In conversation with HRH Prince Turki AlFaisal 13 September 2024 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

This event will discuss how the ongoing Gaza war is impacting the region and the role external actors can play to support de-escalation.

The Gaza war, now in its tenth month, continues with ever-worsening consequences for Palestinians and no end in sight. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has also heightened tensions across the Middle East with fears of a broader regional war that would include Iran and aligned groups from the ‘axis of resistance’.

Against this backdrop, ceasefire negotiations supported by regional and international mediators, have not amounted to an agreement nor have there been any concrete proposals for a way forward out of the crisis by key actors such as the United States, Gulf countries or other key stakeholders.

In this event, His Royal Highness Prince Turki AlFaisal will discuss how the Gaza war and related developments are impacting the Middle East, and will share his views on the role of regional and external actors in supporting de-escalation efforts.

The addresses:

• How are Middle Eastern countries managing regional security and heightened tensions with Iran and aligned groups in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen?
• What role are Gulf countries playing in efforts to de-escalate tensions?
• How can they support short- and long-term planning for a way forward in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
• How are relationships between Middle East countries and external powers such as the United States changing as a result of the Gaza war?

In person places for this event are balloted. Confirmations will be sent by email on Monday 9 September at 3pm or a placed on the waiting list. Virtual registrations are confirmed immediately.

Individual membership provides you with the complete Chatham House experience, connecting you with a unique global policy community. Find out more about membership.

A world in transition and the future of the global workforce 15 October 2024 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 22 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

How are migration and global megatrends shaping international labour?

As the fallout of 2024’s ‘Election Super-Year’ becomes clearer, international policymakers and business leaders must now equip themselves to face the challenges and opportunities of the three key transitions that will dominate the next few decades: the journey toward a greener and healthier world; the transition to a more technologically adept society; and the development of a secure and productive economy for all.

The adaption and evolution of the global workforce is an essential component of all three of these transitions and therefore a prescient analysis of how migration, workforce policies and modern technology trends will impact this ecosystem is essential.

Upskilling the workforce will no doubt remain a key focus for stakeholders. But the question remains, how do these plans move beyond the ‘ideas-phase’ and become policies that will keep pace in the fast-paced, modern and digital workplace?

It may prove harder than ever for these ideas to come to fruition, with the rise of populist and nationalist political thinking fragmenting the balance between local and international labour. Indeed, this often leads to reduced attractiveness of skilled foreign labour in domestic markets.

This puts global business in a very powerful position though, as companies can play an important role in readdressing these narratives, shaping the future of workforce policies and using examples of best practice to improve access, mobility and ultimately economic productivity, for the benefit of all.

Through this event, in partnership with EY, the panel analyses how migration, skills development agendas and global megatrends, such as technology, sustainability and the global economy, will shape developments in the years to come.

A networking breakfast precedes this event, served between 0800 and 0900 BST.

Director’s Briefing: Assessing foreign policy challenges for the next US president 5 September 2024 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 27 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

This briefing will explore what challenges might await the winner of 2024 US presidential election.

As the 2024 US Presidential election draws closer, the future direction of American foreign policy seems ever more uncertain. Kamala Harris, the Democratic presidential candidate, appears to be embracing many of Biden’s policies, but she brings a different background, and most likely a different team, so change is likely.  Donald Trump has more well-known views on foreign policy, but the context for a second Trump administration would be very different than the first.

The next U.S. President will be confronted a world in need of leadership with two major wars, a more assertive and capable China, a climate crisis, ungoverned technological change, emerging powers that demand a seat at the table, and debt distress across much of the developing world.

Please join us for this critical conversation covering:

• How will US-China strategic competition and the threat of conflict over Taiwan challenge US policy makers?
• What are the risks and challenges posed by Russia’s illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine?
• How does war in the Middle East and the threat of regional escalation shape US foreign policy?

Making the circular economy work for global development: how the UN Summit of the Future can deliver 23 September 2024 — 6:15PM TO 9:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 September 2024 Online

This policy roundtable focusses on how to advance implementation of a global approach and collaboration to an inclusive circular economy for an updated post-2030 SDG framework.

As the world looks beyond the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) towards the post-2030 era, integrating the principles of the circular economy into the future global development agenda becomes imperative.  

A new Chatham House research paper about the role of the circular economy for the SDGs and their possible extension into the post-2030 development agenda will be launched in September 2024 during the UN Summit of the Future and the New York Climate Week. The paper outlines the rationale for the integration of circular economy goals into for the next crucial phase of international development and how to meet net-zero 2050 targets. It provides actionable recommendations on international cooperation mechanisms for policymakers and stakeholders at the UN Summit for the Future in 2024 and beyond.

The aim of the roundtable is to bring together stakeholders and leaders from intergovernmental organisations, business, governments and civil society. The focus of the roundtable meeting is: 

• Reflections on the Summit of the Future and the role of circularity for an updated post-2030 SDG framework.
• Discussion on key aspects of the institutional arrangements and international coordination that are needed for a globally coordinated approach to achieve an inclusive circular economy that supports SDG implementation. 
• Development of joint strategies on how to advance implementation of a global approach and collaboration to an inclusive circular economy as a follow-up from the Summit of the Future.

The objective is to emerge from the roundtable with a clearer roadmap for translating the recommendations for international coordination into concrete actions, with a shared commitment to driving meaningful change on the international level.

The event is co-hosted by Chatham House and partners from the Global Circular Economy Roadmap initiative including the African Circular Economy Network, the African Development Bank, Circular Change, Circular Innovation Lab, Circle Economy, EU CE Stakeholder Platform, Hanns Seidel Foundation, Institute of Global Environmental Strategies, Sitra, UNIDO, World Business Council on Sustainable Development, World Economic Forum and the Wyss Academy for Nature.

Further background information is available on the initiative website.

More speakers to be announced.

Fostering inclusive health systems amidst geopolitical instability 13 October 2024 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 11 September 2024 Sheraton Berlin Grand Hotel Esplanade

How can we build trust and inclusivity in the health sector in a fractured geopolitical environment?

Building trust in government, service provision and delivery are crucial considerations for policymakers who aim to make local, national and international health systems more inclusive. In the health space, trust can be a matter of life and death. Understanding and modulating policies that account for the trust factor, alongside the geopolitical determinants of health, can lead to more inclusive decision making and thus better health outcomes for larger proportions of a population.

International unity is key to addressing the challenges posed by geopolitical instability, which include disinformation campaigns, rising nationalism and growing divisions between states. If countries can find common ground through an inclusive approach to health, the effects could be transformative in achieving global health and equity targets.

This discussion, held in partnership with Haleon, will examine what it takes to foster trust and resilience in the health sector, achieve global inclusivity aims and chart a path for the public and private spheres to come together to navigate a fractured geopolitical environment.

• In what ways can localised health inclusivity data help policymakers to alleviate gaps in healthcare provision and why is this an essential element in instilling trust across the system?
• What role should multilateral organizations play in setting precedents for health inclusivity around the world?
• How do health inclusivity policies empower the service user and help reduce the burden placed on public healthcare systems?
• How can the health sector come together to ensure individuals are included within their own health decisions, are able to access services regardless of demographics and geography and trust their healthcare providers?

This event will be held at the Sheraton Hotel, Grand Esplanade, Berlin in the margins of the World Health Summit. You do not need a ticket for the World Health Summit to attend this event.

Labour Party Conference – International affairs networking brunch 24 September 2024 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 September 2024 Labour – Grace 1 Suite, Hilton Hotel, Liverpool

Hosted by Sir Simon Fraser, Chairman of Chatham House.

This event is taking place at the Hilton Hotel, Grace 1 Suite, Liverpool.

You are warmly invited to join us for an exclusive networking brunch at the 2024 Labour Party Conference.

Sir Simon Fraser, Chairman of Chatham House, and Olivia O’Sullivan, Director of Chatham House’s UK in the World Programme, will deliver opening remarks, followed by an interactive networking session where you will have the chance to engage with a wide range of stakeholders. Join us to connect with key senior parliamentary, corporate and media attendees at the Labour Party Conference.

This event will be taking place outside of the secure zone.

In conversation with Martin Griffiths: How can a divided world address conflict? 1 October 2024 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 16 September 2024 Chatham House and Online

The former United Nations Under-Secretary-General describes how a weakening multilateralism system and dysfunctional political diplomacy can be revitalized by a humanitarian approach.

US domestic polarization and implications for the presidential election 30 September 2024 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 September 2024 Online

This webinar explores the rise of polarization amongst the US public and implications for the upcoming election.

Domestic polarization has been on the rise in the US in recent years, with Democrats and Republicans moving further away from the centre on key policy issues. As polarization increases, so too do concerns about the state of US democracy and prospects of political violence surrounding the upcoming presidential election. 

This expert panel discusses key questions including:

• What are the driving forces of the growing political divide in the US?
• How far apart are voters on key election issues, from healthcare to immigration to national security?
• How is partisan polarisation altering the effectiveness of US foreign policy and influencing America’s role in the world?

Business Briefing: US election geopolitical and economic risk scenarios 10 October 2024 — 11:45AM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 September 2024 Chatham House

Please join us for this critical discussion of the US Election related global business risks.

The outcome of the US presidential election will have significant, intersecting implications for global as well as American business. At stake will be the degree of continuity and stability on both the domestic and international fronts, with a Harris presidency pursuing policies building broadly on the Biden Administration and a second Trump Administration departing sharply from them—with both shaped and limited by control of Congress.

An already volatile geopolitical environment and global economy may become even more unpredictable in the face of potential American political instability and uncertain leadership in the international community.

Please join us for this critical session to discuss:

• How might trade policy differ between a Harris and Trump presidency? Will national security pressures, especially over China, lead to greater policy commonalities than expected?

