October 1 was officially "International Raccoon Appreciation Day," for those of you who love to love the adorable trash panda. Around here, honestly, every day is raccoon appreciation day, so it's an "International Day" I can genuinely get behind.

National Day Calendar explains the origins of the day:

In 2002, a young girl in California wanted to highlight the good points about the raccoon instead of the bad ones.

— Read the rest

The post Every day should be raccoon appreciation day appeared first on Boing Boing.

The following article, ‘Blatant Weaponization’: FEMA Facing Investigations For Targeting Suffering Trump Supporters, was first published on Conservative Firing Line.

Republicans are calling for investigations, or are already launching their own, into charges that the federal government deliberately and willfully discriminated against supporters of President-elect Donald Trump following a hurricane disaster in Florida. It was the Daily Wire that initially documented how Marn’I Washington, a Federal Emergency Management Agency supervisor, instructed employees under her authority …

Continue reading ‘Blatant Weaponization’: FEMA Facing Investigations For Targeting Suffering Trump Supporters ...

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Long story (not very) short? One night in 2003--after killing it in front of audience of about 30 lucky people in Oakland--The Long Winters needed a place to crash, and my wife and I were happy to oblige. 

So, they drove their Big Stinky Blue Van over the bridge, slept on our floor, and by breakfast the next morning, it'd become clear to me that I'd provided lodging to a man who was not only very likely a member of my karass--he was also one of the smartest bullshit artists I'd ever met. 

Almost eight years later, although I don't see him nearly as much as I'd like, I still count the guy as one of my best pals ever.

That's John Roderick. And, I think you need to know about him.

John doesn't read this site--he's more of a Twitter person--so I don't risk feeding his astounding excess of dignity by saying he's one of the most gifted writers and bon vivants of our generation. He's just the best. In large part because he's congenitally incapable of suffering bullshit.

This was never more apparent than the Saturday morning in 2007 when we sat in my back yard and talked about a lot of stuff. Playing guitar, advertising on the web, the evil work of promoters, and why everyone is always trying to shortchange everyone on copper pipe. 

That talking became a four-part interview I ran on the late and occasionally lamented The Merlin Show, and, to this day, it's one of my favorite things I've been lucky enough to post to the web.

So, y'know how I'm definitely "not for everyone?" Well, John is really "not for everyone."

He's opinionated and arrogant and undiplomatic and unironically loves Judas Priest--meaning everyone will find at least one thing not to like about him. Despite being hairy and enjoying laying on your bed, John is not exactly a teddy bear. 

But, John's also right a lot. And, he never sands off the edges of his personality or opinions to make you theoretically "like" him. Which, it will come as no surprise to you, is a big reason I love the guy more than a free prime rib dinner. 

So, why the jizzfest about that awful jerk, John Roderick?

Because, as I noted the other day on the Twitter, in our first episode of Back to Work I misattributed a line that should have been credited to John. Which in itself is unimportant, except inasmuch as finding that link to correct the error got me watching our 50-some minutes of chatting again. I also received some at-responses and emails that reminded me how much people enjoyed our chat. 

But, really it made me realize how much that rambling morning in my back yard still resonates so much with stuff I care a lot about. Independence. Agency. Directness. And, never apologizing for wanting to get paid. Also, guitars and talkative hippies.

So, anyway. John. 

I edited all four parts of the video into one big (streamable/downloadable) movie that should make it way easier to watch at a sitting. Should that interest you. Which it may not. Which, as ever, is totally fine, and kind of the point.

But. If you like Dan and my new show (and, seriously—God bless you magnificent bastards who helped briefly make B2W the most popular podcast in the world [gulp]), I think you'll really like this interview a lot too. I hope so, anyway.

Thus, submitted for your disapproval, permit me to present my four-year-old visit with the acerbic, opinionated, and reportedly unlikeable bullshit artist whom I respect and adore more than just about anybody. 

Meet Hotrod.

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She likes Kamala's polices enough to put a lawn sign up on her property, but when one toll with a postcard personalizes those policies... she loses it.

The post Harris Supporter Outraged By Postcard Trolling… Did They Go Too Far? appeared first on Clash Daily.

The usual talking heads in the media are freaking out and making all kinds of wild claims. Those are the rage-y emotional reactions. What's a more sensible take on all of this?

The post Why Did Trump Win And What Happens Now? appeared first on Clash Daily.

Kamala was right about one thing: this election really DID deliver 'joy'... just not the way she expected.

The post EPIC: The ‘Songify’ Trend Of Clipping Speeches To Music Is Back… And AWESOME! appeared first on Clash Daily.

A.F. Branco Cartoon – Free Market Capitalism is great, but when big corporations merge with the Government, it begins to..

Even after her loss on Nov. 5, Vice President Kamala Harris’ election campaign is still hounding donors for money. Harris’ campaign has bombarded supporters with fundraising messages following her election […]

The post Kamala's Campaign Is Still Aggressively Shaking Down Supporters For Cash appeared first on The Western Journal.

Just because you’re paranoid, it doesn’t mean you’re wrong. And for any supporters of President-elect Donald Trump who feel that they’ve been unfairly targeted by the government, but were summarily […]

The post Fired FEMA Worker Reveals Discrimination Against Trump Supporters Was Even Worse Than First Reported appeared first on The Western Journal.

A Louisiana law that sought to post the Ten Commandments in every schoolroom in the state has been shelved by a federal judge. U.S. District Court Judge John W. deGravelles, […]

The post Obama-Appointed Federal Judge Temporarily Blocks Ten Commandments Law appeared first on The Western Journal.

The rare feat of winning both the Two Oceans and Soweto marathons has marked Onalenna Khonkhobe’s breakthrough season, establishing him as one of South Africa’s rising road-running stars.

Evidence Makgopa wore a sheepish smile when Bafana Bafana coach Hugo Broos showered him with praise before literally patting the forward on the back, making him blush at Dobsonville Stadium.

Late injection Johan Grobbelaar may find himself more than simply an “extra” on the Bok tour, writes Rob Houwing.

