The molecular mechanisms of reduced frataxin (FXN) expression in Friedreich's ataxia (FRDA) are linked to epigenetic modification of the FXN locus caused by the disease-associated GAA expansion. Here, we identify that SUV4-20 histone methyltransferases, specifically SUV4-20 H1, play an important role in the regulation of FXN expression and represent a novel therapeutic target. Using a human FXN–GAA–Luciferase repeat expansion genomic DNA reporter model of FRDA, we screened the Structural Genomics Consortium epigenetic probe collection. We found that pharmacological inhibition of the SUV4-20 methyltransferases by the tool compound A-196 increased the expression of FXN by ∼1.5-fold in the reporter cell line. In several FRDA cell lines and patient-derived primary peripheral blood mononuclear cells, A-196 increased FXN expression by up to 2-fold, an effect not seen in WT cells. SUV4-20 inhibition was accompanied by a reduction in H4K20me2 and H4K20me3 and an increase in H4K20me1, but only modest (1.4–7.8%) perturbation in genome-wide expression was observed. Finally, based on the structural activity relationship and crystal structure of A-196, novel small molecule A-196 analogs were synthesized and shown to give a 20-fold increase in potency for increasing FXN expression. Overall, our results suggest that histone methylation is important in the regulation of FXN expression and highlight SUV4-20 H1 as a potential novel therapeutic target for FRDA.

Expert

V. G. Lysov
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 291-304.
Abstract, references and article information

E. A. Rakhmanov and S. P. Suetin
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 269-290.
Abstract, references and article information

A. B. Bogatyrev
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 217-225.
Abstract, references and article information

A. Kh. Khachatryan, Kh. A. Khachatryan and A. Zh. Narimanyan
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 183-200.
Abstract, references and article information

Plant-based 'Meat' and Cultured Meat: Revolutionizing the Livestock Sector 10 April 2019 — 4:00PM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 March 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Consensus is building across the scientific, environmental and public health communities that a radical shift away from excessive meat-eating patterns is urgently needed to tackle the unsustainability of the livestock sector. Recognizing the scale of the challenge ahead, public policymakers, civil society and innovators have increasingly sought to prompt shifts in consumer food choices – away from the most resource-intensive meat products and towards more sustainable alternatives.

Meat analogues – plant-based ‘meat’ and cultured meat also known as ‘lab-grown’ meat – mark a departure from traditional meat alternatives. Both are intended to be indistinguishable from – and in the case of cultured meat biologically equivalent to – animal-derived meat and are marketed principally at meat-eaters. Innovation and investment in meat analogues have increased significantly, but the direction and pace of growth in the meat analogue industry will depend upon a multitude of factors, including public acceptance, civil society support and incumbent industry responses.

This event will explore the challenges of scaling up production and generating demand for meat alternatives. It will also look at the ways policymakers in the UK and EU can impact the direction of the industry while examining what factors will influence consumer acceptance of plant-based ‘meat’ and cultured meat as substitutes for animal-derived meat.

The EU’s Un-Common Agricultural Policy 21 October 2019 — 8:30AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 27 September 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

What does sustainable agriculture mean? 24 May 2022 — 5:30PM TO 6:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 May 2022 Chatham House and Online

Experts compare and contrast visions of ‘sustainable’ agriculture.

There is growing and unprecedented recognition of the adverse effects of food systems on global warming, air and water pollution, biodiversity, soil, and managing the emergence and spread of infectious diseases. At the same time, concern is rising over the role of climate change itself in compromising food security, supply-chain resilience and food price spikes.

Against this backdrop, the need for agriculture to become more ‘sustainable’ is clear. However, there is little consensus over what that means in practice. To address this, Chatham House is launching a new research paper comparing and contrasting the two most commonly articulated versions of ‘sustainable agriculture’.

The first focuses on sparing land for nature and increasing the productivity of agricultural land while minimizing environmental impacts. The second involves scaling up nature-friendly farming while emphasizing demand-side changes to reduce the overall pressure on land.

• How can we understand the arguments in support of either version and the assumptions and ideologies which underpin them?

• What are the implications of promoting one version of agriculture over the other

• How can policy transform agriculture and food systems?

