With violent protests following the second anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, and calls for a new unified government amid dire comments about the stability of Egypt, the world’s attention is again on President Morsi and his country. This follows a tumultuous period last month, when Egyptians went to the polls and ratified a new constitution. The document, criticized as hurried, incomplete, and lacking in consensus is enormously contentious.

In the Saban Center’s newest Middle East Memo, The View From a Distance: Egypt’s Contentious New Constitution, nonresident fellow Mirette F. Mabrouk gives a broad overview of the new constitution, and provides context and analysis for specific sections.

Mabrouk outlines several ways in which, she argues, the document is shaky on the protection of freedoms and rights, particularly those of women, some religious minorities and minors. Mabrouk also encourages analysts to stop viewing this situation as an Islamist/ secular divide, arguing that idea is too simplistic, and lacks the context for greater understanding of Egypt’s domestic politics.

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• The View From a Distance: Egypt’s Contentious New Constitution

       

This summer, the world has watched as an al Qaeda offshoot, the Islamic State group, launched a militant offensive into Iraq, seizing large swaths of land. This Center for Middle East Policy’s Middle East Memo, Kurdistan Rising: To Acknowledge or Ignore the Unraveling of Iraq, examines how the fall of Iraq’s key city of Mosul has changed matters for Kurds in Iraq, and the necessity for American policymakers to take stock of the reality of the Kurdistan Region in this “post-Mosul” world.

Highlights: 

• A look at the Kurds of Iraq, their history and how the United States has largely spurned a partnership with them. Having been autonomous in Iraq since 1991, the Kurds heeded the aspirations of the United States in 2003 to assist in the removal of the Baath regime of Saddam Hussein, and played by the rules of the game established in the post-2003 period, albeit unwillingly at times. However, they have consistently refused to follow a path that would result in relinquishing the powers they enjoy. They have even taken steps to extend their autonomy to the point of having economic sovereignty within a federal Iraq, thus bringing them into serious dispute with Baghdad and the government of Nouri al-Maliki and earning the rebuke of the United States.

• An examination of how, since 2011, failed U.S. and European policies aimed at healing Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic fissures have contributed to the current situation. By so strongly embracing the concept of Iraq’s integrity as crucial to American interests in the region, key allies and partners have been marginalized along the way.

• Policy recommendations for the United States and its western allies, given that the Kurdistan region now stands on the threshold of restructuring Iraq according to its federal or confederal design, or exercising its full right to self-determination and seceding from Iraq. By ignoring the realities of Kurdish strength in Iraq, U.S. and European powers run the risk of losing influence in the only part of Iraq that can be called a success story, and antagonizing what could be a key ally in an increasingly unpredictable Middle East.

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• Kurdistan Rising: To Acknowledge or Ignore the Unraveling of Iraq

       

       

       

       

INTRODUCTION

The Obama administration needs to focus on executing its existing financial rescue plans, keep the TARP focused on the banking sector, and create a contingency plan should the banking system destabilize again.

Crystal balls are dangerous, especially when it comes to economic predictions, which is why it is important for the administration to chart a path forward. Public policy must remain focused on the very real possibility that the apparent easing in the economy’s decline may be followed by little or no growth for several quarters and there could possibly be another negative turn. One of the risks is that the United States is very connected to the rest of the world, most of which is in severe recession. The global economy could be a significant drag on U.S. growth.

Cautious optimism should be the order of the day. We fear that the recent reactions of the financial markets and of some analysts carry too much of the optimism without recognizing enough of the uncertainty. There remains a lot of uncertainty and policymakers should not rest on their laurels or turn to other policies, even if they look more exciting. It is vital to follow through on the current financial rescue plans and to have well-conceived contingency plans in case there is another dip down.

We propose three recommendations for the financial rescue plans:

• Focus on execution of existing programs. The Administration has created programs to deal with each of the key elements necessary to solve the financial crisis. All of them have significant steps remaining and some of them have not even started yet, such as the programs to deal with toxic assets. As has been demonstrated multiple times now since October 2008, these are complex programs that require a great deal of attention. It is time to execute rather than to create still more efforts.
• Resist the temptation to allocate money from the TARP to other uses—it is essential to maintain a reserve of Congressionally-authorized funds in case they are needed for the banks. It would be difficult to overemphasize the remaining uncertainties about bank solvency as they navigate what will remain a rough year or more. The banks could easily need another $300 billion of equity capital and might need still more. It is essential that the administration have the ammunition readily available.
• Third, make sure there is a contingency plan to deal with a major setback for the banking system. The plan needs broad support within the administration and among regulators and, ideally, from key congressional leaders. We probably won’t need it, but there is too high a chance that we will require it for us to remain without one. The country cannot afford even the appearance of the ad hoc and changing nature of the responses that were evident last fall.

