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Poland’s Elections: Domestic and Foreign Policy Implications

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Published On :: Wed, 18 Sep 2019 11:30:01 +0000

Research Event

30 September 2019 - 12:30pm to 1:30pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Dr Sławomir Dębski, Director, Polish Institute of International Affairs
Dr Stanley Bill, Senior Lecturer in Polish Studies, University of Cambridge

On 13 October 2019, Poland goes to the polls in national elections. On the back of a strong performance in the European elections, the incumbent Law and Justice Party (PiS) is seeking to retain its absolute majority. The election takes place against a background of continued strong economic growth but amid disputes over the direction of social policy and a domestic contest about liberal values. The European Commission and the Polish government have clashed over reforms that the Commission believes could compromise the independence of the judiciary in the Poland. Meanwhile, in foreign policy terms, Poland has sought to develop good working relations with the Trump administration and supported a tough line towards Russia.

The speakers will address the domestic and international significance of the Polish election. Will PiS be able to secure another majority? What would be the implications for the direction of social and political reform in Poland? And how could the elections shift Poland’s approach to politics at the European level and its wider foreign policy?

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Department/project

Europe Programme

Alina Lyadova

Europe Programme Coordinator

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What Europe Can Learn From the Law and Justice Party’s Victory in Poland

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Published On :: Tue, 15 Oct 2019 14:39:52 +0000

15 October 2019

Dr Angelos Chryssogelos

Associate Fellow, Europe Programme

The EU must remain vigilant about threats to liberal democracy in Poland, but European leaders must also accept that PiS’s electoral success is reflective of its ability to deliver on things that other political parties in Europe have long neglected.

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The button of a PiS supporter on election day. Photo: Getty Images.

The Polish election on 13 October resulted, as expected, in a victory for of the ruling Law and Justice party (PiS).

But despite again securing a slim majority in parliament, it has not been wholly a triumph for PiS. And though there continue to be concerns about the party’s authoritarian tendencies, the election has illuminated some important nuances to its support and appeal, which hold lessons for politics across Europe.

Even though some opinion polls had suggested PiS were close to winning a supermajority in parliament that would have allowed it to pursue constitutional changes, the party fell short of that target, while it lost its majority in the Senate. Thus, while PiS may well renew its efforts to consolidate its control over the state apparatus and the media or meddle with the justice system, it becomes much more difficult with the opposition controlling the Senate and being able to scrutinize laws or have a say in the appointment of public officials.

Most importantly, the election result has shown that while Polish citizens were willing to reward a party that delivered on promises of economic growth and redistribution, they were not ready to hand a blank cheque for full-blown institutional realignment to PiS. Tellingly, many moderate candidates in PiS lists performed quite well among the party’s voters.

Even though they rewarded a party that at times employed harsh rhetoric against Brussels, Polish voters have long expressed some of the strongest rates of support for EU membership, according to Eurobarometer surveys. The government has also faced massive protests against its most radical initiatives, such as reform of the judicial system and a law to almost completely ban abortion that was ultimately scrapped. It is therefore more likely that the party’s radicalism kept it from increasing its share, rather than helping it to secure victory.

This is not to say that the threat of illiberalism does not remain alive in Poland. But it shows that the degree of PiS dominance in Poland has never been comparable to that of Fidesz in Hungary, with which it is often compared.

This was reflected in the party’s own rhetoric. In the election campaign the government mostly focused on its economic record, recognizing that much of its support is conditional on conventional measures of political success like voter welfare. PiS may not give up on its ambition to establish a ‘new Polish republic’, but the elections have made it clear that economic stability rather than political radicalism will ensure its longevity in power – with the latter perhaps even being a liability as the party experiences fatigue in office.

Similarly, despite the government’s antagonistic stance towards the EU on various issues, PiS never entertained ideas of withdrawing from the EU, as some of its critics feared earlier in its term. With the Polish economy deeply entwined with the European market and Poland expecting – probably for the last time – to receive substantial subsidies from the next EU budget, EU membership is a necessary precondition for the economic success for which PiS is claiming credit.

With the pro-European left returning to parliament but also an extreme party of the right winning representation, the next government will have a difficult balancing act as it tries to draw on the benefits of EU membership while maintaining its defiant image towards Brussels.

Ultimately, beneath the rhetoric and the posturing, PiS is a party that has shrewdly combined popular policies from the left and right, fulfilling promises of both cultural sovereignty and economic redistribution. Its reelection should not come as a surprise given that it fulfilled its electoral pledges by delivering some of the things that many voters in western Europe also crave but that mainstream parties there have largely failed to provide.