• What might differing approaches to decarbonization and the energy transition mean for the future of policy toward EVs, critical mineral supply chains, and ‘green’ industrial subsidy?

• How might each Administration approach fiscal policy? Will either push for a tightening to the current loose policy—and what may be implications for US debt and the dollar?

• What economic effects can we expect in the case of a disputed election result or non-peaceful transfer of power—and will Corporate America be compelled to make public statements?

Funding Ukraine’s recovery 15 October 2024 — 2:00PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 24 September 2024 Online

The expert panel explores the role of the private sector in financing recovery projects.

Despite the ongoing war, recovery and reconstruction is under way in Ukraine. The question of how to push and finance the pipeline of the recovery projects remains one of the key challenges for the Ukrainian government. Most importantly, there is an outstanding question about how foreign investors can participate in the process.

Energy, together with access to finance and uninterrupted export routes is one of the key pillars of Ukraine’s wartime economy. In the coming months, Ukraine faces an ultimate test on its capacity to implement energy projects to restore energy generation. It is a test case for how effectively Kyiv raises public and private funds and delivers results to mitigate destruction as the war continues.

This expert panel discusses key questions including:

• What funding streams and mechanisms are currently in place?
• What does the new Ukraine Investment Framework offer?
• How successful is the energy sector in generating necessary funding?
• What role for private-public partnerships? Do we have examples?

This event is organised in partnership with Ukrainian project ‘The Recovery Spending Watchdog’ financed by the EU. The project is a joint effort of the Centre for Economic Strategy, the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, and the NGO ‘Technologies for Progress’.

Security and defence 2025 6 March 2025 — 8:00AM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 September 2024 Chatham House and Online

Join senior policymakers, business leaders and international security experts at Chatham House for a day of thought-provoking discussions exploring the tools needed to equip military forces with for an increasingly insecure future.

You will receive further instructions regarding your registration soon.

Future-proofing a fracturing world

The security and defence landscape is characterised by rapid change and evolving threats to global stability. The uncertainties of a complex geopolitical environment, with war on multiple fronts, are exacerbated by the array of threats presented across the domains of conflict - from land, sea and air through to space and technology. From drone swarm attacks in the Donbas, utilising the latest battlefield technology to gain advantages on the land and in the air, through to the battle for primacy in the space domain above the strategically important, yet inhospitable Arctic shipping lanes, the domains of conflict are becoming increasingly intertwined. A holistic strategy fit to tackle the threats of a fracturing world will rely on effective collaboration between the public and private sectors.

The 2025 Security and Defence conference brings together global policymakers, senior military and armed forces figures, business leaders and civil society experts. An insightful day of keynotes, high-level panel dialogues, and ‘under-the-Rule’ spotlights will explore how advanced technology is shaping the battlefield, examine how security architectures can be redesigned to support the end goal of peace, and address the future of arms control measures. Discussions will also unpack how forward-thinking defence actors might unlock fresh opportunities alongside current challenges. Forging stronger ties with partners to future-proof institutions and develop the architecture that will sustain security and defence ecosystems into the future will be crucial to ensuring that fighting forces are equipped, not just for the conflicts of today, but the security challenges of tomorrow.

Why attend?

• Learn more about the areas that leaders across the security and defence ecosystem are prioritizing and how they aim to counter emerging threats in order to foster resilience in this environment.
• Gain an understanding of the array of threats that are present, both across the domains of conflict and also the different regions of the world.
• In-person networking opportunities with senior leaders from across the government, international militaries and global business, as well as access to exclusive ‘under-the-Rule’ sessions.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

What are MENA countries’ priorities for climate action and COP? 24 October 2024 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 October 2024 Online

Experts discuss the impacts of COP27 and 28 on the region and priorities for COP29.

In November this year, all eyes will be on Azerbaijan as Baku hosts the 29th UN Climate Conference (COP). Hosting COP offers an opportunity to push for climate action that reflects the host country’s unique circumstances, as well as regional interests. COP28 in the United Arab Emirates and COP27 in Egypt highlighted the climate priorities for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), one of the world’s most vulnerable regions to the impacts of climate change.

From rising temperatures and deadly heatwaves, to extreme weather events such as heavy rainstorms, sandstorms, and cyclones, climate change exacerbates existing vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities include water scarcity, food security, and the preservation of livelihoods increasingly threatening the region’s social and economic stability.

While there has been some progress in advancing formal negotiations on key issues, the gap between COP agreements and tangible actions to address the increasingly severe effects of climate change in the MENA region remains vast. 

This webinar aims to assess:

• What are the key tangible impacts of COP27 and COP28 in Egypt and the UAE respectively on driving climate action in the region?
• How do MENA countries balance COP28’s landmark agreement to transition away from fossil fuels with their unique national circumstances?
• How will the region benefit from COP28 breakthrough in integrating the issues of climate, peace and security in climate action through the ‘Declaration of Climate, Relief, Recovery and Peace’?
• What are the priorities for COP29 and how do they align with the climate agenda in the MENA region?

Shaping modern Britain: the role of African and Caribbean communities 24 October 2024 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 3 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

As part of Black History Month, this event celebrates the enduring contributions of African and Caribbean communities to the UK.

When British colonial rule ended, newly independent countries in Africa and the Caribbean retained influences such as the English language and governance systems modelled on that of the UK. Initially, these post-independence relations were largely marked by the UK’s soft power, shaping the nation-building processes in these regions.

Over time, however, this influence has become a two-way exchange. African and Caribbean cultures have profoundly shaped modern Britain – from music and food to sports, arts, literature and beyond. These evolving dynamics have not only enriched the UK’s cultural landscape but also provided significant benefits for diaspora communities, fostering a sense of belonging and promoting cultural exchange. Diaspora groups and civil society organizations have adeptly utilised these connections to advocate for their communities and advance their interests.

At this event, speakers will explore how African and Caribbean influences rose to prominence in the UK and how this cultural momentum can be harnessed to build stronger, forward-looking partnerships. By highlighting the shared histories and more vibrant present-day exchanges, this event will explore how these ties can be used to break down stereotypes, promote social cohesion, and contribute to a more inclusive future.

This event forms part of our series of events celebrating Black History Month, including a photo exhibition and drinks reception.

Iraq Initiative Conference 2024 20 November 2024 — 9:30AM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Our sixth annual Iraq Initiative conference will convene Iraqi and international policymakers, experts and civil society in London to discuss the critical questions for Iraq’s future, and the country’s trajectory in the year ahead.

Over two decades following regime change, Iraq appears to be on a path to recovery and growth. With the support of high oil prices, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani’s government is implementing an ambitious plan to develop critical infrastructure, enhance ties with neighbouring countries, and renegotiate relationships with international partners like the US and UN. The political system has rebounded from a series of shocks and is in the process of consolidating and centralising power in Baghdad under the governing Shia Coordination Framework.

However, underlying political, economic, security, and regional challenges, if not addressed, threaten this apparent stability and frustrate longer-term hope for a better future. Despite the country’s wealth, many young Iraqis struggle to find jobs while the space for civic activism shrinks. Meanwhile, the escalation of violence across the region threatens to engulf Iraq in further conflict. With the 2025 parliamentary election approaching, infighting within the governing coalition also suggests political turmoil in the year ahead.

The key questions explored through each session include:

• How can the Sudani government tackle the roots of these obstacles to ensure that development can be sustained over time?
• What are the key steps to coherent and effective state-building?
• And how can regional and international actors support this process?

This conference is part of Chatham House’s Iraq Initiative.

This year’s conference features RE-PLAY – a video art exhibition curated by Dr Tamara Chalabi of the Ruya Foundation. The artists featured in this exhibition, spanning multiple generations both within Iraq and in the Iraqi diaspora, use their work to grapple with complex notions of Iraqi identity through the thematic issues of heritage, exile, disconnection, freedom of expression, and other persistent issues explored in this show.

Simultaneous English-Arabic interpretation will be available for all conference sessions. This event is part of Chatham House’s Iraq Initiative.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

Civilian priorities for ending the war in Sudan 31 October 2024 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Dr Abdalla Hamdok, former prime minister of Sudan and chairperson of the Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces (Tagadum), will discuss the prospects for conflict resolution in Sudan.

The intensification of fighting across Sudan demonstrates that both warring parties and their allies are continuing to pursue an outright military victory in the war, with little regard for the human cost. Diplomatic efforts, including the US-led Geneva talks in August, have produced little progress towards a ceasefire.  Meanwhile, the conflict has resulted in widespread devastation, mass displacement, and an escalating hunger crisis.

Civilian perspectives on ending the war, their vital efforts in providing lifesaving humanitarian assistance, and the aspiration of many Sudanese for a more inclusive and democratic Sudan, have been sidelined by the interests and actions of the belligerent parties.

At this event, Dr Abdalla Hamdok will discuss options for reaching a ceasefire and seeking a peaceful political resolution to the conflict. He will also address the urgent need for an international response to what has become the world’s largest humanitarian crisis.

Please note that in-person attendance for this event will be balloted. Guests looking to join in-person must ‘register interest’ in joining. Full confirmations to successful applicants will be sent on Monday 28 October at 15:00.

Is the world ready for the next pandemic? 29 October 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

In a joint event with The Elders, Helen Clark, Ban Ki-moon and other experts discuss the policies needed to prevent the next health catastrophe. A drinks reception will follow this event.

The world faces multiple interlinked existential threats such as pandemics and the climate crisis, exacerbated by conflict and extreme poverty. However, the multilateral system is failing to respond with sufficient urgency or impact. As the fifth anniversary of the COVID-19 pandemic approaches, Chatham House and The Elders will discuss the risk of a general slide into complacency. 

