Why Europe must end limbo for Afghans seeking asylum Expert comment Anonymous (not verified) 14 October 2021

With a focus on evacuations from Afghanistan, the situation in Europe is often forgotten as thousands of asylum seekers continue to wait for their cases to be settled.

Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, European leaders shared messages to welcome those evacuated, but the reality of European responses to displacement in Afghanistan paints a more contentious picture. 

As of July 2021, 33,325 cases of Afghan asylum applicants were pending in Germany, in France 18,410 people were waiting on a decision, while in Greece the numbers were 13,660. 

Arguably, such numbers are manageable given European states’ size and their functioning asylum systems but, while 56 per cent of Afghans in Europe receive protection status, a large proportion is still in limbo in differing European countries’ asylum systems. 

Europe hosts fewer than ten per cent of the three million UN-registered displaced Afghans globally, as neighbouring countries carry the burden of Afghanistan’s forced displacement: Iran hosts almost one million Afghan refugees and Pakistan 1.5 million, and these numbers double when adding undocumented or Afghan passport holders.
 
But despite these manageable numbers, national authorities in Europe often leave people waiting for months or even years to receive an asylum decision. Deportations to Afghanistan were halted only after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul and even then there was resistance to this from certain European countries, while Austria suggested setting up ‘deportation centres’ in countries neighbouring Afghanistan. 

Europe remains a fortress

The European Commission’s Draft Action Plan responding to the events in Afghanistan confirmed the willingness of the European Union (EU) to continue returns to non-European ‘third countries’. So Europe remains a fortress, despite pledging support for ‘the safe and orderly departure of foreign nationals and Afghans who wish to leave the country’. 

The wall by Greece at its border with Turkey and Poland’s treatment of Afghan asylum seekers trapped at its border with Belarus illustrate this hardline stance. The president of the European Council Charles Michel and EU Home Affairs Chief Ylva Johansson both confirm the priority is to secure European borders. 

This is further backed up by the European Council’s latest set of Conclusions on Afghanistan which focuses on security and ‘preventing illegal migration’ while avoiding reference to any domestic asylum efforts or the establishment of protection pathways for Afghans. 

This disconnect is not new. At the national level, reports of illegal pushbacks on European land and sea borders alarmingly intensified in 2020 as authorities intercepted and sent migrants back to neighbouring countries without assessing asylum claims. 

At the EU level, development aid to countries such as Afghanistan has long been conditional on their governments’ adherence to the bloc’s migration objectives of preventing asylum seekers from reaching European borders and facilitating the repatriation of those refused asylum in Europe. 

But this latest displacement crisis from Afghanistan exposes clear inconsistencies in European approaches to asylum and humanitarianism. Migration remains a divisive issue in European politics, but European governments must act promptly to support Afghans already residing in their territories alongside establishing robust international commitments.

Time for concrete action

European countries should firstly improve the treatment of those Afghans currently in limbo within their respective asylum systems by expediting pending Afghan asylum applications and family reunification cases, re-examining rejected asylum applications, and facilitating integration.

Secondly, national authorities should not return asylum seekers to Afghanistan or any third countries deemed ‘safe’. For Europe to coordinate evacuations from Afghanistan while simultaneously deporting asylum seekers undermines the international refugee regime and threaten Europe’s global credibility. 

The law as a tool for EU integration could be ending Expert comment NCapeling 15 October 2021

Poland is not the only EU member state challenging the supremacy of European law, as historic change is happening in how European integration functions.

The Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling that several articles of the European treaties are incompatible with the Polish constitution is prompting much debate, especially in terms of both the similarities and differences between it and rulings by the German constitutional court which have also challenged the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

Pro-Europeans are keen to draw a sharp distinction between the reasoning deployed by the two courts. They see the Polish court’s challenge as an exceptional case which the European Union (EU) cannot ‘tolerate’ because it would lead to the ‘demolition of the EU’s legal order from within’ and argue the EU must take a tough approach to Poland by re-asserting the supremacy of EU law.

But this view misses a bigger long-term shift in the EU. Both the German and Polish cases illustrate some of the basic conflicts within the EU’s legal system for decades. What is being challenged increasingly openly – even since the UK left the EU – is the idea of the EU as a de facto federation in which non-majoritarian institutions such as the ECJ have final say about the quality of democracy in member states.

ECJ’s quiet revolution

Historically ‘integration through law’ was central to the European project and the ECJ was a key institution driving forward integration – usually benefiting from what Erik Stein called ‘benign neglect by the powers that be and the mass media’. Even when European integration in the form of treaties stalled in the 1960s and 1970s, ‘judicial integration’ through the ECJ continued, including its notable 1964 decision that EU law was supreme.

This self-empowerment of the ECJ – what another scholar of European constitutionalism Joseph Weiler calls ‘a quiet revolution’ – was possible because there was a ‘permissive consensus’ in member states which allowed judicial integration to continue largely unchallenged. But this has now changed as both politicians and national courts are more willing to challenge what they see as judicial overreach.

There are important differences between the approach of the German and the Polish constitutional courts. The Law and Justice Party has politicized the Polish court, packing it with judges sympathetic to that party, whereas the German court is more independent.

In addition, whereas the German court made qualified and subdued objections to measures taken in response to the euro crisis during the past decade and, in particular, the steps towards the mutualization of eurozone debt – but often backed down with ‘all bark and no bite’ as Christoph Schmid put it – the Polish court is driven by political considerations and has challenged the supremacy of EU law in a more direct and general way.

However, the German court has made it clear it is the guardian of the German constitution and seeks to impose limits on the ECJ’s self-empowerment by arguing Europe is not a federation. According to the German court’s theory of ‘constitutional pluralism’, there is in effect a constant dialogue and accommodation between the national and EU level rather than a simple primacy of EU law over national law.

The court sees itself as the ultimate arbiter of whether steps in European integration are consistent with the German constitution, and is likely to challenge any further steps in fiscal integration even if the ECJ deems them in accordance with the treaties – as it did with the European Central Bank’s quantitative easing programme.

Supremacy of EU law is under pressure

Right across Europe, courts and politicians are increasingly challenging the ECJ and questioning the supremacy of EU law. Michel Barnier called for France to regain ‘legal sovereignty’ and should no longer be subject to the judgments of the ECJ – an extraordinary demand from the EU Brexit negotiator who regularly lectured the UK about the sanctity of the EU’s legal order.

Other possible French presidential candidates such as Valérie Pécresse and Eric Zemmour are also openly challenging the primacy of EU law. The UK, of course, is fighting its own battle with the EU about the ECJ’s role in the Northern Ireland Protocol.

It was not the current Polish government but the people of France and the Netherlands who blocked the attempt at explicit constitutionalisation of the EU in a referendum just one year after the 2004 enlargement. Whereas the Constitutional Treaty ‘would have codified the doctrine of EU legal supremacy’, that provision was dropped from its successor the Lisbon Treaty, again indicating consensus on EU legal supremacy is not as strong as is often claimed.

The West must face down Putin The World Today MVieira 1 February 2022

If Russia’s ambitions are not checked, the implications will be global, warns James Nixey

After seven years of invasions, annexations, assassinations, abuses and now the current crisis in European security over the fate of Ukraine, one thing has been laid bare: the true nature of the Russian state.

Moscow made its ambition clear in mid-December with the unprecedented and public issuing of ultimatums in the form of draft treaty proposals.

Portrayed by Russia as an attempt to end Nato’s expansion eastwards, the Kremlin is in fact demanding that the United States and western institutions roll back their security guarantees to Eastern Europe. 

These are not two sides of the same coin if one believes and accepts the principles of the Helsinki Accords that the successor states to the Soviet Union are just as independent and sovereign as Russia.

Russia’s demands laid bare equate to giving it a free hand in Eastern Europe. This should not be reduced to simplistic labels such as ‘territorial expansionism’ or a ‘return to the Soviet Union’, both of which can be picked at for a lack of accuracy.

But it is, in Russia’s own words, the most explicit statement yet of its long-standing desire to return to a former age, where great powers directed their respective spheres of influence – a yearning for a time of empire and a disregard for the flow of history.

The intense diplomatic and media focus since then suggests there is a consensus that Russia has gone beyond being an awkward player at the negotiation table or a bully who can be dealt with further down the line.

But this has not as yet led to the operational conclusion that Russia must be challenged and ultimately faced down, no matter how unpalatable.

The logical response to the exposure of Russia’s true intentions would be an overhaul of western policy. Yet the West persists in its article of faith that dialogue with Russia will bring about a change in its behaviour – despite all evidence to the contrary. 

