Pro-Trump businessmen Elon Musk (the richest man in the world) and Vivek Ramaswamy have officially joined the incoming Trump administration. President-elect Donald Trump announced in a statement published Tuesday that […]

The post Breaking: Musk, Ramaswamy Officially Join Trump Administration - Their Job Is to Destroy Bureaucracy appeared first on The Western Journal.

Springbok coach Rassie Erasmus wants a tour whitewash and, with the Scotland win, he's a third of the way there. He didn't say it would be pretty, as Sunday's success at Murrayfield showed.

With some of its infrastructure decaying and no premier division club using it, the somewhat abandoned Dobsonville Stadium offered the perfect setting for Sage Stephens to take his first steps as a Bafana Bafana player at the ripe age of 33.

Canan Moodie used his start against Scotland to show that he is about far more than just pace out wide and aerial ability.

Sir Kenny Dalglish hailed nine-time Major champion Gary Player and expressed his delight at Liverpool's position at the top of the Premier League during his visit to South Africa this weekend.

In his latest Rucking with Rob newsletter, Rob Houwing argues that for England to have any hopes of beating the Springboks, they'll have to be on the ball in the final stages.

As captain, Aiden Markram is allowed a long rope from a wonky form perspective, but how long can that rope be as the run river continues to shrivel, asks Khanyiso Tshwaku.

Bafana Bafana coach Hugo Broos has welcomed the number of young players who are given a chance and backed in the premier division, but has warned that to build on their progress, agents must prioritise players' development over their personal enrichment.

Former Kaizer Chiefs legend Brian Baloyi says that holding the Kaizer Chiefs No 1 jersey requires a hardened mentality, but he is upbeat over Amakhosi's chances this season.

The Springboks will continue to evolve their attack, but they must do so within the framework of what has made them so successful, says attack coach Tony Brown.

The race to succeed Bill Beaumont as chairman of World Rugby comes to a conclusion in a vote in Dublin at the governing body's headquarters on Thursday.

The first battle cry has sounded ahead of the showdown at Twickenham on Saturday, with English winger Tommy Freeman reckoning that the Springboks are 'still human' and 'still playing the same game'.

Evidence Makgopa wore a sheepish smile when Bafana Bafana coach Hugo Broos showered him with praise before literally patting the forward on the back, making him blush at Dobsonville Stadium.

Wednesday's third T20 between South Africa and India at SuperSport Park in Centurion is shaping up to be a run-drenched one, especially if the weather holds and SA's bowling centre doesn't.

Late injection Johan Grobbelaar may find himself more than simply an “extra” on the Bok tour, writes Rob Houwing.

Originally posted on Oct 28, 2022 It was an honor to be interviewed by the beautiful and patriotic Sandy Rios about my book and my journey writing it on her show, “Sandy Rios In the Morning.” https://afr.net/podcasts/sandy-rios-in-the-morning/2022/october/cynthia-farahat-discusses-her-new-book-the-secret-apparatus-the-muslim-brotherhood-s-industry-of-death/

Cairo, Egypt Oct. 28, 2022 On Egyptian TV show, “Headlines,” Dr. Hossam Farouk dedicated an episode to discussing national and international coverage of the Secret Apparatus: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Industry of Death. It was a great honor having the book featured on this great show.

By SADF – Nov. 30, 2022 Online conversation on The West, a New Haven for the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’s Planetary Nebula’? On November the 29th at 16H.00 (CET), SADF promoted an online conversation in the web platform StreamYard titled ‘The West, a New Haven for the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’s Planetary Nebula’?’ The conversation included the Member of the European Parliament (EPP, […]

By Walter Donway, Savvy Street originally published on Dec. 4, 2022 Book Review: The Secret Apparatus: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Industry of Death by Cynthia Farahat, Post Hill Press, Bombardier Books (2022) A grim irony of twentieth-century history (but, of course, also predating it) is that the most horrendous threats to humanity have simply been too monstrously evil […]

By Cynthia Farahat On Friday 27th, 2023 at 11:00 am EST, my sweet dear younger brother Amir Farahat passed away. Amir was the most loving father I have ever seen, a great brother, son, husband, and brother-in-law. My little Miró, my little prince, my soul is shattered by your loss. I will forever mourn your […]

TikTok will have more US users than Snapchat and Pinterest in 2022   January 24, 2022 (New York, NY) – YouTube is the “OG” of influencer marketing platforms, and it’s […]

Carvana is America’s fastest-growing e-tailer   February 23, 2022 (New York, NY) – Americans have taken to buying cars online, so much so that ecommerce car dealer Carvana is now […]

3.6 million will pay with crypto in US; payment value to spike 70% in 2022   April 20, 2022 (New York, NY) – Cryptocurrency usage will continue its meteoric rise, […]

May 10, 2022 (New York, NY) – Elon Musk has his work cut out for him as he takes the reigns at Twitter. Worldwide user growth will be essentially flat […]

