade in illegal timber have borne fruit and prompted some positive reforms in producer countries, a new report from Chatham House has found. However, changes in the sector mean overall trade in illegal timber has not fallen in the last decade. 
  
EU and US policies designed to reduce demand for illegal timber have helped cut illegal imports to those markets. These reforms and the EU’s partnership agreements with producer countries have prompted improvements in forest governance and a fall in large-scale illegal timber production.

But growth of demand in emerging markets means that the progressive policies of so-called ‘sensitive markets’ are now less influential. China is now the world’s largest importer and consumer of wood-based products, as well as a key processing hub. India, South Korea, and Vietnam are also growing markets. The increasing role of small-scale producers, whose activities often fall outside legal frameworks, and a rapid increase in illegal forest conversion, also present new challenges. 
  
Alison Hoare: 'The EU and US have spearheaded some progressive and effective reforms. However, the changing scale and nature of the problem demands more coordinated international action. To stop further deforestation and associated carbon emissions, and to help achieve global objectives for sustainable development, the EU and US need to maintain their leadership while other countries - especially China, Japan, India and South Korea - need to step up their efforts to tackle illegal logging.'

The Chatham House report, which is based on the studies of 19 countries, which include key producers, consumers, or processors of timber, and is an update of a 2010 study found: 

Timber production

• More than 80 million m3 of timber was illegally produced in 2013 in the nine producer countries assessed, accounting for about one-third of their combined total production.
• An estimated 60% of this illegal timber is destined for these countries’ domestic markets.
• Small-scale producers are increasingly important – for example, in Cameroon, the DRC and Ghana, they account for an estimated 50, 90 and 70% respectively of annual timber production. The majority of this is illegal.
• For the nine producer countries, the area of forest under voluntary legality verification or sustainability certification schemes increased by nearly 80% between 2000 and 2013. 

Imports of illegal wood-based products 

• In most of the consumer and producer countries assessed, the volume of illegal imports of wood-based products fell during the period 2000–13. 
• The exceptions were China, and India and Vietnam where the volume of illegal imports more than doubled. 
• As a proportion of the whole, illegal imports declined for nearly all countries. 
• However, at the global level, the proportion of illegal timber imports remained steady at 10% - a result of the growth of the Chinese market. 

The EU and US 

• The volumes of illegal imports into the UK, France and the Netherlands nearly halved over the period 2000-13, from just under 4 million m3 to 2 million m3. 
• The volume of illegal imports into the US increased between 2000 and 2006, from around 5 to 9 million m3, and then declined to just under 6 million m3 in 2013. 
• In 2013, more than 60% of illegal imports of wood-based products to the UK and US came from China.

China

• The volume of illegal imports into China doubled between 2000 and 2013 from 17 to 33 million m3; but as a proportion of the whole illegal imports fell, from 26 to 17%.
•  The volume of exports of wood-based products (legal and illegal) from the nine producer countries to China nearly tripled, from 12 million m3 in 2000 to 34 million m3 in 2013.

The Chatham House report makes the following recommendations:

• The EU and US need to maintain and reinforce current efforts 
• Other countries need to take stronger action – China in particular, but also India, Japan and South Korea
• Strong international cooperation is needed to maintain & reinforce current efforts – the G20 could provide a forum to galvanise international action
• Producer countries need to focus on strengthening efforts to tackle corruption, improving legality within the small-scale sector, and reforming land-use governance 

     
Alison Hoare: 'Developing countries are losing significant amounts of potential revenue from illegal logging, which is also causing the loss and degradation of forests, depleting livelihoods, and contributing to social conflict and corruption. Tackling illegal logging and strengthening forest governance are essential for achieving critical climate and development goals. Having seen the progress that can be made, it’s imperative that governments agree to work together to rise to new challenges and promote a more sustainable forest sector for the benefit of all.'   

Read the report >>

A controversial debate during COVID-19 is the state of readiness within governments and health systems for a pandemic, with lines of the debate drawn on the issues of testing provision, personal protective equipment (PPE), and the speed of decision-making.

President Macron in a speech to the nation admitted French medical workers did not have enough PPE and that mistakes had been made: ‘Were we prepared for this crisis? We have to say that no, we weren’t, but we have to admit our errors … and we will learn from this’.

In reality few governments were fully prepared. In years to come, all will ask: ‘how could we have been better prepared, what did we do wrong, and what can we learn?’. But after every crisis, governments ask these same questions.

Most countries have put in place national risk assessments and established processes and systems to monitor and stress-test crisis-preparedness. So why have some countries been seemingly better prepared?

Comparing different approaches

Some have had more time and been able to watch the spread of the disease and learn from those countries that had it first. Others have taken their own routes, and there will be much to learn from comparing these different approaches in the longer run.

Governments in Asia have been strongly influenced by the experience of the SARS epidemic in 2002-3 and - South Korea in particular - the MERS-CoV outbreak in 2015 which was the largest outside the Middle East. Several carried out preparatory work in terms of risk assessment, preparedness measures and resilience planning for a wide range of threats.

And, at the international level, there are frameworks for preparedness for pandemics. The International Health Regulations (IHR) - adopted at the 2005 World Health Assembly and binding on member states - require countries to report certain disease outbreaks and public health events to the World Health Organization (WHO) and ‘prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade’.

Under IHR, governments committed to a programme of building core capacities including coordination, surveillance, response and preparedness. The UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk highlights disaster preparedness for effective response as one of its main purposes and has already incorporated these measures into the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other Agenda 2030 initiatives. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has said COVID-19 ‘poses a significant threat to the maintenance of international peace and security’ and that ‘a signal of unity and resolve from the Council would count for a lot at this anxious time’.

This pandemic looks set to continue to be a grave threat to humanity. But there will also be future pandemics – whether another type of coronavirus or a new influenza virus – and our species will be threatened again, we just don’t know when.

Other disasters too will befall us – we already see the impacts of climate change arriving on our doorsteps characterised by increased numbers and intensity of floods, hurricanes, fires, crop failure and other manifestations of a warming, increasingly turbulent atmosphere and we will continue to suffer major volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis. All high impact, unknown probability events.

Preparedness for an unknown future is expensive and requires a great deal of effort for events that may not happen within the preparers’ lifetimes. It is hard to imagine now, but people will forget this crisis, and revert to their imagined projections of the future where crises don’t occur, and progress follows progress. But history shows us otherwise.

Preparations for future crises always fall prey to financial cuts and austerity measures in lean times unless there is a mechanism to prevent that. Cost-benefit analyses will understandably tend to prioritise the urgent over the long-term. So governments should put in place legislation – or strengthen existing legislation – now to ensure their countries are as prepared as possible for whatever crisis is coming.

Such a legal requirement would require governments to report back to parliament every year on the state of their national preparations detailing such measures as:

• The exact levels of stocks of essential materials (including medical equipment)
• The ability of hospitals to cope with large influx of patients
• How many drills, exercises and simulations had been organised – and their findings
• What was being done to implement lessons learned & improve preparedness

In addition, further actions should be taken:

• Parliamentary committees such as the UK Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy should scrutinise the government’s readiness for the potential threats outlined in the National Risk register for Civil Emergencies in-depth on an annual basis.
• Parliamentarians, including ministers, with responsibility for national security and resilience should participate in drills, table-top exercises and simulations to see for themselves the problems inherent with dealing with crises.
• All governments should have a minister (or equivalent) with the sole responsibility for national crisis preparedness and resilience. The Minister would be empowered to liaise internationally and coordinate local responses such as local resilience groups.
• There should be ring-fenced budget lines in annual budgets specifically for preparedness and resilience measures, annually reported on and assessed by parliaments as part of the due diligence process.

