Memory politics: the challenge of commemoration in post-Soviet Eastern Europe and the Caucasus 5 October 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 September 2021 Online

This event explores how to address memory and commemoration in the former Soviet states, considering their role in political processes and violent conflict. 

How the past is remembered and commemorated plays a large role – perhaps too large – in contemporary political debates and in how conflicts are negotiated.

Perceptions of history influence people’s actions and are used to judge or dismiss the actions of others. Nowhere is this more so than in the political, territorial and social debates and disputes across the former Soviet Union.
 
This event examines how to address the problems caused by entrenched memory debates – and proposes a framework for ‘ethical political commemoration’ for use across historical enquiry, political processes, and conflict transformation initiatives.

The speakers explore the topic through the context of Turkey and the Armenian genocide, as well as more broadly through their own experiences in conflict transformation and peace processes.

Director’s breakfast briefing: Shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11 14 October 2021 — 8:00AM TO 9:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2021 Chatham House

Former MI6 chief, Sir Alex Younger, discusses shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11.

Former MI6 chief Sir Alex Younger, discusses shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11.

The dramatic events surrounding the withdrawal from Afghanistan demonstrates a profound shift in European security priorities since the beginning of the ‘war on terror’. Against the backdrop of the 20th anniversary of 9/11, former MI6 chief, Sir Alex Younger, discusses recent shifts in European foreign policy.

How has the focus on counterterrorism changed over the last two decades particularly in light of new and evolving strategic challenges? Why were many long-term objectives in Afghanistan left unachieved? Has the threat of terrorism changed across Europe? How has cooperation between security and intelligence services across the world changed particularly across the Atlantic? And, 20 years on, is the ‘war on terror’ really over?

This event is only open to Chatham House Partners and Major Corporate Members as well as selected giving circles of Chatham House. If you would like to attend, please RSVP to Linda Bedford at RSVP@chathamhouse.org.

Undercurrents: Europe's far-right educational institutions Audio bhorton.drupal 8 October 2021

In Hungary, France and Spain, new political movements from the far-right are attempting to reshape their education systems.

Under the supportive eye of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the recently established National University of Public Service seeks to embed nationalist illiberal values in a new generation of Hungarian students. Meanwhile in France and Spain, far-right public figure Marion Maréchal has turned away from the electoral politics of the Front Nationale to set up a new conservative research institute, ISSEP.

Both of these developments represent a challenge to the liberal values which underpin the existing international order. To find out more, Ben spoke with Professor Dorit Geva and Dr Felipe Santos, whose recent article in International Affairs considers the implications of this illiberal educational turn. 

Why Europe must end limbo for Afghans seeking asylum Expert comment Anonymous (not verified) 14 October 2021

With a focus on evacuations from Afghanistan, the situation in Europe is often forgotten as thousands of asylum seekers continue to wait for their cases to be settled.

Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, European leaders shared messages to welcome those evacuated, but the reality of European responses to displacement in Afghanistan paints a more contentious picture. 

As of July 2021, 33,325 cases of Afghan asylum applicants were pending in Germany, in France 18,410 people were waiting on a decision, while in Greece the numbers were 13,660. 

Arguably, such numbers are manageable given European states’ size and their functioning asylum systems but, while 56 per cent of Afghans in Europe receive protection status, a large proportion is still in limbo in differing European countries’ asylum systems. 

Europe hosts fewer than ten per cent of the three million UN-registered displaced Afghans globally, as neighbouring countries carry the burden of Afghanistan’s forced displacement: Iran hosts almost one million Afghan refugees and Pakistan 1.5 million, and these numbers double when adding undocumented or Afghan passport holders.
 
But despite these manageable numbers, national authorities in Europe often leave people waiting for months or even years to receive an asylum decision. Deportations to Afghanistan were halted only after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul and even then there was resistance to this from certain European countries, while Austria suggested setting up ‘deportation centres’ in countries neighbouring Afghanistan. 

Europe remains a fortress

The European Commission’s Draft Action Plan responding to the events in Afghanistan confirmed the willingness of the European Union (EU) to continue returns to non-European ‘third countries’. So Europe remains a fortress, despite pledging support for ‘the safe and orderly departure of foreign nationals and Afghans who wish to leave the country’. 

The wall by Greece at its border with Turkey and Poland’s treatment of Afghan asylum seekers trapped at its border with Belarus illustrate this hardline stance. The president of the European Council Charles Michel and EU Home Affairs Chief Ylva Johansson both confirm the priority is to secure European borders. 

This is further backed up by the European Council’s latest set of Conclusions on Afghanistan which focuses on security and ‘preventing illegal migration’ while avoiding reference to any domestic asylum efforts or the establishment of protection pathways for Afghans. 

This disconnect is not new. At the national level, reports of illegal pushbacks on European land and sea borders alarmingly intensified in 2020 as authorities intercepted and sent migrants back to neighbouring countries without assessing asylum claims. 

At the EU level, development aid to countries such as Afghanistan has long been conditional on their governments’ adherence to the bloc’s migration objectives of preventing asylum seekers from reaching European borders and facilitating the repatriation of those refused asylum in Europe. 

But this latest displacement crisis from Afghanistan exposes clear inconsistencies in European approaches to asylum and humanitarianism. Migration remains a divisive issue in European politics, but European governments must act promptly to support Afghans already residing in their territories alongside establishing robust international commitments.

Time for concrete action

European countries should firstly improve the treatment of those Afghans currently in limbo within their respective asylum systems by expediting pending Afghan asylum applications and family reunification cases, re-examining rejected asylum applications, and facilitating integration.

Secondly, national authorities should not return asylum seekers to Afghanistan or any third countries deemed ‘safe’. For Europe to coordinate evacuations from Afghanistan while simultaneously deporting asylum seekers undermines the international refugee regime and threaten Europe’s global credibility. 

The law as a tool for EU integration could be ending Expert comment NCapeling 15 October 2021

Poland is not the only EU member state challenging the supremacy of European law, as historic change is happening in how European integration functions.

The Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling that several articles of the European treaties are incompatible with the Polish constitution is prompting much debate, especially in terms of both the similarities and differences between it and rulings by the German constitutional court which have also challenged the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

Pro-Europeans are keen to draw a sharp distinction between the reasoning deployed by the two courts. They see the Polish court’s challenge as an exceptional case which the European Union (EU) cannot ‘tolerate’ because it would lead to the ‘demolition of the EU’s legal order from within’ and argue the EU must take a tough approach to Poland by re-asserting the supremacy of EU law.

But this view misses a bigger long-term shift in the EU. Both the German and Polish cases illustrate some of the basic conflicts within the EU’s legal system for decades. What is being challenged increasingly openly – even since the UK left the EU – is the idea of the EU as a de facto federation in which non-majoritarian institutions such as the ECJ have final say about the quality of democracy in member states.

ECJ’s quiet revolution

Historically ‘integration through law’ was central to the European project and the ECJ was a key institution driving forward integration – usually benefiting from what Erik Stein called ‘benign neglect by the powers that be and the mass media’. Even when European integration in the form of treaties stalled in the 1960s and 1970s, ‘judicial integration’ through the ECJ continued, including its notable 1964 decision that EU law was supreme.

This self-empowerment of the ECJ – what another scholar of European constitutionalism Joseph Weiler calls ‘a quiet revolution’ – was possible because there was a ‘permissive consensus’ in member states which allowed judicial integration to continue largely unchallenged. But this has now changed as both politicians and national courts are more willing to challenge what they see as judicial overreach.

There are important differences between the approach of the German and the Polish constitutional courts. The Law and Justice Party has politicized the Polish court, packing it with judges sympathetic to that party, whereas the German court is more independent.

In addition, whereas the German court made qualified and subdued objections to measures taken in response to the euro crisis during the past decade and, in particular, the steps towards the mutualization of eurozone debt – but often backed down with ‘all bark and no bite’ as Christoph Schmid put it – the Polish court is driven by political considerations and has challenged the supremacy of EU law in a more direct and general way.

However, the German court has made it clear it is the guardian of the German constitution and seeks to impose limits on the ECJ’s self-empowerment by arguing Europe is not a federation. According to the German court’s theory of ‘constitutional pluralism’, there is in effect a constant dialogue and accommodation between the national and EU level rather than a simple primacy of EU law over national law.

The court sees itself as the ultimate arbiter of whether steps in European integration are consistent with the German constitution, and is likely to challenge any further steps in fiscal integration even if the ECJ deems them in accordance with the treaties – as it did with the European Central Bank’s quantitative easing programme.

Supremacy of EU law is under pressure

Right across Europe, courts and politicians are increasingly challenging the ECJ and questioning the supremacy of EU law. Michel Barnier called for France to regain ‘legal sovereignty’ and should no longer be subject to the judgments of the ECJ – an extraordinary demand from the EU Brexit negotiator who regularly lectured the UK about the sanctity of the EU’s legal order.

Other possible French presidential candidates such as Valérie Pécresse and Eric Zemmour are also openly challenging the primacy of EU law. The UK, of course, is fighting its own battle with the EU about the ECJ’s role in the Northern Ireland Protocol.

It was not the current Polish government but the people of France and the Netherlands who blocked the attempt at explicit constitutionalisation of the EU in a referendum just one year after the 2004 enlargement. Whereas the Constitutional Treaty ‘would have codified the doctrine of EU legal supremacy’, that provision was dropped from its successor the Lisbon Treaty, again indicating consensus on EU legal supremacy is not as strong as is often claimed.

Here we go again: Russia’s energy ‘diplomacy’ in Moldova Expert comment LJefferson 6 December 2021

The gas crisis shows that while the new Moldovan government may wish for geopolitics to go away, they are a weapon Russia will deploy at will.

In October, Moldova came under the spotlight when Russia, its primary provider of gas, slashed supplies by a third and refused to extend the existing contract.

The crisis was resolved at the end of October when Russia and Moldova signed a new contract, in which Moscow has used Moldova’s gas dependence to extract geopolitical concessions, weaken the new pro-western Chisinau government and drive a wedge between the EU and Moldova.

A chronic failure to reform

Moldova became a classic case of state capture when political elites – including nominally pro-European political elites – engaged in massive rent-extraction.

Up until 2020, when pro-reform forces came to power, Moldovan politics offered rapid route to riches for both the nominally pro-European parties and the pro-Russian Socialist Party; each was responsible for playing up ethnic and geopolitical cleavages in the country to mobilize votes and shore up legitimacy.

These predatory elites hollowed out Moldova economically and politically by a chronic failure to reform, in particular the energy sector which became a major source of rent.

However, this started to change when the pro-reform forces came to power as a result of the 2020 presidential and then 2021 parliament elections. The pro-reformist Maia Sandu defeated the incumbent president Igor Dodon (58 per cent to 42 per cent) in November of that year. And then her party got 58 per cent of the vote in the parliamentary elections which followed in July 2021.

Her Party of Action’s (PAS) winning formula was to focus on corruption and domestic reforms – rather than playing the ‘geopolitical’ card, a favourite strategy of their predecessors. As Sandu put it, the elections marked ‘the end of the reign of thieves in Moldova’.

A gas crisis is initiated  

Russia’s response to these results was to initiate a gas crisis. Up until the victory of the pro-reform forces, Russia had annually renewed a gas contract signed in 2007. However, in September 2021, Russia refused to renew the contract as it had done many times before and instead insisted on a new contract, which allowed Russia to create linkages between energy prices, debt settlement, a halt on energy market reforms and, it can be logically inferred, further integration with the EU.

Moldova’s national energy company, Moldovgaz, is 63.5 per cent de facto owned by Gazprom with the Moldovan government owning the remaining 35.5 per cent. (Moldova was forced to give Gazprom a controlling stake when faced with a cut in supplies in January 2006). It is therefore hardly surprising that no efforts were made to de-monopolise the sector and diversify energy supplies.

This lack of modernization can be explained by the somewhat surreal fact that in any negotiations and planning, Moldovagaz – majority owned by Gazprom – represents the Moldovan side in negotiations with Gazprom. So, when it came to signing of the new five-year contract in October 2021, Russia, through Gazprom, was able to institute a contract which made gas prices conditional on various geopolitical conditions.

It is noteworthy that Moldova’s original 2007 gas contract had been renewed annually despite the supposed accrual of debt. However, the very nature of this debt is suspect. While Moldova’s debt is said to be approximately $700 million, the debt of the much smaller breakaway Transnistria was around $7.3 billion.

The exact level and source of the debt remain murky. Russia appears to be making Moldova liable to repay at least some of Transnistria’s debt while only demanding the debt settlement with Moldova, but not with Transnistria.

High stakes for Moscow

Moreover, the contract is used to derail liberalisation of the energy market in line with EU’s energy market rules (through the so-called unbundling of supplies and distribution) which Moldova had committed itself to since the country joined the Energy Community in 2010.

Referring to ‘the non-application of forced reorganization and sanctions against Moldovagaz’, the new gas contract forces Moldova to postpone implementing the unbundling of supplies and distribution by making it conditional on resolving the energy debt.

Furthermore, Moldova ominously agreed to create an ‘intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation’ with Russia, which effectively blocks Moldova’s economic integration with the EU. (This demand is hardly new as Russia previously requested, and was granted, a seat at the negotiating table on a bilateral trade agreement between the EU and Ukraine. The trilateral EU-Ukraine-Russia negotiations have made it clear that Russia is seeking a veto over European integration of all neighbouring countries.)  

Targeting Moldova’s new reformist government reflects high personal stakes for Moscow. Moldova’s caretaker (kurator) in the Kremlin is Dimitrii Kozak, who in 2003 masterminded the so-called ‘Kozak Memorandum’. This sought to reintegrate breakaway Transnistria into a Moldova-Transnistria federation.

It was thwarted at the last minute but the Russian leadership has not given up on its plan. Now using his position as the deputy head of Presidential Administration, Kozak is masterminding Russia’s rehashed policy towards Moldova and has attempted to bring back his Memorandum as a political blueprint for a ‘settlement’.

Russia’s heavy-handed energy ‘diplomacy’

The new Moldovan government is caught in a crossfire of domestic expectations and Russian geopolitical demands. The gas crisis shows that while the new government may wish for geopolitics to go away, they are a weapon Russia will deploy at will.

The Moldovan government is brand new so it has relatively little experience of dealing with Russia’s heavy-handed ‘energy diplomacy’. But the EU has been on the receiving end of this before – this is a direct replica of Russia’s strategy toward Armenia and Ukraine – and neither ended well for the target countries or for the EU.

So, Russia’s plans for Moldova are likely to have similar consequences for the EU’s latest attempts to be a convincing foreign policy actor. 

How European security is changing Expert comment LJefferson 10 January 2022

Although migration, economic, health, tech and climate policy are increasingly thought of in terms of security, different issues are taking place in each of these policy areas.

Since the end of the Cold War, debates about security among both academics and policymakers have shifted away from traditional military or state security towards a broader conception of what security is – including, for example, ideas such as ‘human security’.

More recently, there has been a widespread perception of a ‘return of great power competition’ and even renewed fears about great power war – in other words, a resurgence of traditional security debates that many hoped and believed were a thing of the past. At the same time, and especially since the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020, the concept of ‘security’ has also been increasingly applied to other areas like economic and health policies.

These complex and parallel developments raise a number of difficult questions. First, does the changing way in which the concept of ‘security’ is used – and in particular the way people now increasingly speak of ‘economic security’ and ‘health security’ – reflect a changing reality or rather simply a changing perception of reality? Second, are these changes in the way we think about security helpful or not? In other words, is the redefinition of security that seems to be taking place leading to good policy responses and making citizens more secure, or is it rather unhelpfully ‘securitizing’ policy areas and possibly undermining democracy in the process?

Part of the reason that these questions are difficult to answer is that there are different developments taking place in different policy areas. This article briefly analyses developments in five policy areas: migration policy, economic and trade policy, health policy, technology policy, and climate policy.

The authors argue there are at least three separate developments taking place, though it is often quite difficult to disentangle them – and more than one development may be taking place in each policy area. The analysis focuses on developments in Europe – defined broadly as including countries such as the UK which are outside the European Union (EU) – which may be different from those taking place elsewhere.

Five policy areas, three trends

In migration policy, the clearest development that is taking place, in particular since the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, is the militarization of borders in Europe – in particular, the militarization of the EU’s external border.

The removal of borders within Europe was once seen by some as a step towards a borderless world, but since 2015 the EU seems to have concluded that the internal removal of borders requires a much harder external border than was previously the case.

In particular, since the ‘refugee crisis’, the EU has massively invested in Frontex, its border agency, which describes itself as ‘Europe’s first uniformed service’ that ‘helps guarantee free movement without internal borders checks that many of us take for granted’. In short, we are seeing an application to migration policy of military tools, including armed border guards.

Something different seems to be taking place in economic policy. For the last three or four decades since the end of the Cold War, economic policy has been dominated by (neo-)liberal assumptions. But these are now increasingly being challenged and a shift may be taking place away from this macroeconomic paradigm.

The reasons for this are complex – in part, a domestic backlash against this paradigm, particularly from the ‘losers’ or ‘left behind’ (in other words those who have suffered from the distributional consequences of the economic and especially trade policies of the last 30-40 years going back to the ‘neoliberal turn’), and in part a sense among analysts and policymakers that a different set of more protectionist policies are required in order to compete with China as a ‘systemic rival’.

These two different drivers of an economic paradigm shift have become even more tightly connected since the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020. The pandemic led to both an increased demand for a new economic paradigm and a sense of intensified competition with China and, in the EU, to a lesser extent with the United States.

However, because the set of rules governing economic and in particular trade policy was set during the earlier period of (neo-)liberal hegemony, they restricted the ability of states to pursue what were seen as protectionist policies in order to redistribute and created exceptions only for security reasons. This has created a structural pressure on nation states to present economic policies in terms of security.