June 22, 2022 (New York, NY) – Will Apple’s entry into the buy now, pay later (BNPL) space upend the already competitive industry? That’s the question many are trying to […]

Toni Annala, Marc Hoyois and Ryomei Iwasa
J. Amer. Math. Soc. 38 (), 243-289.
Abstract, references and article information

Marcelo Campos, Matthew Jenssen, Marcus Michelen and Julian Sahasrabudhe
J. Amer. Math. Soc. 38 (), 179-224.
Abstract, references and article information

Nonphotochemical quenching (NPQ) is a mechanism of regulating light harvesting that protects the photosynthetic apparatus from photodamage by dissipating excess absorbed excitation energy as heat. In higher plants, the major light-harvesting antenna complex (LHCII) of photosystem (PS) II is directly involved in NPQ. The aggregation of LHCII is proposed to be involved in quenching. However, the lack of success in isolating native LHCII aggregates has limited the direct interrogation of this process. The isolation of LHCII in its native state from thylakoid membranes has been problematic because of the use of detergent, which tends to dissociate loosely bound proteins, and the abundance of pigment–protein complexes (e.g. PSI and PSII) embedded in the photosynthetic membrane, which hinders the preparation of aggregated LHCII. Here, we used a novel purification method employing detergent and amphipols to entrap LHCII in its natural states. To enrich the photosynthetic membrane with the major LHCII, we used Arabidopsis thaliana plants lacking the PSII minor antenna complexes (NoM), treated with lincomycin to inhibit the synthesis of PSI and PSII core proteins. Using sucrose density gradients, we succeeded in isolating the trimeric and aggregated forms of LHCII antenna. Violaxanthin- and zeaxanthin-enriched complexes were investigated in dark-adapted, NPQ, and dark recovery states. Zeaxanthin-enriched antenna complexes showed the greatest amount of aggregated LHCII. Notably, the amount of aggregated LHCII decreased upon relaxation of NPQ. Employing this novel preparative method, we obtained a direct evidence for the role of in vivo LHCII aggregation in NPQ.

Cracking down on kleptocracy Interview LJefferson 4 August 2022

In the third of a series of interviews with the Queen Elizabeth II Academy faculty, Alex Cooley examines the challenges of reigning in kleptocratic networks.

Recently you spoke at the Queen Elizabeth II Academy about kleptocracy, and the impact of the individual sanctions used to target kleptocrats since the war on Ukraine began.

As you can imagine, the problems of dark money and  kleptocracy are familiar to Londoners. People tend to associate kleptocracy with Russia; why is that? Is its rise linked to the global decline of democracy that has taken place over the past 15 years?   

This is a great question. Kleptocracy literally means ‘rule by thieves’, and in contemporary usage refers to the plundering of economies and societies by political elites for their own personal gain. 

It does not necessarily have to track with democratic backsliding, but in many countries, it has for a couple of reasons. First, over the last 30 years, as globalization has expanded, with more integrated financial markets and greater provision of services to support this expansion (accountants, shell company providers, lawyers), transnational kleptocracy networks have also become more expansive as there is now a more sophisticated co-mingling of licit and illicit funds through these networks of globalization.

Second, like the illiberal norms and practices that are promoting democratic backsliding, kleptocracy networks should be thought of as global in scale and reach. Corruption tends to be framed as an illegal act that takes place within states, while international rankings of levels of corruption by watchdogs like Transparency International tend to reinforce this view.

However, corrupt acts that may initially occur domestically are facilitated by a number of transnational actors and processes, many of them operating out of so-called ‘clean’ countries. At the end of the day, for a kleptocrat to profit from his or her stolen loot, they must store those funds where their value will be guaranteed by strong property rights protections. That means that the destination for kleptocrats is often the West, jurisdictions that enjoy rule of law, that have good financial services, and that guarantee privacy to client services. 

To give  a brief example of a hypothetical kleptocrat, take a regional official in China who has skimmed money off a state contract; that money will be booked into by an accounting firm in Hong Kong, then will be used to purchase an offshore vehicle – another tool of globalization – a shell company that is registered in the British Virgin Islands (BVI) but is sold, as part of a complex structure of nested companies, by a shell company provider, such as the Panama-based law firm Mossack Fonseca, at the centre of the Panama Papers exposé, which specialized in selling complex shell company structures to conceal the true owners.

Then, that entity will open an actual corporate bank account in a global financial centre, say in Switzerland. Finally, that account from a ‘clean’ jurisdiction may purchase a luxury asset, such as a condominium in New York, without having to disclose the actual beneficial owner. That is a relatively simple transaction, but it includes jurisdictions from Hong Kong, the BVI, Panama, Switzerland, and New York to abet this initial act of local embezzlement by a mid-level Chinese official. 