Western politicians have been anxious to avoid direct confrontation with Russia. But the Kremlin is likely to see this course of action as confirmation that it can proceed unchecked. When Moscow has chosen the path of conflict, efforts at dialogue rarely bring a peaceful resolution. 

Russia is blessed with particularly talented negotiators. While it has its fair share of angry ultra-nationalists who are easily dismissed, it also has more subtle brains at official and unofficial levels with whom western politicians are eager to engage to claim morsels of intelligence or to show that the Kremlin is not beyond redemption.

Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, is an intelligent and experienced man, who is adept at dismissing the protests of most of his western counterparts. In such circumstances, and with such a pressing need to avoid a war, dialogue must be tightly contained as it has the potential to lead to compromise in areas where there should be none.

Russia’s ambitions for a land empire

Eastern European states which were part of the Soviet Union or signatories to the Warsaw Pact are geographically closer to Russia and as a result more physically at risk. But their history and close relations with Moscow in the past have allowed them to acquire experience and expertise in dealing with their more powerful neighbour.

They uphold principled stances on sovereign rights, which has led the Kremlin to brand the Baltic states, Ukraine and more recently Moldova as traitors. To the West, on the other hand, they can often be seen as awkward or getting in the way.

While the sandwiched eastern states may have much to teach us about dealing with Russia, some central European countries have a closer relationship with Moscow. Serbia’s security services have recently been exposed as being under the influence of Russia’s own FSB, the Federal Security Service, successor to the KGB, and have colluded in repressing Moscow’s political opponents. At the same time, Viktor Orbán’s Hungary continues to defy the European Union with its repressions and is one of the few states that looks to Russia as a model. 

What is at stake here is a basic grasp of the nature of relations between states in the 21st century. What Russia is insisting on is its right to a land empire which is entirely at odds with the principles of statehood that now govern Europe, and indeed much of the rest of the world.

By failing to address the real nature of Russia’s demands, Europe is avoiding critical decisions that will affect its future security for generations to come. The implications of that avoidance do not only affect Europe – they are global in importance. 

Other powers, most notably China, will watch closely how the West responds to Russia and gauge its willingness to support allies, friends and partners against aggression.

Any failure to respond firmly to Russia’s approach of demanding limits on the sovereignty of its neighbours, backed by the threat of military force, can only encourage similar strong-arm tactics elsewhere. It is notable that, from Chechnya to Syria, Russia has not yet suffered an unambiguous defeat when it has asserted its ambitions through military power. 

Resolving the incompatibility between the way Russia sees itself and what the rest of Europe views as the acceptable limits of Russian power will be a long, painful process. Facing down Russia will take skill, time, spine, money, grit and self-sacrifice. Sanctions, for example, hurt those imposing them as well as the receiver. These are attributes in short supply in what Russia considers to be the weak, decadent West. 

Since such resources are unlikely to be found, the unappetizing future for relations is most likely to involve Russia continuing to chip away at European sovereignty while its own structural flaws further weaken it to the point of irrelevance, or to push it to take ever more extreme risks.

Why a no-fly zone risks escalating the Ukraine conflict Expert comment NCapeling 13 March 2022

The US rejection of Poland’s offer to send fighter jets as a boost to Ukraine’s air defence shows just how uneasy nations are about direct combat with Russia.

The Pentagon’s decision to turn down the proposal by its fellow NATO member Poland to put Russian-made MiG-29 jets at its disposal demonstrates again how keen the US and allies are to avoid risking major confrontation with Russian forces.

The US Department of Defense says the offer to locate jets at bases in Germany was ‘not tenable’ as this risks flying into contested airspace over Ukraine – a non-NATO member – raising ‘serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance’ and echoing the continuing rejection of calls to implement no-fly zones (NFZs) as a way of easing the devastation being faced by trapped Ukraine civilians.

NFZs restrict any aircraft, including drones, from flying over a pre-defined region and can be used for both military and civilian purposes. But the implementation of NFZs is difficult to enforce and – most significantly – is unlikely to achieve the intended effect on the ground.

In conflict situations, they are usually implemented under the remit of United Nations (UN) peace support operations, requiring authorization under Article 42 of the UN Charter. This details that if all possible methods have proven ineffective in responding to a threat, countries ‘may take such action by air, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’.

Protection but with limitations

NFZs provide both protection from attack and surveillance but do have limitations. They must be monitored and enforced which requires committing to fighter jet patrols with the explicit task of defending the area from the air by whatever means necessary.

This could mean jets firing upon Russian planes and drones so, if NATO allies and partners were to enforce a NFZ, it would represent an escalation of measures which is a step that would most likely provoke an unpredictable Vladimir Putin into further escalation – in short, it is highly likely to be seen as an act of war.

UK defence secretary Ben Wallace – among others – has repeatedly dispelled the idea, saying that enforcing NFZs would mean deploying ‘British fighter jets directly against Russian fighter jets’. In relation to moves such as the Polish jets, the Kremlin has warned that any countries offering airfields to Ukraine for attacks on Russia may be viewed as having entered the conflict.

There have only been three past instances of military NFZs. In Bosnia, as part of Operation Deny Flight from 1993-1995, a NFZ was enforced as part of a strategy which also including the provision of close air support and approved air strikes.

In Iraq, an NFZ endured for 12 years from 1991 and was succcesful in preventing Saddam Hussein from attacking Kurdish and Shia Muslim civilians. And in Libya in 2011, a NFZ was deployed to prevent the destruction of military infrastructure and the Libyan regime – although this quickly morphed into the provision of close air support.

So it is unclear just how successful NFZs are at providing protection. In Iraq and Libya, NFZ cover protection was provided but neither Saddam Hussein or Colonel Gaddafi were able to effectively target victims through their ground forces whereas, in Bosnia, Slobodan Milosevic infamously used ground troops to slaughter 8,000 Bosnian men and boys at Srebrenica.

Putin would still be able to continue to use both ground forces and artillery to assault Ukrainian cities with or without a NFZ – in fact, his sparse use of his Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) has been one of the surprising features of the war so far. Under a NFZ, missile attacks could also continue, there is nothing in the record of no-fly zones to suggest the provision of safe areas for non-combatants would work.

And NFZs have only been successful against vastly inferior forces such as in Iraq, Bosnia, and Libya. But Russia has an air force second only in size to the US and has a vast range of defences including the potent S-400 Triumf at its disposal. Not only would an NFZ be ineffective, it might also not be possible to enforce without risking significant losses to the peace operations force.

It is due to a combination of these reasons that NFZs have not been used more in previous conflicts. The most recent consideration for a NFZ was in Syria but President Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian forces, protected by Russian air cover, could still have targeted their intended victims despite air policing so a NFZ was not used.

In the long-term, under the terms of a ceasefire agreement, it may be possible to include a NFZ under a UN or joint OSCE-UN peace terms. However, the forces involved should exclude NATO allies and partners or any states with Russian alliances to avoid further conflict.

This leaves few suitable countries with the capacity, willingness, and political stance to be called on. Two of the world’s most militarily capable states – China and India – abstained in the Uniting for Peace vote in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Whether another willing state with the military capability – such as a Gulf state – could be considered acceptable to all sides remains to be tested.

Notable successes with SAMs

Many military commentators also note that currently Ukrainian forces are having notable success without jets, downing Russian aircraft using sophisticated surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) such as Stinger and Javelin, and NATO countries continue to supply those in their thousands.

Ukraine exposes Europe’s double standards for refugees Expert comment NCapeling 30 March 2022

As European governments provide swift protection assurances to those fleeing Ukraine, non-European asylum-seekers continue to face violence at the EU’s borders.

One month after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU) already faces its largest refugee crisis since World War Two, with more than ten million people having fled their homes – 6.5 million displaced within Ukraine and 3.9 million escaping to neighbouring countries.

Acting quickly and decisively, European governments have opened borders and European citizens have opened their homes in an unprecedented showing of solidarity towards refugees. But, with all eyes on Ukraine, the Greek coastguard continues to illegally push back asylum-seekers crossing from Turkey while Spanish police forcefully repel those who dare to jump the fence in Melilla.

The painful contrast exposes the double standards in the EU’s approach to refugees. With Europe’s grim history of restrictive asylum policies, it is wishful thinking that the warm welcome to Ukrainians will extend to all asylum-seekers. The EU solidarity to displaced Ukrainians illustrates the deeply politicized – and often discriminatory – nature of providing refugee protection.

However, the hope is this turning point in European history can at least set an important precedent for treating refugees more humanely. Undoubtedly, EU solidarity towards people fleeing the horrors of Putin’s war is critically important and the initial response is positive in its efforts to meet immense humanitarian needs.