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John Casson

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Published On :: Mon, 02 Dec 2019 16:24:38 +0000

Associate Fellow, Europe Programme

Biography

John Casson, CMG contributes to work on British power and foreign policy in the Brexit context, and on UK diplomacy and diplomatic leadership and formation.

He also contributes insights on middle east policy and multilateral diplomacy, drawing on his experience as British Ambassador in Cairo 2014-2018 and as the prime minister’s foreign policy lead in 10 Downing Street 2010-2014.

He spent 20 years as a civil servant in FCO, HMT and Downing Street.

Areas of expertise

EU and the UK’s European engagement
Egypt, and the Middle East
Transatlantic relations and multilateralism
International development and education
People-centred diplomacy: social media, faith and diplomacy, social entrepreneurship

Past experience

2014-18	British Ambassador to Cairo
2010-14	Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister’s Office
1998-2018	HM Diplomatic Service
1996-98	Researcher, University of Cambridge (religion and politics in Africa)
1993-94	Post-Graduate Diploma in Theology, University of Cambridge
1990-93	BA in History, University of Cambridge

07584 407174

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How Can the EU Learn the Language of Power?

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Published On :: Tue, 03 Dec 2019 09:51:04 +0000

3 December 2019

Vassilis Ntousas

Stavros Niarchos Foundation Academy Fellow, Europe Programme

The new EU foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, has an eye-catching declaration of intent. But what does it mean in practice?

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High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security Policy Josep Borrell answers the questions of members of the European Parliament in Brussels in October. Photo: Getty Images.

The new European Commission has finally started its work this week. In a world increasingly defined by great power competition and deprived of the certainties of a strong transatlantic partnership, this might well be the first commission where foreign and security policy issues will be equally important to internal EU ones.

Amid an escalating Sino-American rivalry, there is a growing realization in Brussels that something has to change in the way the EU thinks and acts internationally.

Charting a more successful path forward will not be easy. Josep Borrell, the EU’s new high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, during his confirmation hearing, offered a hint as to what might be needed to get there: ‘The EU has to learn to use the language of power.”’

What might this mean in practice?

Four issues illustrate some of the key dilemmas ahead for the EU and its new executive.

Hard power

The most revealing of these concerns hard power.

For a union so addicted to the US security guarantee, and so used to the softer approaches of exercising its influence, this was always going to be a difficult discussion. The recent disagreement between Germany and France over the future of NATO gave a taste of how fraught and complex this discussion can be.

Underpinning it are three fundamental questions. If the EU has to enhance its capacity to defend its interests with military power, how (and how quickly) is it to move ahead, how much additional responsibility will that mean and to what degree will this responsibility need to be shouldered autonomously, potentially distancing itself from NATO or Washington? Moving forward with this agenda while balancing the competing interests of member states and preserving the fragile progress already achieved with initiatives such as PESCO will not be easy.

Discussion and debate among member states should not be discouraged, but the new commission has a role to play in ensuring that such discussion is constructive. Distracting talks about an EU army or a nuclear ‘Eurodeterrent’ should be shelved, with the focus as much as possible on acquiring tangible capabilities, getting the defence architecture right, ensuring operational readiness and spending defence budgets smartly.

How to use power

Great powers have traditionally been able to cooperate in certain areas while competing in others. Given their wide reach, powers like the US have generally not allowed disagreement on one issue to interfere with the ability to work together on others.

If the EU aspires to be a more assertive global player, it will need to grow comfortable with this compartmentalization. For example, if Brussels wants to stand up to Beijing regarding human rights, the South China Sea or issues of acquisition of European infrastructure, this should not mean that cooperation on areas such as peacekeeping, arms control or climate change needs to be blocked.

Footing the bill

Ursula von der Leyen, the new commission president, has announced that she wants an increase of 30% for external action in the 2021–27 Multi-annual Financial Framework (the EU budget). But with the Brexit budget gap looming, and little appetite to increase contributions or reduce the funds allocated to costly schemes, like the Common Agricultural Policy, compromises will have to be made for this to happen.

This will be one of the first key tests for the new commission. Power costs money, not just gestures, and therefore specific commitments already made under the Juncker mandate regarding the European Defence Fund or the new Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument need to be guaranteed, if not expanded.

Internal politics

None of these steps are possible if the internal workings of the EU become too dysfunctional. A stronger stance internationally would make the sometime incoherence of internal EU management more of a liability to the bloc’s credibility. For example, how can the EU advocate for the rule of law beyond its borders while some of its own member states violate the same principles?

And there remains the perpetual question of how much more power member states are willing to cede – if any – to deliver faster and more efficient decision-making. If the bloc’s reflexes – often slow, consensual and risk averse – are out of place with the role of a modern great power, how does the commission envision introducing decision-making mechanisms, like qualified majority voting, in foreign and security policy matters?