You’re telling the story of why this has become transnational and global, but this is very much a supply-driven story. Is there a demand-side to this story?  

Sure, and this is the other side of globalization. You asked initially why so many Russians and former Soviet individuals were associated with kleptocratic schemes. This is because in the 1990s, as these institutions and tools of globalization proliferated, there was a chaotic economic transition underway in the former Soviet Union.

Economic transition in places like Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan andTajikistan, transpired at the time of this financial deregulation, where there was a general perception that all capital account openness was good and that the international community assisted these countries with financial liberalization. The offshore dynamic is particularly pronounced in the post-Soviet countries because the state-building, regime consolidation, and reform of these economies coincided with this era of financial globalization.  

Why has the UK government turned a blind eye to this problem for so long? Is there profit that has been made? Is it too difficult?  

This is a really good question. First, the UK is the centre of many of the service providers that are absolutely critical for the operation of kleptocratic networks. There are two sides to being a kleptocrat. One is the money-laundering side, where dubiously acquired loot needs to be turned into legitimate assets that are safe and protected by the rule of law – this requires Western-based wealth managers, bankers, lawyers, real estate brokers and accountants.

The second is reputation laundering. How do you recast yourself in the global spotlight from a controversial figure who made money in controversial transactions into an internationally respected, global business and philanthropist? Doing so requires that you donate to philanthropic causes, secure appointments on corporate and non-for-profit boards, support higher-education institutions and retain lobbyists, advisors, and cultivating allies within your residing country’s political system. These are all ways in which you can try and manage your image.

Also, because of the UK’s strict libel laws, you have leaders in public relations and reputation management industries that are retained to closely monitor all media mentions of that individual, and to challenge or quash any negative characterizations about them. 

It is easy to see why the UK is attractive to kleptocrats, but why has it taken the UK government so long to respond? Is it just a simple calculation: this is money that is hard to turn down and there is at least plausible deniability of its more nefarious sources? 

It is really good money and kleptocrats engage in various legitimate business and cultural activities in order to obscure their sketchy pasts. It is very difficult to prove that their original wealth was actually obtained illegally. And, until now, there has not been a strong international norm and cooperation against kleptocrats the way there is with illicit actors such as terrorists or drug traffickers. 

Is it also because it is not strictly speaking illegal? Is there a sense that there is ‘money from uncertain sources being put to good purposes’? 

Many will make this argument too! If the source of funds is not strictly illegal, then why not actually use this wealth to ‘do good’? For example, why not have scholarships for students who need them at the university?  As long as there is no overt interference in the terms of these donations, what is the harm?

The problem with this line of reasoning is that it allows kleptocrats to create positive profiles. Indeed, these acts of charity can be leveraged in legal proceedings or in public opinion to burnish their reputations and establish track records of being good citizens.

It also creates supportive constituencies in society. For example, if you buy, even with your questionably acquired wealth, a major football team and you take it to the peak of success, you are revered and now have a platform to even contest previous critical accounts of you. 

Do you think that the war in Ukraine will prove to be an inflection point in terms of how other advanced democracies in Europe and North America treat this problem, and not only the UK?

I hope so – I have seen some hopeful trends. For instance, some countries have expedited the implementation of important anti-corruption legislation that they already passed. And there is a broader understanding that it is now a matter of national security to actually know who owns what in your country, whether it’s a company, commercial property, a bank account, or a holding company. 

I also think the Russian oligarchs themselves have been fatally stigmatized.. They can no longer control the overwhelmingly negative image and association with the Kremlin that this ghastly war has brought. Also, we are seeing push in the UK for reform on SLAPPS, while the National Crime Agency has established a dedicated ‘kleptocracy cell’ designed to investigate the hidden wealth of oligarchs and possible sanctions avoidance.

But the latter will require sustained funding and staffing. Unfortunately, most of their assets are not in luxury yachts that are relatively easy to seize, but embedded in complex webs of opaque global transactions. It will be challenging to even identify these assets, let alone freeze and confiscate them. 

We have talked a lot about Russia for obvious reasons, but if you go down the list, who’s next when it comes to the source of this problem? 

Countries with especially powerful ruling families that have been in power for a long time, and that have some sort of rentier economy, either extractives, natural resources, or big former state-operated enterprises that perhaps have been privatized.

For example, oil-exporting countries like Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan have incubated classic kleptocrats along with transnational reputation laundering schemes involving Western institutions.   

During your talk with the Academy fellows at Chatham House, you suggested that the pressure on kleptocrats would also have broader geopolitical effects. Can you say more about this? Is there a risk that measures intended to excise kleptocrats from our economies leads to greater divisions globally?

Whether there will be comprehensive anti-kleptocracy reforms in the US, London, Canada and Switzerland  remains an open question, but already  kleptocrats are shifting away from Western jurisdictions and going further Eastward; they are going to Singapore, and they are also going to the Gulf, especially the UAE.