American Media Periscope Published  Sep. 19, 2022 In this episode of MSOM, Sean Morgan interviews Ladislav Vrabel about the populist movement in Czech Republic. Next Cynthia Farahat explains the secret apparatus of the Muslim Brotherhood. CynthiaFarahat.com https://americanmediaperiscope.com/amp/signup Check Out This Episode’s Podcast: https://www.podbean.com/media/share/pb-chpay-12c2875

By Walter Donway, Savvy Street originally published on Dec. 4, 2022 Book Review: The Secret Apparatus: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Industry of Death by Cynthia Farahat, Post Hill Press, Bombardier Books (2022) A grim irony of twentieth-century history (but, of course, also predating it) is that the most horrendous threats to humanity have simply been too monstrously evil […]

A feminist and postcolonial approach to nuclear politics Expert comment NCapeling 20 July 2022

The July issue of International Affairs includes eight articles on the global nuclear order and eight more covering Chinese lending, abortion rights, and global security.

Disarmament and arms control has been a consistent area of debate in this journal for the past century, as underscored in our recent archive collection of research on a century of war and conflict.

The July edition moves this debate forward with a collection of papers guest-edited by Shine Choi and Catherine Eschle. The section ‘Feminist interrogations of global nuclear politics’ includes work by nine authors exploring seven global case-studies that help rethink nuclear politics and feminism.

As the guest editors note in their introduction, the section brings together research on nuclear power and nuclear weaponry to ‘begin the process of decentring 1980s white, western experiences of the global nuclear order in feminist IR’.

The articles speak to three core themes: they provide evidence of the ongoing destructive nature of nuclear technologies, extend understanding of the gendered, racialized, and colonial dimensions of nuclear discourses, and unearth the impact of colonialism on the global nuclear order.

Global nuclear politics

Anne Sisson Runyan examines the gendered effects of uranium mining and nuclear waste dumping on North American Indigenous women, showing how the nuclear cycle tends to have a disproportionate effect on certain communities but also that the area of disposal remains problematic.

This is a global problem – for example, the Royal Navy has yet to successfully dispose of a single redundant nuclear-powered submarine and is rapidly running out of space to store further vessels.

Hebatalla Taha goes back to the early years of nuclear development and, using Egypt as a case-study, her article argues the early visualizations of the atomic age were fluid and ambivalent. She concludes – perhaps controversially – that feminizing nuclear politics and nuclear images will not lead to disarmament but rather reinforce the nuclearized world. The piece is a welcome addition to the emerging field of visuality within international relations.

Anand Sreekumar brings together feminist and Gandhian thinking to suggest a way for Narendra Modi’s government to move beyond the possession of nuclear weapons as symbols of power. In doing so, he also critiques the binary labels of ‘West’ and ‘non-West’ that often frame our understanding of the world.

Lorraine Bayard de Volo revisits the Cuban missile crisis – a point in time where nuclear war looked likely. She compares the actions of Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy and finds the pursuit of masculinity led to the rejection of approaches considered more feminine, such as diplomacy and negotiation – the crisis was exacerbated by what might be referred to now as toxic masculinity.

Sweden’s and Finland’s recent application to join the nuclear alliance NATO lends a particular urgency to Emma Rosengren’s article on the original Swedish decision to renounce the development of nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Her article concludes much of the emphasis on power in international relations has contributed to a gendered and racialized nuclear order.

Similarly, Laura Rose Brown and Laura Considine’s article on the Non-Proliferation Treaty finds that ‘gender-sensitive’ approaches focus almost exclusively on women’s inclusion as opposed to feminist policy analysis. They end by making recommendations for future policymaking.

Finally, Rebecca Hogue and Anais Maurer look at the anti-nuclear poetry of Pacific women. This article raises fundamental questions about what is currently considered to constitute evidence. They point to the role of oral history in many communities and the tendency of policymakers and social scientists to ignore this source of understanding.

National politics with international implications

This edition’s ‘Editor’s Choice’ is Jeffrey A. Friedman’s article which questions whether US grand strategy is dead in a post-Trump world. Running counter to much of the existing literature, he suggests there is a strong bilateral commitment to existing partnerships and alliances within the US political establishment.

Following the US Supreme Court decision over Roe vs Wade, it is important to note the issue of abortion rights can have an international dimension. Megan Daigle, Deirdre N. Duffy, and Diana López Castañeda reveal that, although Colombia now has the most progressive legal framework for abortion in Latin America, intense backlash persists as legacies of the civil war overshadow the issue and lead to barriers to safe abortion care.

China

Ric Neo and Chen Xiang look at Chinese public opinion and finds that citizens can be upset by foreign policies of other states even when they have no impact on their daily lives. It reminds us of the potency of nationalism and the importance of who controls the prevailing narrative.

Deborah Brautigam examines China’s role in creating Zambia’s debt crisis, arguing this has not been brought about by a centralized master plan which would give China control over Zambia. Instead, the crisis has been caused by the failure of Chinese bureaucracy with too many state organs offering funding in an uncoordinated fashion.

Security and defence

Using Iran as a case-study, Henrik Stålhane Hiim argues the development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles is a key indicator when looking for potential nuclear proliferators.

Eray Alim demonstrates the impact of an external great power interacting with local states. Russia’s involvement in the Syrian civil war has allowed it – sometimes through restrictive and punitive measures – to ensure Turkey and Israel do not harm its interests in the region.

Nina Wilén draws on fieldwork in Niger to study how Security Force Assistance (SFA) impacts on Niger’s security sector and compares this to global trends in security. She finds these developments contribute to blurred borders and confusion regarding labour division in the security sector and points to wider questions for intervenors in developing local units.

Chinese supply chains could tip the balance in Ukraine Expert comment NCapeling 29 March 2023

Disrupting supply chains of critical minerals to those supporting Ukraine could give China a key advantage in its wider international trade competition.

Direct military intervention from China into the war on Ukraine, with Chinese troops and airmen appearing at the front line, would be highly escalatory and highly unlikely.

Equipping Russia with weapons and equipment is much more likely – if indeed it hasn’t already happened – and considering the West is supplying armaments to Ukraine, a joust with western technologies would be an interesting development to follow.

But if Chinese weapons underperform in the heat of battle, this may have implications for the current situation with Taiwan and the US, as a poor outcome on the Ukraine front could give the West more confidence over the tensions in the South China Sea. And the use of Chinese weapons in Ukraine would also be a feast for Western technical intelligence to capture.

