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Cross-regulation between LUBAC and caspase-1 modulates cell death and inflammation [Signal Transduction]

The linear ubiquitin assembly complex (LUBAC) is an essential component of the innate and adaptive immune system. Modification of cellular substrates with linear polyubiquitin chains is a key regulatory step in signal transduction that impacts cell death and inflammatory signaling downstream of various innate immunity receptors. Loss-of-function mutations in the LUBAC components HOIP and HOIL-1 yield a systemic autoinflammatory disease in humans, whereas their genetic ablation is embryonically lethal in mice. Deficiency of the LUBAC adaptor protein Sharpin results in a multi-organ inflammatory disease in mice characterized by chronic proliferative dermatitis (cpdm), which is propagated by TNFR1-induced and RIPK1-mediated keratinocyte cell death. We have previously shown that caspase-1 and -11 promoted the dermatitis pathology of cpdm mice and mediated cell death in the skin. Here, we describe a reciprocal regulation of caspase-1 and LUBAC activities in keratinocytes. We show that LUBAC interacted with caspase-1 via HOIP and modified its CARD domain with linear polyubiquitin and that depletion of HOIP or Sharpin resulted in heightened caspase-1 activation and cell death in response to inflammasome activation, unlike what is observed in macrophages. Reciprocally, caspase-1, as well as caspase-8, regulated LUBAC activity by proteolytically processing HOIP at Asp-348 and Asp-387 during the execution of cell death. HOIP processing impeded substrate ubiquitination in the NF-κB pathway and resulted in enhanced apoptosis. These results highlight a regulatory mechanism underlying efficient apoptosis in keratinocytes and provide further evidence of a cross-talk between inflammatory and cell death pathways.




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Learning the ABCs of ATP release [Signal Transduction]

ATP plays important roles outside the cell, but the mechanism by which it is arrives in the extracellular environment is not clear. Dunn et al. now show that decreases in cellular cholesterol levels mediated by the ABCG1 transporter increase ATP release by volume-regulated anion channels under hypotonic conditions. Importantly, these results may imply that cells that handle cholesterol differently might experience differential extracellular ATP release during hypotonicity.




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ABC transporters control ATP release through cholesterol-dependent volume-regulated anion channel activity [Signal Transduction]

Purinergic signaling by extracellular ATP regulates a variety of cellular events and is implicated in both normal physiology and pathophysiology. Several molecules have been associated with the release of ATP and other small molecules, but their precise contributions have been difficult to assess because of their complexity and heterogeneity. Here, we report on the results of a gain-of-function screen for modulators of hypotonicity-induced ATP release using HEK-293 cells and murine cerebellar granule neurons, along with bioluminescence, calcium FLIPR, and short hairpin RNA–based gene-silencing assays. This screen utilized the most extensive genome-wide ORF collection to date, covering 90% of human, nonredundant, protein-encoding genes. We identified two ABCG1 (ABC subfamily G member 1) variants, which regulate cellular cholesterol, as modulators of hypotonicity-induced ATP release. We found that cholesterol levels control volume-regulated anion channel–dependent ATP release. These findings reveal novel mechanisms for the regulation of ATP release and volume-regulated anion channel activity and provide critical links among cellular status, cholesterol, and purinergic signaling.




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G{alpha}q splice variants mediate phototransduction, rhodopsin synthesis, and retinal integrity in Drosophila [Signal Transduction]

Heterotrimeric G proteins mediate a variety of signaling processes by coupling G protein–coupled receptors to intracellular effector molecules. In Drosophila, the Gαq gene encodes several Gαq splice variants, with the Gαq1 isoform protein playing a major role in fly phototransduction. However, Gαq1 null mutant flies still exhibit a residual light response, indicating that other Gαq splice variants or additional Gq α subunits are involved in phototransduction. Here, we isolated a mutant fly with no detectable light responses, decreased rhodopsin (Rh) levels, and rapid retinal degeneration. Using electrophysiological and genetic studies, biochemical assays, immunoblotting, real-time RT-PCR, and EM analysis, we found that mutations in the Gαq gene disrupt light responses and demonstrate that the Gαq3 isoform protein is responsible for the residual light response in Gαq1 null mutants. Moreover, we report that Gαq3 mediates rhodopsin synthesis. Depletion of all Gαq splice variants led to rapid light-dependent retinal degeneration, due to the formation stable Rh1-arrestin 2 (Arr2) complexes. Our findings clarify essential roles of several different Gαq splice variants in phototransduction and retinal integrity in Drosophila and reveal that Gαq3 functions in rhodopsin synthesis.




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NF-{kappa}B mediates lipopolysaccharide-induced alternative pre-mRNA splicing of MyD88 in mouse macrophages [Signal Transduction]

Although a robust inflammatory response is needed to combat infection, this response must ultimately be terminated to prevent chronic inflammation. One mechanism that terminates inflammatory signaling is the production of alternative mRNA splice forms in the Toll-like receptor (TLR) signaling pathway. Whereas most genes in the TLR pathway encode positive mediators of inflammatory signaling, several, including that encoding the MyD88 signaling adaptor, also produce alternative spliced mRNA isoforms that encode dominant-negative inhibitors of the response. Production of these negatively acting alternatively spliced isoforms is induced by stimulation with the TLR4 agonist lipopolysaccharide (LPS); thus, this alternative pre-mRNA splicing represents a negative feedback loop that terminates TLR signaling and prevents chronic inflammation. In the current study, we investigated the mechanisms regulating the LPS-induced alternative pre-mRNA splicing of the MyD88 transcript in murine macrophages. We found that 1) the induction of the alternatively spliced MyD88 form is due to alternative pre-mRNA splicing and not caused by another RNA regulatory mechanism, 2) MyD88 splicing is regulated by both the MyD88- and TRIF-dependent arms of the TLR signaling pathway, 3) MyD88 splicing is regulated by the NF-κB transcription factor, and 4) NF-κB likely regulates MyD88 alternative pre-mRNA splicing per se rather than regulating splicing indirectly by altering MyD88 transcription. We conclude that alternative splicing of MyD88 may provide a sensitive mechanism that ensures robust termination of inflammation for tissue repair and restoration of normal tissue homeostasis once an infection is controlled.




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Biophysical characterization of SARAH domain-mediated multimerization of Hippo pathway complexes in Drosophila [Signal Transduction]

Hippo pathway signaling limits cell growth and proliferation and maintains the stem-cell niche. These cellular events result from the coordinated activity of a core kinase cassette that is regulated, in part, by interactions involving Hippo, Salvador, and dRassF. These interactions are mediated by a conserved coiled-coil domain, termed SARAH, in each of these proteins. SARAH domain–mediated homodimerization of Hippo kinase leads to autophosphorylation and activation. Paradoxically, SARAH domain–mediated heterodimerization between Hippo and Salvador enhances Hippo kinase activity in cells, whereas complex formation with dRassF inhibits it. To better understand the mechanism by which each complex distinctly modulates Hippo kinase and pathway activity, here we biophysically characterized the entire suite of SARAH domain–mediated complexes. We purified the three SARAH domains from Drosophila melanogaster and performed an unbiased pulldown assay to identify all possible interactions, revealing that isolated SARAH domains are sufficient to recapitulate the cellular assemblies and that Hippo is a universal binding partner. Additionally, we found that the Salvador SARAH domain homodimerizes and demonstrate that this interaction is conserved in Salvador's mammalian homolog. Using native MS, we show that each of these complexes is dimeric in solution. We also measured the stability of each SARAH domain complex, finding that despite similarities at both the sequence and structural levels, SARAH domain complexes differ in stability. The identity, stoichiometry, and stability of these interactions characterized here comprehensively reveal the nature of SARAH domain–mediated complex formation and provide mechanistic insights into how SARAH domain–mediated interactions influence Hippo pathway activity.