Here, however, the EU may be an outlier. During the last few decades, the EU has gone even further than the rest of the world has in creating rules around economic policy – at least internally. In particular, the EU’s fiscal rules may prevent its member states from borrowing to invest and its state aid rules may prevent them from experimenting with new kinds of industrial policy.

Therefore, the EU may be structurally constrained from making the kind of paradigm shift in economic policy that many now think is necessary. In particular, despite the rhetoric about a more ‘geopolitical’ EU, it may be limited in the extent to which it can think of economic policy in terms of security – sometimes to the regret of security establishments, as is the case for debates around 5G, for example.

In health policy, something similar may be happening as in economic policy. During the last three or four decades, health policy has been approached in a rather liberal way. Across Europe, though to different degrees and in different ways, market principles have been introduced into health systems.

In many cases such as the UK, this has involved privatizing what were previously state functions in healthcare. But since the pandemic, there has been a renewed focus on renationalizing or, in the case of the EU, ‘re-regionalizing’ supply chains, in particular for personal protective equipment (PPE) and vaccines, which is presented in terms of ‘health security’. COVID-19 has also reinforced the need to better include pandemic preparedness in national security planning.

A similar trend seems to be taking place in technology policy, which as with health policy is now increasingly viewed in a defensive, protectionist way rather than the liberal way it was previously seen. For example, the production of semiconductors was previously viewed in economic liberal terms – in other words, they should be produced wherever they can be produced most efficiently.

But analysts and policymakers increasingly see technology as central to the competition between China and the United States – or even more broadly between authoritarian states and democracies. As in health policy, there is an increasing focus on a shared approach among allies and on the ‘resilience’ of supply chains for technology. A similar shift is taking place on the management of data flows and the need to think harder – and maybe, be less naive – about the security impact of our online life.

Finally, in climate policy, something different seems to be taking place. Here, there is neither an attempt to apply military tools (notwithstanding the fact some national European militaries as well as NATO are increasingly interested in climate security, for instance regarding the ability to train and fight in altered weather conditions, notably extreme heat) nor a paradigm shift away from liberalism – although some, especially on the left, do question whether it is possible to prevent catastrophic climate change unless we abandon economic liberalism and much of the debate about green investment is closely connected to debates about an economic paradigm shift.

Rather, what is striking is the increasing talk of a ‘climate emergency’ – with its implication of the need to suspend normal democratic decision-making – and of the need to take extraordinary measures to prevent catastrophic climate change. However, for the time being, such rhetoric on climate change is not matched by relevant extraordinary emergency measures.

Across these five policy areas, in other words, there seem to be at least three developments taking place that are reshaping how we think about security in Europe. The difficult question is whether each of these developments is a ‘good’ thing or not, i.e. whether they actually make European citizens more secure in an appropriate way.

In other words, is it a good idea to militarize the EU’s borders, to shift away from the earlier liberal paradigm in economic, health and technology policy and frame the shift in terms of ‘security’, or to invoke an emergency in order to be able to take more drastic measures to prevent climate change?

The limits of securitization theory

One way of thinking about these issues is what academics call ‘securitization’ – the situation when something is identified in rhetoric as an existential threat to some object, specifying a point of no return, that legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures and pushes the issue higher on the political and policy agenda.

The response to COVID-19 can be seen as an example of securitization – the existential threat to human beings but also healthcare systems was used to legitimize lockdowns and social distancing requirements.

The West must face down Putin The World Today MVieira 1 February 2022

If Russia’s ambitions are not checked, the implications will be global, warns James Nixey

After seven years of invasions, annexations, assassinations, abuses and now the current crisis in European security over the fate of Ukraine, one thing has been laid bare: the true nature of the Russian state.

Moscow made its ambition clear in mid-December with the unprecedented and public issuing of ultimatums in the form of draft treaty proposals.

Portrayed by Russia as an attempt to end Nato’s expansion eastwards, the Kremlin is in fact demanding that the United States and western institutions roll back their security guarantees to Eastern Europe. 

These are not two sides of the same coin if one believes and accepts the principles of the Helsinki Accords that the successor states to the Soviet Union are just as independent and sovereign as Russia.

Russia’s demands laid bare equate to giving it a free hand in Eastern Europe. This should not be reduced to simplistic labels such as ‘territorial expansionism’ or a ‘return to the Soviet Union’, both of which can be picked at for a lack of accuracy.

But it is, in Russia’s own words, the most explicit statement yet of its long-standing desire to return to a former age, where great powers directed their respective spheres of influence – a yearning for a time of empire and a disregard for the flow of history.

The intense diplomatic and media focus since then suggests there is a consensus that Russia has gone beyond being an awkward player at the negotiation table or a bully who can be dealt with further down the line.

But this has not as yet led to the operational conclusion that Russia must be challenged and ultimately faced down, no matter how unpalatable.

The logical response to the exposure of Russia’s true intentions would be an overhaul of western policy. Yet the West persists in its article of faith that dialogue with Russia will bring about a change in its behaviour – despite all evidence to the contrary. 

Western politicians have been anxious to avoid direct confrontation with Russia. But the Kremlin is likely to see this course of action as confirmation that it can proceed unchecked. When Moscow has chosen the path of conflict, efforts at dialogue rarely bring a peaceful resolution. 

Russia is blessed with particularly talented negotiators. While it has its fair share of angry ultra-nationalists who are easily dismissed, it also has more subtle brains at official and unofficial levels with whom western politicians are eager to engage to claim morsels of intelligence or to show that the Kremlin is not beyond redemption.

Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, is an intelligent and experienced man, who is adept at dismissing the protests of most of his western counterparts. In such circumstances, and with such a pressing need to avoid a war, dialogue must be tightly contained as it has the potential to lead to compromise in areas where there should be none.

Russia’s ambitions for a land empire

Eastern European states which were part of the Soviet Union or signatories to the Warsaw Pact are geographically closer to Russia and as a result more physically at risk. But their history and close relations with Moscow in the past have allowed them to acquire experience and expertise in dealing with their more powerful neighbour.

They uphold principled stances on sovereign rights, which has led the Kremlin to brand the Baltic states, Ukraine and more recently Moldova as traitors. To the West, on the other hand, they can often be seen as awkward or getting in the way.

While the sandwiched eastern states may have much to teach us about dealing with Russia, some central European countries have a closer relationship with Moscow. Serbia’s security services have recently been exposed as being under the influence of Russia’s own FSB, the Federal Security Service, successor to the KGB, and have colluded in repressing Moscow’s political opponents. At the same time, Viktor Orbán’s Hungary continues to defy the European Union with its repressions and is one of the few states that looks to Russia as a model. 

What is at stake here is a basic grasp of the nature of relations between states in the 21st century. What Russia is insisting on is its right to a land empire which is entirely at odds with the principles of statehood that now govern Europe, and indeed much of the rest of the world.

By failing to address the real nature of Russia’s demands, Europe is avoiding critical decisions that will affect its future security for generations to come. The implications of that avoidance do not only affect Europe – they are global in importance. 

Other powers, most notably China, will watch closely how the West responds to Russia and gauge its willingness to support allies, friends and partners against aggression.

Any failure to respond firmly to Russia’s approach of demanding limits on the sovereignty of its neighbours, backed by the threat of military force, can only encourage similar strong-arm tactics elsewhere. It is notable that, from Chechnya to Syria, Russia has not yet suffered an unambiguous defeat when it has asserted its ambitions through military power. 

Resolving the incompatibility between the way Russia sees itself and what the rest of Europe views as the acceptable limits of Russian power will be a long, painful process. Facing down Russia will take skill, time, spine, money, grit and self-sacrifice. Sanctions, for example, hurt those imposing them as well as the receiver. These are attributes in short supply in what Russia considers to be the weak, decadent West. 

Since such resources are unlikely to be found, the unappetizing future for relations is most likely to involve Russia continuing to chip away at European sovereignty while its own structural flaws further weaken it to the point of irrelevance, or to push it to take ever more extreme risks.

Review: Islam's role in shaping Europe The World Today rsoppelsa.drupal 1 February 2022

Maryyum Mehmood on a work that recasts the role of Muslim minorities

Muslims and the Making of Modern Europe
Emily Greble, Oxford University Press, £26.99

When discussing the historical role of Muslims in Europe, most authors focus on Muslims in the western part of the continent, many of whom arrived as immigrant settlers from Muslim-majority nations. As a result, Muslims are easily identifiable as a foreign ‘other’. 

Emily Greble takes a different trajectory. In Muslims and the Making of Modern Europe, Greble centres her analysis on south-eastern European Muslims who are native to the region and, despite this fact, have still been subject to continuous stigmatization. 

In light of the present-day political tensions and targeted attacks on Muslims in Bosnia, which has seen inter-ethnic and religious hostility at its worst in 30 years, Greble’s nuanced retelling of the region’s social and political landscape has renewed urgency. Her work serves as a refreshing intervention to the literature on various fronts. It subverts stereotypical assumptions promulgated by the ‘Eastern Question’, whereby Muslims are portrayed as a simple ethnic minority living under colonial rule. Instead, Greble shows how they are a marginalized indigenous group that is by no means a monolithic, homogeneous entity. 

By uncovering the history of the region through the lens of Muslims, Greble highlights their capabilities as agents of change. Muslims were not just passive subjects but active citizens whose engagement was vital in the framing of social norms, political, ethical and legislative structures. 

Greble’s neatly crafted thesis serves as a counterpunch to a decades-long clash-of-civilizations discourse, which pits Muslims of the region as Ottoman outsiders to be scapegoated as and when deemed necessary. 

The author offers a proposition that while secularism was the overarching aim of the new European state-project, the role of religion, especially marginalized or ‘othered’ religious communities cannot be overlooked or relegated to a simple ‘minority’ issue. 

This argument is laid out in three historical parts, beginning with the post-Ottoman transition of power (1878-1921), to the Yugoslav nation-building project (1918-1941) and finally to the political overhaul in a post-Second World War Europe (1941-1949).

Most historical analyses of the region focus on state actions towards Muslim minorities. Greble points out that such an approach is lacking because it is riddled with institutional biases from the very sources and methods used to understand them. 

Instead, the author takes Muslims, their lived realities and agency as her starting point and effectively manages to avoid such pitfalls.

What is most remarkable about this book is Greble’s self-reflective approach to confronting such a sensitive topic with great care.

Almost every chapter begins with an insightful and deeply personal historical account from a Muslim from the region which sets the scene for Greble’s assessment of key social, political and legal struggles.

With an enriching methodology, Greble explores the topic through first and second-hand accounts of how Muslims manoeuvred in both the secular realm and within religious spaces, such as madrasas (Islamic seminaries), waqfs (local community funds), muftis and ulemas (religious scholar), and the shariah courts. As a result, the reader is shown how Muslims affected change and steered the trajectory of constitutional democracies in Europe at key historical junctures. 

By taking this lens, Greble does not just offer another retelling of the significance of the 1878 Congress of Berlin, which enabled the demarcation of new territorial boundaries in a post-Ottoman world, but also conveys the story of how Muslims contributed to the emerging narratives around citizenship. 

Crucially, we are exposed to Muslim leadership as more than just a docile, homogenous grouping, but a defining entity that shaped the European citizenship project by refashioning both imperial secular norms, as well as Islamic jurisprudential rulings to suit their unique context, as opposed to a remnant of bygone Ottoman rule. 

A fundamental difference that sets this book apart from other contemporary work on the topic is that the author brings forth multiple intra-faith complexities found within Muslim groups of the region, from revivalist to reformists, and all else in between. The fluctuating relationship between the traditionalist ulema, muftis and qadis (religious scholars, clergy and judges) and the secular state powers is intricately captured across most chapters in this book. 

At times, the ulema would be seen to bandy with the state to acculturate Muslims to the emerging polities of the region. As Greble shows, muftis in 1914 travelled across southern Serbia giving dawah (missionary work) to locals to encourage them to support the Serbian state. Similarly, qadis in Montenegro in 1902 reassured local Muslims that by following the law of the land, they would be guaranteed their ‘shariah rights’, which were loosely defined by the Muslim clergy. 

This created a paradox for the states: the role of nation-building and liberalizing orthodox religious communities was given to conservative clerics who, in turn, were gatekeepers setting the boundaries and thus interpreted and applied Islam to preserve their position of power. The consequences were twofold. As Greble suggests, ‘instead of becoming more tied to secular structures of state and society – through centralized law, conscription, political representation – Muslims in formerly Ottoman lands were becoming more deeply bound to Islam’. 

Simultaneously, the rhetoric used further embedded Muslims firmly as a minority. 

Ironically in contrast, it was the liberal reformist thinkers who, sometimes, stood in opposition to the state regimes. Such internal divisions within Muslim spaces became more overtly discernible under communist rule, wherein members of the same Muslim community fought in different camps. 

For instance, the author notes how some were aligned with the communist regime, while others were fighting with the allied forces and many were still backing revivalist Islamic groups. In light of this, what is perhaps most intriguing is how the communist takeover in 1945 managed to tear down any seemingly progressive movement that benefited the region’s Muslims. And it brought them back to square one, with the scrapping of shariah law and the removal of a mufti-led judiciary. Such crackdowns caused greater frenzy among the region’s Muslims and led to resistance movements in the form of activism and insurgencies. 

Ultimately, the author offers a complex perspective not only of Balkan Muslims and their lived experiences, but also, the implications of this upon wider society and the states themselves.

Greble’s remapping of the historical underpinnings of the tale of Muslims and the Making of Modern Europe is not just a clear example of how Muslims are not a foreign entity to the region, but a call to overturn the entrenched Great Replacement theory which uses this foreign ‘othering’ to further prejudice and calls for the ousting of Muslims and other minorities from Europe, a land which has forever been their home.
 

Ukraine response reveals Europe’s security is changing Expert comment NCapeling 8 February 2022

Recent events regarding Ukraine show an active UK responding quickly while EU powers deliberate. But pulling ahead of the pack is not the same as leadership.

Britain’s relationship with Ukraine appears to be thriving, with Ukrainian defence journalist Illia Ponomarenko recently tweeting the ‘British are just unstoppable these days’ and that the UK finds itself ‘on the right side of history’ while one Ukrainian wine bar has started offering free drinks to British nationals.

Ponomarenko’s remarks and the wine bar offer – certainly one post-Brexit benefit of having a British passport – are down to the UK decision to send anti-tank weapons to support Ukraine’s forces against a potential Russian attack.

The UK’s quick response was praised by Ponomarenko as being ‘wise enough not to be lured into going the easiest way, which is always the fastest lane straight to hell’ and strikes a clear contrast with that of Germany, whose typically moderated approach to geopolitical tensions went down badly in Kyiv.

The chief of Germany’s navy was forced to resign after saying Russian president Vladimir Putin ‘deserved respect’ and that Ukraine will never win back annexed Crimea. The German government also sought an energy exception to proposed US sanctions, so that gas can continue to flow into Europe.

France’s response was somewhat stronger but rather confusing as Emmanuel Macron initially called for European Union (EU) member states to ‘conduct their own dialogue’ with Russia, seemingly as an alternative to supporting the US-led NATO response.

Risks of a ‘bullying’ Russia

Although positioning himself as the convener of a transatlantic response to the Ukraine crisis brings welcome respite for UK prime minister Boris Johnson from his domestic ‘partygate’ fiasco, he is also reported as saying some world leaders ‘may not appreciate the deteriorating picture on the Ukrainian border, or fully comprehend the risks posed by a bullying Russia’.

One particular image sums up the difference in approach between the UK and the EU, as a flight path shows a British RAF plane flying around Germany before taking a detour over Denmark on route to Ukraine.

Given that Germany later blocked the export of NATO ally Estonia’s weapons to Ukraine, this image gives ‘Global Britain’ advocates a strong symbol of apparent British reliability and resourcefulness in the face of supposed European deliberation and disunity.

But although the UK’s response to the Ukraine crisis has rightly been credited as swift and substantial, it also reveals deeper developments in the current European security landscape as EU countries had worried Britain might choose to become absent post-Brexit.

Losing one of its two main military powers would certainly have been a blow to Europe, particularly as Russia’s threat has grown in recent years, so there will be relief that the Ukraine crisis shows Britain is undoubtedly committed to the region. Now the question for leaders in Paris, Berlin, and Brussels is how to deal with an active Britain committed to Europe but under no obligation to work within EU processes.

The UK already has an interesting network of bilateral and mini-lateral relationships with European allies. Its Joint Expeditionary Force brings together ten European countries – including Scandinavian and Baltic states – and is well-placed to support NATO activities while also remaining flexible and independent. In the past year, the UK worked with Norway in the Arctic region, provided military engineers support to Poland, and worked directly with France and Germany through the E3 grouping – once again bypassing EU institutions.

The UK also brings a unique diplomatic, technology, and intelligence-sharing relationship with the US which is unavoidably important in dealing with the threat from Russia. As the US sees European security through a NATO lens – rather than an EU one – this makes Britain a leading player as one of the few countries meeting its NATO spending commitments.

UK must do more to win trust

But despite such creative partnerships transcending the constraints of Brexit, the UK must do more to win the trust of the EU’s biggest players France and Germany to be a permanent power in the region. And relations with France have deteriorated following disputes over fishing, a lack of cooperation on migrants, and the AUKUS defence technology agreement between the UK, US, and Australia.

When it comes to Germany, the UK must not use the Ukraine crisis as an opportunity for geopolitical point-scoring. There are good historical reasons for Germany’s cautious approach to military engagement, even if these do constrain the country’s response to this challenge.

In dealing with Russia, some members of Germany’s ruling SPD sincerely believe their party’s less confrontational posture was central to de-escalating conflict during the Cold War. And although some historians may dispute that belief, it is still a distinct and more noble motivation for ‘dovishness’ than pure economic self-interest.