• What should civil society support as ‘sustainable’ choices?

Jan Goedgebeur, Jorik Jooken, On-Hei Solomon Lo, Ben Seamone and Carol T. Zamfirescu
Math. Comp. 93 (), 3059-3082.
Abstract, references and article information

Daniel A. Goldston, Apoorva Panidapu and Jordan Schettler
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2943-2958.
Abstract, references and article information

Katherine Baker, Lehel Banjai and Mariya Ptashnyk
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2711-2743.
Abstract, references and article information

Selim Esedoḡlu, Jiajia Guo and David Li
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2679-2710.
Abstract, references and article information

Imelda Flores Vazquez from Econometrica, Inc. explains how economists use mathematics to evaluate the efficacy of health care policies. When a hospital or government wants to adjust their health policies — for instance, by encouraging more frequent screenings for certain diseases — how do they know whether their program will work or not? If the service has already been implemented elsewhere, researchers can use that data to estimate its effects. But if the idea is brand-new, or has only been used in very different settings, then it's harder to predict how well the new program will work. Luckily, a tool called a microsimulation can help researchers make an educated guess.

Time: 9:00 AM, Location: E1.028 (Hearing Room)

Ning Jiang, Yi-Long Luo and Shaojun Tang
Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 5323-5359.
Abstract, references and article information

Tangled Bank posted a photo:

Tangled Bank posted a photo:

Tangled Bank posted a photo:

Paweł Hitczenko and Nick Wormald
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 5411-5427.
Abstract, references and article information

Giovanni Catino and Alberto Roncoroni
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 5339-5354.
Abstract, references and article information

András Kroó
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 5149-5162.
Abstract, references and article information

Forty-six mathematical scientists have been named recipients of AMS-Simons Research Enhancement Grants for Primarily Undergraduate Institution (PUI) Faculty. Each awardee will receive $3,000 per year for three years. 

The grants foster and support research collaboration by full-time mid-career mathematicians at US institutions that do not offer a mathematics doctoral degree.

This year’s grant recipients hail from 42 institutions across 21 US states. The grants will support their research in several different areas, from number theory to applied mathematics.

This is the grant program’s second cohort, said Sarah Bryant, associate vice president of programs. “Over the first two years, we’ve worked with faculty from 75 different institutions, including 19 minority-serving institutions, which shows just how much this program is expanding and making an impact,” Bryant said. She noted that “in the first year, the grants supported 87 trips, helped produce 70 publications and preprints, and gave awardees the resources needed to collaborate and advance their work.”

The grant allows for any activities that will further the awardee’s research program. Expenses include but are not limited to conference participation, institute visits, collaboration travel (awardee or collaborator), computer equipment or software, family-care expenses, and teaching assistants.

Administration of the award by the grantee’s institution is required; annual discretionary funds for a grantee’s department and administrative funds for a grantee's institution will be available at the end of each grant year.

The grants are made possible through funding from the Simons Foundation and the American Mathematical Society (AMS), as well as Eve, Kirsten, Lenore, and Ada of the Menger family.

Applications for the next cohort are anticipated to open on MathPrograms.org on January 9, 2025. Visit the AMS website to view an informational PowerPoint or sign up to receive email updates about the program. Faculty who applied for but did not receive the 2023 or 2024 awards are encouraged to reapply if they are still eligible for the grant. 

Programmed cell death protein 1 (PD-1) is a critical inhibitory receptor that limits excessive T cell responses. Cancer cells have evolved to evade these immunoregulatory mechanisms by upregulating PD-1 ligands and preventing T cell–mediated anti-tumor responses. Consequently, therapeutic blockade of PD-1 enhances T cell–mediated anti-tumor immunity, but many patients do not respond and a significant proportion develop inflammatory toxicities. To improve anti-cancer therapy, it is critical to reveal the mechanisms by which PD-1 regulates T cell responses. We performed global quantitative phosphoproteomic interrogation of PD-1 signaling in T cells. By complementing our analysis with functional validation assays, we show that PD-1 targets tyrosine phosphosites that mediate proximal T cell receptor signaling, cytoskeletal organization, and immune synapse formation. PD-1 ligation also led to differential phosphorylation of serine and threonine sites within proteins regulating T cell activation, gene expression, and protein translation. In silico predictions revealed that kinase/substrate relationships engaged downstream of PD-1 ligation. These insights uncover the phosphoproteomic landscape of PD-1–triggered pathways and reveal novel PD-1 substrates that modulate diverse T cell functions and may serve as future therapeutic targets. These data are a useful resource in the design of future PD-1–targeting therapeutic approaches.

