This event will focus on the trade in Pericopsis elata (Afrormosia/Assamela) harvested in West and Central Africa, and will be co-chaired by Emmanuel Heuse, FLEGT facilitator in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

This workshop is supported by the Climate and Land Use Alliance, the UK Department of International Development and the European Union Action to Fight Environmental Crime.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Summary

• This paper challenges the view that the ‘resource curse’ – for which so many academics found evidence in previous decades – has now been laid to rest.
• During the commodities boom of the past decade, a number of influential policy and corporate institutions have encouraged poor countries to capitalize on below-ground resources for economic growth and development. The key assumption is that improved management of the extractives sector will enable it to spearhead positive national development and avoid resource curse effects such as declining global competitiveness in the rest of the economy and a widening wealth gap. This assumption continues to influence governance advice and country investment choices.
• The extractives-led growth agenda promoted by donors and international advisers in multilateral banks, consultancies and some development agencies has tended to reinforce domestic, government and investor pressures to pursue a ‘fast-track’ approach to extractives projects. This appears logical, given the obvious benefits of foreign-investment inflows and export revenues for countries suffering from poverty, lack of infrastructure and high levels of indebtedness.
• However, there is an urgent need to re-evaluate whether the policy advice stemming from this agenda can serve as an antidote to the negative effects identified in the resource-curse literature. First, there is often a mismatch between governance advice given and the capacity of countries to follow it. Second, the global context has changed: exporters are suffering as a result of the current downturn in commodity prices, while reliance on the sale of high-carbon fuels is challenged by the global shift to lower-carbon technologies and energy efficiency.
• Extractive revenues should not be viewed as income to be consumed, but as representing a reshuffling of the national portfolio of assets. Converting extractive resources below ground into cash above ground raises key questions about how this cash can be deployed to create productive assets for the future which do not rely on depletable resources.
• Diversification of the economy away from the resource sector over an appropriate timeframe remains a key priority. In many cases, this will require slower development of projects to allow time for institutional capacity in government and the private sector to develop.
• More economic and governance capacity needs to be in place before investment begins in a project, to enable investment and eventual revenues to generate real benefits to the rest of the economy, as well as appropriate, sustainable diversification.

This article uses the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) that took place in Tel Aviv to explore how cultural mega-events serve both as political arenas and as tools for identity construction, negotiation and contestation. These processes of identity politics are all conducted across national–subnational–international–transnational levels. The hosting of mega-events fleshes out these multiple processes in a very strong manner. We first discuss the politics of hosting mega-events in general. We then examine the identity politics associated more specifically with the Eurovision Song Contest, before examining in depth the complex forms of identity politics emerging around the competition following the 2018 Israeli victory. We suggest that it is important to study together the multiple processes—domestic, international and transnational—of identity politics that take place around the competition, as they interact with each other. Consequently, we follow the various stakeholders involved at these different levels and their interactions. We examine the internal identity negotiation process in Israel surrounding the event, the critical actors debating how to use the stage to challenge the liberal, western, ‘normal’ identity Israel hoped to project in the contest and how other stakeholders (participating states, national broadcasting agencies, participating artists) reacted to them, and finally we examine the behaviour of the institution in charge, the European Broadcasting Union, and national governments. We contribute to the study of mega-events as fields of contestation, to the understanding of the complex, multilevel nature of national identity construction, negotiation and contestation in the current era, and more broadly to the role that popular culture plays in this context.

Mass human displacement crises like those in Syria, Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar do not dissipate within a year or two. The average age of a refugee camp globally is 18 and counting.

Meanwhile, the pressures on resources and services in neighbouring countries absorbing an influx of vulnerable people can be harsh. Imagine the overstressed schools and hospitals where intake has doubled in areas of Jordan and Lebanon, and the damage to ecosystems and elephant habitats where camps have sprung up in Bangladesh. 

The fallout from such crises is prompting new ways of working in the international humanitarian system. These recognize that short-term, emergency responses can jeopardize national development goals if maintained indefinitely. In most refugee camps for instance, each family cooks with wood in regions already suffering from deforestation.

Reliance on polluting trucks to bring in fuel and water is high. At the same time, developing countries – which host 80 per cent of the record 70.8 million people currently displaced by conflict – desperately need to address health, water, energy and housing needs for their own populations. Aid and welfare interventions directed only at refugees can provoke frustrations amongst the local community, damaging social cohesion and fostering political instability. 