Solidarity with Ukrainians

The EU activation of the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) is a significant step towards a more humane protection regime and fairer responsibility-sharing among member states. Without the need for the examination of individual applications, those fleeing Ukraine can access harmonized rights across the EU for three years – including residence, housing, medical assistance, and access to the labour market and education.

The TPD is also a move away from the strict ‘Dublin’ rules which put the pressure of hosting refugees onto the countries of ‘first arrival’. Ironically, the fiercest opponents of intra-EU solidarity, such as Poland and Hungary, are the ones benefiting from this change now but, in the case of Ukraine, geographical proximity and shared histories must be considered when analysing Europe’s response.

Eastern European and Baltic countries share a post-Soviet history and fear of Russian aggression, and Ukrainians already enjoyed 90 days of visa-free travel in the EU – with a large diaspora, many have established networks across Europe. But even considering these distinctive connections with Ukrainian displacement, the initial response still shows that European countries have both the political will and the capacity to host refugees.

Unlike the usual – often media-fuelled – narratives of refugee ‘invasions’ into Europe, the waves of women and children leaving Ukraine prompted a surge of humanitarian action but they are also a chilling reality check of Europe’s double standards.

The EU has used agreements with countries such as Turkey and Libya to prevent arrivals and outsource asylum responsibilities, while border violence, detention, and lengthy asylum procedures await the few asylum seekers who manage to enter Europe from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.

These ‘fortress Europe’ legacies have even undercut the humanitarian response in Ukraine, with reports of incidents of discrimination towards people of colour at the EU borders being condemned by the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU), the media facing allegations of racist reporting, and comments from Bulgarian PM Kiril Petkov providing a stark reminder of the islamophobia, racism, and history of colonization which still pervades European asylum policies.

Foreign policy also influences how EU leaders treat the right to asylum, as the geopolitics of Europe’s efforts to create a united front against Russian aggression is an undercurrent to the prompt European response to Ukrainians. But only a few months ago, non-European asylum-seekers trapped in freezing forests at the Poland-Belarus border were used as political pawns by Belarusian leader Aliaksandr Lukashenka and then dehumanised as a ‘hybrid attack’ by EU leaders.

A turning point for asylum in Europe?

Despite entrenched discriminatory precedents, it is worth looking ahead at this moment of reckoning. Although policy changes remain far off, the unity shown over Ukraine can help reshape and refocus political efforts towards increased responsibility-sharing among EU member states – the perennial ‘hot potato’ of the EU asylum system.

War on Ukraine: Exploring the humanitarian response to the conflict 12 April 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 April 2022 Online

This event explores the implications of the humanitarian realities from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the largest ground campaign in Europe since World War Two.

Reports from humanitarian organizations working in Ukraine are dire and reveal that a humanitarian disaster on an epic scale is unfolding.

The United Nations (UN) and other organizations estimate 12 million of Ukraine’s population are in need of assistance, 4.1 million have been displaced to neighbouring countries, and 6.4 million have become internally displaced.

Gillian Triggs, the assistant secretary-general and assistant high commissioner for protection at the UNHCR, joins other experts to discuss the humanitarian situation in Ukraine.

The panel considers:

• What are the greatest needs in Ukraine now?
• How can aid agencies meet those needs?
• What are the short and long-term implications of the crisis for Ukraine and Europe?
• How do international organizations work with local NGOs to provide food, medical aid and shelter?

This event is part of a regular series of events offering insight and analysis from experts and policymakers on how the war is affecting Ukraine, the region and the world.

This event is part of Chatham House’s ongoing work on the future of conflict.

Read the transcript

New research on 21st-century conflict 25 April 2022 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 April 2022 Online

This International Affairs webinar shares research on US special operations, urban warfare, and digital activism in recent conflicts.

Given the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, and continuing conflicts in Myanmar, Yemen, and other countries, it is important to understand the changing nature of conflict in the 21st century.

In this webinar, authors from the March 2022 issue of International Affairs share research on the transformation of Western special forces, the impact of army size in urban warfare, and the use of social media and online activism in war.

The speakers in this event drew on the following research:

• US Special Forces transformation: post-Fordism and the limits of networked warfare (https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab213)
• Urban insurgency in the twenty-first century: smaller militaries and increased conflict in cities (https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac007)
• Diasporas as cyberwarriors: infopolitics, participatory warfare and the 2020 Karabakh war (https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac015)

International Affairs was started at Chatham House in 1922 to communicate research to members who could not attend in person. Over the past 100 years, it has transformed into a journal that publishes academically rigorous and policy-relevant research. It is published for Chatham House by Oxford University Press. Read the latest issue here.

Africa and Europe: Cooperation on digital transitions and new technologies 26 May 2022 — 8:00AM TO 12:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 May 2022 Online

The 11th Africa Day International Conference takes place under the auspices of the president of the Republic of Slovenia, HE Mr Borut Pahor, and within the framework of the Bled Strategic Forum.

Slovenia’s annual high-level Africa event seeks to improve policy outcomes for citizens in Europe and Africa as a result of a mutual understanding and strengthened cooperation between the two regions.

The event is co-hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, the Chatham House Africa Programme and the European Commission.

Expert discussions at this year’s edition will examine collaborative links between Africa and Europe in promoting responsible innovation and governance of emerging technologies, as well as the role of technology in shaping creative and cultural economies.

The conference will be broadcast live on this website, on the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website and on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

Culture notes: Populists of the world unite The World Today rsoppelsa.drupal 25 May 2022

America’s hard-right has successfully played a long game at home, and now it’s schmoozing Europe. We should be worried, says Catherine Fieschi

The politics of advanced democracies is a rather Janus-faced affair these days. No sooner have we breathed a sigh of relief at the results of the French presidential election than a leaked United States Supreme Court document on Roe v Wade signals American abortion rights are under threat. 

Yes, Europe seems to be maintaining political unity in its support of Ukraine, and the US is lavishing eye-watering sums on it both in military and humanitarian aid. Yet one cannot help but feel that these might be short-lived spells of relief in the face of mounting storm clouds on the political horizon. Both at the domestic and international level, populist politics looks to be gathering pace still. 

On the domestic front, we should be cautious in our relief. In the French elections Emmanuel Macron was indeed re-elected, and comfortably so, but there is no denying the space occupied by populist politicians on the left and the right. In the first round, Marine Le Pen gained 23 per cent of the vote, left populist candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon 22 per cent, and far-right candidate Éric Zemmour 7 per cent. Add to this a record low turnout, and the picture is one of a system in which mainstream politics has overall been rejected in favour of various populist options. 

The Hungarians weren’t so lucky, and Viktor Orbán’s capture of the media and quashing of the opposition over his years in power delivered solid victory. 

What should be cause for further concern is what is happening in the United States, as well as its potential impact on European politics. A quick flick through American politics today suggests dysfunctionalities of staggering magnitude and depth, and the full extent of the success of the right-wing Republican project, as confirmed by the intention to reverse Roe v Wade. 

Any reversal of Roe v Wade is a further step towards a drastic re-territorialization of American politics: into red states and blue states, into urban v rural, into places where taxes fund public education and public goods and where they won’t. It is also about a re-territorialization of institutional power away from the federal and into state institutions. 

The words of JD Vance, the Ohio Republican senatorial candidate – author of the rather good memoir Hillbilly Elegy – pander to an ‘American heartlands’ view of the United States’ role in the world. Asked about the fate of Ukraine, Vance simply replied that he ‘didn’t really care what happens to Ukraine one way or another’. 

On an even more basic level, we would do well to keep in mind that there were 440 anti-voter bills in 49 states at the end of 2021 and rising, calling into question citizens’ basic rights to vote. Republicans have pursued this agenda relentlessly. They have played a long game and invested in media, education and minor and not so minor projects – all of which have secured them a social and political base that is well-disposed towards the deep reversal of the American liberal global project and that of its allies across the world.

And it is perhaps on this last point that we should be most alarmed. Between May 18-20, the Conservative Political Action Conference, an American conclave of the right, was held in Europe. Viktor Orbán gave the keynote speech, and other speakers included the Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s son, Eduardo, and the president of Spain’s far-right party Vox, Santiago Abascal, as well as some well-known American Trumpian voices, including Trump himself. Marine Le Pen, whose earlier appearance at the conference had met with rapturous applause, chose not to cosy-up too closely to Orbán in the run-up to the French parliamentary elections in June but she sent her deputy. 

The export of the Fox News-driven conference from across the Atlantic is deeply worrying. Up until now populists have failed in their attempts at international alliances. At the European Union level their nationalism has always been in the way of their working together, and their groups tend to be short-lived or ineffective as a result. As for American attempts in Europe, the one led by Steve Bannon, the former White House adviser, in 2020 that aimed to create an Academy for the Judeo-Christian West ended as a damp squib – possibly not helped by his dismissal from the White House amid charges of defrauding donors.