High-throughput sequencing of hematologic malignancies and other cancers has revealed recurrent mis-sense mutations of genes encoding pre-mRNA splicing factors. The essential splicing factor U2AF2 recognizes a polypyrimidine-tract splice-site signal and initiates spliceosome assembly. Here, we investigate representative, acquired U2AF2 mutations, namely N196K or G301D amino acid substitutions associated with leukemia or solid tumors, respectively. We determined crystal structures of the wild-type (WT) compared with N196K- or G301D-substituted U2AF2 proteins, each bound to a prototypical AdML polypyrimidine tract, at 1.5, 1.4, or 1.7 Å resolutions. The N196K residue appears to stabilize the open conformation of U2AF2 with an inter-RNA recognition motif hydrogen bond, in agreement with an increased apparent RNA-binding affinity of the N196K-substituted protein. The G301D residue remains in a similar position as the WT residue, where unfavorable proximity to the RNA phosphodiester could explain the decreased RNA-binding affinity of the G301D-substituted protein. We found that expression of the G301D-substituted U2AF2 protein reduces splicing of a minigene transcript carrying prototypical splice sites. We further show that expression of either N196K- or G301D-substituted U2AF2 can subtly alter splicing of representative endogenous transcripts, despite the presence of endogenous, WT U2AF2 such as would be present in cancer cells. Altogether, our results demonstrate that acquired U2AF2 mutations such as N196K and G301D are capable of dysregulating gene expression for neoplastic transformation.

Mammalian Asn-linked glycans are extensively processed as they transit the secretory pathway to generate diverse glycans on cell surface and secreted glycoproteins. Additional modification of the glycan core by α-1,6-fucose addition to the innermost GlcNAc residue (core fucosylation) is catalyzed by an α-1,6-fucosyltransferase (FUT8). The importance of core fucosylation can be seen in the complex pathological phenotypes of FUT8 null mice, which display defects in cellular signaling, development, and subsequent neonatal lethality. Elevated core fucosylation has also been identified in several human cancers. However, the structural basis for FUT8 substrate specificity remains unknown.Here, using various crystal structures of FUT8 in complex with a donor substrate analog, and with four distinct glycan acceptors, we identify the molecular basis for FUT8 specificity and activity. The ordering of three active site loops corresponds to an increased occupancy for bound GDP, suggesting an induced-fit folding of the donor-binding subsite. Structures of the various acceptor complexes were compared with kinetic data on FUT8 active site mutants and with specificity data from a library of glycan acceptors to reveal how binding site complementarity and steric hindrance can tune substrate affinity. The FUT8 structure was also compared with other known fucosyltransferases to identify conserved and divergent structural features for donor and acceptor recognition and catalysis. These data provide insights into the evolution of modular templates for donor and acceptor recognition among GT-B fold glycosyltransferases in the synthesis of diverse glycan structures in biological systems.

Investigations of bacterial resistance strategies can aid in the development of new antimicrobial drugs as a countermeasure to the increasing worldwide prevalence of bacterial antibiotic resistance. One such strategy involves the TipA class of transcription factors, which constitute minimal autoregulated multidrug resistance (MDR) systems against diverse antibiotics. However, we have insufficient information regarding how antibiotic binding induces transcriptional activation to design molecules that could interfere with this process. To learn more, we determined the crystal structure of SkgA from Caulobacter crescentus as a representative TipA protein. We identified an unexpected spatial orientation and location of the antibiotic-binding TipAS effector domain in the apo state. We observed that the α6–α7 region of the TipAS domain, which is canonically responsible for forming the lid of antibiotic-binding cleft to tightly enclose the bound antibiotic, is involved in the dimeric interface and stabilized via interaction with the DNA-binding domain in the apo state. Further structural and biochemical analyses demonstrated that the unliganded TipAS domain sterically hinders promoter DNA binding but undergoes a remarkable conformational shift upon antibiotic binding to release this autoinhibition via a switch of its α6–α7 region. Hence, the promoters for MDR genes including tipA and RNA polymerases become available for transcription, enabling efficient antibiotic resistance. These insights into the molecular mechanism of activation of TipA proteins advance our understanding of TipA proteins, as well as bacterial MDR systems, and may provide important clues to block bacterial resistance.