The Global Compact on Refugees, affirmed by the United Nations General Assembly one year ago, aims at fairer responsibility-sharing amongst countries and equitable resourcing to host communities and refugees. The Global Refugee Forum (GRF) taking place 17–18 December in Geneva is the starting point for donor pledges and commitments. 

An opportunity for refugee-hosting countries

Among the GRF’s 6 focus themes is ‘Energy and Infrastructure’ – a new priority for humanitarian aid and finance. This covers energy, environment, water and sanitation, health, shelter and connectivity – services that are tightly interconnected. In October, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) also launched its first energy strategy, which ‘promotes the transition to clean, renewable energy at refugee camps and hosting sites’.

Given this impetus, alongside a growing international focus on speeding up Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) delivery, stabilizing migration and supporting climate resilience, more aid and soft credit for interlinked objectives will become available. Countries hosting refugees have an opportunity; how they approach it will determine the level of support they attract and how effectively it is deployed. 

Policy conditions are key to success

In a refugee situation, energy access is about much more than keeping warm or cooking food. It is also about connecting with loved ones across borders, safety at night, healthy births and making a living. Due to the lack of long-term funding, maintenance systems or government approvals, failed pilots to introduce for example, solar streetlighting or clean cookstoves, are the norm. 

To increase their durability and reach, projects need to harness local markets and support national development goals, especially those on access to modern energy for all (SDG 7), protecting ecosystems (SDG 15) and resilient human settlements (SDG 11). Several examples of these are emerging, each with valuable lessons to share. 

The policy environment, in particular, coordination between authorities, humanitarian agencies and private sector actors, can make or break a project. Beyond the basic conditions of adequate security and refugee acceptance, our research highlights three enabling factors:

First: government willingness to engage in long-term response and resilience coordination. Jordan is the most advanced in this with its three-year rolling Response Plan for the Syria Crisis whereby the government works with humanitarian agencies to integrate refugee welfare with national development needs.

Here, energy, water and housing needs are specified and have attracted funding. For example, in Irbid, Jordan where over 137,600 Syrian refugees live, the Norwegian Refugee Council, is expanding a programme under the Renewable Energy for Refugees (RE4R) initiative that applies energy efficiency and solar water heating to reduce bills and rents for refugee tenants while adding value for Jordanian homeowners.   

Second: strong, clear, energy and environment plans and legislation. Signals can be mixed. Jordan’s ‘wheeling’ regulation, allowed UNHCR to reduce its electricity bills through specially built solar plants at Azraq and Zaatari, yet the current freeze on renewable connections has stifled further projects.

In Rwanda,  the government banned the supply of woodfuel to refugee camps on the basis of concerns about deforestation. The announcement sharpens focus on cleaner cooking.

Yet with little guidance on enforcement and the timeframe for change, it is difficult for UNHCR and its partners to plan viable schemes. A reversion to stove and fuel handouts is likely, damaging the potential to create markets for alternative cooking practices in the camps. 

Third: local fuel prices. Where polluting fuels are subsidized or untaxed, additional subsidy is needed to make cleaner alternatives competitive. The higher prices of diesel in Uganda for example are an incentive for solar projects at Bidi Bidi, the world’s largest refugee settlement.

The Gaia Association-UNHCR clean energy programme in Ethiopia’s Western refugee camps has avoided burning some 10,000 tonnes of wood since 2006 through ethanol, but if  VAT (which is applied to neither charcoal nor kerosene) were waived, it could scale up commercially. 

Joining up the dots

Many humanitarian and government dots could be joined up in support of the SDGs. In Rwanda for example, clarity on electrification plans – which appear to cover refugee areas – could allow camp mini-grids to be designed for eventual grid integration. In Jordan, lessons learned from the home upgrading programme could be applied to meet city climate resilience ambitions. 

Donors at the GRF should support humanitarian operations that leave a positive legacy, increasing the robustness of country infrastructure and systems. Host-country governments should help define and encourage projects that benefit national and refugee populations. This will be critical to both development outcomes and limiting future human suffering. 

The assassination of General Qassem Soleimani has created much speculation about the possible impact on oil markets and – although any impact will very much depend upon what happens next in terms of political and military responses – theoretically the potential exists for Iran to seriously destabilize oil markets, raising oil prices.