And at the international level:

• The UN Security Council should establish a Crisis Preparedness Committee to bolster the ability of United Nations Member States to respond to international crisis such as pandemics, within their borders and across regions. The Committee would function in a similar fashion as the Counter Terrorism Committee that was established following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States.
• States should present reports on their level of preparedness to the UN Security Council. The Crisis Preparedness Committee could establish a group of experts who would conduct expert assessments of each member state’s risks and preparedness and facilitate technical assistance as required.
• Regional bodies such as the OSCE, ASEAN and ARF, the AU, the OAS, the PIF etc could also request national reports on crisis preparedness for discussion and cooperation at the regional level.

COVID-19 has been referred to as the 9/11 of crisis preparedness and response. Just as that shocking terrorist attack shifted the world and created a series of measures to address terrorism, we now recognise our security frameworks need far more emphasis on being prepared and being resilient. Whatever has been done in the past, it is clear that was nowhere near enough and that has to change.

As tensions escalate in the Middle East, US President Donald Trump has threatened to strike targets in Iran should they seek to retaliate over the killing of Qassem Soleimani. According to the president’s tweet, these sites includes those that are ‘important to Iran and Iranian culture’.

Defense Secretary Mark Esper was quick on Monday to rule out any such action and acknowledged that the US would ‘follow the laws of armed conflict’. But Trump has not since commented further on the matter.

Any move to target Iranian cultural heritage could constitute a breach of the international laws protecting cultural property. Attacks on cultural sites are deemed unlawful under two United Nations conventions; the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property during Armed Conflict, and the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.

These have established deliberate attacks on cultural heritage (when not militarily necessary) as a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in recognition of the irreparable damage that the loss of cultural heritage can have locally, regionally and globally.

These conventions were established in the aftermath of the Second World War, in reaction to the legacy of the massive destruction of cultural property that took place, including the intense bombing of cities, and systematic plunder of artworks across Europe. The conventions recognize that damage to the cultural property of any people means ‘damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind’. The intention of these is to establish a new norm whereby protecting culture and history – that includes cultural and historical property – is as important as safeguarding people.

Such historical sites are important not simply as a matter of buildings and statues, but rather for their symbolic significance in a people’s history and identity. Destroying cultural artefacts is a direct attack on the identity of the population that values them, erasing their memories and historical legacy. Following the heavy bombing of Dresden during the Second World War, one resident summed up the psychological impact of such destruction in observing that ‘you expect people to die, but you don’t expect the buildings to die’.

Targeting sites of cultural significance isn’t just an act of intimidation during conflict. It can also have a lasting effect far beyond the cessation of violence, hampering post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction, where ruins or the absence of previously significant cultural monuments act as a lasting physical reminder of hostilities.

For example, during the Bosnian War in the 1990s, the Old Bridge in Mostar represented a symbol of centuries of shared cultural heritage and peaceful co-existence between the Serbian and Croat communities. The bridge’s destruction in 1993 at the height of the civil war and the temporary cable bridge which took its place acted as a lasting reminder of the bitter hostilities, prompting its reconstruction a decade later as a mark of the reunification of the ethnically divided town.

More recently, the destruction of cultural property has been a feature of terrorist organizations, such as the Taliban’s demolition of the 1,700-year-old Buddhas of Bamiyan in 2001, eliciting international condemnation. Similarly, in Iraq in 2014 following ISIS’s seizure of the city of Mosul, the terrorist group set about systematically destroying a number of cultural sites, including the Great Mosque of al-Nuri with its leaning minaret, which had stood since 1172. And in Syria, the ancient city of Palmyra was destroyed by ISIS in 2015, who attacked its archaeological sites with bulldozers and explosives.

Such violations go beyond destruction: they include the looting of archaeological sites and trafficking of cultural objects, which are used to finance terrorist activities, which are also prohibited under the 1954 Hague Convention.

As a war crime, the destruction of cultural property has been successfully prosecuted in the International Criminal Court, which sentenced Ahmad Al-Faqi Al-Mahdi to nine years in jail in 2016 for his part in the destruction of the Timbuktu mausoleums in Mali. Mahdi led members of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to destroy mausoleums and monuments of cultural and religious importance in Timbuktu, irreversibly erasing what the chief prosecutor described as ‘the embodiment of Malian history captured in tangible form from an era long gone’.

Targeting cultural property is prohibited under customary international humanitarian law, not only by the Hague Convention. But the Convention sets out detailed regulations for protection of such property, and it has taken some states a lot of time to provide for these.

Although the UK was an original signatory to the 1954 Hague Convention, it did not ratify it until 2017, introducing into law the Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017, and setting up the Cultural Protection Fund to safeguard heritage of international importance threatened by conflict in countries across the Middle East and North Africa.

Ostensibly, the UK’s delay in ratifying the convention lay in concerns over the definition of key terms and adequate criminal sanctions, which were addressed in the Second Protocol in 1999. However, changing social attitudes towards the plunder of antiquities, and an alarming increase in the use of cultural destruction as a weapon of war by extremist groups to eliminate cultures that do not align with their own ideology, eventually compelled the UK to act.

In the US, it is notoriously difficult to get the necessary majority for the approval of any treaty in the Senate; for the Hague Convention, approval was achieved in 2008, following which the US ratified the Convention in 2009.

Destroying the buildings and monuments which form the common heritage of humanity is to wipe out the physical record of who we are. People are people within a place, and they draw meaning about who they are from their surroundings. Religious buildings, historical sites, works of art, monuments and historic artefacts all tell the story of who we are and how we got here. We have a responsibility to protect them.

A controversial debate during COVID-19 is the state of readiness within governments and health systems for a pandemic, with lines of the debate drawn on the issues of testing provision, personal protective equipment (PPE), and the speed of decision-making.

President Macron in a speech to the nation admitted French medical workers did not have enough PPE and that mistakes had been made: ‘Were we prepared for this crisis? We have to say that no, we weren’t, but we have to admit our errors … and we will learn from this’.

In reality few governments were fully prepared. In years to come, all will ask: ‘how could we have been better prepared, what did we do wrong, and what can we learn?’. But after every crisis, governments ask these same questions.

Most countries have put in place national risk assessments and established processes and systems to monitor and stress-test crisis-preparedness. So why have some countries been seemingly better prepared?

Comparing different approaches

Some have had more time and been able to watch the spread of the disease and learn from those countries that had it first. Others have taken their own routes, and there will be much to learn from comparing these different approaches in the longer run.

Governments in Asia have been strongly influenced by the experience of the SARS epidemic in 2002-3 and - South Korea in particular - the MERS-CoV outbreak in 2015 which was the largest outside the Middle East. Several carried out preparatory work in terms of risk assessment, preparedness measures and resilience planning for a wide range of threats.

And, at the international level, there are frameworks for preparedness for pandemics. The International Health Regulations (IHR) - adopted at the 2005 World Health Assembly and binding on member states - require countries to report certain disease outbreaks and public health events to the World Health Organization (WHO) and ‘prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade’.