Cooperation always requires some compromise on all sides. Germany must accept some level of economic risk if sanctions against Russia are to be meaningful and France has to accept the necessity of the UK and US’s involvement and that the most effective dialogue is unlikely to be achieved through EU institutions.

Meanwhile, the UK must accept some role for the two biggest EU players, particularly as the Normandy Format which includes Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany has proved productive in the past. And the UK needs to clamp down on its own economic ties with Russia.

Why a no-fly zone risks escalating the Ukraine conflict Expert comment NCapeling 13 March 2022

The US rejection of Poland’s offer to send fighter jets as a boost to Ukraine’s air defence shows just how uneasy nations are about direct combat with Russia.

The Pentagon’s decision to turn down the proposal by its fellow NATO member Poland to put Russian-made MiG-29 jets at its disposal demonstrates again how keen the US and allies are to avoid risking major confrontation with Russian forces.

The US Department of Defense says the offer to locate jets at bases in Germany was ‘not tenable’ as this risks flying into contested airspace over Ukraine – a non-NATO member – raising ‘serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance’ and echoing the continuing rejection of calls to implement no-fly zones (NFZs) as a way of easing the devastation being faced by trapped Ukraine civilians.

NFZs restrict any aircraft, including drones, from flying over a pre-defined region and can be used for both military and civilian purposes. But the implementation of NFZs is difficult to enforce and – most significantly – is unlikely to achieve the intended effect on the ground.

In conflict situations, they are usually implemented under the remit of United Nations (UN) peace support operations, requiring authorization under Article 42 of the UN Charter. This details that if all possible methods have proven ineffective in responding to a threat, countries ‘may take such action by air, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’.

Protection but with limitations

NFZs provide both protection from attack and surveillance but do have limitations. They must be monitored and enforced which requires committing to fighter jet patrols with the explicit task of defending the area from the air by whatever means necessary.

This could mean jets firing upon Russian planes and drones so, if NATO allies and partners were to enforce a NFZ, it would represent an escalation of measures which is a step that would most likely provoke an unpredictable Vladimir Putin into further escalation – in short, it is highly likely to be seen as an act of war.

UK defence secretary Ben Wallace – among others – has repeatedly dispelled the idea, saying that enforcing NFZs would mean deploying ‘British fighter jets directly against Russian fighter jets’. In relation to moves such as the Polish jets, the Kremlin has warned that any countries offering airfields to Ukraine for attacks on Russia may be viewed as having entered the conflict.

There have only been three past instances of military NFZs. In Bosnia, as part of Operation Deny Flight from 1993-1995, a NFZ was enforced as part of a strategy which also including the provision of close air support and approved air strikes.

In Iraq, an NFZ endured for 12 years from 1991 and was succcesful in preventing Saddam Hussein from attacking Kurdish and Shia Muslim civilians. And in Libya in 2011, a NFZ was deployed to prevent the destruction of military infrastructure and the Libyan regime – although this quickly morphed into the provision of close air support.

So it is unclear just how successful NFZs are at providing protection. In Iraq and Libya, NFZ cover protection was provided but neither Saddam Hussein or Colonel Gaddafi were able to effectively target victims through their ground forces whereas, in Bosnia, Slobodan Milosevic infamously used ground troops to slaughter 8,000 Bosnian men and boys at Srebrenica.

Putin would still be able to continue to use both ground forces and artillery to assault Ukrainian cities with or without a NFZ – in fact, his sparse use of his Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) has been one of the surprising features of the war so far. Under a NFZ, missile attacks could also continue, there is nothing in the record of no-fly zones to suggest the provision of safe areas for non-combatants would work.

And NFZs have only been successful against vastly inferior forces such as in Iraq, Bosnia, and Libya. But Russia has an air force second only in size to the US and has a vast range of defences including the potent S-400 Triumf at its disposal. Not only would an NFZ be ineffective, it might also not be possible to enforce without risking significant losses to the peace operations force.

It is due to a combination of these reasons that NFZs have not been used more in previous conflicts. The most recent consideration for a NFZ was in Syria but President Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian forces, protected by Russian air cover, could still have targeted their intended victims despite air policing so a NFZ was not used.

In the long-term, under the terms of a ceasefire agreement, it may be possible to include a NFZ under a UN or joint OSCE-UN peace terms. However, the forces involved should exclude NATO allies and partners or any states with Russian alliances to avoid further conflict.

This leaves few suitable countries with the capacity, willingness, and political stance to be called on. Two of the world’s most militarily capable states – China and India – abstained in the Uniting for Peace vote in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Whether another willing state with the military capability – such as a Gulf state – could be considered acceptable to all sides remains to be tested.

Notable successes with SAMs

Many military commentators also note that currently Ukrainian forces are having notable success without jets, downing Russian aircraft using sophisticated surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) such as Stinger and Javelin, and NATO countries continue to supply those in their thousands.

Ukraine crisis could trigger cascading risks globally Expert comment NCapeling 16 March 2022

The effects on the wider world from the Ukraine invasion go far beyond the waves of shock and horror being felt from this escalating conflict.

Russia and Ukraine rank 11th and 55th respectively in terms of their national economies but, for the global supply of critical resources such as energy, food, and minerals, these two countries together are far bigger hitters – and both the threat and reality of resource flows from them being reduced have already driven up global prices.

The world is already facing a cost-of-living squeeze coming out of the COVID-19 pandemic, so further price spikes or supply constraints have the potential to seriously undermine food and energy security, equitable access to basic goods and services, and social stability around the world – which can then potentially create systemic risks for economies and societies.

The global implications of the Ukraine conflict are only just beginning to be explored fully but the immediate impacts of the crisis on global markets are already well-documented. In the first few days after Russia’s invasion, energy prices spiked, triggering further fertilizer price rises – as fertilizer production is highly energy intensive – which in turn is contributing to food price rises because fertilizer costs are an important factor in food production.

Interruptions to shipping in the region around Ukraine – as well as globally – have impeded the flow of goods which pushed prices up even further, while economic sanctions on cross-border flows of goods and finance are further adding to market pressures. But this is just the start – these impacts will bring ripple effects which propagate far beyond their point of origin, known as ‘cascading risks’.

Risk is a combination of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability – in terms of the Ukraine invasion, the hazard is the conflict and its immediate impacts on the societies and economies of Ukraine and Russia, while exposure relates to the degree to which other countries are likely to be affected depending on how much they are integrated into the global economy or the ‘just in time’ nature of their supply chains.

Vulnerability relates to a society’s capacity to mitigate the harmful impacts of the conflict, such as controlling borders, sourcing alternative goods from suppliers, or protecting against price or supply shocks.

Risk cascades – the second- and third-order impacts of the original hazard and of responses to that hazard – can interact across sectoral boundaries – as with energy and food, for example – and their compound effect can lead to overall systemic risks for society.

Anticipating this potential is essential to understanding the nature and scale of the global ramifications being felt from the Ukraine conflict. Recent work in the UK to assess levels of cascading risks resulting from a changing climate – the UK Climate Change Risk Assessment – provides a valuable framework for thinking about this area.

It examines key pathways for risk to cascade through global systems – when applied to the situation in Ukraine, these pathways and their interactions offer an indication of the scale of crisis that citizens face far beyond Ukraine’s and Russia’s borders.

Interruptions to the flows of goods and energy

In globalized trade networks, localized disruption to supply chains rapidly yields widespread international impacts – of particular concern is the immediate supply of food because most countries rely on lean supply chains and some may only have a few days food within their own borders.

Experience from previous food price crises indicate even small interruptions to trade can result in runs on the market and rapid price inflation. In the case of this conflict, the trade interruption will be far from small because, between them, Russia and Ukraine export around one-quarter of all traded wheat, more than three-quarters of traded sunflower oil, and one-sixth of traded maize.

Energy markets are also a concern because many countries use more energy than they produce and therefore rely on imports of energy or fuel for domestic use. Russia produces around ten per cent of the world’s commercial energy with a concentration of sales in major regions such as the European Union (EU) and China.

As with food, a shortfall in energy provision leads to market runs and rapid inflation as actors compete in a tightening space, while poorly designed policy interventions by nations trying to ensure their own security add further pressure to global supply and worsen price rises. In addition, the closely interconnected nature of energy markets means disruption to one fuel – such as gas in this case – affects global prices for other forms of energy.

The impact of moving people and money

As the last decade richly illustrates, the cross-border flows of people impact those societies absorbing them – for example, contributing to a rise in nationalism – as well as increase the costs of supplying essential resources. Given many people are understandably fleeing this conflict, other countries may struggle to cope as the cost-of-living crisis and urgent efforts to bolster national security infrastructure may squeeze available public funds.

Financial flows are crucial to the functioning of global economies, whether for inward investment or insurance and – as Russian citizens may be about to discover – restricting the global flow of money has a serious impact on households. Beyond Russia, the outflow of money from major financial centres such as London to meet insurance claims or to enable infrastructure reinvestment post-conflict may also have severe knock-on economic impacts.

The impact on governance and health

The global spikes in energy and food prices resulting from these supply chain disruptions will see many countries struggle with rising food and energy insecurity as well as increased inequality. Taken together these conditions create many issues beyond immigration pressures and the associated politics, including increased inequality and civil unrest.

This potentially destabilizes governments which has consequences for the stability of an entire region such as interrupted supply chains, the need to deploy peacekeeping forces, or significant flows of aid – all with global consequences far beyond the countries in question.

Populations may suffer mental health impacts arising from the Ukraine invasion, whether from the trauma of being forced to leave home to escape conflict, anxiety for the wellbeing and safety of families and friends caught up in it, or a more general anxiety arising from the perception of living in an unstable world.

Ukraine exposes Europe’s double standards for refugees Expert comment NCapeling 30 March 2022

As European governments provide swift protection assurances to those fleeing Ukraine, non-European asylum-seekers continue to face violence at the EU’s borders.

One month after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU) already faces its largest refugee crisis since World War Two, with more than ten million people having fled their homes – 6.5 million displaced within Ukraine and 3.9 million escaping to neighbouring countries.

Acting quickly and decisively, European governments have opened borders and European citizens have opened their homes in an unprecedented showing of solidarity towards refugees. But, with all eyes on Ukraine, the Greek coastguard continues to illegally push back asylum-seekers crossing from Turkey while Spanish police forcefully repel those who dare to jump the fence in Melilla.

The painful contrast exposes the double standards in the EU’s approach to refugees. With Europe’s grim history of restrictive asylum policies, it is wishful thinking that the warm welcome to Ukrainians will extend to all asylum-seekers. The EU solidarity to displaced Ukrainians illustrates the deeply politicized – and often discriminatory – nature of providing refugee protection.

However, the hope is this turning point in European history can at least set an important precedent for treating refugees more humanely. Undoubtedly, EU solidarity towards people fleeing the horrors of Putin’s war is critically important and the initial response is positive in its efforts to meet immense humanitarian needs.

Solidarity with Ukrainians

The EU activation of the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) is a significant step towards a more humane protection regime and fairer responsibility-sharing among member states. Without the need for the examination of individual applications, those fleeing Ukraine can access harmonized rights across the EU for three years – including residence, housing, medical assistance, and access to the labour market and education.

The TPD is also a move away from the strict ‘Dublin’ rules which put the pressure of hosting refugees onto the countries of ‘first arrival’. Ironically, the fiercest opponents of intra-EU solidarity, such as Poland and Hungary, are the ones benefiting from this change now but, in the case of Ukraine, geographical proximity and shared histories must be considered when analysing Europe’s response.

Eastern European and Baltic countries share a post-Soviet history and fear of Russian aggression, and Ukrainians already enjoyed 90 days of visa-free travel in the EU – with a large diaspora, many have established networks across Europe. But even considering these distinctive connections with Ukrainian displacement, the initial response still shows that European countries have both the political will and the capacity to host refugees.

Unlike the usual – often media-fuelled – narratives of refugee ‘invasions’ into Europe, the waves of women and children leaving Ukraine prompted a surge of humanitarian action but they are also a chilling reality check of Europe’s double standards.

The EU has used agreements with countries such as Turkey and Libya to prevent arrivals and outsource asylum responsibilities, while border violence, detention, and lengthy asylum procedures await the few asylum seekers who manage to enter Europe from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.

These ‘fortress Europe’ legacies have even undercut the humanitarian response in Ukraine, with reports of incidents of discrimination towards people of colour at the EU borders being condemned by the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU), the media facing allegations of racist reporting, and comments from Bulgarian PM Kiril Petkov providing a stark reminder of the islamophobia, racism, and history of colonization which still pervades European asylum policies.

Foreign policy also influences how EU leaders treat the right to asylum, as the geopolitics of Europe’s efforts to create a united front against Russian aggression is an undercurrent to the prompt European response to Ukrainians. But only a few months ago, non-European asylum-seekers trapped in freezing forests at the Poland-Belarus border were used as political pawns by Belarusian leader Aliaksandr Lukashenka and then dehumanised as a ‘hybrid attack’ by EU leaders.

A turning point for asylum in Europe?

Despite entrenched discriminatory precedents, it is worth looking ahead at this moment of reckoning. Although policy changes remain far off, the unity shown over Ukraine can help reshape and refocus political efforts towards increased responsibility-sharing among EU member states – the perennial ‘hot potato’ of the EU asylum system.

War on Ukraine: Exploring the humanitarian response to the conflict 12 April 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 April 2022 Online

This event explores the implications of the humanitarian realities from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the largest ground campaign in Europe since World War Two.

Reports from humanitarian organizations working in Ukraine are dire and reveal that a humanitarian disaster on an epic scale is unfolding.

The United Nations (UN) and other organizations estimate 12 million of Ukraine’s population are in need of assistance, 4.1 million have been displaced to neighbouring countries, and 6.4 million have become internally displaced.

Gillian Triggs, the assistant secretary-general and assistant high commissioner for protection at the UNHCR, joins other experts to discuss the humanitarian situation in Ukraine.

The panel considers:

• What are the greatest needs in Ukraine now?
• How can aid agencies meet those needs?
• What are the short and long-term implications of the crisis for Ukraine and Europe?
• How do international organizations work with local NGOs to provide food, medical aid and shelter?

This event is part of a regular series of events offering insight and analysis from experts and policymakers on how the war is affecting Ukraine, the region and the world.

This event is part of Chatham House’s ongoing work on the future of conflict.

Read the transcript

Putin’s Eurasian dream may soon become a nightmare Expert comment NCapeling 3 May 2022

The Ukraine invasion has detrimental consequences for the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, a project which has been stumbling since its inception.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) – consisting of Russia with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan – represents the culmination of Russia’s pursuit of regional integration with its post-Soviet neighbours.

Officially, the Union has an ambitious economic goal – the creation of a market based on common rules for its five member states and their 180 million citizens – and Russia likes to portray the EAEU as an Eurasian replica of the European Union (EU).

But although a common market was placed at the heart of the EAEU as a way to appeal to member states, it is of marginal importance for the Russian economy. For Moscow, the EAEU is primarily a geopolitical tool to help re-assert its regional and global role.

In a world of evermore powerful trading blocs, Moscow wants to use the EAEU to establish its own economic power base in the new polycentric world order. But Russia’s limited interest in the technocratic intricacies needed for the economic union to live up to its lofty proclamations exposes the real geopolitical ambitions.

The Kremlin has no qualms about disregarding the common rules when they clash with Russia’s own foreign policy, and it soon became evident the EAEU was a means to an end rather than an equitable institution within which Russia would accept constraints on its unilateral behaviour.

A crisis in the making

Although the EAEU has enabled some internal trade liberalization as well as the movement of people and labour to the benefit of its members reliant on labour migrant remittances, it has failed to tackle institutional barriers or promote growth and development policies.

It has been hampered by weak common institutions and a lack of institutional capacity of its member states, while Russia’s dubious commitment is also problematic. The EAEU lacks the institutional features of a genuine common market and any attempts to address these shortcomings have been essentially empty promises.

EAEU membership does benefit the political elites of its member states, because its hub-and-spoke model relies on bilateral high-level political deals between Russia and each member state individually. And by using the enticement of security guarantees and both political and financial support, Moscow has succeeded in attracting new members to join.

But a member’s political survival – or defence against political and economic reform – is dependent on military, economic, financial, and political support from Russia. This has been evidenced by the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, and by Russia’s backing of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus and the Tokayev government in Kazakhstan.

The design of the EAEU ties it to Russia’s own fate, and so the impact of harsh sanctions imposed on Russia for invading Ukraine are in stark evidence across its member states. Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are reeling from the adverse effects on their domestic currencies and remittances, and the trade bans of key commodities.

And although the ban Russia imposed on grain export to EAEU members has softened, it shows the extent to which Russia was prepared to disregard the rules and sacrifice the EAEU to rescue its own economy. Members are incurring direct economic losses from Putin’s war against Ukraine and the fluctuation of the rouble has created a major impediment to trade with Russia.

Russia seems to increasingly view the Union as a convenient tool to bypass sanctions, with massive implications for its partner countries. And the supposed advantages of EAEU membership – enhanced trade, growth, and modernization – have simply not materialized.

Due to the rapid economic decline of Russia – a fall of 10-15 per cent is anticipated for 2022 – the EAEU is even less likely to deliver the promised economic benefits, while also putting members at risk of secondary sanctions.

The Ukraine invasion has also reignited domestic sensitivities and regional tensions. In Kazakhstan, Tokayev has failed to endorse Russia’s justification for the invasion and refuses to recognize the ‘independence’ of the separatist LNR and DNR.

Meanwhile Azerbaijan has pursued territorial gains in Nagorno-Karabakh while Russia is distracted by its invasion of Ukraine, and has requested the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping from the disputed territory.

Russia is keen for partner countries to help mitigate the economic impact of sanctions by providing alternative transit routes for imports to Russia. But the EAEU faces challenges even at its most basic level because the sharing of custom duties among member states was denominated in dollars, which Russia now wants to move away from.

