Over recent weeks, widespread popular protests have engulfed Iraq and Lebanon. What began as calls for reform in the context of high unemployment and endemic corruption have evolved into direct challenges to the existing political order in both countries.

In response, ruling elites have moved to protect the systems from which they draw power. In Iraq, the state has responded to protests with violence, killing more than 300 people and injuring over 15,000. In Lebanon, protesters are facing attempts at co-optation and intransigence by their leaders. These developments have served to underline the widening gap between elites and ordinary citizens and to highlight geopolitical tensions in the region that have contributed to both countries' woes.

This event will delve into what is at stake for those mobilizing in Iraq and Lebanon. Speakers will discuss the obstacles to meaningful reform and possible routes out of the current crises.

To attend this event, please e-mail Reni Zhelyazkova.

There is a broad consensus that Libya’s rentier, patronage-based system of governance is a driver, and not only a symptom, of Libya’s continuing conflict. The dysfunction of Libya’s economic system of governance has been exacerbated by the governance split that has prevailed since 2014 whereby rival administrations of state institutions have emerged. Despite these challenges, a system of economic interdependence, whereby forces aligned with Field Marshal Haftar control much of the oil and gas infrastructure and the UN-backed Government of National Accord controls the means of financial distribution, has largely prevailed. Yet, at the time of writing, this is under threat: a damaging oil blockade is being implemented by forces aligned with Haftar and those state institutions that do function on a national basis are finding it increasingly difficult to avoid being dragged into the conflict.

This roundtable will bring together analysts and policymakers to discuss these dynamics and look at possible remedies. Jason Pack, non-resident fellow at the Middle East Institute, will present the findings of his latest paper on the issue which recommends the formation of 'a Libyan-requested and Libyan-led International Financial Commission vested with the requisite authorities to completely restructure the economy.' Tim Eaton, who has been leading Chatham House’s work on Libya’s conflict economy, supporting UNSMIL’s efforts in this field, will act as respondent.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

On April 9, Iraqi President Barham Salih gathered the Shia, Kurdish and Sunni political blocs at the presidential palace to task head of intelligence Mustafa al-Kadhimi with forming a government.

Kadhimi is the third prime minister-designate assigned since Prime Minister Adil abd al-Mehdi resigned in November, in the wake of mass protests against government corruption and the country’s ethno-sectarian based political system.

Kadhimi’s two predecessors, Muhammad Tawfiq Allawi and Adnan al-Zurfi, both failed to form a government. This third attempt came as Iraq struggles with repeated crises since October 2019, when the government began responding with deadly force to large-scale mass protests, killing more than 600 and injuring tens of thousands.

In January, the assassination of Qasem Soleimani escalated tensions between the United States and Iran, with Iraq stuck in the middle and becoming the home for regular tit-for-tat attacks. The Islamic State — never completely defeated — took advantage of these crises and increased its attacks in disputed territories.

The outbreak of COVID-19 challenges the country’s fragile public health sector, while the decline in the price of oil will make it harder for leaders to pay the public salaries that keep the system (and patronage) moving.

What does the delay in forming a government amid multiple crises mean for the post-2003 Iraqi political system?

Iraq’s post-2003 political system is designed to withstand crisis. Over the years, political parties reflecting the country’s ethnic and sectarian divides have had a tacit understanding that crises represent a risk to their collective interests. These elite stakeholders have together weathered civil war, insurgency and multiple protests — despite deep conflicts with one another.

For instance, in September 2018 protesters attacked most major political party headquarters and the Iranian consulate in Basra, and authorities killed some 20 protesters.

Since the May election of that year, the fragmented Shia elite had been unable to even declare which side has the largest parliamentary bloc, let alone decide on a government.

But after the September crisis, the previously gridlocked parties swiftly came together to form an “understanding” that pushed through the impasse leading to the Mehdi government. In 2020, however, Iraq’s political parties were slower to come back together despite the multiple crises — far greater than 2018. The system is less able to swiftly fix itself, based primarily on the fragmentation of the elite — and their determination to prevent any challenge to their rule.

Why did the two prior attempts fail?

The two previous prime minister-designates each fell short for different reasons. When I met Allawi in February at the prime minister’s guesthouse in Baghdad, he was very clearly convinced that his mandate was to sideline the parties.