Amid the expanding outbreak of mpox in Africa, rich countries continue to withhold stockpiled mpox vaccines. The failure to release the required amount is contributing to the diseases spread across the continent. 

Meanwhile, the Pandemic Accord negotiations are in overtime, with nations unable to reach agreement over concerns around sovereignty and resource distribution in any future pandemic. Similarly, a proposal to include a UN Emergency Platform in the recent Summit of the Future to strengthen the multilateral response to complex global shocks was shelved due to political deadlock.

Can the world learn from past mistakes and break the cycle of panic and neglect? In today’s fractious and polarized geopolitical context, what would it take for leaders to do what’s necessary? And why is it so critical to have equity at the heart of any sustainable global response?

Join Chatham House for this event in which the panel discuss key questions including:

• Five years on from COVID-19, who is showing global leadership today in preparing for future pandemics?
• Are international organizations and institutions fit for purpose to respond to pandemics in a multipolar geopolitical environment? How can they best adapt?
• What can be done to clarify and detoxify current debates around sovereignty to improve global pandemic prevention, preparedness and response?

Numerous iron-sulfur (Fe-S) proteins with diverse functions are present in the matrix and respiratory chain complexes of mitochondria. Although [4Fe-4S] clusters are the most common type of Fe-S cluster in mitochondria, the molecular mechanism of [4Fe-4S] cluster assembly and insertion into target proteins by the mitochondrial iron-sulfur cluster (ISC) maturation system is not well-understood. Here we report a detailed characterization of two late-acting Fe-S cluster-carrier proteins from Arabidopsis thaliana, NFU4 and NFU5. Yeast two-hybrid and bimolecular fluorescence complementation studies demonstrated interaction of both the NFU4 and NFU5 proteins with the ISCA class of Fe-S carrier proteins. Recombinant NFU4 and NFU5 were purified as apo-proteins after expression in Escherichia coli. In vitro Fe-S cluster reconstitution led to the insertion of one [4Fe-4S]2+ cluster per homodimer as determined by UV-visible absorption/CD, resonance Raman and EPR spectroscopy, and analytical studies. Cluster transfer reactions, monitored by UV-visible absorption and CD spectroscopy, showed that a [4Fe-4S]2+ cluster-bound ISCA1a/2 heterodimer is effective in transferring [4Fe-4S]2+ clusters to both NFU4 and NFU5 with negligible back reaction. In addition, [4Fe-4S]2+ cluster-bound ISCA1a/2, NFU4, and NFU5 were all found to be effective [4Fe-4S]2+ cluster donors for maturation of the mitochondrial apo-aconitase 2 as assessed by enzyme activity measurements. The results demonstrate rapid, unidirectional, and quantitative [4Fe-4S]2+ cluster transfer from ISCA1a/2 to NFU4 or NFU5 that further delineates their respective positions in the plant ISC machinery and their contributions to the maturation of client [4Fe-4S] cluster-containing proteins.

The human cardiovascular system has adapted to function optimally in Earth's 1G gravity, and microgravity conditions cause myocardial abnormalities, including atrophy and dysfunction. However, the underlying mechanisms linking microgravity and cardiac anomalies are incompletely understood. In this study, we investigated whether and how calpain activation promotes myocardial abnormalities under simulated microgravity conditions. Simulated microgravity was induced by tail suspension in mice with cardiomyocyte-specific deletion of Capns1, which disrupts activity and stability of calpain-1 and calpain-2, and their WT littermates. Tail suspension time-dependently reduced cardiomyocyte size, heart weight, and myocardial function in WT mice, and these changes were accompanied by calpain activation, NADPH oxidase activation, and oxidative stress in heart tissues. The effects of tail suspension were attenuated by deletion of Capns1. Notably, the protective effects of Capns1 deletion were associated with the prevention of phosphorylation of Ser-345 on p47phox and attenuation of ERK1/2 and p38 activation in hearts of tail-suspended mice. Using a rotary cell culture system, we simulated microgravity in cultured neonatal mouse cardiomyocytes and observed decreased total protein/DNA ratio and induced calpain activation, phosphorylation of Ser-345 on p47phox, and activation of ERK1/2 and p38, all of which were prevented by calpain inhibitor-III. Furthermore, inhibition of ERK1/2 or p38 attenuated phosphorylation of Ser-345 on p47phox in cardiomyocytes under simulated microgravity. This study demonstrates for the first time that calpain promotes NADPH oxidase activation and myocardial abnormalities under microgravity by facilitating p47phox phosphorylation via ERK1/2 and p38 pathways. Thus, calpain inhibition may be an effective therapeutic approach to reduce microgravity-induced myocardial abnormalities.

The cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR) is a plasma membrane anion channel that plays a key role in controlling transepithelial fluid movement. Excessive activation results in intestinal fluid loss during secretory diarrheas, whereas CFTR mutations underlie cystic fibrosis (CF). Anion permeability depends both on how well CFTR channels work (permeation/gating) and on how many are present at the membrane. Recently, treatments with two drug classes targeting CFTR—one boosting ion-channel function (potentiators) and the other increasing plasma membrane density (correctors)—have provided significant health benefits to CF patients. Here, we present an image-based fluorescence assay that can rapidly and simultaneously estimate both CFTR ion-channel function and the protein's proximity to the membrane. We monitor F508del-CFTR, the most common CF-causing variant, and confirm rescue by low temperature, CFTR-targeting drugs and second-site revertant mutation R1070W. In addition, we characterize a panel of 62 CF-causing mutations. Our measurements correlate well with published data (electrophysiology and biochemistry), further confirming validity of the assay. Finally, we profile effects of acute treatment with approved potentiator drug VX-770 on the rare-mutation panel. Mapping the potentiation profile on CFTR structures raises mechanistic hypotheses on drug action, suggesting that VX-770 might allow an open-channel conformation with an alternative arrangement of domain interfaces. The assay is a valuable tool for investigation of CFTR molecular mechanisms, allowing accurate inferences on gating/permeation. In addition, by providing a two-dimensional characterization of the CFTR protein, it could better inform development of single-drug and precision therapies addressing the root cause of CF disease.

The main protease (3CL Mpro) from SARS–CoV-2, the etiological agent of COVID-19, is an essential enzyme for viral replication. 3CL Mpro possesses an unusual catalytic dyad composed of Cys145 and His41 residues. A critical question in the field has been what the protonation states of the ionizable residues in the substrate-binding active-site cavity are; resolving this point would help understand the catalytic details of the enzyme and inform rational drug development against this pernicious virus. Here, we present the room-temperature neutron structure of 3CL Mpro, which allowed direct determination of hydrogen atom positions and, hence, protonation states in the protease. We observe that the catalytic site natively adopts a zwitterionic reactive form in which Cys145 is in the negatively charged thiolate state and His41 is doubly protonated and positively charged, instead of the neutral unreactive state usually envisaged. The neutron structure also identified the protonation states, and thus electrical charges, of all other amino acid residues and revealed intricate hydrogen-bonding networks in the active-site cavity and at the dimer interface. The fine atomic details present in this structure were made possible by the unique scattering properties of the neutron, which is an ideal probe for locating hydrogen positions and experimentally determining protonation states at near-physiological temperature. Our observations provide critical information for structure-assisted and computational drug design, allowing precise tailoring of inhibitors to the enzyme's electrostatic environment.

Dilated cardiomyopathy (DCM) is associated with mutations in cardiomyocyte sarcomeric proteins, including α-tropomyosin. In conjunction with troponin, tropomyosin shifts to regulate actomyosin interactions. Tropomyosin molecules overlap via tropomyosin–tropomyosin head-to-tail associations, forming a continuous strand along the thin filament. These associations are critical for propagation of tropomyosin's reconfiguration along the thin filament and key for the cooperative switching between heart muscle contraction and relaxation. Here, we tested perturbations in tropomyosin structure, biochemistry, and function caused by the DCM-linked mutation, M8R, which is located at the overlap junction. Localized and nonlocalized structural effects of the mutation were found in tropomyosin that ultimately perturb its thin filament regulatory function. Comparison of mutant and WT α-tropomyosin was carried out using in vitro motility assays, CD, actin co-sedimentation, and molecular dynamics simulations. Regulated thin filament velocity measurements showed that the presence of M8R tropomyosin decreased calcium sensitivity and thin filament cooperativity. The co-sedimentation of actin and tropomyosin showed weakening of actin-mutant tropomyosin binding. The binding of troponin T's N terminus to the actin-mutant tropomyosin complex was also weakened. CD and molecular dynamics indicate that the M8R mutation disrupts the four-helix bundle at the head-to-tail junction, leading to weaker tropomyosin–tropomyosin binding and weaker tropomyosin–actin binding. Molecular dynamics revealed that altered end-to-end bond formation has effects extending toward the central region of the tropomyosin molecule, which alter the azimuthal position of tropomyosin, likely disrupting the mutant thin filament response to calcium. These results demonstrate that mutation-induced alterations in tropomyosin–thin filament interactions underlie the altered regulatory phenotype and ultimately the pathogenesis of DCM.

The novel severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) has emerged to a pandemic and caused global public health crisis. Human angiotensin-converting enzyme 2(ACE2) was identified as the entry receptor for SARS-CoV-2. As a carboxypeptidase, ACE2 cleaves many biological substrates besides angiotensin II to control vasodilatation and vascular permeability. Given the nanomolar high affinity between ACE2 and SARS-CoV-2 spike protein, we investigated how this interaction would affect the enzymatic activity of ACE2. Surprisingly, SARS-CoV-2 trimeric spike protein increased ACE2 proteolytic activity ∼3-10 fold against model peptide substrates, such as caspase-1 substrate and Bradykinin-analog. The enhancement in ACE2 enzymatic function was mediated by the binding of SARS-CoV-2 spike RBD domain. These results highlighted the potential for SARS-CoV-2 infection to enhance ACE2 activity, which may be relevant to the cardiovascular symptoms associated with COVID-19.