No easy escape

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine clearly reduces the benefits of Eurasian integration even further than before and imposes higher cost on the partner countries than were envisaged when they joined. They have been dragged into a geopolitical calamity over which they have no control – the inability of EAEU institutions to mediate or constrain Russia’s behaviour is stark.

War in Ukraine: Can the EU survive without Russian oil and gas? Audio NCapeling 5 May 2022

The fourth episode of our podcast mini-series examines how reliant the European Union (EU) is on Russian energy.

What would an all-out ban on Russian oil look like? Which countries would be most affected? Does this offer an opportunity for renewable energy?

Clips used: Bloomberg News

This episode was produced by Anouk Millet of Earshot Strategies on behalf of Chatham House.

Reshaping NATO for an uncertain future The World Today mhiggins.drupal 25 May 2022

A Chatham House expert panel outlines the challenges for delegates at the Madrid summit where the roadmap for the transatlantic alliance will be created

This year had already been earmarked as pivotal for the shape and direction of European security even before Russia, a nuclear superpower, rolled its tanks into Ukraine.

On the agenda at the NATO summit in Madrid in June is the Strategic Concept, which sets out the alliance’s direction and priorities for the next decade. There is much to discuss. From shared values to the state of the security environment, the Strategic Concept will have a direct impact on the global security landscape.

Ten years ago, the world was a very different place. The United States had just withdrawn from its bloody war in Iraq and was still embroiled in Afghanistan fighting the Taliban. In China, Xi Jinping was poised to become the next president, while refugees escaping the vicious civil war in Syria were heading towards Europe. In Africa, Islamist activity in Mali was about to spread throughout the Sahel.

Now, Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine rages on NATO’s doorstep, spurring the once neutral countries of Sweden and Finland to seek membership. How will Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine affect the western security agenda and what will be the shape of the new NATO that emerges from these talks?  To help answer these questions, The World Today convened a panel of Chatham House experts to consider what the next 10 years holds for NATO.

Here is what they said.

Alice Billon-Galland
We shouldn’t expect a revolution, but more an adaptation of reforms that have taken place at NATO for quite a long time, especially since the Wales summit in 2014. NATO allies will have to decide on the Russian threat perception and decide how they want to reinforce their deterrence and defence posture in the East, and how this affects their ability to maintain a 360-degree approach and to carry out the ambitious NATO 2030 agenda.

Patricia Lewis
We need to understand how deterrence works far better and we should have better metrics by now. Russia and NATO do not wish to engage in conventional warfare with each other, which suggests that Nato’s conventional deterrence is working. That said, Putin’s nuclear threats have not been within the framework of deterrence. But nuclear deterrence has not worked in the way strategists imagined since the end of the Cold War, and we need a much clearer hard look at these weapons once this is all over.

Had we followed through on disarmament in the 1990s, Putin would have held very little sway today. Nuclear weapons and despots are not a good mix and with these weapons there are no small mistakes. We would be foolish to imagine that rationality will hold when it comes to nuclear decision-making.

It is time to put arms control back on the agenda and strengthen our efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. We need to put the elimination of these weapons back on the UN Security Council agenda.

Andrew Dorman
Finland and Sweden coming into NATO completely transforms the Baltic. It makes the deployment of reinforcements to the Baltic states an awful lot easier. From the Kremlin’s point of view, the last thing they want is another border with NATO. Russia is already overly committed and hasn’t got enough forces to deal with Ukraine. Its border with Finland is enormous. And NATO would be gaining two very robust, well-organized military forces. You are seeing a lot more NATO assets starting to look at the high north.

Hans Kundnani
I am actually slightly less worried about the Russian threat to NATO countries than I was before February 24. The war has demonstrated how weak the Russian military is, and so the idea that it might present a threat to Finland and Sweden seems less plausible than before. It is not even clear to me that Russia could do very much in other south-eastern European countries. It already seems pretty overstretched. This should make us more relaxed, rather than more worried, about threats to other countries and in particular to NATO countries or to Finland and Sweden.

Leslie Vinjamuri
Sweden and Finland moving forward with their requests for membership is a sign of success for the West, but it also raises important questions for the future of European security. The possibility that we lock in a division that might suit Europe and the United States now does not bode well for a Russia maybe 10 years out or with a different leader.

Alice Billon-Galland
We need to avoid mission creep, but we also need to avoid going back to a position where NATO only focuses on Russia and then set an agenda for 10 years based on that threat assessment alone. We will risk missing out on the next big challenge if we go back on something too specific. We risk being reactive, whereas the Strategic Concept is an exercise that should be proactive and provide a space for transatlantic partners to share broader common security concerns.

Patricia Lewis
NATO is open to all countries in the transatlantic area, and it is even possible that Russia could join in the future should they wish to apply. But it is important to remember that NATO is a political-military alliance, and its politics are fundamental to its cohesion, far more than that of any weapon system or a specific enemy. It will continue to address a wider range of threats as it has in, for example, Afghanistan and many of those will be directly related to the impacts of climate change.

One thing to note, in light of Russia’s nuclear threats, is that NATO’s characterization of itself as a ‘nuclear alliance’ should be revised. NATO needs to be resilient to ebbs and flows of weapon systems and not become over-reliant on one system which has recently demonstrated severe negative impacts.

Hans Kundnani
During the Cold War, what held the alliance together was a shared perception of a threat from the Soviet Union – not a set of shared values. After all, there were authoritarian states in NATO. After the end of the Cold War that overwhelming sense of a shared threat from the Soviet Union disappeared and NATO tried to reinvent itself as a community alliance of democracies with shared values.

But we now once again have authoritarian states in NATO. So it was really in danger of being pulled apart. The war in Ukraine has refocused NATO on its original, historic mission: collective security in relation to Russia. In that sense it has given NATO a lifeline.

Creon Butler
Shared values are still an awful lot stronger as an element of what ties NATO together now than they were in the past. I think you now have the threat perception coming back full force. But I still think you have that very strong element of values, indeed the extra countries that are coming in are very strong democratic countries.

The interesting question is the out-of-area stuff – the Afghanistan-related stuff and counterterrorism more generally, and how important those threats remain. I guess there is an element to that which is a global kind of threat, counterterrorism, but there is also the out-of-area activity which obviously has been transformed following the withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Alice Billon-Galland
The crisis management mandate needs to be looked at again with some of the lessons learnt after Afghanistan and Libya, especially given what happened in Kabul, and all the discussion around cooperative security. The question is not only how do we work with partners and countries in the region, but how do we want to engage with China, for instance? How do we want to work on new technologies? How do we want to work with the European Union, with the United Nations?

The alliance must decide what it wants to do versus  what it wants to set aside and have other organizations do, while it refocuses on its core historic tasks.

Andrew Dorman
One of the sensitive, ongoing debates within NATO is whether it has a global role or whether it has a more transatlantic role. There are divisions within NATO about which is its focus. I think the answer, to a degree, is both. One of the real challenges for policymakers, particularly the Biden administration, is that they are going to be pushing for NATO to act as a global player.

This is one of the dilemmas that NATO faces. It could spend all its time focused purely on the short term – that is Russia –  and ignore China, and then suddenly need to think, ‘Oh heck’. What happens if , as a result of this, Russia is essentially dropped into the China camp and Putin becomes Xi Jinping’s poodle? That is a real dilemma, and why I think the US is going to focus on a global NATO.

Leslie Vinjamuri
NATO may have a role to play in Washington’s China strategy. But it won’t be the most important institution. The Biden administration is relying on multiple frameworks for engaging in the Indo-Pacific. For example, the Quad – a partnership between the US, Japan, India and Australia – is designed to secure India’s participation. Pulling India into the region where it has economic power, influence, military and security capabilities and can move the needle. It is both an intelligent and pragmatic strategy to have a number of groupings, a patchwork of overlapping partnerships, including existing alliances. That seems right to me.

Patricia Lewis
It is unlikely that the US would want to create a global NATO. The US and its allies in other regions may wish to model future alliances on NATO, that have strong relationships with it in areas such as political coherence, interoperability, and joint training and exercises and such. But political decision-making would be better suited to sit within specific regional contexts.

Washington has formal alliances in the Indo-Pacific region that commit the US to, for example, the defence of Australia through the Anzus security treaty, as well as Japan. As Washington increases its focus on the Pacific, the existing political-military relationships in the region could become more coherent. We might see a version of a Pacific-Asia Treaty Organization emerge – a Pato. All this depends on how China uses its power and how perspectives in the region evolve.

Creon Butler
I am not sure it is a problem that NATO does not have a specific focus on dealing with the China threat. It potentially has a role in dealing with those things that are seen by the membership as common threats. Which clearly is Russia now but has added terrorism in the past and may well include other things. China is not a common threat in the way that Russia is perceived to be. Of course, something could happen, not least something with Taiwan, which would change that, but that is not where NATO is at present.

Alice Billon-Galland
I think we should really avoid a false dichotomy between ‘NATO should do only Russia’ and ‘NATO should do everything’ because there are lots of activities in the middle where the alliance can bring some added value – and that is exactly what we should be discussing. The issue around China and NATO is being completely overblown. We need to be very clear that the purpose of NATO is to defend the Euro-Atlantic space, but that may include keeping an eye on ‘when China comes to us’, as NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg often says.

Hans Kundnani
None of the regional partners in Asia that you need to deal with the China challenge are in NATO – and can’t be – so it is just the wrong vehicle to deal with the Indo-Pacific. But there is also a bit of a tension here between Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic. People in Asia also look at the different threat perceptions in completely different ways than we do in Europe. There are a number of reasons why people in India do not support the war in the Ukraine, but one of them is that they see China, not Russia, as the real threat.

Andrew Dorman
I think so much of the debate we have had so far is about political NATO as supposed to military NATO. One of its key roles is how military forces operate, engage and conduct operations, plan operations through deterrents and so forth. NATO as the template of the West does work. That is why it is in the interest of the US to keep this going. It is one of the ways of making sure, for example, the US Pacific fleet remains compatible with the US Atlantic fleet by forcing them to operate the same system, which is the NATO system.

It is one of the things the American forces learnt out of Afghanistan and Iraq. There is a NATO way which is a global footprint. NATO’s role within the African Union is as a template for peacekeeping operations. You have got the likes of Australia and South Korea and Japan very much integrated into NATO. It doesn’t have to be a formal political NATO, but it does strike me to be in the interest of the West to have them reach forces capable of operating with one another.

Patricia Lewis
One of the most interesting developments in the past year has been the creation of Aukus, the security pact between Australia, Britain and the United States. That grew out of the Five Eyes intelligence partnership which led to the need to develop new, interoperable equipment such as nuclear-powered submarines. We will have to see how it develops, but maybe it could be the start of a PATO in the region.  

Creon Butler
In the current situation, we have a crucial partnership between NATO and the EU over Russia, in terms of the long-term future they hold out for Ukraine, but also with the G7 because that is the place to organize the financial support for Ukraine and the economic and financial sanctions against Russia. They are different memberships but the combination of the EU, G7 and NATO is an absolutely crucial alliance of different alliances, with different memberships serving different purposes but having an overall impact that can potentially be very effective.

Leslie Vinjamuri
We work with the institutions that we have, but not always with a clear recognition of their limitations. We are facing a dark moment for the UN Security Council, with one of its founder members blatantly violating the UN’s most important norm. Yet many people in the rest of the world say, ‘Yes, but in 2003, the United States violated Iraq’s sovereignty …’ Where the West sees moral clarity, and so condemns Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there is an assumption by much of the rest of the world of moral equivalence between these two invasions.

Working through the UN Security Council is going to be difficult for some time. This means that states are probably going to find different strategies for working around, rather than through, the Security Council.

Interview: Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya The World Today mhiggins.drupal 25 May 2022

Belarus’s exiled democratic opposition leader tells Roxanne Escobales about her unexpected political career and President Lukashenka’s wavering support for Putin

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya is the face of the Belarusian democratic movement. In 2020, she stood as a presidential candidate against Aliaksandr Lukashenka after her husband, an anti-corruption campaigner and the main opposition candidate, was arrested on the campaign trail and imprisoned. Lukashenka, autocratic ruler of Belarus for more than 30 years, was re-elected. Since then, Sviatlana has lived in exile in Lithuania meeting with western leaders and calling for regime change in her native land. Her husband Sergey remains in prison serving an 18-year sentence.

You have said in the past that there will be no free Belarus without a free Ukraine. How is the fate of the two countries connected?

The Kremlin wants to drag our countries into the past, and we are looking into a future which we want to choose for ourselves. The Kremlin doesn’t recognize Ukraine or Belarus as independent countries – it sees them as part of Russia. While the current regime is in our country, there will be a constant threat of aggression from Russia. But we are absolutely independent countries with our own languages, cultures and so on.

The fate of Belarus depends a lot on the outcome of the war in Ukraine, it is evident. When Ukraine wins – and they definitely will win – it will mean the Kremlin is weak and that Lukashenka is weak. Every day we create multiple points of pressure on the regime from within the country, from outside the country. For countries like Ukraine and Belarus the support of strong democracies is very important.

It is very important for European society to understand that it is not just a war between Russia and Ukraine. It is a war between democratic values and dictatorship on the territory of Ukraine. It is very important for democracy to have a strong voice at the moment.

Recently Lukashenka said the war was taking too long. Do you think he understood what he was getting into when he supported Vladimir Putin by allowing his illegal invasion to be launched from Belarus?

The support between the Kremlin and Lukashenka has always been situational – it is not a real friendship. Lukashenka got huge political and economic support in 2020 after the protests, and now he owes a debt to the Kremlin and had to show his loyalty.

And we see how his rhetoric is changing because the situation in Ukraine is changing. At the beginning Lukashenka always said that, ‘Me and Putin will take Ukraine in three days’, and when this blitzkrieg failed, now he wants to get out of the situation. Now he wants to say, ‘Look, we are for peace. We didn’t have any intention to invade Ukraine.’ He wants to act like he is a peacemaker.

He only cares about his own interest, not his country or its people. He just wants to keep his power.

You have been living in exile in Lithuania for two years, and a lot has happened in that time. What is the state of the Belarusian democratic movement now?

We have been a grassroots movement since the first day. There is no leader who says you have to do this or that. My role is to work on the political level. My task is to go to the European Union, to the United States, and ask for packages to assist civil society. With this technical assistance from our democratic partners, we have managed to build structures in exile, and people in Belarus have managed to build structures inside the country.

Another task of mine is to inspire people, and to explain to the international community what is going on and to show them that Belarus is not just Lukashenka’s regime – it is people who want change.

I communicate with Belarusian people almost every day, especially those who are in the country. We have to keep close ties. It is important to understand how dangerous it is in Belarus to communicate on different channels like Telegram or even to subscribe to some media sources. But people do this. They understand the threats and the consequences, but their energy is still so alive.

We have to keep this energy strong and to give this assurance to people that in case something happens to them, or their families, they will get help from outside. This is how it works.

This struggle has come at a very personal cost to you and your husband, Sergey, who is in prison for his political activities. How is he doing?

I communicate with my husband through his lawyer, who visits him once a week. It has to be short messages because there is no privacy. Our children can send him letters and they receive letters back from him.

There are thousands of people like Sergey, and we have to take care of all of them. The treatment of political prisoners is much worse than criminals because they are like Lukashenka’s personal enemies. That is why it is so important to support human rights organizations who provide lawyers to political prisoners. It is important to fund support for them and for families of political prisoners.

You were a teacher when you took over your husband’s presidential campaign. If you could go back in time, what advice would you give yourself?

I would wish I could have had more confidence. I didn’t have any political experience – I was an ordinary woman and wife, the same as millions of other Belarusians. At the beginning, I didn’t feel confident because I didn’t know about politics. I didn’t know how to communicate with the political leaders of different countries. I was scared.

What motivated you to step into your husband’s shoes?

It was an accidental choice. It was terrible for my husband. But I saw millions of people on the streets, and when you see people standing shoulder to shoulder it inspires you. Every day thousands of people call me who want to help, and I understand that we are not alone. This motivates me.

Also, the fact that thousands of children want to see their mothers and fathers who are in jail gives me strength. When sometimes you think you can’t do this any more because it is so difficult, you think about those who haven’t seen their children for two years. It is awful.

So, every day, you find something that gives you a small energy and it doesn’t let you give up.

NATO must now transform old missions into new strategy Expert comment NCapeling 21 June 2022

As the war in Ukraine becomes prolonged and unpredictable, risks for the transatlantic alliance will increase, as will the global shockwaves of the conflict.

As a revitalized NATO alliance deals with a crisis that has major economic and humanitarian as well as military dimensions, the need for it to develop both a European and a global containment strategy grows ever more urgent.

Bolstering NATO’s defences so as to provide the capability to repel any form of Russian attack on land, at sea, in the air, or through space and cyberspace is a key aspect of this strategy as, in recent weeks, more combat forces able to defend territory have taken the form of additional troops, ships, and aircraft reinforcing the Baltic states and the Black Sea coastlines of Poland and Romania.

Ten allies have so far contributed to this effort, placing 40,000 troops under direct NATO command. Those sceptical about the future of the transatlantic security relationship have been confounded by the major role the US has played in this effort, sending parts of the 82nd Airborne Division and 3rd Armoured Division to Poland, and redeploying US Stryker brigades from Germany and Italy to the Baltic states and Romania.

Although many other allies have sent useful assets – such as French and UK aircraft to Romania or German and Netherlands Patriot batteries to Slovakia – the US contribution still surpasses all European efforts put together. The US now has 100,000 troops in Europe, the most it has deployed there since the mid-1990s.

