Expert

The Ukraine war and threats to food and energy security 13 April 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 April 2022 Online

What are the potential impacts on food and energy markets emerging from the situation in Ukraine?

Russia and Ukraine are key players in global energy, food, fertilizer and mineral markets. In the first few days after Russia’s invasion, both the threat and reality of resource flows being reduced drove up global prices, and has impacted the day-to-day life of people and businesses around the world.

Developing and nutrition-fragile countries across Africa and the Middle East will be hit the hardest – Somalia, for example, is reliant on Russia and Ukraine for 100 per cent of its wheat imports and is currently experiencing its worst drought in years.

The potential scale of disruption to food and energy markets increases with every week the war continues. This event launches the Environment and Society programme’s latest briefing paper The Ukraine war and threats to food and energy security: Cascading risks from rising prices and supply disruptions.

The panel discusses:

• The political, socio-economic and resource pressures already faced by the international community prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
• Direct and cascading impacts on the complex and interconnected energy, minerals, food and fertilizer markets, and policy or market responses that may exacerbate these impacts.
• Geopolitical ramifications that will affect the evolution of the conflict, as well as longer-term international cooperation and security.
• Measures that governments can take to build resilience, both to the ongoing impacts of the situation in Ukraine and to future risks of market disruption and geopolitical upheaval.

Bo Shan Deval, Xabier García-Martínez and Tim Van der Linden
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 5039-5053.
Abstract, references and article information

23 July 2020

18 August 2020

War in Ukraine: The world reaction - Brazil and Africa Audio NCapeling 9 June 2022

The ninth episode of our podcast mini-series examines perspectives from Brazil and the Africa region and the impact on their relations with Russia.

How have Brazil and Africa reacted to the war in Ukraine? With impending elections in Brazil, how is President Bolsonaro’s relationship with Putin received by the public? How will food insecurity affect African nations’ response to the war?

This episode was produced by David Dargahi and Anouk Millet of Earshot Strategies on behalf of Chatham House.

How is the war in Ukraine affecting perceptions of Russia in Africa? Explainer Video NCapeling 10 June 2022

Aanu Adeoye outlines how the invasion of Ukraine is affecting perceptions of Russia across the Africa region.

He says the voting patterns at the United Nations (UN) shows that the majority of African countries are unhappy about Russia’s actions, but there is not a united voice as there is in the European Union (EU) and North America.

Certain countries are heavily influenced by historical ties with Russia going back to the Soviet era and their own struggles for liberation, while others tend to remain non-aligned whenever possible.

RAS genes are the most commonly mutated in human cancers and play critical roles in tumor initiation, progression, and drug resistance. Identification of targets that block RAS signaling is pivotal to develop therapies for RAS-related cancer. As RAS translocation to the plasma membrane (PM) is essential for its effective signal transduction, we devised a high-content screening assay to search for genes regulating KRAS membrane association. We found that the tyrosine phosphatase PTPN2 regulates the plasma membrane localization of KRAS. Knockdown of PTPN2 reduced the proliferation and promoted apoptosis in KRAS-dependent cancer cells, but not in KRAS-independent cells. Mechanistically, PTPN2 negatively regulates tyrosine phosphorylation of KRAS, which, in turn, affects the activation KRAS and its downstream signaling. Consistently, analysis of the TCGA database demonstrates that high expression of PTPN2 is significantly associated with poor prognosis of patients with KRAS-mutant pancreatic adenocarcinoma. These results indicate that PTPN2 is a key regulator of KRAS and may serve as a new target for therapy of KRAS-driven cancer.

