ni Webinar: The effects of the coronavirus outbreak on marginalized communities By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 25 Mar 2020 19:00:40 +0000 As the coronavirus outbreak rapidly spreads, existing social and economic inequalities in society have been exposed and exacerbated. State and local governments across the country, on the advice of public health officials, have shuttered businesses of all types and implemented other social distancing recommendations. Such measures assume a certain basic level of affluence, which many… Full Article
ni Droning on: Thoughts on the Rand Paul “Talking Filibuster” By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 07 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500 Sen. Rand Paul has just completed his nearly thirteen hour filibuster against John Brennan's nomination to head the CIA. Breaking off his filibuster (because, he inferred, he had to pee), Rand was heralded for bringing back the "talking filibuster." There was much written (and tweeted) about his filibuster, which began with Paul’s dramatic: "I will speak until I can no longer speak…I will speak as long as it takes, until the alarm is sounded from coast to coast that our Constitution is important, that your rights to trial by jury are precious, that no American should be killed by a drone on American soil without first being charged with a crime, without first being found to be guilty by a court." I thought I would add a few late-night thoughts in honor of this day spent with C-Span 2 humming in my ear. First, I think Jon Bernstein’s reaction to the filibuster was right on the mark. There’s been a lot of enthusiasm for the talking filibuster today, from Ezra Klein's "If more filibusters went like this, there’d be no reason to demand reform," to Josh Marshall’s, "This is a good example of why we should have the talking filibuster and just the talking filibuster." But Bernstein raises a critical point: "Today’s live filibuster shows again just how easy it is to hold the Senate floor for an extended period." The motivation of recent reformers has been to reduce filibustering by raising the costs of obstruction for the minority. In theory, making the filibuster more burdensome to the minority—while putting their views under the spotlight—should make filibusters more costly and more rare. (Paul did note in coming off the Senate floor tonight that his feet hurt…) But as Bernstein points out, Paul believes in his cause, and it plays well with his constituencies. On the physical front, the tag-team of GOP senators rallying to Paul's cause also lessened the burden on Paul (as would have a pair of filibuster-proof shoes). That said, today's filibuster was a little unusual. The majority seemed unfazed by giving up the day to Paul’s filibuster, perhaps because the rest of Washington was shutdown for a pseudo-snow storm. Moreover, the Brennan nomination had bipartisan support, with Reid believing there were 60 senators ready to invoke cloture. In short, today's episode might not be a great test case for observing the potential consequences of reform. Second, keep in mind that this was a double-filibuster day. The nomination of Caitlin Halligan for the DC Court of Appeals was blocked, failing for the second time to secure cloture. With 41 Republican senators voting to block an up or down confirmation vote on Halligan, an often-noted alternative reform (which would require 41 senators to block cloture instead of 60 senators to invoke it) would have made no difference to the outcome. And what if the minority had been required to launch a talking filibuster to block Halligan’s nomination? Reid might have been willing to forfeit the floor time to Paul today. But Reid would unlikely have wanted to give up another day to Halligan’s opponents. As Steve Smith has argued, the burden of talking filibusters also falls on the majority, which typically wants to move on to other business. "Negotiating around the filibuster," Smith has argued, "would still be common." On a day with two successful minority filibusters (at least in consuming floor time and deterring the majority from its agenda), we can see why the majority might be reticent to make senators talk. Third, let's not lose sight of the target of Rand's filibuster: The head of the CIA. Although the chief spook is not technically in the president’s cabinet, the position certainly falls within the ranks of nominations that have typically been protected from filibusters. Granted, that norm was trampled with the Hagel filibuster for Secretary of Defense. But rather than seeing the potential upside of today's talking filibuster, I can't help but see the downside: In an age of intense policy and political differences between the parties, no corner of Senate business is immune to filibusters. All that said, what's not to like about a mini demonstration of a real live filibuster?! Perhaps Paul's late day Snickers break was cheating. But it was a good C-Span type of day overall, for filibuster newbies to Franklin Burdette devotees. Even Dick Durbin well after midnight seemed to be enjoying the fray. Perhaps there’s a silver lining for talking filibusters after all. Authors Sarah A. Binder Publication: The Monkey Cage Image Source: © Jonathan Ernst / Reuters Full Article
ni Banning Filibusters: Is Nuclear Winter Coming to the Senate this Summer? By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 23 May 2013 12:04:00 -0400 It seems the Senate could have a really hot summer. Majority leader Harry Reid (D-NV) has reportedly threatened to “go nuclear” this July—meaning that Senate Democrats would move by majority vote to ban filibusters of executive and judicial branch nominees. According to these reports, if Senate Republicans block three key nominations (Richard Cordray to head the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Thomas Perez at Labor, and Gina McCarthy at EPA), Reid will call on the Democrats to invoke the nuclear option as a means of eliminating filibusters over nominees. Jon Bernstein offered a thoughtful reaction to Reid’s gambit, noting that Reid’s challenge is to “find a way to ratchet up the threat of reform in order to push Republicans as far away from that line as possible.” Jon’s emphasis on Reid’s threat is important (and is worth reading in full). Still, I think it’s helpful to dig a little deeper on the role of both majority and minority party threats that arise over the nuclear option. Before getting to Reid’s threat, two brief detours. First, a parliamentary detour to make plain two reasons why Reid’s procedural gambit is deemed “nuclear.” First, Democrats envision using a set of parliamentary moves that would allow the Senate to cut off debate on nominations by majority vote (rather than by sixty votes). Republicans (at least when they are in the minority) call this “changing the rules by breaking the rules,” because Senate rules formally require a 2/3rds vote to break a filibuster of a measure to change Senate rules. The nuclear option would avoid the formal process of securing a 2/3rds vote to cut off debate; instead, the Senate would set a new precedent by simple majority vote to exempt nominations from the reach of Rule 22. If Democrats circumvent formal rules, Republicans would deem the move nuclear. Second, Reid’s potential gambit would be considered nuclear because of the anticipated GOP reaction: As Sen. Schumer argued in 2005 when the GOP tried to go nuclear over judges, minority party senators would “blow up every bridge in sight.” The nuclear option is so-called on account of the minority’s anticipated parliamentary reaction (which would ramp up obstruction on everything else). A second detour notes simply that the exact procedural steps that would have to be taken to set a new precedent to exempt nominations from Rule 22 have not yet been precisely spelled out. Over the years, several scenarios have been floated that give us a general outline of how the Senate could reform its cloture rule by majority vote. But a CRS report written in the heat of the failed GOP effort to go nuclear in 2005 points to the complications and uncertainties entailed in using a reform-by-ruling strategy to empower simple majorities to cut off debate on nominations. My sense is that using a nuclear option to restrict the reach of Rule 22 might not be as straight forward as many assume. That gets us to the place of threats in reform-by-ruling strategies. The coverage of Reid’s intentions last week emphasized the importance of Reid’s threat to Republicans: Dare to cross the line by filibustering three particular executive branch nominees, and Democrats will go nuclear. But for Reid’s threat to be effective in convincing GOP senators to back down on these nominees, Republicans have to deem Reid’s threat credible. Republicans know that Reid refused by go nuclear last winter (and previously in January 2009), not least because a set of longer-serving Democrats opposed the strategy earlier this year. It would be reasonable for the GOP today to question whether Reid has 51 Democrats willing to ban judicial and executive branch nomination filibusters. If Republicans doubt Reid’s ability to detonate a nuclear device, then the threat won’t be much help in getting the GOP to back down. Of course, if Republicans don’t block all three nominees, observers will likely interpret the GOP’s behavior as a rational response to Reid’s threat. Eric Schickler and Greg Wawro in Filibuster suggest that the absence of reform on such occasions demonstrates that the nuclear option can “tame the minority.” Reid’s threat would have done the trick. As a potentially nuclear Senate summer approaches, I would keep handy an alternative interpretation. Reid isn’t the only actor with a threat: given Republicans’ aggressive use of Rule 22, Republicans can credibly threaten to retaliate procedurally if the Democrats go nuclear. And that might be a far more credible threat than Reid’s. We know from the report on Reid’s nuclear thinking that “senior Democratic Senators have privately expressed worry to the Majority Leader that revisiting the rules could imperil the immigration push, and have asked him to delay it until after immigration reform is done (or is killed).” That tidbit suggests that Democrats consider the GOP threat to retaliate as a near certainty. In other words, if Republicans decide not to block all three nominees and Democrats don’t go nuclear, we might reasonably conclude that the minority’s threat to retaliate was pivotal to the outcome. As Steve Smith, Tony Madonna and I argued some time ago, the nuclear option might be technically feasible but not necessarily politically feasible. To be sure, it’s hard to arbitrate between these two competing mechanisms that might underlie Senate politics this summer. In either scenario—the majority tames the minority or the minority scares the bejeezus out of the majority—the same outcome ensues: Nothing. Still, I think it’s important to keep these alternative interpretations at hand as Democrats call up these and other nominations this spring. The Senate is a tough nut to crack, not least when challenges to supermajority rule are in play. Authors Sarah A. Binder Publication: The Monkey Cage Image Source: © Joshua Roberts / Reuters Full Article
ni How to increase financial support during COVID-19 by investing in worker training By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 06 May 2020 17:46:07 +0000 It took just two weeks to exhaust one of the largest bailout packages in American history. Even the most generous financial support has limits in a recession. However, I am optimistic that a pandemic-fueled recession and mass underemployment could be an important opportunity to upskill the American workforce through loans for vocational training. Financially supporting… Full Article
ni Class Notes: Harvard Discrimination, California’s Shelter-in-Place Order, and More By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 08 May 2020 19:21:40 +0000 This week in Class Notes: California's shelter-in-place order was effective at mitigating the spread of COVID-19. Asian Americans experience significant discrimination in the Harvard admissions process. The U.S. tax system is biased against labor in favor of capital, which has resulted in inefficiently high levels of automation. Our top chart shows that poor workers are much more likely to keep commuting in… Full Article
ni Rebuilding or redefining Syria? By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 13 Feb 2017 13:02:32 +0000 Syria’s tenuous ceasefire brokered by Russia, Turkey, and Iran has rekindled hopes for ending the horrific violence in the country while reviving interest in various initiatives for reconstruction. The latter include the United Nation’s National Agenda for the Future of Syria, an ambitious undertaking with participation from the regime and opposition groups, assessments from the […] Full Article
ni 6 elements of a strategy to push back on Iran’s hegemonic ambitions By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 15:08:23 +0000 Iran is posing a comprehensive challenge to the interests of the United States and its allies and partners in the Middle East. Over the past four decades, it has managed to establish an “arc of influence” that stretches from Lebanon and Syria in the Levant, to Iraq and Bahrain on the Gulf, to Yemen on […] Full Article
ni To help Syrian refugees, Turkey and the EU should open more trading opportunities By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 02 Mar 2020 11:05:52 +0000 After nine years of political conflict in Syria, more than 5.5 million Syrians are now displaced as refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, with more than 3.6 million refugees in Turkey alone. It is unlikely that many of these refugees will be able to return home or resettle in Europe, Canada, or the United States.… Full Article
ni The coronavirus has led to more authoritarianism for Turkey By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 08 May 2020 20:00:26 +0000 Turkey is well into its second month since the first coronavirus case was diagnosed on March 10. As of May 5, the number of reported cases has reached almost 130,000, which puts Turkey among the top eight countries grappling with the deadly disease — ahead of even China and Iran. Fortunately, so far, the Turkish death… Full Article
ni Chicago’s Regional Housing Initiative promotes regional mobility By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 05 May 2016 11:00:00 -0400 Stephen was still a teenager on the north side of St. Louis when his dad, a police officer, was killed during a robbery in their neighborhood. Despite the trauma, Stephen later joined the police force to continue his dad’s legacy and commitment to safe and inclusive neighborhoods. But even before the fatal shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson in 2014, Stephen (not his real name) yearned to right local wrongs through broader approaches. “The darkest forces weren’t necessarily the ones getting arrested,” he observed. “So I retired from the police force after 22 years, essentially to chase after a different type of perpetrator.” Wanting to focus on policies at multiple levels of government that “were causing the disparities that fueled increasing crime and violence in St. Louis,” Stephen pivoted to civil rights enforcement, tracking policy violations and innovations at a government agency in the St. Louis region. I met Stephen in February while in St. Louis for a conference his agency organized on HUD’s recently strengthened Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH ) rule, which increases local accountability in promoting residential integration. He wasn’t a speaker at the event, but hearing his story reinforced the importance of combating the deeply entrenched and often invisible causes of segregation. Recent events and new academic research, including landmark findings by Raj Chetty and colleagues testifying to the benefits of low-poverty neighborhoods for low-income kids, the updated AFFH rule, and the Supreme Court’s disparate impact decision upholding other tools to fight segregation have brought renewed attention to these challenges. Meanwhile, underlying these developments, poverty has failed to decline since the recession and, as recent Brookings research shows, has become more concentrated in neighborhoods of extreme poverty. How can regional leaders and practitioners respond to these challenges? I was in St. Louis to discuss one part of the solution—advancing more mixed-income neighborhoods. In the Chicago region, our housing and community development-focused firm, BRicK Partners, is collaborating with the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning (CMAP), the Illinois Housing Development Authority (IHDA), and 10 metropolitan Chicago public housing authorities, with support and leadership from HUD, to develop and operate the Regional Housing Initiative (RHI) RHI is a small, systemic, and potentially scalable “work around” of a very specific set of programs and policies that contribute inadvertently to regional inequities. A flexible and regional pool of resources working across the many traditional public housing authority (PHA) and municipal jurisdictions in the Chicago region, RHI increases quality rental housing in neighborhoods with good jobs, schools, and transit access and provides more housing options to households on Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) waiting lists. Recognizing that the federal formulas allocating HCVs to each individual PHA are not responsive to population, employment, or poverty trends, RHI partners convert and pool a small portion of their HCVs to provide place-based operating subsidies in