In their comment (1) on our publication (2), the authors make two points: (i) they raise concerns about the possible effect of residual NONOate in our study, and (ii) they promote nitrosylcobalamin (NOCbl) supplied by their own company. Both points lack merit for the following reasons. The authors make the astonishing claim that the spectra of nitric oxide (NO•) and cobalamins overlap. Unlike NO•, cobalamin absorbs in the visible region, permitting unequivocal spectral assignment of NOCbl as reported (3). We demonstrated that whereas NOCbl is highly unstable in solution, it is stabilized by the B12 trafficking protein CblC. So even if present, residual NONOate (which is unstable at neutral pH and is removed during the work-up (3)) could not account for the observed difference.The authors then misrepresent our synthetic method, claiming that anaerobic conditions were used to generate nitrocobalamin (NO2Cbl), which results in the transient formation of NOCbl. We synthesized NO2Cbl aerobically using nitrite as described (4); NOCbl is not an intermediate in this ligand exchange reaction. The aerobic instability of NOCbl has been rigorously described by inorganic chemists (3, 5) and raises obvious questions about its purported biological effects as exemplified by the authors' own 2003 JBC publication, which was later withdrawn.As to promoting NOCbl from their company, the authors refer to a synthetic route from a mixture of NO• gas and aquocobalamin. The authors' method (6) has been described as “dubious” by chemists (5). Whereas DEAE NONOate used in our method is widely known as an NO• donor,...

After a thorough read of this paper (1), we wish to clarify that the authors' anaerobic method of synthesis for the production of nitrocobalamin results in the transient formation of nitrosylcobalamin, an unstable intermediate upon exposure to air. We concur that the authors' method results in the production of nitrocobalamin based on the UV-visible data as shown. The authors' adapted anaerobic method consists of mixing hydroxocobalamin hydrochloride with diethylamine NONOate diethylammonium salt in aqueous solution. Of concern, the UV spectrum of nitric oxide overlaps that of all cobalamin species under anaerobic conditions, making any assignments of the binding of nitric oxide to hydroxocobalamin suspect (2). Additionally, the use of acetone to precipitate the authors' product causes precipitation of diethylamine NONOate, resulting in an impure product. As a result, its utility for drawing experimental conclusions is faulty.The product from the authors' anaerobic synthetic method has not been assessed for purity, and the synthetic method itself has not been validated using a stability-indicating method as required by the International Conference on Harmonization (ICH) (ICH Q2B, Validation of Analytical Procedures) methodology, which is a hallmark for analytical characterization. Our nitrosylcobalamin synthesis involves reacting nitric oxide gas with hydroxocobalamin acetate as a heterogeneous mixture in a non-electron-donating solvent followed by rotary evaporation. Our nitrosylcobalamin product is stable in air, releases nitric oxide gas in situ (3), and meets ICH stability guidelines (4). Additionally, our nitrosylcobalamin product demonstrates biological activity, which has not been observed for nitrocobalamin (3, 5).

Heterotrimeric G-proteins are signaling switches broadly divided into four families based on the sequence and functional similarity of their Gα subunits: Gs, Gi/o, Gq/11, and G12/13. Artificial mutations that activate Gα subunits of each of these families have long been known to induce oncogenic transformation in experimental systems. With the advent of next-generation sequencing, activating hotspot mutations in Gs, Gi/o, or Gq/11 proteins have also been identified in patient tumor samples. In contrast, patient tumor-associated G12/13 mutations characterized to date lead to inactivation rather than activation. By using bioinformatic pathway analysis and signaling assays, here we identified cancer-associated hotspot mutations in Arg-200 of Gα13 (encoded by GNA13) as potent activators of oncogenic signaling. First, we found that components of a G12/13-dependent signaling cascade that culminates in activation of the Hippo pathway effectors YAP and TAZ is frequently altered in bladder cancer. Up-regulation of this signaling cascade correlates with increased YAP/TAZ activation transcriptional signatures in this cancer type. Among the G12/13 pathway alterations were mutations in Arg-200 of Gα13, which we validated to promote YAP/TAZ-dependent (TEAD) and MRTF-A/B-dependent (SRE.L) transcriptional activity. We further showed that this mechanism relies on the same RhoGEF-RhoGTPase cascade components that are up-regulated in bladder cancers. Moreover, Gα13 Arg-200 mutants induced oncogenic transformation in vitro as determined by focus formation assays. In summary, our findings on Gα13 mutants establish that naturally occurring hotspot mutations in Gα subunits of any of the four families of heterotrimeric G-proteins are putative cancer drivers.

G protein–coupled receptors (GPCRs) initiate signaling cascades via G-proteins and beta-arrestins (βarr). βarr-dependent actions begin with recruitment of βarr to the phosphorylated receptor tail and are followed by engagement with the receptor core. βarrs are known to act as adaptor proteins binding receptors and various effectors, but it is unclear whether in addition to the scaffolding role βarrs can allosterically activate their downstream targets. Here we demonstrate the direct allosteric activation of proto-oncogene kinase Src by GPCR–βarr complexes in vitro and establish the conformational basis of the activation. Whereas free βarr1 had no effect on Src activity, βarr1 in complex with M2 muscarinic or β2-adrenergic receptors reconstituted in lipid nanodiscs activate Src by reducing the lag phase in Src autophosphorylation. Interestingly, receptor–βarr1 complexes formed with a βarr1 mutant, in which the finger-loop, required to interact with the receptor core, has been deleted, fully retain the ability to activate Src. Similarly, βarr1 in complex with only a phosphorylated C-terminal tail of the vasopressin 2 receptor activates Src as efficiently as GPCR–βarr complexes. In contrast, βarr1 and chimeric M2 receptor with nonphosphorylated C-terminal tail failed to activate Src. Taken together, these data demonstrate that the phosphorylated GPCR tail interaction with βarr1 is necessary and sufficient to empower it to allosterically activate Src. Our findings may have implications for understanding more broadly the mechanisms of allosteric activation of downstream targets by βarrs.

The amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) and frontotemporal dementia (FTD)–linked RNA-binding protein called FUS (fused in sarcoma) has been implicated in several aspects of RNA regulation, including mRNA translation. The mechanism by which FUS affects the translation of polyribosomes has not been established. Here we show that FUS can associate with stalled polyribosomes and that this association is sensitive to mTOR (mammalian target of rapamycin) kinase activity. Specifically, we show that FUS association with polyribosomes is increased by Torin1 treatment or when cells are cultured in nutrient-deficient media, but not when cells are treated with rapamycin, the allosteric inhibitor of mTORC1. Moreover, we report that FUS is necessary for efficient stalling of translation because deficient cells are refractory to the inhibition of mTOR-dependent signaling by Torin1. We also show that ALS-linked FUS mutants R521G and P525L associate abundantly with polyribosomes and decrease global protein synthesis. Importantly, the inhibitory effect on translation by FUS is impaired by mutations that reduce its RNA-binding affinity. These findings demonstrate that FUS is an important RNA-binding protein that mediates translational repression through mTOR-dependent signaling and that ALS-linked FUS mutants can cause a toxic gain of function in the cytoplasm by repressing the translation of mRNA at polyribosomes.

The inositol 1,4,5-trisphosphate (IP3) receptors (IP3Rs), which form tetrameric channels, play pivotal roles in regulating the spatiotemporal patterns of intracellular calcium signals. Mutations in IP3Rs have been increasingly associated with many debilitating human diseases such as ataxia, Gillespie syndrome, and generalized anhidrosis. However, how these mutations affect IP3R function, and how the perturbation of as-sociated calcium signals contribute to the pathogenesis and severity of these diseases remains largely uncharacterized. Moreover, many of these diseases occur as the result of autosomal dominant inheritance, suggesting that WT and mutant subunits associate in heterotetrameric channels. How the in-corporation of different numbers of mutant subunits within the tetrameric channels affects its activities and results in different disease phenotypes is also unclear. In this report, we investigated representative disease-associated missense mutations to determine their effects on IP3R channel activity. Additionally, we designed concatenated IP3R constructs to create tetrameric channels with a predefined subunit composition to explore the functionality of heteromeric channels. Using calcium imaging techniques to assess IP3R channel function, we observed that all the mutations studied resulted in severely attenuated Ca2+ release when expressed as homotetramers. However, some heterotetramers retained varied degrees of function dependent on the composition of the tetramer. Our findings suggest that the effect of mutations depends on the location of the mutation in the IP3R structure, as well as on the stoichiometry of mutant subunits assembled within the tetrameric channel. These studies provide insight into the pathogenesis and penetrance of these devastating human diseases.

IQGAP1 is a key scaffold protein that regulates numerous cellular processes and signaling pathways. Analogous to many other cellular proteins, IQGAP1 undergoes post-translational modifications, including phosphorylation. Nevertheless, very little is known about the specific sites of phosphorylation or the effects on IQGAP1 function. Here, using several approaches, including MS, site-directed mutagenesis, siRNA-mediated gene silencing, and chemical inhibitors, we identified the specific tyrosine residues that are phosphorylated on IQGAP1 and evaluated the effect on function. Tyr-172, Tyr-654, Tyr-855, and Tyr-1510 were phosphorylated on IQGAP1 when phosphotyrosine phosphatase activity was inhibited in cells. IQGAP1 was phosphorylated exclusively on Tyr-1510 under conditions with enhanced MET or c-Src signaling, including in human lung cancer cell lines. This phosphorylation was significantly reduced by chemical inhibitors of MET or c-Src or by siRNA-mediated knockdown of MET. To investigate the biological sequelae of phosphorylation, we generated a nonphosphorylatable IQGAP1 construct by replacing Tyr-1510 with alanine. The ability of hepatocyte growth factor, the ligand for MET, to promote AKT activation and cell migration was significantly greater when IQGAP1-null cells were reconstituted with IQGAP1 Y1510A than when cells were reconstituted with WT IQGAP1. Collectively, our data suggest that phosphorylation of Tyr-1510 of IQGAP1 alters cell function. Because increased MET signaling is implicated in the development and progression of several types of carcinoma, IQGAP1 may be a potential therapeutic target in selected malignancies.