Borrell’s résumé shows his extensive experience in handling critical policy dossiers. He is also expected to travel less than his predecessor, being mindful of the even heavier institutional work ahead, not least in working with a more politically fragmented European Council and a more politicized European Parliament.

Ultimately, learning the language of power might mean that the EU finally deals with the basics of international affairs as a coherent and cohesive actor, rather than as an occasional ensemble. This endeavour clearly lacks a fixed path or destination. But the new commission seems to be mindful that the EU will have to find new ways to use power as the world changes around it. In doing so, it should keep in mind that the language of power is best articulated not with words, but with actions.

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Don’t Be Afraid of Political Fragmentation

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Published On :: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 11:00:17 +0000

16 December 2019

Pepijn Bergsen

Research Fellow, Europe Programme

If managed correctly, splintering and more volatile political systems – so-called ‘Dutchification’ – need not be a ticket to political and policy paralysis.

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Voters cast their vote as part of the Dutch general elections on March 15, 2017 at a polling station in a mill in Oisterwijk. Photo by ROB ENGELAAR/AFP via Getty Images.

In recent decades, political party systems across Europe have fragmented and electoral volatility has increased. The number of parties represented in parliaments across the continent has grown and the formerly dominant mainstream parties have seen their support base collapse, forcing parties into often uncomfortable and unstable coalitions.

From the United Kingdom to Germany, politicians and commentators talk of such scenarios in often apocalyptic terms and associate it with political instability and policy paralysis.

They shouldn’t. Instead they should focus their energy on making these increasingly competitive political markets work.

The Netherlands is frequently held up as a prime example of this process, which is therefore sometimes referred to as ‘Dutchification’. Its highly proportional political system has created the opportunity for new parties and specific interest groups to win parliamentary representation, ranging from an animal rights party and a party catering specifically to the interests of the elderly.

This has been accompanied by increased electoral volatility. In the 1970s, less than 15% of seats in the Dutch parliament would change party at any election, but in the last election in 2017, this was just over a quarter. The system also created space for the relatively early rise of populist far-right parties, though it was not the cause of their rise.

Nevertheless, despite the regularly difficult coalition politics, it remains one of the most well-governed countries in the world.

A short history of fragmentation

Looking at the effective number of parties represented in parliaments, the number of parties, corrected for their size, provides a good measure of the extent of fragmentation. In the Netherlands this steadily increased from around four in the 1980s to over eight following the election in 2017. Even the populist far-right vote has fragmented, with two parties partly competing for the same electorate. In other countries it has been a more recent phenomenon. Spain remained a de facto two-party system until the financial crisis. Dissatisfaction with both mainstream parties has seen challenger parties on both the left and the right attract significant support, making it harder to form stable coalitions. Political fragmentation decreased slightly in Italy in recent years, but that was from a high base as it shot up in the early 1990s when the post-war political settlement crumbled.

German politics, long a hallmark of stability, is struggling with the decrease in support for the parties that dominated its political scene in the post-war period. The Christian Democrats and Social Democrats only barely managed to win a majority together in the election in 2017, at 53.4% of the vote compared with the 81.3% achieved 30 years earlier. The latest polls suggest they would only get to 40% together if an election were held today.

A similar trend is visible within the European Parliament. Whereas the two largest groups in the European Parliament, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, together won 66% of the vote in the election in 1999, they did not even manage to win a majority together in 2019, taking just 39.5% of the vote.

No crisis of democracy

If electoral volatility and political fragmentation does indeed constitute some sort of crisis of democracy, we should expect to see voters become unhappy about how their national democracy functions. Largely, the opposite seems to be the case.

In the Netherlands, satisfaction with its democracy went up at the same time as Dutchification did its work. Similar trends are visible in other highly fragmented European political systems, often those with very proportional systems. Despite regular minority governments, satisfaction with democracy is above 90% in Denmark and at 80% in Sweden, according to the latest Eurobarometer data.

In comparison, it stood at 52% in the United Kingdom and 53% in France, where the electoral system has, at least on the surface, prevented the kind of fragmentation supposedly plaguing proportional systems.

Satisfaction with democracy seems to be affected by a number of factors. This includes the state of the economy, particularly in countries that were hit the hardest by the global financial and euro zone crises. Nevertheless, the data suggests that, even if we can’t say that Dutchification by definition leads to more satisfaction with democracy, it is clearly not associated with falling faith in the system.

A competitive political market

Dutchification should be seen as accompanying a more competitive political marketplace. A more emancipated, demanding and politically engaged electorate than in the post-war decades is willing to shop around instead of merely vote according to socioeconomic class or other dividing lines, such as religious ones. The fragmented parliaments that emerge as a result provide better representation of different groups within European societies.