Alice Santonastaso
Dec 1, 2020; 61:1687-1696
Research Articles

Lipoprotein (a) [Lp(a)] is characterized by an LDL-like composition in terms of lipids and apoB100, and by one copy of a unique glycoprotein, apo(a). The apo(a) structure is mainly based on the repetition of tandem kringle domains with high homology to plasminogen kringles 4 and 5. Among them, kringle IV type 2 (KIV-2) is present in a highly variable number of genetically encoded repeats, whose length is inversely related to Lp(a) plasma concentration and cardiovascular risk. Despite it being the major component of apo(a), the actual function of KIV-2 is still unclear. Here, we describe the first high-resolution crystallographic structure of this domain. It shows a general fold very similar to other KIV domains with high and intermediate affinity for the lysine analog, -aminocaproic acid. Interestingly, KIV-2 presents a lysine binding site (LBS) with a unique shape and charge distribution. KIV-2 affinity for predicted small molecule binders was found to be negligible in surface plasmon resonance experiments; and with the LBS being nonfunctional, we propose to rename it "pseudo-LBS". Further investigation of the protein by computational small-molecule docking allowed us to identify a possible heparin-binding site away from the LBS, which was confirmed by specific reverse charge mutations abolishing heparin binding. This study opens new possibilities to define the pathogenesis of Lp(a)-related diseases and to facilitate the design of specific therapeutic drugs.

War on Ukraine: The state of the global response 17 October 2022 — 6:30PM TO 7:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 3 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

Implications of the war for the future of multilateralism.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has tested the capacity for a unified global response to grave violations of the UN Charter. The world is in unchartered territory as a nuclear member of the United Nations Security Council attacks a non-nuclear country. 

Multilateral institutions that were born out of an effort to prevent war are struggling to prove their relevance in the face of growing existential threats to humanity. The war is exacerbating divisions within the global community, disrupting food and energy supplies worldwide and contributing to a profound crisis of multilateralism.

The longer these divisions last, the longer the war in the middle of Europe and the harder it will be to respond to the interconnected global crises that threaten everyone.

This discussion offers a unique insight into the macro-geopolitical questions in relation to the war in Ukraine with members of the Elders and other experts:

The panel considers:

• How can a more united global response to Russian aggression be built?

• What stands in the way of an effective multilateral response based on international norms?

• In what ways are divisions between UN member states influencing the trajectory of the war or prospects for peace?

• How is the conflict changing geopolitics and the ability of the multilateral system to address global challenges?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation. This event is organised in partnership between Chatham House and The Elders, the group of independent global leaders founded by Nelson Mandela who work for peace, justice and human rights.

Read the transcript.

War on Ukraine: The energy crisis and Europe’s impending long winter 2 November 2022 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2022 Online

Can Europe remain unified over the long winter?

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the global community has been responding to significant price shocks, especially energy. As Europe heads into a particularly difficult winter, policymakers are grappling with the costs, both political and economic, required to make sure Russian energy blackmail does not succeed.

Retaining a unified front against Russia and providing continued support to the Ukrainian government will be great challenges. As the cold begins to bite, war fatigue may accelerate among the populations of Europe. Providing their people with adequate heat will not come cheaply for governments across the continent at a time of economic uncertainty.

At this critical moment of Russia’s invasion, experts discuss:

• Have European preparations been sufficient to stave off an energy crisis this winter?
• What will be Russia’s reaction during and after the winter period, particularly if Europe avoids energy market failures?
• How will this ‘energy crisis’ ensure future dependencies on single state actors of goods and services do not occur in the future?

Read the transcript. 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: How it changed the world 21 February 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 1 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

Chatham House experts examine how the world has changed since 24 February 2022.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine prompted serious soul-searching about European security, what it means to be European and the futures of the two principal protagonists. However, practical questions have developed throughout the war in surprising ways.

Chatham House is producing a multi-author feature reflecting on seven things Russia’s war has changed in the world. The article assesses the impact of the war one year on, the long-term changes this has catalyzed and unpacks why these changes are significant for the future of international affairs.

This event examines key themes with the research directors who authored the piece. Alliances, national resiliency for both Ukraine and Russia and sanctions are examined including the following questions:

• How did the war change Ukraine?

• What alliances have been forged over the past year? 

• How long can ‘fortress Russia’ weather the storm and what has it revealed about Russia’s integration into the international system? 

• What have countries done to mitigate the impact on supply chains and markets? Who, for example, has been most affected by the grain crisis?

• What have we learnt about Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky that we didn’t know before 24 February 2022?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Linked article: ‘Seven ways Russia’s war on Ukraine has changed the world’, read the featured piece here.

Read the transcript. 

From Iraq to Ukraine: What did governments learn? 20 March 2023 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

What were the main lessons for today’s conflicts from the way in which the war in Iraq played out?