Creating economic disruption

A much more likely development for China is to put in place export controls on critical minerals for Western powers supplying arms to Ukraine. This is a significant lever which China has used before during its fishing dispute with Japan in 2010 when hi-tech industrial production in Japan was affected by shortages of China-sourced critical minerals. Once normal supplies were resumed, Japan started to stockpile critical mineral reserves.

In October 2020, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) passed a new statute enabling – when necessary – restriction of critical mineral supplies to third party nations intending to use them for defence and security applications, adding a ‘versatile weapon to Beijing’s arsenal’ in its trade competition with the US.

That legal control has been applied to Lockheed Martin production of Taiwan-bound F-35s and it applies not only to critical minerals mined on the Chinese mainland, but also to Chinese-controlled enterprises within international supply chains, of which there are many.

Responding to any such restrictions by opening up new mines and setting up new supply chains can take more than a decade, so the countries involved may need to start stockpiling critical materials as Japan has been doing since 2010.

Commodity markets also need to be ready for some interesting price wobbles – a persistent problem in critical minerals extractives investment as is overcoming environmental, social, and governance (ESG) challenges in this new game of global supplies.

In addition, those markets include the London Metal Exchange, now owned by Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing whose biggest shareholder is the Hong Kong government which is struggling to operate with complete independence from Beijing.

Splitting the West’s consensus

By extending the thinking on China’s potential to throttle global critical mineral supply chains and the ensuing latency of extraction from new mining resources, progress to the Paris Agreement 2050 goals on climate change will inevitably be affected.

Given there are no supply chain assurance mechanisms, such as distributed ledger technologies, in place within global mining supply chains, a key issue to overcome would be how the West assures China that critical mineral supplies are not destined for military applications.

But if China’s default position becomes a total refusal to supply client nations unless end-to-end assurances can be achieved to prove non-military use, the West’s aspirations regarding the Paris 2050 goals will certainly be put in jeopardy, or even made unachievable.

In conversation with David Miliband: Finding a new approach to tackle conflict, climate and extreme poverty 11 September 2024 — 5:00PM TO 5:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

David Miliband discusses how the climate crisis, extreme poverty and conflict are becoming inextricably linked and how the global community must respond.

Combatting the climate crisis, ending protracted conflicts, and alleviating poverty are three of the greatest priorities for international action. However, these three challenges become increasingly concentrated in a handful of countries. The subsequent feedback loop makes addressing these challenges even more complex.

The International Rescue Committee’s (IRC’s) work in crisis-affected communities highlights this new geography of crisis. Just 16 countries, which are both climate-vulnerable and conflict-affected. This represents 43% of all people living in extreme poverty, 44% of all people affected by natural disasters and 79% of all people in humanitarian need. This trend towards the concentration of crisis is only deepening. In three decades, the number of conflict-affected, climate-vulnerable states has increased from 44% to more than two-thirds.

Affected countries - like Sudan, Myanmar, and Syria - are also among the least supported financially. Debt burdens are siphoning away critical resources needed for adaptation and resilience. Humanitarian aid budgets are being slashed by donor governments. The private sector refuses to invest in these communities they view as too risky. And the international financial institutions meant to alleviate poverty and spur climate action are not well-designed to work with crisis-affected states or local communities. With the upcoming COP29 Summit in Azerbaijan focused on the New Collective Quantified Goal for climate finance, vulnerable communities will be watching closely whether they will get support in their fight against the worst impacts of the climate crisis.

Conflict, the climate crisis, and extreme poverty are taking their toll. But how can the world best respond?

Key questions to be discussed during the session include:

• At a time of political disruption, how does the West engage with vulnerable countries? What actions should be prioritised in providing support to such countries?
• Can global institutions evolve to better protect vulnerable and displaced people from conflict and climate-risk, particularly as geopolitical rivalries reduce space for cooperation?
• What is the UK’s role in supporting climate action in fragile states and how does this align with its agenda on the Sustainable Development Goals and extreme poverty?

Hdac3 is a lysine deacetylase that removes acetyl groups from histones and additional proteins. Although Hdac3 functions within mesenchymal lineage skeletal cells are defined, little is known about Hdac3 activities in bone-resorbing osteoclasts. In this study we conditionally deleted Hdac3 within Ctsk-expressing cells and examined the effects on bone modeling and osteoclast differentiation in mice. Hdac3 deficiency reduced femur and tibia periosteal circumference and increased cortical periosteal osteoclast number. Trabecular bone was likewise reduced and was accompanied by increased osteoclast number per trabecular bone surface. We previously showed that Hdac3 deacetylates the p65 subunit of the NF-κB transcriptional complex to decrease DNA-binding and transcriptional activity. Hdac3-deficient osteoclasts demonstrate increased K310 NF-κB acetylation and NF-κB transcriptional activity. Hdac3-deficient osteoclast lineage cells were hyper-responsive to RANKL and showed elevated ex vivo osteoclast number and size and enhanced bone resorption in pit formation assays. Osteoclast-directed Hdac3 deficiency decreased cortical and trabecular bone mass parameters, suggesting that Hdac3 regulates coupling of bone resorption and bone formation. We surveyed a panel of osteoclast-derived coupling factors and found that Hdac3 suppression diminished sphingosine-1-phosphate production. Osteoclast-derived sphingosine-1-phosphate acts in paracrine to promote bone mineralization. Mineralization of WT bone marrow stromal cells cultured with conditioned medium from Hdac3-deficient osteoclasts was markedly reduced. Expression of alkaline phosphatase, type 1a1 collagen, and osteocalcin was also suppressed, but no change in Runx2 expression was observed. Our results demonstrate that Hdac3 controls bone modeling by suppressing osteoclast lineage cell responsiveness to RANKL and coupling to bone formation.

Network Power in the Asia-Pacific: Making Sense of the New Regionalism and Opportunities for Cooperation 7 February 2020 — 9:45AM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The Asia-Pacific region continues to increase in geopolitical and geoeconomic importance. The rise of China and tensions with the US are affecting bilateral relationships and traditional alliances in the region. Whether seen from the perspective of the Quad – Australia, India, Japan and the US – or the Indo-Pacific concept embraced by a wide range of countries but with no shared consensus on scope and objectives or with ASEAN who insists on the importance of its own centrality, the region is redefining and reconceptualising itself.