Under IHR, governments committed to a programme of building core capacities including coordination, surveillance, response and preparedness. The UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk highlights disaster preparedness for effective response as one of its main purposes and has already incorporated these measures into the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other Agenda 2030 initiatives. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has said COVID-19 ‘poses a significant threat to the maintenance of international peace and security’ and that ‘a signal of unity and resolve from the Council would count for a lot at this anxious time’.

This pandemic looks set to continue to be a grave threat to humanity. But there will also be future pandemics – whether another type of coronavirus or a new influenza virus – and our species will be threatened again, we just don’t know when.

Other disasters too will befall us – we already see the impacts of climate change arriving on our doorsteps characterised by increased numbers and intensity of floods, hurricanes, fires, crop failure and other manifestations of a warming, increasingly turbulent atmosphere and we will continue to suffer major volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis. All high impact, unknown probability events.

Preparedness for an unknown future is expensive and requires a great deal of effort for events that may not happen within the preparers’ lifetimes. It is hard to imagine now, but people will forget this crisis, and revert to their imagined projections of the future where crises don’t occur, and progress follows progress. But history shows us otherwise.

Preparations for future crises always fall prey to financial cuts and austerity measures in lean times unless there is a mechanism to prevent that. Cost-benefit analyses will understandably tend to prioritise the urgent over the long-term. So governments should put in place legislation – or strengthen existing legislation – now to ensure their countries are as prepared as possible for whatever crisis is coming.

Such a legal requirement would require governments to report back to parliament every year on the state of their national preparations detailing such measures as:

• The exact levels of stocks of essential materials (including medical equipment)
• The ability of hospitals to cope with large influx of patients
• How many drills, exercises and simulations had been organised – and their findings
• What was being done to implement lessons learned & improve preparedness

In addition, further actions should be taken:

• Parliamentary committees such as the UK Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy should scrutinise the government’s readiness for the potential threats outlined in the National Risk register for Civil Emergencies in-depth on an annual basis.
• Parliamentarians, including ministers, with responsibility for national security and resilience should participate in drills, table-top exercises and simulations to see for themselves the problems inherent with dealing with crises.
• All governments should have a minister (or equivalent) with the sole responsibility for national crisis preparedness and resilience. The Minister would be empowered to liaise internationally and coordinate local responses such as local resilience groups.
• There should be ring-fenced budget lines in annual budgets specifically for preparedness and resilience measures, annually reported on and assessed by parliaments as part of the due diligence process.

And at the international level:

• The UN Security Council should establish a Crisis Preparedness Committee to bolster the ability of United Nations Member States to respond to international crisis such as pandemics, within their borders and across regions. The Committee would function in a similar fashion as the Counter Terrorism Committee that was established following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States.
• States should present reports on their level of preparedness to the UN Security Council. The Crisis Preparedness Committee could establish a group of experts who would conduct expert assessments of each member state’s risks and preparedness and facilitate technical assistance as required.
• Regional bodies such as the OSCE, ASEAN and ARF, the AU, the OAS, the PIF etc could also request national reports on crisis preparedness for discussion and cooperation at the regional level.

COVID-19 has been referred to as the 9/11 of crisis preparedness and response. Just as that shocking terrorist attack shifted the world and created a series of measures to address terrorism, we now recognise our security frameworks need far more emphasis on being prepared and being resilient. Whatever has been done in the past, it is clear that was nowhere near enough and that has to change.

As tensions escalate in the Middle East, US President Donald Trump has threatened to strike targets in Iran should they seek to retaliate over the killing of Qassem Soleimani. According to the president’s tweet, these sites includes those that are ‘important to Iran and Iranian culture’.

Defense Secretary Mark Esper was quick on Monday to rule out any such action and acknowledged that the US would ‘follow the laws of armed conflict’. But Trump has not since commented further on the matter.

Any move to target Iranian cultural heritage could constitute a breach of the international laws protecting cultural property. Attacks on cultural sites are deemed unlawful under two United Nations conventions; the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property during Armed Conflict, and the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.

These have established deliberate attacks on cultural heritage (when not militarily necessary) as a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in recognition of the irreparable damage that the loss of cultural heritage can have locally, regionally and globally.

These conventions were established in the aftermath of the Second World War, in reaction to the legacy of the massive destruction of cultural property that took place, including the intense bombing of cities, and systematic plunder of artworks across Europe. The conventions recognize that damage to the cultural property of any people means ‘damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind’. The intention of these is to establish a new norm whereby protecting culture and history – that includes cultural and historical property – is as important as safeguarding people.

Such historical sites are important not simply as a matter of buildings and statues, but rather for their symbolic significance in a people’s history and identity. Destroying cultural artefacts is a direct attack on the identity of the population that values them, erasing their memories and historical legacy. Following the heavy bombing of Dresden during the Second World War, one resident summed up the psychological impact of such destruction in observing that ‘you expect people to die, but you don’t expect the buildings to die’.

Targeting sites of cultural significance isn’t just an act of intimidation during conflict. It can also have a lasting effect far beyond the cessation of violence, hampering post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction, where ruins or the absence of previously significant cultural monuments act as a lasting physical reminder of hostilities.

For example, during the Bosnian War in the 1990s, the Old Bridge in Mostar represented a symbol of centuries of shared cultural heritage and peaceful co-existence between the Serbian and Croat communities. The bridge’s destruction in 1993 at the height of the civil war and the temporary cable bridge which took its place acted as a lasting reminder of the bitter hostilities, prompting its reconstruction a decade later as a mark of the reunification of the ethnically divided town.

More recently, the destruction of cultural property has been a feature of terrorist organizations, such as the Taliban’s demolition of the 1,700-year-old Buddhas of Bamiyan in 2001, eliciting international condemnation. Similarly, in Iraq in 2014 following ISIS’s seizure of the city of Mosul, the terrorist group set about systematically destroying a number of cultural sites, including the Great Mosque of al-Nuri with its leaning minaret, which had stood since 1172. And in Syria, the ancient city of Palmyra was destroyed by ISIS in 2015, who attacked its archaeological sites with bulldozers and explosives.

Such violations go beyond destruction: they include the looting of archaeological sites and trafficking of cultural objects, which are used to finance terrorist activities, which are also prohibited under the 1954 Hague Convention.

As a war crime, the destruction of cultural property has been successfully prosecuted in the International Criminal Court, which sentenced Ahmad Al-Faqi Al-Mahdi to nine years in jail in 2016 for his part in the destruction of the Timbuktu mausoleums in Mali. Mahdi led members of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to destroy mausoleums and monuments of cultural and religious importance in Timbuktu, irreversibly erasing what the chief prosecutor described as ‘the embodiment of Malian history captured in tangible form from an era long gone’.

Targeting cultural property is prohibited under customary international humanitarian law, not only by the Hague Convention. But the Convention sets out detailed regulations for protection of such property, and it has taken some states a lot of time to provide for these.

Although the UK was an original signatory to the 1954 Hague Convention, it did not ratify it until 2017, introducing into law the Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017, and setting up the Cultural Protection Fund to safeguard heritage of international importance threatened by conflict in countries across the Middle East and North Africa.

Ostensibly, the UK’s delay in ratifying the convention lay in concerns over the definition of key terms and adequate criminal sanctions, which were addressed in the Second Protocol in 1999. However, changing social attitudes towards the plunder of antiquities, and an alarming increase in the use of cultural destruction as a weapon of war by extremist groups to eliminate cultures that do not align with their own ideology, eventually compelled the UK to act.