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Mechanistic insights explain the transforming potential of the T507K substitution in the protein-tyrosine phosphatase SHP2 [Signal Transduction]

The protein-tyrosine phosphatase SHP2 is an allosteric enzyme critical for cellular events downstream of growth factor receptors. Mutations in the SHP2 gene have been linked to many different types of human diseases, including developmental disorders, leukemia, and solid tumors. Unlike most SHP2-activating mutations, the T507K substitution in SHP2 is unique in that it exhibits oncogenic Ras-like transforming activity. However, the biochemical basis of how the SHP2/T507K variant elicits transformation remains unclear. By combining kinetic and biophysical methods, X-ray crystallography, and molecular modeling, as well as using cell biology approaches, here we uncovered that the T507K substitution alters both SHP2 substrate specificity and its allosteric regulatory mechanism. We found that although SHP2/T507K exists in the closed, autoinhibited conformation similar to the WT enzyme, the interactions between its N-SH2 and protein-tyrosine phosphatase domains are weakened such that SHP2/T507K possesses a higher affinity for the scaffolding protein Grb2-associated binding protein 1 (Gab1). We also discovered that the T507K substitution alters the structure of the SHP2 active site, resulting in a change in SHP2 substrate preference for Sprouty1, a known negative regulator of Ras signaling and a potential tumor suppressor. Our results suggest that SHP2/T507K's shift in substrate specificity coupled with its preferential association of SHP2/T507K with Gab1 enable the mutant SHP2 to more efficiently dephosphorylate Sprouty1 at pTyr-53. This dephosphorylation hyperactivates Ras signaling, which is likely responsible for SHP2/T507K's Ras-like transforming activity.




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The focal adhesion protein kindlin-2 controls mitotic spindle assembly by inhibiting histone deacetylase 6 and maintaining {alpha}-tubulin acetylation [Signal Transduction]

Kindlins are focal adhesion proteins that regulate integrin activation and outside-in signaling. The kindlin family consists of three members, kindlin-1, -2, and -3. Kindlin-2 is widely expressed in multiple cell types, except those from the hematopoietic lineage. A previous study has reported that the Drosophila Fit1 protein (an ortholog of kindlin-2) prevents abnormal spindle assembly; however, the mechanism remains unknown. Here, we show that kindlin-2 maintains spindle integrity in mitotic human cells. The human neuroblastoma SH-SY5Y cell line expresses only kindlin-2, and we found that when SH-SY5Y cells are depleted of kindlin-2, they exhibit pronounced spindle abnormalities and delayed mitosis. Of note, acetylation of α-tubulin, which maintains microtubule flexibility and stability, was diminished in the kindlin-2–depleted cells. Mechanistically, we found that kindlin-2 maintains α-tubulin acetylation by inhibiting the microtubule-associated deacetylase histone deacetylase 6 (HDAC6) via a signaling pathway involving AKT Ser/Thr kinase (AKT)/glycogen synthase kinase 3β (GSK3β) or paxillin. We also provide evidence that prolonged hypoxia down-regulates kindlin-2 expression, leading to spindle abnormalities not only in the SH-SY5Y cell line, but also cell lines derived from colon and breast tissues. The findings of our study highlight that kindlin-2 regulates mitotic spindle assembly and that this process is perturbed in cancer cells in a hypoxic environment.




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Polarization of protease-activated receptor 2 (PAR-2) signaling is altered during airway epithelial remodeling and deciliation [Immunology]

Protease-activated receptor 2 (PAR-2) is activated by secreted proteases from immune cells or fungi. PAR-2 is normally expressed basolaterally in differentiated nasal ciliated cells. We hypothesized that epithelial remodeling during diseases characterized by cilial loss and squamous metaplasia may alter PAR-2 polarization. Here, using a fluorescent arrestin assay, we confirmed that the common fungal airway pathogen Aspergillus fumigatus activates heterologously-expressed PAR-2. Endogenous PAR-2 activation in submerged airway RPMI 2650 or NCI–H520 squamous cells increased intracellular calcium levels and granulocyte macrophage–colony-stimulating factor, tumor necrosis factor α, and interleukin (IL)-6 secretion. RPMI 2650 cells cultured at an air–liquid interface (ALI) responded to apically or basolaterally applied PAR-2 agonists. However, well-differentiated primary nasal epithelial ALIs responded only to basolateral PAR-2 stimulation, indicated by calcium elevation, increased cilia beat frequency, and increased fluid and cytokine secretion. We exposed primary cells to disease-related modifiers that alter epithelial morphology, including IL-13, cigarette smoke condensate, and retinoic acid deficiency, at concentrations and times that altered epithelial morphology without causing breakdown of the epithelial barrier to model early disease states. These altered primary cultures responded to both apical and basolateral PAR-2 stimulation. Imaging nasal polyps and control middle turbinate explants, we found that nasal polyps, but not turbinates, exhibit apical calcium responses to PAR-2 stimulation. However, isolated ciliated cells from both polyps and turbinates maintained basolateral PAR-2 polarization, suggesting that the calcium responses originated from nonciliated cells. Altered PAR-2 polarization in disease-remodeled epithelia may enhance apical responses and increase sensitivity to inhaled proteases.




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Small-molecule agonists of the RET receptor tyrosine kinase activate biased trophic signals that are influenced by the presence of GFRa1 co-receptors [Neurobiology]

Glial cell line–derived neurotrophic factor (GDNF) is a growth factor that regulates the health and function of neurons and other cells. GDNF binds to GDNF family receptor α1 (GFRa1), and the resulting complex activates the RET receptor tyrosine kinase and subsequent downstream signals. This feature restricts GDNF activity to systems in which GFRa1 and RET are both present, a scenario that may constrain GDNF breadth of action. Furthermore, this co-dependence precludes the use of GDNF as a tool to study a putative functional cross-talk between GFRa1 and RET. Here, using biochemical techniques, terminal deoxynucleotidyl transferase dUTP nick end labeling staining, and immunohistochemistry in murine cells, tissues, or retinal organotypic cultures, we report that a naphthoquinone/quinolinedione family of small molecules (Q compounds) acts as RET agonists. We found that, like GDNF, signaling through the parental compound Q121 is GFRa1-dependent. Structural modifications of Q121 generated analogs that activated RET irrespective of GFRa1 expression. We used these analogs to examine RET–GFRa1 interactions and show that GFRa1 can influence RET-mediated signaling and enhance or diminish AKT Ser/Thr kinase or extracellular signal-regulated kinase signaling in a biased manner. In a genetic mutant model of retinitis pigmentosa, a lead compound, Q525, afforded sustained RET activation and prevented photoreceptor neuron loss in the retina. This work uncovers key components of the dynamic relationships between RET and its GFRa co-receptor and provides RET agonist scaffolds for drug development.




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Phosphoproteomic characterization of the signaling network resulting from activation of the chemokine receptor CCR2 [Genomics and Proteomics]

Leukocyte recruitment is a universal feature of tissue inflammation and regulated by the interactions of chemokines with their G protein–coupled receptors. Activation of CC chemokine receptor 2 (CCR2) by its cognate chemokine ligands, including CC chemokine ligand 2 (CCL2), plays a central role in recruitment of monocytes in several inflammatory diseases. In this study, we used phosphoproteomics to conduct an unbiased characterization of the signaling network resulting from CCL2 activation of CCR2. Using data-independent acquisition MS analysis, we quantified both the proteome and phosphoproteome in FlpIn-HEK293T cells stably expressing CCR2 at six time points after activation with CCL2. Differential expression analysis identified 699 significantly regulated phosphorylation sites on 441 proteins. As expected, many of these proteins are known to participate in canonical signal transduction pathways and in the regulation of actin cytoskeleton dynamics, including numerous guanine nucleotide exchange factors and GTPase-activating proteins. Moreover, we identified regulated phosphorylation sites in numerous proteins that function in the nucleus, including several constituents of the nuclear pore complex. The results of this study provide an unprecedented level of detail of CCR2 signaling and identify potential targets for regulation of CCR2 function.