We also give the administration a thumbs-up for their bank recapitalization as well as the TALF program, while they are much more skeptical of the Treasury’s approaches to toxic assets. The authors also believe it is time to focus on the truly mind-blowing budget deficits given the danger that markets will not be able to absorb the amount of government borrowing needed without triggering a rise in U.S. interest rates and perhaps an unstable decline in the value of the dollar, nor do they believe there should be a another fiscal stimulus except under extreme circumstances.

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Paris and Rome may be famous for romance, but it’s Filipinos who get the most love. That, at least, is a conclusion that can be drawn from a global love survey conducted by the Gallup Organization.

In our latest column for Bloomberg View, we mine the unique Gallup data for insights into the nature of love and its relationship to nationality, age, money and economic development. The survey, conducted in 136 countries, posed the question: “Did you experience love for a lot of the day yesterday?”

In honor of Valentine’s Day, we thought readers might be interested in seeing the full ranking. So here goes. The first number after each country name is the percentage of respondents who said they had experienced love the previous day. The second (in parentheses) is the sample size for the country.

1. Philippines 93% (2193)
2. Rwanda 92% (1495)
3. Puerto Rico 90% (495)
4. Hungary 89% (1002)
5. Cyprus 88% (988)
6. Trinidad and Tobago 88% (506)
7. Paraguay 87% (1986)
8. Lebanon 86% (970)
9. Costa Rica 85% (1985)
10. Cambodia 85% (1961)
11. Nigeria 84% (1965)
12. Guyana 83% (486)
13. Spain 83% (998)
14. Mexico 82% (989)
15. Tanzania 82% (1941)
16. Ecuador 82% (2126)
17. Jamaica 82% (534)
18. Venezuela 82% (997)
19. Cuba 82% (978)
20. Brazil 82% (1038)
21. Laos 81% (1947)
22. Argentina 81% (1985)
23. Belgium 81% (1015)
24. Canada 81% (1006)
25. Greece 81% (996)
26. U.S. 81% (1224)
27. Denmark 80% (1003)
28. Portugal 80% (995)
29. Netherlands 80% (993)
30. Vietnam 79% (1901)
31. New Zealand 79% (1775)
32. Italy 79% (1000)
33. Colombia 79% (1994)
34. Madagascar 78% (998)
35. Uruguay 78% (1969)
36. Turkey 78% (985)
37. Dominican Republic 78% (1976)
38. United Arab Emirates 77% (961)
39. Saudi Arabia 77% (978)
40. Chile 76% (1982)
41. Malawi 76% (1997)
42. Ghana 76% (1986)
43. South Africa 76% (1968)
44. Australia 76% (1199)
45. Panama 75% (1995)
46. Zambia 74% (1971)
47. Kenya 74% (1965)
48. Namibia 74% (996)
49. Nicaragua 74% (1988)
50. Germany 74% (1214)
51. Ireland 74% (992)
52. Sweden 74% (993)
53. U.K. 74% (1200)
54. Switzerland 74% (986)
55. Montenegro 74% (800)
56. Austria 73% (984)
57. France 73% (1217)
58. Kuwait 73% (934)
59. Finland 73% (993)
60. El Salvador 73% (2000)
61. Pakistan 73% (2253)
62. Zimbabwe 72% (1989)
63. Honduras 72% (1947)
64. Peru 72% (1982)
65. Egypt 72% (1024)
66. Serbia 72% (1474)
67. Bosnia and Herzegovina 72% (1896)
68. Sierra Leone 71% (1986)
69. India 71% (3140)
70. Taiwan 71% (984)
71. Bangladesh 70% (2200)
72. Belize 70% (464)
73. Croatia 69% (958)
74. Macedonia 69% (1000)
75. Mozambique 69% (996)
76. Bolivia 69% (1948)
77. Liberia 68% (988)
78. Iran 68% (963)
79. China 68% (7206)
80. Slovenia 68% (1000)
81. Haiti 68% (471)
82. Norway 67% (992)
83. Sri Lanka 67% (1974)
84. Poland 67% (939)
85. Guatemala 67% (1988)
86. Uganda 66% (1961)
87. Sudan 66% (971)
88. Israel 66% (957)
89. Kosovo 65% (983)
90. Thailand 65% (2377)
91. Jordan 65% (998)
92. Albania 64% (855)
93. Guinea 62% (952)
94. Botswana 62% (999)
95. Angola 62% (957)
96. Burkina Faso 62% (1876)
97. Malaysia 61% (2115)
98. Mali 61% (984)
99. Niger 61% (1925)
100. Palestinian Territories 61% (991)
101. Romania 61% (937)
102. Senegal 61% (1805)
103. Indonesia 61% (2013)
104. Afghanistan 60% (1128)
105. Hong Kong 60% (789)
106. Cameroon 59% (1967)
107. Japan 59% (1138)
108. Nepal 59% (1965)
109. Bulgaria 59% (927)
110. Slovakia 58% (991)
111. Singapore 58% (3002)
112. Czech Republic 58% (992)
113. Mauritania 57% (1960)
114. Benin 56% (974)
115. South Korea 56% (2056)
116. Myanmar 55% (1047)
117. Latvia 54% (1942)
118. Togo 54% (988)
119. Estonia 53% (1800)
120. Lithuania 50% (1863)
121. Russia 50% (4667)
122. Chad 49% (1915)
123. Yemen 48% (959)
124. Ukraine 48% (1930)
125. Ethiopia 48% (1913)
126. Azerbaijan 47% (1824)
127. Tajikistan 47% (1847)
128. Moldova 46% (1937)
129. Kazakhstan 45% (1871)
130. Morocco 43% (1011)
131. Belarus 43% (1992)
132. Georgia 43% (1904)
133. Kyrgyzstan 34% (1969)
134. Mongolia 32% (928)
135. Uzbekistan 32% (962)
136. Armenia 29% (1954)