Transitioning from temporary to permanent deployment

NATO has also mobilized its high-readiness Reaction Force for the first time and aims to establish four new multinational battalions in the Black Sea region – with France offering to lead the one in Romania, Italy in Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic in Slovakia. Most of these deployments are on a temporary basis, but the receiving allies would understandably like them to stay longer and for NATO to commit to permanent stationed forces.

Although this would oblige the alliance to break formally from the pledge it made to Moscow in 1997 not to station substantial combat forces or nuclear weapons or build military infrastructure on the territory of its new member states in eastern Europe, this was a political undertaking linked to circumstances prevailing at the time.

Given Russia’s behaviour, there is no reason why NATO should not now abandon it. There is also a question over whether NATO could also repeal the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Russia Council, or simply leave them in suspension for a future, more cooperative, and less bellicose Russian regime.

Beyond showing the flag along its eastern flank, NATO does face longer-term issues which need to be clarified in its new Strategic Concept. First is whether to abandon its current strategy of reinforcement and military mobility across Europe – known as the Enhanced Forward Presence in the NATO jargon – in favour of the deployment of heavy armoured brigades or even divisions in fixed positions close to borders.

This will be expensive in the long-run and deprive allies of the flexibility they have enjoyed since the end of the Cold War to use their forces as and where they wish – from deployments in the Sahel or Afghanistan to fighting forest fires or building emergency hospitals for COVID-19 patients at home. The only exception is when they have put forces on rotation into the NATO high readiness forces or the European Union (EU) Battle Groups.

Germany’s commitment gives NATO more options

The decision of Germany to increase its defence spending to two per cent of GDP and to devote €100 billion to modernizing the Bundeswehr makes it technically possible for NATO to move to a Cold War-style forward, armoured defence. But it is unclear how quickly Berlin could raise its new divisions given its problems with procurement and government/industry relations in the defence sector.

It may make more sense for Germany not to launch new acquisition programmes but to buy existing off-the-shelf capabilities – as it has recently done with its decision to buy 35 US F35 aircraft – which other European countries are also acquiring, offering economies of scale and cheaper operating and maintenance costs.

But if Germany abandons ambitious defence projects with France – which prefers a ‘buy European’ approach – such as the Future European Air Combat System, the relationship with France will become strained and French plans for EU self-reliance in the military field put at risk.

As a country averse to war fighting and narrow military approaches to security, it is uncertain how much of the conventional defence burden in NATO Germany would be willing to take on, so this could be the opportunity to create more integrated European units with France, the Benelux, Poland, and Italy, even with the post-Brexit UK.

The UK has doubled the size of its forces in Estonia and sent 1,000 troops to Poland, as well as devoting a substantial portion of its army, navy, and airforce to regular NATO exercises in the Baltic region. London was also the first ally to grant Sweden and Finland a temporary security guarantee pending full integration into the alliance.

NATO will likely settle on a compromise, increasing the size of its battalions on its eastern flank – turning them into battle groups – but giving each one a larger reserve force which will remain in Germany or other European allied countries.

A NATO strategic plan is now needed

The other issue for NATO is to develop a single theatre-wide strategic plan managed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and the NATO command structure. In reinforcing the alliance’s eastern flank, allies have sent forces to wherever they like and largely under national command, but this would not work in a real war.

NATO must revise its exercises to prepare and train for the new threat level, ensuring its forward deployed forces are fully integrated with local forces and the police and border guards to anticipate and respond to any Russian hybrid war tactics. It also needs to step up its joint planning and interoperability with Sweden and Finland and bring their territories into its standing defence plans.

One thing NATO has done well in this crisis is its political messaging. As Russia has become more threatening and reckless, it has been essential for NATO to be consistent and predictable. Re-affirming its core defensive purpose, calmly rejecting Putin’s nuclear posturing, and refusing to put NATO forces in Ukraine may be frustrating for some but it is vital not to play into Putin’s playbook regarding an ‘aggressive NATO’ or give him the sense he is being pushed into a corner. However, NATO strategic ambiguity can be useful when considering how to respond to a Russian escalation in Ukraine itself, such as using chemical weapons.

The key questions for NATO are:

• What should be the balance between permanently deployed and rotational forces in NATO’s new posture?
• What should be the balance of US/Canadian and European forces in this posture?
• How can the capability development programmes under EU Strategic Autonomy (such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund) be geared to support the European role and responsibility in the alliance? Air and missile defence would seem to be priorities given Russia’s reliance on long range strikes.
• How can the EU’s Strategic Compass, NATO’s next Strategic Concept and the third NATO-EU Joint Declaration be harmonized to bring the two institutions more closely together in responding to Russian hybrid operations and influence campaigns, and in assisting both Ukraine and others such as Georgia and Moldova?
• What should be the balance between forces for collective defence with heavy armour and directed artillery fire, and those for expeditionary missions beyond Europe such as counterterrorism, stabilization and peacekeeping?

NATO is revived and refocused

Although the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a catastrophe for Ukraine and Europe more generally, the multilateral system has discovered a new energy and sense of purpose as NATO has been revived and refocused on its core mission.

The EU and the US have pulled together with daily coordination of their policies and actions, and the EU is also facing up to its geo-political role, as recognizing the EU aspirations of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia as well as the countries of the western Balkans shows its responsibility for the security and economic integration of the whole of Europe.

President Maia Sandu on democracy and politics in Moldova Video jon.wallace 4 July 2022

The president covers Moldova’s challenges as it seeks closer integration with the European Union.

President Maia Sandu discusses challenges to Moldovan democracy and society during an interview at Chatham House’s 2022 London Conference.

She covers issues including corruption, the presence of Russian troops in the Transnistria region, neutrality in Moldova’s constitution, popular support for EU membership and refugees from Russian aggression in Ukraine.

Central and Eastern Europe become hawkish on China Expert comment LJefferson 16 September 2022

The recent withdrawal of the Baltic countries from the ‘17+1’ format displays changing perceptions of China due to its ambiguity towards the war in Ukraine.

While the Russian invasion of Ukraine only confirmed Central and Eastern Europe’s views of Russia, it is also affecting their relations with China. Although the relationship was already complicated due to unfulfilled Chinese economic promises to CEE countries and growing indications of efforts to influence their domestic politics, China’s support for Russia is pushing Central and Eastern Europeans even further away.

This shift was highlighted, and formalized, recently by several countries in the region leaving the ‘17+1’ format, through which China cooperates with a group of countries from the region. The shifting attitudes towards China will also influence the relationship between the European Union as a whole and China.

A Trojan Horse that never was

When the format was launched in 2012 between 16 CEE countries at the time and China, the countries jumping on board expected a wave of Chinese investment and an opportunity to diversify mostly west-bound trade.

These hopes never fully materialized as Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in CEE has been generally lower compared to the rest of Europe and China never became an important export destination for any of the countries. The growing disillusionment and concern about Chinese security threats has led to some of the countries speaking up about the perceived perils of closer cooperation.

The first to withdraw from what had become ‘17+1’ by 2021 was Lithuania, which also took an interest in strengthening ties with Taiwan and allowed it to open a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius. This triggered a breakdown in the bilateral relations with China. As a retaliatory response, China blocked Lithuanian imports and imports from other EU states containing inputs from Lithuania, leading the EU to launch an official dispute at the WTO.

War in Ukraine

Since the invasion started, CEE countries have been dealing with large numbers of Ukrainian refugees, organizing shipments of military equipment to Ukraine, and at the same time worrying whether they could be next on Russia’s list.

However, the concerns and security environment that these countries face seems to be almost entirely disregarded by China. On the sidelines of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, Xi and Putin signed the joint communiqué in which China backed Moscow’s demands to reverse NATO borders to the pre-1997 situation, completely disregarding CEE’s security interests.

China’s implicit support for Russia after the invasion has sowed deep mistrust of its respect for the sovereignty of other nations. The Chinese diplomatic apparatus clearly noticed this changing mood among CEE governments and sent a special envoy to eight capitals in April-May tasked with ‘eliminating misunderstandings regarding Russia-Ukraine conflict’.

However, the trip was not particularly successful. The delegation failed to secure high-level meetings, with the most prominent case being the Polish minister of foreign affairs declining to meet Huo Yuzhen, the Chinese Special Councilor for CEEC cooperation. Given that Andrzej Duda, President of Poland, was the only head of an EU state who attended the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony just before the Russian invasion in February, the change in attitudes is clear.

Following the envoy’s visit to the Czech Republic, the Czech parliament’s foreign affairs committee unanimously approved a resolution calling for the country to quit the ‘16+1’ format and the government is expected to act upon it in the near future. Meanwhile, Latvia and Estonia recently jointly announced that they would no longer be participating in the cooperation framework, turning it into ‘14+1’.

Issues to watch in 2023 The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 November 2022

From nuclear proliferation to African debt, here are the issues six of our expert contributors expect to make the news in the year ahead.

Europe’s energy outlook

Mike Bradshaw, Professor of Global Energy, Warwick Business School

There is cautious optimism that Europe will endure this winter without an energy crisis. Gas prices have fallen, storage is 95 per cent full, and the autumn was mild. High summer gas prices cut industrial demand but domestic heating demand will be critical over the winter. Already, France’s problematic nuclear fleet and lower hydroelectric output mean Europe is using more gas to generate power. 

Russian pipeline gas supply to southern Europe has fallen by 55 per cent. While Asian demand has fallen, Europe has still paid record prices to secure additional liquefied natural gas (LNG), largely from America but also Russia. European demand for LNG this winter will push prices up, and these will rise even higher if China relaxes its Zero-Covid policy and demand recovers. However, with luck, Europe will avoid power cuts in early 2023. The problem is next winter. With less Russian pipeline gas and a tight LNG market, 90 per cent winter gas storage levels will be much harder to achieve. 

NATO’s resurgence

Alice Billon-Galland, Research Fellow, Europe Programme, Chatham House and one of 14 NATO Young Leaders

In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO adopted a new strategic concept. Member states will reinforce NATO battlegroups and bolster higher readiness forces from 40,000 troops to more than 300,000, while striving to avoid escalation with Russia. Turkey’s attempts to block Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership will preoccupy Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary-General, until he leaves his post next autumn.

Expect arguments on defence spending in the run-up to the July summit in Vilnius. Although only nine of its 30 members are expected to meet the 2 per cent spending target, the debate is moving towards 3 per cent, in part to reduce dependency on American assets and hedge against the uncertainty of the 2024 US presidential election. Infrastructure vulnerabilities, such as the Nord Stream pipeline sabotage in the Baltic, will also be a focus. Otherwise, NATO ’s eyes will be on China: from its relations with Russia to the threat of cyberattacks.

Universal health reforms

Robert Yates, Executive Director, Centre for Universal Health, Chatham House

In response to the perma-crisis experienced by many populations this past year, some leaders are launching or extending universal health reforms. New left-wing leaders in Chile, Colombia and Brazil have promised to rebuild their publicly financed universal health systems. In Brazil, newly elected president Lula da Silva has pledged to increase public health spending and improve access to medicines. It is hoped Malaysia’s new coalition will carry forward its predecessor’s pledge to raise health spending to 5 per cent of GDP by 2027 to provide a universal package of free health services.

In September, world leaders will discuss universal health coverage at the UN General Assembly. There, Chatham House will publish its Commission for Universal Health report, identifying countries in which crises may trigger new national health programmes. Might this be when a US presidential candidate announces a platform to create a publicly financed health system?

Weapons of mass destruction

Patricia Lewis, Director of the International Security Programme, Chatham House

Since its illegal invasion of Ukraine, Russia has attacked civil nuclear power stations, falsely accused Ukraine of possessing bioweapons and radiological bombs, and threatened to use nuclear weapons. In contrast, NATO has instead demonstrated that deterrence can be highly effective with conventional weaponry. In the coming year, the Kremlin’s nuclear brinkmanship will still be a focus. Washington will try to restart bilateral nuclear negotiations with Moscow and similarly try to engage Beijing.

Following the failure of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference to reach consensus in August, the next review cycle will start by looking at strengthening the process. Iran’s nuclear capabilities remain a concern, and North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme is a growing threat. So, we are left with a question: will 2023 be the year of  nuclear conflict or the year when states get busy again on non-proliferation and disarmament?  

Africa’s mounting debt

Joseph Asunka, Chief Executive Officer, Afrobarometer

Inflation is at historic highs in several African economies. Meanwhile, many African countries including Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Democratic Republic of Congo will hold  elections in 2023, driving up public spending, increasing inflationary pressures and exacerbating poverty. According to Afrobarometer data, the proportion of Africans experiencing high levels of poverty has increased from 19 per cent in 2014/2015 to  26 per cent in 2021/2022.

Worse still, many of those countries holding elections are either, like Zimbabwe, in debt distress – that is unable to honour their obligations to creditors – or at high risk of debt distress, like Nigeria. This makes the elections in Zimbabwe and Nigeria critical. The expiration of the World Bank/IMF-backed debt service suspension initiative in 2021 has only amplified this risk. What are viable policy options to tackle this dire economic predicament? A debt service moratorium, debt cancellation and serious attention to fiscal discipline.

Feminist foreign policy

Daniela Philipson García, Co-founder of Internacional Feminista, and a PhD candidate, Monash University

Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) is under threat. The war in Ukraine led to strengthened military budgets and alliances at odds with FFP’s human security and peace-centred approaches. Sweden’s new right-wing government reversed its FFP. In Mexico, the first Global South country to adopt an FFP, Congress has voted to expand the military’s role to curb cartel-related violence, in contradiction of its FFP. The second anniversary of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan will be a moment to assess how foreign policy, diplomacy and women’s and girls’ rights have been affected globally. 

There is hope. Germany, whose coalition government adopted an FFP in 2021, is to publish more guidelines in the spring. The governments of Colombia and Chile have announced their own FFPs. Colombia’s first National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, to be announced at the UN General Assembly in September, is expected to set a standard for a region submerged in violence. 

Russian imperial mindset must change for real victory Expert comment NCapeling 8 December 2022

The attitude of Russia’s elite – and wider population – to the states which used to constitute the USSR needs to change in order to solve the Russia challenge.

Although the reverberations of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine clearly stretch around the globe, the strongest shocks are – and will continue to be – felt by those countries Moscow used to directly rule.

These countries struggle to shrug off a Soviet legacy as, to varying degrees – linguistically, technologically, culturally, and politically – they bear psychological and physical scars of Russia’s colonial past and its present mentality.

It does not help that these countries lack an appropriate collective descriptor. Over the years there has been ‘Newly Independent States’ – hardly appropriate after 31 years – the now-defunct ‘Commonwealth of Independent States’, the ‘post-Soviet space’ and ‘Former Soviet Union’ which both reference the past, and simply ‘Eurasia’ which is hardly appropriate for either Ukraine or Turkmenistan.

Some of these former ‘colonies’ are as badly governed and as sinister – albeit not as lethal beyond their borders – as Russia itself. Others, most notably the Baltic states, are modern, liberal, affluent societies, but Moscow’s shadow still looms.

There is a strong mindset in most of Russia’s citizens that, because that it used to rule these other countries, it either still has privileged rights over them or they are not real countries at all – but instead historical aberrations to be extinguished.

What is past is gone

As historian Timothy Snyder has noted, whatever the wrongs of Putin’s ‘history-based’ assertions about the ‘return of historic lands’, all historical claims are bunkum anyway. If the past brings validity, almost no land border on earth would be beyond dispute. It is agreements which count, and Russia signed away the other successor states in 1991.

The Russia and Eurasia programme at Chatham House has, for the last 31 years, always taken as a starting position that these countries are as sovereign as any other. This of course this means they can choose to be in Russia’s embrace if they wish. But none do because Russia is insufficiently attractive. Some have better relationships with Moscow than others – mainly the more autocratic ones – but no former slave goes back to their master willingly.

At the recent Chatham House conference Russia’s war: How will it shape the region’s future? (note the avoidance of a specific descriptor), the overwhelming consensus was that Russia must lose, that Ukraine must be reconstructed and planning for that must start now, and that the regional economy is convulsing.

But another key view was that, in Russia, rent seeking and buying loyalty are likely to lead to the separation of the Russian people and the regime, especially as the population ages and young men being sent to die at the front. Putin may still be popular in some places in Russia, but not in others – although popularity can rise and fall fast in Russia. However, few at the conference foresaw the disintegration of Russia any time soon.

With continued skill, determination, and more weaponry, Ukraine may well vanquish Russia on the battlefield, and this remains a necessary pre-requisite for European security. But even a Ukraine victory will not erase malign intent.

The Russian imperial itch is so deeply embedded, it must be excised not just from Russian capability but from the intention and mindset of elites and in the popular imagination. That is hard to achieve when so many believe in it as fervently as a religion – even the Russian Orthodox Church invokes a messianism in Russia’s imperial ‘rights’.

The wider region is suffering

Getting Russians to look upon their neighbours as equals requires widescale self-reassessment in a post-Putin Russia. But, for now, the wider region will surely be looking to simply neuter Russia’s destructive capacities.

Culture notes: Will the EU find its voice at last? The World Today mhiggins.drupal 30 January 2023

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has galvanized the bloc, but doubt remains about how it can capitalize on this moment, writes Catherine Fieschi.

Despite its reticence to believe that Russia would attack Ukraine, once Vladimir Putin’s tanks rolled across the Donbas, the European Union finally grasped the momentous nature of the events unfolding on its eastern flank. The immediate reaction of Europe’s member states was one of unity, resolve and uncharacteristically rapid decision-making, at least on sanctions and energy policy.

That they would need to act in concert across a concatenation of crises that would be either triggered (energy), worsened (inflation) or heightened (geopolitical instability) by Putin’s move was obvious. And so, Europe’s collective narrative of this past year slid into place, and it goes something like this: We gave Russia the benefit of every doubt, including after their invasion of Crimea when we still tried to bring them back to the negotiating table, but Putin has made the fundamental choice of turning away from democracy and the rule of law.