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Inflammatory and mitogenic signals drive interleukin 23 subunit alpha (IL23A) secretion independent of IL12B in intestinal epithelial cells [Signal Transduction]

The heterodimeric cytokine interleukin-23 (IL-23 or IL23A/IL12B) is produced by dendritic cells and macrophages and promotes the proinflammatory and regenerative activities of T helper 17 (Th17) and innate lymphoid cells. A recent study has reported that IL-23 is also secreted by lung adenoma cells and generates an inflammatory and immune-suppressed stroma. Here, we observed that proinflammatory tumor necrosis factor (TNF)/NF-κB and mitogen-activated protein kinase (MAPK) signaling strongly induce IL23A expression in intestinal epithelial cells. Moreover, we identified a strong crosstalk between the NF-κB and MAPK/ERK kinase (MEK) pathways, involving the formation of a transcriptional enhancer complex consisting of proto-oncogene c-Jun (c-Jun), RELA proto-oncogene NF-κB subunit (RelA), RUNX family transcription factor 1 (RUNX1), and RUNX3. Collectively, these proteins induced IL23A secretion, confirmed by immunoprecipitation of endogenous IL23A from activated human colorectal cancer (CRC) cell culture supernatants. Interestingly, IL23A was likely secreted in a noncanonical form, as it was not detected by an ELISA specific for heterodimeric IL-23 likely because IL12B expression is absent in CRC cells. Given recent evidence that IL23A promotes tumor formation, we evaluated the efficacy of MAPK/NF-κB inhibitors in attenuating IL23A expression and found that the MEK inhibitor trametinib and BAY 11–7082 (an IKKα/IκB inhibitor) effectively inhibited IL23A in a subset of human CRC lines with mutant KRAS or BRAFV600E mutations. Together, these results indicate that proinflammatory and mitogenic signals dynamically regulate IL23A in epithelial cells. They further reveal its secretion in a noncanonical form independent of IL12B and that small-molecule inhibitors can attenuate IL23A secretion.




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Five Foreign Policy Questions for the UK’s Next Prime Minister

18 June 2019

Thomas Raines

Director, Europe Programme
Even if most don’t get to vote in the Conservative leadership election, the public deserves serious answers on the foreign policy plans of those who want to lead the country.

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10 Downing Street. Photo: Getty Images.

In a month’s time, the UK will have a new prime minister. The campaign has been dominated by candidates’ views on how to deliver Britain’s withdrawal from the EU by October, alongside some discussion of domestic issues.

But relatively little has been said about international affairs, despite the fact that foreign policy questions are becoming a more partisan issue and Britain is facing crucial questions around Brexit and the wider international context. These will be waiting for whoever finds themselves in Number 10 on 22 July. 

1. How can Britain influence Europe from outside the EU?

Theresa May was fond of saying that Britain is leaving the EU but not leaving Europe. Britain cannot change its geography. It will continue to share many strategic and security interests with the rest of the continent, but it will be outside of Europe’s central political and economic project. A new PM will not only have to negotiate Britain’s new relationship with the EU, but also think about how to influence it as a third country.

An aspect of this will be finding a new way to work with the EU on foreign, security and defence policy that meets the need for autonomy on both sides. How deep this relationship is or how institutionalized it will be is yet to be negotiated and can be shaped by the next PM.

The UK needs to decide how ambitiously it wants to engage with the new defence agenda in the EU (particularly its industrial components), and how to balance these with key bilateral relationships like France and Germany. Amid uncertainty about American security guarantees and Russian aggression, the next PM must also consider what Britain’s security role in Europe should be and NATO’s place within that.

Beyond conventional foreign policy issues, Britain is also going to be heavily shaped and influenced by the rule-making power of the EU, and how the world’s largest market regulates itself, from energy to financial services, consumer products and the environment.

The UK will need a strategy to influence the EU from the outside – something Swiss, Norwegians and Americans will acknowledge is no easy feat. This could include significantly increasing its diplomatic footprint across Europe, working closely with the UK’s private and non-profit sectors, utilizing Britain’s technical expertise in areas like sanctions, and creating new ad hoc groupings to share perspectives and ideas, building on examples like the Northern Future Forum

2. Should Britain do business with President Trump?

President Trump represents a fundamental challenge to Britain: an American president whose belligerent unilateralism runs counter to many of Britain’s foreign policy objectives. His frequent and often shameless diplomatic faux pas – from proposing Nigel Farage be the British ambassador to his dog-whistle attacks on the mayor of London – are compounded by real differences of substance on issues like trade, climate change and nuclear non-proliferation.

A new prime minister must decide how to manage relations with the US administration, whether to challenge or condemn a US president when he acts against Britain’s interests, or use flattery or quieter diplomacy to seek to influence him. Theresa May’s strategy of staying politically close to the president and playing to his ego has yielded little in policy terms, though other world leaders have fared little better.

A new PM will face some uncomfortable choices. Will they continue to defend the Iran nuclear deal alongside European allies while the US continues to undermine it? Do they believe a trade deal with America is desirable or achievable with the current administration, and what are they willing to sacrifice to achieve it? Is the American security guarantee for Europe secure with Donald Trump as president? Judgements on these questions should inform Britain's wider strategy, and its objectives for a future relationship with the European Union.

3. Should Britain prioritize economics or security in its relations with China?

Britain faces its own version of the challenge that many countries face – how to balance the economic and investment benefits of a positive relationship with China with concerns about repressive domestic politics and a more assertive Chinese role regionally and globally. This tension has become more acute for two reasons.

First, the economic dislocation of leaving the EU may create a greater reliance on Chinese trade and investment. China is already a major investor in the UK. If Brexit proves to be disorderly, Britain’s need may be all the greater (though China faces economic headwinds as well). Some in Brussels even fear that the economic difficulties of Brexit may make the UK a soft touch for emerging powers from which it seeks inward investment and market access.

Second, the deterioration in US–China relations means the UK may come under increasing pressure from the United States to take a tough line with China. The controversy over Huawei’s role in delivering 5G networks may become a more regular feature of transatlantic debates, with Britain facing Chinese economic pressure on one side and a squeeze from America over security issues on the other, without the weight of the EU behind it.  

A new prime minister should consider whether the UK’s interests are served by a security role in east Asia, and whether it has the capability to play one.

The UK remains a party to the Five Power Defence Arrangements. The Royal Navy has conducted freedom of navigation exercises in the South China Sea, prompting a rebuke from Beijing. It has also taken steps to deepen security ties with Japan.

But the UK government has struggled to present a coherent position. Some cabinet ministers have sought to open doors to the Chinese market at the same time as others announced their intentions to send aircraft carriers to the Pacific. The next PM will need to find a balance between China and the US, or accept the consequences of more directly taking sides on disputes about trade, technology, and security.

4. How can the contradictions between UK foreign and domestic policy be reconciled?

One of the many problems with the vague and unhelpful slogan ‘Global Britain’ is how it jars with many aspects of domestic policy. This incoherence reduces Britain’s foreign policy credibility and effectiveness.

Britain has actively supported the UN-led Yemen peace process while continuing to support Saudi Arabia’s military campaign through arms sales. Britain wants to build a new ambitious independent trade policy while restricting the migration that is crucial for services trade. British foreign secretaries trumpet the UK’s soft power while the Home Office deports members of the Windrush generation, bungles EU citizenship applications and sets unreasonable burdens for many people seeking visas simply to visit the country.

Global universities are celebrated while international students had their post-study visas cut (a policy that sensibly is likely to be reversed). Britain advocates international tax compliance and transparency while not taking robust steps to regulate the tax haven role played by crown dependencies and overseas territories.

A new prime minister has the chance to get to grips with these inconsistencies and develop foreign and domestic policies which are more coherent and self-re-enforcing.

5. At what level should Britain’s international ambitions be funded?

Successive governments have celebrated the fact the UK is the only Western country to spend 2% of GDP on defence and 0.7% on development. However, this masks some real pressures in the system.

There are significant problems in the defence budget and a growing gap between commitments and committed funds. Meanwhile, the funding of Britain’s diplomacy has been cut by successive governments – Labour, Conservative and coalition – for much of the last 20 years. Numerous bodies have highlighted the problems facing the overstretched and underfunded Foreign Office. Where would defence and diplomacy sit in the new prime minister’s hierarchy of priorities?

The problem is not purely one of funding, but the gap between ambitions, rhetoric and resources. It is not sustainable for British ministers to trumpet Britain’s global ambitions while not properly funding the tools of its influence abroad.

It would be reasonable and understandable for a new prime minister to adjust that ambition and tone down the rhetoric, or alternatively to address resource pressures by investing in diplomacy and defence. But that choice should be informed by a sober reflection on Britain’s international position and interests as it leaves the EU. Brexit offers a chance to revisit assumptions that have guided British policy for a generation. A new prime minister should seize this opportunity.