15 July 2020

COP27: Navigating a difficult road to Sharm El-Sheikh Expert comment NCapeling 6 July 2022

Against a backdrop of rising urgency, COP27 in Egypt will bring all aspects of climate action into the spotlight – but especially the role of the host country.

As COP26 drew to a close in Glasgow, Egyptian officials announced their priorities for COP27, emphasizing climate finance and climate adaptation – a new approach given previous COPs mainly focused on mitigation, reducing emissions to limit climate damage.

This was followed by the COP27 presidency outlining its vision at MENA Climate Week 2022 to achieve ‘substantive and equal progress’ on all aspects of the negotiations, and Egypt emphasizing its intention to focus on implementing existing carbon reduction targets rather than pushing for further carbon cuts.

Egypt argues it is hosting COP27 on behalf of African nations and that, while it is promoting the interests of the developing world, it will be an impartial arbiter. However it is also useful to consider its priorities from the Egyptian government’s perspective.

Agenda drivers

Egypt has long prioritized climate finance and adaptation because it remains in need of technical and financial support to adapt, especially in agriculture and tourism.

It plans to expand its access to climate funding and investment, an area in which Egypt has been relatively successful as it currently receives 27 per cent of all multilateral climate finance in the MENA region and has issued the region’s first sovereign green bonds.

With public debt currently 94 per cent of GDP, Egyptian officials have also called for debt relief for Egypt and other developing countries.

Egypt’s Climate Change Strategy reflects this approach, aiming to enhance Egypt’s rank on the Climate Change Performance Index in order to ‘attract more investments and acquire more climate funding’.

Limiting the mitigation scope and the focus on finance also echoes Egypt’s own reluctance to make carbon reduction commitments. The Egyptian nationally determined contribution (NDC) – its 2030 pledge under the Paris Agreement – does not include any quantifiable emission reduction targets.

Egypt is one of only a few countries which failed to submit an updated NDC in 2021 and its upcoming update will not include an economy-wide carbon reduction target.

Egypt has also never published a long-term strategy and has no decarbonization plans despite independent estimates it should cut rising emissions by one-quarter by 2030, and by two-thirds by 2050 to be aligned with the Paris Agreement. This partly explains why observers rate Egypt’s climate action as highly insufficient.

Furthermore, Egypt’s championing of ‘moving from pledges to implementation’ without having quantifiable carbon reduction pledges of its own effectively exempts it from both pledging and implementation.

As a developing country, Egypt’s negotiating position is supported by UNFCCC provisions which recognize differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities of nations.

Its proposal to focus COP27 on the implementation of climate action and finance pledges is important in consolidating progress. But not pushing for more emission reductions at this critical moment risks derailing global decarbonization momentum and undermining global climate action.

According to optimistic estimates, if current climate pledges were implemented the world would still remain on track for 2°C of warming by the end of the century, with far worse impacts than if warming was curbed at 1.5°C.

Under a 2°C scenario, 37 per cent of the global population could regularly be exposed to extreme heat waves compared to 14 per cent in a 1.5°C warmer world, with developing countries expected to be worst-affected.

A 2°C trajectory also runs the risk of tipping points such as the melting of ice sheets in Antarctica and Greenland, triggering runaway climate change. Time to change the warming trajectory is running out as the latest IPCC assessment warns the window of opportunity is now ‘brief and rapidly closing’, and the UN Secretary General recently called for faster carbon cuts by the end of 2022 to avoid a ‘climate catastrophe’.

A different energy transition

Egypt opted not to join any of the voluntary sectoral coalitions at COP26 on reducing methane, clean energy transition, transition to zero-emissions vehicles, or moving beyond oil and gas.