Arguably, it would be in Iran’s interest to do so. It would certainly hurt Trump’s possibility of a second term if higher prices were to last for some time as the 2020 presidential election gets underway. And it would also help shore up Iran’s failing economy. 

The assassination did initially cause oil prices to rise by a few dollars before quickly falling back, and the missile attacks by Iran produced a similar response. However, direct action by Iran to raise prices – for example by trying to close the Strait of Hormuz – is unlikely.

Around one-fifth of the world's oil supplies passes through the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow choke point between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula. Closing it would invite serious military action by the Americans and many of its allies who, so far, have been rather lukewarm over Trump’s actions. It would also possibly limit Iran’s own oil exports.

Similarly, overt attacks on American allies in the region such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE would probably invite too heavy a reaction, although this is uncertain given the lack of response after the alleged Iranian attacks on Abqaiq and Khurais in mid-September.

Indirect action by Iran to affect oil supplies is much more likely as they have many options by using their proxies to affect others’ oil production. This is especially true for Iraq, which is now an important source of global oil supply as Iraqi exports in 2019 averaged 3.53 million barrels per day (Mb/d), a significant amount.

Iraq’s future production has already been damaged as international oil companies are withdrawing staff for safety reasons, anticipating potential attacks by both Iraqi and Iranian sources. It is now very unlikely that the crucial ‘common seawater supply project’ being run by Exxon – essential for expanding production capacity – will go ahead in the near future.

However, one important consequence of the assassination that has attracted little attention is that it has almost fully restored the role of geopolitics into the determination of oil prices. Up to 2014, geopolitics played a key role in determining oil prices in the paper markets where perceptions and expectations ruled.

Prices determined in these markets – NYMEX in New York, ICE in London and other lesser futures markets throughout the world – then influence wet barrel markets where real barrels of oil are traded. 

In 2014, the world was so oversupplied with real oil barrels that the oil price collapsed – the price of Brent crude fell from $110.72 on 23 May to $46.44 eight months later. Thereafter, little if any attention was given to geopolitical events, and geopolitics became marginalized in the determination of crude oil prices.

This began to change in 2019. The market remained physically over-supplied but events in the Gulf began to attract attention. In June, there were a series of attacks on oil tankers close to the Gulf, followed by attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq processing facility and the Khurais oil field in September.

The Americans claimed these attacks were launched by Iran, but no convincing evidence for the claim was provided. Both attacks produced an initial price response but it was surprisingly limited and short-lived. However, it did suggest that geopolitics might be creeping back into influencing oil prices.

This became ever more noticeable in the third and fourth quarters as rumours regarding the trade talks between China and US clearly began to affect price – talks going well meant higher oil demand, and prices rose; talks going badly meant lower oil demand, and prices fell.

Meanwhile, the oil market showed signs of tightening towards the end of 2019. Although there was much cheating on the OPEC+ agreement that was trying to restrain production and protect prices, the OPEC meeting last December saw both Iraq and Nigeria agreeing to restrain production. 

US stock levels also began to fall in December and the futures markets began to price in a tightening market towards the end of 2020. Significantly, the tighter the market appears, the greater attention is paid to the level of spare producing capacity.

Just before the attack on Abqaiq, the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated there was 3.5 Mb/d spare capacity in OPEC which, historically, is quite comfortable. However, 2.5 of this was estimated to be in Saudi Arabia, so how much of this spare capacity still existed after the Abqaiq attack?

The Saudis claimed the Abqaiq capacity was quickly restored but technical experts greeted this with considerable skepticism, not least because the Abqaiq equipment was highly specialized. If spare capacity is tight, this makes the oil price vulnerable to geopolitical scares and rumours, real or imagined. 

Although the assassination of General Soleimani has exacerbated the sensitivity of oil markets to geopolitical events, this becomes irrelevant if a serious shooting war starts in the region. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iraq’s oil infrastructure remains highly vulnerable to attack either directly by Iran or one of its many proxies, suggesting oil prices will become increasingly volatile but, at the same time, benefit from a rising geopolitical premium.

Historically, Iraq lay claim to one of the most abundant water supplies in the Middle East. But the flow of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers has reduced by up to 40% since the 1970s, due in part to the actions of neighbouring countries, in particular Turkey, upstream.