A realistic vision for the future

All these issues will be more pronounced if the UK leaves the EU with no deal at the end of October. ‘No deal’ would be not simply an economic shock but a diplomatic rupture that will colour the UK’s capacity to negotiate a new relationship with the EU, which will be the first order of business after a ‘no deal’ exit. Trust will be in short supply.

Even if they don’t get to vote on the new prime minister, the public deserves serious answers to these and other questions from the men who want to lead the country. Not the platitudes of ‘Global Britain’ or a reflexive and unexamined British exceptionalism, but a serious, realistic assessment of how Britain will cope with the disruptions of leaving the EU and how it might thrive outside the regional bloc it has been a part of for more than 45 years.




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Poland’s Elections: Domestic and Foreign Policy Implications

Research Event

30 September 2019 - 12:30pm to 1:30pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Dr Sławomir Dębski, Director, Polish Institute of International Affairs
Dr Stanley Bill, Senior Lecturer in Polish Studies, University of Cambridge

On 13 October 2019, Poland goes to the polls in national elections. On the back of a strong performance in the European elections, the incumbent Law and Justice Party (PiS) is seeking to retain its absolute majority. The election takes place against a background of continued strong economic growth but amid disputes over the direction of social policy and a domestic contest about liberal values. The European Commission and the Polish government have clashed over reforms that the Commission believes could compromise the independence of the judiciary in the Poland. Meanwhile, in foreign policy terms, Poland has sought to develop good working relations with the Trump administration and supported a tough line towards Russia.

The speakers will address the domestic and international significance of the Polish election. Will PiS be able to secure another majority? What would be the implications for the direction of social and political reform in Poland? And how could the elections shift Poland’s approach to politics at the European level and its wider foreign policy?  

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Department/project

Alina Lyadova

Europe Programme Coordinator




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UK General Election 2019: Britain's New Foreign Policy Divide

9 December 2019

Thomas Raines

Director, Europe Programme
A breakdown of foreign policy consensus means voters have a meaningful choice between two different visions of Britain’s place in the world.

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Boris Johnson and Jeremy Corbyn at the state opening of Parliament in October. Photo: Getty Images.

Genuine ideological differences have returned to British politics. That is as true in foreign policy as in questions of domestic politics. The post-Cold War foreign policy consensus in UK politics around liberal multilateralism is fraying.

This tradition had some key characteristics. It saw Britain as one of the cornerstones of an international order built on a liberal (or neo-liberal if you prefer) approach to economic globalization. EU membership was considered central to Britain’s influence and prosperity (even if further political integration never had deep support). Security policy was grounded in a stable package of NATO membership, close ties to the US, nuclear deterrence and a willingness to conduct military intervention.

Both main parties accepted that foreign policy had a commercial dimension. Both were willing to sell arms abroad to regimes with dubious domestic records.

Despite differences of emphasis, and some moments of genuine disagreement, foreign policy did not undergo big shifts as different parties traded periods in office. That may be set to change. 

Party divides

On the one hand, Labour wants to reset and re-orientate Britain’s international role based on human rights and international law. It promises a new internationalism and to end what it glibly calls the ‘bomb first, talk later’ approach, alongside a human rights-driven trade policy. More concretely, it promises to legislate to ensure Parliament takes decisions on military action, boost resources for the underfunded Foreign Office and suspend arms sales to Saudi Arabia for use in Yemen.  

In Jeremy Corbyn, they have a leader with roots in a distinct left-wing ideological tradition of internationalism that blends a commitment to international solidarity alongside anti-imperial and anti-war sentiment. He has spent his career as a sharp critic of Israeli and US policy, while championing various international political causes, some more radical or fringe than others. His historic positions on issues like NATO and nuclear deterrence, while not represented in the party manifesto, demonstrate a personal radicalism that no recent Labour PM has embodied.

His willingness to challenge the failures of the hitherto centre ground of foreign policy – particularly on military interventions from Iraq to Libya – is an under-appreciated aspect of his appeal among many supporters, even while it is one of the sharpest lines of attack from his critics. Boris Johnson’s chauvinistic rhetoric could not stand in sharper contrast to Labour’s commitment to conduct an audit of the effect of Britain’s colonial legacy on violence and insecurity.  

The Conservative manifesto asserts their pride in Britain’s historical role in the world, followed by a broad set of largely rhetorical commitments to bolster alliances and expand influence. An ambitious free trade agenda points to a more economic and commercially driven foreign policy, the inevitable trade-offs and constraints of which are only beginning to be addressed and debated.

There is an underlying sense that Britain will be liberated from the constraints of EU membership, although beyond trade there is little that would not have been possible, or in most cases easier, from within the EU. As my colleague Richard Whitman has observed, the empty bromide ‘Global Britain’ has been dropped altogether, though beyond the idea of a new UK space command and a stronger sanctions regime, there is little that is new or specific.  

Not all the consensus centre-ground position has been abandoned. Both major parties remain committed to spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence and 0.7 per cent of gross national income on development in their 2019 manifestos.

But beyond their manifesto commitments, prime ministers can exercise extensive powers in foreign affairs through the royal prerogative. Their government can choose to recognize other states, as Labour intends to do with Palestine. They can sign international treaties. And at present, in the absence of the sort of war powers act proposed by Labour, they can conduct military action without recourse to Parliament, which has no legally established role in this area.

Even a weak minority government would have considerable scope to transform the tone of Britain’s diplomacy.

Foreign policy as a partisan political issue

If UK foreign policy becomes more partisan, this will have longer term implications. Voters will theoretically have greater scope to shape and influence foreign policy more directly. Foreign policy may become divisive if it becomes more partisan. It may also become less consistent, which will affect the capacity of the UK to show leadership over the longer term on issues on which there is no domestic consensus. Britain’s allies may need to manage a less reliable partner. The diplomatic and security apparatus of Whitehall will need to be more adaptable.  

British elections generally don’t turn on foreign policy questions; 2019 will not buck that trend. At the same time, this election will be very influential in shaping Britain’s position on the world stage and its approach to international issues. Boris Johnson and Jeremy Corbyn represent very different ideas about Britain’s role: its foreign policy, its alliances, and indeed its idea of itself. The Brexit context makes these political undercurrents on foreign policy matter all the more.

Foreign policy may not matter that much to most voters, but these elections matter for foreign policy. 




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The EU Cannot Build a Foreign Policy on Regulatory Power Alone

11 February 2020

Alan Beattie

Associate Fellow, Global Economy and Finance Programme and Europe Programme
Brussels will find its much-vaunted heft in setting standards cannot help it advance its geopolitical interests.

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EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen speaks at the European Parliament in Strasbourg in February. Photo: Getty Images.

There are two well-established ideas in trade. Individually, they are correct. Combined, they can lead to a conclusion that is unfortunately wrong.

The first idea is that, across a range of economic sectors, the EU and the US have been engaged in a battle to have their model of regulation accepted as the global one, and that the EU is generally winning.

The second is that governments can use their regulatory power to extend strategic and foreign policy influence.

The conclusion would seem to be that the EU, which has for decades tried to develop a foreign policy, should be able to use its superpower status in regulation and trade to project its interests and its values abroad.

That’s the theory. It’s a proposition much welcomed by EU policymakers, who know they are highly unlikely any time soon to acquire any of the tools usually required to run an effective foreign policy.

The EU doesn’t have an army it can send into a shooting war, enough military or political aid to prop up or dispense of governments abroad, or a centralized intelligence service. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has declared her outfit to be a ‘geopolitical commission’, and is casting about for any means of making that real.

Through the ‘Brussels effect’ whereby European rules and standards are exported via both companies and governments, the EU has indeed won many regulatory battles with the US.

Its cars, chemicals and product safety regulations are more widely adopted round the world than their American counterparts. In the absence of any coherent US offering, bar some varied state-level systems, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is the closest thing the world has to a single model for data privacy, and variants of it are being adopted by dozens of countries.

The problem is this. Those parts of global economic governance where the US is dominant – particularly the dollar payments system – are highly conducive to projecting US power abroad. The extraterritorial reach of secondary sanctions, plus the widespread reliance of banks and companies worldwide on dollar funding – and hence the American financial system – means that the US can precisely target its influence.

The EU can enforce trade sanctions, but not in such a powerful and discriminatory way, and it will always be outgunned by the US. Donald Trump could in effect force European companies to join in his sanctions on Iran when he pulled out of the nuclear deal, despite EU legislation designed to prevent their businesses being bullied. He can go after the chief financial officer of Huawei for allegedly breaching those sanctions.