This March marks the 20th anniversary of the US and UK-led invasion of Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein. Based primarily on unfounded fears Iraq’s WMD (weapons of mass destruction) capability was buidling up in the absence of UN inspection and constraints on the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards, the decision to go to war has reverberated throughout the Middle East, the intelligence communities, and Western political decision-making ever since.

In the 2002–03 period when UN inspectors were allowed back into Iraq, Hans Blix, chairman of UNMOVIC (UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) and Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the IAEA, were at the centre of a storm in which they were put under huge pressure to agree with the US/UK narrative on the ‘missing’ WMD.

Their problem was that the evidence they were uncovering did not support the claims, but the war went ahead – and Saddam was overthrown – despite these UN findings.

Much has changed since 2003. As the geopolitical landscape has shifted, so have geopolitics and capabilities. Today’s Russia’s war against Ukraine which includes WMD threats, cyberattacks, and an assertive disinformation campaign has opened up new ways of thinking about communicating information from open source and government intelligence analysis.

This panel explores the experiences of people involved with decision-making at the UN and in the UK in 2003 and how things have changed today.

• What were the lessons from the way in which the war in Iraq played out?
• How has that influenced the way in which NATO has responded to Russia’s wars against Ukraine?
• How should information be communicated within governments and to the public?
• How to deal with disinformation campaigns in the days of open source information and social media?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Ukraine response reveals Europe’s security is changing Expert comment NCapeling 8 February 2022

Recent events regarding Ukraine show an active UK responding quickly while EU powers deliberate. But pulling ahead of the pack is not the same as leadership.

Britain’s relationship with Ukraine appears to be thriving, with Ukrainian defence journalist Illia Ponomarenko recently tweeting the ‘British are just unstoppable these days’ and that the UK finds itself ‘on the right side of history’ while one Ukrainian wine bar has started offering free drinks to British nationals.

Ponomarenko’s remarks and the wine bar offer – certainly one post-Brexit benefit of having a British passport – are down to the UK decision to send anti-tank weapons to support Ukraine’s forces against a potential Russian attack.

The UK’s quick response was praised by Ponomarenko as being ‘wise enough not to be lured into going the easiest way, which is always the fastest lane straight to hell’ and strikes a clear contrast with that of Germany, whose typically moderated approach to geopolitical tensions went down badly in Kyiv.

The chief of Germany’s navy was forced to resign after saying Russian president Vladimir Putin ‘deserved respect’ and that Ukraine will never win back annexed Crimea. The German government also sought an energy exception to proposed US sanctions, so that gas can continue to flow into Europe.

France’s response was somewhat stronger but rather confusing as Emmanuel Macron initially called for European Union (EU) member states to ‘conduct their own dialogue’ with Russia, seemingly as an alternative to supporting the US-led NATO response.

Risks of a ‘bullying’ Russia

Although positioning himself as the convener of a transatlantic response to the Ukraine crisis brings welcome respite for UK prime minister Boris Johnson from his domestic ‘partygate’ fiasco, he is also reported as saying some world leaders ‘may not appreciate the deteriorating picture on the Ukrainian border, or fully comprehend the risks posed by a bullying Russia’.

One particular image sums up the difference in approach between the UK and the EU, as a flight path shows a British RAF plane flying around Germany before taking a detour over Denmark on route to Ukraine.

Given that Germany later blocked the export of NATO ally Estonia’s weapons to Ukraine, this image gives ‘Global Britain’ advocates a strong symbol of apparent British reliability and resourcefulness in the face of supposed European deliberation and disunity.

But although the UK’s response to the Ukraine crisis has rightly been credited as swift and substantial, it also reveals deeper developments in the current European security landscape as EU countries had worried Britain might choose to become absent post-Brexit.

Losing one of its two main military powers would certainly have been a blow to Europe, particularly as Russia’s threat has grown in recent years, so there will be relief that the Ukraine crisis shows Britain is undoubtedly committed to the region. Now the question for leaders in Paris, Berlin, and Brussels is how to deal with an active Britain committed to Europe but under no obligation to work within EU processes.