In the US, it is notoriously difficult to get the necessary majority for the approval of any treaty in the Senate; for the Hague Convention, approval was achieved in 2008, following which the US ratified the Convention in 2009.

Destroying the buildings and monuments which form the common heritage of humanity is to wipe out the physical record of who we are. People are people within a place, and they draw meaning about who they are from their surroundings. Religious buildings, historical sites, works of art, monuments and historic artefacts all tell the story of who we are and how we got here. We have a responsibility to protect them.

A controversial debate during COVID-19 is the state of readiness within governments and health systems for a pandemic, with lines of the debate drawn on the issues of testing provision, personal protective equipment (PPE), and the speed of decision-making.

President Macron in a speech to the nation admitted French medical workers did not have enough PPE and that mistakes had been made: ‘Were we prepared for this crisis? We have to say that no, we weren’t, but we have to admit our errors … and we will learn from this’.

In reality few governments were fully prepared. In years to come, all will ask: ‘how could we have been better prepared, what did we do wrong, and what can we learn?’. But after every crisis, governments ask these same questions.

Most countries have put in place national risk assessments and established processes and systems to monitor and stress-test crisis-preparedness. So why have some countries been seemingly better prepared?

Comparing different approaches

Some have had more time and been able to watch the spread of the disease and learn from those countries that had it first. Others have taken their own routes, and there will be much to learn from comparing these different approaches in the longer run.

Governments in Asia have been strongly influenced by the experience of the SARS epidemic in 2002-3 and - South Korea in particular - the MERS-CoV outbreak in 2015 which was the largest outside the Middle East. Several carried out preparatory work in terms of risk assessment, preparedness measures and resilience planning for a wide range of threats.

And, at the international level, there are frameworks for preparedness for pandemics. The International Health Regulations (IHR) - adopted at the 2005 World Health Assembly and binding on member states - require countries to report certain disease outbreaks and public health events to the World Health Organization (WHO) and ‘prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade’.

Under IHR, governments committed to a programme of building core capacities including coordination, surveillance, response and preparedness. The UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk highlights disaster preparedness for effective response as one of its main purposes and has already incorporated these measures into the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other Agenda 2030 initiatives. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has said COVID-19 ‘poses a significant threat to the maintenance of international peace and security’ and that ‘a signal of unity and resolve from the Council would count for a lot at this anxious time’.

This pandemic looks set to continue to be a grave threat to humanity. But there will also be future pandemics – whether another type of coronavirus or a new influenza virus – and our species will be threatened again, we just don’t know when.

Other disasters too will befall us – we already see the impacts of climate change arriving on our doorsteps characterised by increased numbers and intensity of floods, hurricanes, fires, crop failure and other manifestations of a warming, increasingly turbulent atmosphere and we will continue to suffer major volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis. All high impact, unknown probability events.

Preparedness for an unknown future is expensive and requires a great deal of effort for events that may not happen within the preparers’ lifetimes. It is hard to imagine now, but people will forget this crisis, and revert to their imagined projections of the future where crises don’t occur, and progress follows progress. But history shows us otherwise.

Preparations for future crises always fall prey to financial cuts and austerity measures in lean times unless there is a mechanism to prevent that. Cost-benefit analyses will understandably tend to prioritise the urgent over the long-term. So governments should put in place legislation – or strengthen existing legislation – now to ensure their countries are as prepared as possible for whatever crisis is coming.

Such a legal requirement would require governments to report back to parliament every year on the state of their national preparations detailing such measures as:

• The exact levels of stocks of essential materials (including medical equipment)
• The ability of hospitals to cope with large influx of patients
• How many drills, exercises and simulations had been organised – and their findings
• What was being done to implement lessons learned & improve preparedness

In addition, further actions should be taken:

• Parliamentary committees such as the UK Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy should scrutinise the government’s readiness for the potential threats outlined in the National Risk register for Civil Emergencies in-depth on an annual basis.
• Parliamentarians, including ministers, with responsibility for national security and resilience should participate in drills, table-top exercises and simulations to see for themselves the problems inherent with dealing with crises.
• All governments should have a minister (or equivalent) with the sole responsibility for national crisis preparedness and resilience. The Minister would be empowered to liaise internationally and coordinate local responses such as local resilience groups.
• There should be ring-fenced budget lines in annual budgets specifically for preparedness and resilience measures, annually reported on and assessed by parliaments as part of the due diligence process.

And at the international level:

• The UN Security Council should establish a Crisis Preparedness Committee to bolster the ability of United Nations Member States to respond to international crisis such as pandemics, within their borders and across regions. The Committee would function in a similar fashion as the Counter Terrorism Committee that was established following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States.
• States should present reports on their level of preparedness to the UN Security Council. The Crisis Preparedness Committee could establish a group of experts who would conduct expert assessments of each member state’s risks and preparedness and facilitate technical assistance as required.
• Regional bodies such as the OSCE, ASEAN and ARF, the AU, the OAS, the PIF etc could also request national reports on crisis preparedness for discussion and cooperation at the regional level.

COVID-19 has been referred to as the 9/11 of crisis preparedness and response. Just as that shocking terrorist attack shifted the world and created a series of measures to address terrorism, we now recognise our security frameworks need far more emphasis on being prepared and being resilient. Whatever has been done in the past, it is clear that was nowhere near enough and that has to change.

A controversial debate during COVID-19 is the state of readiness within governments and health systems for a pandemic, with lines of the debate drawn on the issues of testing provision, personal protective equipment (PPE), and the speed of decision-making.

President Macron in a speech to the nation admitted French medical workers did not have enough PPE and that mistakes had been made: ‘Were we prepared for this crisis? We have to say that no, we weren’t, but we have to admit our errors … and we will learn from this’.

In reality few governments were fully prepared. In years to come, all will ask: ‘how could we have been better prepared, what did we do wrong, and what can we learn?’. But after every crisis, governments ask these same questions.

Most countries have put in place national risk assessments and established processes and systems to monitor and stress-test crisis-preparedness. So why have some countries been seemingly better prepared?

Comparing different approaches

Some have had more time and been able to watch the spread of the disease and learn from those countries that had it first. Others have taken their own routes, and there will be much to learn from comparing these different approaches in the longer run.

Governments in Asia have been strongly influenced by the experience of the SARS epidemic in 2002-3 and - South Korea in particular - the MERS-CoV outbreak in 2015 which was the largest outside the Middle East. Several carried out preparatory work in terms of risk assessment, preparedness measures and resilience planning for a wide range of threats.

And, at the international level, there are frameworks for preparedness for pandemics. The International Health Regulations (IHR) - adopted at the 2005 World Health Assembly and binding on member states - require countries to report certain disease outbreaks and public health events to the World Health Organization (WHO) and ‘prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade’.

Under IHR, governments committed to a programme of building core capacities including coordination, surveillance, response and preparedness. The UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk highlights disaster preparedness for effective response as one of its main purposes and has already incorporated these measures into the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other Agenda 2030 initiatives. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has said COVID-19 ‘poses a significant threat to the maintenance of international peace and security’ and that ‘a signal of unity and resolve from the Council would count for a lot at this anxious time’.

This pandemic looks set to continue to be a grave threat to humanity. But there will also be future pandemics – whether another type of coronavirus or a new influenza virus – and our species will be threatened again, we just don’t know when.

