Mark Fisher was co-founder of the Rhode Island chapter of BLM. He voted for Joe Biden in 2020. Does he have buyers remorse? Yeah, you could say so. His viral video is causing a stir... but there's more to that story.

The post Former BLM Chapter Co-Founder Switches To Trump In ’24 … What Changed His Mind? appeared first on Clash Daily.

Team Biden thought it was a clever work-around to open up the border without looking like they were opening the border. Texas took the cheat to court.

The post AMNESTY: Texas & American First Legal Score BIG Win Against Open Border Policy appeared first on Clash Daily.

Melania Trump will not be traveling with her husband to Washington on Wednesday when President-elect Donald Trump and President Joe Biden have a formal transition meeting, according to multiple reports. […]

The post Melania Trump to Give Jill Biden the Cold Shoulder This Week: Report appeared first on The Western Journal.

A Louisiana law that sought to post the Ten Commandments in every schoolroom in the state has been shelved by a federal judge. U.S. District Court Judge John W. deGravelles, […]

The post Obama-Appointed Federal Judge Temporarily Blocks Ten Commandments Law appeared first on The Western Journal.

As captain, Aiden Markram is allowed a long rope from a wonky form perspective, but how long can that rope be as the run river continues to shrivel, asks Khanyiso Tshwaku.

The Springboks will continue to evolve their attack, but they must do so within the framework of what has made them so successful, says attack coach Tony Brown.

Total media ad spend in Russia to drop nearly 50%   March 30, 2022 (New York, NY) – Insider Intelligence expects the ongoing war in Ukraine to have a significant […]

What is the future of cross-border data flows? 16 September 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

Navigating long-standing tensions and newfound difficulties for unlocking shared prosperity among modern, digital economies.

Cross-border data flows can unlock shared prosperity among digital economies, advance international security, and address cybercrime and global crises. But ensuring the free flow of data across borders involves navigating complex regulatory, security, trust, political, and technical challenges. Developing effective frameworks and agreements to support data flows is a significant undertaking.

Recent bilateral and multilateral agreements and initiatives have advanced data-sharing, respecting the right to privacy and upholding notions of sovereignty. This has contributed to clearer rules and (potentially) better solutions such as the OECD declaration on government access to data held by companies. Further progress, supportive of public safety and national security, is on the horizon, like G7 support for data free flow with trust and industry-led, trusted cloud principles on protecting human rights and competitiveness.

More work is needed to operationalize commitments and advance ongoing negotiations, like US–EU negotiations on e-evidence in criminal proceedings. This is key for ensuring ‘hard’ legal and regulatory mechanisms complement OECD principles. Stakeholders from law enforcement, national security, data protection and industry must confront tensions between sovereign prerogatives and cooperation. They must also overcome traditional silos between law enforcement and national security work. On the horizon are newfound challenges (for example, in harmonizing legal frameworks and responding to advances in technology). All the while, stakeholders must work together to promote economic interests, data protection, privacy and cybersecurity.

This expert panel discusses the future of cross-border data-sharing, raising questions including:

• What value does cross-border data-sharing bring and where are its current ‘pain points’?
• To enable data free flows, how should principles complement ‘hard’ legal and regulatory mechanisms?
• Beyond states, law enforcement, major industry players and international organizations, what roles should SMEs, the technical community and civil society stakeholders play in shaping and operationalizing principles?
• Looking ahead, where is progress in data-sharing principles and arrangements expected or possible?

A drinks reception follows the event.

This event is supported by Microsoft as part of a project on data sharing. The project has benefited greatly from the insights of a multi-stakeholder taskforce and concludes with an open-access special issue of the Journal of Cyber Policy.

Shaping modern Britain: the role of African and Caribbean communities 24 October 2024 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 3 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

As part of Black History Month, this event celebrates the enduring contributions of African and Caribbean communities to the UK.

When British colonial rule ended, newly independent countries in Africa and the Caribbean retained influences such as the English language and governance systems modelled on that of the UK. Initially, these post-independence relations were largely marked by the UK’s soft power, shaping the nation-building processes in these regions.

Over time, however, this influence has become a two-way exchange. African and Caribbean cultures have profoundly shaped modern Britain – from music and food to sports, arts, literature and beyond. These evolving dynamics have not only enriched the UK’s cultural landscape but also provided significant benefits for diaspora communities, fostering a sense of belonging and promoting cultural exchange. Diaspora groups and civil society organizations have adeptly utilised these connections to advocate for their communities and advance their interests.