Note: This content was first published on Bloomberg View on February 13, 2013.

      

President Obama is right to keep at it in Afghanistan, argues a new policy brief by Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow and director of research for the Brookings Foreign Policy program.

Some have criticized the president’s decision to maintain a significant troop presence there (5,500 troops), instead of following through on the planned military withdrawal. But Afghanistan remains very important to American security, O’Hanlon contends, and the situation in the country is far from hopeless in spite of recent setbacks. We should reinvigorate American efforts in Afghanistan, he argues—not returning to levels seen in previous years, but ramping up somewhat from our current posture.

O’Hanlon calls Obama’s resolve in Afghanistan commendable, but writes that he and his administration are still making mistakes on U.S. policy toward the war-torn country. He advises that Washington make two specific changes to its military strategy in Afghanistan:

1. Allow U.S. and NATO airpower to target the Islamic State and the Taliban (currently, they can only fight those groups if directly attacked). The narrow rules of engagement constraining foreign forces were intended to push Afghan armed forces to defend their territory themselves. While a worthy goal, O’Hanlon says, these rules often prevent us from attacking ISIS (though the targeting strategy towards the group may be changing) as well as the Taliban. They also impose unrealistically high demands on Afghan forces and make too fine a distinction between an array of aligned extremist groups operating in the country.
2. Expand U.S. force presence from the current 5,500 troops to around 12,000 for a few years. In O’Hanlon’s opinion, our current numbers are not enough to work with fielded Afghan forces, and skimping on ground forces has contributed to security challenges in places like Helmand, for instance, which experienced new setbacks in 2015. More broadly, leaders in Washington and Brussels should stress the value of a long-term NATO-Afghanistan partnership, rather than emphasizing an exit strategy. This will signal Western resolve to the Taliban and other groups. While the next commander in chief should set the United States on a gradual path toward downsizing American troops in Afghanistan, he believes it would be a mistake for Obama to do so in the short term.

The long haul

O’Hanlon also argues that the United States needs to take a longer-term perspective on key political and economic issues in Afghanistan. On the economic front, there seems to be little thinking about an agricultural development plan for Afghanistan, associated infrastructure support, and land reform, among other challenges. On the political front, conversations often tend to focus on shorter-term issues like organizing parliamentary elections, reforming the Independent Election Commission, or modifying the current power-sharing arrangement. In the process, conversations about foundational political strategy focusing on Afghan institutions and the health of its democracy get short-changed. The parliament is in need of reforms, for instance, as is the political party system (which should encourage Afghans to group around ideas and policy platforms, rather than tribes and patronage networks).