There are a number of reports now of Russian oligarchs relocating and residing there and taking their assets with them. The UAE is not part of the sanctions regime even though it is a US security partner, and in fact it has scored very poorly on illicit money laundering rankings and watchdog lists.

China’s political chessboard: The 20th party congress 14 October 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 August 2022 Online

As the CCP gathers for its quinquennial political event, experts analyse its national, regional and global relevance.

In October, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) assembles to appoint new leaders and discuss political, social, economic and foreign policy priorities for the coming 2022–2027 period and beyond.

One of the key outcomes of the meeting of China’s political class is the future of current President Xi Jinping. Technically, as he is at the end of his second five-year term, Xi was due to step down this year. The next generation of leadership was supposed to step in, as the next stage of the party’s evolution takes place.

However, this is unlikely to happen. The president has consolidated his power, manoeuvring allies into key positions and developing a faction of support in the party. With ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ added to the party charter and China’s constitution and term limits removed, Xi shows no intention of stepping down.

However, the president is not all-powerful. Critics and alternative factions operate within the party. His second term has also had to contend with the botched early handling of the pandemic, worsening ties with the US, and a slowing economy.

In an increasingly unpredictable world, events in the 2022 Party Congress will be hugely impactful for China’s and global affairs. What trajectory will Beijing take?

Key questions the panel discuss include:

• How does the Party Congress function and what does it mean for domestic Chinese politics?

• Will President Xi’s political and economic legacies continue under new political leaders and policymakers?

• What does President Xi’s next role in China’s government tell us about his power?

• As the 20th CCP Party Congress takes place, is there unity and cohesion at the top of the political structure?

• Will the Party Congress have any impact on China’s international relations? Particularly the US?

 As with all Chatham House member events, questions from members drive the conversation.

Read the transcript. 

Russia–China defence and security relations: Insights from the expert community 13 September 2022 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 31 August 2022 Online

Experts share insights on Russia–China military, defence, and security relations. 

In the defence and security realms, Russia–China relations resemble more pragmatic cooperation based on shared, calculated interests than an alliance.

This event presents and discusses key findings from a recent expert survey conducted by Chatham House with the aim to gather insights on Russia–China military, defence, and security relations.

Survey responses helped identify areas of bilateral cooperation but also crucial friction points and obstacles that prevent the relationship from developing further, as well as policy pathways for the West.

Russia-China Defence and Security Relations

This project explores the military and security linkages between Russia and China.

The project seeks to provide a nuanced understanding of Russia-China relations in the defence and security realms.

It also seeks to understand Russian political and security perceptions regarding Chinese inroads into what Russia considers its ‘near abroad’, as well as other sources of irritation and tension in the bilateral relationship. It offers recommendations to guide NATO policy responses.

A guide to the Chinese Communist Party's National Congress The World Today rescobales.drupal 21 September 2022

In the first of a three-part series examining the global importance of the CCP’s 20th National Congress, Yu Jie explains how it makes its big decisions.

Why does the CCP National Congress matter?

The world’s most populous country and its smallest state have little in common with one exception: how they select their leader. Like the Vatican, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) shrouds its leadership selection process in secrecy.

Every five years, a week-long conclave – the Party Congress – is held and at its end a new cohort of leaders is presented that will steer the world’s second largest economy for the next five years.

The congress is the most important date in China’s political calendar. It not only selects China’s leadership team but acts as a signpost indicating the direction the country will be heading in the near future, with implications for decades to come. It also reveals the breadth and depth of power held by Xi Jinping, the party’s general-secretary.

The 20th CCP National Congress, opening on October 16 and expected to last a week, is taking place during unsettling times. While Xi Jinping is expected to embark on his third term as general-secretary of the party after the removal of a two-term limit in February 2018, it is hardly a crowning glory. Xi’s China is battling an economic maelstrom at home while juggling fraught foreign relations abroad.

What does the National Congress do?

Quite simply, the CCP National Congress is the gathering that defines China’s political leadership and sets the tone for its relationship with the rest of the world.

It serves to fulfil three primary functions:

First, it sets the party’s principal agenda across all policy sectors, from macroeconomics to the price of food. During the week, it draws up a consensus-based evaluation of the party’s work over the past five years, which includes a detailed examination of the party’s current situation.

Second, it introduces any revisions to the party constitution deemed necessary, for instance on changes to the criteria for leadership recruitment or amendments to the party’s ‘guiding ideology’.

Third, it selects the leadership team that will steer China for the next five years, a function that attracts the most international attention but is not the sole purpose of the congress.

How is the party leadership team chosen?

The congress comprises 2,300 delegates representing all levels of the party hierarchy across 34 provinces and regions – from the governors of towns and cities, to Olympic champions, astronauts, and even the odd stand-up comedian to mark the ‘inclusiveness’ of the party.