With a diverse range of initiatives – including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) – there are a plethora of regional agreements and institutional groupings that add further complexity.

As the Bretton Woods architecture continues to be dominated by Western powers, China is also spearheading parallel governance initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a means of enhancing its geopolitical and geoeconomic influence.

This one-day conference will focus on how such networks and alliances have been built, and sustained, in the Asia-Pacific region. In order to understand how new regional initiatives might open up opportunities for new forms of international cooperation, the conference will focus on the themes of cyber-technology and innovation, sustainable development and mitigating the impacts of climate change and new infrastructure initiatives. It will assess whether there is a zero-sum conflict between competing networks and agendas or whether a common approach can be developed.

Divided US support shows time is not on Ukraine’s side Expert comment LJefferson 17 February 2023

Growing public opinion evidence and uncertainty about the future of the war suggests that continued American support for aiding Ukraine should not be assumed.

One year into Russia’s war on Ukraine, fears that American support for Kyiv would rapidly wane have proven demonstrably wrong. Western financial and military backing has been robust thanks to allied unity and an unexpectedly mild winter. But, as financial analysts constantly remind us, past performance is no guarantee of future results.

People like to back winners. If the anticipated Russian spring offensive looks successful or the counterpart Ukrainian offensive is uninspiring, expect louder US voices calling for a negotiated settlement. The warning signs are already here.

American officials privately express growing apprehension that there will be an early resolution of the conflict. As one White House official recently observed to me, by the end of the year the war could well be about where it is today. And a plurality of Americans intuitively grasp this: 46 per cent believe neither Russia nor Ukraine currently has the advantage in the conflict.

Momentum matters  

In public opinion, perception of momentum matters. Americans’ support for the Vietnam War waned as the conflict persisted, falling from six-in-ten Americans in 1965 to four-in-ten in 1973.

Similarly, backing for the Iraq war fell from more than seven-in-ten in 2003 to barely four-in-ten in 2008. And with Afghanistan, as the war dragged on, support for US involvement fell from more than nine-in-ten in 2002 to less than five-in-ten in 2021. Notably, once the American public turned on these wars, support never returned.

Of course, Americans were fighting and dying in those wars, which is not the case in the Ukraine conflict. But initially the Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan war support was buoyed by the belief that continued US engagement was justified, otherwise American sons and daughters had died in vain. With no American lives at stake in Ukraine, only financial and military resources, there is a growing wariness of throwing good money after bad.

In the last year, the share of Americans who say the United States is doing too much for Ukraine has nearly quadrupled, from seven to 26 per cent. And the portion that believe Washington has not done enough has halved, from 49 per cent to 17 per cent.

Sentiment about Ukraine support has become increasingly partisan. In March 2022, nine per cent of Republicans and five per cent of Democrats said the US was doing too much for Ukraine. By January 2023, 40 per cent of Republicans but just 15 per cent of Democrats complained Washington was doing too much.

This erosion of Americans’ support for Ukraine does not bode well for the future. Less than half (48 per cent) of the public in November, compared to 58 per cent in July, believed Washington should support Ukraine for as long as it takes, even if it means American households have to pay higher gas and food prices as a consequence.

A similar share, 47 per cent – up from 38 per cent in July – said the United States should urge Ukraine to settle for peace as soon as possible so the costs aren’t so great for American households, even if that means Ukraine will lose some territory.

A partisan divide

The partisan divide over Ukraine is largely driven by Republican political rhetoric during and after the 2022 midterm elections. Current Republican Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy observed last October: ‘I think people are going to be sitting in a recession and they’re not going to write a blank cheque to Ukraine.’

More recently, in the wake of Ukrainian president Zelenskyy’s December speech to Congress, Florida Republican Representative Matt Gaetz, whose vote was pivotal in making McCarthy Speaker, tweeted: ‘Hemorrhaging billions in taxpayer dollars for Ukraine while our country is in crisis is the definition of America last.’

In January, newly-elected Ohio Republican Senator J.D. Vance told a Cleveland radio station that it was ‘ultimately not in our national security interest’ to send M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine, despite the fact that they will be built by his constituents in Ohio.

In addition, ten Republican members of the House of Representatives have introduced legislation asserting ‘that the United States must end its military and financial aid to Ukraine, and urges all combatants to reach a peace agreement.’ 

And this month former President Donald Trump said: ‘That war has to stop, and it has to stop now, and it’s easy to do’ and it ‘can be negotiated within 24 hours’. Why worry about continued support for the war if it’s about to be over?

The road to 2024

With the 2024 US presidential election already revving up, Americans’ appetite for continued backing for Ukraine may hinge on how voters judge the Biden administration’s handling of the conflict.

Democrats are more than twice as likely as Republicans (61 per cent versus 27 per cent) to approve of the Biden administration’s response to the Russia invasion, suggesting Ukraine will be yet another partisan talking point as the campaign heats up. Notably, men are much more likely than women to approve of Biden’s efforts, as are older Americans compared with younger Americans.

Alfred C. O. Vertegaal
Dec 1, 2006; 5:2298-2310
Research

Steven A. Carr
Mar 1, 2014; 13:907-917
Technological Innovation and Resources

Roland Bruderer
May 1, 2015; 14:1400-1410
Research

Christian Tagwerker
Apr 1, 2006; 5:737-748
Research

Albrecht Gruhler
Mar 1, 2005; 4:310-327
Research

Shao-En Ong
May 1, 2002; 1:376-386
Research

Chatham House appoints new director and chief executive News release jon.wallace 5 April 2022

Bronwen Maddox will take up the role at the end of August, succeeding Dr Robin Niblett CMG.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) is delighted to announce that its new director and chief executive will be Bronwen Maddox, who joins from the Institute for Government.

Bronwen Maddox has been the director of the Institute for Government, an independent think tank based in London promoting better government, since September 2016. 

She joined the institute from the current affairs magazine Prospect, where she spent six years as editor and CEO.

Bronwen was previously foreign editor, chief foreign commentator and US editor at The Times, and before that, she ran award-winning investigations and wrote economics editorials for the Financial Times, after a career as an investment analyst in the City. She writes frequent op-ed columns for the Financial Times and broadcasts widely.