O’Hanlon concludes that the situation in Afghanistan today, while fraught, is understandable given the Taliban’s resilience and NATO’s gradual withdrawal of 125,000 troops. We should not be despondent, he writes—rather, we should identify specific strategies that can help improve the situation. At the end of the day, Afghans must make the big decisions about the future of their country. But as long as the United States and its partners are still providing tremendous resources—and as long as security threats emanating from South Asia continue to threaten the United States—leaders in Washington should use their influence wisely.

      

Editors’ Note: For the United States to succeed in its mission in Afghanistan, it is essential that the Obama administration sustain the current level of U.S. forces there. Recognizing this, John Allen spearheaded a move to ask President Obama to do so, in the following open letter to which former leaders from the military and diplomatic corps signed on. This letter originally appeared on The National Interest.

Washington, DC

June 3, 2016

Dear Mr. President,

We are writing, as Americans committed to the success of our country’s Afghanistan mission, to urge that you sustain the current level of U.S. forces in Afghanistan through the remainder of your term. Aid levels and diplomatic energies should similarly be preserved without reduction. Unless emergency conditions require consideration of a modest increase, we would strongly favor a freeze at the level of roughly ten thousand U.S. troops through January 20. This approach would also allow your successor to assess the situation for herself or himself and make further adjustments accordingly.

The broader Middle East is roiled in conflicts that pit moderate and progressive forces against those of violent extremists. As we saw on 9/11 and in the recent attacks in Paris, San Bernardino and Brussels, the problems of the Middle East do not remain contained within the Middle East. Afghanistan is the place where Al Qaeda and affiliates first planned the 9/11 attacks and a place where they continue to operate—and is thus important in the broader effort to defeat the global extremist movement today. It is a place where Al Qaeda and ISIS still have modest footprints that could be expanded if a security vacuum developed. If Afghanistan were to revert to the chaos of the 1990s, millions of refugees would again seek shelter in neighboring countries and overseas, dramatically intensifying the severe challenges already faced in Europe and beyond.

In the long-term struggle against violent extremists, the United States above all needs allies—not only to fight a common enemy, but also to create a positive vision for the peoples of the region. Today, aided by the bipartisan policies of the last two U.S. administrations, Afghans have established a democratic political system, moderately effective security forces, a much improved quality of life, and a vibrant civil society. Afghans are fighting and dying for their country, and in our common battle against extremism, with more than five thousand police and soldiers laying down their lives annually each of the past several years.

Afghanistan is a place where we should wish to consolidate and lock down our provisional progress into something of a more lasting asset. It is a Muslim country where most of the public as well as government officials want our help and value our friendship. Afghanistan is also a crucial partner in helping to shape the calculations of Pakistan, which has been an incubator of violent extremism but which might gradually be induced to cooperate in building a regional order conducive to peace and economic progress.

You have rightly prioritized Afghanistan throughout your presidency and have successfully achieved several crucial objectives. You have prevented the reemergence of a terrorist sanctuary in Afghanistan, from which attacks on Americans might emanate. You have helped Afghanistan develop security forces so that it is principally Afghans who are defending Afghanistan, thereby enabling a 90 percent reduction in the U.S. military presence relative to its peak (and a two-thirds reduction relative to what you inherited in 2009). You have established a long-term strategic partnership with Afghanistan that can address common threats from extremist groups based in Pakistan. To our minds, these are significant accomplishments. They have established much of the foundation for pursuing the ultimate goals of stabilizing Afghanistan and defeating extremism in the region.

To be sure, there have been significant frustrations in Afghanistan along the way. All of us have lived and experienced a number of them. All of us have, like you, deeply lamented the loss of each American life that has been sacrificed there in pursuit of our mission objectives and our national security.

Yet, though the situation is fraught, we have reason to be confident. President Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah, and many brave Afghans are working hard to rebuild their country. NATO allies and other partners remain committed to the mission. The level of support we must provide to enable continued progress is much lower than in earlier periods.