The UK already has an interesting network of bilateral and mini-lateral relationships with European allies. Its Joint Expeditionary Force brings together ten European countries – including Scandinavian and Baltic states – and is well-placed to support NATO activities while also remaining flexible and independent. In the past year, the UK worked with Norway in the Arctic region, provided military engineers support to Poland, and worked directly with France and Germany through the E3 grouping – once again bypassing EU institutions.

The UK also brings a unique diplomatic, technology, and intelligence-sharing relationship with the US which is unavoidably important in dealing with the threat from Russia. As the US sees European security through a NATO lens – rather than an EU one – this makes Britain a leading player as one of the few countries meeting its NATO spending commitments.

UK must do more to win trust

But despite such creative partnerships transcending the constraints of Brexit, the UK must do more to win the trust of the EU’s biggest players France and Germany to be a permanent power in the region. And relations with France have deteriorated following disputes over fishing, a lack of cooperation on migrants, and the AUKUS defence technology agreement between the UK, US, and Australia.

When it comes to Germany, the UK must not use the Ukraine crisis as an opportunity for geopolitical point-scoring. There are good historical reasons for Germany’s cautious approach to military engagement, even if these do constrain the country’s response to this challenge.

In dealing with Russia, some members of Germany’s ruling SPD sincerely believe their party’s less confrontational posture was central to de-escalating conflict during the Cold War. And although some historians may dispute that belief, it is still a distinct and more noble motivation for ‘dovishness’ than pure economic self-interest.

Cooperation always requires some compromise on all sides. Germany must accept some level of economic risk if sanctions against Russia are to be meaningful and France has to accept the necessity of the UK and US’s involvement and that the most effective dialogue is unlikely to be achieved through EU institutions.

Meanwhile, the UK must accept some role for the two biggest EU players, particularly as the Normandy Format which includes Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany has proved productive in the past. And the UK needs to clamp down on its own economic ties with Russia.

Why a no-fly zone risks escalating the Ukraine conflict Expert comment NCapeling 13 March 2022

The US rejection of Poland’s offer to send fighter jets as a boost to Ukraine’s air defence shows just how uneasy nations are about direct combat with Russia.

The Pentagon’s decision to turn down the proposal by its fellow NATO member Poland to put Russian-made MiG-29 jets at its disposal demonstrates again how keen the US and allies are to avoid risking major confrontation with Russian forces.

The US Department of Defense says the offer to locate jets at bases in Germany was ‘not tenable’ as this risks flying into contested airspace over Ukraine – a non-NATO member – raising ‘serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance’ and echoing the continuing rejection of calls to implement no-fly zones (NFZs) as a way of easing the devastation being faced by trapped Ukraine civilians.

NFZs restrict any aircraft, including drones, from flying over a pre-defined region and can be used for both military and civilian purposes. But the implementation of NFZs is difficult to enforce and – most significantly – is unlikely to achieve the intended effect on the ground.

In conflict situations, they are usually implemented under the remit of United Nations (UN) peace support operations, requiring authorization under Article 42 of the UN Charter. This details that if all possible methods have proven ineffective in responding to a threat, countries ‘may take such action by air, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’.

Protection but with limitations

NFZs provide both protection from attack and surveillance but do have limitations. They must be monitored and enforced which requires committing to fighter jet patrols with the explicit task of defending the area from the air by whatever means necessary.

This could mean jets firing upon Russian planes and drones so, if NATO allies and partners were to enforce a NFZ, it would represent an escalation of measures which is a step that would most likely provoke an unpredictable Vladimir Putin into further escalation – in short, it is highly likely to be seen as an act of war.

UK defence secretary Ben Wallace – among others – has repeatedly dispelled the idea, saying that enforcing NFZs would mean deploying ‘British fighter jets directly against Russian fighter jets’. In relation to moves such as the Polish jets, the Kremlin has warned that any countries offering airfields to Ukraine for attacks on Russia may be viewed as having entered the conflict.

There have only been three past instances of military NFZs. In Bosnia, as part of Operation Deny Flight from 1993-1995, a NFZ was enforced as part of a strategy which also including the provision of close air support and approved air strikes.