support of development activity that advances local and regional priorities. RHI supports both opportunity areas with strong markets and quality amenities as well as revitalization areas where public and private sector partners are planning and investing toward that end. In both cases, the bulk of RHI investments are in the suburbs, where the PHAs are smaller and the rental stock more limited. RHI has committed over 550 RHI subsidies to nearly 40 mixed-income and supportive housing developments across Chicagoland, supporting more than 2,200 total apartments, over half of which are in opportunity areas. The pooling and transferring of subsidies has allowed RHI to support proposals that local jurisdictions wouldn’t be able to undertake otherwise. Although a number of innovative programs around the country provide assistance to households moving to opportunity areas, RHI is unique its focus on increasing the supply of housing in opportunity areas regionwide. Its approach is consistent with lessons learned from Brookings’ work on Confronting Suburban Poverty in America: With CMAP as a strong quarterback, RHI has addressed the shortage of rental housing in the suburbs by working across jurisdictions, developing shared priorities, metrics and selection criteria, and by working with IHDA and other stakeholders to leverage greater private sector investment. This recipe for success is now being deployed in communities beyond Chicago. Baltimore is preparing to advertise for its first round of developer applicants under the leadership of the Baltimore Metropolitan Council, with regionwide PHAs, the State Housing Finance Agency, and a regional housing counselor lined up as supportive partners. In St. Louis, the regional planning and housing finance organizations both attended the February conference where I met Stephen, signaling the potential for greater collaboration for both these entities and the PHAs. Like many housing advocates and professionals, my colleagues and I at BRicK Partners derive a lot of satisfaction from supporting communities like Baltimore and St. Louis and individuals like Stephen and his peers with replicable best practices. Given today’s political realities, we don’t expect major changes in the federal formulas and statutes behind some of the regional inequities, but “work arounds” such as RHI can still scale up. Nationwide, just a small percentage of HCVs have been converted for such flexible supply-side solutions, but there is reason to be hopeful that this will change. The Regional Mobility Demonstration proposed in the 2017 budget as well as federal public housing voucher legislation passed by the House of Representatives earlier this year are signs that there is real momentum to advance regional strategies that increase access to opportunity for low income residents and families. Authors Robin Snyderman Image Source: © Jason Reed / Reuters Full Article
ni The muni market in the post-Detroit and post-Puerto Rico bankruptcy era By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 12 Jul 2016 14:10:00 -0400 Event Information July 12, 20162:10 PM - 4:00 PM EDTOnline OnlyLive Webcast Puerto Rico is the latest, but probably not the last, case of a local government confronting financial strains that call into question its ability to meet its obligations to bondholders while providing services to its taxpaying constituents. Puerto Rico is, of course, a special case because it is a territory, not a state or municipality. Will Puerto Rico’s problems have ripple effects for the $3.7 trillion U.S. municipal bond market? What about the resolution of Detroit's bankruptcy? How will state and local governments and the courts weigh the interests of pensioners, employees, taxpayers and bondholders when there isn't enough money to go around? On Tuesday, July 12, the Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy at Brookings webcasted the keynote address from the 5th annual Municipal Finance Conference, delivered by the sitting governor of Puerto Rico, Hon. Alejandro García Padilla. After Governor Padilla’s remarks on Puerto Rico’s future, Hutchins Center Director David Wessel moderated a panel on the politics and practice of municipal finance in the post-Detroit and post-Puerto Rico era. Join the conversation and tweet questions for the panelists at #MuniFinance. Video Keynote address by Alejandro García PadillaPanel: The muni market in the post-Detroit and post-Puerto Rico eraChanging patterns in household ownership of municipal debtMunicipal borrowing costs and state policies for distressed municipalitiesMunicipal finance structure and Chapter 9 creditor prioritiesTerm limits and municipal borrowing costsWhy has regional income convergence in the U.S. declined?State strategies for detecting fiscal distress in local governmentsPensions and other post-employment benefits Transcript Download the uncorrected transcript (.pdf) Event Materials Garcia Padilla Slides20160712_munifinance_puertorico_detroit_transcript Full Article
ni Strengthening and Streamlining Prudential Bank Supervision By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 06 Aug 2009 09:03:01 -0400 There are a number of causes of the financial crisis that has devastated the U.S. economy and spread globally. Weakness in financial sector regulation was one of the causes and the proliferation of different regulators is, in turn, a cause of the regulatory failure. There is a bewildering, alphabet soup variety of regulators and supervisors for banks and other financial institutions that failed in their task of preventing the crisis and, at the same time, created an excessive regulatory burden on the industry because of overlapping and duplicative functions.We can do better. This paper makes the case for a single micro prudential regulator, that is to say, one federal agency that has responsibility for the supervision and regulation of all federally chartered banks and all major non-bank financial institutions. There would still be state-chartered financial institutions covered by state regulators, but the federal regulator would share regulatory authority with the states. The Objectives Approach to Regulation The Blueprint for financial reform prepared by the Paulson Treasury proposed a system of objectives-based regulation, an approach that had been previously suggested and that is the basis for regulation in Australia. The White Paper prepared by the Geithner Treasury did not use the same terminology, but it is clear from the structure of the paper that their approach is essentially an objectives-based one, as they lay out the different elements of regulatory reform that should be covered. I support the objectives approach to regulation. There should be three major objectives of regulation, as follows. • To make sure that there is micro-prudential supervisions, so that customers and taxpayers are protected against excessive risk taking that may cause a single institution to fail. • To make sure that whole financial sector retains its balance and does not become unstable. That means someone has to warn about the build up of risk across several institutions and perhaps take regulatory actions to restrain lending used to purchase assets whose prices are creating a speculative bubble. • To regulate the conduct of business. That means to watch out for the interests of consumers and investors, whether they are small shareholders in public companies or households deciding whether to take out a mortgage or use a credit card. In applying this approach, it is vital for both the economy and the financial sector that the Federal Reserve has independence as it makes monetary policy. Experience in the United States and around the world supports the view that an independent central bank results in better macroeconomic performance and restrains inflationary expectations. An independent Fed setting monetary policy is essential. An advantage of objectives-based regulation is that it forces us to consider what are the “must haves” of financial regulation—those things absolutely necessary to reduce the chances of another crisis. Additionally we can see the “must not haves”—the regulations that would have negative effects. It is much more important to make sure that the job gets done right, that there are no gaps in regulation that could contribute to another crisis and that there not be over-regulation that could stifle innovation and slow economic growth, than it is that the boxes of the regulatory system be arranged in a particular way. In turn, this means that the issue of regulatory consolidation is important but only to the extent that it makes it easier or harder to achieve the three major objectives of regulation efficiently and effectively. For objectives-based regulation to work, it is essential to harness the power of the market as a way to enhance stability. It will never be possible to have enough smart regulators in place that can outwit private sector participants who really want to get around regulations because they inhibit profit opportunities or because of the burdens imposed. A good regulatory environment is structured so that people who take risks stand to lose their own money if their bets do not work out. The crisis we are going through was caused by both market and regulatory failures and the market failures were often the result of a lack of transparency (“asymmetric information” in the jargon of economics). Those who invested money and lost it often did not realize the risks they were taking. To the extent that policymakers can enhance transparency, they can make market forces work better and help achieve the goal of greater stability. Having a single micro prudential regulator would help greatly in meeting the objectives of regulation, a point that will be taken up in more detail below. It is not a new idea. In 1993-94, the Clinton and Riegle proposals for financial regulation said that a single micro prudential regulator would provide the best protection for the economy and for the industry. In the Blueprint developed by the Paulson Treasury, it was proposed that there be a single micro prudential regulator. Read the full paper » (pdf) Downloads Download Authors Martin Neil Baily Full Article
ni The Trump administration and the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 05 May 2020 19:29:31 +0000 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Trump administration rolled out a new “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept in late 2017. Since this point, the administration’s new strategy has generated as many questions as it has answers. Despite dramatic shifts in many aspects of U.S. foreign policy after the 2016 election, there are notable areas of continuity between the… Full Article
ni Webinar: Reopening and revitalization in Asia – Recommendations from cities and sectors By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: As COVID-19 continues to spread through communities around the world, Asian countries that had been on the front lines of combatting the virus have also been the first to navigate the reviving of their societies and economies. Cities and economic sectors have confronted similar challenges with varying levels of success. What best practices have been… Full Article
ni Contemplating COVID-19’s impact on Africa’s economic outlook with Landry Signé and Iginio Gagliardone By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 04 May 2020 23:05:26 +0000 Full Article
ni The fundamental connection between education and Boko Haram in Nigeria By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 07 May 2020 20:51:38 +0000 On April 2, as Nigeria’s megacity Lagos and its capital Abuja locked down to control the spread of the coronavirus, the country’s military announced a massive operation — joining forces with neighboring Chad and Niger — against the terrorist group Boko Haram and its offshoot, the Islamic State’s West Africa Province. This spring offensive was… Full Article
ni Around the halls: Experts react to the killing of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 03 Jan 2020 20:37:33 +0000 In a drone strike authorized by President Trump early Friday, Iranian commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, who led the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, was killed at Baghdad International Airport. Below, Brookings experts provide their brief analyses on this watershed moment for the Middle East — including what it means for U.S.-Iran… Full Article
ni On April 30, 2020, Vanda Felbab-Brown participated in an event with the Middle East Institute on the “Pandemic in Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Potential Social, Political and Economic Impact.” By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 01 May 2020 20:51:33 +0000 On April 30, 2020, Vanda Felbab-Brown participated in an event with the Middle East Institute on the "Pandemic in Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Potential Social, Political and Economic Impact." Full Article
ni (Un?)Happiness and Gasoline Prices in the United States By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 19 Oct 2010 16:08:00 -0400 Gasoline purchases are an essential part of the American way of life. There were about 250 million motor vehicles in the United States in 2008 – just under a vehicle per person. Americans drive an average of more than 11,000 miles per year and gasoline purchases are an essential part of most households’ budgets. Between 1995 and 2003, gasoline prices in the U.S. averaged about $1.49 a gallon, with average prices rising above $2.00 in 2004. By the summer of 2008, gasoline prices had reached a national average of $4.11 per gallon. At that time, Americans earning less than $15,000 a year were spending as much as 15 percent of their household income on gasoline – double the proportion from seven years earlier. In addition, unpredictable fuel costs make planning monthly household expenditures difficult, which can be detrimental to individual welfare and even to the overall economy. Gasoline prices fell in the aftermath of the 2009 economic crisis. Prior and during the financial crisis, rising gasoline prices were seen as a symptom of an uncertain economic situation, as well as evidence of the questionable sustainability of our future oil supply. Gasoline prices abated along with the decrease of economic activity that accompanied the onset of the recession, reaching their minimum in late December 2008. A few months later, as the economy entered a gradual recovery phase, gasoline prices also trended upward. In contrast to the previous period of great uncertainty about future oil supplies, however, these price trends were considered more positively as signs of the U.S. economic recovery. Downloads Read the full report Authors Soumya ChattopadhyayJames CoanCarol GrahamAmy Myers JaffeKenneth Medlock III Full Article
ni Justin Wolfers Rejoins Brookings Economic Studies as Senior Fellow By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 31 Jul 2013 00:00:00 -0400 Justin Wolfers, professor of Economics and Public Policy at the University of Michigan, re-joins Brookings, Vice President and Economic Studies Co-Director Karen Dynan announced today. Wolfers was a visiting fellow from 2010-2011. A world-renowned empirical economist, Wolfers will continue in his role as co-editor, along with David Romer of the University of California, of the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (BPEA), the flagship economic journal of the Institution. He will continue his focus on labor economics, macroeconomics, political economy, economics of the family, social policy, law and economics, public economics, and behavioral economics. His appointment as senior fellow will last 13 months. Wolfers is also a research associate with the National Bureau for Economic Research, a research affiliate of the Centre for Economic Policy Research in London, a research fellow of the German Institute for the Study of Labor, and a senior scientist for Gallup, among other affiliations. He is a contributor for Bloomberg View, NPR Marketplace, and the Freakonomics website and was named one of the 13 top young economists to watch by the New York Times. Wolfers did his undergraduate work at the University of Sydney, Australia and received his Master’s and Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University. He is a dual Australian-U.S. national and was once an apprentice to a bookie which led to his interest in prediction markets. “We are pleased to re-welcome Justin back to Economic Studies,” said Dynan. “His work continues to challenge the conventional wisdom, and we look forward to collaborating with him once again.” “Justin is outstanding at communicating economic ideas to a wide audience, as evidenced by his regular writings for media as well as his large social media presence,” added Ted Gayer, co-director of Economic Studies. “I have enormous affection for the Brookings Institution, which provides not only a home for deep scholarly research, but also an unmatched platform for engaging the policy debate,” said Wolfers. “The Economic Studies program has a rich history of being the go-to place for policymakers, and I look forward to coming back and engaging in debate with my colleagues there.” Full Article