But something may be changing: the conference’s embrace of Orbán and an international smattering of ‘strongmen’ hailing from the hard-right, aligned with Putin and sup-ported by Trump and a media empire, suggests that we are entering a Trumpian-infused second act that in its triumphal revanchism is seeking to create an international right-wing populist, or even authoritarian front. This is about politics, media, but also money – something European populist parties have been short of. As Marine Le Pen explained to French voters, her party is so poor it had to borrow money from a Russian bank.  

As some have pointed out, the Russian aggression against Ukraine has complicated matters when it comes to Russian funding of disinformation to the West. Many routes have been shut down. But a new route between the US and Hungary as a platform to floss Europe with dirty money is a good replacement to the old Russian route. 
 

Reshaping NATO for an uncertain future The World Today mhiggins.drupal 25 May 2022

A Chatham House expert panel outlines the challenges for delegates at the Madrid summit where the roadmap for the transatlantic alliance will be created

This year had already been earmarked as pivotal for the shape and direction of European security even before Russia, a nuclear superpower, rolled its tanks into Ukraine.

On the agenda at the NATO summit in Madrid in June is the Strategic Concept, which sets out the alliance’s direction and priorities for the next decade. There is much to discuss. From shared values to the state of the security environment, the Strategic Concept will have a direct impact on the global security landscape.

Ten years ago, the world was a very different place. The United States had just withdrawn from its bloody war in Iraq and was still embroiled in Afghanistan fighting the Taliban. In China, Xi Jinping was poised to become the next president, while refugees escaping the vicious civil war in Syria were heading towards Europe. In Africa, Islamist activity in Mali was about to spread throughout the Sahel.

Now, Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine rages on NATO’s doorstep, spurring the once neutral countries of Sweden and Finland to seek membership. How will Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine affect the western security agenda and what will be the shape of the new NATO that emerges from these talks?  To help answer these questions, The World Today convened a panel of Chatham House experts to consider what the next 10 years holds for NATO.

Here is what they said.

Alice Billon-Galland
We shouldn’t expect a revolution, but more an adaptation of reforms that have taken place at NATO for quite a long time, especially since the Wales summit in 2014. NATO allies will have to decide on the Russian threat perception and decide how they want to reinforce their deterrence and defence posture in the East, and how this affects their ability to maintain a 360-degree approach and to carry out the ambitious NATO 2030 agenda.

Patricia Lewis
We need to understand how deterrence works far better and we should have better metrics by now. Russia and NATO do not wish to engage in conventional warfare with each other, which suggests that Nato’s conventional deterrence is working. That said, Putin’s nuclear threats have not been within the framework of deterrence. But nuclear deterrence has not worked in the way strategists imagined since the end of the Cold War, and we need a much clearer hard look at these weapons once this is all over.

Had we followed through on disarmament in the 1990s, Putin would have held very little sway today. Nuclear weapons and despots are not a good mix and with these weapons there are no small mistakes. We would be foolish to imagine that rationality will hold when it comes to nuclear decision-making.

It is time to put arms control back on the agenda and strengthen our efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. We need to put the elimination of these weapons back on the UN Security Council agenda.

Andrew Dorman
Finland and Sweden coming into NATO completely transforms the Baltic. It makes the deployment of reinforcements to the Baltic states an awful lot easier. From the Kremlin’s point of view, the last thing they want is another border with NATO. Russia is already overly committed and hasn’t got enough forces to deal with Ukraine. Its border with Finland is enormous. And NATO would be gaining two very robust, well-organized military forces. You are seeing a lot more NATO assets starting to look at the high north.

Hans Kundnani
I am actually slightly less worried about the Russian threat to NATO countries than I was before February 24. The war has demonstrated how weak the Russian military is, and so the idea that it might present a threat to Finland and Sweden seems less plausible than before. It is not even clear to me that Russia could do very much in other south-eastern European countries. It already seems pretty overstretched. This should make us more relaxed, rather than more worried, about threats to other countries and in particular to NATO countries or to Finland and Sweden.

Leslie Vinjamuri
Sweden and Finland moving forward with their requests for membership is a sign of success for the West, but it also raises important questions for the future of European security. The possibility that we lock in a division that might suit Europe and the United States now does not bode well for a Russia maybe 10 years out or with a different leader.

Alice Billon-Galland
We need to avoid mission creep, but we also need to avoid going back to a position where NATO only focuses on Russia and then set an agenda for 10 years based on that threat assessment alone. We will risk missing out on the next big challenge if we go back on something too specific. We risk being reactive, whereas the Strategic Concept is an exercise that should be proactive and provide a space for transatlantic partners to share broader common security concerns.

Patricia Lewis
NATO is open to all countries in the transatlantic area, and it is even possible that Russia could join in the future should they wish to apply. But it is important to remember that NATO is a political-military alliance, and its politics are fundamental to its cohesion, far more than that of any weapon system or a specific enemy. It will continue to address a wider range of threats as it has in, for example, Afghanistan and many of those will be directly related to the impacts of climate change.

One thing to note, in light of Russia’s nuclear threats, is that NATO’s characterization of itself as a ‘nuclear alliance’ should be revised. NATO needs to be resilient to ebbs and flows of weapon systems and not become over-reliant on one system which has recently demonstrated severe negative impacts.

Hans Kundnani
During the Cold War, what held the alliance together was a shared perception of a threat from the Soviet Union – not a set of shared values. After all, there were authoritarian states in NATO. After the end of the Cold War that overwhelming sense of a shared threat from the Soviet Union disappeared and NATO tried to reinvent itself as a community alliance of democracies with shared values.

But we now once again have authoritarian states in NATO. So it was really in danger of being pulled apart. The war in Ukraine has refocused NATO on its original, historic mission: collective security in relation to Russia. In that sense it has given NATO a lifeline.

Creon Butler
Shared values are still an awful lot stronger as an element of what ties NATO together now than they were in the past. I think you now have the threat perception coming back full force. But I still think you have that very strong element of values, indeed the extra countries that are coming in are very strong democratic countries.

The interesting question is the out-of-area stuff – the Afghanistan-related stuff and counterterrorism more generally, and how important those threats remain. I guess there is an element to that which is a global kind of threat, counterterrorism, but there is also the out-of-area activity which obviously has been transformed following the withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Alice Billon-Galland
The crisis management mandate needs to be looked at again with some of the lessons learnt after Afghanistan and Libya, especially given what happened in Kabul, and all the discussion around cooperative security. The question is not only how do we work with partners and countries in the region, but how do we want to engage with China, for instance? How do we want to work on new technologies? How do we want to work with the European Union, with the United Nations?

The alliance must decide what it wants to do versus  what it wants to set aside and have other organizations do, while it refocuses on its core historic tasks.

Andrew Dorman
One of the sensitive, ongoing debates within NATO is whether it has a global role or whether it has a more transatlantic role. There are divisions within NATO about which is its focus. I think the answer, to a degree, is both. One of the real challenges for policymakers, particularly the Biden administration, is that they are going to be pushing for NATO to act as a global player.

This is one of the dilemmas that NATO faces. It could spend all its time focused purely on the short term – that is Russia –  and ignore China, and then suddenly need to think, ‘Oh heck’. What happens if , as a result of this, Russia is essentially dropped into the China camp and Putin becomes Xi Jinping’s poodle? That is a real dilemma, and why I think the US is going to focus on a global NATO.

Leslie Vinjamuri
NATO may have a role to play in Washington’s China strategy. But it won’t be the most important institution. The Biden administration is relying on multiple frameworks for engaging in the Indo-Pacific. For example, the Quad – a partnership between the US, Japan, India and Australia – is designed to secure India’s participation. Pulling India into the region where it has economic power, influence, military and security capabilities and can move the needle. It is both an intelligent and pragmatic strategy to have a number of groupings, a patchwork of overlapping partnerships, including existing alliances. That seems right to me.

Patricia Lewis
It is unlikely that the US would want to create a global NATO. The US and its allies in other regions may wish to model future alliances on NATO, that have strong relationships with it in areas such as political coherence, interoperability, and joint training and exercises and such. But political decision-making would be better suited to sit within specific regional contexts.

Washington has formal alliances in the Indo-Pacific region that commit the US to, for example, the defence of Australia through the Anzus security treaty, as well as Japan. As Washington increases its focus on the Pacific, the existing political-military relationships in the region could become more coherent. We might see a version of a Pacific-Asia Treaty Organization emerge – a Pato. All this depends on how China uses its power and how perspectives in the region evolve.