In Iraq, an NFZ endured for 12 years from 1991 and was succcesful in preventing Saddam Hussein from attacking Kurdish and Shia Muslim civilians. And in Libya in 2011, a NFZ was deployed to prevent the destruction of military infrastructure and the Libyan regime – although this quickly morphed into the provision of close air support.

So it is unclear just how successful NFZs are at providing protection. In Iraq and Libya, NFZ cover protection was provided but neither Saddam Hussein or Colonel Gaddafi were able to effectively target victims through their ground forces whereas, in Bosnia, Slobodan Milosevic infamously used ground troops to slaughter 8,000 Bosnian men and boys at Srebrenica.

Putin would still be able to continue to use both ground forces and artillery to assault Ukrainian cities with or without a NFZ – in fact, his sparse use of his Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) has been one of the surprising features of the war so far. Under a NFZ, missile attacks could also continue, there is nothing in the record of no-fly zones to suggest the provision of safe areas for non-combatants would work.

And NFZs have only been successful against vastly inferior forces such as in Iraq, Bosnia, and Libya. But Russia has an air force second only in size to the US and has a vast range of defences including the potent S-400 Triumf at its disposal. Not only would an NFZ be ineffective, it might also not be possible to enforce without risking significant losses to the peace operations force.

It is due to a combination of these reasons that NFZs have not been used more in previous conflicts. The most recent consideration for a NFZ was in Syria but President Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian forces, protected by Russian air cover, could still have targeted their intended victims despite air policing so a NFZ was not used.

In the long-term, under the terms of a ceasefire agreement, it may be possible to include a NFZ under a UN or joint OSCE-UN peace terms. However, the forces involved should exclude NATO allies and partners or any states with Russian alliances to avoid further conflict.

This leaves few suitable countries with the capacity, willingness, and political stance to be called on. Two of the world’s most militarily capable states – China and India – abstained in the Uniting for Peace vote in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Whether another willing state with the military capability – such as a Gulf state – could be considered acceptable to all sides remains to be tested.

Notable successes with SAMs

Many military commentators also note that currently Ukrainian forces are having notable success without jets, downing Russian aircraft using sophisticated surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) such as Stinger and Javelin, and NATO countries continue to supply those in their thousands.

Ukraine crisis could trigger cascading risks globally Expert comment NCapeling 16 March 2022

The effects on the wider world from the Ukraine invasion go far beyond the waves of shock and horror being felt from this escalating conflict.

Russia and Ukraine rank 11th and 55th respectively in terms of their national economies but, for the global supply of critical resources such as energy, food, and minerals, these two countries together are far bigger hitters – and both the threat and reality of resource flows from them being reduced have already driven up global prices.

The world is already facing a cost-of-living squeeze coming out of the COVID-19 pandemic, so further price spikes or supply constraints have the potential to seriously undermine food and energy security, equitable access to basic goods and services, and social stability around the world – which can then potentially create systemic risks for economies and societies.

The global implications of the Ukraine conflict are only just beginning to be explored fully but the immediate impacts of the crisis on global markets are already well-documented. In the first few days after Russia’s invasion, energy prices spiked, triggering further fertilizer price rises – as fertilizer production is highly energy intensive – which in turn is contributing to food price rises because fertilizer costs are an important factor in food production.

Interruptions to shipping in the region around Ukraine – as well as globally – have impeded the flow of goods which pushed prices up even further, while economic sanctions on cross-border flows of goods and finance are further adding to market pressures. But this is just the start – these impacts will bring ripple effects which propagate far beyond their point of origin, known as ‘cascading risks’.

Risk is a combination of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability – in terms of the Ukraine invasion, the hazard is the conflict and its immediate impacts on the societies and economies of Ukraine and Russia, while exposure relates to the degree to which other countries are likely to be affected depending on how much they are integrated into the global economy or the ‘just in time’ nature of their supply chains.

Vulnerability relates to a society’s capacity to mitigate the harmful impacts of the conflict, such as controlling borders, sourcing alternative goods from suppliers, or protecting against price or supply shocks.

Risk cascades – the second- and third-order impacts of the original hazard and of responses to that hazard – can interact across sectoral boundaries – as with energy and food, for example – and their compound effect can lead to overall systemic risks for society.