This position is explained by its growing role as an exporter and advocate for fossil gas in the energy transition. Egypt is the second-largest producer of natural gas in Africa and is emerging as a fossil gas hub for the eastern Mediterranean, which is shaping its domestic energy policy.

Its 59GW electricity generation capacity is almost double the peak demand and is dominated by gas-powered electricity generation, which currently represents 42 per cent of all Africa’s gas generation.

Egypt’s climate policy is also shaped by fossil gas, and its national Climate Change Strategy encourages the expansion of gas use by promoting a transition to compressed natural gas for vehicles, the expansion of its domestic natural gas network – despite having universal access to electricity – and shifting to a gas-fuelled shipping sector.

Egypt also voiced support for other African countries to extract and deploy fossil gas and oil resources, making it one of the protagonists of the ‘great fossil gas pushback’. These advocates defend the right of developing countries to deploy fossil gas as a ‘transition fuel’ and champion its necessity to solve energy poverty.

But their position is not shared by all African and developing countries, and is rejected by some civil society groups, who argue it risks locking in greenhouse gases and local emissions for decades as well as delaying future development of low carbon energy systems.

Egypt’s huge spare generation capacity has contributed to a slowdown in renewable energy projects over the past two years. With renewables representing just 6GW, Egypt is expected to miss its renewable energy target for 2022, set at 20 per cent of generating capacity.

Engaging Egypt better

But these positions are more malleable than they seem, and Egypt is open to dialogue – not just on refining the COP27 agenda but also on reviewing its own climate priorities and leveraging its energy sector for a more ambitious transition.

Culture notes: Europe's broken promises to Africa The World Today mhiggins.drupal 1 August 2022

Europe’s ‘gas grab’ in Africa is just the latest abuse of its relationship with the continent, says Catherine Fieschi.

When Emmanuel Macron made one of his first visits to Africa as France’s recently elected young president in 2017, his speech at Ouagadougou University in Burkina Faso was designed to set the tone for a new relationship between his country and African countries. 

‘There no longer is a French policy for Africa,’ he said.

This was a signal away from ‘la Françafrique’, with its post-colonial accents and the propping up of regimes friendly to France, to something that was more strategic, equitable and transparent – more partnership and less tutelage. 

And Europe seemed to be following suit. In March 2020 the European Union and Africa decided that they would redefine their relationship. The European Commission unveiled its vision for a ‘comprehensive strategy with Africa’. The roadmap would give Africa significantly more say over the nature and extent of the relationship, more choice and more political agency.

But what, today, is left of these aspirations? Despite repeated statements, Europe seems to be saying one thing and doing another. 

Earlier this year, after the long-awaited 6th annual EU-African Union summit in Brussels, South African president Cyril Ramaphosa was frank when he summed up the gap between stated ambitions and the current relationship. The pandemic-weary Global South had reason to be wary. Ramaphosa laid out missed opportunities, disappointment and the low expectations that act as self-fulfilling prophecies. 

Europe’s changing focus in Africa 

From the apparent high point of the Ouagadougou speech, Macron has now turned to the Organization Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) in Africa for geopolitical purposes. His primary aim is to combat the rise of Islamist militants and terrorism in the Sahel as well as to tackle the growing influence of China and Russia in the region. 

Russian inroads – via the security firm Wagner in Mali, for instance – have given France further cause to use the OIF to counter destabilization activities. Both the United Kingdom and France train African military in the Sahel, but now, with the end of France’s anti-insurgent Operation Barkhane in Mali, the subsequent withdrawal of French troops and the increasingly established presence of the Wagner group, the security situation in the region is expected to deteriorate dramatically and become increasingly impermeable to European interests and forces.

As for development aid, Britain’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy makes no bones about the fact that Asia is now a priority over Africa.

The relationship between Africa and Britain is being transformed as a result, most obviously through the cuts in development aid, with African aid cut by 66 per cent in 2021. But the nature of the relationship, which has become both more conditional and more transactional, has also changed. 

The UK is emphasizing human rights and ‘free societies’, but also pushing for free market principles rather than the kind of state involvement that some African countries often prefer as a road to accelerated and more autonomous development. 