She is also visiting professor in the Policy Institute at King’s College London, a non-executive board member of the Law Commission, and has just been appointed a council member of Research England, one of the research councils of UK Research & Innovation.

Ms Maddox succeeds Dr Robin Niblett CMG who is standing down in the summer after 15 years in the role. She will take up the role at the end of August.

Chair of Chatham House, Sir Nigel Sheinwald said:

‘This is an exciting appointment for the future of Chatham House and for London as a global hub. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the unprecedented response of the rest of the world reminds us that organizations like Chatham House, with its outstanding record of independent analysis and new ideas on how to build a secure and prosperous world, are needed more than ever.

‘Bronwen Maddox has an international reputation as a compelling commentator and analyst on world affairs, with a proven ability to spot emerging issues and frame them in ways which will provoke intelligent debate and fresh thinking. She has provided successful and innovative leadership at the IFG, Prospect and The Times, and is committed to continuing to broaden Chatham House’s diverse appeal and impact. She is the ideal person to lead the institute into the next stage of its development at this crucial time for the future of international relations.’

Bronwen Maddox said:

‘I am honoured and delighted to become Chatham House’s next director. It’s a momentous period in international affairs and Chatham House, with its reputation for rigour, independence and expert analysis, has a unique role to play in assessing these changes and prompting solutions to confront them – as it shows every day. I look forward to the privilege of working with its teams, and the many others who have come together to advance its work.’

Sir Nigel also paid tribute to Dr Niblett:

‘Robin Niblett has transformed Chatham House in his fifteen years as its head. The institute’s research, activities and impact have grown considerably in that time thanks to Robin’s own high-quality commentary, his productive relationships with our stakeholders, partners, supporters and members and his commitment to the institute’s staff. He leaves an institute which has a much wider and fresher appeal and has strengthened London’s standing as a great centre for international affairs.’

Dr Niblett said:

‘This appointment is excellent news for Chatham House. Bronwen Maddox is ideally placed to ensure the institute continues to play its part in helping governments, business and civil society tackle the serious challenges we face, not just from the return of geopolitical competition and interstate conflict, but also from climate change, unsustainable economic activity and growing inequality, priorities for the institute that have been underlined by the COVID-19 pandemic.’

COP27: What was achieved, and what needs to happen now Expert comment NCapeling 20 November 2022

Chatham House environment experts give their initial reaction to the end of COP27, examining how much progress was achieved, and the key issues still to be worked on.

Loss and Damage fund is a historic moment

Anna Aberg

COP27 will go down in history as the UN climate change conference where the Loss and Damage fund was agreed. After decades of pushing, this is a momentous victory for climate-vulnerable developing countries.

The shift in the conversation – and in the positions of developed countries – since COP26 is remarkable. It is critical parties continue to build on the positive momentum created in Sharm as challenging discussions on how the new loss and damage fund will work – and who will contribute to it financially – ensue.

Tim Benton

Overall COP27 was a hectic, sometimes chaotic, event. The COP advanced some matters but on others failed to drive ambition towards the sort of climate action required to keep alive the possibility of restricting climate change within the envelope of the Paris agreement.

Loss and Damage progressed but, especially in week two, the risk was of going backwards in this COP relative to COP26 in Glasgow. The final cover declaration managed to avoid the worst, but also avoided the best.

Notably disappointing was that, although food systems were much in debate unlike in previous COPs, there was still significant political resistance to fully adopting a systems approach. Globally, food systems emit about one-third of all greenhouse gasses, while poor diets – in rich and poor countries alike – are arguably the single biggest factor in ill-health and early death.

COP27 maintained a firm focus on supply-side solutions to tackle food insecurity, avoiding the politically more contentious demand-side issues of ensuring nutritious and sustainable diets for all.

Start of implementation phase demands renewed urgency

Bernice Lee

It has often been said climate action is moving from target-setting into the implementation phase. What COP27 shows is that, as the implementation phase begins, integrity and accountability will be ever more critical, as the voices of the vulnerable economies and the youth remind the world time and time again.

This compromised outcome is also a reminder that the delivery of climate action begins at home, as does the bread-and-butter politics of money and influence. It is significant the link between fossil energy and climate impacts has now been openly made in the international arena, regardless of whether it appeared in the final cover agreement.

As the dust settles, there will be many questions and reflection over tactics chosen by different parties and actors, and much to be learned that can help those pushing for more breakthrough moments at COP28.

Antony Froggatt

There was insufficient progress on the energy transition both in and around COP27. Few countries followed through on their promises to increase the ambition of their nationally determined contributions (NDCs), although Australia and the European Union (EU) were rare exceptions among the developed countries.

Higher fossil fuel prices, due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, can and should have resulted in an accelerated energy transition. Yet the language in the final decision around carbon reductions and energy at best repeats the language of COP26 and does not reflect the renewed urgency of the situation, stemming from accelerating climate impacts and the weaponization of fossil fuels in Russia’s conflict.

At COP28, parties to the UNFCCC will finalize a Global Stock Take which will include a review of national progress in meeting carbon abatement targets. This will be a key moment and unfortunately is likely to highlight once again how much faster the world needs to reduce its dependency on fossil fuels.

Fossil fuel discussions show failure of imagination

Glada Lahn

Overshadowed by the pain of developing country fuel importers and European attempts to replace Russian gas, discussion of fossil fuels was fraught. The text, which called for accelerating the ‘phasedown of unabated coal’ use for the first time only last year, failed to expand to include oil and gas, despite calls to do so from India, the US, EU, and UK. Gas use also appeared to gain a pass via the inclusion of ‘low emission’ energy alongside renewables.

Given that extracting and burning oil and gas accounts for 40 per cent of all annual greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), and leaders agree on the need for ‘deep, rapid and sustained’ emission cuts, that language is beyond logical argument. However, current dependencies, fears of stranded investments, and a failure of imagination won out.

Stronger than usual oil and gas industry presence led to a higher number of meetings focused on decarbonization of the sector. Major producer countries such as Canada and Saudi Arabia were keen to emphasize technologies to ‘clean up’ rather than phase down their fuels as the future.