Other disasters too will befall us – we already see the impacts of climate change arriving on our doorsteps characterised by increased numbers and intensity of floods, hurricanes, fires, crop failure and other manifestations of a warming, increasingly turbulent atmosphere and we will continue to suffer major volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis. All high impact, unknown probability events.

Preparedness for an unknown future is expensive and requires a great deal of effort for events that may not happen within the preparers’ lifetimes. It is hard to imagine now, but people will forget this crisis, and revert to their imagined projections of the future where crises don’t occur, and progress follows progress. But history shows us otherwise.

Preparations for future crises always fall prey to financial cuts and austerity measures in lean times unless there is a mechanism to prevent that. Cost-benefit analyses will understandably tend to prioritise the urgent over the long-term. So governments should put in place legislation – or strengthen existing legislation – now to ensure their countries are as prepared as possible for whatever crisis is coming.

Such a legal requirement would require governments to report back to parliament every year on the state of their national preparations detailing such measures as:

• The exact levels of stocks of essential materials (including medical equipment)
• The ability of hospitals to cope with large influx of patients
• How many drills, exercises and simulations had been organised – and their findings
• What was being done to implement lessons learned & improve preparedness

In addition, further actions should be taken:

• Parliamentary committees such as the UK Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy should scrutinise the government’s readiness for the potential threats outlined in the National Risk register for Civil Emergencies in-depth on an annual basis.
• Parliamentarians, including ministers, with responsibility for national security and resilience should participate in drills, table-top exercises and simulations to see for themselves the problems inherent with dealing with crises.
• All governments should have a minister (or equivalent) with the sole responsibility for national crisis preparedness and resilience. The Minister would be empowered to liaise internationally and coordinate local responses such as local resilience groups.
• There should be ring-fenced budget lines in annual budgets specifically for preparedness and resilience measures, annually reported on and assessed by parliaments as part of the due diligence process.

And at the international level:

• The UN Security Council should establish a Crisis Preparedness Committee to bolster the ability of United Nations Member States to respond to international crisis such as pandemics, within their borders and across regions. The Committee would function in a similar fashion as the Counter Terrorism Committee that was established following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States.
• States should present reports on their level of preparedness to the UN Security Council. The Crisis Preparedness Committee could establish a group of experts who would conduct expert assessments of each member state’s risks and preparedness and facilitate technical assistance as required.
• Regional bodies such as the OSCE, ASEAN and ARF, the AU, the OAS, the PIF etc could also request national reports on crisis preparedness for discussion and cooperation at the regional level.

COVID-19 has been referred to as the 9/11 of crisis preparedness and response. Just as that shocking terrorist attack shifted the world and created a series of measures to address terrorism, we now recognise our security frameworks need far more emphasis on being prepared and being resilient. Whatever has been done in the past, it is clear that was nowhere near enough and that has to change.

Since assuming office, President Donald Trump’s many encounters with litigation have exposed significant irregularities of the American legal system as it applies to the president.

These encounters – including but not limited to accusations of defamation, obstruction, perjury and non-disclosure agreements – have shown President Trump to hold a particular interpretation of how the rule of law should apply to someone holding the highest elected office in the United States of America.

However, an analysis of Trump’s legal history prior to his assumption of office reveals a tried and tested method of using litigation – or the threat of it – to quieten criticism and opponents. As Trump faces possible impeachment in the House of Representatives, what – if any – influence might his combative approach towards legal battles have on the political proceedings?

Drawing on New York attorney James Zirin’s new book, Plaintiff in Chief, this event examines the relationship between President Trump’s litigation history and his approach to the presidency.

How has the American legal system facilitated Trump’s attitude towards litigation? How can his litigation toolkit be countered?

And what impact has the president’s approach to litigation had on the domestic and global reputation of the American legal system and the office of the president as accountable and credible institutions?

A controversial debate during COVID-19 is the state of readiness within governments and health systems for a pandemic, with lines of the debate drawn on the issues of testing provision, personal protective equipment (PPE), and the speed of decision-making.

President Macron in a speech to the nation admitted French medical workers did not have enough PPE and that mistakes had been made: ‘Were we prepared for this crisis? We have to say that no, we weren’t, but we have to admit our errors … and we will learn from this’.

In reality few governments were fully prepared. In years to come, all will ask: ‘how could we have been better prepared, what did we do wrong, and what can we learn?’. But after every crisis, governments ask these same questions.

Most countries have put in place national risk assessments and established processes and systems to monitor and stress-test crisis-preparedness. So why have some countries been seemingly better prepared?

Comparing different approaches

Some have had more time and been able to watch the spread of the disease and learn from those countries that had it first. Others have taken their own routes, and there will be much to learn from comparing these different approaches in the longer run.

Governments in Asia have been strongly influenced by the experience of the SARS epidemic in 2002-3 and - South Korea in particular - the MERS-CoV outbreak in 2015 which was the largest outside the Middle East. Several carried out preparatory work in terms of risk assessment, preparedness measures and resilience planning for a wide range of threats.

And, at the international level, there are frameworks for preparedness for pandemics. The International Health Regulations (IHR) - adopted at the 2005 World Health Assembly and binding on member states - require countries to report certain disease outbreaks and public health events to the World Health Organization (WHO) and ‘prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade’.

Under IHR, governments committed to a programme of building core capacities including coordination, surveillance, response and preparedness. The UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk highlights disaster preparedness for effective response as one of its main purposes and has already incorporated these measures into the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other Agenda 2030 initiatives. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has said COVID-19 ‘poses a significant threat to the maintenance of international peace and security’ and that ‘a signal of unity and resolve from the Council would count for a lot at this anxious time’.

This pandemic looks set to continue to be a grave threat to humanity. But there will also be future pandemics – whether another type of coronavirus or a new influenza virus – and our species will be threatened again, we just don’t know when.

Other disasters too will befall us – we already see the impacts of climate change arriving on our doorsteps characterised by increased numbers and intensity of floods, hurricanes, fires, crop failure and other manifestations of a warming, increasingly turbulent atmosphere and we will continue to suffer major volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis. All high impact, unknown probability events.

Preparedness for an unknown future is expensive and requires a great deal of effort for events that may not happen within the preparers’ lifetimes. It is hard to imagine now, but people will forget this crisis, and revert to their imagined projections of the future where crises don’t occur, and progress follows progress. But history shows us otherwise.

Preparations for future crises always fall prey to financial cuts and austerity measures in lean times unless there is a mechanism to prevent that. Cost-benefit analyses will understandably tend to prioritise the urgent over the long-term. So governments should put in place legislation – or strengthen existing legislation – now to ensure their countries are as prepared as possible for whatever crisis is coming.

Such a legal requirement would require governments to report back to parliament every year on the state of their national preparations detailing such measures as:

• The exact levels of stocks of essential materials (including medical equipment)
• The ability of hospitals to cope with large influx of patients
• How many drills, exercises and simulations had been organised – and their findings
• What was being done to implement lessons learned & improve preparedness

In addition, further actions should be taken:

• Parliamentary committees such as the UK Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy should scrutinise the government’s readiness for the potential threats outlined in the National Risk register for Civil Emergencies in-depth on an annual basis.
• Parliamentarians, including ministers, with responsibility for national security and resilience should participate in drills, table-top exercises and simulations to see for themselves the problems inherent with dealing with crises.
• All governments should have a minister (or equivalent) with the sole responsibility for national crisis preparedness and resilience. The Minister would be empowered to liaise internationally and coordinate local responses such as local resilience groups.
• There should be ring-fenced budget lines in annual budgets specifically for preparedness and resilience measures, annually reported on and assessed by parliaments as part of the due diligence process.