This makes life harder for Europe’s political parties and politicians, as they juggle large coalitions, or changing coalitions under minority governments, but provides voters with more choice and democratic renewal. If handled correctly this would also allow more responsiveness to shifts in public opinion.

Such democratic creative destruction in competitive political markets is to be celebrated in a well-functioning democracy. Just as companies prefer to operate in an oligopoly, political parties prefer the stability of limited political competition. But wishing for this kind of stability comes perilously close to preferring stability over proper representation.

Worrying about Dutchification risks confusing a crisis of the traditional mainstream parties with a crisis of democracy. For some countries, particularly those like the Netherlands and Denmark which have longer histories of consensus-based politics and coalition building, this is an easier adjustment. But this should not be an excuse to not attempt to make politics work better as they were forced to go through, arguably still ongoing, adjustment processes too.

Instead of investing in futile attempts to get back to how things were in the old days, or hoping this will somehow magically happen, political leaders and parties across Europe need to reassess how they deal with the new reality of Dutchification.

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The EU Cannot Build a Foreign Policy on Regulatory Power Alone

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Published On :: Tue, 11 Feb 2020 16:33:26 +0000

11 February 2020

Alan Beattie

Associate Fellow, Global Economy and Finance Programme and Europe Programme

Brussels will find its much-vaunted heft in setting standards cannot help it advance its geopolitical interests.

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EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen speaks at the European Parliament in Strasbourg in February. Photo: Getty Images.

There are two well-established ideas in trade. Individually, they are correct. Combined, they can lead to a conclusion that is unfortunately wrong.

The first idea is that, across a range of economic sectors, the EU and the US have been engaged in a battle to have their model of regulation accepted as the global one, and that the EU is generally winning.

The second is that governments can use their regulatory power to extend strategic and foreign policy influence.

The conclusion would seem to be that the EU, which has for decades tried to develop a foreign policy, should be able to use its superpower status in regulation and trade to project its interests and its values abroad.

That’s the theory. It’s a proposition much welcomed by EU policymakers, who know they are highly unlikely any time soon to acquire any of the tools usually required to run an effective foreign policy.

The EU doesn’t have an army it can send into a shooting war, enough military or political aid to prop up or dispense of governments abroad, or a centralized intelligence service. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has declared her outfit to be a ‘geopolitical commission’, and is casting about for any means of making that real.

Through the ‘Brussels effect’ whereby European rules and standards are exported via both companies and governments, the EU has indeed won many regulatory battles with the US.

Its cars, chemicals and product safety regulations are more widely adopted round the world than their American counterparts. In the absence of any coherent US offering, bar some varied state-level systems, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is the closest thing the world has to a single model for data privacy, and variants of it are being adopted by dozens of countries.

The problem is this. Those parts of global economic governance where the US is dominant – particularly the dollar payments system – are highly conducive to projecting US power abroad. The extraterritorial reach of secondary sanctions, plus the widespread reliance of banks and companies worldwide on dollar funding – and hence the American financial system – means that the US can precisely target its influence.

The EU can enforce trade sanctions, but not in such a powerful and discriminatory way, and it will always be outgunned by the US. Donald Trump could in effect force European companies to join in his sanctions on Iran when he pulled out of the nuclear deal, despite EU legislation designed to prevent their businesses being bullied. He can go after the chief financial officer of Huawei for allegedly breaching those sanctions.

By contrast, the widespread adoption of GDPR or data protection regimes inspired by it may give the EU a warm glow of satisfaction, but it cannot be turned into a geopolitical tool in the same way.

Nor, necessarily, does it particularly benefit the EU economy. Europe’s undersized tech sector seems unlikely to unduly benefit from the fact that data protection rules were written in the EU. Indeed, one common criticism of the regulations is that they entrench the power of incumbent tech giants like Google.

There is a similar pattern at work in the adoption of new technologies such as artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things. In that field, the EU and its member states are also facing determined competition from China, which has been pushing its technologies and standards through forums such as the International Telecommunication Union.

The EU has been attempting to write international rules for the use of AI which it hopes to be widely adopted. But again, these are a constraint on the use of new technologies largely developed by others, not the control of innovation.

By contrast, China has created a vast domestic market in technologies like facial recognition and unleashed its own companies on it. The resulting surveillance kit can then be marketed to emerging market governments as part of China’s enduring foreign policy campaign to build up supporters in the developing world.

If it genuinely wants to turn its economic power into geopolitical influence – and it’s not entirely clear what it would do with it if it did – the EU needs to recognize that not all forms of regulatory and trading dominance are the same.