He hoped that simply choosing technocratic ministers outside the elite pact, with the support of Moqtada al-Sadr behind him, would garner support from protesters and the disillusioned public. He failed, however, because his cabinet had to go through parliament and the parties rejected what they saw a threat to the elite pact and the system.

Zurfi similarly failed after being directly appointed in March by Salih after the Shia parties failed to come up with a candidate. From the beginning, then, Zurfi faced challenges because parties were not in agreement. He attempted to directly confront his opposition, and spoke out against Iranian influence in Iraq. As a result, Zurfi was unable to even get to parliament with his proposed cabinet, as the Shia parties got back together to bring him down.

The failure of both strategies — Allawi attempting to work outside the elite party system and Zurfi trying to target certain parties — reveals tensions in Iraq’s political system. This fragmentation strains the parties’ ability to swiftly unite, and the system’s ability to withstand crises.

The endemic problems are a consequence of fragmentation, including the failure following the 2018 elections to declare governing parliamentary bloc. Moreover, after that election, newcomers into the political system (two-thirds of the MPs are serving their first term) are increasingly making their own demands and less willing to blindly toe party lines.

Can Kadhimi overcome the impasse?

Kadhimi’s appointment as prime minister-designate nonetheless is on shaky foundations. His appointment had previously faced a veto from Iran and its allied groups which make up the Fateh bloc. Kataeb Hezbollah, an armed group close to Iran and linked to the Popular Mobilization Units, issued a statement accusing Kadhimi with blood on his hands for the deaths of Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.

Many Fateh bloc members had for months vetoed Kadhimi’s name due to this allegation. Immediately before Kadhimi addressed the nation for the first time, Iraqi state television broadcast a prerecorded statement by PMU (and Fateh) leader Qais al-Khazali, who had also previously accused Kadhimi of spying for the Americans and being complicit in the two killings.

Khazali, who commands the second-largest party within Fateh, accepted the party line to back Kadhimi but came out with his own conditions on television. However, the concerns about the COVID-19 crisis and the collapse of the price of oil finally brought all sides to compromise — a design of the political system.

Kadhimi has signalled he will play by the old rules with these stakeholders. Because of the magnitude of these simultaneous crises, Iraqi politics is moving back to the post-2003 norm. The ethno-sectarian based political system is geared to weather such existential crises more than it is to handling day-to-day governance. Despite the notion of “post-sectarianism” in Iraq, this system is based on ethno-sectarian political party compromise.

In his television address, Khazali, who had previously attempted to move away from sectarian language, explained that the process of selecting a prime minister is reserved to the Shia, who have the right as the majority, and not to Salih, a Kurd.

Over the years Kadhimi has expressed an admiration of the bravery of the protesters and of the importance of civil society. Many Iraqi civil society activists owe their lives to the work of the former intelligence chief. However, he has also been part of the same system that has violently suppressed protesters.

As the compromise prime minister-designate, he will find it difficult to transform his country as long as he plays by the rules of post-2003 Iraq — an irony not lost on the protesters who immediately rejected the candidacy of a man whom until recently many protesters had supported.

This article was originally published in The Washington Post

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Efforts to address illegal logging and reduce the trade in illegal timber have borne fruit and prompted some positive reforms in producer countries, a new report from Chatham House has found. However, changes in the sector mean overall trade in illegal timber has not fallen in the last decade. 
  
EU and US policies designed to reduce demand for illegal timber have helped cut illegal imports to those markets. These reforms and the EU’s partnership agreements with producer countries have prompted improvements in forest governance and a fall in large-scale illegal timber production.

But growth of demand in emerging markets means that the progressive policies of so-called ‘sensitive markets’ are now less influential. China is now the world’s largest importer and consumer of wood-based products, as well as a key processing hub. India, South Korea, and Vietnam are also growing markets. The increasing role of small-scale producers, whose activities often fall outside legal frameworks, and a rapid increase in illegal forest conversion, also present new challenges. 
  
Alison Hoare: 'The EU and US have spearheaded some progressive and effective reforms. However, the changing scale and nature of the problem demands more coordinated international action. To stop further deforestation and associated carbon emissions, and to help achieve global objectives for sustainable development, the EU and US need to maintain their leadership while other countries - especially China, Japan, India and South Korea - need to step up their efforts to tackle illegal logging.'