And at the international level:

• The UN Security Council should establish a Crisis Preparedness Committee to bolster the ability of United Nations Member States to respond to international crisis such as pandemics, within their borders and across regions. The Committee would function in a similar fashion as the Counter Terrorism Committee that was established following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States.
• States should present reports on their level of preparedness to the UN Security Council. The Crisis Preparedness Committee could establish a group of experts who would conduct expert assessments of each member state’s risks and preparedness and facilitate technical assistance as required.
• Regional bodies such as the OSCE, ASEAN and ARF, the AU, the OAS, the PIF etc could also request national reports on crisis preparedness for discussion and cooperation at the regional level.

COVID-19 has been referred to as the 9/11 of crisis preparedness and response. Just as that shocking terrorist attack shifted the world and created a series of measures to address terrorism, we now recognise our security frameworks need far more emphasis on being prepared and being resilient. Whatever has been done in the past, it is clear that was nowhere near enough and that has to change.

Governments are increasingly using public procurement policy to promote the use of legal and sustainable timber, thereby helping to reduce deforestation and illegal logging and encouraging sustainable forestry. 

At least 26 countries, mostly in the EU, currently possess some form of timber procurement policy at central government level. Although some have been implemented more recently than others and all tend to vary in their design, the evidence suggests that they are having a positive effect on increasing market share for verified legal and sustainable timber. Although government purchasing accounts for only a limited share of the market, the evidence also suggests that these timber procurement policies are having a broader impact on consumer markets, partly through their impact on suppliers and partly through the signals they send to the market. 

These policies are also relatively straightforward to introduce: many countries already possess some form of green procurement policy, and criteria for legal and sustainable timber can easily be tailored to fit. In general no new legislation is needed, though the more comprehensive policies benefit from training and advice to government purchasers. 

The gradual spread of the EU Green Procurement Policy programme, and commitments by an increasing number of private companies to eliminate deforestation from their supply chains are likely to encourage further uptake of procurement policies for sustainable timber. Timber procurement can also provide valuable lessons to governments when developing sustainable procurement policies for other products associated with deforestation, such as palm oil. 

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses the global response to illegal logging and the related trade.

The Indonesian government has taken a number of important steps to tackle illegal logging and the associated trade, most notably with the ratification of the Indonesia–EU FLEGT voluntary partnership agreement in 2014. The process of negotiating this agreement has contributed to the introduction of a national timber legality verification system (SVLK), clarification of the relevant legal framework and significantly improved engagement with stakeholders in the forest sector. There have also been important developments in recognizing indigenous peoples’ tenure rights to forest land and resources.

However, implementation and enforcement challenges remain. In particular, progress is hampered by a poorly functioning decentralized governance system, persistent corruption and insufficient transparency of information.

The private sector has responded positively, with growing awareness of the issue of illegal logging. While uptake of voluntary legality verification has recently declined, with the need for this now circumvented by the introduction of the SVLK, the area of forest certified as being managed sustainably increased in 2012.

An analysis of data on timber production and consumption suggests that illegal logging has decreased since 2000, and the findings of the expert perceptions survey tend to confirm this for the period 2010 to 2013. In part, these findings reflect a shift towards plantations and away from natural forest harvesting. However, legal ambiguity over the permitting process for forest conversion may mean that levels of illegality are higher than these data suggest.

Building on the government’s response to illegal logging will require effective implementation of the SVLK including addressing identified shortcomings. Improved land-use planning to support effective control and monitoring of forest conversion is also needed. Increased resources and training for enforcement officials are required, while efforts to tackle corruption in the sector should be stepped up. The government should clarify the rights of indigenous peoples through concrete actions such as developing clear processes for mapping and registering their land claims.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses the global response to illegal logging and the related trade.

The Brazilian government has made slow progress in tackling illegal logging and associated trade since the previous Chatham House assessment, in 2010. Illegality, corruption and fraud remain widespread in the forest sector, despite a relatively strong legal framework. Considerable efforts have been made to improve law enforcement in the sector but these have been hampered by poor coordination between the relevant government agencies, limited resources and inadequate penalties. At the same time, attempts to involve a range of stakeholders in policy discussions and decision-making have stalled.

The private sector’s response to illegal logging is perceived to be weak, despite the reasonably high uptake of sustainability certification schemes. Initiatives are under way aimed at promoting a legal and sustainable market for timber within Brazil, with the engagement of the private sector. However, such undertakings are modest given that the majority of the country’s timber production is consumed domestically.

Considerable investment in systems to monitor timber and revenue flows is required to tackle fraud, while the regulation of sawmills needs to be tightened to reduce the scope for the laundering of illegal timber. The imposition of appropriate sanctions and ensuring the collection of financial penalties could help to fill the gap in resources that is impeding effective enforcement.

Clarification of the regulatory framework is needed – in particular, those regulations related to the fiscal regime for the forest sector – as is the simplification of the processes for approving forest management plans. The latter is a priority if smallholders are to be able to engage in legal and sustainable forest management. An extensive programme of outreach and training is a prerequisite for ensuring such engagement. Finally, efforts to promote legal timber on the domestic market should be intensified and expanded.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses the global response to illegal logging and the related trade. 

The Ghanaian government has taken a number of important steps to reduce illegal logging and related trade, most notably with the signing of the Ghana–EU voluntary partnership agreement in 2009. This agreement has prompted improved multi-stakeholder dialogue within the sector as well as a process of legal reform. Considerable effort has also been put into the development of a timber legality assurance system, which has been successfully piloted. However, a number of enforcement and administrative challenges remain, particularly in relation to tenure and land and resource rights, as well as broader governance challenges including corruption.

Awareness of the issue of illegal logging has improved among the private sector, and the area of natural forest that is verified as legally compliant has increased considerably in recent years. However illegal practices remain widespread in the country. Illegal chainsaw milling is prevalent, predominantly supplying the domestic market. Illegality is also an issue in supply chains for export, albeit at a lower level. Trade data discrepancies indicate that illegal trade is a problem, in particular for tropical logs, and there is a lack of clarity over the legality of many logging permits.

A key challenge for the country is its declining resource base. The forest sector has shrunk considerably over the last 15 years as a result of this, and the situation looks set to worsen. Wood-balance estimates indicate that timber consumption considerably exceeds sustainable harvesting levels. 

In order to make further progress in tackling illegal logging, the process of legal reform and efforts to improve enforcement need to continue. Priorities include: a review of fiscal policies for the sector; improvements to land administration; completion of the conversion process of logging rights; and implementation of the legality assurance system across the country. Efforts must also continue to address the challenge of illegal chainsaw milling, which will require a range of approaches from legal reform to developing alternative livelihood strategies. 

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses the global response to illegal logging and the related trade. 

The government of Lao PDR has taken a number of steps to reduce illegal logging and associated trade. Most notably, it has made progress towards negotiations with the EU on a voluntary partnership agreement (VPA). This has prompted the establishment of a multi-stakeholder steering committee and a technical working group and the revision of several land and forestry laws to include provisions related to the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan.

However, significant implementation and enforcement challenges remain. The legal framework is unclear and, at times, contradictory. Implementation by central and local governments is inconsistent, and internal mechanisms to oversee government decisions are limited. Moreover, enforcement capacity is weak and there is a lack of transparency. The available evidence suggests that illegal practices are widespread in the forest sector.