ni WATCH: South African Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan on the country’s challenges, potential, and resilience By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 05 May 2016 10:15:00 -0400 At a time of decelerating regional growth in sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa—one of the continent’s leading economies—is facing the brunt of concurrent external and domestic growth shocks. During a Brookings event on April 14, 2016 moderated by Africa Growth Initiative Director Amadou Sy, South African minister of finance, the Honorable Pravin Gordhan, provided cause for encouragement, as he highlighted strategies that South Africa is implementing to reverse slowing growth trends, boost social cohesion, and springboard inclusive, sustainable development. Throughout the event, Minister Gordhan emphasized that South Africa is refocusing its efforts on implementing homegrown policies to mitigate the effects of global and domestic shocks: “Our approach is not to keep pointing outside our borders and say, ‘That’s where the problem is.’ We've got our own challenges and difficulties, and potential and opportunities. And it's important to focus on those, and rally South Africans behind that set of initiatives so that we could go wherever we can in terms improving the situation.” He began by explaining the major growth problems facing South Africa, including first-level structural challenges—consistent electricity supply and labor relations—as well as deeper structural challenges, for instance, reforming the oligopolistic sectors of its economy. To address these issues, he expanded on what collaborative, multi-stakeholder efforts would be necessary. Watch: Pravin Gordhan notes the major growth challenges in South Africa Contending with infrastructure needs—particularly energy and logistical, but also social, such as water and sanitation, health care, and educational facilities—will play a significant role in overcoming these aforementioned challenges. Minister Gordhan explained how the government aims to fill existing infrastructure gaps through innovative financing mechanisms. Watch: Pravin Gordhan on addressing South Africa’s infrastructure gaps Later in the event, Sy pressed Minister Gordhan on plans for implementation for the country’s ambitious goals. As an example, Minister Gordhan underlined “Operation Phakisa,” a results-driven approach to fast-track the implementation of initiatives to achieve development objectives. The government intends to use this methodology to address a number of social priorities, including unlocking the potential of South Africa’s coastlines and oceans. Watch: Pravin Gordhan on implementation of South Africa's development objectives Urbanization in South Africa and sub-Saharan Africa as a whole is widespread and increasing, creating a demand for governments to both maintain their infrastructure as well as harness their energy and human capacity. Cities, especially those in South Africa’s Gauteng Province (Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Ekurhuleni), will continue to be crucial engines of economic development if municipal governance systems effectively manage the region’s expected rapid urbanization in the years to come. Minister Gordhan discusses some of the lessons learned from the Gauteng city region. Watch: Pravin Gordhan on the vital role of cities in economic development in South Africa In sum, referring to the confluence of adverse global conditions and internal problems currently affecting South Africa, Minister Gordhan stated, “Whenever you are in the middle of a storm it looks like the worst thing possible—but storms don’t last forever.” He did not doubt the ability of the South African people to weather and emerge stronger from the storm, offering: “Ultimately South Africans are hopeful, are optimistic and resilient.” You can watch the full event here. Video Pravin Gordhan notes the major growth challenges in South AfricaPravin Gordhan on addressing South Africa’s infrastructure gapsPravin Gordhan on implementation of South Africa's development objectivesPravin Gordhan on the vital role of cities in economic development in South Africa Authors Amy Copley Full Article
ni Why the U.S. needs a pandemic communications unit By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 29 Apr 2020 17:04:00 +0000 When policymakers consider how to respond to a public health crisis, they tend to think in terms of quarantines, medical equipment supplies, and travel restrictions. Yet they too often miss a vital factor that countries like South Korea and Singapore recognized long ago—that public communications are just as crucial. Effective communication increases compliance with public… Full Article
ni Trade secrets shouldn’t shield tech companies’ algorithms from oversight By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 04 May 2020 12:00:00 +0000 Technology companies increasingly hide the world’s most powerful algorithms and business models behind the shield of trade secret protection. The legitimacy of these protections needs to be revisited when they obscure companies’ impact on the public interest or the rule of law. In 2016 and 2018, the United States and the European Union each adopted… Full Article
ni What Ukraine’s new prime minister is (and isn’t) likely to achieve By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 18 Apr 2016 10:35:00 -0400 A months-long political crisis in Kiev came to an end on April 14, when Ukraine’s Rada (parliament) approved a new prime minister. Expectations that the government will move on needed reforms and anti-corruption measures, however, are low. Kamikaze prime minister? The previous prime minister, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, had served since the Maidan Revolution in February 2014. Early on, Yatsenyuk equated his tenure to a kamikaze mission, noting that the reforms the government would adopt would carry heavy political costs. He proved right. By early 2016, his National Front party, which won over 22 percent in the October 2014 party-list vote in the Rada elections, polled in the low single digits. Reports of a widening rift between Yatsenyuk and President Petro Poroshenko grew last autumn, though they still had reason to stay together. The National Front party and Poroshenko Bloc formed the core of the majority coalition in the Rada, and neither party could expect to fare well in early parliamentary elections. Early on, Yatsenyuk equated his tenure to a kamikaze mission, noting that the reforms the government would adopt would carry heavy political costs. The crisis took a twist in mid-February, when the Rada passed a resolution expressing disapproval of the work of Yatsenyuk and his cabinet…but then failed to pass a vote of no-confidence that would have led to Yatsenyuk’s dismissal. Speculation nevertheless intensified over his looming replacement, with American-born Finance Minister Natalie Jaresko mooted as a possibility. Volodymyr Hroysman’s name also came into play. Hroysman, a member of the Poroshenko Bloc, is closely connected to the president. He had a reputation as a reformer and effective mayor of the city of Vinnytsia, though his performance as Rada speaker was mixed. For example, he opposed the finance ministry’s proposed tax reform, even though it was a requirement of Ukraine’s program with the International Monetary Fund. When Yatsenyuk announced his resignation on April 10, Hroysman appeared the front-runner to succeed him. His appointment took longer than expected, however, as he reportedly rejected some suggestions from the president’s camp for ministers, seeking to put in place his own people instead. Backroom negotiations and a fair amount of horse-trading as parties jockeyed for ministerial positions took place April 11 to 13. Finally, the Rada approved Hroysman on April 14. Low reform expectations At first glance, the composition of the new cabinet is a far more political group than its predecessor, which comprised many technocrats. It is devoid of names with established reputations for pressing reform or fighting corruption. My conversations on the margins of the Kiev Security Forum on April 14 to 15 turned up few expectations that the new cabinet will proceed with the kinds of reform actions and, in particular, measures to combat corruption that the country needs. The International Monetary Fund will watch the cabinet’s actions before it considers releasing an additional tranche of funding for Ukraine. One unsettling sign: The incoming finance minister suggested that some adjustments might be sought in the IMF’s criteria. Historically, when Ukrainian finance ministers seek adjustments to IMF criteria and programs, they do not aim for changes that will accelerate reform. At first glance, the composition of the new cabinet is a far more political group than its predecessor. Some in Kiev worry about the close relationship between Hroysman and Poroshenko. But that relationship may have one upside: it ties Poroshenko more closely to the prime minister and his success or failure. Too often in the past, Ukrainian presidents have stood some distance from the prime minister, positioning themselves to escape responsibility for difficult government policies rather than throwing their full political weight behind the prime minister’s efforts. Poroshenko did not fully back Yatsenyuk. As one Ukrainian observer put it, the president often seemed more interested in explaining or rationalizing the status quo rather than trying to change it. Now, if Hroysman and the new cabinet fail to deliver, it will reflect more directly on Poroshenko. A friendly push If my Ukrainian interlocutors are correct, the new government will pursue the needed reforms at best only half-heartedly. Among other things, that could leave in place the current system in which oligarchs exercise outsized and unhealthy political influence. That will impede Ukraine’s prospects of getting on the path to becoming a modern European state. The International Monetary Fund, United States, and European Union should help the Ukrainian president and prime minister make the right decisions: to press forward a program of genuine reform and, at long last, a real anti-corruption campaign. The West should make clear that further assistance will depend on such actions. Authors Steven Pifer Full Article
ni The case for reinvigorating U.S. efforts in Afghanistan By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 15:40:00 -0500 President Obama is right to keep at it in Afghanistan, argues a new policy brief by Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow and director of research for the Brookings Foreign Policy program. Some have criticized the president’s decision to maintain a significant troop presence there (5,500 troops), instead of following through on the planned military withdrawal. But Afghanistan remains very important to American security, O’Hanlon contends, and the situation in the country is far from hopeless in spite of recent setbacks. We should reinvigorate American efforts in Afghanistan, he argues—not returning to levels seen in previous years, but ramping up somewhat from our current posture. O’Hanlon calls Obama’s resolve in Afghanistan commendable, but writes that he and his administration are still making mistakes on U.S. policy toward the war-torn country. He advises that Washington make two specific changes to its military strategy in Afghanistan: Allow U.S. and NATO airpower to target the Islamic State and the Taliban (currently, they can only fight those groups if directly attacked). The narrow rules of engagement constraining foreign forces were intended to push Afghan armed forces to defend their territory themselves. While a worthy goal, O’Hanlon says, these rules often prevent us from attacking ISIS (though the targeting strategy towards the group may be changing) as well as the Taliban. They also impose unrealistically high demands on Afghan forces and make too fine a distinction between an array of aligned extremist groups operating in the country. Expand U.S. force presence from the current 5,500 troops to around 12,000 for a few years. In O’Hanlon’s opinion, our current numbers are not enough to work with fielded Afghan forces, and skimping on ground forces has contributed to security challenges in places like Helmand, for instance, which experienced new setbacks in 2015. More broadly, leaders in Washington and Brussels should stress the value of a long-term NATO-Afghanistan partnership, rather than emphasizing an exit strategy. This will signal Western resolve to the Taliban and other groups. While the next commander in chief should set the United States on a gradual path toward downsizing American troops in Afghanistan, he believes it would be a mistake for Obama to do so in the short term. The long haul O’Hanlon also argues that the United States needs to take a longer-term perspective on key political and economic issues in Afghanistan. On the economic front, there seems to be little thinking about an agricultural development plan for Afghanistan, associated infrastructure support, and land reform, among other challenges. On the political front, conversations often tend to focus on shorter-term issues like organizing parliamentary elections, reforming the Independent Election Commission, or modifying the current power-sharing arrangement. In the process, conversations about foundational political strategy focusing on Afghan institutions and the health of its democracy get short-changed. The parliament is in need of reforms, for instance, as is the political party system (which should encourage Afghans to group around ideas and policy platforms, rather than tribes and patronage networks). O’Hanlon concludes that the situation in Afghanistan today, while fraught, is understandable given the Taliban’s resilience and NATO’s gradual withdrawal of 125,000 troops. We should not be despondent, he writes—rather, we should identify specific strategies that can help improve the situation. At the end of the day, Afghans must make the big decisions about the future of their country. But as long as the United States and its partners are still providing tremendous resources—and as long as security threats emanating from South Asia continue to threaten the United States—leaders in Washington should use their influence wisely. Authors Anna Newby Full Article
ni Keep troop levels steady in Afghanistan By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 06 Jun 2016 16:33:00 -0400 Editors’ Note: For the United States to succeed in its mission in Afghanistan, it is essential that the Obama administration sustain the current level of U.S. forces there. Recognizing this, John Allen spearheaded a move to ask President Obama to do so, in the following open letter to which former leaders from the military and diplomatic corps signed on. This letter originally appeared on The National Interest. Washington, DC June 3, 2016 Dear Mr. President, We are writing, as Americans committed to the success of our country’s Afghanistan mission, to urge that you sustain the current level of U.S. forces in Afghanistan through the remainder of your term. Aid levels and diplomatic energies should similarly be preserved without reduction. Unless emergency conditions require consideration of a modest increase, we would strongly favor a freeze at the level of roughly ten thousand U.S. troops through January 20. This approach would also allow your successor to assess the situation for herself or himself and make further adjustments accordingly. The broader Middle East is roiled in conflicts that pit moderate and progressive forces against those of violent extremists. As we saw on 9/11 and in the recent attacks in Paris, San Bernardino and Brussels, the problems of the Middle East do not remain contained within the Middle East. Afghanistan is the place where Al Qaeda and affiliates first planned the 9/11 attacks and a place where they continue to operate—and is thus important in the broader effort to defeat the global extremist movement today. It is a place where Al Qaeda and ISIS still have modest footprints that could be expanded if a security vacuum developed. If Afghanistan were to revert to the chaos of the 1990s, millions of refugees would again seek shelter in neighboring countries and overseas, dramatically intensifying the severe challenges already faced in Europe and beyond. In the long-term struggle against violent extremists, the United States above all needs allies—not only to fight a common enemy, but also to create a positive vision for the peoples of the region. Today, aided by the bipartisan policies of the last two U.S. administrations, Afghans have established a democratic political system, moderately effective security forces, a much improved quality of life, and a vibrant civil society. Afghans are fighting and dying for their country, and in our common battle against extremism, with more than five thousand police and soldiers laying down their lives annually each of the past several years. Afghanistan is a place where we should wish to consolidate and lock down our provisional progress into something of a more lasting asset. It is a Muslim country where most of the public as well as government officials want our help and value our friendship. Afghanistan is also a crucial partner in helping to shape the calculations of Pakistan, which has been an incubator of violent extremism but which might gradually be induced to cooperate in building a regional order conducive to peace and economic progress. You have rightly prioritized Afghanistan throughout your presidency and have successfully achieved several crucial objectives. You have prevented the reemergence of a terrorist sanctuary in Afghanistan, from which attacks on Americans might emanate. You have helped Afghanistan develop security forces so that it is principally Afghans who are defending Afghanistan, thereby enabling a 90 percent reduction in the U.S. military presence relative to its peak (and a two-thirds reduction relative to what you inherited in 2009). You have established a long-term strategic partnership with Afghanistan that can address common threats from extremist groups based in Pakistan. To our minds, these are significant accomplishments. They have established much of the foundation for pursuing the ultimate goals of stabilizing Afghanistan and defeating extremism in the region. To be sure, there have been significant frustrations in Afghanistan along the way. All of us have lived and experienced a number of them. All of us have, like you, deeply lamented the loss of each American life that has been sacrificed there in pursuit of our mission objectives and our national security. Yet, though the situation is fraught, we have reason to be confident. President Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah, and many brave Afghans are working hard to rebuild their country. NATO allies and other partners remain committed to the mission. The level of support we must provide to enable continued progress is much lower than in earlier periods. Our group is taking full stock of the situation in Afghanistan and will make a broader range of recommendations available to the next U.S. president on the interrelated subjects of governance, the economy, and security. But as an interim measure, and with the NATO Warsaw summit as well as other key decision points still looming on your watch, we urge you to maintain the current U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan through the end of your term. Based on longstanding experience in the country as well as recent trips to Afghanistan by some of us, this step would be seen as a positive reaffirmation of America’s commitment to that nation, its people and its security. It would likely have helpful effects on refugee flows, the confidence of the Taliban, the morale of the Afghan military and Afghan people, the state of the Afghan economy and perhaps even the strategic assessments of some in Pakistan. Conversely, we are convinced that a reduction of our military and financial support over the coming months would negatively affect each of these. Sincerely, Ambassadors to Afghanistan Ryan Crocker James Cunningham Robert Finn Zalmay Khalilzad Ronald Neumann Military Commanders in Afghanistan John Allen David Barno John Campbell Stanley McChrystal David Petraeus Special Representatives for Afghanistan/Pakistan James Dobbins Daniel Feldman Marc Grossman Authors John R. Allenother former senior U.S. officials Publication: The National Interest Full Article