Anticipating this potential is essential to understanding the nature and scale of the global ramifications being felt from the Ukraine conflict. Recent work in the UK to assess levels of cascading risks resulting from a changing climate – the UK Climate Change Risk Assessment – provides a valuable framework for thinking about this area.

It examines key pathways for risk to cascade through global systems – when applied to the situation in Ukraine, these pathways and their interactions offer an indication of the scale of crisis that citizens face far beyond Ukraine’s and Russia’s borders.

Interruptions to the flows of goods and energy

In globalized trade networks, localized disruption to supply chains rapidly yields widespread international impacts – of particular concern is the immediate supply of food because most countries rely on lean supply chains and some may only have a few days food within their own borders.

Experience from previous food price crises indicate even small interruptions to trade can result in runs on the market and rapid price inflation. In the case of this conflict, the trade interruption will be far from small because, between them, Russia and Ukraine export around one-quarter of all traded wheat, more than three-quarters of traded sunflower oil, and one-sixth of traded maize.

Energy markets are also a concern because many countries use more energy than they produce and therefore rely on imports of energy or fuel for domestic use. Russia produces around ten per cent of the world’s commercial energy with a concentration of sales in major regions such as the European Union (EU) and China.

As with food, a shortfall in energy provision leads to market runs and rapid inflation as actors compete in a tightening space, while poorly designed policy interventions by nations trying to ensure their own security add further pressure to global supply and worsen price rises. In addition, the closely interconnected nature of energy markets means disruption to one fuel – such as gas in this case – affects global prices for other forms of energy.

The impact of moving people and money

As the last decade richly illustrates, the cross-border flows of people impact those societies absorbing them – for example, contributing to a rise in nationalism – as well as increase the costs of supplying essential resources. Given many people are understandably fleeing this conflict, other countries may struggle to cope as the cost-of-living crisis and urgent efforts to bolster national security infrastructure may squeeze available public funds.

Financial flows are crucial to the functioning of global economies, whether for inward investment or insurance and – as Russian citizens may be about to discover – restricting the global flow of money has a serious impact on households. Beyond Russia, the outflow of money from major financial centres such as London to meet insurance claims or to enable infrastructure reinvestment post-conflict may also have severe knock-on economic impacts.

The impact on governance and health

The global spikes in energy and food prices resulting from these supply chain disruptions will see many countries struggle with rising food and energy insecurity as well as increased inequality. Taken together these conditions create many issues beyond immigration pressures and the associated politics, including increased inequality and civil unrest.

This potentially destabilizes governments which has consequences for the stability of an entire region such as interrupted supply chains, the need to deploy peacekeeping forces, or significant flows of aid – all with global consequences far beyond the countries in question.

Populations may suffer mental health impacts arising from the Ukraine invasion, whether from the trauma of being forced to leave home to escape conflict, anxiety for the wellbeing and safety of families and friends caught up in it, or a more general anxiety arising from the perception of living in an unstable world.

Ukraine exposes Europe’s double standards for refugees Expert comment NCapeling 30 March 2022

As European governments provide swift protection assurances to those fleeing Ukraine, non-European asylum-seekers continue to face violence at the EU’s borders.

One month after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU) already faces its largest refugee crisis since World War Two, with more than ten million people having fled their homes – 6.5 million displaced within Ukraine and 3.9 million escaping to neighbouring countries.

Acting quickly and decisively, European governments have opened borders and European citizens have opened their homes in an unprecedented showing of solidarity towards refugees. But, with all eyes on Ukraine, the Greek coastguard continues to illegally push back asylum-seekers crossing from Turkey while Spanish police forcefully repel those who dare to jump the fence in Melilla.

The painful contrast exposes the double standards in the EU’s approach to refugees. With Europe’s grim history of restrictive asylum policies, it is wishful thinking that the warm welcome to Ukrainians will extend to all asylum-seekers. The EU solidarity to displaced Ukrainians illustrates the deeply politicized – and often discriminatory – nature of providing refugee protection.

However, the hope is this turning point in European history can at least set an important precedent for treating refugees more humanely. Undoubtedly, EU solidarity towards people fleeing the horrors of Putin’s war is critically important and the initial response is positive in its efforts to meet immense humanitarian needs.