By contrast, the widespread adoption of GDPR or data protection regimes inspired by it may give the EU a warm glow of satisfaction, but it cannot be turned into a geopolitical tool in the same way.

Nor, necessarily, does it particularly benefit the EU economy. Europe’s undersized tech sector seems unlikely to unduly benefit from the fact that data protection rules were written in the EU. Indeed, one common criticism of the regulations is that they entrench the power of incumbent tech giants like Google.

There is a similar pattern at work in the adoption of new technologies such as artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things. In that field, the EU and its member states are also facing determined competition from China, which has been pushing its technologies and standards through forums such as the International Telecommunication Union.

The EU has been attempting to write international rules for the use of AI which it hopes to be widely adopted. But again, these are a constraint on the use of new technologies largely developed by others, not the control of innovation.

By contrast, China has created a vast domestic market in technologies like facial recognition and unleashed its own companies on it. The resulting surveillance kit can then be marketed to emerging market governments as part of China’s enduring foreign policy campaign to build up supporters in the developing world.

If it genuinely wants to turn its economic power into geopolitical influence – and it’s not entirely clear what it would do with it if it did – the EU needs to recognize that not all forms of regulatory and trading dominance are the same.

Providing public goods to the world economy is all very well. But unless they are so particular in nature that they project uniquely European values and interests, that makes the EU a supplier of useful plumbing but not a global architect of power.

On the other hand, it could content itself with its position for the moment. It could recognize that not until enough hard power – guns, intelligence, money – is transferred from the member states to the centre, or until the member states start acting collectively, will the EU genuinely become a geopolitical force. Speaking loudly and carrying a stick of foam rubber is rarely a way to gain credibility in international relations.

This article is part of a series of publications and roundtable discussions in the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum.




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NAD+ biosynthesis in bacteria is controlled by global carbon/nitrogen levels via PII signaling [Microbiology]

NAD+ is a central metabolite participating in core metabolic redox reactions. The prokaryotic NAD synthetase enzyme NadE catalyzes the last step of NAD+ biosynthesis, converting nicotinic acid adenine dinucleotide (NaAD) to NAD+. Some members of the NadE family use l-glutamine as a nitrogen donor and are named NadEGln. Previous gene neighborhood analysis has indicated that the bacterial nadE gene is frequently clustered with the gene encoding the regulatory signal transduction protein PII, suggesting a functional relationship between these proteins in response to the nutritional status and the carbon/nitrogen ratio of the bacterial cell. Here, using affinity chromatography, bioinformatics analyses, NAD synthetase activity, and biolayer interferometry assays, we show that PII and NadEGln physically interact in vitro, that this complex relieves NadEGln negative feedback inhibition by NAD+. This mechanism is conserved in distantly related bacteria. Of note, the PII protein allosteric effector and cellular nitrogen level indicator 2-oxoglutarate (2-OG) inhibited the formation of the PII-NadEGln complex within a physiological range. These results indicate an interplay between the levels of ATP, ADP, 2-OG, PII-sensed glutamine, and NAD+, representing a metabolic hub that may balance the levels of core nitrogen and carbon metabolites. Our findings support the notion that PII proteins act as a dissociable regulatory subunit of NadEGln, thereby enabling the control of NAD+ biosynthesis according to the nutritional status of the bacterial cell.




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Consigned to hedge: south-east Asia and America's ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ strategy

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

See Seng Tan

This article assesses how south-east Asian countries and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have responded to the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategies promoted by the United States and the other countries in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the ‘Quad’: US, Japan, Australia and India). Their nuanced ripostes imply a persistent commitment to hedging and shifting limited alignments in the face of growing great rivalry and the lack of a clear FOIP vision among Quad members. In the face of external pressure to take sides, the ASEAN states are likely to keep hedging through working selectively with China and the United States. Given the United States' apparent preference to balance China and Trump's disregard for multilateralism, ASEAN's ability to maintain its centrality in the evolving regional architecture is in doubt—despite the Quad countries' (belated) accommodation of ASEAN in their FOIP strategies. However, the success of the US strategy depends on Washington's ability to build and sustain the requisite coalition to balance Beijing. ASEAN has undertaken efforts to enhance bilateral security collaboration with China and the United States respectively. In doing so, ASEAN is arguably seeking to informally redefine its centrality in an era of Great Power discord and its ramifications for multilateralism.




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Webinar: US Foreign Policy in a Post COVID-19 World

Research Event

29 April 2020 - 2:00pm to 3:00pm

Event participants

Tony Blinken, Senior Advisor, Biden for President; US Deputy Secretary of State, 2015 - 17
In Conversation with: Sir Peter Westmacott, Associate Fellow, US and Americas Programme, Chatham House; British Ambassador to the United States, 2012 - 16
Chair: Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, Director, US and Americas Programme, Chatham House
The coronavirus crisis has accentuated the need for US leadership and international cooperation to address the global health emergency and economic crisis. The pandemic comes at a time of profound uncertainty over America's future role in the world, its commitments to transatlantic security, and its relationship with China.
 
As we face the 2020 US Presidential elections, America's European partners look ahead to the potential foreign policy priorities of the next US administration.
 
In this conversation, Tony Blinken, US Deputy Secretary of State 2015 – 17, speaks with Sir Peter Westmacott, British Ambassador to the US 2012 – 16, about the impact of COVID-19 and the 2020 US presidential elections on America’s global role.

US and Americas Programme




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Iraq on the International Stage: Foreign Policy and National Identity in Transition

Research Event

4 July 2013 - 5:00pm to 7:00pm

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Dr Ghanim Al-Jumaily, Ambassador of Iraq to Saudi Arabia
Jane Kinninmont, Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House
Dr Phebe Marr, Historian of Modern Iraq, Middle East Institute
Professor Gareth Stansfield, Director, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter
Chair: Omar Sirri, Research Assistant, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House

As Iraq emerges from the shadow of war and occupation, it has sought to regain influence as a major actor in an ever-more volatile region. Though the 'new Iraq' attempts to project an independent foreign policy, renewed instability and violence inside the country has challenged the state's ability to develop a coherent and unified foreign policy stance.

Jane Kinninmont and Gareth Stansfield will present the findings of their new report which explores how foreign policy in Iraq today is developed and implemented, and analyses the extent to which Iraq's foreign policy aims are identifiable, independent and national in nature. They will also engage in a wider discussion with an expert panel on Iraqi foreign policy, particularly towards the conflict in Syria and how issues in neighbouring states are intertwined with domestic Iraqi politics.

Event attributes

Livestream




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Iraq on the International Stage: Foreign Policy and National Identity in Transition

1 July 2013

Jane Kinninmont
Former Deputy Head and Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

Gareth Stansfield and Omar Sirri

This report aims to shed light on the key actors, processes and narratives that are shaping Iraq's foreign policy behaviour and options, at a time when the country is seeking to emerge from international sanctions and resume a more normal role in international affairs.

  • Iraq's foreign relations are increasingly intertwined with the country's own divisions, and the increasing polarization of key Middle Eastern countries over Syria threatens to escalate Iraq's internal crisis.
     
  • Syria has become the most divisive foreign policy issue facing Iraq, with little consensus on how to respond to the conflict. To protect against the risk of spillover from Syria, Iraq's political groupings must develop at least a basic agreement on their strategic response to the conflict.
     
  • Western governments should caution their allies in the Gulf that the exploitation of sectarian discourses will have toxic effects that could last for at least a generation.
More on Iraq 


 




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Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy Priorities

Research Event

21 November 2013 - 2:00pm to 3:00pm

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Erlan Idrissov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan has attracted international attention due to its energy resources, its relative openness to foreign investment and its proximity to Afghanistan, all of which influence its foreign policy. The withdrawal of ISAF forces from the region in 2014 and Kazakhstan's participation in a number of regional and international initiatives are also likely to play a role in shaping the country's foreign policy in the short to medium term.

Mr Idrissov will outline the main items on Astana's foreign policy agenda for approximately 15 minutes, followed by 45 minutes for questions and discussion.

Attendance is by invitation only. 