ni On Capitol Hill: 5 Indian prime ministers, 8 themes By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 08 Jun 2016 11:08:00 -0400 On the invitation of House Speaker Paul Ryan, who stated that “[t]he friendship between the United States and India is a pillar of stability in an important region of the world,” Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be addressing a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress on June 8. There have been five Indian prime ministers who’ve given such remarks: Jawaharlal Nehru (1949, to separate House and Senate gatherings), Rajiv Gandhi (1985), P.V. Narashima Rao (1994), Atal Bihari Vajpayee (2000) and Manmohan Singh (2005). Their speeches were reflective of the contemporary global context and the state of the U.S.-India relationship, but they did share some themes as well. Modi will likely emphasize that he is transforming India (as these other prime ministers asserted as well) and want to highlight the change he is bringing, but his speech might also echo some of these past themes. Below is a look back at what India’s prime ministers have said to Congress—a past glimpse that is also instructive in terms of how much the U.S.-India relationship has changed. On October 13, 1949, two years of India’s independence (and a few days after the communists had taken over China), Jawaharlal Nehru addressed back-to-back meetings of the House and Senate. Declaring that “Nehru puts India on freedom’s side,” The New York Times noted in a front-page story that "Pandit Nehru expressed pride for India's past, hope for her future, but acute awareness of her present economic difficulties." On June 13, 1985, Rajiv Gandhi, Nehru’s grandson who had won a major electoral victory the previous year, became the first Indian premier to address a joint meeting of Congress. In an above-the-fold story featuring a photo of a smiling Gandhi, Vice President George H.W. Bush and House Speaker Tip O’ Neill, The New York Times particularly remarked on the 40-year-old prime minister’s youthfulness and remarks on Afghanistan. On May 18, 1994, a few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and after having introduced a wave of economic reforms, P.V. Narasimha Rao addressed Congress. Ten days before that The New York Times featured a story on his finance minister Manmohan Singh and the reforms the two leaders were undertaking. Reflecting the relative disinterest in India in the U.S. at the time, the Times did not, however, cover Rao’s speech. On September 14, 2000, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India’s first prime minister from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) addressed the U.S. Congress. His two years in power till then had seen India conduct nuclear tests, a crisis with Pakistan seen as a turning point in U.S.-India relations because the U.S. called out Pakistan for its actions, and a U.S. presidential visit to India after two decades. A jovial photo of the prime minister and President Clinton made the front page a couple of days later, but the speech itself did not get coverage in the newspaper of record. On July 19, 2005, Manmohan Singh, who’d just reached a civil nuclear agreement with President Bush, addressed Congress. His visit—and that agreement—received front-page coverage, but the speech itself was not covered separately. In his speech, Prime Minister Modi will likely stress the challenge that terrorism poses globally and regionally, and highlight U.S.-India the counter-terrorism cooperation. The last three Indian premiers have addressed this challenge as well. President Obama reiterated U.S. support for Indian membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and encouraged other members to welcome Indian into the group. The U.S. and India have come a long way on a subject that has come up in every prime minister’s speech since Rajiv Gandhi. Every prime minister has outlined their economic policy objectives and achievements—more recent ones, have highlighted the opportunity India represents. While this was the focus of Modi’s speech to the U.S.-India Business Council, expect this to be a subject he covers in his remarks to Congress as well. Indian prime ministers have seen the U.S. as a crucial source of technology, and often made the case for technological assistance or transfers or collaboration. There has also been the linkage between democracy and development in various ways: highlighting the development task India is undertaking in a democratic context, stressing that democracies are better placed over the long-run to innovate and develop equitably, and suggesting that the U.S. has an interest in helping India’s democratic experiment—now democratic engine—succeed. Whether to address concerns in Congress, note the similarities between India and the U.S., or stress India’s multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious nature, each prime minister has talked about diversity, equality and freedom. In their speeches, each of the prime ministers have noted the contributions of the growing numbers of Indian-Americans and non-resident Indians in the United States. Modi has made the diaspora a key focus; expect him to emphasize its role. A week before his speech to Congress, Vajpayee famously asserted that “India and the USA are natural allies.” He’s not the only one to have noted the “natural” character of the relationship, though there’s been different reasoning behind that assertion or hope. Authors Tanvi Madan Full Article
ni Africa in the News: Zuma violates South African constitution, Angola jails activists and Tanzania suffers aid cuts By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 01 Apr 2016 14:34:00 -0400 South African court rules President Zuma violated the constitution Thursday, South Africa’s highest court found President Zuma guilty of violating the constitution as he refused to reimburse the large sum of money spent on improvements to his personal home. Between 2010 and 2014, the home located in the president’s rural hometown of Nkandla received improvement which cost an estimated $23 million. The improvements include a chicken coop, an amphitheater, a swimming pool, and a helipad. President Zuma has stated that the improvements were necessary to ensure his security and should consequently be paid for with taxpayers’ money. In 2014, public prosecutor Thuli Madonsela ruled that the president should repay part of the taxpayers’ money spent on the improvements of his personal home. In refusing to do so, he violated the country’s constitution “by not complying with a decision by the public protector, the national watchdog.” The court has given the National Treasury 60 days to determine the sum the president must repay. The opposition has stated that they will seek Zuma’s impeachment. In other South African news, this week, the rand strengthen against the U.S. dollar and reached its highest value since December 8, 2015, the day before President Zuma fired former Finance Minister Nhlanla Nene. The strengthening of the rand was coupled with the strengthening of other Emerging Markets currencies. This hike follows the statement from Federal Reserve Chair Janey Yellen, reiterating the importance to raise U.S. interest rates cautiously, amid risks in the global economy. Investors—weighting prospects of higher U.S. borrowing costs—were holding off in acquiring emerging-market assets. Seventeen Angolan activists are sentenced to jail time This week, 17 Angolan activists were sentenced to jail time for rebellion against the government of Jose Eduardo dos Santos. The sentences ranged from two years to eight and a half years. Last June, the activists were arrested during a book club meeting focusing on Gene Sharp’s book titled From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation—a book on nonviolence and resistance to repressive regimes. Monday, the activists were charged and sentenced with acts of rebellion, planning mass action of civil disobedience, and producing fake passports, among other charges. Amnesty International has accused the Angolan court of wrongfully convicting the activists and using the judicial system to “silence dissenting views.” Later in the week, in response to the jailing of the young activists, the Portuguese branch of hacking group Anonymous claimed the shutdown of 20 government websites, including that of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, among others. In a Facebook post claiming the attack, the group states, “The real criminals are outside, defended by the capitalist system that increasingly spreads in the minds of the weak.” The functionality of the websites has been restored. Aid cuts due to disputed election rerun hit Tanzania On Monday, March 28, the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) withdrew $472 million in aid from the government of Tanzania after the result of the last weekend’s disputed presidential election rerun in the semi-autonomous archipelago of Zanzibar was announced. Incumbent President Ali Mohamed Shein of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party was declared the winner with 91.4 percent of the vote. However, the rerun was boycotted by the opposition Civic United Front party over the cancellation of last October’s election by the Zanzibar Electoral Commission. The commission claimed the October poll was fraudulent, while the opposition says the allegations of fraud were fabricated to thwart a victory by their candidate. The MCC was planning a number of power and infrastructure projects in Tanzania, but its development assistance programming is conditional upon beneficiaries meeting certain standards of good governance. The MCC’s board of directors held a vote on Monday, in which they determined that Tanzania was no longer eligible to partner with the MCC given the election outcome. Although the loss of the MCC partnership is a sizable blow to the Tanzanian government, the Tanzanian finance minister appeared optimistic that the power projects would continue despite the MCC’s decision, as he stated: “We weren’t surprised at all because we were prepared for whatever the outcome. We will implement those projects using local sources of fund and the support of from other development partners.” Meanwhile, 10 out of the country’s 14 key western donors withdrew general budget support to Tanzania over the contested election. Authors Mariama Sow Full Article
ni The Trump administration misplayed the International Criminal Court and Americans may now face justice for crimes in Afghanistan By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 11 Mar 2020 12:00:42 +0000 At the start of the long war in Afghanistan, acts of torture and related war crimes were committed by the U.S. military and the CIA at the Bagram Internment Facility and in so-called “black sites” in eastern Europe. Such actions, even though they were not a standard U.S. practice and were stopped by an Executive… Full Article
ni The Federal Housing Policy Dilemma for Older Communities By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 23 Mar 2007 00:00:00 -0400 Often the biggest challenge for older cities and close-in suburbs is not a lack of affordable housing but a need to grow, hold, and attract middle-income households and to foster mixed-income neighborhoods. This creates a policy dilemma: While federal policymakers target limited federal housing assistance to persons with the greatest needs, doing so can create concentrations of poverty within already challenged cities and suburbs. This approach also can set limits that hinder efforts to create the middle-income and mixed-income areas needed for revitalization in older communities.The metro program hosts and participates in a variety of public forums. To view a complete list of these events, please visit the metro program's Research and Commentary page which provides copies of major speeches, PowerPoint presentations, event transcripts, and event summaries. Downloads Download Authors Jennifer S. VeyRobert Puentes Publication: Capitol Hill Briefing Full Article
ni Restoring Prosperity: The State Role in Revitalizing Ohio’s Core Communities By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 10 Sep 2008 07:30:00 -0400 Event Information September 10, 20087:30 AM - 4:30 PM EDTColumbus Convention Center400 North StreetColumbus, OH 46085 The 2008 Ohio Summit – Restoring Our Prosperity: The State Role in Revitalizing Ohio’s Core Communities convened more than 1000 government, corporate, civic, neighborhood and academic leaders from around the state, including Governor Ted Strickland, Lieutenant Governor Lee Fisher, Senate President Bill Harris and Speaker of the House Jon Husted confirmed as speakers. The Summit was co-convened by the Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings and GreaterOhio. The purpose of The Summit was to elicit reaction to a draft set of proposals for state policy reforms that reflect a critique of past policies, aimed at revitalizing communities throughout Ohio. Each of the recommendations was carefully tailored to the unique assets and challenges of Ohio’s 32 core communities whose revitalization is the springboard to a more prosperous and competitive state as a whole. Comments derived from this gathering will help to shape the final report to be released in early 2009.Comment here » Event Presentations: Bruce Katz Vice President and Director, Metropolitan Policy Program Download multimedia presentation slides Download written remarks Scott Bernstein President, Center for Neighborhood Technology Download presentation slides Rob Greenbaum Professor, John Glenn School of Public Affairs, Ohio State University Download presentation slides Mark Partridge Swank Chair in Rural-Urban Policy, The Ohio State University Download presentation slides Jane Dockery Associate Director, Center for Urban and Public Affairs, Wright State University Download presentation slides Alan Mallach Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution Download presentation slides Event Resources: Welcome Letter Summit Agenda Sponsor List Biographies of the Speakers Executive Summary- Restoring Prosperity: The State Role in Revitalizing Ohio’s Core Communities A Restoring Prosperity Case Study: Akron, Ohio Working Draft: Restoring Prosperity: The State Role in Revitalizing Ohio’s Core Communities Working Draft: Our Joint Future: Rural-Urban Interdependence in 21st Century Ohio Restoring Prosperity to Ohio: Fact Sheet Ohio Summit in the News Lavea Brachman and The Honorable Michael Coleman The audience at Restoring Prosperity The Honorable Ted Strickland Douglas Kridler, The Honorable JonHusted, Nancy Zimpher, Al Ratner,The Honorable David Burger Video The Honorable Michael ColemanLavea BrachmanBruce KatzThe Honorable Ted Strickland Full Article
ni How COVID-19 could push Congress to start reining in vulture capitalism By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 09 Apr 2020 14:57:23 +0000 The effects of income inequality have been felt throughout society but they are especially evident in the current coronavirus crisis. For instance, workers in the information economy are able to telework and draw their salaries, but workers in the service sector are either unemployed or at great risk as they interact with customers during a… Full Article