Providing public goods to the world economy is all very well. But unless they are so particular in nature that they project uniquely European values and interests, that makes the EU a supplier of useful plumbing but not a global architect of power.

On the other hand, it could content itself with its position for the moment. It could recognize that not until enough hard power – guns, intelligence, money – is transferred from the member states to the centre, or until the member states start acting collectively, will the EU genuinely become a geopolitical force. Speaking loudly and carrying a stick of foam rubber is rarely a way to gain credibility in international relations.

This article is part of a series of publications and roundtable discussions in the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum.

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Can the UK Strike a Balance Between Openness and Control?

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Published On :: Mon, 02 Mar 2020 13:07:34 +0000

2 March 2020

Hans Kundnani

Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme

Rather than fetishizing free trade, Britain should aim to be a model for a wider recalibration of sustainable globalization.

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Boris Johnson speaks at the Old Naval College in Greenwich on 3 February. Photo: Getty Images.

This week the UK will start negotiating its future relationship with the European Union. The government is trying to convince the EU that it is serious about its red lines and is prepared to walk away from negotiations if the UK’s ‘regulatory freedom’ is not accepted – a no-deal scenario that would result in tariffs between the EU and the UK. Yet at the same time the story it is telling the world is that Britain is ‘re-emerging after decades of hibernation as a campaigner for global free trade’, as Boris Johnson put it in his speech in Greenwich a few weeks ago.

The EU is understandably confused. It’s a bit odd to claim to be campaigning for free trade at the exact moment you are creating new barriers to trade. If Britain were so committed to frictionless trade, it wouldn’t have left the EU in the first place – and having decided to leave, it would have sought to maintain a close economic relationship with the EU, like that of Norway, rather than seek a basic trade deal like Canada’s.

As well as creating confusion, the narrative also absurdly idealizes free trade. Johnson invoked Richard Cobden and the idea that free trade is ‘God’s diplomacy – the only certain way of uniting people in the bonds of peace since the more freely goods cross borders the less likely it is that troops will ever cross borders’. But the idea that free trade prevents war was shattered by the outbreak of the First World War, which brought to an end the first era of globalization.

We also know that the domestic effects of free trade are more complex and problematic than Johnson suggested. Economic liberalization increases efficiency by removing friction but also creates disruption and has huge distributional consequences – that is, it creates winners and losers. In a democracy, these consequences need to be mitigated.

In any case, the world today is not the same as the one in which Cobden lived. Tariffs are at a historically low level – and many non-tariff barriers have also been removed. In other words, most of the possible gains from trade liberalization have already been realized. Johnson talked about the dangers of a new wave of protectionism. But as the economist Dani Rodrik has argued, the big problem in the global economy is no longer a lack of openness, it is a lack of democratic legitimacy.

The UK should therefore abandon this confusing and misleading narrative and own the way it is actually creating new barriers to trade – and do a better job of explaining the legitimate reasons for doing so. Instead of simplistically talking up free trade, we should be talking about the need to balance openness and economic efficiency with democracy and a sense of control, which is ultimately what Brexit was all about. Instead of claiming to be a ‘catalyst for free trade’, as Johnson put it, the UK should be talking about how it is trying to recalibrate globalization and, in doing so, make it sustainable.

In the three decades after the end of the Cold War, globalization got out of control as barriers to the movement of capital and goods were progressively removed – what Rodrik called ‘hyper-globalization’ to distinguish it from the earlier, more moderate phase of globalization. This kind of deep integration necessitated the development of a system of rules, which have constrained the ability of states to pursue the kind of economic policy, particularly industrial policy, they want, and therefore undermined democracy.

Hyper-globalization created a sense that ‘the nation state has fundamentally lost control of its destiny, surrendering to anonymous global forces’, as the economist Barry Eichengreen put it. Throughout the West, countries are all struggling with the same dilemma – how to reconcile openness and deep integration on the one hand, and democracy, sovereignty and a sense of control on the other.

Within the EU, however, economic integration and the abolition of barriers to the movement of capital and goods went further than in the rest of the world – and the evolution of the principle of freedom of movement after the Maastricht Treaty meant that barriers to the internal movement of people were also eliminated as the EU was enlarged. What happened within the EU might be thought of as ‘hyper-regionalization’ – an extreme example, in a regional context, of a global trend.

EU member states have lost control to an even greater extent than other nation states – albeit to anonymous regional rather than global forces – and this loss of control was felt intensely within the EU. It is therefore logical that this led to an increase in Euroscepticism. Whereas the left wants to restore some barriers to the movement of capital and goods, the right wants to restore barriers to the movement of people.