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Year Two of the Abe Administration: Prospects for the Future of Japanese Foreign Policy and UK-Japan Relations

Research Event

11 February 2014 - 3:00pm to 5:00pm

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Kiichi Fujiwara, Professor of International Politics, Graduate School for Law and Politics, Tokyo University
Yuichi Hosoya, Professor of International Politics, Faculty of Law, Keio University
Akiko Yamanaka, Senior Visiting Research Fellow, Churchill College, University of Cambridge; Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan (2005-2006)
Chair: John Swenson-Wright, Senior Consulting Fellow, Asia Programme, Chatham House 

As Prime Minster Abe enters his second year in office, the speakers will consider future prospects for Japanese foreign policy and UK-Japan relations. 

This event is funded by the Nippon Foundation. It is held in partnership with the Nippon Foundation and the Great Britain Sasakawa Foundation.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

Department/project




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The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy

12 March 2014 - 9:00am to 10:00am

Chatham House, London

Julie Bishop, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Australian Government
Chair: Lord Michael Williams of Baglan, Distinguished Visiting Fellow and Acting Head, Asia Programme, Chatham House

Australia’s new foreign minister will reflect on the country’s relations and policy priorities within the Asia-Pacific region. The speaker will also discuss how Australia is working to build Asian regional architecture and to strengthen the international rules-based order.

ASK A QUESTION: Send questions for the speaker by email to questions@chathamhouse.org or using #askCH on Twitter. A selection will be put to her during the event.

Event attributes

Livestream




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America Is in Transition – and So Is Its Foreign Policy

24 February 2014

Xenia Wickett
Former Head, US and the Americas Programme; Former Dean, The Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs

20140202USCanadMexPres.jpg

US President Barack Obama, Mexico's President Enrique Pe–ña Nieto, and Canada's Prime Minister Stephen Harper arrive at a press conference as part of North American leaders meeting 19 February 2014, Toluca, Mexico. Photo by Miguel Tovar/LatinContent/Getty Images.

America is changing. So too is the rest of the world. But will America's internal changes carry broader implications for its role in the world, the influence and power it wields, and the foreign policy choices it makes?

While proving causality would be difficult, commonsense logic might suggest that a youthful America, one that has a more diverse ethnic and cultural makeup and that is more aware of its economic inequality, is also one that might hold more open, accepting (and perhaps liberal) views on a number of issues. However the record is mixed: while in some areas America is becoming more liberal, in others such as gun control and abortion, the trend seems to be towards the conservative.

But America is undergoing some fundamental transformations. America's demographics are changing. Unlike many in Asia and Europe, the US is remaining a relatively young country. It is also becoming more diverse. In 2011, there were more births in the US among minorities than Caucasians (minorities made up 50.4 per cent of the nation's population under one year old). Hispanics are the fastest growing segment of the population.

America, in common with many other countries, is also seeing a dramatic rise in the level of economic inequality. While the 2011 Occupy Wall Street movement spread to 900 cities around the world, the US is perhaps exceptional in the speed with which the social gap is widening and its size. These populations are also swiftly urbanizing.

The number of Americans who do not identify with any religion is growing rapidly. According to Pew Research polling, one-fifth of the US public are religiously unaffiliated today, the highest numbers recorded by them. Younger adults are more likely to have no religious affiliation than their elders, suggesting that this trend is likely to continue.

These changes could be contributing to the possible trend towards more liberal views in the US, led for the main part by cities and states. For example, while federal law continues to ban cannabis, in the summer of 2013, two states – Washington and Colorado – legalized it. Since Massachusetts in 2004 made gay marriage legal, 16 other states (and the District of Columbia) have followed suit, with nine of these decisions taking place in 2013. And, at a federal level, after 18 years of 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' (the law that prevented military personnel from disclosing that they were gay), the law was finally repealed in 2011 after years of debate.

One could also argue that the slow creep of some Republican platforms towards a more open social agenda is also an indication that, at least politically, some on the right recognize that to be reelected they need to move where they perceive the population to be (i.e. left of their position).

These demographic and political changes are taking place in a backdrop of some other important national trends. Over the past 10 years, the arrival of new technologies, most notably fracking, has led to an energy revolution in the United States. America's trend towards energy self-sufficiency is having a direct impact on the US economy and will have implications for its diplomacy. It is supporting 're-shoring' (the return of jobs to the US) which is rebuilding America's manufacturing and industrial base, and it is helping the US (along with the stimulus and other policies) climb out of recession faster than many of its European allies.

This is taking place in the context of the highest ever levels of political polarization (as measured by Congressional voting). For the first time last year, the most liberal Republican was to the right of the most conservative Democrat; the traditional overlap that facilitated the two political parties working together has now disappeared.

These trends are joined, and at times reinforced, by two other profound global factors: faster technological shifts and the dispersal of power.

As all these dynamics interact it will have implications for America's foreign policy and, as such, should be of interest to an international audience – with a caveat: Americans generally don't appear to care much about foreign policy and as such their impact on it is limited.

At a basic level, a youthful America is a productive one that is likely to retain relatively high growth rates. This is vital for its trading and investment partners, not least in Europe and Asia. While the US will soon have to deal with unaffordable entitlements (such as social security and health care) and needs to reenergize its early education, the fact that it still has a relatively low ratio of retirees to workers, means that it has a bit more time to manage this transition.

America's young and diverse population could also have an impact on America's soft power. The fact that increasing numbers of Americans affiliate as Asian-Americans or Hispanic-Americans (to name but two groups) could have profound effects on how the nation manages its relationships with these regions and is seen by their citizens. The proliferation of communications channels and the empowerment of the individual will only reinforce these tendencies.

The increase in people-to-people links likely to result is also a manifestation of the broader trend of the diffusion of power to other non-state actors. Over the long term, foreign policy is no longer going to be the exclusive right of the state, but other actors, from individuals to philanthropists and businesses, will play a role.

However at some level, while the young are taking advantage of new technologies to engage with their neighbours, and a more diverse population is linking with their families and friends overseas, the rising income inequality could be pushing the globalization agenda in the opposite direction. As those towards the bottom strata find technology taking away their jobs or corporates moving them overseas they are likely to push back. And their ability to be heard (individual empowerment once more) is only increasing.

Two regions in particular are likely to see specific foreign policy changes. In Latin America the inevitable shift on immigration (although it could still be some time in coming) will have potentially huge implications on migration of workers north. At the same time, America's 'war on drugs' has already begun to change under the Obama administration from a historically supply side driven policy to one that accepts (at least rhetorically) the need for addressing the demand side. This more nuanced policy could allow a more balanced policy agenda between the US and its southern neighbors.

And for Europeans, the young increasingly don't remember the Cold War and the importance of the Alliance in and after World War II (Obama is the first US president who didn't live through it). The ties that bind could in time weaken. This is only being reinforced by immigration trends; fewer citizens from Europe come to the US than from any other region of the world.

America is not, as some assert, becoming isolationist. 'Nation-building at home' may be Obama's focus, but this does not precipitate an abandonment of international engagement. These trends suggest instead that America might become more nuanced and collaborative in its relationships. America's diversity has always been a strength and as it increases, will continue to be one. America, more than any other nation, truly continues to be the global melting pot.

This article was originally published by the Huffington Post.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback




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Fantasy Fortifications — Part 3: Design

This article is part 3 of a series on Fantasy Fortifications by Toni Šušnjar.

The design of a fortification depends on its purpose and on the threats it is expected to face. A fortification facing only infantry-held weapons, one facing mechanical artillery, and one facing gunpowder artillery will all significantly differ in design characteristics. Some characteristics however will be the same – geography will always provide advantage (or disadvantage) in defending a fort or a city, and thus location has to be carefully chosen. In some cases, location may be good enough to allow the defender to skimp on certain design features – as seen with e.g. Klis fortress, where northern wall is waist-tall at best, thanks to its position on an inaccessible cliff (clissa). In other cases, disadvantageous terrain may have to be compensated with by massive man-made features.

General Design

In order to cope with development of artillery, design of fortifications changed with time. First fortifications, which only had to deal with handheld weapons, were simple wooden palisades. These were later supplemented with earthen ramparts

As siege weapons developed, fortifications grew both in height and thickness.

Continue reading Fantasy Fortifications — Part 3: Design at Mythic Scribes.