ni A dispatch from Afghanistan: What the Taliban offensive in Kunduz reveals By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 08 Oct 2015 10:06:00 -0400 Editor’s note: Brookings Senior Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown is currently on the ground in Afghanistan and sent over a dispatch on what she’s seeing. President Barack Obama is about to make crucial decisions about the number of U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan in 2016 and possibly after. His decision will be a vital signal to other U.S. allies in Afghanistan and its neighbors. Recent events in Afghanistan, particularly the Taliban's capture of Kunduz, show how too large a reduction in US military and economic support can hollow out the state-building effort and strengthen the Taliban and many other terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan, including those labeling themselves daesh. In such a case, collapse of the government and indeed a collapse of the entire political order the United States has sought to build since 2001 are high. Maintaining support at something close to the current level of effort does not guarantee military or political success or that peace negotiations with the Taliban will eventually produce any satisfactory peace. But it buys us time. On the cusp of a dire situation, Afghan politicians equally need to put aside their self-interested hoarding, plotting, and back-stabbing, which are once again running high, and being put ahead of the national interest. The Taliban’s recent victory in Kunduz is both highly impactful and different from the previous military efforts and victories of the Taliban over the past several years. For the first time since 2001, the Taliban managed to conquer an entire province and for several days hold its capital. The psychological effect in Afghanistan has been tremendous. For a few days, it looked like the entire provinces of Badakshan, Takhar, and Baghlan would also fall. Many Afghans in those provinces started getting ready to leave or began moving south. If all these northern provinces fell, the chances were high, with whispers and blatant loud talk of political coups intensifying for a number of days, that the Afghan government might fall, and perhaps the entire political system collapse., In short, the dangerous and deleterious political and psychological effects are far bigger than those from the Taliban's push in Musa Qala this year or last year. Particularly detrimental and disheartening was the fact that many Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) units, led by weak or corrupt commanders, did not fight, and threw down their arms and ran away. Conversely, the boost of morale to the Taliban and the strengthening of its new leader Mullah Akbar Mansour were great. However, the Taliban also discredited itself with its brutality in Kunduz City. The Taliban operation to take Kuduz was very well-planned and put together over a period of months, perhaps years. Foreign fighters from Central Asia, China, and Pakistan featured prominently among the mix of some 1,000 fighters, adding much heft to local militias that the Taliban mobilized against the militias of the dominant powerbrokers and the United States, as well as the government-sponsored Afghan Local Police. The support of Pakistan's Inter-services Intelligence for the Taliban, which the country has not been able to sever despite a decade of pressure from the United States and more recent engagement from China, significantly augmented the Taliban's capacities. Kunduz is vital strategic province, with major access roads to various other parts of Afghanistan's north. Those who control the roads—still now the Taliban—also get major revenue from taxing travelers, which is significant along these opium-smuggling routes. It will take time for the Afghan forces to reduce Taliban control and influence along the roads, and large rural areas will be left in the hands of the Taliban for a while. Both in the rural areas and in Kunduz City itself, the Taliban is anchored among local population groups alienated by years of pernicious exclusionary and rapacious politics, which has only intensified since March of this year. Equally, however, many of the local population groups hate the Taliban, have engaged in revenge killings and abuses this week, and are spoiling for more revenge. Despite the intense drama of the past week, however, Afghanistan has not fallen off the cliff. Takhar and Baghlan have not fallen, nor has all of Badakhshan. The political atmosphere in Kabul is still poisonous, but the various anti-government plots and scheming are dissipating in their intensity and immediacy. On Wednesday, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani reached out to some of those dissatisfied powerbrokers, who have been salivating for a change in political dispensation. The crisis is not over, neither on the battlefield in Kunduz and many other parts of Afghanistan, nor in the Afghan political system. But it is much easier to exhale on Thursday, October 8th. United States air support was essential in retaking Kunduz and avoiding more of Badakhshan falling into the hands of the Taliban, precipitating a military domino effect in the north and inflaming the political crisis. Despite the terrible and tragic mistake of the U.S. bombing of the Médecins Sans Frontières hospital, maintaining and expanding U.S. air support for the Afghan forces, and allowing for U.S. support beyond in extremis, such as in preventing a similar Taliban offensive, is vital. It is equally important to augment intelligence- assets support. Significant reductions in U.S. assistance, whether that be troops, intelligence, or air support, will greatly increase the chances that another major Taliban success—like that of Kunduz, and perhaps possibly again in Kunduz—will happen again. It would also be accompanied by intensely dangerous political instability. Equally imperative is that Afghan politicians put aside their self-interested scheming and rally behind the country to enable the government to function, or they will push Afghanistan over the brink into paralysis, intensified insurgency, and outright civil war. In addition to restraining their political and monetary ambitions and their many powerplays in Kabul, they need to recognize that years of abusive, discriminatory, exclusionary governance; extensive corruption; and individual and ethnic patronage and nepotism were the crucial roots of the crisis in Kunduz and elsewhere. These have corroded the Afghan Army and permeate the Afghan Police and anti-Taliban militias. Beyond blaming Pakistan, Afghan politicians and powerbrokers need to take a hard look at their behavior over the recent days and over many years and realize they have much to do to clean their own house to avoid disastrous outcomes for Afghanistan. To satisfy these politicians, many from the north of the country and prominent long-term powerbrokers, President Ghani decided over the past few days to include them more in consultations and power-sharing. Many Afghan people welcome such more inclusive politics, arguing that while the very survival of the country might be at stake, grand governance and anti-corruption ambitions need to be shelved. That may be a necessary bargain, but it is a Faustian one. Not all corruption or nepotism can or will disappear. But unless outright rapacious, exclusionary, and deeply predatory governance is mitigated, the root causes of the insurgency will remain unaddressed and the state-building project will have disappeared into fiefdoms and lasting conflict. At that point, even negotiations with the Taliban will not bring peace. Authors Vanda Felbab-Brown Image Source: © Reuters Staff / Reuters Full Article
ni Don’t abandon Afghanistan too soon By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 16 Oct 2015 12:00:00 -0400 The loss of the Afghan provincial capital Kunduz was a psychological shock to the Afghan people, a strategic and tactical defeat for both Afghanistan and the United States, and a tragedy for those at the Doctors Without Borders hospital there. Yet the shock may prompt essential changes. It is important to examine both Afghan and U.S. responsibility for the disaster, what is happening now and what needs to be done. President Obama’s decision Thursday to maintain existing U.S. force levels into next year was absolutely correct to achieve the goal he stated of “sustainable Afghan capacity and self-sufficiency.” Kunduz, which has since been recaptured by Afghan forces, was more than just the first provincial capital to be taken by the Taliban; its fall was highly symbolic because it was the site of the Taliban’s last stand in 2001. The poor initial performance of Afghan security forces and the tragic bombing of a nongovernmental organization hospital in the midst of a chaotic response to the attack sparked national disappointment in Afghanistan and international concern. All this came on the back of a dismal year in which many more Afghan civilians died than did so while international forces fought the Taliban, and the national unity government, which came into office on a wave of hope a year ago, stalled on filling essential positions and reforming governance. The United States and its allies share responsibility for the military losses. We built security forces that depend on air power and need continued intelligence and advisory support. But instead of ensuring that these capabilities are available, we have severely limited air support, transferred key intelligence enablers to Iraq and created a patchwork system that left key areas, including Kunduz, without effective advisers. Our withdrawals from these vital functions based on politically driven timetables ignored reality on the ground, including Taliban capabilities and the embrace of the Islamic State by some militants. But Afghans need to understand that U.S. support is not, and should not, be a blank check. Both the government and the opposition need to work to improve their military, political and governance performance, and come together instead of pulling the country apart. The Kunduz setback does not mean the war is lost. Elite Afghan commandos delivered by recapturing critical areas. Whereas Mosul in Iraq remains in enemy hands a year after it fell, Kunduz has returned to government control. President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah appear to be heeding the call to action. During our recent 10-day visit to Afghanistan, each told us that they have agreed to an accelerated appointment process. Five new governors have been named, including three to critical provinces; further appointments and the long-delayed replacement of numerous senior officers is promised and must happen quickly. Appointments must involve effective individuals and cannot be merely political payoffs. Ghani has created a commission to investigate Kunduz, with a mandate to recommend action, that is led by opposition voices, including a former head of intelligence, though it sadly lacks female members. If government performance takes off, public confidence could begin to be restored. More remains to be done. Afghan power brokers, intent on advancing personal agendas, seek to replace the government. They need to be pressed to stand down. The effort to reduce predatory governance in the provinces and Kabul cannot be shoved aside. Ghani and Abdullah must work effectively together despite the rapacious desires of their supporters and opponents. Broader consultation with the Afghan people is needed. The United States needs to continue to step up to its own responsibilities, as well. Ground combat troops are not needed, but advisers and air power must be kept in place and not reduced on some blind, years-old timetable. Air power must be available to preempt attacks and not confined, as it is now, to desperate defense after attacks have begun. Afghan and foreign officials we spoke to foresee a crescendo of Taliban attacks as international forces withdraw. An even bigger Taliban offensive next year is likely to stretch battered Afghan forces further. We have not ended a war, only left it to the Afghans too soon. The United States should maintain its current forces and funding levels, which are less than 10 percent of expenditures a few years ago, and focus on effectively advising Afghan forces. A reduction of the U.S. effort to a “pure” counterterrorism effort, still foreshadowed by the president’s hope of getting to about half the current force level sometime next year, would be disturbingly similar to what President George W. Bush tried a decade ago. Such a premature drawdown would abandon Afghan forces before they are ready, increasing the risk that a renewed terrorist haven will emerge. Asking our allies to do jobs they are not equipped to do raises the risk of more reversals such as Kunduz and tragedies like the hospital bombing. Obama’s decision to maintain forces properly avoids preempting his successor’s choices about a difficult and evolving situation. That focus, and not a predetermined timetable, should continue to guide decisions throughout the remainder of this administration. The president’s public determination to maintain our current training and advising effort until Afghan forces do not need such help will provide a needed boost to both Afghans and our NATO allies — some of whom have been ahead of us in urging that we stay. And it is the right thing to do for our national interests. This piece was originally published by The Washington Post. Authors Vanda Felbab-BrownRonald NeumannDavid Sedney Publication: The Washington Post Image Source: © Omar Sobhani / Reuters Full Article
ni Now is not the time to abandon Afghanistan By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 22 Dec 2015 12:00:00 -0500 The gruesome theatrics of the Islamic State (IS) captivate the world’s attention, instilling fear in the public from Los Angeles to Paris to Beirut. Yet while arrests are made in Europe and airstrikes continue in Raqqa, Americans ignore developments on another worn-out battlefield: Afghanistan. Afghanistan faces numerous crises in 2016 that could rock the country and threaten U.S. security investments. The United States still has 10,000 troops stationed in the country. It must take decisive action not to supply vast numbers of troops or massively increase spending, but instead abandon inadequate policies before something catastrophic occurs. These must be more than incremental policy changes that merely stave off disaster for the interim, as this would compound the seriousness of each crisis. After traveling to Afghanistan in October 2015, we have identified key security risks and steps the United States can take to forestall disaster. In 2015, Taliban violence resulted in more Afghan civilian, police, and military casualties than in any year since U.S. and NATO forces began fighting in Afghanistan. More fighters, better weapons, and new tactics made the 2015 Taliban offensive their most effective yet, with a recent attack in Parwan province that killed six U.S. soldiers serving as a terrible reminder of this grim reality. Next year, the Taliban will aim to take provincial cities, pounce on Kandahar, and spread fear through spectacular attacks. A major Taliban offensive following this year’s fierce assault is almost certain. Indeed, as a recent Department of Defense report describes, the security situation in Afghanistan has grown more precarious over the last year. The Afghan army has done its best to counter the Taliban assault. Afghan forces retook Kunduz and pushed back serious Taliban offensives in other cities, including Ghazni. While attrition is high due to soldiers overstaying leaves, desertion, and Taliban threats to soldiers’ families, recruitment of new forces has exceeded losses. Yet, strong ground forces cannot compensate for inadequate air support, modern intelligence capabilities, well-functioning logistics (to maintain vehicles and keep essential supplies available), and higher-order assistance for Afghanistan’s still-nascent security institutions. The United States must help fill these critical gaps while maintaining its promises to complete these critical, but unfinished, programs. The United States must also amend the very restrictive rules of engagement that currently limit air support capabilities, and restore intelligence assets that have been withdrawn. Stronger battlefield intelligence capabilities are essential, as we learned after the tragic bombing of the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital in Kunduz. More effective air attacks and improved intelligence could seriously disrupt Taliban operations in Afghanistan. But the Taliban is no longer the only threat to stability in Afghanistan. The influence of the Islamic State is growing, as it recruits more extremist Taliban members and brings in fighters from non-Afghan communities, including Uzbeks and Pakistanis. These IS-inspired groups challenge the new Taliban leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, who seeks to cement his leadership after the years-long deception over the death of his predecessor, Mullah Omar. The Taliban fragmentation and competition from IS, especially prominent in the provinces of Zabul and Nangarhar, have led to increased violence, including the recent beheadings of minority Hazaras. The renewed violence reduces already slim hopes for a negotiated peace in Afghanistan. The United States and NATO must intensify actions against IS in Afghanistan. Like al Qaeda, the group must be a priority target for air and counter terrorist missions. Now is the time to destroy it. At a minimum, coalition forces must restrain the growth of this hostile force before it becomes a significantly larger threat. Afghanistan is undertaking a unique experiment in elected government. Nearly 70 percent of the electorate