The Critical Transition: China’s Priorities for 2021 Research paper sysadmin 31 January 2017

This paper sets out the core issues for the Xi leadership, and focuses on what these might mean for the UK, particularly in the post-Brexit world and with the election of Donald Trump as US president.

In 2017 Xi Jinping will complete his first full five-year term as China’s leader. Towards the end of the year, in autumn, the country is due to hold its 19th Party Congress. This major meeting usually marks the moment when the Communist Party of China (CPC) assesses its performance over the previous five years, sets out political goals for the coming five-year period and makes new appointments.

Xi Jinping’s leadership has been characterized by a number of significant domestic and international policy strategies. China’s economic growth rate is slowing, and the country’s economy is undergoing major restructuring. Export-led manufacturing growth and capital investment in fixed assets are now being replaced by consumer-led and service-dominated expansion. Meanwhile, the role of the CPC has been rearticulated with a major anti-corruption struggle since 2013 that has sought to clear away a raft of different networks and senior officials and connected business people. Xi has proved a more communicative, more populist and more nationalistic leader than his predecessors. He is also crafting an image of himself as a more visionary leader.

Internationally, China is striving for a relevance and role that it has never had before. Its reach is felt in international organizations, regionally, and through its economic and resource needs. It has a role in global affairs that embraces places once considered on its periphery, such as Latin America, the Arctic and Antarctic Circles, and the Middle East. Its impact in Asia is particularly striking, marked by activity in the South China Sea, and a new kind of relationship with Russia, India and the US. The major Belt and Road Initiative, in particular, has started to outline a new expansiveness in China’s relations with the outside world, despite the largely abstract nature of its overall shape and form at the moment.

The themes and viewpoints in this collection of essays are particularly geared towards those with an interest in policy engagement with China. While setting out the core issues for the Xi leadership, it also focuses on what these might mean for the UK, particularly in the post-Brexit world and with the election of Donald Trump as US president. As the UK seeks a new kind of relationship with a rapidly changing China, this group of expert opinions maps out the key markers in the run up to 2021, when China is due to celebrate achieving the first of its centennial goals: the delivery of middle-income status and a moderately prosperous society.

Brexit: Implications for EU–China Relations Research paper sysadmin 10 May 2017

For Beijing, the EU–China relationship will take priority over UK–China ties – with China’s relative focus on Germany becoming even more significant.

Summary

• The extent of current UK relations with China means that Brexit will notably reduce the scale and diversity of overall EU–China economic and commercial interactions. But the impact will vary across different areas.
• In policy terms, liberal voices on economic policy towards China will be somewhat weaker among the post-Brexit EU27. Brexit will not be the most important factor determining the future level of strategic coherence in EU policy towards China.
• The impact on post-Brexit EU27 trade with China will be felt both in the volume of trade and its composition. Following Brexit the EU will no longer be China’s largest trading partner.
• There will be some relative shift in Chinese investment in Europe away from the UK, though over time the impact of Europe-wide policy approaches to Chinese investment will have more impact than Brexit per se.
• EU–China educational exchanges will be weakened after Brexit, but inbound Chinese tourism will be less affected by Brexit.
• By 2025, the EU will have compensated for Brexit’s impact in some areas, but much depends on the EU’s own trajectory over the next decade.
• For Beijing, the EU–China relationship will take priority over UK–China ties. Within the EU, China’s relative focus on Germany will be even more significant.

China: End of the Reform Era 20 July 2018 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 May 2018 Chatham House, London

The speaker will argue that China’s reform era is ending, and that core factors which characterized it - including political stability, ideological openness and rapid economic growth - are unravelling.

Since the 1990s, Beijing’s leaders have firmly rejected any fundamental reform of their authoritarian one-party political system, even as a decades-long boom has reshaped China’s economy and society. On the surface, their efforts have been a success, but Carl Minzner says a closer look at China’s reform era reveals a different truth.

He outlines how over the past three decades, a frozen political system has fuelled both the rise of entrenched interests within the Communist Party and the systematic underdevelopment of institutions of governance among state and society at large. Economic gaps have widened, social unrest has worsened and ideological polarization has deepened.

The speaker will discuss how China’s leaders are attempting to address these looming challenges, including institutional reforms and a shift back towards single-man rule. The speaker will also consider the question of regime stability given that China’s era of ‘reform and opening up’ is ending and there is now a renewed uncertainty over Beijing’s future.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

Mobile Ecosystems as a Driver of Innovation and Growth in the Asia-Pacific 19 September 2018 — 12:30PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 September 2018 Chatham House, London

How Women are Transforming Indonesia Interview sysadmin 20 May 2019

In a series exploring women in international affairs, Isabel Dunstan speaks to Gitika Bhardwaj about the rise of the women’s movement in Indonesia.

Southeast Asia has one of the highest records of gender-based violence in the world and Indonesia was recently ranked as the second most dangerous place for women in the Asia-Pacific. What is the state of women’s rights and gender equality in Indonesia?

It is true that Indonesia has high rates of violence against women, however, it’s difficult to know the realities of women’s experiences because in the past the data has been somewhat unreliable. This has been due to reasons such as a lack of reporting mechanisms available to survivors of violence and the fact that discussing sexual violence is a taboo and, if reported, can result in stigmatization which limits the number of survivors who have come forward.

However, the first reliable nationwide survey on gendered violence in Indonesia was conducted in 2017 by the Indonesian Ministry of Women and Child Protection and the United Nations Population Fund. Interestingly, it showed that Indonesia’s rates of violence against women are on par with the global rate which is that 1 in 3 women are affected by sexual violence in their lifetime.

It’s therefore difficult to generalize that Indonesia is an unsafe place for women because it’s an extremely diverse country. There is a growing middle class while there is pervasive poverty. There is religious diversity where the eastern-most province of Aceh is the only province in the country where Sharia law is enforced, whereas in the western-most province of West Papua, the dominant religion is Christianity and the ways of life are completely different.

Nevertheless, violence against women is high in Indonesia and can happen in all places – rich or poor, east or west – and has different manifestations from street harassment and trafficking to domestic violence and workplace harassment.

In some parts of the country there are high rates of child marriage too and, according to UNICEF, 14 per cent of girls in Indonesia are married by the time they turn 18 which is shocking when we think about how child marriage limits girls’ access to education and makes them more vulnerable to sexual violence and therefore restricts their futures.

Child marriage is high in Indonesia in part due to rooted gender norms, low levels of education and discriminating legislation, such as the marriage law, which states that, although it is legal to marry at 21, girls can marry at 16 and boys can marry at 19 with parental consent. But this can be even lower meaning parents could get their daughters married at as young as 13. So the law is fundamentally unfair between girls and boys and the women’s movement in Indonesia has been fighting extremely hard to reform legislation that discriminates against women and girls.

From the country’s first female president, Megawati Sukarnoputri​, to incumbent finance minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati – who was voted ‘Best Minister in the World’ in 2018 – and maritime​ and fisheries minister Susi Pudjiastuti – who has become notorious for her tough stance against illegal fishing activities – how are women progressing in Indonesian politics?

Indonesia has come a long way since becoming a democracy in 1998. Before that, the second president and dictator, Suharto, ruled the country for almost 32 years and increased the inequality gap between men and women during his reign.

Since the fall of Suharto, however, gender equality is explicitly enshrined in Indonesia’s constitution and the country has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.

The country has also been undergoing a process of democratization which has involved slowly decentralizing its power. This means that greater authority has been distributed to the 34 provincial governments outside of the capital of Jakarta.

Furthermore, to aid gender equality, a quota system requiring political parties to be made up of 30 per cent women has been put in place, although remnants of Suharto’s old system of cronyism remain, limiting the impact of the quotas translating to more women in provincial parliaments.

But the defining approach to furthering gender equality in Indonesia has been through gender mainstreaming and gender-responsive budgeting which can be seen throughout provincial administrations in the country.

This means there is the intention to ensure infrastructure, health and education outcomes include results that address specific gender equality gaps. The challenge for effective gender mainstreaming, however, is the political will to translate the approach into well-resourced programmes from one province to another.

Nevertheless, we have just seen Indonesia go through the most incredible presidential and legislative elections last month – won by the current president, Joko Widodo, who has often been called the ‘Barack Obama of Southeast Asia’ and whose existing cabinet has the highest number of women in the country’s history. This is not simply a matter of filling seats in the cabinet with women – such as the wives and sisters of male politicians – because it’s required by law. But, rather, there are some incredible female political figures who are there because they are strong, smart and capable.

You’ve rightly mentioned Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, who is a fabulous role model for a lot of women particularly women who have not had tertiary education because she entered politics through an unorthodox route.

Then there’s Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, who is also the former leader of the World Bank and is such an inspiration to a lot of women who are looking to work in public life because of her experience as well as her work to include gender mainstreaming in state budgets.

There is also Minister of Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection, Yohana Susana Yembise, who is a Papuan woman, as well as many more female public figures.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives 2019-24 – Workshop 2 24 September 2019 — 9:00AM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 September 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within the UK strategic and policymaking communities to explore British perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024.