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Implications of AMLO and Bolsonaro for Mexican and Brazilian Foreign Policy

Invitation Only Research Event

26 February 2020 - 12:15pm to 1:15pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Ambassador Andrés Rozental, Senior Adviser, Chatham House; Founding President, Mexican Council on Foreign Relations
Dr Elena Lazarou, Associate Fellow, US and the Americas Programme, Chatham House
Chair: Dr Christopher Sabatini, Senior Research Fellow for Latin America, US and the Americas Programme, Chatham House

The end of 2018 was a monumental year for Latin America’s two biggest economies. In December 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) was inaugurated as Mexico’s 58th president. The following month saw another political shift further south, as Jair Bolsonaro became Brazil’s 38th president. While sitting on opposite ends of the political spectrum, both AMLO and Bolsonaro were considered to be political outsiders and have upended the status quo through their election to office. 

To what extent does the election of AMLO in Mexico and Bolsonaro in Brazil represent a shift in those countries’ definitions of national interest and foreign policy priorities? How will this affect these states’ policies regarding international commitments and cooperation on issues such as human rights, environment and climate change, migration, and trade? To what extent do possible shifts reflect changing domestic opinions?  Will any changes represent a long-term shift in state priorities and policies past these administrations?

US and Americas Programme




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Webinar: US Foreign Policy in a Post COVID-19 World

Research Event

29 April 2020 - 2:00pm to 3:00pm

Event participants

Tony Blinken, Senior Advisor, Biden for President; US Deputy Secretary of State, 2015 - 17
In Conversation with: Sir Peter Westmacott, Associate Fellow, US and Americas Programme, Chatham House; British Ambassador to the United States, 2012 - 16
Chair: Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, Director, US and Americas Programme, Chatham House
The coronavirus crisis has accentuated the need for US leadership and international cooperation to address the global health emergency and economic crisis. The pandemic comes at a time of profound uncertainty over America's future role in the world, its commitments to transatlantic security, and its relationship with China.
 
As we face the 2020 US Presidential elections, America's European partners look ahead to the potential foreign policy priorities of the next US administration.
 
In this conversation, Tony Blinken, US Deputy Secretary of State 2015 – 17, speaks with Sir Peter Westmacott, British Ambassador to the US 2012 – 16, about the impact of COVID-19 and the 2020 US presidential elections on America’s global role.

US and Americas Programme




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Learning the ABCs of ATP release [Signal Transduction]

ATP plays important roles outside the cell, but the mechanism by which it is arrives in the extracellular environment is not clear. Dunn et al. now show that decreases in cellular cholesterol levels mediated by the ABCG1 transporter increase ATP release by volume-regulated anion channels under hypotonic conditions. Importantly, these results may imply that cells that handle cholesterol differently might experience differential extracellular ATP release during hypotonicity.




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ABC transporters control ATP release through cholesterol-dependent volume-regulated anion channel activity [Signal Transduction]

Purinergic signaling by extracellular ATP regulates a variety of cellular events and is implicated in both normal physiology and pathophysiology. Several molecules have been associated with the release of ATP and other small molecules, but their precise contributions have been difficult to assess because of their complexity and heterogeneity. Here, we report on the results of a gain-of-function screen for modulators of hypotonicity-induced ATP release using HEK-293 cells and murine cerebellar granule neurons, along with bioluminescence, calcium FLIPR, and short hairpin RNA–based gene-silencing assays. This screen utilized the most extensive genome-wide ORF collection to date, covering 90% of human, nonredundant, protein-encoding genes. We identified two ABCG1 (ABC subfamily G member 1) variants, which regulate cellular cholesterol, as modulators of hypotonicity-induced ATP release. We found that cholesterol levels control volume-regulated anion channel–dependent ATP release. These findings reveal novel mechanisms for the regulation of ATP release and volume-regulated anion channel activity and provide critical links among cellular status, cholesterol, and purinergic signaling.




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G{alpha}q splice variants mediate phototransduction, rhodopsin synthesis, and retinal integrity in Drosophila [Signal Transduction]

Heterotrimeric G proteins mediate a variety of signaling processes by coupling G protein–coupled receptors to intracellular effector molecules. In Drosophila, the Gαq gene encodes several Gαq splice variants, with the Gαq1 isoform protein playing a major role in fly phototransduction. However, Gαq1 null mutant flies still exhibit a residual light response, indicating that other Gαq splice variants or additional Gq α subunits are involved in phototransduction. Here, we isolated a mutant fly with no detectable light responses, decreased rhodopsin (Rh) levels, and rapid retinal degeneration. Using electrophysiological and genetic studies, biochemical assays, immunoblotting, real-time RT-PCR, and EM analysis, we found that mutations in the Gαq gene disrupt light responses and demonstrate that the Gαq3 isoform protein is responsible for the residual light response in Gαq1 null mutants. Moreover, we report that Gαq3 mediates rhodopsin synthesis. Depletion of all Gαq splice variants led to rapid light-dependent retinal degeneration, due to the formation stable Rh1-arrestin 2 (Arr2) complexes. Our findings clarify essential roles of several different Gαq splice variants in phototransduction and retinal integrity in Drosophila and reveal that Gαq3 functions in rhodopsin synthesis.




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Small-molecule agonists of the RET receptor tyrosine kinase activate biased trophic signals that are influenced by the presence of GFRa1 co-receptors [Neurobiology]

Glial cell line–derived neurotrophic factor (GDNF) is a growth factor that regulates the health and function of neurons and other cells. GDNF binds to GDNF family receptor α1 (GFRa1), and the resulting complex activates the RET receptor tyrosine kinase and subsequent downstream signals. This feature restricts GDNF activity to systems in which GFRa1 and RET are both present, a scenario that may constrain GDNF breadth of action. Furthermore, this co-dependence precludes the use of GDNF as a tool to study a putative functional cross-talk between GFRa1 and RET. Here, using biochemical techniques, terminal deoxynucleotidyl transferase dUTP nick end labeling staining, and immunohistochemistry in murine cells, tissues, or retinal organotypic cultures, we report that a naphthoquinone/quinolinedione family of small molecules (Q compounds) acts as RET agonists. We found that, like GDNF, signaling through the parental compound Q121 is GFRa1-dependent. Structural modifications of Q121 generated analogs that activated RET irrespective of GFRa1 expression. We used these analogs to examine RET–GFRa1 interactions and show that GFRa1 can influence RET-mediated signaling and enhance or diminish AKT Ser/Thr kinase or extracellular signal-regulated kinase signaling in a biased manner. In a genetic mutant model of retinitis pigmentosa, a lead compound, Q525, afforded sustained RET activation and prevented photoreceptor neuron loss in the retina. This work uncovers key components of the dynamic relationships between RET and its GFRa co-receptor and provides RET agonist scaffolds for drug development.




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Undercurrents: Episode 12 - Trump's Visit to the UK, and Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia




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Undercurrents: Episode 14 - Sustainable Energy for Refugees and Australian Foreign Policy




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The Failed Marshall Plan: Learning from US Foreign Policy Missteps




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Iran’s New Foreign Policy Challenges




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Undercurrents: Episode 25 - The End of Liberal Foreign Policy, and the Legacy of the Paris Peace Conference




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Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy Priorities




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A New Vision for American Foreign Policy




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US Foreign Policy After Trump




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UK General Election 2019: Foreign Policy Implications




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China’s Foreign Policy




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An Improved Boosting to Amplify Signal with Isobaric Labeling (iBASIL) Strategy for Precise Quantitative Single-cell Proteomics [Research]

Mass spectrometry (MS)-based proteomics has great potential for overcoming the limitations of antibody-based immunoassays for antibody-independent, comprehensive, and quantitative proteomic analysis of single cells. Indeed, recent advances in nanoscale sample preparation have enabled effective processing of single cells. In particular, the concept of using boosting/carrier channels in isobaric labeling to increase the sensitivity in MS detection has also been increasingly used for quantitative proteomic analysis of small-sized samples including single cells. However, the full potential of such boosting/carrier approaches has not been significantly explored, nor has the resulting quantitation quality been carefully evaluated. Herein, we have further evaluated and optimized our recent boosting to amplify signal with isobaric labeling (BASIL) approach, originally developed for quantifying phosphorylation in small number of cells, for highly effective analysis of proteins in single cells. This improved BASIL (iBASIL) approach enables reliable quantitative single-cell proteomics analysis with greater proteome coverage by carefully controlling the boosting-to-sample ratio (e.g. in general <100x) and optimizing MS automatic gain control (AGC) and ion injection time settings in MS/MS analysis (e.g. 5E5 and 300 ms, respectively, which is significantly higher than that used in typical bulk analysis). By coupling with a nanodroplet-based single cell preparation (nanoPOTS) platform, iBASIL enabled identification of ~2500 proteins and precise quantification of ~1500 proteins in the analysis of 104 FACS-isolated single cells, with the resulting protein profiles robustly clustering the cells from three different acute myeloid leukemia cell lines. This study highlights the importance of carefully evaluating and optimizing the boosting ratios and MS data acquisition conditions for achieving robust, comprehensive proteomic analysis of single cells.