voted in 2014, despite threats from the Taliban to kill or mutilate anyone who did so. However, the results were clouded by accusations of widespread fraud. After an extended political impasse, the United States brokered a peaceful settlement and a power-sharing agreement between the two contenders in the run off. The National Unity Government (NUG) was formed with Ashraf Ghani serving as president and his chief rival, Abdullah Abdullah, as chief executive officer. Military solutions alone cannot solve all of the country’s woes, as the electorate’s participation and the elected officials’ ability to govern are as critical to a stable state as a strong security apparatus. Now, at a time when insurgent attacks need a strong response and the government needs to stop its internal wrangling and start delivering services to civilians, the NUG finds itself politically distracted. Ex-president Hamid Karzai and mujahedeen leaders continue to undermine the government in an attempt to spur its collapse. These attempts are little more than a naked power grab that, if successful, would usher in months of political paralysis while the victors squabble over the spoils of power. This would be disastrous, at a time when insurgent attacks need a strong response and the government needs to start delivering services. The United States and other coalition nations must voice strong opposition to all efforts to change the constitution through a Loya Jirga or the scheduling of early elections. Without first reforming the electoral system, another massively fraudulent election will surely follow. Quiet opposition will be taken as willingness to see the NUG undone. Despite some positive developments, the Afghan government is losing popular support. More and more Afghans believe that the country is heading in the wrong direction. Thousands of Afghans are fleeing the country, and along with them goes the potential for economic growth. Crime and insecurity in the cities contribute to this brain and asset drain. Stakeholders in Afghanistan must demand governance improvements from the NUG – including opposition to vicious ethnic discrimination and power abuse, which the Taliban exploited in Kunduz – that the Afghan people crave. The government should focus on increasing effective anti-criminal and anti-corruption policing in the major cities, such as Kabul, Herat, and Jalalabad. This would require significant government action against some major power brokers. Additionally, a concerted foreign advisory effort with the police is needed to improve civilian security. These actions require vigorous U.S. and international backing. Doubts are growing about the United States’ and NATO’s commitment to long-term support for Afghanistan. While President Barack Obama’s decision to retain major security hubs in Afghanistan was a step in the right direction, this progress was undercut by the planned force reductions at the end of 2016. In a worsening security environment, Afghans fear being abandoned by their international partners. To rebuild confidence, a U.S.-led NATO review of conditions on the ground and a demonstrated willingness to fill major gaps, such as air support, would counteract this sense of abandonment. Not all is gloom. Unlike Karzai, who blamed the United States for most of Afghanistan’s problems and refused to move against massive corruption, Ghani remains committed to reform. There is progress in revenue collection, enforcement action against fraud in Kabul Bank, and some members of the new cabinet are making progress in less visible but important reforms like speeding business licensing and settling land titles. Unlike in Syria and Iraq, militias do not yet dominate either politics or the battlefield. Actions are still available to minimize the looming crises. But planning and decisions are needed now, not after the crises explode. This piece was originally published by Foreign Policy. Authors Vanda Felbab-BrownRonald NeumannDavid Sedney Publication: Foreign Policy Image Source: © Jonathan Ernst / Reuters Full Article
ni Blame Pakistani spy service for attack on Indian air force base By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 05 Jan 2016 12:00:00 -0500 The Pakistani intelligence service is behind the recent attack on a major Indian air force base in Punjab using a terrorist group it created 15 years ago, according to well-informed press and other knowledgeable sources. The attack is designed to prevent any detente between India and Pakistan after Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s surprise Christmas Day visit to Pakistan. The escalating violence between the two nuclear-weapons states, which have already fought four wars, threatens to get worse. The Pakistani intelligence service has the capability to launch more attacks with little notice, at some point prompting a vigorous Indian response. On Dec. 31, a team of terrorists infiltrated across the Pakistani border into India. On Saturday they assaulted the Pathankot air base, one of India’s largest air force installations near the border. At least seven Indian soldiers were killed in the fighting, which lasted for days. On Sunday, the Indian Consulate in Mazar-e Sharif in northern Afghanistan was also attacked by gunmen. Both attacks are the work of the Pakistani terror group Jaish e Muhammad, according to reliable press reports. JEM was created in 2000 by Mualana Masoud Azhar, a longtime Pakistani terrorist leader. Azhar was captured in India in 1994 after taking western hostages in Kashmir. In December 1999 a group of terrorists hijacked an Air India jet flying from Nepal to India and diverted it to Afghanistan. They demanded the release of Azhar and his colleagues in return for the passengers and crew. And they got it, thanks to help from the Pakistani intelligence service ISI and al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, according to accounts of the hijacking based on the Indian officials who negotiated with the terrorists for the hostages’ freedom. The Afghan Taliban assisted the hijackers once they got to Afghanistan. Once Azhar was traded for the hostages, the ISI took him on a public victory tour through Pakistan to raise money for the jihad against India, and he announced the formation of Jaish e Muhammad, or the Army of Muhammad, in early 2000. JEM received training and weapons from the ISI and worked closely with al Qaeda. In December 2001, JEM terrorists working with terrorists from another ISI-backed group, Lashkar e Tayyiba (LET), attacked the Indian parliament building in New Delhi. That attack prompted India to mobilize its military, and a tense standoff went on for nine months. Only intense mediation by President Bush’s national security team averted war. Azhar kept a low profile for several years after LET’s 2008 attack on Mumbai, but he reappeared publicly in 2014, giving fiery calls for more attacks on India and the United States. His group is technically illegal in Pakistan but enjoys the continuing patronage of the ISI. The ISI is under the generals’ command and is composed of army officers, so the spies are controlled by the Pakistani army, which justifies its large budget and nuclear weapons program by citing the Indian menace. Any diminution in tensions with India might risk the army’s lock on its control of Pakistan’s national security policy. The army continues to distinguish between “good” terrorists like JEM and LET and “bad” terrorists like the Pakistani Taliban, despite decades of lectures from American leaders. The army has long distrusted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who has advocated a detente with India since the 1990s. An army coup in 1999 sent him into exile in Saudi Arabia for a decade. His warm embrace of Modi on Christmas Day in his home in Lahore undoubtedly angered the generals. Modi’s visit was the first by an Indian prime minister in more than a decade. It was also Sharif’s birthday and the birthday of Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Jinnah. Modi’s decision to visit and the warm family greeting Sharif extended set the stage for a planned resumption of formal diplomatic negotiations between the two countries scheduled for later this month. So far New Delhi has not canceled the planned talks. Modi’s advisers are well aware of the double game the Pakistani army plays and the differences inside the Pakistani establishment. After four wars with Pakistan and a nuclear arms race, Indian experts understand the complexity of the dynamics inside Islamabad. The Indians have accepted Prime Minister Sharif’s public condemnation of the attack and promised to provide evidence of JEM’s role to his government, including cellphones captured in the attack. Washington put JEM on the terrorist sanctions list years ago—but it continues to coddle the Pakistani army. Gen. Raheel Sharif, the army’s boss (and no relation to the prime minister) got a warm embrace from the Pentagon last fall—despite the ISI’s support for the Afghan Taliban’s offensive against the Kabul government and despite the Pakistani military’s backing of terror groups like JEM. This piece was originally published by The Daily Beast. Authors Bruce Riedel Publication: The Daily Beast Image Source: © Mukesh Gupta / Reuters Full Article
ni Nigeria and Boko Haram: The state is hardly always just in suppressing militancy By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 12:00:00 -0500 In this interview, Vanda Felbab-Brown addresses issues of terrorism, organized crime, and state responses within the context of Boko Haram’s terrorism, insurgency, and militancy in the Niger Delta. She was interviewed by Jide Akintunde, Managing Editor of Financial Nigeria magazine. Q: The Boko Haram menace has been with Nigeria for seven years. Why is it that the group does not appear to have run out of resources? A: Boko Haram has been able to sufficiently plunder resources in the north to keep going. It has accumulated weapons and ammunition from seized stocks. It also taxes smuggling in the north. But its resources are not unlimited. And unlike other militant and terrorist groups, such as ISIS or the Taliban, Boko Haram faces far more acute resource constraints. Q: Boko Haram is both an insurgent and a terrorist group. Does this explain why it is arguably the deadliest non-state actor in the world and the group that has used women for suicide bombings the most in history? A: Boko Haram’s record in 2015 of being the deadliest group is a coincidence. Very many other militant groups have combined characteristics of an insurgency and a terrorist group. Its violence belies its weaknesses as much as its capacities. Boko Haram’s resort to terrorism, often unrestrained terrorism and unrestrained plunder, reflect its loss of territory and most limited strategy calibration and governance skills. Its terrorist attacks, including by female suicide bombers, also reflect the limitation of the military COIN (counter-insurgency) strategy. For instance, after the international clearing, little effective control and “holding” is still exercised by the Nigerian military or its international partners. Q: Although many views have rejected economic deprivation or poverty as the root cause of the insurgency, almost everyone agrees that military victory over the group would not help much if economic improvement is not brought to bear in the Northeastern Nigeria – the theatre of the insurgent activities. Is this necessarily contradictory? A: Economic deprivation is hardly ever the sole factor stimulating militancy. There are many poor places, even those in relative decline compared to other parts of the country, where an insurgency does not emerge. But relative economic deprivation often becomes an important rallying cause. And indeed, there are many reasons for focusing on the economic development of the north, including effectively suppressing militancy but it also goes beyond that. Improving agriculture, including by investing in infrastructure and eliminating problematic and distortive subsidies in other sectors, would help combat insurgency and prevent its reemergence. Q: While Nigerians remain befuddled about the grievances of Boko Haram, we are clear about the gripes of the militants in the oil-rich Niger Delta: they want resource control, since the Nigerian state has been unable to develop the area that produces 70 per cent of the federal government’s revenue. So, is the state always just and right in suppressing militant groups? A: Indeed not; the state is hardly always just in suppressing militancy, even as suppressing militancy is its key imperative. Economic grievances, discriminations, and lack of equity and access are serious problems that any society should want to tackle. Even if there are “no legitimate grievances,” the state does not have a license to combat militancy in any way it chooses. Its own brutality will be discrediting and can be deeply counterproductive. The Nigerian state’s approach to MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta) is fascinating: essentially the cooptation of MEND leaders through payoffs, but without addressing the underlying root causes. The insurgency quieted down, but the state’s approach is hardly normatively satisfactory nor necessarily sustainable unless new buyoffs to MEND leaders are again handed over. But that compounds problems of corruption, accountability, transparency, and inclusion. Q: We can raise the same issue about economic justice in the way criminal and terrorist organizations operate their underground economies. How flawed have you found the alternative social orders that the leaders of criminal and terrorist organizations claim to foster? A: The governance – the normative, political, and economic orders -- that militant groups provide are often highly flawed. They often underdeliver economically and they lack accountability mechanisms, even when they outperform the state in being less corrupt and providing swifter justice. However, the choice that populations face is not whether the order that militants provide is optimal or satisfactory. The choice that matters to people is whether that order is stable and better than that provided by the state. So the vast majority of people in Afghanistan, for example, say they don’t like the Taliban. But they don’t like corrupt warlords or corrupt government officials even. It’s not the absolute ideal but the relative realities that determine allegiances or at least the (lack of) willingness to support one or the other. Moreover, the worst outcome is constant contestation and military instability. A stable brutality is easier to adjust to and develop coping mechanisms for than capriciousness and unstable military contestation. Q: The Nigerian amnesty programme seemed to be a model in resolving issues between the state and the non-state actors in the Niger Delta, given the quiet in that region in the past few years of the programme. But since the political power changed at the federal level, we are seeing signs of the return of sabotage of oil installations. What models, say in Latin America or elsewhere, can help foster more sustainable peace between governments and non-state actor militant groups? A: I don’t think that the MEND programme is a model, precisely because of the narrow cooptation I alluded to. Many of the middle-level MEND commanders as well as foot soldiers are dissatisfied with the deal. And much of the population in the Delta still suffers the same level of deprivation and exclusion as before. The deal was a bandage without healing the wounds underneath. It’s a question how long it will continue sticking. Despite its many urgent and burning tasks and a real need to focus on the north, the Nigerian government should use the relative peace in the Delta to move beyond the plaster and start addressing the root causes of militancy and dissatisfaction there. This interview was originally published by Financial Nigeria. Authors Jide AkintundeVanda Felbab-Brown Publication: Financial Nigeria Image Source: © Reuters Staff / Reuters Full Article