The votes that decide the next cohort of party leaders come from three committees only: the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, with 205 members and 171 alternate members (alternate members are simply substitutes to replace a member if they die, retire or are dismissed); the Central Committee, with 204 members; and the Politburo, with 25 members, only one of whom is a woman.

Unlike multiparty elections in liberal democracies, neither the full 25 members of the Politburo nor the seven members of its Standing Committee are nominated by or directly voted for by constituents.

A procedure known as ‘democratic recommendation’ is essentially a straw poll that includes all congress participants. They are then given a ballot listing the names of around 200 Politburo candidates in stroke order – the Chinese equivalent to alphabetical order. This short-listing process is completed in the run-up to the congress. Some pundits asserted that this process was put on hold after 2017, yet this has not been formally confirmed within the party constitution.

A few senior delegates may express their preferences to their colleagues anonymously during this process. All the shortlisted candidates must meet the criteria for Politburo membership, which means serving at either a ministerial rank or above or in the People’s Liberation Army at military region level or above and being younger than 62.

Based on the result of this straw poll, and more importantly on the preferences of current Politburo members, the incumbent Politburo and its Standing Committee will approve the nominees, conclude the Seventh Plenum of the 19th Party Congress and call for the 20th Congress. The delegates at the Party Congress then ceremonially cast their votes for the Politburo at the Party Congress although the result is pre-agreed, a procedure somewhat similar to the US Electoral College.

What are the rules for choosing Politburo members?

The Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) consists of between five and nine members, with seven selected at the 19th Congress. It is the supreme decision-making body of the Communist Party as well as the People’s Republic of China.

If the 20th Congress follows convention, there are three de-facto rules to be followed:

First, Politburo and Standing Committee members must retire at 68. This age limit is known as ‘Eight down, Seven up’.

Second, new appointments to the PSC are drawn exclusively from regular Politburo members. The only exceptions to this rule have been Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, who were appointed at the 17th Party Congress in 2007.

This exception follows the third convention, under which PSC appointees are among the youngest senior party leaders eligible. Potentially three vacancies could arise in 2022, as Xi himself is 69 but it is highly unlikely that he would step down. That would be a radical departure from past precedents.

The extent to which past procedure is applied could act as a signal as to whether Xi Jinping is consolidating his power, while the size of the standing committee will be scrutinized to assess how much power Xi wields.

If the procedure for leadership appointments at the 20th Congress deviates from these conventions, it could indicate two things. First, the CCP faces a new set of challenges and requires the introduction of new rules to shape the top leadership. Or, second, Xi has gained substantial personal power that allows him to bypass the collective leadership system endorsed by Deng Xiaoping and choose appointees to suit his own taste. There has thus far been little evidence from the official media to reflect on any changes.

Changes in party institutional constraints, however, raise the danger of undermining governance at home and China’s relations abroad.

Read the two further articles in this series: the second discusses the key domestic policy themes that Xi Jinping is expected to outline at this year’s congress; the third analyses the foreign policy issues likely to be discussed at the congress.   

Beijing briefing: Party power remains a male preserve The World Today mhiggins.drupal 27 September 2022

Yu Jie explores why so few women have won leadership roles in Communist China.

UPDATE: Since this article was published at the end of September, the incoming members of the Politburo and the Standing Committee were announced at the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress on October 22. The party broke more than two decades of convention by not appointing any women to the Politburo or its Standing Committee. The sole woman among the outgoing 19th CCP Politburo, Sun Chunlan, will retire. Only 33 women rank among the 376 members of the 20th CPC Central Committee, which elects the Politburo - less than one in 10.

As the curtain of the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress gets ready to rise, the lack of female representation in Beijing’s corridors of power attracts international attention once again.

Female participation in Chinese finance, science, sports or other aspects of society is relatively healthy. Yet there has never been a single woman at the apex of power in the party nor any who has held a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee, the supreme decision-making body for the party and the state.

Historically, China has been run by a number of powerful women starting in 307BC during the first imperial era of the Middle Kingdom. In the Qin Dynasty the Queen Dowager Xuan held de facto power for 35 years during the Warring States period.

More than 2,000 years later, Empress Dowager Cixi wined and dined her European visitors at the Imperial Summer Palace. She was also responsible for the demise of the late Qing Dynasty. Their legacies continue to fascinate and inspire stories in contemporary China.

In modern times, Mao Zedong, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, proclaimed that ‘women hold up half of the sky’. While Chinese law states that women and men should have equal rights in all aspects of political life, the reality is that women remain marginalized in politics, even after the economic and social transformation seen in the past few decades. Chinese men continue to dominate political power.

The top three party, military or state leadership positions have never been filled by a woman and none of China’s 26 ministers is female. There is only one woman among the 31 party bosses that control China’s provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions and only one woman among the 25 members of the all-powerful Politburo, and she oversaw the government’s response to the Covid pandemic. She is Vice-Premier Sun Chunlan, a former party boss of Fujian Province. Among the 371 members of the Central Committee, which elects the Politburo, there are only 30 women, which is less than one in 10.