The roundtable took place at Chatham House in London. The report below contains a summary of the discussions.

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The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives 2019-20 – Workshop 1 11 September 2019 — 10:00AM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 September 2019 East-West Center, 1819 L St., NW, Suite 600, Washington, DC 20036, USA

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within the US strategic and policymaking communities to explore American perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable was organized in cooperation with, and was held at, the East-West Center in Washington D.C.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Satu Limaye, Vice President and Director of the East-West Center in Washington, DC.

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Development Prospects in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of the Asian Development Bank 25 September 2019 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 September 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The speaker will discuss development prospects in the Asia-Pacific and their implications for Europe and the UK. He will outline prospects for the region’s growth, the impact of the current US-China trade conflict as well as other challenges faced by the region. He will also discuss the future role of the Asian Development Bank and how it plans to support the further development of the region.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives to 2024 - Workshop 3 17 October 2019 — 9:30AM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 October 2019 Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, 27 rue de la Procession, 75740 Paris Cedex 15, France

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within the French strategic and policymaking community to explore French perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable was organized in cooperation with, and was held at, the Institut français des relations internationals in Paris.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Céline Pajon, Research Fellow, Center for Asian Studies, Institut français des relations internationals.

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The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Outlook to 2024 - Workshop 4 26 November 2019 — 9:30AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 January 2020 Gateway House, Stevens Street, Colaba

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within India’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Indian perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable was organized in cooperation with, and was held at, Gateway House in Mumbai.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by the International Security Studies Programme at Gateway House.

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Network Power in the Asia-Pacific: Making Sense of the New Regionalism and Opportunities for Cooperation 7 February 2020 — 9:45AM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The Asia-Pacific region continues to increase in geopolitical and geoeconomic importance. The rise of China and tensions with the US are affecting bilateral relationships and traditional alliances in the region. Whether seen from the perspective of the Quad – Australia, India, Japan and the US – or the Indo-Pacific concept embraced by a wide range of countries but with no shared consensus on scope and objectives or with ASEAN who insists on the importance of its own centrality, the region is redefining and reconceptualising itself.

With a diverse range of initiatives – including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) – there are a plethora of regional agreements and institutional groupings that add further complexity.

As the Bretton Woods architecture continues to be dominated by Western powers, China is also spearheading parallel governance initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a means of enhancing its geopolitical and geoeconomic influence.

This one-day conference will focus on how such networks and alliances have been built, and sustained, in the Asia-Pacific region. In order to understand how new regional initiatives might open up opportunities for new forms of international cooperation, the conference will focus on the themes of cyber-technology and innovation, sustainable development and mitigating the impacts of climate change and new infrastructure initiatives. It will assess whether there is a zero-sum conflict between competing networks and agendas or whether a common approach can be developed.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Outlook From Now to 2024 - Workshop 5 18 February 2020 — 12:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 February 2020 Langafonua Centre

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within Tonga’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Tongan perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable took place in Nuku’alofa and was co-hosted by the Royal Oceania Institute in Tonga.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Lady Fane Fakafanua, Director of Operations at the Royal Oceania Institute.

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Virtual Roundtable: The Economic Implications of COVID-19 on Asia 2 April 2020 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 27 March 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The COVID-19 pandemic is likely to have a damaging economic impact on Asia, potentially the most serious since the financial crisis two decades ago. While early estimates suggest that a recession is inevitable, differing countries in Asia are generally deploying modest fiscal and monetary measures. This is true even in China, compared with the ‘whatever it takes’ approach pursued by Europe and America.

How effective will these measures be in reviving growth and in easing the pain, particularly on the poor in developing countries in Asia? Is Asia witnessing a sudden but temporary halt in economic activity rather than a prolonged slowdown? At this virtual roundtable, the speakers will consider the likelihood of a recovery for trade in the region and will explore what lessons can be learned from countries like Singapore, who seem to be successfully managing the health and economic aspects of COVID-19.

This event is online only. After registering, you will receive a follow-up confirmation email with details of how to join the webinar.

Webinar: Is It All Over For Globalization? 15 April 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 April 2020

The coronavirus pandemic has led many to predict the end of globalization. Confronted with unprecedented social and economic challenges, countries are prioritizing their own citizens. Now, more than ever, international cooperation is necessary but, amidst the rise of nationalist-populist governments, global partnerships are absent or faltering. And as economies grind to a halt, so does international commerce — particularly in trade-dependent Asia, a region whose rise drove the period of ‘hyper-globalization’ which preceded the global financial crisis.

Yet there are other possible futures too. The level of scientific collaboration and information-sharing now underway in search of a vaccine is unprecedented, and after a hesitant beginning the major powers have woken up to the importance of concerted economic stimuli. The virus may in some ways have the paradoxical result of bringing countries together, not driving them apart. Rather than causing its demise, it could help begin a new period in which globalization is not as deep, but at least is better managed and more equitable? Could this be the catalyst for a new coming together at home and abroad?

In this webinar, speakers debate what impact the COVID-19 pandemic will have on the future of globalization, both in Asia and around the world.

China's Evolving Economic Relations with North Africa: Before and After COVID-19 10 September 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 20 August 2020 Online

China’s economic presence across North Africa has grown in recent years. The global power has forged close economic relationships with Egypt and Algeria, while also continuing to develop ties with Morocco and Tunisia.

Beijing, which views the region as a geostrategic intersection between Mediterranean, Middle East, and Africa, has primarily focused its efforts on developing bilateral relations, while also working within the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF).

All countries of the region have agreed to participate in China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI), which has raised concerns among Western powers. As North African countries grapple with fiscal constraints as part of the fallout from COVID-19 (and the oil price drop for hydrocarbon exporters such as Algeria), it is yet to be seen whether China’s ambitions and relations within the region will continue to develop at the same pace going forward.

In this webinar, organized by Chatham House’s MENA and Asia-Pacific Programmes, experts will discuss the evolving economic relationship between China and North African states, and explore the impact of China’s pandemic diplomacy across the region.

How asymmetric are economic relations between China and North African states? Which sectors are most important, and what are the prospects for China to develop the region’s digital and healthcare infrastructure? Will China’s increasing economic interests necessitate an increasing political and security engagement? Should North African states be wary of Chinese loans? What is the public opinion of China’s economic presence in North Africa? Have Chinese ‘soft power’ efforts helped to bolster economic (and political) ties? What will be the likely fallout of COVID-19 on BRI and infrastructure projects in the region?

You can express your interest in attending by following this link. You will receive a Zoom confirmation email should your registration be successful. Alternatively, you can watch the event live on the MENA Programme Facebook page.

Policy for Recovery in Africa: Rethinking Energy Solutions for Universal Electricity Access 10 December 2020 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 20 November 2020 Online

Approximately three quarters of Africa’s population do not have access to clean cooking fuel and face costs to their health. Speakers explore policy opportunities to bridge this gap, the key barriers that remain and the transformative potential of energy transition in delivering sustainable access for all.

Speakers explore policy opportunities to bridge the energy access gap, the key barriers that remain and the transformative potential of energy transition in delivering sustainable access for all.

African countries face an uphill battle as they confront the shocks of the coronavirus pandemic, seeking recovery in the context of global socio-economic difficulty and fragmented geopolitics.

With deficits in terms of governance, public health systems, social protection, and basic service delivery presenting challenges even before the outbreak, careful analysis and creative evidence-based policy solutions, as well as emphasis on implementation, will be crucial if Africa is to progress towards the SDGs and Agenda 2063.

The Policy for Recovery in Africa series brings together expert speakers and decision makers to examine and exchange on key challenges, potential solutions, and approaches for implementation.

The energy access gap in Africa presents one of the most serious obstacles to the long-term pandemic recovery effort, with almost half of the continent’s population estimated to still lack access to electricity, creating a negative annual GDP impact estimated to be over 25 billion USD.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives until 2024 – Japanese perceptions 24 February 2020 — 9:00AM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 March 2021 Chatham House

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within Japan’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Japanese perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable took place in Tokyo and was organized in partnership with the Indo-Pacific Studies Group.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Hiroki Sekine, Visiting Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House.

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Nancy Pelosi in Taiwan: What lies ahead for China and the US? Expert comment GBhardwaj 3 August 2022

Chatham House experts examine the implications for Taiwan, China and the United States of Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island.

China’s fading ties with Washington?

Dr Yu Jie

US House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi’s, visit to Taiwan has plunged China-US relations into a new low as the reservoir of trust forged between the two sides over the last 40 years appears to be almost exhausted.

However, her move will likely not result in the full-scale crisis across the Taiwan strait that some hawkish voices in both Beijing and Washington believe. Instead, Beijing will most likely offer a combination of military posturing toward the US navy and economic sanctions on Taiwanese agricultural and manufacturing products in order to send a clear bellwether to any future potential visits by high-level Western political figures.

Neither Beijing nor Washington has declared a willingness to change the current status quo as the present impasse benefits both governments – but for different reasons. For China, the best approach is to reach a military and economic capability that prevents US engagement with Taiwan without the use of force. For the US, the strategic ambiguity under the Taiwan Relations Act remains an effective card to counter China’s growing military influence in the Indo-Pacific and keep itself relevant within the region as a security guarantor. Yet, both sides have decided to kick the issue of Taiwan’s status down the road, believing that time is ultimately on their side.

Despite a chorus of nationalistic rhetoric, China will be careful not to stumble into an accidental conflict which risks colossal damage on all fronts. Chinese President, Xi Jinping, must weigh all of the options before him as Beijing cannot afford to be perceived as unilaterally seeking to change what it agreed with the US back in 1979 when ties were re-established. If that happens, it will provoke the US political establishment to reach a unanimous agreement to change its ‘One China Policy’ and, ahead of the 20th Communist Party Congress where Xi is expected to be crowned for a historic third term, the last thing he wants is an unnecessary conflict with Taiwan.