Creon Butler
I am not sure it is a problem that NATO does not have a specific focus on dealing with the China threat. It potentially has a role in dealing with those things that are seen by the membership as common threats. Which clearly is Russia now but has added terrorism in the past and may well include other things. China is not a common threat in the way that Russia is perceived to be. Of course, something could happen, not least something with Taiwan, which would change that, but that is not where NATO is at present.

Alice Billon-Galland
I think we should really avoid a false dichotomy between ‘NATO should do only Russia’ and ‘NATO should do everything’ because there are lots of activities in the middle where the alliance can bring some added value – and that is exactly what we should be discussing. The issue around China and NATO is being completely overblown. We need to be very clear that the purpose of NATO is to defend the Euro-Atlantic space, but that may include keeping an eye on ‘when China comes to us’, as NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg often says.

Hans Kundnani
None of the regional partners in Asia that you need to deal with the China challenge are in NATO – and can’t be – so it is just the wrong vehicle to deal with the Indo-Pacific. But there is also a bit of a tension here between Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic. People in Asia also look at the different threat perceptions in completely different ways than we do in Europe. There are a number of reasons why people in India do not support the war in the Ukraine, but one of them is that they see China, not Russia, as the real threat.

Andrew Dorman
I think so much of the debate we have had so far is about political NATO as supposed to military NATO. One of its key roles is how military forces operate, engage and conduct operations, plan operations through deterrents and so forth. NATO as the template of the West does work. That is why it is in the interest of the US to keep this going. It is one of the ways of making sure, for example, the US Pacific fleet remains compatible with the US Atlantic fleet by forcing them to operate the same system, which is the NATO system.

It is one of the things the American forces learnt out of Afghanistan and Iraq. There is a NATO way which is a global footprint. NATO’s role within the African Union is as a template for peacekeeping operations. You have got the likes of Australia and South Korea and Japan very much integrated into NATO. It doesn’t have to be a formal political NATO, but it does strike me to be in the interest of the West to have them reach forces capable of operating with one another.

Patricia Lewis
One of the most interesting developments in the past year has been the creation of Aukus, the security pact between Australia, Britain and the United States. That grew out of the Five Eyes intelligence partnership which led to the need to develop new, interoperable equipment such as nuclear-powered submarines. We will have to see how it develops, but maybe it could be the start of a PATO in the region.  

Creon Butler
In the current situation, we have a crucial partnership between NATO and the EU over Russia, in terms of the long-term future they hold out for Ukraine, but also with the G7 because that is the place to organize the financial support for Ukraine and the economic and financial sanctions against Russia. They are different memberships but the combination of the EU, G7 and NATO is an absolutely crucial alliance of different alliances, with different memberships serving different purposes but having an overall impact that can potentially be very effective.

Leslie Vinjamuri
We work with the institutions that we have, but not always with a clear recognition of their limitations. We are facing a dark moment for the UN Security Council, with one of its founder members blatantly violating the UN’s most important norm. Yet many people in the rest of the world say, ‘Yes, but in 2003, the United States violated Iraq’s sovereignty …’ Where the West sees moral clarity, and so condemns Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there is an assumption by much of the rest of the world of moral equivalence between these two invasions.

Working through the UN Security Council is going to be difficult for some time. This means that states are probably going to find different strategies for working around, rather than through, the Security Council.

How Oslo adds a touch of style to the UN The World Today rsoppelsa.drupal 25 May 2022

Seventy years ago, Norway paid for the interior of ‘the most important room in the world’. Now it’s rediscovering the soft power of its design heritage

The view from the roof terrace of Oslo’s newest museum takes in the deep blue fjord and harbour but also the recently opened Munch Museum, whose tilting tower leans over the white iceberg of the opera house. All are emblematic of the transformation of Norway’s capital, one of Europe’s fastest growing cities, into a cultural destination.  

The £500 million National Museum, which opens on June 11, is another statement building in a city which has tended to value modesty over self-promotion. Locals may call it ‘the bunker’ but Denise Hagströmer, a senior curator who compiled its design galleries, believes the museum’s monumental scale and the range of its displays mark a change in Norway’s idea of itself: ‘The country that in the past was thought of as the “little brother” of Scandinavia is now speaking with a completely different voice.’

Norway, with a population of only 5.5 million people, has a history of excelling when it comes to using cultural soft power as a tool of foreign policy, says Hagströmer. 

One of the exhibits in the design galleries is the blue and gold wallpaper used in the United Nations Security Council Chamber in New York, dubbed ‘the most important room in the world’. In here, the Security Council imposes sanctions, dispatches peacekeeping missions and authorizes the use of force.

Designed by Else Poulsson, the Norwegian textile artist, its motifs represent faith, hope and love, reflecting the aspirations of the UN.  

Norway’s decision to pay for the interior of the Security Council Chamber 70 years ago came at a time when the country was recovering from Nazi occupation, while the oil that would make it rich had yet to be discovered. Trygve Lie, the first UN Secretary-General, a Norwegian Labour politician, is said to have played a central role in pushing the project, intended to show the effectiveness of design as a cultural ambassador. 

‘Norway elevated its position on the world stage and achieved an oversized presence at the UN for such a small country,’ says Sarah Lichtman, a design historian from the Parsons School of Design in New York. Even though it doesn’t have a permanent seat on the Security Council, Norway embedded its identity in the room through the legacy of the architecture and interior design, she adds.  

While other Scandinavian architects in the UN complex went for the fashionable modernist look in the Trusteeship and Economic and Social Council chambers, Norwegian Arnstein Arneberg opted for a more classic, even conservative style. In a letter to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, he wrote: ‘This interior must represent Norway in a worthy manner.’ 

As well as Poulsson, Arneberg hired his fellow countryman Per Krohg to paint a giant mural. Krohg, who had been a prisoner of the Nazis in the Second Word War, turned his commission into an altarpiece to peace. ‘The world we abandoned cannot be erased just like that, but one can build a bridge over the adversity and from that journey to a new society,’ he said of his mural, which measures five metres by nine metres. 

The connection between design and politics is explored further in the new Oslo museum’s design galleries and in a separate exhibition, Scandinavian Design & the United States, which show how Nordic objects were charged with democratic values in the post-war period.  ‘Design plays an important role in the Cold War battles that are not just about bombs and missiles but also about lifestyle and ideology,’ says the Swedish writer, Sara Kristoffersson.  

Scandinavian design is rooted in egalitarian ideals of social democracy. Ornate decoration that valued one object above another was replaced with clean forms, craftsmanship and natural materials such as leather, wood and wool, says Astrid Skjerven, a professor at the department of product design at Oslo Metropolitan University.

Shortly after the Security Council chamber was completed, Norwegian designers participated with Danes, Swedes and Finns in the Design in Scandinavia exhibition that was hugely popular in America in the mid-1950s. 

The Norwegians, who were the least known internationally, had the most to gain from the three-year tour, with stores in Manhattan showcasing their designs. First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy and Emperor Hirohito of Japan each bought pieces by the Norwegian designer Torbjørn Afdal.

Norway’s neighbours capitalized on the international demand for Scandi style by supporting their furniture makers with state funding, promotional campaigns abroad and a national design strategy. 

Yet despite creating prize-winning, mid-century pieces, Norway ended up as ‘the underdog of Nordic design’, according to Morten Hippe, a Norwegian industrial designer, who in 2016 started a company, Eikund, to reproduce furniture from the golden era of Norwegian design. The market in Norway for these goods was tiny, and the discovery of oil in 1969 meant many craftsmen moved to more lucrative jobs. 

Across the Atlantic, Norwegian soft power had made its mark in the halls of the UN. By 2006, the Security Council Chamber and the rest of the UN complex needed renovating. The permanent members stipulated that restoration work must preserve the chamber in its original form. 

They also insisted on having the room duplicated in their temporary space elsewhere in the UN building, with a smaller photographic reproduction of the Krohg mural. The painting had become integral to the function of the room, argues Lichtman – ‘like Picasso’s Guernica or one of those paintings with a moralizing tale that reminds the people in the room of the horrors of war’. Norway gave $5 million to the restoration, which was finished in 2013.

Recently, Norwegian diplomats also realized that design could be used more broadly to communicate values and ideas. A new, minimalist passport was issued in 2020 which reflects Norway’s reputation for design excellence.

When the country’s joint consulate and UN mission in New York had to move location, it was an opportunity to create an open-plan office that reflected the non-hierarchical structure of most private and public bodies back home. 