Now, the narrative goes on, we have to treat them as enemies and give ourselves the means to become resilient in the face of aggression as Ukraine is all that stands – both symbolically and geographically – between us and the chaos of a Europe-wide war.

Like any good narrative, it is anchored in previous trials and exploits. Having learnt from its failure to coordinate action during the eurozone crisis and then the migration crisis, Europe was keen to make the most of its resilience in the face of the Covid pandemic in the form of the joint vaccine purchases and a massive recovery plan.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is an added – albeit dramatic and costly – opportunity to pursue further collective action and discover the next chapter of its shared purpose, as a political and perhaps even a defence alliance.

Europe had long been in need of an arc to follow. In the aftermath of the Second World War, peace and prosperity seemed enough. But the new multipolar world that emerged from the ashes of the Cold War and then 9/11 were more difficult to navigate for a largely commercial and regulatory alliance.

Could the EU, then, ever find its political voice?

David vs Goliath

While Brexit and Covid created rallying points, the shock and tragedy of the invasion delivered everything the EU needed in narrative terms: a David and Goliath story, with the opportunity to feature on Team David in European terms while allying with the United States, and a ‘band of brothers’ element to shore up a union bruised by the defection of a key but troubled member. Above all, the appearance of an arch-villain in the form of Vladimir Putin put Europe back into the familiar and mythical territory of the 1940s and then the Cold War.

When on May 28, 2016, Putin seated himself on the throne of the Byzantine emperors in Mount Athos’ Protaton Church in Greece in a scene truly worthy of Game of Thrones, the writing should have been on the wall. That day he explicitly laid out his aim to appoint himself as the new Eastern emperor who would fight the decadence of the West.

‘Today,’ Putin told the world, ‘we restore the values of patriotism, historical memory and traditional culture.’ Later, he cited Ukraine as the biggest unfinished mission of his years in power. That Europe – and Germany in particular – had taken so long to decipher Putin’s dark designs only adds to the narrative’s epic quality, positioning Europe as a victim of its own good faith and open heart.

Cracks in the narrative

But the narrative is not free from cracks. The Baltic states would argue that they had long warned of Putin’s nefarious intentions; and Poland has always been convinced of the threat posed by its neighbour.

In conversation with Edi Rama, prime minister of Albania 23 March 2023 — 5:30PM TO 6:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

From migration to Russia and China, how is Albania responding to the geopolitical challenges of today?

In late 2022, the UK government made a pointed remark that many of the illegal migrants attempting to get into the country were from Albania. In response, Albania prime minister Edi Rama replied that targeting Albanians as the cause of Britain’s crime and border problems ‘makes for easy rhetoric but ignores hard fact’. 

This nuanced response demonstrated the challenges and complexities that Albania faces, the same as many other countries. As well as being embroiled in the major challenge of international migration, Albania has suffered from a serious cyber-attack in July 2022 from Iran. Government networks were compromised for a month with Tirana removing the Iranian embassy in the capital.

Then there is the ongoing threat from Russia and China. Nestled in the already volatile Balkans, Albania has been at the heart of international affairs in recent months.

Prime Minister Rama speaks at Chatham House to discuss:

• How is Albania responding to Russian aggression and what is its stance on Ukraine?
• Where does Tirana believe China poses the most serious threat?
• How can countries in Europe best respond to illegal migration and better control the flow of people?
• How is the region of the Western Balkans effected by the war in Ukraine and how can it contribute to the security challenges posed by the war?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

How Russia’s war affects politics in southeast Europe 4 April 2023 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 24 March 2023 Online

This event will discuss how the war on Ukraine has affected southeastern Europe.

This event will discuss how the war on Ukraine has affected southeastern Europe. How have the governments and publics responded to the war?

The panel will discuss Russia’s goals and leverage in the region, including the impact of its disinformation campaigns. Are the governments reassessing their foreign policy options?

The granting of EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova has brought attention to the stalled accession process in the Western Balkans. What lessons from the Western Balkans can be applied in Ukraine and Moldova? Have new linkages emerged between the two regions?

Review: Rediscovering Milan Kundera’s European tragedy The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 March 2023

The Czech writer’s 40-year-old essay on the roots of Russia’s empire-building, ‘A Kidnapped West’, reads all too presciently, writes Stefan Auer.

A Kidnapped West: The Tragedy of Central Europe
Milan Kundera, Faber, £10

‘In November 1956, the director of the Hungarian News Agency, shortly before his office was flattened by artillery fire, sent a telex to the entire world with a desperate message announcing that the Russian attack against Budapest had begun. The dispatch ended with these words: “We are going to die for Hungary and for Europe.”’ Thus, Milan Kundera began his 1983 essay for the French journal Le Débat, reflecting on the 1956 Hungarian Uprising.

A seminal essay

The Czech author might well have written a near-identical passage about the fraught hours immediately after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In the event, Russian tanks failed to occupy Kyiv, unlike Budapest in 1956. Nevertheless, Faber has chosen this moment, 40 years later, to republish Kundera’s seminal essay on Europe and Russian aggression in its original translation for the New York Review of Books by Edmund White. How salient are its observations today?

The essay’s original French title, ‘Un Occident kidnappé ou la tragédie de l’Europe centrale’ (The Kidnapped West, or the Tragedy of Central Europe), described the fate of Hungary, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and, to an extent, Poland in 1980-81 at the hands of the Soviet Union. Owing to the Cold War division of Europe, the countries of Central Europe were denied their true destiny, Kundera thought, to be an integral part of the liberal, democratic West. Kundera himself fled Czechoslovakia for France in 1975.

The author of The Unbearable Lightness of Being might no longer be as well-known as he was at the height of his fame in the 1980s, but his novels and essays still deserve attention. So, it is pleasing to see Kundera’s masterpiece republished, even as it is awful to witness the enduring relevance of the questions it raises.

What did the Hungarian journalist mean when he declared his willingness to die for Europe, Kundera asked? That ‘Russians, in attacking Hungary, were attacking Europe itself. He was ready to die so that Hungary might remain Hungary and European’. The journalist did indeed die in the uprising.

It is a line that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his supporters abroad have echoed time and again: that Ukrainian soldiers are not just dying for their country, they are dying for Europe at large.

The ‘tragedy’ in Kundera’s essay was that the West didn’t care. ‘Europe hasn’t noticed the disappearance of its cultural home,’ Kundera wrote, ‘because Europe no longer perceives its unity as a cultural unity.’

In other words, as the cultural sphere in Central Europe continued to defy the political restrictions imposed by the Soviet empire, it embodied the western values of freedom and democracy more than the West itself did. The extent to which this analysis remains relevant today will prove decisive for Europe’s future.

As timely as ever

Kundera’s essay is as timely as ever but in ways that both vindicate and challenge his key arguments. His suspicion of Russia has been validated. His frustration about the indifference of the West less so. But the true tragedy of Ukraine would be if the West has not changed sufficiently. So far, the West appears to be doing enough to enable Ukraine to defend itself, but not enough to defeat the aggressor.

Faber has made an excellent decision in combining The Tragedy of Central Europe with a lesser-known text by Kundera: his 1967 speech to the Czech Writers’ Congress given the year before the ill-fated Prague Spring. In it, Kundera addressed what was to become a lifelong preoccupation: the fate of small nations. ‘For Czechs’, Kundera wrote, ‘nothing has ever constituted an indisputable possession – neither their language nor their belonging to Europe.’

Rather than reflecting the size of its territory or population, a small nation ‘is one whose very existence can be put in question at any moment; a small nation can disappear, and it knows it.’ In this way Ukraine, Europe’s largest country, apart from Russia, is fighting to avoid the fate of Kundera’s ‘small nation’.

Historically, the ‘small’ nations of Central Europe were threatened by both Germany and Russia. But after the Second World War, the threat was from the Soviet Union, which for Kundera was indistinguishable from Russia (tacitly including Ukraine). In its expansiveness, Russia was the opposite of Central Europe. While the latter was based on the principle of ‘the greatest variety within the smallest space’, the former represented ‘the smallest variety within the greatest space’.

In this sense, authoritarian communism was the fulfilment of Russian history, Kundera argued, writing that ‘Russian communism vigorously reawakened Russia’s old anti-western obsessions and turned it brutally against Europe’. Vladimir Putin’s Russia appears to build on these same pernicious impulses.

Kundera was widely criticized for observations in his essay that smack of civilizational racism (including by me) describing Russians as fundamentally different from us: ‘Russia knows another (greater) dimension of disaster, another image of space (a space so immense that entire nations are swallowed up in it), another sense of time (slow and patient), another way of laughing, living, and dying’.

Independent Thinking: Sweden, Finland, and NATO Audio NCapeling 31 March 2023

Episode 21 of our weekly podcast examines the latest developments relating to Sweden and Finland’s proposed accession to NATO.

The Hungarian parliament has finally ratified Finland’s membership to the NATO alliance, two weeks after President Erdogan in Turkey gave his seal of approval following a meeting with the Finnish president.

Sweden however remains trapped in limbo, with both Turkey and Hungary delaying Stockholm’s membership and Erdogan in particular asking for more concessions.

The panel discusses why Turkey and Hungary took issue with Sweden and Finland, what the strategic situation in the Baltic looks like now with only Finland joining NATO, and the challenges facing Sweden amid its fraught ties with President Erdogan.

We also look ahead to Turkey’s presidential election in May as recent opinion polls point to a neck-and-neck race, with some polls even showing President Erdogan falling behind the opposition. The panel examines what the sentiment is like in Turkey ahead of the election, and how the world would respond if there was a change in power in Ankara for the first time in 20 years.

Joining Bronwen Maddox on the podcast this week is Henri Vanhanen, research fellow with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, and Galip Dalay, associate fellow with our Middle East and North Africa programme.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Virtual breakfast: The state of the EU in 2023 3 May 2023 — 8:30AM TO 9:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 5 April 2023 Online

In this breakfast discussion, we will explore the current state of play in the EU with one the most prominent experts on European politics.

While the European Union has come together in its response to the invasion of Ukraine, significant divisions remain on other issues. East-West tensions remain high and troublesome German-French relations are hampering the bloc’s traditional engine of integration.
 
Furthermore, the EU is pushing through legislation at breakneck speed, including in its attempts to kickstart green industrial policy with its responses to the American Inflation Reduction Act. At the same time, the main players within the EU continue to disagree on what the bloc’s fiscal rules should look like.

• What are the implications of the recent wave of protests in France against President Macron’s pension reforms?
• What is the outlook of EU-UK relations following the successful completion of the Windsor Framework?
• Where are the fiscal rules likely to land and when will they be back in place?
• Are we seeing the emergence of a new Central and Eastern European power bloc within the EU?

In short, despite having avoided an energy crisis over the winter, the EU continues to face significant challenges. In this breakfast event, we will explore the current state of play in the EU with one of the most prominent experts on European politics.

Methods to shorten [¹⁸F]FDG Patlak PET imaging procedures ranging from 65–90 to 20–30 min after injection, using a population-averaged input function (PIF) scaled to patient-specific image-derived input function (IDIF) values, were recently evaluated. The aim of the present study was to explore the feasibility of ultrashort 10-min [¹⁸F]FDG Patlak imaging at 55–65 min after injection using a PIF combined with direct Patlak reconstructions to provide reliable quantitative accuracy of lung tumor uptake, compared with a full-duration 65-min acquisition using an IDIF. Methods: Patients underwent a 65-min dynamic PET acquisition on a long-axial-field-of-view (LAFOV) Biograph Vision Quadra PET/CT scanner. Subsequently, direct Patlak reconstructions and image-based (with reconstructed dynamic images) Patlak analyses were performed using both the IDIF (time to relative kinetic equilibrium between blood and tissue concentration (t*) = 30 min) and a scaled PIF at 30–60 min after injection. Next, direct Patlak reconstructions were performed on the system console using only the last 10 min of the acquisition, that is, from 55 to 65 min after injection, and a scaled PIF using maximum crystal ring difference settings of both 85 and 322. Tumor lesion and healthy-tissue uptake was quantified and compared between the differently obtained parametric images to assess quantitative accuracy. Results: Good agreement was obtained between direct- and image-based Patlak analyses using the IDIF (t* = 30 min) and scaled PIF at 30–60 min after injection, performed using the different approaches, with no more than 8.8% deviation in tumor influx rate value (K_i) (mean difference ranging from –0.0022 to 0.0018 mL/[min x g]). When direct Patlak reconstruction was performed on the system console, excellent agreement was found between the use of a scaled PIF at 30–60 min after injection versus 55–65 min after injection, with 2.4% deviation in tumor K_i (median difference, –0.0018 mL/[min x g]; range, –0.0047 to 0.0036 mL/[min x g]). For different maximum crystal ring difference settings using the scan time interval of 55–65 min after injection, only a 0.5% difference (median difference, 0.0000 mL/[min x g]; range, –0.0004 to 0.0013 mL/[min x g]) in tumor K_i was found. Conclusion: Ultrashort whole-body [¹⁸F]FDG Patlak imaging is feasible on an LAFOV Biograph Vision Quadra PET/CT system without loss of quantitative accuracy to assess lung tumor uptake compared with a full-duration 65-min acquisition. The ultrashort 10-min direct Patlak reconstruction with PIF allows for its implementation in clinical practice.

Quantification of ¹⁸F-FDG PET images is useful for accurate diagnosis and evaluation of various brain diseases, including brain tumors, epilepsy, dementia, and Parkinson disease. However, accurate quantification of ¹⁸F-FDG PET images requires matched 3-dimensional T₁ MRI scans of the same individuals to provide detailed information on brain anatomy. In this paper, we propose a transfer learning approach to adapt a pretrained deep neural network model from amyloid PET to spatially normalize ¹⁸F-FDG PET images without the need for 3-dimensional MRI. Methods: The proposed method is based on a deep learning model for automatic spatial normalization of ¹⁸F-FDG brain PET images, which was developed by fine-tuning a pretrained model for amyloid PET using only 103 ¹⁸F-FDG PET and MR images. After training, the algorithm was tested on 65 internal and 78 external test sets. All T₁ MR images with a 1-mm isotropic voxel size were processed with FreeSurfer software to provide cortical segmentation maps used to extract a ground-truth regional SUV ratio using cerebellar gray matter as a reference region. These values were compared with those from spatial normalization-based quantification methods using the proposed method and statistical parametric mapping software. Results: The proposed method showed superior spatial normalization compared with statistical parametric mapping, as evidenced by increased normalized mutual information and better size and shape matching in PET images. Quantitative evaluation revealed a consistently higher SUV ratio correlation and intraclass correlation coefficients for the proposed method across various brain regions in both internal and external datasets. The remarkably good correlation and intraclass correlation coefficient values of the proposed method for the external dataset are noteworthy, considering the dataset’s different ethnic distribution and the use of different PET scanners and image reconstruction algorithms. Conclusion: This study successfully applied transfer learning to a deep neural network for ¹⁸F-FDG PET spatial normalization, demonstrating its resource efficiency and improved performance. This highlights the efficacy of transfer learning, which requires a smaller number of datasets than does the original network training, thus increasing the potential for broader use of deep learning–based brain PET spatial normalization techniques for various clinical and research radiotracers.

C-X-C motif chemokine receptor 4 (CXCR4)–directed imaging has gained clinical interest in aiding clinical diagnostics in primary aldosteronism (PA). We retrospectively evaluated the feasibility of CXCR4-directed scintigraphy using the novel CXCR-4 ligand [^99mTc]Tc-pentixatec in patients with PA. Methods: Six patients (mean age ± SD, 49 ± 15 y) underwent CXCR4-directed scintigraphy (including planar imaging and SPECT/CT) 30, 120, and 240 min after injection of 435 ± 50 MBq of [^99mTc]Tc-pentixatec. Adrenal CXCR4 expression was analyzed by calculating lesion-to-contralateral ratios (LCRs). Imaging results were correlated to clinical information. Histopathology and clinical follow-up served as the standard of reference. Results: Three subjects showed lateralization of adrenal tracer accumulation, with a mean maximum lesion-to-contralateral ratio of 1.65 (range, 1.52–1.70), which correlated with morphologic findings on CT. One individual underwent adrenalectomy and presented with complete biochemical and clinical remission at follow-up. Histopathologic workup confirmed unilateral aldosterone-producing adenoma. Conclusion: [^99mTc]Tc-pentixatec scintigraphy with SPECT in patients with PA is feasible and might offer a valuable alternative to CXCR4-directed imaging with [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-pentixafor PET.

The peptide hormone ghrelin is produced in cardiomyocytes and acts through the myocardial growth hormone secretagogue receptor (GHSR) to promote cardiomyocyte survival. Administration of ghrelin may have therapeutic effects on post–myocardial infarction (MI) outcomes. Therefore, there is a need to develop molecular imaging probes that can track the dynamics of GHSR in health and disease to better predict the effectiveness of ghrelin-based therapeutics. We designed a high-affinity GHSR ligand labeled with ¹⁸F for imaging by PET and characterized its in vivo properties in a canine model of MI. Methods: We rationally designed and radiolabeled with ¹⁸F a quinazolinone derivative ([¹⁸F]LCE470) with subnanomolar binding affinity to GHSR. We determined the sensitivity and in vivo and ex vivo specificity of [¹⁸F]LCE470 in a canine model of surgically induced MI using PET/MRI, which allowed for anatomic localization of tracer uptake and simultaneous determination of global cardiac function. Uptake of [¹⁸F]LCE470 was determined by time–activity curve and SUV analysis in 3 regions of the left ventricle—area of infarct, territory served by the left circumflex coronary artery, and remote myocardium—over a period of 1.5 y. Changes in cardiac perfusion were tracked by [¹³N]NH₃ PET. Results: The receptor binding affinity of LCE470 was measured at 0.33 nM, the highest known receptor binding affinity for a radiolabeled GHSR ligand. In vivo blocking studies in healthy hounds and ex vivo blocking studies in myocardial tissue showed the specificity of [¹⁸F]LCE470, and sensitivity was demonstrated by a positive correlation between tracer uptake and GHSR abundance. Post-MI changes in [¹⁸F]LCE470 uptake occurred independently of perfusion tracer distributions and changes in global cardiac function. We found that the regional distribution of [¹⁸F]LCE470 within the left ventricle diverged significantly within 1 d after MI and remained that way throughout the 1.5-y duration of the study. Conclusion: [¹⁸F]LCE470 is a high-affinity PET tracer that can detect changes in the regional distribution of myocardial GHSR after MI. In vivo PET molecular imaging of the global dynamics of GHSR may lead to improved GHSR-based therapeutics in the treatment of post-MI remodeling.