ni "They are riding a tiger that they cannot control": Pakistan and the future of Afghanistan By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 08:30:00 -0500 2016 is shaping up to be a potentially critical year for Afghanistan. ISIS is rising there, the Taliban is gaining ground, the stability of the Afghan government is deteriorating by the day, and national elections are coming in October. The US, China, Pakistan, and the Afghan government are currently holding talks aimed at bringing the Taliban to the table to try negotiate an end to the war. Of those countries, it's Pakistan that is the most significant. Pakistan has probably the most influence of anyone over whether those talks will succeed in getting the Taliban to agree to sit down and negotiate a peace agreement with the Afghan government. But there's a lot more going on with the peace talks that are perhaps the country's best or only remaining hope. To understand how this works and why it matters, I spoke to Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow in the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institution and an expert on Afghanistan. What follows is a transcript of our conversation, lightly edited for clarity and length. Jennifer Williams: Could you start by just explaining how Pakistan has been involved in the conflict between the Taliban and Afghanistan historically? Vanda Felbab-Brown: That goes back to the creation of independent Pakistan, with issues having to do with the Pashtun minority in Pakistan, which is also the majority population of Afghanistan, and irredentist claims by Afghan Pashtun politicians, as well as the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States, who at different times supported either Pakistan or Afghanistan and played the two against each other. Then you have the Taliban emerging in the 1990s, and Pakistan fully supports the Taliban: They help equip it, they provide intelligence, advisers, and during the Taliban era when they ruled country, Pakistan is one of only three countries that recognize the Taliban regime. They continued supporting the Taliban throughout the past decade, and US-Pakistan relations became very fraught and complicated. It's never been easy. Pakistanis sometimes use the expression that the United States treats Pakistan like a condom: uses it when they need it then discards it when they are finished with it. It's a fairly common saying in Pakistan, especially in the military. So there is a sense of betrayal on the part of the United States, untrustworthiness, that it's an exploitative relationship on the part of the US toward Pakistan. I should also say that Pakistan has long supported many Islamic extremist groups as part of its asymmetric policy toward India, and some of these groups have now mutated, or they slipped Pakistan's full control. Even with respect to the Afghan Taliban, there is a lot of support from the Pakistani state intelligence services and military to the Afghan Taliban. At the same time, Pakistan has been under enormous US and international pressure to act against them, and so they will take the occasional action against the Afghan Taliban as well. But those actions are mostly seen as halfhearted, incomplete window dressing. JW: So what role is Pakistan playing today? I know that they just had the four-party talks and that Pakistan has been insisting that these talks take place in Pakistan. Are they trying to speak for the Taliban? VFB: I'm not sure that it's a fair characterization that they are speaking for the Taliban. Certainly the Afghan government, including in the latest talks, often insinuates or alleges that Pakistan speaks for the Taliban. But they clearly do not. The relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan is hardly smooth and perfect. Many members of the Afghan Taliban deeply resent the level of Pakistani interference, even as the group has been supported by Pakistan. There is a lot of Afghan Pashtun nationalism also among the Taliban that deeply resents the influence and attempts at control by the Pakistani state. Part of the key issue in the relationship is that although Pakistan supports the Afghan Taliban, and although it has historically supported other extremist groups, it does not have perfect control. And arguably, its control is diminishing. And so they posture, they do their double game. They want to appear strong, and so they posture that they have much greater control than they have, but at the same time they deny that they have any nefarious role. In reality, they are playing both sides against the middle, and they often have much less capacity to control and rein in the extremist groups, including the Afghan Taliban, than many assume. The widespread criticism of Pakistan is one of its duplicity and its nefarious activity and its lack of willingness to act against the Afghan Taliban. Those are true, but they are also coupled with limits to their capacity. They are riding a tiger that they cannot control fully. So they have been hosting these four-way talks that involve them, the US government, the Afghan government, and the Chinese government. The Afghan government is desperate to achieve some sort of negotiated deal with the Taliban. It feels under tremendous pressure, the military is taking a pounding from the Taliban, and the government lacks legitimacy. The US has similar views on the notion that the way out of the predicament in Afghanistan is a negotiated deal. The Chinese also like the idea. They have their own influence in Pakistan. China would very much like to say that they finally achieved what the US failed to do over the past decade, that they will bring peace to Afghanistan, and that they will do it by enabling the negotiations. Pakistan is responsive to China. Their relationship with China is much stronger than their relationship with the United States. They often tell the US that China is their old friend, that China is the country that hasn't betrayed them, unlike the United States. China has promised massive economic development in Pakistan at $40 billion. The Pakistanis often say to the US that the Pakistan-China relationship is "greater than the Himalayas and deeper than the ocean." Very flowery. JW: What's the relationship like between the Afghan government and Pakistan today? VFB: The crucial man there really is the Pakistani chief of the army staff Raheel Sharif; no relation to [Prime Minister] Nawaz Sharif. I think that there is sort of goodwill and motivation right now, even on the army staff — but that is juxtaposed with, again, the limits of control even the chief has. With almost clockwork regularity you have a round of negotiations in Pakistan or you have a meeting between Raheel Sharif and [Afghan President Ashraf] Ghani, and the next day a bomb goes off in Kabul and people die, or the Indian consulate is attacked. All those ploys are meant to destroy any beginning of a more positive relationship and have been very effective in subverting the process. The same goes on between Pakistan and India. Meanwhile, Ghani is taking an enormously risky strategy with respect to the negotiations. It's vastly unpopular in Afghanistan, and many, many Afghans hate Pakistan and blame it for all of their troubles. They use Pakistan as the explanation of everything that ever goes wrong in Afghanistan. And the Pakistanis are responsible for a lot, but there's much, much blame and responsibility that lies on Afghan politicians and Afghan people. So Ghani's outreach and engagement with Pakistan is extremely unpopular. He's spending an extreme amount of political capital, and does not have support from his partner in the government, Abdullah Abdullah, and the northern Tajik factions that hate Pakistan with great vitriol. So the more Pakistan is unable to deliver things like the Haqqani network, reducing or stopping its attacks in Kabul, the more politically impossible for Ghani the process will be. JW: So what does that mean in terms of the stability of Afghanistan's unity government? VFB: The unity government is extremely strained. "Unity" it isn't. The Pakistani negotiation angle is just too big for the strain. It might be strategically important. It might be a very significant element in getting any negotiation going, but it's also extremely politically costly, and the longer it doesn't produce anything, the more politically costly and unsustainable it will be. In October, there are supposed to be parliamentary elections and district elections in Afghanistan, and, more important, this loya jirga [a national assembly of Afghan elders]. And unless there is some sort of major breakthrough by the summer, a lot of the negotiations and political process with both the Taliban and Pakistan will be put on ice, because it will just be politically impossible in the context of the loya jirga and the elections. So they really have until the summer to make some sort of breakthrough, and then you will have months of morass and extreme political instability in Afghanistan, but it will also not be conducive in any way to improving either the relationship with Pakistan or the negotiations. JW: How does Pakistan fit into the rise of ISIS in Afghanistan? What's the relationship there? And how might this affect the peace negotiations? VFB: The rise of ISIS-Khorasan is one of the most interesting developments. It complicates the negotiations for the Taliban. They oppose the negotiations, and they're a big problem for Mullah Mansour and those who want to negotiate. They enable defections, make them easy, and make them costly. At the same time, it is interesting because ISIS does not have the same linkages to Pakistan that the Afghan Taliban had, even though ISIS includes many defectors from the Taliban. They quite specifically reject what they call the "yoke" that Pakistan has put on the Afghan Taliban, and they call the Afghan Taliban leadership traitors because of the close relationship with Pakistan. Moreover, ISIS-Khorasan also has quite a few members of various Pakistani extremist groups like Lashkar-e Taiba and members of TTP [Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan]. So there is also a lot of resentment and hostility toward Pakistan. I think the rise of ISIS might make Pakistan be cooperative to some extent, but on the other hand, I think it will also reinforce in the mind of many Pakistan security controllers that it's important to cultivate the Afghan Taliban as friends against the bigger danger of ISIS. JW: Now that ISIS-Khorasan has directly targeted Pakistan, the consulate in Jalalabad, do you think Pakistan will take action? VFB: I think they'll take action against ISIS and groups like Tehrik-e Taliban. I don't think it will produce more resolve to go after the Afghan Taliban. That's my view. Others are hoping that they will finally accept the realities and really believe that they have to fight all of the insurgents, all of the terrorists, and that they cannot differentiate among them. I am not persuaded that that will, in fact, happen. JW: So what does this all mean for the prospects for peace? Are you hopeful at all? VFB: I think the peace negotiations are important, but I am skeptical that anything will happen quickly. I think that if by summer the Taliban has been willing to join the negotiating table, that will be an important breakthrough, but nothing will be agreed. The summer will be very bloody, and then there will be the political [wrangling] associated with the loya jirga and the elections. In my view, even if the Taliban comes to the negotiating table, we are looking at years of negotiations, and certainly no breakthrough before 2017 and likely much longer. And so the question is whether we, the United States, are prepared to stand by with Afghanistan for that long and whether the Afghans will have the resolve. So it's really important that the military and the police fight as hard as they can, because the weaker they fight, the more they defect, the more intimidated they are, the more brain drain that flows from Afghanistan, the stronger the Taliban is viewed and the more intransigent they will be in the negotiations. Now the negotiations will be very much about the military battlefield as much as they will about what's happening at the table for a long time. This interview was originally published by Vox. Authors Vanda Felbab-BrownJennifer Williams Publication: Vox Image Source: © Omar Sobhani / Reuters Full Article
ni Blood and faith in Afghanistan: A June 2016 update By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 26 May 2016 00:00:00 -0400 Vanda Felbab-Brown writes that after more than a decade of struggles against al-Qaida and the Taliban, U.S. President Barack Obama hoped to extricate the United States from participating militarily in Afghanistan’s counterinsurgency. But as the end of his presidency approaches in the summer of 2016, Afghanistan again faces crisis. Very few trends in the country are going well. The U.S. drone killing of the Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour in Baluchistan, Pakistan in May 2016 provides a fillip to the embattled Afghan government and may in the long-term result in fragmentation and internal withering of the Taliban. But that outcome is not guaranteed nor likely to materialize quickly. In fact, the Taliban swiftly announced Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada, a deputy to Mullah Mansour, as its new leader to avoid the tensions and chaos that surrounded Mansour’s appointment. The Taliban has mounted and sustained its toughest military campaign in years, and the war has become bloodier than ever. Despite the Taliban’s internal difficulties, its military energy shows no signs of fizzling out. The influence of the particularly vicious Haqqani network within the Taliban has grown. Moreover, the Islamic State established itself in Afghanistan in 2015, although it faces multiple strong countervailing forces. Most ominously, Afghanistan’s political scene remains fractious and polarized. The National Unity Government of President Ashraf Ghani and his chief executive officer and rival Abdullah Abdullah (created in the wake of the highly contested presidential elections of 2014) has never really found its feet. Fundamental structural problems of the government remain unaddressed, and after two years in power the government may face its end as a result of a possible Loya Jirga assembly in the fall of 2016. Even if the Jirga does not meet, Afghanistan’s leadership will face potentially debilitating crises of legitimacy. Afghanistan’s elite has not taken any steps to heal the country’s deep and broad political wounds. Instead, the dominant mode of politics is to plot the demise of the government and focus on a parochial accumulation of one’s power at the expense of the country’s national interest, and even the very survival of the post-2001 order. Struggling to deliver the promised improvements in government efficiency and reduction in corruption, President Ghani staked the two first years of his presidency on negotiations with the Taliban. In order to facilitate the negotiations, he reached out to Pakistan in a daring and politically costly gambit in the fall of 2014 and repeatedly since. The payoff so far has been limited and Ghani’s political space is shrinking. The death of Mullah Mansour is likely to complicate the process even more. In the paper, Felbab-Brown discusses the evolving international support for Afghanistan; military developments in Afghanistan since the fall of 2014 and the intensity of the Taliban’s battlefield thrust; the Taliban’s internal cohesion, fragmentation and leadership successions; President Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan and the effort to negotiate with the Taliban; and Afghan political processes and trends. Downloads Blood and faith in Afghanistan: A June 2016 update Authors Vanda Felbab-Brown Image Source: © Ahmad Masood / Reuters Full Article
ni The political implications of transforming Saudi and Iranian oil economies By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000 Both Saudi Arabia and Iran are conspicuously planning for a post-oil future. The centrality of oil to the legitimacy and autonomy of both regimes means that these plans are little more than publicity stunts. Still, just imagine for a moment what it would mean for Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Middle East if these grandiose agendas were adopted. Full Article Uncategorized
ni Is the Iranian-Saudi “cold war” heating up? How to reduce the temperature By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 22 Jun 2016 17:43:00 +0000 In Saudi Arabia and Iran, emotions are running high, and even an accidental spark could turn the cold war between the two regional powers hot. Their antagonism is a grave threat to the wider region, which isn’t exactly a bastion of stability these days—and it’s contrary to those states' long-term interests. Full Article Uncategorized
ni Why the Iran deal’s second anniversary may be even more important than the first By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 14 Jul 2016 15:26:00 +0000 At the time that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran was being debated here in Washington, I felt that the terms of the deal were far less consequential than how the United States responded to Iranian regional behavior after a deal was signed. I see the events of the past 12 months as largely having borne out that analysis. Full Article Uncategorized
ni Responding to COVID-19: Using the CARES Act’s hospital fund to help the uninsured, achieve other goals By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 13 Apr 2020 13:36:07 +0000 Full Article
ni Covid-19 is a wake-up call for India’s cities, where radical improvements in sanitation and planning are needed By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 21 Apr 2020 07:44:48 +0000 Full Article
ni Upvoting the administrative state By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 02 Apr 2020 13:00:17 +0000 Nothing in this article relates to the COVID-19 pandemic. Why? It’s not because new federal agency rules won’t be part of the solution. It’s because this article is about improving the notice-and-comment rulemaking process whereas, in emergencies like this, federal agencies are empowered to issue emergency regulations that by-pass the usual prior notice and public… Full Article
ni Trade secrets shouldn’t shield tech companies’ algorithms from oversight By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 04 May 2020 12:00:00 +0000 Technology companies increasingly hide the world’s most powerful algorithms and business models behind the shield of trade secret protection. The legitimacy of these protections needs to be revisited when they obscure companies’ impact on the public interest or the rule of law. In 2016 and 2018, the United States and the European Union each adopted… Full Article