Awareness of the issue of illegal logging has improved, including in the private sector. The area of natural forest certified under the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) scheme has been gradually increasing in recent years. However, a key challenge for the Lao forest sector is pressure on forest resources from agricultural plantations, mineral extraction and infrastructure development.

In order to make further progress in tackling illegal logging, the government should push ahead with preparations for the VPA negotiations, ensuring that the lead agencies are appropriately engaged and resourced to implement a credible dialogue process. Data on the allocation and management of forest resources should be systematically collected and made available to the public in order to enable effective forest monitoring. In addition, accountability mechanisms, including anti-corruption strategies, should be clearly defined and implemented by all relevant ministries to ensure that forest resources are exploited legally and for the benefit of the country. 

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade. 

The Japanese government has continued to engage on the issue of illegal logging and related trade, but its approach remains focused on ‘soft’, voluntary measures rather than establishing legally binding requirements. It has been actively promoting the country’s legality verification system, known as the goho-wood system, and this is helping to raise awareness of the issue of illegal logging in Japan. However, the system is not only voluntary but has serious design weaknesses which limit its ability to eliminate illegal products from Japan’s market.

While the number of companies registered as goho-wood suppliers has increased, this may be occurring at the expense of sustainability certification, which is more demanding and expensive. The number of companies in Japan with FSC chain-of-custody certification remains low.

Japan’s imports of timber-sector products at high risk of illegality are estimated to have declined significantly since the start of the century, though levelling off since 2010, while imports of high-risk paper-sector products are estimated to have gradually increased over this period. Levels of high-risk imports remain significantly above those of the other consumer countries reviewed. These are currently estimated to comprise 12 per cent and seven per cent of total timber- and paper-sector products respectively.

It is recommended that the government develop further legislation to control imports of illegal products, including a requirement for risk assessment and mitigation as well as third-party monitoring. Such legislation would also help support the government’s policy to promote the domestic timber industry. Until such legislation is passed, Japanese industry should implement more robust risk assessment and mitigation procedures.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade. 

The French government has been engaged on the issue of illegal logging and the related trade: the government played an active part in the development of the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan and has been supporting the negotiation and implementation of voluntary partnership agreements (VPAs) in producer countries.

The government has also been actively promoting the production and consumption of sustainable timber, providing funding for forest-management related projects in producer countries and establishing the National Group on Tropical Forests to facilitate a multi-stakeholder dialogue on forest policy. Media coverage of illegal logging has increased considerably since 2007, indicating greater awareness of the issue among the general public.

This response, as well as increased sourcing of sustainably certified products by the private sector, is thought to have been a factor in the decline in imports into France of timber-sector products likely to be illegal. The proportion of timber-sector imports at high risk of illegality is currently estimated to be two per cent. The proportion of highly processed products such as furniture has grown significantly, as has the share coming from China, with a parallel decline in imports of logs and sawnwood from central and West Africa.

However, there remain a number of areas for improvement by the government. In particular, with legislation now in place to implement the EUTR, this should be rigorously enforced and sufficient resources put in place to enable this. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the sanctions regime should be monitored. The planned review of the public procurement policy should be undertaken, and monitoring of its implementation should also be introduced.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade.

The United Kingdom has shown a strong response to the problem of illegal logging and related trade; of the five consumer countries studied, it scored highest in the assessment of laws, regulations and policies related to this issue.

The government played an active part in the development of the EU’s FLEGT Action Plan and has subsequently been supporting the negotiation and implementation of voluntary partnership agreements with producer countries. The government has also been providing a significant amount of funding, through the Forest Governance, Markets and Trade Programme, to initiatives aimed at tackling the trade in illegal timber and improving forest governance.

The private sector in the UK has also been proactive, as reflected in the increase in the number of companies with chain-of-custody certification and in the amount of certified wood-based products on the UK market. A high level of media coverage of illegal logging also indicates that there is widespread awareness of this issue.

This response is thought to be partly responsible for the decline in imports into the UK of timber-sector products likely to be illegal, currently estimated to comprise three per cent of the total. However, there has been a significant shift in the types and sources of high-risk products coming into the UK, reflecting changes in the global timber industry: a growing proportion is coming from China and comprises more highly processed products such as furniture.

While the UK has been one of the most proactive European countries in addressing illegal logging and the related trade, further action could be taken. Cooperation with the Chinese government and its private sector would be beneficial. Systematic monitoring of the UK’s timber procurement policy is also required, and the efforts made to date to enforce the EUTR will need to be maintained.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade. 

Efforts to tackle the problem of illegal logging and related trade have continued in the United States; the Lacey Act amendments in 2008 have influenced behaviour within the industry and high-profile enforcement cases have increased awareness of the issue. 

The impact of the Lacey Act on levels of illegal imports into the US is uncertain. The proportion of imports of high-risk timber-sector products is estimated to have declined since 2010, while that of paper-sector products has stayed at about the same level: in 2013, high-risk imports were estimated to comprise five per cent and two per cent of the totals respectively. However, there has been a significant shift in the types and sources of high-risk products coming into the country, reflecting changes in the global timber industry: a growing proportion is coming from China and comprises more highly processed products such as furniture.

Though the Lacey Act is an important piece of legislation for tackling the trade in illegal timber, several implementation and enforcement challenges have arisen since the amendments were enacted, in particular the interpretation of ‘due care’. Improvements to the procedure for processing import declaration forms are also required to ensure effective enforcement of the act. In order to effectively tackle illegal logging and the related trade, the US government should also continue to encourage its trading partners to strengthen their forest governance.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade. 

The Netherlands has shown a strong response to the problem of illegal logging and related trade: the government played an active part in the development of the EU’s FLEGT Action Plan, and has been supporting the negotiation and implementation of Voluntary Partnership Agreements with producer countries.

The government has also been promoting the production and consumption of sustainable timber. It has a comprehensive procurement policy, established the Sustainable Trade Initiative and helped to launch the European Sustainable Tropical Timber Coalition.

As a result both of these government actions and of promotion by the private sector, there is a high proportion of certified wood-based products on the Dutch market as well as a large number of companies with chain-of-custody certification. A high level of media coverage on the issue of illegal logging also indicates that there is widespread awareness of this issue.

This response is thought to be partly responsible for the decline in imports into the Netherlands of timber-sector products likely to be illegal, currently estimated to comprise two per cent of the total. However, there has been a significant shift in the types and sources of high-risk products coming into the country, reflecting changes in the global timber industry: a growing proportion is coming from China and comprises more highly processed products such as furniture.

While the Netherlands has been one of the most proactive European countries in addressing illegal logging and the related trade, further action could be taken. A key challenge will be effective enforcement of the EU Timber Regulation given the Netherlands’ role as a major conduit for timber to the rest of Europe. Systematic monitoring of its timber procurement policy is also required.

This paper accompanies a series of Chatham House assessments on China, France, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK, the US and Vietnam and provides details on how the estimates of the level of illegality of imports of wood-based products into those countries were derived. The assessments are part of a research project that monitored levels of illegal logging and related trade in selected consumer, producer and processing countries in order to evaluate the effectiveness of efforts to tackle this problem.