However, having left the EU, the UK is uniquely well placed to find a new equilibrium. The UK has an ideological commitment to free trade that goes back to the movement to abolish the Corn Laws in the 1840s – which Johnson’s speech expressed. It is difficult to imagine the UK becoming protectionist in any meaningful sense. But at the same time, it has a well-developed sense of national and popular sovereignty, and the sense that the two go together – which is why it was so sensitive to the erosion of them through the EU. This means that Britain is unlikely to go to one extreme or the other.

In other words, the UK may be the ideal country to find a new balance between openness and integration on the one hand, and a sense of control on the other. If it can find this balance – if it can make Brexit work – the UK could be a model for a wider recalibration of sustainable globalization. That, rather than fetishizing free trade, is the real contribution the UK can make.

A version of this article was originally published in the Observer.

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POSTPONED: Is a 'Geopolitical' Europe Possible?

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Published On :: Thu, 05 Mar 2020 10:10:01 +0000

Invitation Only Research Event

25 March 2020 - 8:30am to 9:30am

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Michael Karnitschnig, Director for External Relations, Secretariat-General, European Commission

What role does the EU want to play in a world characterised increasingly by power politics? The new European Commission has explicitly stated its ambition for the EU to become a stronger geopolitical actor. Is it capable of becoming a third pole in an enduring US-China stand-off?

From climate change to trade policy and security, the next 5 years may prove decisive in proving the EU can be a strong player both in its neighbourhood and globally. Given what is at stake, what are the Commission’s strategic and policymaking priorities for the next five years? With the discussions on the future EU budget ongoing, what areas will be prioritized when member states come to make decisions between competing objectives? Does the way the EU is perceived externally depend on its member states’ ability to put on a united front when it comes to the most pressing global challenges?

Finally, is this ambitious geopolitical vision deliverable within the EU’s existing structures? If not, are member states ready to give up more control for a stronger Europe at the EU level?

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Department/project

Europe Programme, Britain and Europe: The Post-Referendum Agenda

Situated within feminist Christian Realism, this article looks at what political theology is and its relevance to International Relations. Hope is a central theme to political theology, underpinning the necessity to be witness to and to work against oppressive structures. Simply put, hope is the desire to make life better. For Christians, this hope stems from a belief in resurrection of Christ and the faith that such redemption is offered to all of humanity. Hope, however, is not limited to Christianity and, therefore, Christian theology. Thus, taking an intersectional approach, the article looks for similarities in how hope is articulated in three personal narratives: theologian Jürgen Moltmann, UK Muslim advocate Asim Qureshi, and Black Lives Matter co-founder Patrisse Khan-Cullors. Across all three personal narratives, the need for hope begins in a place of despair, signalling a need to recognize that hope and privilege are in tension with one another. Feminist Christian Realism acknowledges and embraces this tension, recognizing that hope cannot function if the pain, oppression and harm caused by privilege are erased or minimized.

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Webinar: Coronavirus Crisis – Implications for an Evolving Cybersecurity Landscape

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Published On :: Thu, 23 Apr 2020 11:25:01 +0000

Corporate Members Event Webinar

7 May 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Event participants

Neil Walsh, Chief, Cybercrime and Anti-Money Laundering Department, UN Office of Drugs and Crime

Lisa Quest, Head, Public Sector, UK & Ireland, Oliver Wyman

Chair: Joyce Hakmeh, Senior Research Fellow, International Security Programme; Co-Editor, Journal of Cyber Policy, Chatham House

Further speakers to be announced.

The COVID-19 pandemic is having a profound impact on the cybersecurity landscape - both amplifying already-existing cyber threats and creating new vulnerabilities for state and non-state actors. The crisis has highlighted the importance of protecting key national and international infrastructures, with the World Health Organization, US Department of Health and Human Services and hospitals across Europe suffering cyber-attacks, undermining their ability to tackle the coronavirus outbreak. Changing patterns of work resulting from widespread lockdowns are also creating new vulnerabilities for organizations with many employees now working from home and using personal devices to work remotely.

In light of these developments, the panellists will discuss the evolving cyber threats resulting from the pandemic. How are they impacting ongoing conversations around cybersecurity? How can governments, private sector and civil society organizations work together to effectively mitigate and respond to them? And what could the implications of such cooperation be beyond the crisis?

This event is part of a fortnightly series of 'Business in Focus' webinars reflecting on the impact of COVID-19 on areas of particular professional interest for our corporate members and giving circles.

Not a corporate member? Find out more.

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Webinar: Can Responsible Behaviour in Cyberspace Be Achieved?