Women are less likely to join the Communist Party

It is difficult to explain why female participation in the Chinese elite politics is so low but social convention certainly plays its part. Despite increasing financial independence and much improved career prospects, Chinese women are still expected to run the household and look after the children while holding down a full-time job. This surely reduces opportunities to seek public offices.

Although unspoken, China’s experience of handing power to a woman may be another reason why the party is hesitant to put a female in charge. Jiang Qing, better known to the outside world as Madame Mao, was China’s de-facto First Lady until 1976. She was one of the architects of the ‘Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution’, which ushered in a decade of chaos and political upheaval and brought the country to a standstill.

Successive leaders have been determined to prevent a repeat of this misfortune so no woman has been chosen for a top leadership role. But perhaps the main reason for the absence of women in top positions is the way people move up the party ranks.

Women make up around 49 per cent of China’s 1.4 billion population, yet they account for only about 30 per cent of the Chinese Communist Party membership. Once inside the party they are often handed less competitive positions. Rising through the ranks requires party members to achieve certain career breakthroughs. Such success makes them eligible to participate in high politics.

The majority of China’s top leaders have served as a party chief of a province or municipality, a position women rarely achieve. Consequently, few female candidates are considered eligible for more senior roles.

By the time they qualify for Politburo membership, too often they are fast approaching the retirement age for Chinese women politicians: 55. As it is rare to secure a spot on the Politburo under that age, women are virtually ruled out from joining this exclusive group of 25 people.

The Iron Lady of China

There has been one exception since the early 2000s. Vice-Premier Wu Yi, who is known as the Iron Lady of China, was described by Forbes magazine as the third most powerful woman in the world. She led China into the World Trade Organization and successfully bid for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. However, her success has been an exception, not a rule.

While Chinese women have been given a nominal egalitarian status with female astronauts, female Olympic champions and female Nobel Prize laureates in place, beneath the surface older practices of patriarchy still hold firm. Liberated or not, the quest for a Chinese female leader under the Communist Party is a long way off.

China Party Congress: Xi’s political blueprint The World Today rescobales.drupal 28 September 2022

In the second of her three-part series on the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Yu Jie outlines two key policy themes we can expect Xi to define: ‘common prosperity’ and ‘self-reliance’.

What can we expect from the Party Congress?

In mid-October five years ago, the 19th Party Congress opened with Xi Jinping delivering a political report lasting three-and-a-half hours. He will repeat the performance on October 16, the opening day of this year’s 20th Party congress.

Bland as its name may be, this political report is one of the Party Congress’s core items of business. It remains the most authoritative public account of the Chinese Communist Party’s path on all major policy fronts, containing a laundry list of policies undertaken by the outgoing Central Committee in the past five years, while putting forward guidance for future policy.

It represents the view of the current Politburo Standing Committee and that of the CCP. The 20th Congress report is a collegial effort and should not be considered Xi’s personal manifesto, nor should it be counted as another of his speeches to his comrades.

However, as general-secretary of the party for the past decade, it will most probably reflect many of the elements that Xi has influenced.

What are China’s political priorities?

No matter how complicated the geopolitics of the world becomes, Xi sticks to the conservative approach that has served his country well for past centuries: that China prioritizes the management of its own affairs.

Since the Cold War ended, two recurring themes have dominated the political report: the economy and security. For the 20th session, Xi will use the phrases ‘common prosperity’ as shorthand for the economy and ‘self-reliance’ for security.

Xi introduced the slogan ‘common prosperity’ at the start of his third term in August 2021. His aim was to close the income gap, address regional economic inequality and improve social welfare provision. Rebalancing social inequality was seen as essential to avoid the social disruption witnessed in other parts of the world.

Xi’s concept of ‘common prosperity’ was influenced by his childhood experiences living in exile in a remote village in Shanxi Province, in northwest China, during the Cultural Revolution. The ensuing upheaval was to prove a tragedy for his family and a disaster for the country.

His ambition is to define progress not in terms of producing double-digit growth but in dealing with the long-standing challenge of scarcities across different sections of society to meet ‘people’s ever-growing needs for a better life’. This direction was indicated at the 19th Party Congress by the term ‘shifting the principal contradiction’.

What state is the Chinese economy in?

Xi may have arrived at the right diagnosis but he has so far failed to find a cure that invokes ‘common prosperity’. After sweeping regulatory measures, the CCP has clamped down on its most successful private companies and spooked investors. While providing 80 per cent of China’s jobs, private enterprises are worried that the ‘common prosperity’ initiative may jeopardize their business.

Equally, Beijing’s zero-Covid policy has discouraged much-needed investment and failed to win the hearts and minds of Chinese youth, who have suffered most, both economically and socially.