At this event, speakers will explore how African and Caribbean influences rose to prominence in the UK and how this cultural momentum can be harnessed to build stronger, forward-looking partnerships. By highlighting the shared histories and more vibrant present-day exchanges, this event will explore how these ties can be used to break down stereotypes, promote social cohesion, and contribute to a more inclusive future.

This event forms part of our series of events celebrating Black History Month, including a photo exhibition and drinks reception.

Water, Ecosystems and Energy in South Asia: Making Cross-Border Collaboration Work Research paper sysadmin 29 June 2016

A new paper sets out the factors that have made previous cross-border projects in South Asia successful, arguing that cooperation around water is feasible despite the region’s political differences and economic assymetries.

• The countries of South Asia share some of the world’s major river basins – the Ganga (or Ganges), the Brahmaputra and the Indus. These rivers and their tributaries flow through seven countries, support more than 1 billion people, irrigate millions of hectares of land and are of cultural importance to many of those who rely on them.
• River management presents common challenges across the region. These include physical factors such as droughts, flooding, cyclones and climate change, as well political and institutional factors impeding the development of solutions and policies to improve resource management and reduce vulnerability. Water is increasingly seen as a source of competition, with population growth, industrialization and urbanization exacerbating the pressures on supply.
• Although South Asian examples of regional cooperation in general are limited, there is a clear positive trend. In areas such as disaster response and cross-border power trading, regional and bilateral engagement is beginning to take place. Multilateral official arrangements exist for trade and other economic issues, but there is none on water or ecosystems. However, as the benefits from cooperation become proven, its desirability is likely to gradually enter mainstream policy thinking on water issues.
• This research paper sets out the factors that have enabled cooperation, and the processes adopted, in previous successful cross-border projects. It focuses on four categories of cooperation: development of early-warning systems for natural disasters, in particular floods; protection of cross-border ecosystems; sharing of learning, through the showcasing of innovative approaches in one country that can be adopted by others; and power trading, in particular the development of hydropower in Bhutan and its export to India.
• The paper argues that cooperation around water in South Asia is feasible despite political differences and economic asymmetries. Different forms of collective action, and common understanding of both the threats and the shared benefits from cooperation, are required to foster more partnerships within the river basin states.

World in brief: Biden seeks to win over African leaders The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 November 2022

At the US-Africa Leaders Summit, Washington will need to go beyond strategic geopolitical interest to compete with China’s offer, says James Orr.

African heads of state will join President Joe Biden in Washington in mid-December to take part in the second United States-Africa Leaders Summit. Some 50 African leaders will travel to the US capital for the two-day conference, which starts on December 13. 

Senior policymakers say  talks will focus on economic engagement, human rights, food security and climate, with an emphasis on partnerships that demonstrate an intention to go beyond strategic geo-political interest. President Biden has said he hopes to ‘reinforce the US-Africa commitment to democracy; mitigate the impact of Covid, respond to the climate crisis and amplify diaspora ties’. The White House will seek to offer reassurance to African governments concerned by a perceived cooling in relations with the US.

Africa’s cooling relations with the US 

‘As trite as it might sound, the key objective of this conference should really be to enhance trust between African leaders and the United States,’ said Gilbert Kaplan, a former under-secretary at the US Department of Commerce.  ‘I was in Africa in 2018 leading the President’s Advisory Council on Doing Business in Africa and the foreign minister of Ethiopia said to me: “Well you’re here but are you really here?” What he meant was: is the United States really committed to a long-term, strong relationship with the African continent or is it just a drive-through and a hello without making major commitments?’

The first summit was held by President Barack Obama in 2014. Addressing the inaugural conference, he spoke of the ‘blood of Africa’ that ran through his veins and how ‘the bonds between our countries are deeply personal’. Today, however, a succession of abstentions or no votes from African states over United Nations resolutions on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine points to a growing misalignment in the relationship. This is indicative of expanding Chinese and Russian influence on the continent, say analysts.