ni Dark Clouds Gather over Greenland's Mining Ambitions By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 16 Jan 2015 12:00:00 -0500 In September 2014, we released a study on mineral and energy resources in Greenland and were honored to have Aleqa Hammond, then the Premier of Greenland, with us at Brookings for the launch event. Since gaining political autonomy from the Kingdom of Denmark in 2009, successive governments in Greenland have been aggressively promoting the development of a mining industry as a solution to its deep and worsening economic woes. Our study concluded that Greenland was likely to develop large-scale mining and energy projects eventually, but that the pace of development would be much slower than the government of Greenland anticipated due to steep declines in iron ore prices and unrealistic expectations of demand for rare earth elements. A lot has changed since then, but our original conclusions still hold. While there has been progress on smaller mines such as the Aappaluttoq ruby and sapphire project in southwest Greenland, it appears increasingly unlikely that any of the large-scale mining and energy projects that Greenland has been counting on will get off the ground in the near term. Global events beyond Greenland’s control have conspired in recent months to reduce the incentives for investment in mining and offshore oil and gas projects. Political Crisis in Nuuk, But Siumut Remains in Control Following her trip to Washington, Premier Hammond became embroiled in a political scandal concerning the misuse of public funds. She resigned from office and an election was called. Hammond’s incumbent Siumut party, now under the leadership of former Environment Minister Kim Kielsen, held on to power against its main rival by a tiny margin of 326 votes. All major political parties in Greenland support the development of a mining industry, but the two main parties are divided on the issue of uranium mining, with the opposition Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA) party opposed on environmental grounds. However, following the election Siumut successfully negotiated a coalition government, bringing together rival parties (the Democrat party and Atassut) that support uranium mining. Ebola Outbreak Leads London Mining to Bankruptcy Global events continued to conspire against Greenland’s efforts to develop a mining industry. Just before the November elections London Mining, the British company developing the Isua iron ore mine, went bankrupt and was placed into receivership after incurring heavy losses at its Sierra Leone mine due to the Ebola crisis. As we noted in our report, London Mining’s project in Greenland sought to attract investments, labor and engineering support from Chinese partners, but the company was not successful in its efforts to secure that support given the high costs of the project (estimated at about $2 billion) and the unique engineering challenges associated with the project. Nevertheless, the company’s plan to bring nearly two thousand foreign workers to Greenland along with the government of Greenland’s efforts to pass legislation that would exempt workers on large projects from Greenland’s minimum labor standards sparked an enormous controversy in Denmark over the scope of Greenland’s autonomy. It also led some commentators in Denmark and elsewhere to suggest that this investment was part of a larger strategic plan by Beijing to establish a foothold in the Arctic region. We concluded in our study that there was no evidence of any such geopolitical connection and emphasized that, contrary to many reports, there was in fact no Chinese investment in Greenland. Last week, London Mining’s Greenland operations were purchased by a Chinese investment and trading group based in Hong Kong. Like London Mining, the project’s new owners are unlikely to develop the Isua project unless they can locate a major Chinese mining company willing to provide capital, labor and engineering. This would seem unlikely in the near term given the precipitous drop in iron ore prices since 2012 and increased production by the international mining majors. The buyer, General Nice, is a privately held trading and investment conglomerate with subsidiaries in mainland China, Hong Kong, India, Singapore and South Africa. The company’s corporate background is unclear. It was founded in 1992, but a quick search reveals no information about the group’s activities prior to 2006, when General Nice acquired Singapore-listed Abterra. This listed subsidiary has reportedly come under scrutiny in Singapore for its lack of transparency concerning unusual investments in coal mines in Shanxi province. General Nice has made a handful of financial investments in overseas mines, all in partnership with major mining companies from mainland China. The company does not appear to have experience operating iron mines. China Cancels Its Rare Earth Production Quotas China’s decision last week to drop export quotas on rare earth elements is another bad sign for Greenland’s plans to develop mining projects. Investment in rare earth projects outside of China has largely been driven by expectations of limited supply from China, where production capacity has been restricted by quotas on both production and export. The removal of the export quotas may reduce interest in international rare earth projects, including the two projects in Greenland. Security concerns expressed in Denmark over the mining of uranium and rare earth have not yet been resolved. A working group established in early 2014 between Greenland and the Danish government to resolve these issues was scheduled to conclude in late 2014, but these talks have been interrupted by the change in government. While the new coalition supports uranium mining, these issues will have to be worked out before mining can move forward. This is particularly important for the development of the Kvanefjeld rare earth project, which contains significant levels of uranium, but may also be a factor for the Kringlerne rare earth project—which does not contain uranium – as Denmark has reserved the right to reject proposed rare earth projects on security grounds regardless of uranium content. In addition, several rare earth element projects outside China (but not in Greenland) have in fact moved ahead, further reducing the urgency to develop a project in Greenland. Falling Oil Prices Oil extraction was always at best a long-term prospect for Greenland due to harsh conditions, limited infrastructure and the wide availability of cheaper alternative supplies. As oil prices started falling in June 2014 and global demand growth slowed, arguably the need for exploration in high-cost areas like Greenland further diminished. Thus, in September we concluded that under the most optimistic scenario it would take at least ten years before commercial oil production would take place in Greenland. Oil prices have continued to fall, and if prices remain low the timeline for exploration in Greenland is likely to be further extended. Dim Economic Prospects None of this is good news for Greenland, which has hoped to meet anticipated budget shortfalls with revenue from new mines. This week the new government publicly acknowledged the difficulty in securing major investments in the near term and will place more emphasis on developing infrastructure to support the tourism industry, which now appears to be Greenland’s best hope for economic development. One such project is a proposed new airport serving the tourist hub Illulissat. Any such measures will be important as the government faces a growing gap between expenses and the annual block grant from Denmark, which is likely to increase further as the population ages. Authors Tim BoersmaKevin Foley Full Article
ni Is the United States positioned to lead in the Arctic? By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 24 Apr 2015 10:30:00 -0400 As the United States readies to assume chairmanship of the Arctic Council today, it is timely to assess where the United States stands in terms of its ability and commitment to lead in the region. While there are many important elements of Arctic leadership outlined in the U.S. National Arctic Strategy, the ultimate metric of state leadership comes not from policy alone but also willingness to commit the resources needed to advance national interests and shape favorable global norms for peace, stability, and responsibility. In this context, the United States has yet to demonstrate a strong commitment to 21st century Arctic leadership. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the decaying state of the U.S. heavy icebreaking “fleet”—currently consisting of just one operational heavy icebreaker—and the lack of a credible national strategy to expand, much less sustain, this capacity. Although the Arctic Council framework focuses specifically on shared, non-military interests, it would be a mistake to assume the region will be immune from future incidents, whether from eventual increases in tourism and shipping, energy development, or even limited geopolitical conflict. The United States must sustain heavy icebreaking capability to assure year-round access to the region and to be ready to respond in the event of a safety, security, or environmental threat. Commercial activity in the Arctic While commercial activity in the Arctic remains limited today, signs of increased economic investment are on the rise, including Royal Dutch Shell’s announcement of intent to resume Arctic drilling later this year and Crystal Cruises’ planned 2016 traverse of the Northwest Passage with its 820 foot, 1,000 passenger cruise ship Crystal Serenity. The Arctic’s vast untapped resources and opening sea lanes are beginning to drive previously-unheard of levels of human activity. Some have suggested companies like Shell can and will invest in their own icebreaking and emergency response capabilities for Arctic drilling, rendering a U.S. government asset superfluous. This is a shortsighted view that fails to recognize the fundamental risks associated with abdicating prevention and response capabilities solely to the private sector. While a single icebreaker obviously has neither the capacity nor capability to clean up a large oil spill in the Arctic, or anywhere else for that matter, in certain scenarios it could help prevent a spill from happening in the first place, mitigate the severity of a spill, and provide a means to ensure on-scene government oversight and command of any incident. In the case of Arctic tourism, it is important to recognize that a mass rescue operation involving hundreds of passengers on a cruise ship—already one of the most difficult scenarios for search and rescue professionals—becomes exponentially more difficult in the remote and harsh Arctic environment. Finally, although unlikely in the near-term, a future scenario can also be envisioned in which U.S. Navy surface ships need access to the Arctic, and icebreaking capacity is necessary to execute the mission. This is perhaps a distant possibility in the context of today’s Arctic but is a contingency for which the nation should be prepared in the future. Access to the polar regions The Coast Guard’s nearly 40-year old and recently reactivated Polar Star is the only U.S. icebreaker with the size and horsepower to provide unfettered access to the polar regions. The reactivation of this vessel, built in the 1970s, cost nearly $60 million and is estimated to have extended its lifetime by only 7 to 10 years. This presents a difficult and unique challenge in an emergency; if for example, the aging Polar Star has a machinery failure and gets stuck in the ice, the United States does not have the means to extract it and may have to resort to assistance from a foreign country. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Paul Zukunft recently put it bluntly, saying the Coast Guard “has no self-rescue for its Arctic mission, for its Antarctic mission." While dozens of small and medium sized icebreakers operate successfully in other parts of the world, heavy icebreakers—generally classified as those that exceed 45,000 horsepower—are needed to assure unrestricted access to the Arctic at any time of the year. Additionally, for the United States, heavy icebreaking capacity is also needed for missions like the annual resupply of McMurdo Station in Antarctica, an operation sponsored by the National Science Foundation and executed by the Coast Guard. Sustaining the capability to access any region of the globe has been a fundamental tenet of U.S. national security policy for decades, and the Arctic should be no exception. The United States is falling behind other Arctic nations, like Russia, that have demonstrated an enduring commitment to maintaining access to the Arctic with heavy icebreakers. These investments may be considered consistent with the size of Russia’s Arctic coastline and associated Exclusive Economic Zone, both of which are substantially larger than those of the United States or any other Arctic Nation. Indeed, there is certainly room to debate how many heavy icebreakers the United States will ultimately need in the future. A 2011 Coast Guard study concluded that meeting the tenets of the 2010 Naval Operations Concept—which calls for constant, year-round presence in both polar regions—would require six heavy and four medium icebreakers. Likewise, the study indicated three heavy and three medium icebreakers are needed for Arctic presence. Putting the debate in perspective, the Obama administration’s special representative for the Arctic, retired Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Robert Papp, recently gave a keynote address at the Brookings Institution stressing that “we should at least build one,” acknowledging the critical state of U.S. capability. Replacing the Polar Star presents a unique challenge. Such vessels have not been built in four decades in the United States, and most estimates suggest a 10-year, $1 billion program to build just one in a U.S. shipyard under the federal government’s arduous acquisitions process. This places delivery of a new heavy icebreaker beyond the Polar Star’s remaining service life and adds to the urgency of the current situation. U.S. engagement in the Arctic In short, the United States must have the ability to access and engage in the polar regions on its own terms. No entity is better positioned to fulfill this national security imperative than the United States Coast Guard, which has the authority and organizational ethos to advance high latitude safety, security, and environmental interests without a corresponding threat of excessive militarization. The Coast Guard also remains one of few governmental entities capable of collaborative engagement with the Russians, built on years of maritime cooperation with their border guard. While the case for icebreaker investment is clear, the Coast Guard lacks the resources to move forward on its own. For the Coast Guard, a new icebreaker is at best a distant runner-up to other recapitalization imperatives within the chronically underfunded service. The Coast Guard’s Medium Endurance Cutters are the cornerstone of the service’s offshore presence in the Western Hemisphere and are even older than the icebreakers. Replacing these 1960s-era cutters is justifiably the service’s top acquisition priority. The question here is not whether the Coast Guard wants new icebreaking capability, but rather how a new icebreaker stacks up against other, more urgent priorities in the context of current budget constraints. The most appropriate funding solution is one that reflects the full breadth of inherently governmental interests in the Arctic, including safety, security, environmental protection, facilitation of maritime commerce and responsible economic development, national defense, and scientific research. In other words: funding from across the government to deliver a national, multi-mission asset. The United States is considered an “Arctic Nation,” a term proudly used by policymakers to highlight our intrinsic national interests in the region and a profoundly basic yet important acknowledgement that Alaska and its associated territory above the Arctic Circle are indeed part of the United States. Unfortunately, the United States has yet to advance from this most basic construct of high latitude stakeholder to a proactive leadership and investment posture for the future. Not because of a lack of “skin in the game,” the United States has a legacy of well-documented interests in the Arctic, but a lack of consensus to make it a national priority in the context of the current budget environment. Whether via national crisis or a comprehensive budget deal, polar icebreakers must eventually become the subject of serious resource discussions, and should ultimately garner broad bipartisan support. At that time, additional funding should be appropriated to the Coast Guard to support the acquisition of the much-needed heavy icebreakers, but not at the expense of its other, more pressing recapitalization programs. Until then, let’s be more realistic about our ability and commitment to lead in the Arctic. Authors Jason TamaHeather GreenleyDavid Barata Image Source: © STR New / Reuters Full Article
ni School closures, government responses, and learning inequality around the world during COVID-19 By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 14 Apr 2020 19:27:29 +0000 According to UNESCO, as of April 14, 188 countries around the world have closed schools nationwide, affecting over 1.5 billion learners and representing more than 91 percent of total enrolled learners. The world has never experienced such a dramatic impact on human capital investment, and the consequences of COVID-19 on economic, social, and political indicators… Full Article
ni Why Boko Haram in Nigeria fights western education By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 17 Apr 2020 09:00:46 +0000 The terrorist group Boko Haram has killed tens of thousands of people in Nigeria, displaced millions, and infamously kidnapped nearly 300 schoolgirls in 2014, many of whom remain missing. The phrase “boko haram” translates literally as “Western education is forbidden.” In this episode, the author of a new paper on Boko Haram talks about her research… Full Article