The paper describes the methodology for estimating the levels of wood-based products at high risk of illegality that are being imported into consumer and processing countries. The methodology was developed in order to provide quantitative estimates of the scale of such imports and to assess how they have changed over time. The figures adopted for the assessments are based on the best available evidence; but, given the challenges of quantifying levels of illegal logging and the limited information available for some countries, they should not be regarded as definitive. Rather, they indicate the likely levels of illegality and, perhaps more important, how they may have changed over time.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade. The Chinese government has made notable progress in its efforts to tackle illegal logging and the associated trade. This has included the development of a draft national timber legality verification system (TLVS) and its active engagement with a number of consumer countries. The government’s plans to establish bilateral trade agreements with producer countries are also encouraging, although no formalized commitments have yet been made. Reflecting the growing awareness of the impact of Chinese companies overseas, the government has also been developing further guidance to promote sustainable forest products trade and investment.

The private sector is also taking action, with continued growth in the uptake of chain-of-custody (CoC) certification. Industry associations have been promoting legal and sustainable sourcing, and they will have an important role to play in testing the draft TLVS.

These steps are likely to have had an impact on the volume of illegal wood-based products being imported into China. However, trade data discrepancies and analysis of trade flows both indicate that illegal trade remains a significant problem. While imports of high-risk products are estimated to have declined since 2000, these are reckoned to comprise 17 per cent of the total by volume in 2013. This proportion is high compared with other timber-importing countries examined in this assessment.

In order to build on its response to illegal logging and related trade, the Chinese government should establish binding regulations and stringent controls on the import and export of illegal wood-based products. The draft TLVS should be further developed, including through pilot projects with timber-exporting countries and effective consultation with industry, civil society and other consumer-country governments. The government’s procurement policy should be strengthened through the clarification of its legality and sustainability requirements, the inclusion of a wider range of products within its scope, and the development of a robust mechanism to monitor compliance. 

Increased training for the private sector on due diligence, market regulations and legality requirements in consumer countries is required to stimulate further action by industry, and the work to elaborate further guidelines for companies operating overseas in the forest products trade should be continued. Awareness-raising initiatives for Chinese consumers should also be extended, in order to increase demand for verified legal wood-based products.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade. 

The Vietnamese government has made some progress towards tackling illegal logging and the associated trade. It has negotiated a voluntary partnership agreement (VPA) with the EU, a process that has prompted a review of relevant legislation and improved the government’s engagement with civil society. In addition, it has signed agreements with Lao PDR and Cambodia in which it has committed to coordination on forest management and trade. However, there has been little progress in policy reform, and there is still no legislation regulating illegal timber imports.

There is a high level of awareness of illegal logging and associated trade within the private sector: Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) chain-of-custody (CoC) certification has increased rapidly, particularly in the furniture sector. But efforts are hampered by poor access to third-party verified raw material.

Both trade data discrepancies and analysis of trade flows indicate that illegal trade remains a serious problem. The volume of imports of wood-based products at a high risk of illegality is estimated to have increased since 2000, while its share in the volume of total imports of wood-based products gradually declined until 2009 and then increased slightly: they are estimated to have comprised 18 per cent of the total by volume in 2013.

In order to build on its response to illegal logging and related trade, the government should establish a legal responsibility for Vietnamese importers to ensure that their timber sources are legal. Furthermore, to increase domestic demand for legal products, it should establish a public procurement policy requiring the use of verified legal products. Within the framework of the VPA, broad and effective multi-stakeholder engagement will be vital to ensure that a robust timber legality assurance system is developed. In addition, proactive partnerships should be forged with high-risk supply countries to establish legality criteria and indicators that reflect the full scope of the relevant legislation in those countries.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses the global response to illegal logging and the related trade. 

This assessment of the extent of illegal logging in Cameroon and the response to this issue suggests that progress has stalled since 2010. The reform of the legislative framework for the forest sector has yet to be completed; and while there have been improvements in the availability of forestry information, there remain many gaps. Furthermore, the principle of transparency has yet to be broadly accepted within the government. Enforcement is weak and information management systems are deemed inadequate. Most important, corruption remains widespread and the political will needed to drive change is felt to be lacking.

While there is evidence of progress in the private sector – the area of forests with legality verification and certification has increased – illegal activities are rife throughout the forest sector. Half of all timber production is estimated to come from the informal artisanal sector – mainly supplying the domestic market. However, illegal activities are also common in supply chains for export: timber originating from ‘small permits’ and sales of standing volume permits is thought to be particularly problematic. This is of particular concern, as the supply of timber from such permits is expected to increase owing to the growing pressure on forests from other sectors.

Since 2000 trade has shifted away from sensitive markets: the EU market’s significance as a destination for Cameroon’s exports of timber-sector products has decreased, while China’s significance has increased enormously. This has important implications for strategies on how best to tackle illegal logging in Cameroon.

In order to make further progress, markets for legal timber need to continue to be developed in key consumer countries – which, in the case of Cameroon, are now both the EU and China. Within Cameroon, further analysis of the political economy of the forest sector is required. Attempts to tackle corruption should be reinforced, and this would be facilitated by examining the experience of anti-corruption efforts elsewhere in the world. Further improvements to transparency are needed; the establishment of a new independent observer will be important in achieving this goal.

The next stages of legal reform will require broad consultation among stakeholders, in particular small-scale producers as well as local communities and indigenous peoples. Efforts to promote a legal domestic market should be intensified, including more extensive training and outreach for small-scale producers and processors. Finally, to improve enforcement efforts, continued investment in the training of enforcement agents and the provision of adequate resources are required.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses the global response to illegal logging and the related trade. 

There has been limited progress in tackling illegal logging and related trade in Malaysia since 2010. Widespread problems remain, particularly in the state of Sarawak. There are high levels of deforestation throughout the country: expansion of timber, pulp and agricultural plantations (including oil palm and rubber) is the main driver of forest loss.

Forest policy-making in Malaysia involves both the federal and state governments, but the states have prerogative rights to develop their own policies on land and forests. This poses challenges, not least since governance of the forest sector varies quite significantly from one region of the country to another.

The government has been negotiating a Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the EU since 2007. Negotiations stalled for a number of years but resumed in 2012 without the participation of Sarawak. Concerns remain among stakeholders about the limited recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights by the government, as well as about corruption and the lack of transparency.

Awareness of illegal logging and related trade is increasing in the private sector, although the area of natural forest concessions certified as being under sustainable production remained virtually unchanged during the period 2008–12.

Asia is the major export market destination for Malaysia’s timber products. However, both the US and the EU import significant volumes of wood-based products from Malaysia too.

The Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) has recently stepped up investigating corruption in the forest sector. In Sarawak, an intensified focus on combatting illegal logging could signal a turning point for the state’s forest sector.

In order to build on its response to illegal logging and related trade to date, the Malaysian government should fully engage with the voluntary partnership agreement process and improve multi-stakeholder participation. Transparency in decisions about forest allocation needs to be significantly improved and greater recognition accorded to the rights of indigenous peoples.

More concerted efforts are required to tackle high-level corruption – for example, through strengthening the MACC. At the same time, the government should consider options for an independent monitor for the forest sector as a means of improving forest governance.

This event will focus on the trade in Pericopsis elata (Afrormosia/Assamela) harvested in West and Central Africa, and will be co-chaired by Emmanuel Heuse, FLEGT facilitator in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

This workshop is supported by the Climate and Land Use Alliance, the UK Department of International Development and the European Union Action to Fight Environmental Crime.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.