‘Africa is faced with some of the biggest governance challenges on the globe,’ said Kah Walla, president of the Cameroon People’s Party and the first woman in the nation’s history to run as a presidential candidate in 2011. ‘We need government that is functional, competent and innovative, and what we are getting instead is the US and a global international system that is supporting [via financial aid] autocratic and dysfunctional governments. We can’t continue in this way.’

Africa’s 54 nation states span six time zones and the continent’s population of 1.4 billion is on course to make up a quarter of the global population by 2050. It boasts the youngest demographic in the world, a potentially huge labour resource for private sector investors seeking to expand in manufacturing and processing, for example. The current median age in Africa is 18.8 years, compared with a global median age of 30.

In July this year, the US provided nearly $1.3 billion in humanitarian assistance to help stave off hunger due to drought in the Horn of Africa. Since June 2019, the US, under its Prosper Africa programme, has also helped close some 800 export and investment deals across 45 African nations with an estimated value of $50 billion.

The US is losing out to China in Africa

Meanwhile, China surpassed the US as Africa’s largest trade partner in 2009, with total bilateral trade reaching more than $254 billion in 2021, a 35 per cent rise on 2020.

‘Despite Africa’s tremendous economic potential, the US has lost substantial ground to traditional and emerging partners, especially China,’ Landry Signé, a member of the World Economic Forum’s Regional Action Group for Africa, told a Senate subcommittee on Africa last year. ‘While recent trends indicate that the US engagement with the region has fallen, it has not and should not cede its relationship with the region to other powers.’

Japan’s G7 leadership: Defending the liberal order amid crisis 28 February 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 20 February 2023 Online

How G7 countries should best respond to global economic and security challenges in order to defend the liberal international order.

In May 2023 Japan hosts the G7 summit in Hiroshima, where leaders of the US, UK, Canada, France, Germany and Italy come to discuss the most urgent challenges facing the world.

This year’s summit takes place against a backdrop of continued global economic and political instability from the war in Ukraine to intensifying competition between China and the West.

The speakers discuss Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s priorities at the summit and consider how G7 countries should best respond to global economic and security challenges in order to defend the liberal international order.

This event is the third of a three-part series held in partnership with Japan House London.

Watch the first event which looked at Africa-Japan relations here, and the second event, on the UK and Japan’s engagement with Southeast Asia, here.

Yi Zhang
Sep 1, 2005; 4:1240-1250
Research

Christian Tagwerker
Apr 1, 2006; 5:737-748
Research

New essay anthology examines the future of the international order News release jon.wallace 7 May 2021

Featuring a new essay by Robin Niblett, Chief Executive of Chatham House, and Leslie Vinjamuri, Director of the US and Americas programme.

“Anchoring the World”, a new anthology, features an important new essay by Robin Niblett, Chief Executive of Chatham House, and Leslie Vinjamuri, Director of the US and Americas programme. The essay, “The Liberal Order Begins At Home”, argues powerfully for the revival of a liberal international order.

The essay collection has been produced by the Lloyd George Study Group on World Order, and celebrates the centennial years of Chatham House, Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, and the Council on Foreign Relations.

Robin Niblett said:

“In this excellent collection, some authors argue that the United Nations should continue to anchor the international system, while others argue for the creation of a new Concert of Powers.

“Our essay argues that it is both necessary and possible to revive the idea of a liberal international order: necessary (and urgent) because of heightened global competition with China, and possible only if western democracies repair their deep social and economic problems at home.

“We hope this volume carries forward the fortitude and creative spirit that the School of Foreign Service, Chatham House, and the Council on Foreign Relations have brought to the study and practice of international affairs over the past century.”

The Lloyd George Study Group and book were made possible by the generosity of the family of Robert Lloyd George, the great-grandson of British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George.

Anchoring the World is published by Foreign Affairs magazine.

Cross-border conflict, evidence, policy and trends (XCEPT)

This five-year policy-focused research programme seeks to respond to the challenges of long-term cross-border conflicts by exploring the drivers behind them.

Protracted conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, Horn of Africa and parts of Asia, although usually arising from intra-state disputes, rarely remain contained within national borders. Their effects reverberate outward and external actors are drawn in.

The longer these wars last, the more difficult they are to resolve as the interests of international actors collide and the web of economic and political interactions which sustain violence and connect conflict across borders expand and deepen.