The corner office, with the best views, has a communal table that everyone can use. The room’s design has echoes of a wooden cabin, the typical weekend bolt hole for many Norwegians. Carpets resemble a forest floor, birdsong plays in the bathrooms and futuristic ‘Extreme’ chairs designed by Terje Ekstrom are framed by views of Manhattan. Consul General Heidi Olufsen says visitors to the offices are taken aback when they find a little slice of Norwegian life.

Olufsen’s official residence is sparer and more elegant. The mid-century dining table and chairs designed by Fredrik Kayser are from Eikund and the bright velvet Bollo chairs by Andreas Engesvik, seen by many as the country’s top furniture designer. Olufsen wants the decor to make guests ‘feel they are in the modern Norway of 2022’, she says, with more to offer than just mountains and fjords. 

Yet Olufsen admits there is still a way to go: ‘We still have more to do to boost our self-confidence and demand more space for Norwegian design.’ 
 

Polish-British Belvedere Forum 2022 7 July 2022 TO 8 July 2022 — 12:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 June 2022 Chatham House and Online

The Belvedere Forum is a leading annual British and Polish dialogue that seeks to strengthen the extensive social, economic and political partnership between the two countries.

Please note this event has reached full in-person capacity. You are welcome to join virtually via the Zoom link: https://chathamhouse.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_QFwXsXb0RoSt-1ywkuPjfQ  

The video on this page is of the opening remarks from the Belvedere Forum, with addresses from Sir Robin Niblett KCMG, Dr Sławomir Dębski, Prof Zdzisław Krasnodębski, Sir Malcolm Rifkind KCMG QC, Ambassador Anna Clunes CMG OBE, Lord (Tariq) Ahmad of Wimbledon, Min Marcin Przydacz, and Ambassador Piotr Wilczek.

This and other session videos are available to watch on the Belvedere Forum 2022 playlist on YouTube. Photos by Mateusz Jozwiak, Zuzanna Nowak/PISM.

The Belvedere Forum is a leading annual British and Polish bilateral dialogue bringing together a diverse group of actors from civil society, politics, business, academia and NGOs.

It seeks to strengthen and deepen the extensive partnership between the two countries by exploring political, economic, social and cultural issues through debate and discussion.

The forum is an annual event alternating between the UK and Poland. Originally created in 2017 by the governments of the UK and Poland, the forum is now jointly organized by Chatham House and the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) in Warsaw.

The forum brings together a diverse group of actors to debate and discuss not only current British-Polish relations, but also the British and Polish responses to key European and global challenges.

NATO must now transform old missions into new strategy Expert comment NCapeling 21 June 2022

As the war in Ukraine becomes prolonged and unpredictable, risks for the transatlantic alliance will increase, as will the global shockwaves of the conflict.

As a revitalized NATO alliance deals with a crisis that has major economic and humanitarian as well as military dimensions, the need for it to develop both a European and a global containment strategy grows ever more urgent.

Bolstering NATO’s defences so as to provide the capability to repel any form of Russian attack on land, at sea, in the air, or through space and cyberspace is a key aspect of this strategy as, in recent weeks, more combat forces able to defend territory have taken the form of additional troops, ships, and aircraft reinforcing the Baltic states and the Black Sea coastlines of Poland and Romania.

Ten allies have so far contributed to this effort, placing 40,000 troops under direct NATO command. Those sceptical about the future of the transatlantic security relationship have been confounded by the major role the US has played in this effort, sending parts of the 82nd Airborne Division and 3rd Armoured Division to Poland, and redeploying US Stryker brigades from Germany and Italy to the Baltic states and Romania.

Although many other allies have sent useful assets – such as French and UK aircraft to Romania or German and Netherlands Patriot batteries to Slovakia – the US contribution still surpasses all European efforts put together. The US now has 100,000 troops in Europe, the most it has deployed there since the mid-1990s.

Transitioning from temporary to permanent deployment

NATO has also mobilized its high-readiness Reaction Force for the first time and aims to establish four new multinational battalions in the Black Sea region – with France offering to lead the one in Romania, Italy in Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic in Slovakia. Most of these deployments are on a temporary basis, but the receiving allies would understandably like them to stay longer and for NATO to commit to permanent stationed forces.

Although this would oblige the alliance to break formally from the pledge it made to Moscow in 1997 not to station substantial combat forces or nuclear weapons or build military infrastructure on the territory of its new member states in eastern Europe, this was a political undertaking linked to circumstances prevailing at the time.

Given Russia’s behaviour, there is no reason why NATO should not now abandon it. There is also a question over whether NATO could also repeal the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Russia Council, or simply leave them in suspension for a future, more cooperative, and less bellicose Russian regime.

Beyond showing the flag along its eastern flank, NATO does face longer-term issues which need to be clarified in its new Strategic Concept. First is whether to abandon its current strategy of reinforcement and military mobility across Europe – known as the Enhanced Forward Presence in the NATO jargon – in favour of the deployment of heavy armoured brigades or even divisions in fixed positions close to borders.

This will be expensive in the long-run and deprive allies of the flexibility they have enjoyed since the end of the Cold War to use their forces as and where they wish – from deployments in the Sahel or Afghanistan to fighting forest fires or building emergency hospitals for COVID-19 patients at home. The only exception is when they have put forces on rotation into the NATO high readiness forces or the European Union (EU) Battle Groups.

Germany’s commitment gives NATO more options

The decision of Germany to increase its defence spending to two per cent of GDP and to devote €100 billion to modernizing the Bundeswehr makes it technically possible for NATO to move to a Cold War-style forward, armoured defence. But it is unclear how quickly Berlin could raise its new divisions given its problems with procurement and government/industry relations in the defence sector.

It may make more sense for Germany not to launch new acquisition programmes but to buy existing off-the-shelf capabilities – as it has recently done with its decision to buy 35 US F35 aircraft – which other European countries are also acquiring, offering economies of scale and cheaper operating and maintenance costs.

But if Germany abandons ambitious defence projects with France – which prefers a ‘buy European’ approach – such as the Future European Air Combat System, the relationship with France will become strained and French plans for EU self-reliance in the military field put at risk.

As a country averse to war fighting and narrow military approaches to security, it is uncertain how much of the conventional defence burden in NATO Germany would be willing to take on, so this could be the opportunity to create more integrated European units with France, the Benelux, Poland, and Italy, even with the post-Brexit UK.

The UK has doubled the size of its forces in Estonia and sent 1,000 troops to Poland, as well as devoting a substantial portion of its army, navy, and airforce to regular NATO exercises in the Baltic region. London was also the first ally to grant Sweden and Finland a temporary security guarantee pending full integration into the alliance.

NATO will likely settle on a compromise, increasing the size of its battalions on its eastern flank – turning them into battle groups – but giving each one a larger reserve force which will remain in Germany or other European allied countries.

A NATO strategic plan is now needed

The other issue for NATO is to develop a single theatre-wide strategic plan managed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and the NATO command structure. In reinforcing the alliance’s eastern flank, allies have sent forces to wherever they like and largely under national command, but this would not work in a real war.

NATO must revise its exercises to prepare and train for the new threat level, ensuring its forward deployed forces are fully integrated with local forces and the police and border guards to anticipate and respond to any Russian hybrid war tactics. It also needs to step up its joint planning and interoperability with Sweden and Finland and bring their territories into its standing defence plans.

One thing NATO has done well in this crisis is its political messaging. As Russia has become more threatening and reckless, it has been essential for NATO to be consistent and predictable. Re-affirming its core defensive purpose, calmly rejecting Putin’s nuclear posturing, and refusing to put NATO forces in Ukraine may be frustrating for some but it is vital not to play into Putin’s playbook regarding an ‘aggressive NATO’ or give him the sense he is being pushed into a corner. However, NATO strategic ambiguity can be useful when considering how to respond to a Russian escalation in Ukraine itself, such as using chemical weapons.

The key questions for NATO are:

• What should be the balance between permanently deployed and rotational forces in NATO’s new posture?
• What should be the balance of US/Canadian and European forces in this posture?
• How can the capability development programmes under EU Strategic Autonomy (such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund) be geared to support the European role and responsibility in the alliance? Air and missile defence would seem to be priorities given Russia’s reliance on long range strikes.
• How can the EU’s Strategic Compass, NATO’s next Strategic Concept and the third NATO-EU Joint Declaration be harmonized to bring the two institutions more closely together in responding to Russian hybrid operations and influence campaigns, and in assisting both Ukraine and others such as Georgia and Moldova?
• What should be the balance between forces for collective defence with heavy armour and directed artillery fire, and those for expeditionary missions beyond Europe such as counterterrorism, stabilization and peacekeeping?