Solidarity with Ukrainians

The EU activation of the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) is a significant step towards a more humane protection regime and fairer responsibility-sharing among member states. Without the need for the examination of individual applications, those fleeing Ukraine can access harmonized rights across the EU for three years – including residence, housing, medical assistance, and access to the labour market and education.

The TPD is also a move away from the strict ‘Dublin’ rules which put the pressure of hosting refugees onto the countries of ‘first arrival’. Ironically, the fiercest opponents of intra-EU solidarity, such as Poland and Hungary, are the ones benefiting from this change now but, in the case of Ukraine, geographical proximity and shared histories must be considered when analysing Europe’s response.

Eastern European and Baltic countries share a post-Soviet history and fear of Russian aggression, and Ukrainians already enjoyed 90 days of visa-free travel in the EU – with a large diaspora, many have established networks across Europe. But even considering these distinctive connections with Ukrainian displacement, the initial response still shows that European countries have both the political will and the capacity to host refugees.

Unlike the usual – often media-fuelled – narratives of refugee ‘invasions’ into Europe, the waves of women and children leaving Ukraine prompted a surge of humanitarian action but they are also a chilling reality check of Europe’s double standards.

The EU has used agreements with countries such as Turkey and Libya to prevent arrivals and outsource asylum responsibilities, while border violence, detention, and lengthy asylum procedures await the few asylum seekers who manage to enter Europe from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.

These ‘fortress Europe’ legacies have even undercut the humanitarian response in Ukraine, with reports of incidents of discrimination towards people of colour at the EU borders being condemned by the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU), the media facing allegations of racist reporting, and comments from Bulgarian PM Kiril Petkov providing a stark reminder of the islamophobia, racism, and history of colonization which still pervades European asylum policies.

Foreign policy also influences how EU leaders treat the right to asylum, as the geopolitics of Europe’s efforts to create a united front against Russian aggression is an undercurrent to the prompt European response to Ukrainians. But only a few months ago, non-European asylum-seekers trapped in freezing forests at the Poland-Belarus border were used as political pawns by Belarusian leader Aliaksandr Lukashenka and then dehumanised as a ‘hybrid attack’ by EU leaders.

A turning point for asylum in Europe?

Despite entrenched discriminatory precedents, it is worth looking ahead at this moment of reckoning. Although policy changes remain far off, the unity shown over Ukraine can help reshape and refocus political efforts towards increased responsibility-sharing among EU member states – the perennial ‘hot potato’ of the EU asylum system.

War on Ukraine: Exploring the humanitarian response to the conflict 12 April 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 April 2022 Online

This event explores the implications of the humanitarian realities from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the largest ground campaign in Europe since World War Two.

Reports from humanitarian organizations working in Ukraine are dire and reveal that a humanitarian disaster on an epic scale is unfolding.

The United Nations (UN) and other organizations estimate 12 million of Ukraine’s population are in need of assistance, 4.1 million have been displaced to neighbouring countries, and 6.4 million have become internally displaced.

Gillian Triggs, the assistant secretary-general and assistant high commissioner for protection at the UNHCR, joins other experts to discuss the humanitarian situation in Ukraine.

The panel considers:

• What are the greatest needs in Ukraine now?
• How can aid agencies meet those needs?
• What are the short and long-term implications of the crisis for Ukraine and Europe?
• How do international organizations work with local NGOs to provide food, medical aid and shelter?

This event is part of a regular series of events offering insight and analysis from experts and policymakers on how the war is affecting Ukraine, the region and the world.

This event is part of Chatham House’s ongoing work on the future of conflict.

Read the transcript

War in Ukraine: Can the EU survive without Russian oil and gas? Audio NCapeling 5 May 2022

The fourth episode of our podcast mini-series examines how reliant the European Union (EU) is on Russian energy.

What would an all-out ban on Russian oil look like? Which countries would be most affected? Does this offer an opportunity for renewable energy?

Clips used: Bloomberg News

This episode was produced by Anouk Millet of Earshot Strategies on behalf of Chatham House.