The road to escalation?

Dr Bill Hayton

Beijing has chosen to take issue over Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in a way that it did not do for other recent US Congressional visits to the island. Several high-ranking US senators visited in April and May this year yet none of these visits triggered the prospect of a cross-strait crisis. So why has Beijing chosen to turn Pelosi’s visit into a stand-off?

Pelosi’s visit is part of a performance in which both actors – the US and China – are playing primarily for their domestic audiences. This comes at a time when ruling circles in Beijing are preparing for the five-yearly Communist Party Congress. Amid a slowing economy and successive COVID-19 variants, Xi Jinping cannot afford to look weak as he prepares the ground for his third term of office. Meanwhile, the US, represented either by President Joe Biden or House Speaker Pelosi, cannot back down at this point without looking weak itself.

Both sides have moved military assets into strategic positions near Taiwan to demonstrate their resolve. Neither side wants confrontation yet neither wishes to be humiliated. Currently, Pelosi’s visit, amid posturing by China, will make the US appear strong, but the consequences are likely to play out over a longer period. Xi Jinping will need to appear to have recaptured the initiative between now and the congress in the autumn when the risk of an incident will be at its greatest.

Taiwan controls several isolated islands that could be pressured by Chinese forces in the event of a future crisis. The Kinmen and Matsu archipelagos lie just a few miles off the coast of the mainland and have been at the centre of previous confrontations. There are also two other points of concern. Pratas Island – known as Dongsha – sits halfway between Taiwan and Hong Kong. Itu Aba – known as Taiping – is the largest of the Spratly Islands in the centre of the South China Sea. All would be vulnerable to an attack by the People’s Liberation Army, the principal military force of China, and the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party.

A military confrontation between China and the US over Taiwan, or further south in the South China Sea, would have major impacts on regional and global trade. An estimated $300 billion worth of trade passes through the area every month. Japan and South Korea depend heavily on flows of oil and gas through the sea. Exports from Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines would also be heavily affected by disruptions to shipping, increased insurance costs and interruptions in inflows of raw materials. The impact on a world economy already suffering major disruption because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the lingering effects of COVID-19 would indeed be stark.

Is a shift in US policy on the cards?

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan will undoubtedly be seen as a provocation by Beijing – even if it should not be. Pelosi’s trip to the Indo-Pacific, which also includes visits to Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea and Japan, comes at a time of growing tension between the US and China in the region.

It also comes at a time when the divide among Washington’s foreign policy elite is growing, with some arguing that it is time to abandon the country’s policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’, where it refrains from stating how it would react were China to openly and deliberately attack Taiwan. Indeed, recent statements by President Joe Biden have raised questions about whether the US is set to make a policy change. But, since both its ‘One China Policy’ and policy of strategic ambiguity have been largely successful, it would be wise for the US to maintain them.

During her visit, Pelosi is likely to reaffirm the US’ high regard for Taiwan’s democracy and embrace the language of shared values. She has embraced Biden’s framing of international relations as a contest between democracies and autocracies. This alone will continue to exacerbate tensions. It would be a mistake, though, to signal a major policy change away from strategic ambiguity and towards strategic clarity on Taiwan’s status. Even if the US decides later to embrace a policy shift of this size, such a message should be carefully considered and communicated clearly, and not by chance.

Congress has an important role to play but President Joe Biden and his national security team should make the final decision on US policy towards Taiwan. Getting the signals right in international politics is a key part of deterrence and, especially in East Asia, deterring both China and Taiwan’s ambitions is essential. 

Increasing insecurity in the region?

Dr John Nilsson-Wright and Ben Bland

Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan has provoked mixed responses from US allies across Asia.

For Japanese policymakers, the Taiwan issue is connected to the wider issue of regional security. Fears that a military conflict over the island will inevitably draw Japanese self-defense forces into a shooting war with China – a development that is neither formally mandated under the terms of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty nor necessarily constitutionally sanctioned – explains the concerns in Tokyo.

While the Japanese government of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is increasingly worried about China’s growing military presence in the East and South China Seas, Japan’s heavy trade dependence on China and the country’s economic and security vulnerabilities make it imperative to avoid any further escalation of tensions.

Given Tokyo’s non-recognition policy towards Taiwan, Japanese ties with Taipei are handled informally by politicians of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), rather than at cabinet or foreign ministry level, and in recent weeks and months there has been an increase in visits by cross party delegations from Japan.

The death of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as removed from public life a vocal advocate in support of enhanced ties between Tokyo and Taipei, but with public opinion in Japan increasingly tilting in an anti-Chinese direction, and with younger politicians favouring a more combative approach towards Beijing, there is a risk that the government will face pressure at home to toughen its language on Taiwan. Bolstering deterrence through increased military cooperation among allies, along with a graduated increase in defence spending, is the best way of limiting risk over Taiwan.

Nevertheless, privately, many officials in Tokyo are likely to have viewed the Pelosi visit as an unhelpful intervention and will be puzzled and perhaps frustrated by the apparent inability of the Biden administration to persuade the US Speaker of the House of Representatives to cancel her visit.

In South Korea, the government of President Yoon Suk-yeol, faces similar pressures to Japan, given the heavy dependence of the South Korean economy on China for trade and investment opportunities.

Pelosi’s visit to the region will strikingly not include meetings with either the president or Foreign Minister Park Jin. With Yoon on vacation and Park attending the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Cambodia, the absence of high profile engagements for Pelosi might seem to be a purely practical matter, but Seoul may also be seeking to avoid antagonizing Beijing at a time when the Chinese government is seeking to pressure South Korea not to enhance alliance coordination with the United States and Japan or to expand its commitment to the controversial Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile defence system.

As in Japan, public opinion in South Korea is increasingly anti-Chinese, but the logic of regional economic and security uncertainty, requires the Yoon government to avoid getting trapped in a worsening stand-off with Beijing.

What are the lasting impacts of the AUKUS agreement? Interview LJefferson 15 August 2022

Drawing on their International Affairs article, Jamal Barnes and Samuel Makinda outline the effect of AUKUS on Australia-France relations and the liberal order.

Almost a year after the surprise announcement of the AUKUS treaty, its full diplomatic implications are still being understood. The security cooperation agreement between Australia, the US and the UK caused outrage in France and was a notable source of discord between states that see themselves as defenders of the liberal international order.

In this interview Jamal Barnes and Samuel Makinda discuss their recent article in International Affairs and assess the effect of the agreement on relationships between its signatories and France and the EU, the potential for reconciliation in the treaty’s aftermath, as well as the implications it has for trust in world politics.  

What was the AUKUS treaty and why did Australia sign it?

The AUKUS treaty is an agreement between Australia, the US and the UK. Signed in 2021, it facilitates cooperation on security issues in the Indo-Pacific between the three countries – specifically, it concerns the sharing of ‘military capabilities and critical technologies, such as cyber, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and undersea domains’.

A key aspect is that Australia will purchase nuclear-fuelled submarines from either the US or UK. Australia decided to purchase nuclear-powered submarines – and reneged on its 2016 agreement to purchase French-built diesel-propelled submarines – because it believed that the French-made submarines were no longer fit for purpose.

However, the agreement is about more than submarines. Although Australia, the UK and US argue that AUKUS is designed to defend the rules-based international order and help ‘preserve security and stability in the Indo-Pacific’, AUKUS has been largely seen as a response to the rise of China and its military activities in the region. The AUKUS agreement reflects the increased attention that the US, UK and Australia are paying to the Indo-Pacific and their commitment to constraining China’s exercise of power in the region.

What were the effects of the AUKUS treaty on relations between Australia and France?

It led to a serious diplomatic rift. Australian officials, including former Prime Minister Morrison, had visited President Macron in France and told him nothing about AUKUS. Morrison had assured Macron in June 2021 while former Australian foreign and defence ministers had assured their French counterparts that Australia was fully committed to the purchase of French submarines just two weeks before the announcement of AUKUS.

When French officials found out about AUKUS on the day it was announced on 15 September 2021, they declared publicly that they had been betrayed and stabbed in the back. Not only had France built its relationship with Australia on trust, but its relationship was more than just about submarines. It was designed to be central to France’s 50-year engagement strategy in the Indo-Pacific. However, France was not only left out of talks but was also betrayed by a country it considered a close ally.

France responded by temporarily recalling its ambassador and stated that it would ‘redefine’ its relationship with Australia. It did not say that it would not work with Australia, but rather downgraded its relationship to one where it would only do so on a case-by-case basis.

In your article you mention that the AUKUS treaty was seen as a betrayal of trust by France in particular. Why use the word ‘betrayal’?

The word betrayal is accurate because Australia’s actions went beyond simply cancelling a business contract. Australia breached France’s trust. Not all agreements involve trust. Some are driven by self-interest while others are simply legal contracts. When these agreements are broken, the usual response is feelings of disappointment and a belief that one party is unreliable and has not lived up to its end of the agreement.

However, when diplomatic partnerships involve trust, they often contain an emotional element. A key element of trust is that one party makes itself vulnerable to another in the expectation that neither party will take advantage. When that trust is breached, the response is different from a breach of contract.

It involves feelings of betrayal as deeper emotional factors are involved. This could be seen in President Macron’s anger, and his and other French officials’ willingness to publicly call Prime Minister Morrison a liar who had stabbed France in the back. If the previous France-Australia agreement was simply a legal contract, it would have been difficult to explain the emotional element of this diplomatic fallout.