The Chatham House report, which is based on the studies of 19 countries, which include key producers, consumers, or processors of timber, and is an update of a 2010 study found: 

Timber production

• More than 80 million m3 of timber was illegally produced in 2013 in the nine producer countries assessed, accounting for about one-third of their combined total production.
• An estimated 60% of this illegal timber is destined for these countries’ domestic markets.
• Small-scale producers are increasingly important – for example, in Cameroon, the DRC and Ghana, they account for an estimated 50, 90 and 70% respectively of annual timber production. The majority of this is illegal.
• For the nine producer countries, the area of forest under voluntary legality verification or sustainability certification schemes increased by nearly 80% between 2000 and 2013. 

Imports of illegal wood-based products 

• In most of the consumer and producer countries assessed, the volume of illegal imports of wood-based products fell during the period 2000–13. 
• The exceptions were China, and India and Vietnam where the volume of illegal imports more than doubled. 
• As a proportion of the whole, illegal imports declined for nearly all countries. 
• However, at the global level, the proportion of illegal timber imports remained steady at 10% - a result of the growth of the Chinese market. 

The EU and US 

• The volumes of illegal imports into the UK, France and the Netherlands nearly halved over the period 2000-13, from just under 4 million m3 to 2 million m3. 
• The volume of illegal imports into the US increased between 2000 and 2006, from around 5 to 9 million m3, and then declined to just under 6 million m3 in 2013. 
• In 2013, more than 60% of illegal imports of wood-based products to the UK and US came from China.

China

• The volume of illegal imports into China doubled between 2000 and 2013 from 17 to 33 million m3; but as a proportion of the whole illegal imports fell, from 26 to 17%.
•  The volume of exports of wood-based products (legal and illegal) from the nine producer countries to China nearly tripled, from 12 million m3 in 2000 to 34 million m3 in 2013.

The Chatham House report makes the following recommendations:

• The EU and US need to maintain and reinforce current efforts 
• Other countries need to take stronger action – China in particular, but also India, Japan and South Korea
• Strong international cooperation is needed to maintain & reinforce current efforts – the G20 could provide a forum to galvanise international action
• Producer countries need to focus on strengthening efforts to tackle corruption, improving legality within the small-scale sector, and reforming land-use governance 

     
Alison Hoare: 'Developing countries are losing significant amounts of potential revenue from illegal logging, which is also causing the loss and degradation of forests, depleting livelihoods, and contributing to social conflict and corruption. Tackling illegal logging and strengthening forest governance are essential for achieving critical climate and development goals. Having seen the progress that can be made, it’s imperative that governments agree to work together to rise to new challenges and promote a more sustainable forest sector for the benefit of all.'   

Read the report >>

The global health system has contributed significantly to improved health and life expectancy in recent decades. However, the existing architecture needs to be reformed in order to address future challenges and meet the health targets in the Sustainable Development Goals. Rethinking the Global Health System, a new Chatham House report, analyses how fit for purpose the current system is and identifies priority areas for reform. 

The Ebola crisis has shown that weak systems make individual countries more vulnerable and that strong, resilient and equitable systems at country level are needed to protect global health security. There is a pressing need for enhanced global disease surveillance and detection capacity, as well as improved international coordination in responding to emerging health threats.

In addition, addressing determinants of health outside the health sector requires cross-sectoral collaboration and linkages to other policy domains. Historically, the focus has rested on directly reducing illness and death, but the need to address other influences on health outcomes – safe drinking water, proper sewage treatment, good education – is now well recognized.

The report says that stronger leadership in global health is therefore required and the report lends support to calls for the creation of a new organization that would bring together United Nations agencies with health-related mandates – UN-HEALTH. Just as UNAIDS created a more coherent response for HIV, a UN-HEALTH organization could achieve a similar but more wide-reaching effect by bringing together and streamlining all UN agencies working on global health issues.

Professor David Harper, who led the Chatham House project that resulted in the report, said: 

'This report is intended to make a substantial contribution to the international debate on what the world will require of the health architecture of the future. It offers some options for political leaders to consider, but it is just a starting point. More work is urgently needed to develop the ideas introduced in this project and to help generate the high-level political traction that is so vital in any change process.'