Rising temperatures and reduced rainfall due to climate change are also negatively impacting Iraq’s water reserves. Evaporation from dams and reservoirs is estimated to lose the country up to 8 billion cubic metres of water every year.

A threat to peace and stability

Shortages have dried up previously fertile land, increasing poverty in agricultural areas. Shortages have also served to fuel conflict: communities faced with successive droughts and government inertia proved to be easy targets for ISIS recruiters, who lured farmers into joining them by offering money and food to feed their families. Economic hardship for those whose livelihoods relied upon river water has also driven rural to urban migration, putting significant strain on already over-populated towns and cities, exacerbating housing, job and electricity shortages, and widening the gap between haves and have-nots.

But scarcity isn’t the most crucial element of Iraq’s water crisis – contamination is. Decades of local government mismanagement, corrupt practices and a lack of regulation of dumping (it is estimated up to 70% of Iraq’s industrial waste is dumped directly into water) has left approximately three in every five citizens without a reliable source of potable water.

In 2018, 118,000 residents of Basra province were hospitalised with symptoms brought on by drinking contaminated water, which not only put a spotlight on the inadequacies of a crumbling healthcare system but sparked mass protests and a subsequent violent crackdown.

The water crisis is also undermining the stability of the country’s federal governance model, by occasionally sparking disputes between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government, as well as between governorates in the south.

The crisis is both a symptom and a cause of poor governance. Iraq is stuck in a cycle whereby government inaction causes shortages and contamination, which result in economic losses, reduced food supply, increased prices and widespread poor health. This in turn leads to increasing levels of poverty, higher demand on services and civil unrest, increasing the pressure on a weak, dysfunctional system of government.

What can be done?

The first priority should be modernising existing water-management infrastructure - a relic of a time when the problem was an excess rather than a shortage of water (the last time Iraq’s flood defences were required was 1968). Bureaucratic hurdles, widespread corruption and an endless cycle of other crises taking precedent prevent good initiatives from being implemented or scaled up.

Diversifying energy sources to improve provision is crucial. Baghdad has a sewage treatment plant that originally ran on its own electricity source, but this capacity was destroyed in 1991 and was never replaced. The city continues to suffer from dangerous levels of water pollution because the electricity supply from the grid is insufficient to power the plant. Solar energy has great potential in sun-drenched Iraq to bridge the gaping hole in energy provision, but successive governments have chosen to focus on fossil fuels rather than promoting investment to grow the renewables sector.

Heightened tension with upstream Turkey could turn water into another cause of regional conflict. But, if approached differently, collaboration between Iraq and its neighbour could foster regional harmony.

Turkey’s elevated geography and cooler climate mean its water reserves suffer 75% less evaporation than Iraq’s. Given that Turkey’s top energy priority is the diversification of its supply of imported hydrocarbons, a win-win deal could see Turkey exchange access to its water-management infrastructure for delivery of reduced cost energy supplies from Iraq.

German-French cooperation on coal and steel in the 1950s and the evolution of economic integration that followed might provide a model for how bilateral cooperation over one issue could result in cooperation with other regional players (in this case Iran and Syria) on a range of other issues. This kind of model would need to consider the future of energy, whereby oil and gas would be replaced by solar-power exports.

These solutions have been open to policymakers for years and yet they have taken little tangible action. While there are leaders and bureaucrats with the will to act, effective action is invariably blocked by a complex and opaque political system replete with vested interests in maintaining power and wealth via a weak state and limited services from central government.

Breaking the cycle

To break this cycle, Iraq needs a group of professional and able actors outside of government to work with willing elements of the state bureaucracy as a taskforce to pressure for action and accountability. Publishing the recommendations from a hitherto withheld report produced in the aftermath of Basra’s 2018 heath crisis would be a great start.

In time, this taskforce could champion the prioritisation of water on the national agenda, the implementation of infrastructure upgrades, and hold more productive conversations with neighbour states.

With such a high degree of state fragmentation and dysfunction in Iraq, looking to the central government to provide leadership will not yield results. Engagement with a coalition of non-state actors can begin to address the water crisis and also open a dialogue around new models of governance for other critical issues. This might even be a starting point for rewriting the tattered social contract in Iraq.

This piece is based on insights and discussion at a roundtable event, Conflict and the Water Crisis in Iraq, held at Chatham House on March 9 as part of the Iraq Initiative.