The Cross-border conflict, evidence, policy and trends (XCEPT) research programme brings together world-leading experts to examine conflict-affected borderlands, how conflicts connect across borders, and the drivers of violent and peaceful behaviour.

Chatham House provides research leadership to the programme, as part of the wider consortium, and our research explores:

• the intersection of conflict supply chains which sustain and embed violence
• coping supply chains for survival-based economic activity which occurs in the context of violence

Three geographic case studies will be supported by cross-cutting workstreams on gender and social inclusion, livelihoods, and border security. Each will produce analysis and recommendations to inform international policy responses to conflict across borders.

These case studies will focus on:

• armed actors and financial flows through Iraq and the Levant
• human smuggling across Libya, East and West Africa
• gold mining and weapons flows across Sudanese borderlands

The consortium is made up of a range of other organizations, including the Asia Foundation, the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, the Rift Valley Institute, Chemonics UK and King’s College London.

XCEPT is funded by UK Aid from the UK government.

Evolving Turkey–Iran relations and implications for regional reordering

This project examines the nature of the bilateral relationship between Turkey and Iran in relation to Middle Eastern countries and in the context of broader regional dynamics.

The 2016–21 period in Turkish–Iranian relations, which was marked by both sides’ structured cooperation through the Astana Process and Sochi summits on conflict management in Syria, and their largely shared opposition to US policy in Syria and at the broader regional level, to Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence referendum, and to the blockade of Qatar, has run its course. 

However, the new shape of these bilateral relations remains undefined, and understanding them is essential to effective policymaking in the region. How they will evolve will have direct ramifications for Iraq, Syria, regional Kurdish geopolitics, and the process of regional reordering and connectivity in the Middle East and South Caucasus. They will also have direct implications for US and European policymaking and role in the region. 

This project studies the evolving nature of Turkish–Iranian relations through Iraq, Syria and regional Kurdish politics. It examines how Turkey and Iran approach regional connectivity projects and major regional initiatives, and how ongoing regional developments, including the war in Gaza, have and may impact Turkey–Iran relations and EU, US and UK security considerations and policy towards the two countries.

The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin is funded by Stiftung Mercator and the Federal Foreign Office. CATS is the curator of the CATS Network, an international network of think-tanks and research institutions working on Turkey. 

Evolving Turkey–Iran Relations and Implications for Regional Reordering is a project of the CATS Network.

Egypt’s purchase of a Chinese fighter jet is a reminder Cold War tactics are back in the Middle East Expert comment LJefferson 18 October 2024

The Egyptian army is a formidable force lacking air superiority capabilities to match its size and ambitions. China understood this predicament and offered to help.

The reported agreement for Egypt to buy the Chinese Chengdu J-10C 4.5 generation fighter jets is part of a broader shift from focusing on modernizing ground troops to bolstering the air force. The details of the deal have not yet been published. Nonetheless, it reveals Egypt has two motivations beyond backing its arsenal with another fighter jet.

Elusive Western technology

The most important motivation for Egypt’s military diversification strategy (and the biggest source of frustration) is the perceived Western technology starvation.
   
A quick examination of the map around Egypt shows that the most significant perceived threats to its national security are located in remote places where Egypt doesn’t traditionally enjoy ground troops’ presence. These include Ethiopia, the Southern Red Sea, Libya and the vulnerability a potential Israel–Iran regional war would create. From the generals’ perspective in Cairo, this list is more than a catalyst to build a modern and capable long arm.

The race started in 2015 after the Obama administration paused an arms transfer to Cairo in 2013 that included four F-16C Block 52 fighter jets amid toppling the Muslim Brotherhood government. The psychological effect of Washington’s decision in Cairo increased Egypt’s risk tolerance towards challenging its military ties with the US by diversifying away from it. 

Egypt ordered the MiG-29M2 fighter jets from Russia and the French Rafales this same year. In 2018, Egypt negotiated a $2 billion deal with Russia to purchase the Su-35 fighter jet, seen in Washington as crossing a red line and triggering a warning to Egypt that it would impose sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). This caused the deal to collapse.

The main factor of the US military sales in the Middle East is the upholding of the Israel Military Qualitative Edge principle over its neighbours. This principle requires the US to ensure Israel is superior over other regional countries’ strategic military capabilities, especially in air power.