The future of energy exports and COP27

The issue of energy exports points to what will most likely trigger the greatest disappointment in the next few years – climate and climate finance. 

Green energy deals, like the $8.5 billion COP26 package from the EU, United States and UK to South Africa, look far more problematic now in the light of Europe’s African gas-grab. Indeed, Europe is importing as much African gas as it can after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia reduced supplies. Yet African countries are still being told to curb their own use of ‘dirty’ energy. 

As an illustration, Nigeria holds 3 per cent of the world’s gas reserves, but has barely tapped them, while 40 per cent of its output is exported to Europe. In April, Italy closed deals to buy gas from Angola and the Republic of Congo, while Germany did the same with Senegal.
 

At COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, developed countries pledged an annual $100 billion in climate finance to developing countries for both adaptation and mitigation. But pledges have never really materialized. The aid agency Oxfam estimates that only about a third of the money has been delivered. Climate finance was again the main focus of COP26 – and dismissed by Greta Thunberg as more ‘blah, blah, blah’.

This series of repeated resets, pledges and disappointments tells a story – indeed, several stories. First and foremost, it is one of arrogance and betrayal. That much is obvious. But it is also a story about stories – about how the narratives elaborated by various European countries and leaders never amount to more than a sum of transactions. 

Climate change places Europe, and other rich nations, at a crossroads in its relationship with Africa: the former holds the wealth, but also some of the keys and threats to the transition. COP27, to be held in Egypt in November, will be the next chapter in the story. 

Africa-Japan relations and evolving multilateralism 23 November 2022 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 17 November 2022 Online

This panel discussion reflects on the outcomes of TICAD 8 in 2022 and looks forward to TICAD 9 in 2025.

The eighth edition of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), held in Tunisia from 27–28 August 2022, marked the second time that Japan’s now-triennial summit was hosted in an African country, after TICAD 6 was held in Kenya in 2016.

The summit was attended by 48 representatives of African countries and at least 20 heads of state and government and included a pledge by the Japanese government to commit $30 billion in public and private finance to Africa over the next three years.

In reaffirming the three pillars of TICAD 8 – revolving around the economy, societal resilience, and peace and stability – the newly adopted Tunis Declaration (28 August 2022) also outlined some of the key projects underpinning Japan’s pledge, including a $4 billion fund for a Green Growth Initiative with Africa (GGA).

2023 will mark 30 years since the inception of TICAD in 1993 and ten years since the African Union (AU)’s adoption of its flagship Agenda 2063, on which the Tunis Declaration placed distinct emphasis.

This panel discussion reflects on the outcomes of TICAD 8 in 2022 and looks forward to TICAD 9 in 2025, exploring wider developments in summitry, Africa-Asia relations, and modes of multilateralism.

Questions explored include:

• How has international summitry evolved over the past three decades since the inception of TICAD in 1993, which represented the first periodic high-level summit engagement with Africa by a ‘non-traditional’ partner?
• Looking ahead to TICAD 9 in 2025, what are the priorities for enforcing the stated tenets of TICAD – ‘African ownership, international partnership, inclusivity and openness’ – in cooperation efforts?
• What lessons can be drawn from TICAD’s co-partnership approach (with the African Union Commission and others) – particularly given increasing calls for AU membership of the G20 and Prime Minister Kishida’s pledge at TICAD 8 to support a permanent African UNSC seat during its non-permanent membership in 2023–24? Beyond membership, what are the priorities for furthering agency?
• How are Africa-Asia relations evolving and diverging? How are Japan and other Asian countries perceived by different African countries?

This event is the third in the Chatham House – Japan House London webinar series (2022-2023). The series is held in partnership with Japan House London. You can watch previous webinars from the series here.

Visual Abstract

Visual Abstract

Alba Simats
Dec 1, 2020; 19:1921-1935
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Ji Eun Kim
Dec 20, 2020; 0:RA120.002159v1-mcp.RA120.002159
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Alison M. Kurimchak
Dec 1, 2020; 19:2068-2089
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R. Greg Stacey
Nov 4, 2020; 0:RA120.002275v1-mcp.RA120.002275
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Madison T Wright
Nov 18, 2020; 0:RA120.002168v1-mcp.RA120.002168
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