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Published On :: Wed, 06 May 2020 18:40:01 +0000

Members Event Webinar

26 May 2020 - 5:00pm to 6:00pm

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Online

Carmen Gonsalves, Head, International Cyber Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands
Suzanne Spaulding, Senior Adviser for Homeland Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Chair: Joyce Hakmeh, Senior Research Fellow, International Security Programme and Co-Editor, Journal of Cyber Policy, Chatham House

Over the past couple of decades, cyberspace has evolved to become a truly global digital communication space. Managed by a multitude of state and non-state actors, it has enabled a huge range of positive innovations and developments. However, it has also become an arena of intense international competition and rivalry – a reflection of its increasing economic and political importance and broader geopolitical tensions. Despite a number of efforts and some progress in the United Nations and other forums, there are still disagreements on key issues between major powers on how to achieve responsible behaviour in cyberspace.

Event participants

Dr Hafez Ghanem, Vice President for Africa, World Bank
Chair: Elizabeth Donnelly, Deputy Director, Africa Programme, Chatham House

Dr Hafez Ghanem discusses the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for African economies and their development and poverty reduction efforts, and assesses the priorities and obstacles for establishing a comprehensive response to the crisis.

While the acute strain placed on health systems by the COVID-19 pandemic is already in evidence, the long-term economic fallout from the crisis is yet to fully manifest.

For Africa it is the economic impact that may leave the most enduring legacy: from the direct expense of measures to treat, detect and reduce the spread of the virus; to the indirect costs of domestic lockdown measures, global supply chain disruptions and plummeting commodity prices.

As decision-makers globally start to plan for the scale of this economic shock, strategizing in and on Africa to meet the challenge will require unprecedented planning and commitment - and will need to be matched by support from international partners to enable long-term recovery.

Department/project

Africa Programme, Inclusive Economic Growth, Governance and Technology

Hanna Desta

Programme Assistant, Africa Programme

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Webinar: Implications of the COVID-19 Pandemic for Food Security and Resilience in Africa

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Published On :: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 10:15:01 +0000

Research Event

23 April 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Event participants

Dr Arif Husain, Chief Economist and Director of Research, Assessment and Monitoring, United Nations World Food Programme

Respondent: Dr Leena Koni Hoffmann, Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House

Chair: Professor Tim Benton, Research Director, Emerging Risks; Director, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme, Chatham House

Dr Arif Husain gives his assessment of the potential impact that the COVID-19 pandemic will have on food security in Africa and what can be done to prevent a food security emergency.

Linked to the immediate public health consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic are those of economic and food security, particularly significant for low- and middle-income countries. Currently more than 821 million people globally go hungry, with 100 million of those suffering acute hunger, and this will worsen if the evolving economic emergency becomes a food security emergency.

Sub-Saharan African countries rely on trade for food security and for revenue; they imported more than 40 million tons of cereal from around the world in 2018, according to the World Food Programme (WFP). The region faces stark new challenges due to the pandemic.

This event launches the WFP paper COVID-19: Potential impact on the world’s poorest people.

Department/project

Africa Programme

Hanna Desta

Programme Assistant, Africa Programme

Full Article

Webinar: Does COVID-19 Spell the End of America's Interest in Globalization?

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Published On :: Mon, 20 Apr 2020 09:40:01 +0000

Research Event

19 May 2020 - 2:00pm to 3:00pm

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Dr Anne-Marie Slaughter, CEO, New America

Professor Stephen Walt, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
Chair: Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, Director, US and Americas Programme, Chatham House

This event is part of the US and Americas Programme Inaugural Virtual Roundtable Series on the US and the State of the World and will take place virtually only.

Please note this event is taking place between 2pm to 3pm BST.

US and Americas Programme

Department/project

US and the Americas Programme

Full Article

A Proteomic Analysis of Human Cilia: Identification of Novel Components

Toward a Comprehensive Atlas of the Physical Interactome of Saccharomyces cerevisiae

A Tandem Affinity Tag for Two-step Purification under Fully Denaturing Conditions: Application in Ubiquitin Profiling and Protein Complex Identification Combined with in vivoCross-Linking

Discordant Protein and mRNA Expression in Lung Adenocarcinomas

A Human Protein Atlas for Normal and Cancer Tissues Based on Antibody Proteomics

Absolute Quantification of Proteins by LCMSE: A Virtue of Parallel ms Acquisition

A Versatile Nanotrap for Biochemical and Functional Studies with Fluorescent Fusion Proteins

Accurate Proteome-wide Label-free Quantification by Delayed Normalization and Maximal Peptide Ratio Extraction, Termed MaxLFQ

The cytochrome P450 enzyme CYP24A1 increases proliferation of mutant KRAS-dependent lung adenocarcinoma independent of its catalytic activity [Cell Biology]