Our group is taking full stock of the situation in Afghanistan and will make a broader range of recommendations available to the next U.S. president on the interrelated subjects of governance, the economy, and security. But as an interim measure, and with the NATO Warsaw summit as well as other key decision points still looming on your watch, we urge you to maintain the current U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan through the end of your term. Based on longstanding experience in the country as well as recent trips to Afghanistan by some of us, this step would be seen as a positive reaffirmation of America’s commitment to that nation, its people and its security. It would likely have helpful effects on refugee flows, the confidence of the Taliban, the morale of the Afghan military and Afghan people, the state of the Afghan economy and perhaps even the strategic assessments of some in Pakistan. Conversely, we are convinced that a reduction of our military and financial support over the coming months would negatively affect each of these.

Sincerely,

Ambassadors to Afghanistan

Ryan Crocker

James Cunningham

Robert Finn

Zalmay Khalilzad

Ronald Neumann

Military Commanders in Afghanistan

John Allen

David Barno

John Campbell

Stanley McChrystal

David Petraeus

Special Representatives for Afghanistan/Pakistan

James Dobbins

Daniel Feldman

Marc Grossman

       

Event Information

A conversation with USAID Administrator Gayle Smith

On March 30, Global Economy and Development at Brookings and the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network (MFAN) hosted Gayle Smith, administrator of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for an address on the fifth anniversary of the USAID policy on evaluation.

A principal recommendation of the Presidential Policy Determination on Global Development, signed by President Obama in 2010, was greater accountability for U.S. foreign assistance funds, including evaluation of development programs. In 2011, USAID adopted a formal policy on evaluation and since has average some 200 evaluations a year.

Among the issues that will be addressed during the event are the success and challenges in implementing the evaluation policy, the use of alternative evaluation methods, and building a system and process for turning evaluations into learning. Administrator Smith was introduced by Brookings Senior Fellow George Ingram. Following her address, he moderated a panel discussion of Ruth Levine, Wade Warren, and Jodi Nelson.

 Join the conversation on Twitter using #AIDeval

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• Assessing the impact of foreign assistance: The role of evaluation

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160330_usaid_evaluation_transcript

       

China has provided foreign assistance since the 1950s, and is now the largest developing country to provide aid outside of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), a forum of the world’s major donor countries under the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Like its foreign policy more broadly, Chinese foreign assistance has adhered to the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and emphasized the virtue of national self-reliance. At the same time, it has served a strategic purpose alongside other foreign policy priorities.

A slow start but a steady increase

Compared to top DAC donor countries, the scale of China’s foreign assistance is still relatively small. According to some estimates and OECD International Development Statistics, China’s gross foreign aid in 2001 was extremely limited, amounting to only about 1.8 percent of the total contribution by DAC donors. However, since launching its “Go Global” strategy in 2005, China has deepened its financial engagement with the world, and its foreign aid totals have grown at an average rate of 21.8 percent annually. In 2013, China contributed about 3.9 percent to total global development assistance, which is 6.6 percent of the total contribution by DAC countries and over 26 percent of total U.S. foreign aid. 

Millions of USD (Current)

Gross foreign aid provided by China versus major DAC donors

And the lion’s share goes to: Africa

Africa is one of China’s most emphasized areas of strategic engagement. Particularly since the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, the relationship between China and Africa has gotten closer and closer. In 2009, African countries received 47 percent of China’s total foreign assistance. Between 2000 and 2012, China funded 1,666 official assistance projects in 51 African countries (the four countries that don’t have diplomatic relations with China—Gambia, Swaziland, Burkina Faso, and São Tomé and Príncipe—were left out), which accounted for 69 percent of all Chinese public and private projects. Among the 1,666 official projects, 1,110 qualified as Official Development Assistance (ODA)—defined by the OECD as flows of concessional, official financing administered to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries. The remaining 556 projects could be categorized, also according to the OECD, as Other Official Flow (OOF)—transactions by the state sector that are not “development-motivated” or concessional (such as export credits, official sector equity and portfolio investment, and debt reorganization). (Note: in terms of dollar amounts, not included in the statistics here, most Chinese lending to Africa and other parts of the developing world is not concessional and is therefore not foreign aid.)

Zeroing in on infrastructure

About 61 percent of Chinese concessional loans to Africa are used for infrastructure construction, and 16 percent are for industrial development. The three areas that receive the largest allocations of Chinese concessional loans are transport and storage; energy generation and supply; and industry, mining, and construction. A small portion of the remaining allocations go to health, general budget support, and education. 