For Egypt, this has long been a strategic vulnerability. The US turned down multiple requests by Egypt to purchase the active radar long-range AIM-120 AMRAAM fire-and-forget missile that can be launched from the F-16 fighter jets, the main striking force in Egypt’s arsenal. 

Unlike the Gulf and other states (such as Jordan and Turkey), Egypt was only allowed the old AIM-7 Sparrow and the AIM-9 Sidewinders, which are shorter in range and technologically inferior. Israel also allegedly pressured the Trump administration to refuse Egypt’s request to buy the F-35 stealth fight jets in 2019.

The US and Israel reportedly pressured France to not sell to Egypt the MBDA’s Meteor 100 km air-to-air missile with the Rafale fighters. Instead, Egypt received the 80 km MICA missile as part of the deal to buy 30 Rafales in 2021. Acquiring this advanced radar system and long-range missiles was likely behind Cairo’s deal to purchase 24 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft from Italy in 2022. However, it is unlikely that they will come with the full package.

Egypt thought the Chinese J-10C Vigorous Dragon fighter may solve this predicament. The Chinese fighter has a beyond-visual range AESA radar and can carry the PL-15 200 km air-to-air missile, similar to the Rafale’s Meteor. The J-10C’s price tag is attractive for Egypt at $40-50 million, much less than the F-16 and Rafales.

The Chinese fighters are also a hedge against Russia’s sanctioned fighter jets, traditionally a second choice for the Egyptian air force.

Risky manoeuvres 

This doesn’t mean Egypt is on a path to abandon its weapons purchases from its Western partners. Egyptian weapons procurement policy is not only motivated by technical considerations. It also serves political objectives. Egypt still receives $1.3 billion every year in military and economic aid from Washington. Regime security and backing are two objectives that will likely encourage Cairo to rely on Western weapons systems for decades. 

However, from Egypt’s military perspective, the time may have come to resort to the Cold War tactics of diversification and counterbalancing. Being forced to accept old technology during the significant modernization of its air force creates a technical and operational necessity to seek this technology elsewhere. 

The regional uncertainty since Hamas’s 7 October attack on Israel and the war that followed in Gaza, southern Lebanon, and Israel’s intermittent confrontations with Iran makes make it imperative for the Egyptian strategic planners to take risky manoeuvres while targeting specific capabilities they seem desperate to acquire. 

The threat to deploy CAATSA sanctions against Egypt in 2019 makes the J-10C deal with China an interesting case study for all Middle Eastern allies of the West. It shows an uptick in Egypt’s risk tolerance to overcome its technological dilemma. It allows other countries considering the Chinese fighters (mainly Saudi Arabia) to gauge Washington’s reaction and design their future approach accordingly.   

Another motivation is to pressure the US, UK, and their allies to reconsider their implicit embargo on certain advanced technology by showing that Cairo now has alternatives. This tactic seems to work. General Frank McKenzie, the former head of US Central Command, said during a congressional hearing in 2022 that Washington will finally provide Egypt with the F-15 heavy-weight air superiority fighter, a longstanding demand by Cairo.

Building favours

The J-10C fighter jet ticks all the boxes: It satisfies Cairo’s diversity strategy and technological needs. It is under the sanctions threshold since it is less technologically savvy than the most controversial J-20 5th generation fighters, the equivalent to Russia’s SU-35. And it takes Egypt’s military partnership with China to a new level.

The rumour that the Chinese fighters are bought to replace the ageing versions of Egypt’s significant F-16 fleet is a source of pride for Beijing since its military technology started to be seen as a competitor to Western technology. A heavyweight military power like Egypt relying on Chinese fighters would almost certainly boost China’s share in the regional weapons market, just like Cairo’s purchase of the Rafale boosted its popularity globally.

US election rhetoric on migration undermines Washington’s soft power in Latin America Expert comment jon.wallace 23 October 2024

As US public opinion hardens, the Democratic party takes a tougher stance, and Donald Trump proposes mass deportations, Latin American leaders note a lack of long-term policy.

The US’s broken immigration system has become a central theme of the 2024 election campaign. But the discussion on immigration, undocumented immigrants, and asylum seekers – increasingly lurching into dehumanizing rhetoric – extends beyond US borders. 

As one former senior director of the National Security Council told me, ‘when the president travels or meets with heads of state from Latin America what comes up –regardless of the country – isn’t US–Cuba policy or even trade. It’s immigration’. How the US talks about and treats citizens of Latin American and the Caribbean matters to elected politicians in the region. 