NATO is revived and refocused

Although the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a catastrophe for Ukraine and Europe more generally, the multilateral system has discovered a new energy and sense of purpose as NATO has been revived and refocused on its core mission.

The EU and the US have pulled together with daily coordination of their policies and actions, and the EU is also facing up to its geo-political role, as recognizing the EU aspirations of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia as well as the countries of the western Balkans shows its responsibility for the security and economic integration of the whole of Europe.

Russia's war: How will it shape the region's future? 1 December 2022 — 9:00AM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 August 2022 Chatham House and Online

This conference takes a deep-dive into the implications of the war for the wider region.

You will receive an email in advance of the conference with further details on accessing the event.

The video on this page is of the opening session only. To view all the session videos, please visit the conference playlist on YouTube.

How will Russia’s war shape the region’s future?

Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine is on such a scale that it will have a seismic effect on all the countries that once formed the Soviet empire. Vladimir Putin’s decisions have accelerated trends across the region leading to unintended consequences.

Now it is more crucial than ever – not only for those concerned with the region’s economic and democratic development, but for all those with a stake in the future security of Europe.

For some states, this will mean a faster break from the legacy of the USSR and from Russia’s ‘Geopathological embrace‘ while, for others, maybe even a fresh start at democracy and good governance.

In isolated cases, the war will conceivably hasten assimilation with Russia. But the two principal combatants, Ukraine and Russia, will diverge even further. Ukraine, though fighting for its survival now, will at least get the opportunity to ‘build back better’ if it achieves some form of victory.

Whatever the course of the war, however, Russia’s aspirations to be a global power again are doomed as it is gradually deglobalized from Western structures.

This conference analyses:

• How Russia’s war will affect the broader regional economy and whether this will hasten Vladimir Putin’s exit
• What to hope for, what to fear and the key trends that will dominate the region going forward.
• Unique expertise in an independent forum on what’s at stake for Europe. 

Gorbachev's complex legacy is beyond the popular belief Expert comment NCapeling 3 September 2022

The last major figure with a decisive Cold War role, Mikhail Gorbachev was not as bad as Putin’s Russia portrays him, but also not as heroic as the West thinks.

Arguably the worst year of the Cold War since the Cuban Missile Crisis was 1983, with three major incidents which escalated East-West tensions – and any one of them could have led to a full-scale war.

The first was the Korean Airline KAL007 being shot down by an SU15 fighter aircraft for straying into Soviet airspace, killing all 269 passengers and crew. Then came the identification of signals from Soviet satellites as being incoming US intercontinental ballistic missiles – Colonel Stanislav Petrov, going against all protocols, thankfully decided to report them as a false alarm before he could be sure.

The third was perhaps the most dangerous, being the misinterpretation of a live-fire NATO exercise which was believed by some in both East Germany and Russia to be a front for an imminent attack.

All three incidents occurred in the few months following the infamous March 1983 ‘Star Wars’ speech by US president Ronald Reagan, in which he talked about nuclear arms control and laid out the US case for a ballistic missile defence programme.

At that time Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was the youngest serving member of the USSR Politburo, known to be a favourite of Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, and it is highly likely he had been aware of these close calls and was part of discussions within Kremlin decision-making circles.

A changemaker both inside and outside the USSR

Following the deaths of Andropov in 1984 and his replacement Konstantin Chernenko in 1985, Gorbachev’s appointment as general secretary of the Communist Party saw him immediately begin to change the Soviet Union from within – and also change relationships with the major Western powers, especially the US, Germany, and the UK.

His policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) were primarily aimed at internal reforms but translated into a major reset of international relations and international security. During his six years as leader, Gorbachev initiated many arms control negotiations which resulted in treaties and increased both the transparency and the confidence between the USSR and the US.

These included the 1986 Stockholm Accord which emanated from the Helsinki Process and allowed for the observation and inspection of large-scale military exercises, the 1985 resumption of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks which lead to START I, and the 1987 INF Treaty in which the USSR ‘out-yessed’ the US – the most open and transparent disarmament treaty in terms of notification and verification measures ever agreed.

There was also a reciprocal moratorium on nuclear weapons tests starting from 1985 – which laid the groundwork for the 1996 CTBT – the 1991 Chemical Weapons Convention, and the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

The most dramatic moment of all was when Gorbachev and Reagan met at a summit in Reykjavik and came close to deciding to eliminate nuclear weapons – but the initiative failed to reach agreement, mainly because Reagan could not drop his commitment to ballistic missile defences and Gorbachev could not accept the offer of joint development.

Nonetheless, all these nuclear arms control treaties led the way for their descendants which have kept nuclear weapons in check ever since and are still in place in the form of the New START agreement.

But despite these outstanding achievements, Gorbachev had blind spots – such as enabling rather than destroying the USSR bioweapons programme, unlike the US which had dismantled its own bioweapons offensive capability by 1973.

And it is now known that, despite negotiating the Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia withheld information on new chemical weapons agents – Novichoks – which have since been used to lethal effect by Russia in Salisbury and against figures opposing the current regime.

His misguided faith in a Soviet future

Gorbachev was markedly different to his predecessors as secretary general. He was neither as decrepit nor as hardline, and he understood from the outset that the Soviet Union was, by the 1980s, finally dying.

Using the intellectual abilities of Aleksandr Yakovlev, he forced through the reforms which simultaneously captured the imagination of the free world and liberated his countrymen and women.

But although he built solid relationships – even friendships – with the world’s major heads of state and improved the USSR’s human rights, releasing dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov, but many – especially Ukrainian dissidents – continued to languish in camps.

The greatest disappointment in Gorbachev’s legacy was he completely believed the USSR could be reformed and still survive as an entity while others, such as Boris Yeltsin and Ronald Reagan, understood it had to be dismantled.

This shortcoming is especially uncomfortable as today’s Russia continues to insist it has a given right to control other former Soviet states, to the extent it is willing to destroy them if they do not concede.

Russian imperial mindset must change for real victory Expert comment NCapeling 8 December 2022

The attitude of Russia’s elite – and wider population – to the states which used to constitute the USSR needs to change in order to solve the Russia challenge.

Although the reverberations of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine clearly stretch around the globe, the strongest shocks are – and will continue to be – felt by those countries Moscow used to directly rule.

These countries struggle to shrug off a Soviet legacy as, to varying degrees – linguistically, technologically, culturally, and politically – they bear psychological and physical scars of Russia’s colonial past and its present mentality.

It does not help that these countries lack an appropriate collective descriptor. Over the years there has been ‘Newly Independent States’ – hardly appropriate after 31 years – the now-defunct ‘Commonwealth of Independent States’, the ‘post-Soviet space’ and ‘Former Soviet Union’ which both reference the past, and simply ‘Eurasia’ which is hardly appropriate for either Ukraine or Turkmenistan.

Some of these former ‘colonies’ are as badly governed and as sinister – albeit not as lethal beyond their borders – as Russia itself. Others, most notably the Baltic states, are modern, liberal, affluent societies, but Moscow’s shadow still looms.

There is a strong mindset in most of Russia’s citizens that, because that it used to rule these other countries, it either still has privileged rights over them or they are not real countries at all – but instead historical aberrations to be extinguished.

What is past is gone

As historian Timothy Snyder has noted, whatever the wrongs of Putin’s ‘history-based’ assertions about the ‘return of historic lands’, all historical claims are bunkum anyway. If the past brings validity, almost no land border on earth would be beyond dispute. It is agreements which count, and Russia signed away the other successor states in 1991.

The Russia and Eurasia programme at Chatham House has, for the last 31 years, always taken as a starting position that these countries are as sovereign as any other. This of course this means they can choose to be in Russia’s embrace if they wish. But none do because Russia is insufficiently attractive. Some have better relationships with Moscow than others – mainly the more autocratic ones – but no former slave goes back to their master willingly.

At the recent Chatham House conference Russia’s war: How will it shape the region’s future? (note the avoidance of a specific descriptor), the overwhelming consensus was that Russia must lose, that Ukraine must be reconstructed and planning for that must start now, and that the regional economy is convulsing.

But another key view was that, in Russia, rent seeking and buying loyalty are likely to lead to the separation of the Russian people and the regime, especially as the population ages and young men being sent to die at the front. Putin may still be popular in some places in Russia, but not in others – although popularity can rise and fall fast in Russia. However, few at the conference foresaw the disintegration of Russia any time soon.

With continued skill, determination, and more weaponry, Ukraine may well vanquish Russia on the battlefield, and this remains a necessary pre-requisite for European security. But even a Ukraine victory will not erase malign intent.