Mutations of p53 protein occur in over half of all cancers, with profound effects on tumor biology. We present the first—to our knowledge—method for noninvasive visualization of p53 in tumor tissue in vivo, using SPECT, in 3 different models of cancer. Methods: Anti-p53 monoclonal antibodies were conjugated to the cell-penetrating transactivator of transcription (TAT) peptide and a metal ion chelator and then radiolabeled with ¹¹¹In to allow SPECT imaging. ¹¹¹In-anti-p53-TAT conjugates were retained longer in cells overexpressing p53-specific than non–p53-specific ¹¹¹In-mIgG (mouse IgG from murine plasma)-TAT controls, but not in null p53 cells. Results: In vivo SPECT imaging showed enhanced uptake of ¹¹¹In-anti-p53-TAT, versus ¹¹¹In-mIgG-TAT, in high-expression p53^R175H and medium-expression wild-type p53 but not in null p53 tumor xenografts. The results were confirmed in mice bearing genetically engineered KPC mouse–derived pancreatic ductal adenocarcinoma tumors. Imaging with ¹¹¹In-anti-p53-TAT was possible in KPC mice bearing spontaneous p53^R172H pancreatic ductal adenocarcinoma tumors. Conclusion: We demonstrate the feasibility of noninvasive in vivo molecular imaging of p53 in tumor tissue using a radiolabeled TAT-modified monoclonal antibody.

Preclinical data have shown that ¹⁶¹Tb-labeled peptides targeting the somatostatin receptor are therapeutically more effective for peptide receptor radionuclide therapy than are their ¹⁷⁷Lu-labeled counterparts. To further substantiate this enhanced therapeutic effect, we performed cellular dosimetry to quantify the absorbed dose to the cell nucleus and compared dose–response curves to evaluate differences in relative biological effectiveness in vitro. Methods: CA20948 cell survival was assessed after treatment with [¹⁶¹Tb]Tb- and [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTATATE (agonist) and with [¹⁶¹Tb]Tb- and [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-LM3 (antagonist) via a clonogenic assay. Cell binding, internalization, and dissociation assays were performed up to 7 d to acquire time-integrated activity coefficients. Separate S values for each type of particle emission (Auger/internal conversion [IC] electrons and β^– particles) were computed via Monte Carlo simulations, while considering spheric cells. Once the absorbed dose to the cell nucleus was calculated, survival curves were fitted to the appropriate linear or linear-quadratic model and corresponding relative biological effectiveness was evaluated. Results: Although the radiopeptide uptake was independent of the radionuclide, [¹⁶¹Tb]Tb-DOTATATE and [¹⁶¹Tb]Tb-DOTA-LM3 delivered a 3.6 and 3.8 times higher dose to the nucleus, respectively, than their ¹⁷⁷Lu-labeled counterparts on saturated receptor binding. This increased nucleus-absorbed dose was mainly due to the additional emission of IC and not Auger electrons by ¹⁶¹Tb. When activity concentrations were considered, both [¹⁶¹Tb]Tb-DOTATATE and [¹⁶¹Tb]Tb-DOTA-LM3 showed a lower survival fraction than did labeling with ¹⁷⁷Lu. When the absorbed dose to the nucleus was considered, no significant difference could be observed between the dose–response curves for [¹⁶¹Tb]Tb- and [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTATATE. [¹⁶¹Tb]Tb-DOTA-LM3 showed a linear-quadratic dose response, whereas [¹⁶¹Tb]Tb-DOTATATE showed only a linear dose response within the observed dose range, suggesting additional cell membrane damage by Auger electrons. Conclusion: The IC, rather than Auger, electrons emitted by ¹⁶¹Tb resulted in a higher absorbed dose to the cell nucleus and lower clonogenic survival for [¹⁶¹Tb]Tb-DOTATATE and [¹⁶¹Tb]Tb-DOTA-LM3 than for the ¹⁷⁷Lu-labeled analogs. In contrast, [¹⁶¹Tb]Tb-DOTATATE showed no higher dose response than [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTATATE, whereas for [¹⁶¹Tb]Tb-DOTA-LM3 an additional quadratic response was observed. Because of this quadratic response, potentially caused by cell membrane damage, [¹⁶¹Tb]Tb-DOTA-LM3 is a more effective radiopeptide than [¹⁶¹Tb]Tb-DOTATATE for labeling with ¹⁶¹Tb.

Radiolabeled small-molecule DOTA-haptens can be combined with antitumor/anti-DOTA bispecific antibodies (BsAbs) for pretargeted radioimmunotherapy (PRIT). For optimized delivery of the theranostic - and β-emitting isotope ¹⁷⁷Lu with DOTA-based PRIT (DOTA-PRIT), bivalent Gemini (DOTA-Bn-thiourea-PEG4-thiourea-Bn-DOTA, aka (3,6,9,12-tetraoxatetradecane-1,14-diyl)bis(DOTA-benzyl thiourea)) was developed. Methods: Gemini was synthesized by linking 2 S-2-(4-isothiocyanatobenzyl)-DOTA molecules together via a 1,14-diamino-PEG4 linker. [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini was prepared with no-carrier-added ¹⁷⁷LuCl₃ to a molar-specific activity of 123 GBq/μmol and radiochemical purity of more than 99%. The specificity of BsAb-¹⁷⁷Lu-Gemini was verified in vitro. Subsequently, we evaluated biodistribution and whole-body clearance for [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini and, for comparison, our gold-standard monovalent [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-S-2-(4-aminobenzyl)-DOTA ([¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-Bn) in naïve (tumor-free) athymic nude mice. For our proof-of-concept system, a 3-step pretargeting approach was performed with an established DOTA-PRIT regimen (anti-GPA33/anti-DOTA IgG-scFv BsAb, a clearing agent, and [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini) in mouse models. Results: Initial in vivo studies showed that [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini behaved similarly to [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-Bn, with almost identical blood and whole-body clearance kinetics, as well as biodistribution and mouse kidney dosimetry. Pretargeting [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini to GPA33-expressing SW1222 human colorectal xenografts was highly effective, leading to absorbed doses of [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini for blood, tumor, liver, spleen, and kidneys of 3.99, 455, 6.93, 5.36, and 14.0 cGy/MBq, respectively. Tumor–to–normal tissue absorbed-dose ratios (i.e., therapeutic indices [TIs]) for the blood and kidneys were 114 and 33, respectively. In addition, we demonstrate that the use of bivalent [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini in DOTA-PRIT leads to improved TIs and augmented [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini tumor uptake and retention in comparison to monovalent [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-Bn. Finally, we established efficacy in SW1222 tumor-bearing mice, demonstrating that a single injection of anti-GPA33 DOTA-PRIT with 44 MBq (1.2 mCi) of [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini (estimated tumor-absorbed dose, 200 Gy) induced complete responses in 5 of 5 animals and a histologic cure in 2 of 5 (40%) animals. Moreover, a significant increase in survival compared with nontreated controls was noted (maximum tolerated dose not reached). Conclusion: We have developed a bivalent DOTA-radiohapten, [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini, that showed improved radiopharmacology for DOTA-PRIT application. The use of bivalent [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-Gemini in DOTA-PRIT, as opposed to monovalent [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-Bn, allows curative treatments with considerably less administered ¹⁷⁷Lu activity while still achieving high TIs for both the blood (>100) and the kidneys (>30).

Fibroblast activation protein (FAP) is abundantly expressed in the stroma of most human solid tumors. Clinical-stage radiolabeled FAP ligands are increasingly used as tools for the detection of various cancer lesions. To unleash the full therapeutic potential of FAP-targeting agents, ligands need to remain at the tumor site for several days after administration. We recently described the discovery of OncoFAP, a high-affinity small organic ligand of FAP with a rapid accumulation in tumors and low uptake in healthy tissues in cancer patients. Trimerization of OncoFAP provided a derivative (named TriOncoFAP, or OncoFAP-23) with improved FAP affinity. In this work, we evaluated the tissue biodistribution profile and the therapeutic performance of OncoFAP-23 in tumor-bearing mice. Methods: OncoFAP-23 was radiolabeled with the theranostic radionuclide ¹⁷⁷Lu. Preclinical experiments were conducted on mice bearing SK-RC-52.hFAP (BALB/c nude mice) or CT-26.hFAP (BALB/c mice) tumors. ¹⁷⁷Lu-OncoFAP and ¹⁷⁷Lu-FAP-2286 were included in the biodistribution study as controls. Toxicologic evaluation was performed on Wistar rats and CD1 mice by injecting high doses of OncoFAP-23 or its cold-labeled counterpart, respectively. Results: ¹⁷⁷Lu-OncoFAP-23 emerged for its best-in-class biodistribution profile, high and prolonged tumor uptake (i.e., ~16 percentage injected dose/g at 96 h), and low accumulation in healthy organs, which correlates well with its potent single-agent anticancer activity at low levels of administered radioactivity. Combination treatment with the tumor-targeted interleukin 2 (L19-IL2, a clinical-stage immunocytokine) further expands the therapeutic window of ¹⁷⁷Lu-OncoFAP-23 by potentiating its in vivo antitumor activity. Proteomics studies revealed a potent tumor-directed immune response on treatment with the combination. OncoFAP-23 and ^natLu-OncoFAP-23 exhibited a favorable toxicologic profile, without showing any side effects or signs of toxicity. Conclusion: OncoFAP-23 presents enhanced tumor uptake and tumor retention and low accumulation in healthy organs, findings that correspond to a strongly improved in vivo antitumor efficacy. The data presented in this work support the clinical development of ¹⁷⁷Lu-OncoFAP-23 for the treatment of FAP-positive solid tumors.

To date, the imaging and diagnosis of hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC) rely on CT/MRI, which have well-known limitations. Glypican-3 (GPC3) is a cell surface receptor highly expressed by HCC but not by normal or cirrhotic liver tissue. Here we report initial clinical results of GPC3-targeted PET imaging with [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-DOTA-RYZ-GPC3 (RAYZ-8009), a peptide-based GPC3 ligand in patients with known or suspected HCC. Methods: [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-RAYZ-8009 was obtained after labeling the peptide precursor with ⁶⁸Ga from a ⁶⁸Ge/⁶⁸Ga generator and heating at 90°C for 10 min followed by sterile filtration. After administration of [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-RAYZ-8009, a dynamic or static PET/CT scan was acquired between 45 min and 4 h after administration. Radiotracer uptake was measured by SUVs for the following tissues: suspected or actual HCC or hepatoblastoma lesions, non–tumor-bearing liver, renal cortex, blood pool in the left ventricle, and gastric fundus. Additionally, tumor–to–healthy-liver ratios (TLRs) were calculated. Results: Twenty-four patients (5 patients in the dynamic protocol; 19 patients in the static protocol) were scanned. No adverse events occurred. Two patients had no lesion detected and did not have HCC during follow-up. In total, 50 lesions were detected and analyzed. The mean SUV_max of these lesions was 19.6 (range, 2.7–95.3), and the mean SUV_mean was 10.1 (range, 1.0–49.2) at approximately 60 min after administration. Uptake in non–tumor-bearing liver and blood pool rapidly decreased over time and became negligible 45 min after administration (mean SUV_mean, <1.6), with a continuous decline to 4 h after administration (mean SUV_mean, 1.0). The opposite was observed for HCC lesions, for which SUVs and TLRs continuously increased for up to 4 h after administration. In individual lesion analysis, TLR was the highest between 60 and 120 min after administration. Uptake in the gastric fundus gradually increased for up to 45 min (to an SUV_max of 31.3) and decreased gradually afterward. Conclusion: [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-RAYZ-8009 is safe and allows for high-contrast imaging of GPC3-positive HCC, with rapid clearance from most normal organs. Thereby, [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-RAYZ-8009 is promising for HCC diagnosis and staging. Further research is warranted.

Our purpose was to prospectively assess the distribution of NETPET scores in well-differentiated (WD) grade 2 and 3 gastroenteropancreatic (GEP) neuroendocrine tumors (NETs) and to determine the impact of the NETPET score on clinical management. Methods: This single-arm, institutional ethics review board–approved prospective study included 40 patients with histologically proven WD GEP NETs. ⁶⁸Ga-DOTATATE PET and ¹⁸F-FDG PET were performed within 21 d of each other. NETPET scores were evaluated qualitatively by 2 reviewers, with up to 10 marker lesions selected for each patient. The quantitative parameters that were evaluated included marker lesion SUV_max for each tracer; ¹⁸F-FDG/⁶⁸Ga-DOTATATE SUV_max ratios; functional tumor volume (FTV) and metabolic tumor volume (MTV) on ⁶⁸Ga-DOTATATE and ¹⁸F-FDG PET, respectively; and FTV/MTV ratios. The treatment plan before and after ¹⁸F-FDG PET was recorded. Results: There were 22 men and 18 women (mean age, 60.8 y) with grade 2 (n = 24) or grade 3 (n = 16) tumors and a mean Ki-67 index of 16.1%. NETPET scores of P0, P1, P2A, P2B, P3B, P4B, and P5 were documented in 2 (5%), 5 (12.5%), 5 (12.5%) 20 (50%), 2 (5%), 4 (10%), and 2 (5%) patients, respectively. No association was found between the SUV_max of target lesions on ⁶⁸Ga-DOTATATE and the SUV_max of target lesions on ¹⁸F-FDG PET (P = 0.505). ¹⁸F-FDG/⁶⁸Ga-DOTATATE SUV_max ratios were significantly lower for patients with low (P1–P2) primary NETPET scores than for those with high (P3–P5) primary NETPET scores (mean ± SD, 0.20 ± 0.13 and 1.68 ± 1.44, respectively; P < 0.001). MTV on ¹⁸F-FDG PET was significantly lower for low primary NETPET scores than for high ones (mean ± SD, 464 ± 601 cm³ and 66 ± 114 cm³, respectively; P = 0.005). A change in the type of management was observed in 42.5% of patients after ¹⁸F-FDG PET, with the most common being a change from systemic therapy to peptide receptor radionuclide therapy and from debulking surgery to systemic therapy. Conclusion: There was a heterogeneous distribution of NETPET scores in patients with WD grade 2 and 3 GEP NETs, with more than 1 in 5 patients having a high NETPET score and a frequent change in management after ¹⁸F-FDG PET. Quantitative parameters including ¹⁸F-FDG/⁶⁸Ga-DOTATATE SUV_max ratios in target lesions and FTV/MTV ratios can discriminate between patients with high and low NETPET scores.

Our objective is to explore quantitative imaging markers for early prediction of treatment response in patients with gastroenteropancreatic neuroendocrine tumors (GEP-NETs) undergoing [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTATATE therapy. By doing so, we aim to enable timely switching to more effective therapies in order to prevent time-resource waste and minimize toxicities. Methods: Patients diagnosed with unresectable or metastatic, progressive, well-differentiated, receptor-positive GEP-NETs who received 4 sessions of [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTATATE were retrospectively selected. Using SPECT/CT images taken at the end of treatment sessions, we counted all visible tumors and measured their largest diameters to calculate the tumor burden score (TBS). Up to 4 target lesions were selected and semiautomatically segmented. Target lesion peak counts and spleen peak counts were measured, and normalized peak counts were calculated. Changes in TBS (TBS) and changes in normalized peak count (nPC) throughout treatment sessions in relation to the first treatment session were calculated. Treatment responses were evaluated using third-month CT and were binarized as progressive disease (PD) or non-PD. Results: Twenty-seven patients were included (7 PD, 20 non-PD). Significant differences were observed in TBS_second-first, TBS_third-first, and TBS_fourth-first (where second-first, third-first, and fourth-first denote scan number between the second and first, third and first, and fourth and first [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTATATE treatment cycles), respectively) between the PD and non-PD groups (median, 0.043 vs. –0.049, 0.08 vs. –0.116, and 0.109 vs. –0.123 [P = 0.023, P = 0.002, and P < 0.001], respectively). nPC_second-first showed significant group differences (mean, –0.107 vs. –0.282; P = 0.033); nPC_third-first and nPC_fourth-first did not reach statistical significance (mean, –0.122 vs. –0.312 and –0.183 vs. –0.405 [P = 0.117 and 0.067], respectively). At the optimal threshold, TBS_fourth-first exhibited an area under the curve (AUC) of 0.957, achieving 100% sensitivity and 80% specificity. TBS_second-first and TBS_third-first reached AUCs of 0.793 and 0.893, sensitivities of 71.4%, and specificities of 85% and 95%, respectively. nPC_second-first, nPC_third-first, and nPC_fourth-first showed AUCs of 0.764, 0.693, and 0.679; sensitivities of 71.4%, 71.4%, and 100%; and specificities of 75%, 70%, and 35%, respectively. Conclusion: TBS and nPC can predict [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTATATE response by the second treatment session.