{gamma}-Hydroxybutyrate does not mediate glucose inhibition of glucagon secretion [Signal Transduction]

12-LOX catalyzes the oxidation of 2-arachidonoyl-lysolipids in platelets generating eicosanoid-lysolipids that are attenuated by iPLA2{gamma} knockout [Signal Transduction]

Cross-regulation between LUBAC and caspase-1 modulates cell death and inflammation [Signal Transduction]

Noncatalytic Bruton's tyrosine kinase activates PLC{gamma}2 variants mediating ibrutinib resistance in human chronic lymphocytic leukemia cells [Membrane Biology]

Biophysical characterization of SARAH domain-mediated multimerization of Hippo pathway complexes in Drosophila [Signal Transduction]

DHHC7-mediated palmitoylation of the accessory protein barttin critically regulates the functions of ClC-K chloride channels [Cell Biology]

The focal adhesion protein kindlin-2 controls mitotic spindle assembly by inhibiting histone deacetylase 6 and maintaining {alpha}-tubulin acetylation [Signal Transduction]

Poland’s Elections: Domestic and Foreign Policy Implications

Event participants

Event attributes

Department/project

Alina Lyadova

What Europe Can Learn From the Law and Justice Party’s Victory in Poland

John Casson

Biography

Areas of expertise

Past experience

How Can the EU Learn the Language of Power?

Hard power

How to use power

Footing the bill

Internal politics

Don’t Be Afraid of Political Fragmentation

A short history of fragmentation

No crisis of democracy

A competitive political market

The EU Cannot Build a Foreign Policy on Regulatory Power Alone

Can the UK Strike a Balance Between Openness and Control?

POSTPONED: Is a 'Geopolitical' Europe Possible?

Event participants

Event attributes

Department/project

Alina Lyadova

Biochemical and structural insights into how amino acids regulate pyruvate kinase muscle isoform 2 [Enzymology]

The heme-regulatory motifs of heme oxygenase-2 contribute to the transfer of heme to the catalytic site for degradation [Protein Structure and Folding]

An enzyme-based protocol for cell-free synthesis of nature-identical capsular oligosaccharides from Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae serotype 1 [Enzymology]

NAD+ biosynthesis in bacteria is controlled by global carbon/nitrogen levels via PII signaling [Microbiology]

Spectral and photochemical diversity of tandem cysteine cyanobacterial phytochromes [Plant Biology]

Crystallographic and kinetic analyses of the FdsBG subcomplex of the cytosolic formate dehydrogenase FdsABG from Cupriavidus necator [Molecular Biophysics]

Quantification of the affinities of CRISPR-Cas9 nucleases for cognate protospacer ad&#x0237;acent motif (PAM) sequences [Molecular Biophysics]

Roles of active-site residues in catalysis, substrate binding, cooperativity, and the reaction mechanism of the quinoprotein glycine oxidase [Enzymology]

Thioredoxin regulates human mercaptopyruvate sulfurtransferase at physiologically-relevant concentrations [Enzymology]

A single amino acid substitution uncouples catalysis and allostery in an essential biosynthetic enzyme in Mycobacterium tuberculosis [Enzymology]

The recalibration of Chinese assertiveness: China's responses to the Indo-Pacific challenge

Feng Liu

Non-traditional security cooperation between China and south-east Asia: implications for Indo-Pacific geopolitics

Xue Gong

Consigned to hedge: south-east Asia and America's ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ strategy

See Seng Tan

Developmental peace in east Asia and its implications for the Indo-Pacific

Ling Wei

Review essay: Where is the Anthropocene? IR in a new geological epoch

Dahlia Simangan

Unpacking the role of religion in political transnationalism: the case of the Shi'a Iraqi diaspora since 2003

Oula Kadhum

Global aid and faith actors: the case for an actor-orientated approach to the ‘turn to religion’

Emma Tomalin

The politics of hope: privilege, despair and political theology

Caron E. Gentry

Webinar: Coronavirus Crisis – Implications for an Evolving Cybersecurity Landscape

Event participants

Webinar: Can Responsible Behaviour in Cyberspace Be Achieved?

It's a man's world: carnal spectatorship and dissonant masculinities in Islamic State videos

Manni Crone

Horror, apocalypse and world politics (free)

Tim Aistrope and Stefanie Fishel

Soundscapes of war: the audio-visual performance of war by Shi'a militias in Iraq and Syria

Helle Malmvig

Webinar: Implications of the COVID-19 Pandemic for African Economies and Development

Event participants

Department/project

Quantification of the affinities of CRISPR-Cas9 nucleases for cognate protospacer adȷacent motif (PAM) sequences [Molecular Biophysics]