The Russian imperial itch is so deeply embedded, it must be excised not just from Russian capability but from the intention and mindset of elites and in the popular imagination. That is hard to achieve when so many believe in it as fervently as a religion – even the Russian Orthodox Church invokes a messianism in Russia’s imperial ‘rights’.

The wider region is suffering

Getting Russians to look upon their neighbours as equals requires widescale self-reassessment in a post-Putin Russia. But, for now, the wider region will surely be looking to simply neuter Russia’s destructive capacities.

Culture notes: Will the EU find its voice at last? The World Today mhiggins.drupal 30 January 2023

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has galvanized the bloc, but doubt remains about how it can capitalize on this moment, writes Catherine Fieschi.

Despite its reticence to believe that Russia would attack Ukraine, once Vladimir Putin’s tanks rolled across the Donbas, the European Union finally grasped the momentous nature of the events unfolding on its eastern flank. The immediate reaction of Europe’s member states was one of unity, resolve and uncharacteristically rapid decision-making, at least on sanctions and energy policy.

That they would need to act in concert across a concatenation of crises that would be either triggered (energy), worsened (inflation) or heightened (geopolitical instability) by Putin’s move was obvious. And so, Europe’s collective narrative of this past year slid into place, and it goes something like this: We gave Russia the benefit of every doubt, including after their invasion of Crimea when we still tried to bring them back to the negotiating table, but Putin has made the fundamental choice of turning away from democracy and the rule of law.

Now, the narrative goes on, we have to treat them as enemies and give ourselves the means to become resilient in the face of aggression as Ukraine is all that stands – both symbolically and geographically – between us and the chaos of a Europe-wide war.

Like any good narrative, it is anchored in previous trials and exploits. Having learnt from its failure to coordinate action during the eurozone crisis and then the migration crisis, Europe was keen to make the most of its resilience in the face of the Covid pandemic in the form of the joint vaccine purchases and a massive recovery plan.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is an added – albeit dramatic and costly – opportunity to pursue further collective action and discover the next chapter of its shared purpose, as a political and perhaps even a defence alliance.

Europe had long been in need of an arc to follow. In the aftermath of the Second World War, peace and prosperity seemed enough. But the new multipolar world that emerged from the ashes of the Cold War and then 9/11 were more difficult to navigate for a largely commercial and regulatory alliance.

Could the EU, then, ever find its political voice?

David vs Goliath

While Brexit and Covid created rallying points, the shock and tragedy of the invasion delivered everything the EU needed in narrative terms: a David and Goliath story, with the opportunity to feature on Team David in European terms while allying with the United States, and a ‘band of brothers’ element to shore up a union bruised by the defection of a key but troubled member. Above all, the appearance of an arch-villain in the form of Vladimir Putin put Europe back into the familiar and mythical territory of the 1940s and then the Cold War.

When on May 28, 2016, Putin seated himself on the throne of the Byzantine emperors in Mount Athos’ Protaton Church in Greece in a scene truly worthy of Game of Thrones, the writing should have been on the wall. That day he explicitly laid out his aim to appoint himself as the new Eastern emperor who would fight the decadence of the West.

‘Today,’ Putin told the world, ‘we restore the values of patriotism, historical memory and traditional culture.’ Later, he cited Ukraine as the biggest unfinished mission of his years in power. That Europe – and Germany in particular – had taken so long to decipher Putin’s dark designs only adds to the narrative’s epic quality, positioning Europe as a victim of its own good faith and open heart.

Cracks in the narrative

But the narrative is not free from cracks. The Baltic states would argue that they had long warned of Putin’s nefarious intentions; and Poland has always been convinced of the threat posed by its neighbour.

In conversation with Edi Rama, prime minister of Albania 23 March 2023 — 5:30PM TO 6:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

From migration to Russia and China, how is Albania responding to the geopolitical challenges of today?

In late 2022, the UK government made a pointed remark that many of the illegal migrants attempting to get into the country were from Albania. In response, Albania prime minister Edi Rama replied that targeting Albanians as the cause of Britain’s crime and border problems ‘makes for easy rhetoric but ignores hard fact’. 

This nuanced response demonstrated the challenges and complexities that Albania faces, the same as many other countries. As well as being embroiled in the major challenge of international migration, Albania has suffered from a serious cyber-attack in July 2022 from Iran. Government networks were compromised for a month with Tirana removing the Iranian embassy in the capital.

Then there is the ongoing threat from Russia and China. Nestled in the already volatile Balkans, Albania has been at the heart of international affairs in recent months.

Prime Minister Rama speaks at Chatham House to discuss:

• How is Albania responding to Russian aggression and what is its stance on Ukraine?
• Where does Tirana believe China poses the most serious threat?
• How can countries in Europe best respond to illegal migration and better control the flow of people?
• How is the region of the Western Balkans effected by the war in Ukraine and how can it contribute to the security challenges posed by the war?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

How Russia’s war affects politics in southeast Europe 4 April 2023 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 24 March 2023 Online

This event will discuss how the war on Ukraine has affected southeastern Europe.

This event will discuss how the war on Ukraine has affected southeastern Europe. How have the governments and publics responded to the war?

The panel will discuss Russia’s goals and leverage in the region, including the impact of its disinformation campaigns. Are the governments reassessing their foreign policy options?

The granting of EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova has brought attention to the stalled accession process in the Western Balkans. What lessons from the Western Balkans can be applied in Ukraine and Moldova? Have new linkages emerged between the two regions?

Eurovision, war and the geopolitics of pop The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 March 2023

Europe’s great song competition may strive for continental harmony, but bitter conflicts and voting blocs often drag it off key, writes Saskia Postema.

In May, the city that spawned the Beatles will add another notch to its cultural belt as Liverpool hosts the Eurovision Song Contest.

The pop competition has been celebrating extravagance, dramatic acts and lots of glitter since 1956. It is expressly designed to be non-political, with performers barred from promoting political interests, yet it exists for a specific political purpose – to promote European unity.

The organizer, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), has certainly succeeded in part with its mission. While Europe Day on May 9 comes and goes without much fanfare, Eurovision is an eagerly anticipated fixture on the cultural calendar.

Cultural diplomacy

While some may dismiss it as simply an extravagant party, there is more to it than that: it is a form of cultural diplomacy. Beyond artistry, acts are expected to bring their cultural identity to the stage as they bid for douze points, Eurovision’s highest score, from national juries.

Like any popular forum, it reflects popular opinion. So, when war threatens the European harmony Eurovision is meant to exude, politics inevitably manifests itself.

This was evident last year. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, Eurovision’s organizers reiterated their apolitical stance stating both countries would be allowed to participate. But when various countries threatened to withdraw if Russia was allowed to compete, the EBU changed its tune and broke off ties with Russian broadcasting agencies indefinitely. As reluctant as it was to act in this capacity, the organization still inadvertently highlighted its role as a political gatekeeper and confirmed Eurovision does function as a political arena.

Unsurprisingly, all eyes were on the Ukrainian entry that year. Kalush Orchestra’s Stefania, presenting a blend of traditional Ukrainian folk music with hip hop beats, went on to win the contest resoundingly.

And while the winning nation normally hosts next year’s competition, due to the war this honour passed to the runner-up, the United Kingdom. Britain, coincidentally, has been one of the most visible supporters of Kyiv’s war efforts. Boris Johnson, the former prime minister, was among the first leaders to visit Kyiv after the Russian invasion.

Last year’s second place ended a long spate of poor results for the UK in the competition. The first year it scored nul points was 2003 when the UK entry was Cry Baby by the duo Jemini. The result was seen widely as a backlash against Britain’s entry into the Iraq war earlier that year.

In the intervening years it has been placed last twice and received nul points again in 2021 when the entry was Embers sung by James Newman. With last year’s second place for Sam Ryder’s Space Man, the UK redeemed itself and will get to host Eurovision in Liverpool, a city twinned with Odesa since 1957.

It is not the first time that Russia’s geopolitical relations have led to Eurovision controversy. In 2008, following the Russo-Georgian war, Russia recognized the self-proclaimed independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia which had broken away from Georgia.

As a result, Georgia initially refused to take part in the 2009 Eurovision as it was to be held in Moscow. It changed its mind, however, submitting a song by Stefane and 3G called We Don’t Wanna Put In. The submission was rejected by the EBU, which said it contained obvious references to the Russian leader, something Georgia denied.

In 2015, Ukraine withdrew from Eurovision following the Russian annexation of Crimea. The following year the EBU was faced with a similar problem when Ukraine submitted a song, 1944,sung by Jamala, which told the story of her great-grandmother who lived through the mass deportation of Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin. This time the EBU allowed the entry, despite the Russian Duma calling for its rejection. The song went on to win.