How did the signing of the AUKUS treaty affect wider relations between members of AUKUS and EU member states?

The EU, like France, felt betrayed by the AUKUS announcement. Despite being a key ally of the US, Australia, and the UK, it was left out of AUKUS discussions, and was not aware of the agreement until it was announced in the media.

What made this worse was that the EU was in the process of announcing its Indo-Pacific strategy, which was characterized as ‘maybe one of the [EU’s] most important geopolitical documents’ by High Representative for Foreign and Security Affairs, Josep Borrell. For the EU, this was the latest in a long line of recent policy betrayals that had left it uncertain if it could trust key allies on important issues. The result was greater calls from within the EU to more forcefully pursue ‘strategic autonomy’, meaning a more assertive and independent EU foreign policy.

Do betrayals of trust affect the health of the liberal international order?

Yes, they can. While it is common for leaders in liberal democracies to lie to their own people, lying to the leaders of other countries can have serious repercussions for the norms, rules and institutions of international society. A key aspect of international society is the ‘presumption of trust’ that facilitates legal compliance and diplomatic cooperation.

Without this presumption it is difficult for states to engage in long term partnerships or have confidence that diplomatic agreements will be upheld. In our article, we highlight how Australia’s violation of a particular norm, that agreements must be kept, has undermined this presumption of trust. This norm not only helps build trust between states, but also contributes to the maintenance of international order by helping to support the presumption of trust in international society.

Nuclear proliferation in a fragmenting world 13 September 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 September 2022 Online

Where does the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) stand in 2022?

With the war in Ukraine and China–US tensions rising, the threat of a nuclear arms race has never been as high since the Cold War.

Global efforts to control the appropriation and use of nuclear weapons are strained with the war in Ukraine, US–Russia and US–China tension, Iran on the nuclear threshold, instability in Pakistan and the ongoing threat from North Korea.

The Review Conference of the NPT that took place in New York this August sought to deal with the multiple nuclear threats, but new missile technology such as hypersonic glide vehicles and torpedoes are not covered by a treaty.

Russia and the US are in a development phase for a host of new technologies and delivery systems, especially after both withdrew from various arms-control treaties in the 2000s and 2010s. Now the nuclear stockpile is growing again and major superpowers are adopting confrontational geostrategic positions.

As the world’s established orders and system fragment, there is a possibility the nine countries with confirmed nuclear weapons could grow. Events in Ukraine highlight the need for a new, modern agreement on nuclear weapons control, needed today more than ever.

The panel of experts discuss key questions including:

• What did ‘RevCon’ in New York tell us about the adoption or update to the NPT?

• Will the war in Ukraine deter or prevent any agreement between nations or does nuclear weapons control represent an area of potential multilateral harmony?

• Are we likely to see a new arms race akin to the Cold War? Where does China fit into this race?

• How has technology changed the arms control landscape?

 As with all Chatham House member events, questions from members drive the conversation.

Why the UN matters for Britain Interview LJefferson 6 September 2022

In the fourth of a series of interviews with Queen Elizabeth II Academy faculty, Jeremy Greenstock argues that the UN is still important in a polarized world.

For many people looking at the United Nations (UN) today, the institution (and the world) appears to be at an inflection point and the UN seems ill-equipped to meet these challenges. From your vantage point, how does this period look in relative terms? 

I think for an institution like the UN founded on principles and compromises laid down in 1945, the passage of time is bound to be difficult because society changes quicker than an institution can reform. We can talk about reform later, but the UN has challenges. Where do these challenges come from? I see them coming from a crisis in governance, in governments around the world.

The UN is a forum of member states, and the member states carry their national labels at the UN and follow their national interests at the UN. And almost all governments are suffering huge challenges, not just from the circumstances of geopolitics, but from the expectations of their own people, which they find difficult to meet.

The UN is a servant in that sense, of governments, and so what happens at the UN reflects what is happening in and between governments. We need to keep that in perspective. The UN still retains a tremendous value as a forum. It is a natural forum for governments to talk before they shoot, which was not there in previous eras, and that has had a significant effect since 1945 in reducing the incidence of war between states, particularly between the largest states.

It has obviously been more difficult to deal with local and regional conflicts, but the kind of confrontation that threatens to escalate into a global war has been severely restricted by the UN. The habit of talking at the UN General Assembly (UNGA), artificial as it may seem, is an extremely important part of the avoidance of conflict in the modern age.  

There is a deep scepticism about the UN. Many people think there is a lot of talking but that the real action takes place elsewhere. What is the value of the UN?  

Well, there are two aspects to this. One is the fact that leaders must give their reasons for their policymaking to an international public. This has a force in today’s digital world where most people have access to a megaphone of some kind. The legitimacy of what governments do is exposed at the UNGA.

Secondly, alongside the open meetings and the publicized speeches, there are countless side meetings that go on, and it is an opportunity for leaders to test each other out, and to have private words that may differ from the public words they have to produce for their own followers in their own capitals.

It is an opportunity for personal diplomacy which is highly valuable, and which might not otherwise happen, particularly between leaders who have very serious differences. And I think that the testing of the legitimacy of policy in both the public and the private spheres is an important aspect of international diplomacy that the UNGA provides an opportunity for.  

At the UNGA, states are called to account before the UN, and this can expose hypocrisies. But sometimes there are fundamental clashes over interests and also over values. How would you characterize the UN’s handling of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?

It is a different audience at the UN from the audience that they have back in their capitals or in their own groups of like-minded people. They must justify themselves in different ways, and there are a whole host of inconsistencies in foreign policy that get exposed at the UN when people must explain themselves in public.

A lot of member states around the world have not condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine; yet underneath their non-condemnation is a general regret because Russia has broken a huge taboo of the UN Charter, which is the sacrosanctity of independent sovereign territories in Article 2.7.

And that article is valuable to member states who feel threatened by more powerful member states. Russia, as a permanent member, has ridden roughshod over sovereign independence. China and India will have equivocal feelings about that, but they can’t say so in public because they want some of the West’s hypocrisies and inconsistencies exposed, and because they find the approach of sanctions very unpalatable.

Sanctions are unpopular, and the use of sanctions has become a major weapon of non-war by the United States in particular. So, the Russian invasion is unpopular, but the approach of the West is also unpopular for not better looking after the interests of emerging economies and lower-income states, particularly on climate change, but also on economic development.

So, a whole host of different considerations come into play over Ukraine at the UNGA.

How do you think the UN could be best repurposed or reformed?  

It is terribly difficult, because if you open the UN Charter for one reason, you are opening it up to a host of demands from member states for other reforms. And remember that no reform of the Charter can happen without a 2/3 majority at the General Assembly, and that is an effective blocker, because you will always find more people opposing a particular reform that supporting it.

So, I think formal reform remains a bit of a dream in the circumstances of a polarized world. I want to divert discussions about UN reform into areas where the Secretary General has a competence without needing a vote from member states.

I am talking about improvement in methodologies, in the meritocracy of appointments, in the day-to-day workings of the UN. It looks unambitious on a large-scale basis, but just improving the competence of the UN and its agencies will ensure the relevance of the UN to people’s material interests in terms of human rights, refugees, food distribution, and children, and all the other things that the agencies look after.

So, I would prefer to concentrate reform energy into competence reforms, management reforms, rather than reforms of the Charter. 

This takes us to the question of the permanent members of the Security Council, and especially the US and the UK. You have experienced first-hand America’s ambivalence towards the UN. How much has this undercut the UN’s relevance?

I was frequently disappointed by the approach of the US to issues of policy at the UN. The US finds it very difficult as a nation to move beyond the primacy of its own domestic public opinion.

That perspective – that we have democracy at home, but we will not, as Americans, allow international democracy – is regarded around the world as an untenable position for the superpower. And I think it is more than untenable, it is against the US’s long-term interests to demand such national exceptionalism.

That exceptionalism is extremely unpopular, and the US’s extraterritorial reach is very unpopular. That loss of legitimacy around the world is affecting American interests, in the Middle East, over Afghanistan, over the reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine; America losing the argument with international public opinion has a material effect on American power, influence and interests.

Has America paid the price for asserting its exceptionalism? From your perspective, representing the UK, arguably the closest ally of the US and one with a permanent seat on the Security Council, how did you manage this?

Well, I had a long experience of that in my job in Baghdad. Yes, the UK normally supports the US in international forums because our interests coincide. In foreign policy, interests are more important than values, and sometimes you have to make compromises and shade your values in order to get results and to avoid conflict.

I found myself taking up the US’ arguments and trying to deliver them as the UK, because the US was more unpopular than the UK and we could act more subtly. The US was more unpopular than the UK because the UK – and a lot of the time France – tried a lot harder than other permanent members to work for the common interest of UN members.

There were times I argued publicly against the US at the Security Council because their logic was incompatible with a multilateral approach, over the International Criminal Court for instance, or over some approaches to the Middle East. I would take a different view, not just because I didn’t want to seem like a constant puppet of the US, but because I thought the logic that they were following was constraining for them, and the counter-productiveness washed off on us.

Here, I want to make an important point. You won’t get governments coming together to form a multilateral approach with all the compromises that this entails unless they are confident of their position at home. They can’t otherwise explain those compromises to their domestic public opinion. If governments are insecure at home, they won’t pursue a multilateral approach because of that insecurity.

The UK is seeking to define a new global role for itself. It has been one of the most influential states at the UN. Do you see this changing?

I don’t think the change of leader makes a terrific difference for the UK in the UN because there is cross-party parliamentary agreement that the UN is important.

I was disappointed that the UK did not take the UN more seriously at a political level except when it badly needed it at a particular moment. At an official level, there was plenty of support from London, but I don’t think that politicians ever gave much priority to the health of the UN.