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Profiling Cell Signaling Networks at Single-cell Resolution [Reviews]

Signaling networks process intra- and extracellular information to modulate the functions of a cell. Deregulation of signaling networks results in abnormal cellular physiological states and often drives diseases. Network responses to a stimulus or a drug treatment can be highly heterogeneous across cells in a tissue because of many sources of cellular genetic and non-genetic variance. Signaling network heterogeneity is the key to many biological processes, such as cell differentiation and drug resistance. Only recently, the emergence of multiplexed single-cell measurement technologies has made it possible to evaluate this heterogeneity. In this review, we categorize currently established single-cell signaling network profiling approaches by their methodology, coverage, and application, and we discuss the advantages and limitations of each type of technology. We also describe the available computational tools for network characterization using single-cell data and discuss potential confounding factors that need to be considered in single-cell signaling network analyses.




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Structural basis of cell-surface signaling by a conserved sigma regulator in Gram-negative bacteria [Molecular Biophysics]

Cell-surface signaling (CSS) in Gram-negative bacteria involves highly conserved regulatory pathways that optimize gene expression by transducing extracellular environmental signals to the cytoplasm via inner-membrane sigma regulators. The molecular details of ferric siderophore-mediated activation of the iron import machinery through a sigma regulator are unclear. Here, we present the 1.56 Å resolution structure of the periplasmic complex of the C-terminal CSS domain (CCSSD) of PupR, the sigma regulator in the Pseudomonas capeferrum pseudobactin BN7/8 transport system, and the N-terminal signaling domain (NTSD) of PupB, an outer-membrane TonB-dependent transducer. The structure revealed that the CCSSD consists of two subdomains: a juxta-membrane subdomain, which has a novel all-β-fold, followed by a secretin/TonB, short N-terminal subdomain at the C terminus of the CCSSD, a previously unobserved topological arrangement of this domain. Using affinity pulldown assays, isothermal titration calorimetry, and thermal denaturation CD spectroscopy, we show that both subdomains are required for binding the NTSD with micromolar affinity and that NTSD binding improves CCSSD stability. Our findings prompt us to present a revised model of CSS wherein the CCSSD:NTSD complex forms prior to ferric-siderophore binding. Upon siderophore binding, conformational changes in the CCSSD enable regulated intramembrane proteolysis of the sigma regulator, ultimately resulting in transcriptional regulation.




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Biophysical characterization of SARAH domain-mediated multimerization of Hippo pathway complexes in Drosophila [Signal Transduction]

Hippo pathway signaling limits cell growth and proliferation and maintains the stem-cell niche. These cellular events result from the coordinated activity of a core kinase cassette that is regulated, in part, by interactions involving Hippo, Salvador, and dRassF. These interactions are mediated by a conserved coiled-coil domain, termed SARAH, in each of these proteins. SARAH domain–mediated homodimerization of Hippo kinase leads to autophosphorylation and activation. Paradoxically, SARAH domain–mediated heterodimerization between Hippo and Salvador enhances Hippo kinase activity in cells, whereas complex formation with dRassF inhibits it. To better understand the mechanism by which each complex distinctly modulates Hippo kinase and pathway activity, here we biophysically characterized the entire suite of SARAH domain–mediated complexes. We purified the three SARAH domains from Drosophila melanogaster and performed an unbiased pulldown assay to identify all possible interactions, revealing that isolated SARAH domains are sufficient to recapitulate the cellular assemblies and that Hippo is a universal binding partner. Additionally, we found that the Salvador SARAH domain homodimerizes and demonstrate that this interaction is conserved in Salvador's mammalian homolog. Using native MS, we show that each of these complexes is dimeric in solution. We also measured the stability of each SARAH domain complex, finding that despite similarities at both the sequence and structural levels, SARAH domain complexes differ in stability. The identity, stoichiometry, and stability of these interactions characterized here comprehensively reveal the nature of SARAH domain–mediated complex formation and provide mechanistic insights into how SARAH domain–mediated interactions influence Hippo pathway activity.




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Breaking the Habit: Why Major Oil Companies Are Not ‘Paris-Aligned’

Invitation Only Research Event

23 October 2019 - 8:30am to 10:00am

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Andrew Grant, Carbon Tracker Initiative
Chair: Siân Bradley, Research Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources, Chatham House

The investment community is increasingly seeking to assess the alignment of their portfolios with the Paris Agreement. In a recent update to their Two Degrees of Separation report, Carbon Tracker assessed the capital expenditure of listed oil and gas producers against ‘well below’ 2C targets, and for the first time, against short-term actions at the project level.

The speaker will present the key findings of the report and will argue that every oil major is betting heavily against a low-carbon world by investing in projects that are contrary to the Paris goals.

This roundtable discussion will further explore the report findings and consider what investors, regulators and oil and gas companies can do to encourage alignment  with the Paris Agreement ahead of 2020.  

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule




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Lipid rafts as signaling hubs in cancer cell survival/death and invasion: implications in tumor progression and therapy [Thematic Reviews]

Cholesterol/sphingolipid-rich membrane domains, known as lipid rafts or membrane rafts, play a critical role in the compartmentalization of signaling pathways. Physical segregation of proteins in lipid rafts may modulate the accessibility of proteins to regulatory or effector molecules. Thus, lipid rafts serve as sorting platforms and hubs for signal transduction proteins. Cancer cells contain higher levels of intracellular cholesterol and lipid rafts than their normal non-tumorigenic counterparts. Many signal transduction processes involved in cancer development (insulin-like growth factor system and phosphatidylinositol 3-kinase-AKT) and metastasis [cluster of differentiation (CD)44] are dependent on or modulated by lipid rafts. Additional proteins playing an important role in several malignant cancers (e.g., transmembrane glycoprotein mucin 1) are also being detected in association with lipid rafts, suggesting a major role of lipid rafts in tumor progression. Conversely, lipid rafts also serve as scaffolds for the recruitment and clustering of Fas/CD95 death receptors and downstream signaling molecules leading to cell death-promoting raft platforms. The partition of death receptors and downstream signaling molecules in aggregated lipid rafts has led to the formation of the so-called cluster of apoptotic signaling molecule-enriched rafts, or CASMER, which leads to apoptosis amplification and can be pharmacologically modulated. These death-promoting rafts can be viewed as a linchpin from which apoptotic signals are launched. In this review, we discuss the involvement of lipid rafts in major signaling processes in cancer cells, including cell survival, cell death, and metastasis, and we consider the potential of lipid raft modulation as a promising target in cancer therapy.





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Consigned to hedge: south-east Asia and America's ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ strategy

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

See Seng Tan

This article assesses how south-east Asian countries and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have responded to the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategies promoted by the United States and the other countries in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the ‘Quad’: US, Japan, Australia and India). Their nuanced ripostes imply a persistent commitment to hedging and shifting limited alignments in the face of growing great rivalry and the lack of a clear FOIP vision among Quad members. In the face of external pressure to take sides, the ASEAN states are likely to keep hedging through working selectively with China and the United States. Given the United States' apparent preference to balance China and Trump's disregard for multilateralism, ASEAN's ability to maintain its centrality in the evolving regional architecture is in doubt—despite the Quad countries' (belated) accommodation of ASEAN in their FOIP strategies. However, the success of the US strategy depends on Washington's ability to build and sustain the requisite coalition to balance Beijing. ASEAN has undertaken efforts to enhance bilateral security collaboration with China and the United States respectively. In doing so, ASEAN is arguably seeking to informally redefine its centrality in an era of Great Power discord and its ramifications for multilateralism.