The challenge facing Xi over the next five years will be to manage the financial risks in downsizing China’s property sector while coming out of a rigidly imposed Covid lockdown without reducing economic growth to such an extent that it damages the personal wealth of millions of people.

One hopes that Xi’s policies in future will be based on an innovative reading of the first-century phrase ‘seeking truth from facts’ adopted by Mao Zedong and last promoted as the political philosophy of Deng Xiaoping in the Seventies. A healthy market economy is not only essential for China’s development but as the only means of maintaining the party’s legitimacy, something vital for Xi.

Does China need more security?

China’s weakened export markets and less-friendly relations with the United States have encouraged it to become more self-reliant. Expect an emphasis on greater self-sufficiency in sectors of strategic importance to form a substantial part of this year’s political report.

In view of increased international hostility, Xi and his lieutenants have publicly recognized the need to take control of production and supply chains. These supply chains need to become ‘self-determined, self-controlled’ they have said, voicing frustration that the highest value-added elements of the Chinese tech sector remain reliant on overseas suppliers and vulnerable to geopolitical tensions.

Equally, on food and energy security, Russia’s invasion in Ukraine has exacerbated China’s already fragile food supplies as both countries are vital sources of food imports. Xi has already called for a ‘comprehensive thrift strategy’ to manage China’s food and energy needs.

Beijing is equally worried about the increase in oil and commodity prices which is driving up the cost of living. This may push parts of Chinese society out of ‘common prosperity’ and into ‘common poverty’, as it threatens to in some parts of Europe.

For the next five years, Xi needs to strike a balance between ‘common prosperity’ and ‘self-reliance’ to mitigate the storms ahead. He cannot afford to lockdown the world’s second largest economy indefinitely.

The hope is that the 20th Party congress will bring much-needed course corrections.

Read the two further articles in this series: the first provides a guide to why the Chinese Communist Party Congress matters; the third analyses the foreign policy issues likely to be discussed at the congress.  

Book preview: Guide to Chinese Climate Policy 2022 20 October 2022 — 10:00AM TO 11:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 28 September 2022 Chatham House and Online

Join authors David Sandalow and Michal Meidan to discuss their upcoming book.

China is the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases and a key player in tackling the global climate crisis. Its stated climate policies, namely its high-level targets to peak emissions by 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060, are significant.

But while national-level ministries, local governments and businesses are setting climate roadmaps, implementation is challenging at times. In the current context of the global energy market and geopolitical turmoil, China’s need to maintain energy security can seem at odds with its climate pledges.

The authors will present the book, which examines Chinese emissions, the impacts of climate change in China, as well as China’s domestic and international climate change policies and the main implementation challenges these policies face.

China's Party Congress: a dose of foreign policy realism is needed The World Today mhiggins.drupal 11 October 2022

In the final article of three on the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress, which opens on 16 October, Yu Jie argues that Beijing must show more pragmatism about Taiwan and the West.

How important is foreign policy at the congress?  

The political reports delivered to the delegates of the week-long 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress, which happens every five years, follow a Marxist-Leninist formula. Economics and the means of production form the base, while politics and society fill in the superstructure. 

We can expect sections on the work of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), ideological discussion, economics, domestic politics, foreign affairs, cultural reform and social developments. Usually, the report prioritizes big domestic political issues.  

The political report typically sheds some light on the status of, and relationships between, senior party members. It can also provide insights into the political fortunes of various interest groups. The report acts as a summary of the party’s achievements and its plans – expressed as the lowest common denominator of consensus between competing factions. 

This year’s congress should be no different, and the political reshuffle that takes place is likely to signal how Beijing intends to rise to the many challenges at home and abroad. 

Given China’s growing power and its fraught relationship with the West, this year’s congress is expected to feature serious discussion on weighty foreign affairs issues affecting Beijing, and which will have long-lasting implications for the rest of the world.  

Which geopolitical issues will be priorities?  

When it comes to foreign affairs, China’s priorities rarely change. The CCP seeks to create a stable external environment to foster its domestic economic development. This conservative maxim was advocated in the 1980s by China’s then-paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, and it will continue to guide Beijing’s relationships after this congress. 

While we don’t know the exact details of this year’s political report, we can expect discussion on relations with the US-led West, a possible shift in the relationship between Beijing and Moscow, and elaboration on China’s ties with the Global South.  

Notably, it’s likely that a separate chapter of the political report will see Taiwan treated alongside the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau, signalling the party’s commitment to its claims over the contested island.  

Despite a chorus of nationalistic rhetoric surrounding the issue of Taiwan, Beijing will be careful not to stumble into an international conflict which risks causing colossal damage on all fronts. The choice of language on the so-called ‘Taiwan question’ in this political report will serve as a bellwether as to how, if at all, the party might fundamentally shift its views regarding Taiwan and deviate from the principle of ‘peaceful reunification’, the policy stated at every congress since 1979. 