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Loopholes in international laws governing the use of incendiary weapons in warfare are allowing warring parties in Ukraine and the Middle East to exploit the use of such weapons without adequately protecting civilians.

Ukraine launched a massive drone attack on Moscow overnight, the largest on the Russian capital since the Russian invasion more than two years ago, forcing three airports to divert traffic and causing casualties.

Ukraine's military intelligence has intercepted what it claims are radio communications between North Korean soldiers in Russia, amid media reports of a massive troop buildup ahead of an attack in the Kursk region.

French President Emmanuel Macron was joined in Paris on Monday by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer for Armistice Day commemorations after a meeting at which both leaders reaffirmed "unwavering" support for Ukraine.

The Rapid Trident 21 exercise to enhance interoperability between Ukraine, U.S. and NATO partners started Monday, with an opening ceremony, and will run through Oct. 1.

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said Ukraine continues to have U.S. support against Russian aggression and is free to decide its own foreign policy during a visit to Kyiv Tuesday. 

North Korean soldiers deployed to the Kursk region of Russia have begun combat operations against Ukrainian troops, the U.S. State Department confirmed Tuesday.

President-elect Donald Trump on Monday announced plans to nominate South Dakota Gov. Kristi Noem to head the Department of Homeland Security of his incoming administration.

The first step to saving nature is the rewilding of our own minds, says conservationist and former Patagonia CEO Kristine McDivitt Tompkins. With an unwavering commitment to protecting ecosystems, she and her late husband Douglas Tompkins created vast conservation parks across South America that allowed ancient flora and fauna to flourish once again. Now, she's carrying that legacy and mission forward with a bold plan to connect parks across geographic boundaries, creating a system of continental-scale wildlife corridors — before it's too late.

Team on ground regrouped; strengthened with surge personnel; Declaration of corporate scale-up response

by Qu Dongyu, Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

Information Note.

FAO’s responses to the crisis in Ukraine and its impacts on global food security: data analyses, policy recommendations, and actions on the ground.

Sometimes, in fact, nature is stranger than fiction

Listen to a short lecture given by curator Margaret Weitekamp on Gene Kranz career with NASA and how his vest ended up at the Smithsonian

A $1 million grant from the U.S. is the latest effort to support Ukraine's fight to preserve its rich past

Kate MacEachern is a Canadian veteran from Ballantynes Cove, N.S., but her service years are far from over. She has spent about two years living in Ukraine, delivering humanitarian aid to communities across the country.

Hired in July by the Seattle Kraken as an assistant coach after two seasons with their AHL affiliate, Jessica Campbell is starting to get to know the team, schedule demands and managing "the vigorous push through it all." It's also about managing the attention as a trailblazer.

Ukraine attacked Moscow on Sunday with at least 34 drones, the biggest drone strike on the Russian capital since the start of the war in 2022, forcing flights to be diverted from three of the city's major airports and injuring at least one person.

U.S. president-elect Donald Trump spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin and advised him not to escalate the Ukraine war, a source familiar with the conversation said, but the Kremlin denied the two had spoken.

A federal judge sentenced a Massachusetts Air National Guard member to 15 years in prison Tuesday for leaking classified military documents about the war in Ukraine, actions prosecutors said put the country's national security at risk, endangered other military members and damaged U.S. relationships with its allies.

Some Ukrainians living in Calgary say they're even more worried for their friends and family back home in light of Donald Trump's election win.

OM Ukraine's sports team equips and trains churches in using non-traditional sports in their summer camps.

A Ukrainian pastor responds to nearly 100 per cent unemployment in his village by starting biofuel and cash crop business enterprises.

Through a new cricket league and sports field approved by the local government, OM Ukraine can minister to hundreds of local families.

Ministering in a country at war is not fun – but a privilege. Ukraine is going through intense emotions and people are open to Kingdom conversations.

A 17 year old high school student shares about how she fled from the war zone and came to stay at OM Odessa's centre.

Through the "Lighthouse" soccer team, Maksim Shlikov is reaching out to young orphanage graduates looking for meaning and hope.

OM Ukraine and experts in crisis management held a seminar for pastors serving on both sides of the conflict line in Eastern Ukraine.