Some have interpreted these trends to mean that China is making an effort to export domestic excess capacity in manufacturing and infrastructure, especially considering the uncertainties of China’s economic transition. But the motivations are broader than that. China’s “Africa Policy”—issued in December 2015, in Johannesburg—clearly expresses the Chinese government’s belief that infrastructure construction is a crucial channel for African development. This notion could be connected to the domestic Chinese experience of having benefited from the technological diffusion of foreign aid and foreign direct investment in the construction sector. Moreover, in practice, China’s more than 20 years of experience in implementing international contract projects, as well as advanced engineering technologies and relatively low labor costs, have proved to be a comparative advantage in Chinese foreign assistance. In addition, by prioritizing the principles of non-interference and mutual benefit, China is more comfortable providing infrastructure packages (e.g., turn-key projects) than many other countries. 

Doing assistance better

Legitimate concerns have been raised about China’s tendency to facilitate authoritarianism and corruption, as well that its assistance does not always trickle down to the poor. As such, the state-to-state Chinese approach to providing assistance should be reformed. Globalization scholar Faranak Miraftab indicates that on-the-ground partnerships between communities and the private sector—mediated by the public sector—could achieve synergies to overcome certain shortcomings, creating a win-win situation. With deeper involvement by domestic assistance providers, Chinese foreign assistance could touch more people’s lives by tackling both the short- and long-term needs of the most under-resourced parts of civil society. Domestic assistance providers should exploring public-private partnerships, which among other benefits could yield increased foreign assistance services. By focusing on its comparative advantage in contributing to infrastructure projects that benefit the general public while also facilitating participation from civil society, Chinese foreign assistance could bring more concrete benefits to more individuals. 

China has already begun tackling these and other weaknesses. Although infrastructure and industry still account for the largest share of total official projects in Africa, China has intentionally strengthened its official development finance efforts in areas related to civil society. Projects have surged in the areas of social infrastructure and services, developmental food aid and food security, support to non-governmental organizations, and women in development, to name a few. Moreover, following President Xi Jinping’s promise at the United Nations summit in September 2015, an initial $2 billion has been committed as a down payment toward the China South-South Cooperation and Assistance Fund. The funding is primarily designed to improve the livelihoods of residents of recipient countries and diversify domestic aid providers (e.g., NGOs) qualified to participate or initiate assistance projects in the least-developed countries. 

In order to achieve positive results, it is critical for the Chinese government to carry out detailed management initiatives to engage civil society: for example, establishing a complete system for information reporting and disclosure (actions have already been taken in several ministries and bureaus), publishing guidelines for the private sector to develop assistance services overseas, and improving coordination and accountability among ministries and within the Ministry of Commerce. Although challenges still remain, Chinese foreign assistance is moving in a positive direction without abandoning its defining characteristics. 

       

       

       

Editor’s note: Brookings Senior Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown is currently on the ground in Afghanistan and sent over a dispatch on what she’s seeing.

President Barack Obama is about to make crucial decisions about the number of U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan in 2016 and possibly after. His decision will be a vital signal to other U.S. allies in Afghanistan and its neighbors. Recent events in Afghanistan, particularly the Taliban's capture of Kunduz, show how too large a reduction in US military and economic support can hollow out the state-building effort and strengthen the Taliban and many other terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan, including those labeling themselves daesh. In such a case, collapse of the government and indeed a collapse of the entire political order the United States has sought to build since 2001 are high. Maintaining support at something close to the current level of effort does not guarantee military or political success or that peace negotiations with the Taliban will eventually produce any satisfactory peace. But it buys us time. On the cusp of a dire situation, Afghan politicians equally need to put aside their self-interested hoarding, plotting, and back-stabbing, which are once again running high, and being put ahead of the national interest.