The roots of the US immigration debate go deep and will not be easily resolved, even with a sweeping reform of the system. 

According to a January 2024 Pew survey, 78 per cent of Americans ‘say the large number of migrants seeking to enter the country at the Mexico border is either a crisis (45 per cent) or a major problem (32 per cent)’. Worries about the border are not limited to Republican voters: 73 per cent of Democrats feel that the issue is either a crisis or major problem. 

Despite the heated popular temperature, the numbers of undocumented immigrants encountered at the US–Mexico border has actually dropped in recent months. US Customs and Border Protection (USCBP) reported 301,981 encounters with irregular border crossings in December 2023; by August 2024 this had dropped to 107,473.  

Nevertheless, illegal border crossings have increased under Biden. During his administration USCBP reported 8 million encounters along the Mexico border compared to 2.5 million under Donald Trump. 

Mexico

Any attempt to address the issue promises to affect US relations with Mexico, requiring the cooperation of newly elected president Claudia Sheinbaum. Her predecessor and founder of her Morena party, leftist Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO), proved an unexpectedly cooperative partner for the previous Trump administration and Biden White House. 

But that came at a cost, particularly for Biden. In return for AMLO’s cooperation, the US soft-pedalled criticism over his failures to disrupt narcotics trafficking and criminal networks and for his steady weakening of checks on executive power. 

Mexico’s borders with other countries are also under pressure. Mexico remains the primary sending country to the US. But political repression and insecurity in countries including Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala and Venezuela has pushed their citizens to travel across Mexico to the US. Economic collapse and humanitarian crises in Cuba and Venezuela have further fuelled the flight.

Rhetoric

The Kamala Harris and Trump campaigns have struck different positions on how to stem the flow of illegal immigration. But as US public opinion shifts, both parties are talking tougher. 

Harris is continuing Biden’s hardening stance, including the controversial move to bar those who cross the border illegally from applying for asylum. 

Biden’s early ‘roots’ strategy, to provide economic and security support in countries from where migrants are travelling, has fallen by the wayside. 

The Trump campaign is taking more extreme positions. The Republican presidential candidate mentions immigration in almost every campaign speech. 

He proposes to carry out the ‘largest deportation in US history’, using ICE personnel, the National Guard and local police forces to round up undocumented immigrants, including in their workplaces. 

The campaign has also pledged to end birth-right citizenship and Biden’s programme of parole for humanitarian reasons. Trump also plans to restore his first term policies including construction of the border wall. 

Trump’s proposals provide little opportunity for a broad, bipartisan consensus on immigration. Should he win in November he is likely, as he did in his first term, to attempt to push his policies via executive action, opening up challenges in federal court. 

A Harris victory would at least create space for the resurrection of the Biden administration’s 2024 immigration enforcement bill, originally supported by moderate Republican leadership in the Senate, but defeated following pressure from Trump. 

The bill would have toughened enforcement at the border – increasing funding for detention centres, asylum hearings and for local governments and border patrols. It would also permit ICE to shut down the border when crossings surpassed an average of 5,000 per day or 8,500 on a single day.

Undermining US influence

But such legislation, while promising to address domestic US perceptions of the crisis, threatens to reduce US soft power in Latin America. That would be counterproductive at a time when the US is attempting to consolidate global support in its competition with China and conflict with Russia. 

For Latin American leaders, US rhetoric on immigration rankles. The priorities of Latin American and Caribbean leaders and their voters are long term: economic growth, improved security, and climate change. These issues require investment and commitment from an engaged and reliable US partner. Sadly, Latin Americans can see such issues are not on the domestic agenda in US politics. 

To improve regional perceptions of US intentions after the election, new policy should seek to address the root causes of migration. That will require a multi-pronged, bipartisan approach that focuses attention and resources on US neighbours south of the border.  

The US’s immigration system will need to broaden paths for legal immigration to meet US labour needs, while delivering increased support for border security, and accelerated (and humane) processes for detaining and repatriating illegal border crossers and asylum claims.  

But any sustainable answer also requires addressing the multifaceted reasons driving migrants north. Any future US administration will need to risk unpopularity with some voters at home and engage with sending countries and their neighbours.