Unspecific bone uptake (UBU) related to [¹⁸F]PSMA-1007 PET/CT imaging represents a clinical challenge. We aimed to assess whether a combination of clinical, biochemical, and imaging parameters could predict skeletal metastases in patients with [¹⁸F]PSMA-1007 bone focal uptake, aiding in result interpretation. Methods: We retrospectively analyzed [¹⁸F]PSMA-1007 PET/CT performed in hormone-sensitive prostate cancer (PCa) patients at 3 tertiary-level cancer centers. A fourth center was involved in performing an external validation. For each, a volume of interest was drawn using a threshold method to extract SUV_max, SUV_mean, PSMA tumor volume, and total lesion PSMA. The same volume of interest was applied to CT images to calculate the mean Hounsfield units (HU_mean) and maximum Hounsfield units. Clinical and laboratory data were collected from electronic medical records. A composite reference standard, including follow-up histopathology, biochemistry, and imaging data, was used to distinguish between PCa bone metastases and UBU. PET readers with less (n = 2) or more (n = 2) experience, masked to the reference standard, were asked to visually rate a subset of focal bone uptake (n = 178) as PCa metastases or not. Results: In total, 448 bone [¹⁸F]PSMA-1007 focal uptake specimens were identified in 267 PCa patients. Of the 448 uptake samples, 188 (41.9%) corresponded to PCa metastases. Ongoing androgen deprivation therapy at PET/CT (P < 0.001) with determination of SUV_max (P < 0.001) and HU_mean (P < 0.001) independently predicted bone metastases. A composite prediction score, the bone uptake metastatic probability (BUMP) score, achieving an area under the receiver-operating-characteristic curve (AUC) of 0.87, was validated through a 10-fold internal and external validation (n = 89 bone uptake, 51% metastatic; AUC, 0.92). The BUMP score’s AUC was significantly higher than that of HU_mean (AUC, 0.62) and remained high among lesions with HU_mean in the first tertile (AUC, 0.80). A decision-curve analysis showed a higher net benefit with the score. Compared with the visual assessment, the BUMP score provided added value in terms of specificity in less-experienced PET readers (88% vs. 54%, P < 0.001). Conclusion: The BUMP score accurately distinguished UBU from bone metastases in PCa patients with [¹⁸F]PSMA-1007 focal bone uptake at PET imaging, offering additional value compared with the simple assessment of the osteoblastic CT correlate. Its use could help clinicians interpret imaging results, particularly those with less experience, potentially reducing the risk of patient overstaging.

This analysis aimed to identify clinical factors associated with positivity on repeat ⁶⁸Ga-PSMA-11 PET/CT after a negative scan in patients with recurrent prostate cancer (PCa) under observation. Methods: This single-center, retrospective analysis included patients who underwent at least 2 ⁶⁸Ga-PSMA-11 PET/CT scans (PET1 and PET2) at UCLA between October 2016 and June 2021 for recurrent PCa with negative PET1 and no PCa-related treatments between the 2 scans. Using Prostate Cancer Molecular Imaging Standardized Evaluation criteria to define negative and positive scans, the final cohort was divided into PET2-negative (PET2-Neg) and PET2-positive (PET2-Pos). The same PET1 was used twice in the more than 2 PET cases with inclusion criteria fulfilled. Patient characteristics and clinical parameters were compared between the 2 cohorts using Mann–Whitney U test and Fisher exact test. Areas under the curve (AUCs) of the receiver operating characteristic and the Youden index were computed to determine the discrimination ability of statistically significant factors and specific cut points that maximized sensitivity and specificity, respectively. Results: The final analysis included 83 sets of 2 PET/CT scans from 70 patients. Thirty-nine of 83 (47%) sets were PET2-Neg, and 44 of 83 (53%) sets were PET2-Pos. Prostate-specific antigen (PSA) increased from PET1 to PET2 for all 83 (100%) sets of scans. Median PSA at PET1 was 0.4 ng/mL (interquartile range, 0.2–1.0) and at PET2 was 1.6 ng/mL (interquartile range, 0.9–3.8). We found higher serum PSA at PET2 (median, 1.8 vs. 1.1 ng/mL; P = 0.015), absolute PSA difference (median, 1.4 vs. 0.7 ng/mL; P = 0.006), percentage of PSA change (median, +270.4% vs. +150.0%: P = 0.031), and median PSA velocity (0.044 vs. 0.017 ng/mL/wk, P = 0.002) and shorter PSA doubling time (DT; median, 5.1 vs. 8.3 mo; P = 0.006) in the PET2-Pos cohort than in the PET2-Neg cohort. Receiver operating characteristic curves showed cutoffs for PSA at PET2 of 4.80 ng/mL (sensitivity, 34%; specificity, 92%; AUC, 0.66), absolute PSA difference of 0.95 ng/mL (sensitivity, 62%; specificity, 71%; AUC, 0.68), percentage of PSA change of a positive 289.50% (sensitivity, 48%; specificity, 82%; AUC, 0.64), PSA velocity of 0.033 ng/mL/wk (sensitivity, 57%; specificity, 80%; AUC, 0.70), and PSA DT of 7.91 mo (sensitivity, 71%; specificity, 62%; AUC, 0.67). Conclusion: Patients with recurrent PCa under observation after a negative ⁶⁸Ga-PSMA-11 PET/CT scan with markedly elevated serum PSA levels and shorter PSA DT are more likely to have positive findings on repeat ⁶⁸Ga-PSMA-11 PET/CT.

Single-domain antibodies (sdAbs) demonstrate favorable pharmacokinetic profiles for molecular imaging applications. However, their renal excretion and retention are obstacles for applications in targeted radionuclide therapy (TRT). Methods: Using a click-chemistry–based pretargeting approach, we aimed to reduce kidney retention of a fibroblast activation protein α (FAP)–targeted sdAb, 4AH29, for ¹⁷⁷Lu-TRT. Key pretargeting parameters (sdAb-injected mass and lag time) were optimized in healthy mice and U87MG (FAP⁺) xenografts. A TRT study in a pancreatic ductal adenocarcinoma (PDAC) patient-derived xenograft (PDX) model was performed as a pilot study for sdAb-based pretargeting applications. Results: Modification of 4AH29 with trans-cyclooctene (TCO) moieties did not modify the sdAb pharmacokinetic profile. A 200-µg injected mass of 4AH29-TCO and an 8-h lag time for the injection of [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-PEG₇-tetrazine resulted in the highest kidney therapeutic index (2.0 ± 0.4), which was 5-fold higher than that of [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-4AH29 (0.4 ± 0.1). FAP expression in the tumor microenvironment was validated in a PDAC PDX model with both immunohistochemistry and PET/CT imaging. Mice treated with the pretargeting high-activity approach (4AH29-TCO + [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-PEG₇-tetrazine; 3 x 88 MBq, 1 injection per week for 3 wk) demonstrated prolonged survival compared with the vehicle control and conventionally treated ([¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-4AH29; 3 x 37 MBq, 1 injection per week for 3 wk) mice. Mesangial expansion was reported in 7 of 10 mice in the conventional cohort, suggesting treatment-related kidney morphologic changes, but was not observed in the pretargeting cohort. Conclusion: This study validates pretargeting to mitigate sdAbs’ kidney retention with no observation of morphologic changes on therapy regimen at early time points. Clinical translation of click-chemistry–based pre-TRT is warranted on the basis of its ability to alleviate toxicities related to biovectors’ intrinsic pharmacokinetic profiles. The absence of representative animal models with extensive stroma and high FAP expression on cancer-associated fibroblasts led to a low mean tumor-absorbed dose even with high injected activity and consequently to modest survival benefit in this PDAC PDX.

Cancer of unknown primary (CUP) represents a heterogeneous group of metastatic tumors for which standardized diagnostic work-up fails to identify the primary site. We aimed to describe the Peter MacCallum Cancer Centre experience with ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT in extracervical CUP with respect to detection of a primary site and its impact on management. A secondary aim was to compare overall survival (OS) in patients with and without a detected primary site. Methods: CUP patients treated between 2014 and 2020 were identified from medical oncology clinics and ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT records. Information collated from electronic medical records included the suspected primary site and treatment details before and after ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT. Clinicopathologic details and genomic analysis were used to determine the clinically suspected primary site and compared against 2 independent masked reads of ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT images by nuclear medicine specialists to determine sensitivity, specificity, accuracy, and the rate of detection of the primary site. Results: We identified 147 patients, 65% of whom had undergone molecular profiling. The median age at diagnosis was 61 y (range, 20–84 y), and the median follow-up time was 74 mo (range, 26–83 mo). Eighty-two percent were classified as having an unfavorable CUP subtype as per international guidelines.¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT demonstrated a primary site detection rate of 41%, resulted in a change in management in 22%, and identified previously occult disease sites in 37%. Median OS was 16.8 mo for all patients and 104.7 and 12.1 mo for favorable and unfavorable CUP subtypes, respectively (P < 0.0001). Median OS in CUP patients when using ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT, clinicopathologic, and genomic information was 19.8 and 8.5 mo when a primary site was detected and not detected, respectively (P = 0.016). Multivariable analysis of survival adjusted for age and sex remained significant for identification of a potential primary site (P < 0.001), a favorable CUP (P < 0.001), and an Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group status of 1 or less (P < 0.001). Conclusion: ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT plays a complementary role in CUP diagnostic work-up and was able to determine the likely primary site in 41% of cases. OS is improved with primary site identification, demonstrating the value of access to diagnostic ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT for CUP patients.

Neoadjuvant therapy in patients with locally advanced rectal cancer (LARC) has achieved good pathologic complete response (pCR) rates, potentially eliminating the need for surgical intervention. This study investigated preoperative methods for predicting pCR after neoadjuvant short-course radiotherapy (SCRT) combined with immunochemotherapy. Methods: Treatment-naïve patients with histologically confirmed LARC were enrolled from February 2023 to July 2023. Before surgery, the patients received neoadjuvant SCRT followed by 2 cycles of capecitabine and oxaliplatin plus camrelizumab. ⁶⁸Ga-labeled fibroblast activation protein inhibitor ([⁶⁸Ga]Ga-FAPI-04) PET/MRI, [¹⁸F]FDG PET/CT, and contrast-enhanced MRI were performed before treatment initiation and before surgery in each patient. PET and MRI features and the size and number of lesions were also collected from each scan. Each parameter’s sensitivity, specificity, and diagnostic cutoff were derived via receiver-operating-characteristic curve analysis. Results: Twenty eligible patients (13 men, 7 women; mean age, 60.2 y) were enrolled and completed the entire trial, and all patients had proficient mismatch repair or microsatellite-stable LARC. A postoperative pCR was achieved in 9 patients (45.0%). In the visual evaluation, both [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-FAPI-04 PET/MRI and [¹⁸F]FDG PET/CT were limited to forecasting pCR. Contrast-enhanced MRI had a low sensitivity of 55.56% to predict pCR. In the quantitative evaluation, [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-FAPI-04 change in SUL_peak percentage, where SUL_peak is SUV_peak standardized by lean body mass, had the largest area under the curve (0.929) with high specificity (sensitivity, 77.78%; specificity, 100.0%; cutoff, 63.92%). Conclusion: [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-FAPI-04 PET/MRI is a promising imaging modality for predicting pCR after SCRT combined with immunochemotherapy. The SUL_peak decrease exceeding 63.92% may provide valuable guidance in selecting patients who can forgo surgery after neoadjuvant therapy.

Understanding which patients with human epidermal growth factor receptor 2 (HER2)–negative or –low metastatic breast cancer (MBC) benefit from HER2-targeted strategies is urgently needed. We assessed the whole-body heterogeneity of HER2 expression on ⁸⁹Zr-trastuzumab PET (HER2 PET) and the diagnostic performance of HER2 PET in a large series of patients, including HER2-negative and -low MBC. Methods: In the IMPACT-MBC study, patients with newly diagnosed and nonrapidly progressive MBC of all subtypes were included. Metastasis HER2 status was determined by immunohistochemistry and in situ hybridization.⁸⁹Zr-trastuzumab uptake was quantified as SUV_max and SUV_mean. HER2 immunohistochemistry was related to the quantitative ⁸⁹Zr-trastuzumab uptake of all metastases and corresponding biopsied metastasis, uptake heterogeneity, and qualitative scan evaluation. A prediction algorithm for HER2 immunohistochemistry positivity based on uptake was developed. Results: In 200 patients, ⁸⁹Zr-trastuzumab uptake was quantified in 5,163 metastases, including 186 biopsied metastases. With increasing HER2 immunohistochemistry status, uptake was higher (geometric mean SUV_max of 7.0, 7.6, 7.3, and 17.4 for a HER2 immunohistochemistry score of 0, 1, 2, or 3+, respectively; P < 0.001). High uptake exceeding 14.6 (90th percentile) was observed in one third of patients with a HER2-negative or -low metastasis biopsy. The algorithm performed best when lesion site and size were incorporated (area under the curve, 0.86; 95% CI, 0.79–0.93). Conclusion: HER2 PET had good diagnostic performance in MBC, showing considerable whole-body HER2 heterogeneity and uptake above background in HER2-negative and -low MBC. This provides novel insights into HER2-negative and -low MBC compared with standard HER2 immunohistochemistry on a single biopsy.

This study evaluates the diagnostic utility of PET/MRI for primary, locoregional, and nodal head and neck squamous cell carcinoma (HNSCC) through systematic review and metaanalysis. Methods: A systematic search was conducted using PubMed and Scopus to identify studies on the diagnostic accuracy of PET/MRI for HNSCC. The search included specific terms and excluded nonhybrid PET/MRI studies, and those with a sample size of fewer than 10 patients were excluded. Results: In total, 15 studies encompassing 638 patients were found addressing the diagnostic test accuracy for PET/MRI within the chosen subject domain. Squamous cell carcinoma of the nasopharynx was the most observed HNSCC subtype (n = 198). The metaanalysis included 12 studies, with pooled sensitivity and specificity values of 93% and 95% per patient for primary disease evaluation, 93% and 96% for locoregional evaluation, and 89% and 98% per lesion for nodal disease detection, respectively. An examination of a subset of studies comparing PET/MRI against PET/CT or MRI alone for evaluating nodal and locoregional HNSCC found that PET/MRI may offer slightly higher accuracy than other modalities. However, this difference was not statistically significant. Conclusion: PET/MRI has excellent potential for identifying primary, locoregional, and nodal HNSCC.

Tumor hypoxia, an integral biomarker to guide radiotherapy, can be imaged with ¹⁸F-fluoromisonidazole (¹⁸F-FMISO) hypoxia PET. One major obstacle to its broader application is the lack of standardized interpretation criteria. We sought to develop and validate practical interpretation criteria and a dedicated training protocol for nuclear medicine physicians to interpret ¹⁸F-FMISO hypoxia PET. Methods: We randomly selected 123 patients with human papillomavirus–positive oropharyngeal cancer enrolled in a phase II trial who underwent 123 ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT and 134 ¹⁸F-FMISO PET/CT scans. Four independent nuclear medicine physicians with no ¹⁸F-FMISO experience read the scans. Interpretation by a fifth nuclear medicine physician with over 2 decades of ¹⁸F-FMISO experience was the reference standard. Performance was evaluated after initial instruction and subsequent dedicated training. Scans were considered positive for hypoxia by visual assessment if ¹⁸F-FMISO uptake was greater than floor-of-mouth uptake. Additionally, SUV_max was determined to evaluate whether quantitative assessment using tumor-to-background ratios could be helpful to define hypoxia positivity. Results: Visual assessment produced a mean sensitivity and specificity of 77.3% and 80.9%, with fair interreader agreement ( = 0.34), after initial instruction. After dedicated training, mean sensitivity and specificity improved to 97.6% and 86.9%, with almost perfect agreement ( = 0.86). Quantitative assessment with an estimated best SUV_max ratio threshold of more than 1.2 to define hypoxia positivity produced a mean sensitivity and specificity of 56.8% and 95.9%, respectively, with substantial interreader agreement ( = 0.66), after initial instruction. After dedicated training, mean sensitivity improved to 89.6% whereas mean specificity remained high at 95.3%, with near-perfect interreader agreement ( = 0.86). Conclusion: Nuclear medicine physicians without ¹⁸F-FMISO hypoxia PET reading experience demonstrate much improved interreader agreement with dedicated training using specific interpretation criteria.

The tumor marker cancer antigen 15-3 (CA 15-3) is that most commonly used to monitor metastatic breast cancer during active therapy and surveillance for disease recurrence after treatment. The association of CA 15-3 and ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT findings can be considered complementary, since any significant rise may indicate the presence of disease and imaging is able to map the tumor sites. Although current guidelines do not recommend the routine performance of CA 15-3 in asymptomatic patients being followed up after definitive breast cancer treatment, most oncologists perform serial assessment of the tumor markers as part of routine follow-up of patients. The aim of this study was to evaluate the correlation between CA 15-3 levels and ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT scan findings in patients with recurrent breast cancer. Methods: This was a cross-sectional study with data collected retrospectively. Patients being evaluated for breast cancer recurrence with ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT imaging and CA 15-3 level were included. Evaluation of the association between CA 15-3 levels and ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT scan findings was then done. Results: In total, 154 cases were included in this study; 62 patients had recurrence (positive) on the ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT scans, whereas 92 patients had normal (negative) findings on follow-up ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT scans. There was an association between CA 15-3 levels and the presence or absence of recurrence on ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT scans, with 84.4% (27/32) of patients who had elevated CA 15-3 levels having disease recurrence on ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT and 84.4% (27/32) of patients who had elevated CA 15-3 levels having disease recurrence on ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT as well as a correlation with the burden of metastases. Most patients with disease recurrence on ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT, however, had normal CA 15-3 levels. Conclusion: Higher CA 15-3 levels correlate with breast cancer recurrence on ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT as well as with burden of metastasis. Notably, CA 15-3 levels within the reference range do not exclude breast cancer disease recurrence since more than half of patients with recurrence had normal CA 15-3 levels. ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT should therefore be considered in patients with suspected breast cancer recurrence but normal CA 15-3 levels.