Not all developing country governments with hydrocarbon reserves see the ‘phase down’ text as conflicting with their economic interests. Large oil and gas exporter Colombia supported the inclusion of ‘all fossil fuels’ and Kenya, a country which had been pursuing oil and coal prospects, became a friend of the high ambition Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance which seeks a ‘managed phase out of oil and gas supply’.

A vocal contingent of African civil society meanwhile railed against health and ecology-damaging oil and gas projects and investments that would lock them into a high emissions future.

With stronger resolve to reorient finance towards net zero both in Sharm el-Sheikh and at the concurrent G20 summit in Bali, the practicalities of economic adaptation to the shift out of fossil fuels – including just transition for workers – rose up the agenda. These issues will overtake the wrangle over wording in the run up to COP28.

Adaptation must now move to the forefront

Ruth Townend

There are three pillars of climate action: mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. This year progress was made on mitigation and loss and damage but, to avoid wild spiralling of the latter, adaptation must have its day in the sun in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at COP28 next year.

Adaptation lacks a concrete goal, akin to the 1.5 degree limit, and few countries have set out plans to adapt to climate change. Momentum will come when the promised ‘global goal on adaptation’ (GGA) is finally defined, to help mobilize finance and spur implementation.

The Glasgow-Sharm-el-Sheikh (GLASS) work programme to achieve this has so far lacked focus. At COP27, parties decided to define a framework to measure the goal’s achievement and enable reviews of progress over the next year.

Some concrete progress on adaptation was seen at the COP: UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called for worldwide extreme weather early warning systems within the next five years, while the Adaptation Fund received more than $230 million for the most climate-vulnerable in 2022.

The call from Glasgow to double adaptation finance was repeated, but overall, progress was muted, when parties really needed to come together for implementation of this crucial element of climate action.

Not enough done for agriculture and food security

Richard King

It is welcome that the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture – adopted in 2017 as the first and only formal UNFCCC agenda item focusing on agriculture and food security – has concluded in a decision to implement a new four-year work programme focused on implementing solutions.

While this has an objective of promoting holistic approaches to addressing climate impacts both on and from agriculture and food security, it disappointingly falls short of taking a food systems lens that includes all activities and actors from farm to fork.

There is now a small window of opportunity until March 2023 for governments and civil society to shape and broaden this agenda for the next four years. If not in the negotiating halls, then certainly in the myriad side events and discussions focusing on the issue, this year’s COP has clearly demonstrated a growing appreciation of the imperative of tackling food systems in their entirety.

An overarching and integrated approach to sustainable food production, distribution, and retail; nutrition and dietary shifts; and addressing food loss and waste will be vital to making comprehensive headway in addressing climate change and other planetary and social challenges.

It is important the parties at COP28 in the UAE seize this rising momentum to become the first climate negotiations to make tangible progress on transforming food systems towards sustainability, equitability, and resilience.

Rainforest leadership challenges traditional aid

Thiago Kanashiro Uehara

COP27 served well as a business fair for entrepreneurs wishing to benefit from new carbon markets. But forests, peatlands, and nature-based solutions did not receive the attention they deserve in guaranteeing climate security.

The good news is the COP26 pledges on forest finance, for the Congo basin, and for indigenous peoples (IP) and local communities’ (LC) forest tenure are pretty much alive, with disbursement rates at decent levels, albeit rarely directly to IP and LC-led organizations. The bad news is the financialization of forest governance and voluntary sustainability standards in global supply chains are solution ‘myths’ and were exposed by scientists as such at the conference.

On the second day of COP27, there was a last-minute launch led by the Global North, with Rishi Sunak and Emmanuel Macron announcing the ‘forests and climate leaders’ partnership’. One week later, at the G20 Bali summit, ministers from Indonesia, DR Congo, and Brazil announced a South-South rainforest leadership alliance – referred by some as the ‘OPEC of forests’ – challenging traditional forms of top-down international aid.

The climate crisis is one symptom of the inequality crisis engulfing our world at present. The African COP represented a step forward in addressing climate justice, an improvement over COP26 in Glasgow, where the issue was virtually denied.

The time has come for Global North constituents to work together with self-fashioned ‘solution countries’, such as the DRC now and Brazil after 2023. An ‘implementation COP’ will be successful only after establishing a new framework of co-leadership in climate action based on principles of justice and strong sustainability.

Outcomes of an African COP

Christopher Vandome

Africa’s contribution to the global energy transition cannot be at the expense of its own industrialization.

While pledges of increased financing for adaptation and the landmark establishment of a fund for loss and damage are important steps, the reality of under-disbursement and delivery of promised funds is causing many African leaders to rethink their engagement with multilateral climate initiatives.

African leaders are intent on advancing their own strategies for energy generation and adaptation that deliver on national priorities of job creation, sustainable growth, and environmental protection.

Many countries strategies involve exploiting gas reserves. But with mounting global pressures against further hydrocarbon extraction, African leaders need to demonstrate to international partners that these operations are part of a long-term transition away from other fossil fuels and contribute towards poverty alleviation.

Leaders need to be coordinated in their demands to international partners on how to phase out over time as well as de-risk potential stranded assets. President Ramaphosa’s unveiling of the investment plan for the South African Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) was a significant mark of progress to unlocking the $8.5 billion pledge for lowering the economy’s reliance on coal.

While progress has at times faltered over the past year, it has been critical that South Africa articulate its own needs and desired energy mix, rather than this be internationally prescribed. It has also demonstrated to other African nations that bilateral not multilateral initiatives may offer a fast-track route to green finance.

K Schoonjans
May 1, 1996; 37:907-925
Reviews

Chatham House appoints Tim Benton as Research Director for Energy, Environment and Resources News Release sysadmin 30 May 2019

Chatham House is pleased to announce that Professor Tim Benton has been appointed as research director of the Energy, Environment and Resources Department.

Chatham House appoints Rob Yates as the new head of the Centre on Global Health Security News Release sysadmin 27 June 2019

Chatham House is pleased to announce that Rob Yates has been appointed as head of the Centre on Global Health Security.

Creon Butler appointed to lead Global Economy and Finance Programme News Release sysadmin 22 October 2019

Creon Butler has been appointed to lead the Global Economy and Finance programme at Chatham House, joining the institute at the beginning of December. He will also form part of the institute’s senior leadership team.

Supporting Next Generation of Leaders in Sustainability News Release NCapeling 28 January 2021

A new programme offering paid internships for young people who are passionate about social, economic, and environmental sustainability has been launched.