The Taliban’s recent victory in Kunduz is both highly impactful and different from the previous military efforts and victories of the Taliban over the past several years. For the first time since 2001, the Taliban managed to conquer an entire province and for several days hold its capital. The psychological effect in Afghanistan has been tremendous. For a few days, it looked like the entire provinces of Badakshan, Takhar, and Baghlan would also fall. Many Afghans in those provinces started getting ready to leave or began moving south. If all these northern provinces fell, the chances were high, with whispers and blatant loud talk of political coups intensifying for a number of days, that the Afghan government might fall, and perhaps the entire political system collapse., In short, the dangerous and deleterious political and psychological effects are far bigger than those from the Taliban's push in Musa Qala this year or last year. Particularly detrimental and disheartening was the fact that many Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) units, led by weak or corrupt commanders, did not fight, and threw down their arms and ran away. Conversely, the boost of morale to the Taliban and the strengthening of its new leader Mullah Akbar Mansour were great. However, the Taliban also discredited itself with its brutality in Kunduz City.

The Taliban operation to take Kuduz was very well-planned and put together over a period of months, perhaps years. Foreign fighters from Central Asia, China, and Pakistan featured prominently among the mix of some 1,000 fighters, adding much heft to local militias that the Taliban mobilized against the militias of the dominant powerbrokers and the United States, as well as the government-sponsored Afghan Local Police. The support of Pakistan's Inter-services Intelligence for the Taliban, which the country has not been able to sever despite a decade of pressure from the United States and more recent engagement from China, significantly augmented the Taliban's capacities.

Kunduz is vital strategic province, with major access roads to various other parts of Afghanistan's north. Those who control the roads—still now the Taliban—also get major revenue from taxing travelers, which is significant along these opium-smuggling routes. It will take time for the Afghan forces to reduce Taliban control and influence along the roads, and large rural areas will be left in the hands of the Taliban for a while. Both in the rural areas and in Kunduz City itself, the Taliban is anchored among local population groups alienated by years of pernicious exclusionary and rapacious politics, which has only intensified since March of this year. Equally, however, many of the local population groups hate the Taliban, have engaged in revenge killings and abuses this week, and are spoiling for more revenge.

Despite the intense drama of the past week, however, Afghanistan has not fallen off the cliff. Takhar and Baghlan have not fallen, nor has all of Badakhshan. The political atmosphere in Kabul is still poisonous, but the various anti-government plots and scheming are dissipating in their intensity and immediacy. On Wednesday, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani reached out to some of those dissatisfied powerbrokers, who have been salivating for a change in political dispensation. The crisis is not over, neither on the battlefield in Kunduz and many other parts of Afghanistan, nor in the Afghan political system. But it is much easier to exhale on Thursday, October 8th.

United States air support was essential in retaking Kunduz and avoiding more of Badakhshan falling into the hands of the Taliban, precipitating a military domino effect in the north and inflaming the political crisis. Despite the terrible and tragic mistake of the U.S. bombing of the Médecins Sans Frontières hospital, maintaining and expanding U.S. air support for the Afghan forces, and allowing for U.S. support beyond in extremis, such as in preventing a similar Taliban offensive, is vital. It is equally important to augment intelligence- assets support. Significant reductions in U.S. assistance, whether that be troops, intelligence, or air support, will greatly increase the chances that another major Taliban success—like that of Kunduz, and perhaps possibly again in Kunduz—will happen again. It would also be accompanied by intensely dangerous political instability.

Equally imperative is that Afghan politicians put aside their self-interested scheming and rally behind the country to enable the government to function, or they will push Afghanistan over the brink into paralysis, intensified insurgency, and outright civil war. In addition to restraining their political and monetary ambitions and their many powerplays in Kabul, they need to recognize that years of abusive, discriminatory, exclusionary governance; extensive corruption; and individual and ethnic patronage and nepotism were the crucial roots of the crisis in Kunduz and elsewhere. These have corroded the Afghan Army and permeate the Afghan Police and anti-Taliban militias. Beyond blaming Pakistan, Afghan politicians and powerbrokers need to take a hard look at their behavior over the recent days and over many years and realize they have much to do to clean their own house to avoid disastrous outcomes for Afghanistan. To satisfy these politicians, many from the north of the country and prominent long-term powerbrokers, President Ghani decided over the past few days to include them more in consultations and power-sharing. Many Afghan people welcome such more inclusive politics, arguing that while the very survival of the country might be at stake, grand governance and anti-corruption ambitions need to be shelved. That may be a necessary bargain, but it is a Faustian one. Not all corruption or nepotism can or will disappear. But unless outright rapacious, exclusionary, and deeply predatory governance is mitigated, the root causes of the insurgency will remain unaddressed and the state-building project will have disappeared into fiefdoms and lasting conflict. At that point, even negotiations with the Taliban will not bring peace.