How have China’s relations with the West worsened?  

President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, the first by an American president to the Communist nation, kicked off five decades of relative stability. However, as China’s global influence has grown, so have Washington’s fears.  

The relationship has transitioned from the cooperation and relative stability that existed under President George W. Bush and President Hu Jintao in the early 2000s, into one characterized by volatility and competition under Xi Jinping, Joe Biden and Donald Trump. These tensions are almost certain to continue in Xi’s likely third term. 

Elements of China’s relationship with the West, such as cooperation over military and aviation technology, are becoming far more competitive. At the same time, trade and investment, once viewed as strong ties, have been rapidly deteriorating – as seen, for example, by several major publicly listed Chinese state-owned enterprises and large private companies withdrawing from the New York Stock Exchange.  

Will Beijing stand by the Kremlin despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?  

At the same time, Beijing’s close relationship with Moscow and its lack of opposition to Russia’s war in Ukraine have put China in an awkward position. The CCP has realized that cooperation with its long-standing ally and neighbour must come with substantial limits to avoid undermining its own political priorities and interests.  

Russia’s recklessness may spur Xi and the CCP’s senior leadership to minimize the economic, financial and political risks associated with the Kremlin’s pursuit of war against a country aligned with, and supported by, the West.  

Will China continue to support its regional partners?  

On its ties with the Global South, Beijing began to rethink its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy gained geopolitical momentum. Regions of Southeast Asia and South Asia received a lot of funding and resources for BRI projects, as seen with Chinese support for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.  

Xi also recently introduced the Global Development and Global Security initiatives, which the political report should flesh out. 

Beijing is fully aware that it can only prosper if its regional partners prosper, and it can only achieve resource security and border stability if its southern and western neighbours in Myanmar and Afghanistan cease to fight over land and resources. 

Chinese foreign policy over the last five years has been a strange combination of high-octane rhetoric and patient pragmatism. To respond to this contradiction, the congress could be used as an opportunity to inject a dose of realism.  

Read the two further articles in this series: the first is a guide to why the Chinese Communist Party Congress matters; the second discusses the key domestic policy themes that Xi Jinping is expected to outline at this year’s congress.

Why a more inward-looking China is bad news for the world economy Expert comment LToremark 16 October 2022

The increased role of geopolitics and ideology in Beijing’s economic decision-making is bad news not just for China but for the world.

This quote by President Xi clearly outlines the inward tilt of Chinese economic policymaking that is now becoming increasingly obvious to the rest of the world. But it actually has deep roots. Ever since the 2008 global financial crisis, when the West’s reliability as a trading partner was thrown into question, self-reliance has become a more decisive organizing principle for Chinese officials.

As a result, the export-dependent growth model on which China built its economic rise in recent decades has been fraying. Exports as a share of China’s GDP peaked at 35 per cent in 2007 but had fallen to around 20 per cent by last year, a level not seen since before China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. This shows that net exports no longer make any meaningful contribution to Chinese GDP growth.

Although China’s inward tilt may have started out as a response to purely economic phenomena – the post-crisis global recession, belt-tightening in the West, the eurozone crisis, and a general softening of global trade growth in the post-crisis years – geopolitical considerations are now dominant in shaping this shift toward self-reliance.

The role of geopolitics in pushing China towards a more inward-looking development path became clear in China’s response to the aggressive tariffs and export controls introduced by the Trump administration in the US. Because of these new constraints on China’s access to international markets and technology, Beijing sought to limit its dependence on the rest of the world.   

The most obvious result of this was the introduction of the ‘dual circulation’ strategy in May 2020, which sets out a rebalancing of China’s economy away from a reliance on external demand as a stimulus to growth (‘international circulation’) towards increased self-dependence (‘domestic circulation’). 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has provided another geopolitical impetus to China’s pursuit of self-reliance. Since it is not far-fetched to think that China, like Russia, might one day also face coordinated sanctions, Chinese authorities must be thinking hard about how to respond to such a risk. 

The only credible strategy that China can adopt is to reduce its economic dependence on the West by creating, in effect, a kind of economic fortress, as its dependence on imported technology, food, and fossil fuels in particular, has created a substantial strategic vulnerability.

Over the next few years, Chinese policymakers will likely attempt to build up the country’s ability to supply its own semi-conductors, food, and green energy sources.

This new approach to economic policymaking isn’t just about China’s relationship with the rest of the world. Within China itself, a new emphasis on the role of the state is increasingly apparent – and seemingly rooted in ideology. 

The previous National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in October 2017, made a push for ‘stronger, better, and bigger’ state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the past five years have indeed seen a measurable rise in the role that SOEs play in the Chinese economy. These firms now account for more fixed investment in the economy than private firms, for the first time since 2005.