Supporting Civic Space: The Role and Impact of the Private Sector 23 September 2020 — 2:00PM TO 4:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 December 2020 Online

The meeting provides an opportunity to explore the drivers of – and barriers to – corporate activism.

A healthy civic space is vital for an enabling business environment. In recognition of this, a growing number of private sector actors are challenging, publicly or otherwise, the deteriorating environment for civic freedoms.

However, this corporate activism is often limited and largely ad hoc. It remains confined to a small cluster of multinationals leaving potential routes for effective coordination and collaboration with other actors underexplored.

This roundtable brings together a diverse and international group of business actors, civil society actors and foreign policy experts to exchange perspectives and experiences on how the private sector can be involved in issues around civic space.

The meeting provides an opportunity to explore the drivers of – and barriers to – corporate activism, develop a better understanding of existing initiatives, identify good practice and discuss practical strategies for the business community.

This meeting is the first of a series of roundtables at Chatham House in support of initiatives to build broad alliances for the protection of civic space. 

Supporting Civic Space: The Role and Impact of the Tech Sector 13 October 2020 — 2:00PM TO 4:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 December 2020 Online

This event brings together a diverse and international group of stakeholders to exchange perspectives and experiences on the role that tech actors can play in supporting civic space.

In a deteriorating environment for civic freedoms, tech sector actors are increasingly engaging, publicly or otherwise, on issues of civic space.

In the US, for example, a number of tech companies have cancelled contracts with the Pentagon and stopped censoring search results in China as a result of protests by employees. The Asia Internet Coalition recently wrote to Pakistan’s Prime Minister expressing human rights concerns about new rules regulating social media.

While we have recently seen technology companies show support for the social movements, including through substantial pledges, in some cases these have elicited criticism of hypocrisy, and the interventions of social media platforms on freedom of expression and privacy issues have been closely linked to the preservation of their own business models.

The COVID-19 crisis has also posed new dilemmas for the tech sector with the pervasiveness of disinformation, as well as new tools for tracking individuals which raise privacy issues.

This roundtable provides an opportunity to explore the drivers of (and barriers to) corporate activism, develop a better understanding of existing initiatives, identify good practice and routes to effective collaboration with other actors, and discuss practical strategies that could be adopted by the tech community.

It is the second of a series of roundtables at Chatham House in support of initiatives to build broad alliances for the protection of civic space.

Implications of post-COVID-19 Restructuring of Supply Chains for Global Investment Governance 14 July 2020 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 February 2021 Online

As companies rethink and diversify their supply chains in order to enhance resilience, what will this mean for current and future global investment governance?

What are the risks of negative effects on inclusivity and transparency? Does this shift create an opportunity to advance good governance of cross-border investment practices?

This event is part of the Inclusive Governance Initiative, which is examining how to build more inclusive models and mechanisms of global governance fit for purpose in today’s world.

Monitoring of trade deals needs a risk-based approach Expert comment NCapeling 24 May 2021

On human rights issues, trading partners must do more than trust to luck.

The recent row within the UK government about the treatment of agricultural products in a proposed new trade deal with Australia provides a reminder that changes to trading arrangements can have social and environmental costs, as well as benefits.

Although the UK government clearly feels political pressure to demonstrate its ‘Global Britain’ credentials with some speedily concluded new deals, rushing ahead without a full understanding of the social, environmental, and human rights implications risks storing up problems for later. In the meantime, calls for better evaluation and monitoring of trade agreements against sustainability-related commitments and goals – ideally with statutory backing – will only get stronger.

EU experiences with these kinds of processes are instructive. For more than 20 years the Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission (DG Trade) has been commissioning sustainability impact assessments (SIAs) from independent consultants in support of trade negotiations, and since 2012 these assessments have explicitly encompassed human rights impacts as a core part of the analysis.

These processes have since been augmented with a programme of periodic ‘ex post’ evaluations of trade agreements to ‘analyse the observed economic, social, human rights, and environmental impacts’ of live trade deals and to make recommendations about any mitigation action which may be needed.

For credibility and objectivity, the Commission outsources much of its sustainability assessment and ex post evaluation activities to independent consultants, who are encouraged to innovate and tailor their approaches subject to broad methodological parameters laid down by the Commission. Over time, experiences with specific assessment and monitoring assignments have enabled external SIA practitioners – and the Commission itself – to progressively strengthen these processes and underlying methodologies.

Yet despite the improvements there remains legitimate questions about whether the human rights aspects of these SIA processes – and subsequent evaluations – are having real policy impact. The difficulty of predicting human rights impacts of trade agreements in advance – as the COVID-19 crisis amply demonstrates – suggests a need for realism about the extent to which a ‘one off’ process, often carried out at a time when there is only ‘agreement in principle’ as to future trading terms, can produce a robust roadmap for heading off future human rights-related risks.

Human rights impact assessments have a potentially valuable role to play in laying down the substantive and structural foundations for future human rights monitoring as part of a broader, iterative, human rights risk management strategy. But the fragmented manner in which many trade agreements approach human rights issues, and the fact that outcomes are the product of negotiation rather than necessarily design, make it difficult to turn this vision into reality.

Controversies surrounding the SIA process for the EU-Mercosur agreement illustrate why striving for more coherence in the identification and subsequent management of human rights-related risks is important. In June 2019, the Commission decided to wrap up negotiations with the South America Mercosur bloc, even though the SIA process for the proposed agreement was still incomplete and the interim and final SIA reports yet to be delivered. Frustrated NGOs made their feelings clear in the form of a formal complaint – and a slap on the wrist from the EU Ombudsman duly followed.

However, when it eventually appeared in December 2020, the final SIA report for the EU-Mercosur deal did include a number of interesting recommendations for responding to specific areas of human rights-related risk identified through the pre-signing assessment process – such as flanking measures designed to address issues pertaining to health, equality, and protection of indigenous peoples, and stressing the need for ‘continuous monitoring’.

Hopefully these recommendations will be proactively followed up, but there are reasons not to be overly optimistic about that. To the extent that these recommendations might have required, or benefitted from, some tweaks to the terms of the trade agreement itself, it was clearly too late. And while there may be opportunities for EU institutions to follow up the recommendations through unilateral ex post evaluation processes, current legal, policy, and institutional arrangements provide few guarantees this will take place.