      

The loss of the Afghan provincial capital Kunduz was a psychological shock to the Afghan people, a strategic and tactical defeat for both Afghanistan and the United States, and a tragedy for those at the Doctors Without Borders hospital there. Yet the shock may prompt essential changes. It is important to examine both Afghan and U.S. responsibility for the disaster, what is happening now and what needs to be done. President Obama’s decision Thursday to maintain existing U.S. force levels into next year was absolutely correct to achieve the goal he stated of “sustainable Afghan capacity and self-sufficiency.”

Kunduz, which has since been recaptured by Afghan forces, was more than just the first provincial capital to be taken by the Taliban; its fall was highly symbolic because it was the site of the Taliban’s last stand in 2001. The poor initial performance of Afghan security forces and the tragic bombing of a nongovernmental organization hospital in the midst of a chaotic response to the attack sparked national disappointment in Afghanistan and international concern. All this came on the back of a dismal year in which many more Afghan civilians died than did so while international forces fought the Taliban, and the national unity government, which came into office on a wave of hope a year ago, stalled on filling essential positions and reforming governance.

The United States and its allies share responsibility for the military losses. We built security forces that depend on air power and need continued intelligence and advisory support. But instead of ensuring that these capabilities are available, we have severely limited air support, transferred key intelligence enablers to Iraq and created a patchwork system that left key areas, including Kunduz, without effective advisers. Our withdrawals from these vital functions based on politically driven timetables ignored reality on the ground, including Taliban capabilities and the embrace of the Islamic State by some militants.

But Afghans need to understand that U.S. support is not, and should not, be a blank check. Both the government and the opposition need to work to improve their military, political and governance performance, and come together instead of pulling the country apart.

The Kunduz setback does not mean the war is lost. Elite Afghan commandos delivered by recapturing critical areas. Whereas Mosul in Iraq remains in enemy hands a year after it fell, Kunduz has returned to government control. President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah appear to be heeding the call to action. During our recent 10-day visit to Afghanistan, each told us that they have agreed to an accelerated appointment process. Five new governors have been named, including three to critical provinces; further appointments and the long-delayed replacement of numerous senior officers is promised and must happen quickly. Appointments must involve effective individuals and cannot be merely political payoffs. Ghani has created a commission to investigate Kunduz, with a mandate to recommend action, that is led by opposition voices, including a former head of intelligence, though it sadly lacks female members.

If government performance takes off, public confidence could begin to be restored. More remains to be done. Afghan power brokers, intent on advancing personal agendas, seek to replace the government. They need to be pressed to stand down. The effort to reduce predatory governance in the provinces and Kabul cannot be shoved aside. Ghani and Abdullah must work effectively together despite the rapacious desires of their supporters and opponents. Broader consultation with the Afghan people is needed.

The United States needs to continue to step up to its own responsibilities, as well. Ground combat troops are not needed, but advisers and air power must be kept in place and not reduced on some blind, years-old timetable. Air power must be available to preempt attacks and not confined, as it is now, to desperate defense after attacks have begun. Afghan and foreign officials we spoke to foresee a crescendo of Taliban attacks as international forces withdraw. An even bigger Taliban offensive next year is likely to stretch battered Afghan forces further. We have not ended a war, only left it to the Afghans too soon.

The United States should maintain its current forces and funding levels, which are less than 10 percent of expenditures a few years ago, and focus on effectively advising Afghan forces. A reduction of the U.S. effort to a “pure” counterterrorism effort, still foreshadowed by the president’s hope of getting to about half the current force level sometime next year, would be disturbingly similar to what President George W. Bush tried a decade ago. Such a premature drawdown would abandon Afghan forces before they are ready, increasing the risk that a renewed terrorist haven will emerge.

Asking our allies to do jobs they are not equipped to do raises the risk of more reversals such as Kunduz and tragedies like the hospital bombing. Obama’s decision to maintain forces properly avoids preempting his successor’s choices about a difficult and evolving situation. That focus, and not a predetermined timetable, should continue to guide decisions throughout the remainder of this administration. The president’s public determination to maintain our current training and advising effort until Afghan forces do not need such help will provide a needed boost to both Afghans and our NATO allies — some of whom have been ahead of us in urging that we stay. And it is the right thing to do for our national interests.

This piece was originally published by The Washington Post.