The credibility of the EU SIA programme has clearly taken a knock because of the problems with the EU-Mercosur process, and stakeholders could be forgiven for questioning whether expending time and effort on engaging in these processes is actually worthwhile. As a first step towards rectifying this, the Commission should be transparent about how it plans to respond to the EU-Mercosur SIA recommendations regarding flanking measures and follow up – ideally consulting with stakeholders about the various human rights monitoring options available.

Looking further ahead, the Commission should be urging SIA practitioners to deal more expansively with the options for follow up human rights monitoring in future SIA reports, setting out recommendations not just on the need for ongoing monitoring of human rights-related issues but on the detail of how this might be done, and how progress towards human rights-related goals could be tracked. And creativity should be encouraged because, as detailed in a newly-published Chatham House research paper, there may be more opportunities for human rights monitoring than first appear.

The SIA process could also provide a forum for exploring complementary measures needed to make future monitoring efforts as effective as possible – jointly and unilaterally; politically, structurally, and resources-wise; both within the framework of the trading relationship and extraneously. The credibility of the process – and hence stakeholder trust – would be further enhanced by commitments from the Commission to be more transparent in future about how different human rights monitoring recommendations laid out in SIAs have been taken into account in subsequent negotiations, in the supervisory arrangements developed for specific trading relationships, and in the implementation of EU trade policy more generally.

Elizabeth Wilmshurst CMG appointed Honorary Queen’s Counsel News release jon.wallace 14 January 2022

Founder of the International Law Programme at Chatham House recognized for her major contribution to the law of England and Wales.

Elizabeth Wilmshurst CMG, distinguished fellow of Chatham House’s International Law Programme, has been awarded the title of Honorary Queen’s Counsel (QC Honoris Causa), recognizing her major contribution to the law of England and Wales, outside practice in the courts. The Lord Chancellor will preside over an appointment ceremony at Westminster Hall on 21 March 2022.

Elizabeth founded the International Law Programme at Chatham House and is an academic expert member of Doughty Street Chambers. She was a legal adviser in the United Kingdom diplomatic service between 1974 and 2003. Between 1994 and 1997 she was the Legal Adviser to the United Kingdom mission to the United Nations in New York. She also took part in the negotiations for the establishment of the International Criminal Court.

Throughout her career, Elizabeth has worked to strengthen the role of international law in reducing global tensions, addressing cross-border challenges and promoting individual liberty, including through influential publications at the Institute such as The Chatham House Principles of International Law on the Use of Force in Self-Defence. 

Robin Niblett CMG, Director and Chief Executive of Chatham House said:

‘We are delighted by this award which recognizes Elizabeth’s outstanding contribution to the field of international law, both in government and – on a continuing basis – through the International Law Programme at Chatham House.’

What is happening in Sri Lanka? Explainer Video aboudiaf.drupal 15 July 2022

Chanu Peiris reflects on the unfolding political and economic crisis in Sri Lanka and its impact on human rights.

What is happening in Sri Lanka?

Sri Lanka has been a leader in South Asia on many human development indicators including health and education. Until recently, it was considered an upper middle-income country. Its GDP, when adjusted for purchasing power, was on par with South Africa’s.  

But the country is now experiencing economic collapse. The crisis has its roots in economic mismanagement by multiple governments. This was made worse by global market disruptions and by internal security emergencies including the 2019 Easter bombings.  

What rights are being impacted?   

The current situation is impacting the full range of human rights for people in Sri Lanka. According to the World Food Programme, over a third of people are now facing moderate to severe hunger.

Shortages of other essentials including cooking gas, fuel and lifesaving medicines are disrupting the normal functioning of society and causing loss of life, enormous hardship, mental distress and social unrest.

There are serious concerns about the long-term impacts to the more vulnerable members of Sri Lanka society – including children, whose development due to lack of proper nutrition and disruptions to schools will be affected.  

The global human rights community has called attention to rights violations by the government, which has been seen to be slow to take the necessary steps to rectify the economic situation. It has also used lethal force and social media blackouts in response to protests. 

What are the broader human rights implications? 

The country is seeing the most widespread and diverse mass demonstrations in its history. So far they have led to the resignation of Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa and the cabinet. They have also resulted in President Gotabaya Rajapaksa leaving the country. 

The scale of the protests signals an important shift in the social contract. The crisis has united people who were previously divided and there are demands for the abolition of the executive presidency.   

It is also significant that people are calling for more than the economic issues to be addressed. They are focusing on the need for systemic changes, including accountability and transparency within a government which has long resisted both.

In other words, what we are seeing is a clear assertion from the streets of the indivisibility of human rights – that access to food, water, and electricity rely on the safeguarding of civil and political rights and proper accountability.

They are making a powerful argument in favour of human rights-sensitive governance – something that has been in short supply around the world. 

Hepatocyte nuclear factor-1β (HNF-1β) is a tissue-specific transcription factor that is required for normal kidney development and renal epithelial differentiation. Mutations of HNF-1β produce congenital kidney abnormalities and inherited renal tubulopathies. Here, we show that ablation of HNF-1β in mIMCD3 renal epithelial cells results in activation of β-catenin and increased expression of lymphoid enhancer–binding factor 1 (LEF1), a downstream effector in the canonical Wnt signaling pathway. Increased expression and nuclear localization of LEF1 are also observed in cystic kidneys from Hnf1b mutant mice. Expression of dominant-negative mutant HNF-1β in mIMCD3 cells produces hyperresponsiveness to exogenous Wnt ligands, which is inhibited by siRNA-mediated knockdown of Lef1. WT HNF-1β binds to two evolutionarily conserved sites located 94 and 30 kb from the mouse Lef1 promoter. Ablation of HNF-1β decreases H3K27 trimethylation repressive marks and increases β-catenin occupancy at a site 4 kb upstream to Lef1. Mechanistically, WT HNF-1β recruits the polycomb-repressive complex 2 that catalyzes H3K27 trimethylation. Deletion of the β-catenin–binding domain of LEF1 in HNF-1β–deficient cells abolishes the increase in Lef1 transcription and decreases the expression of downstream Wnt target genes. The canonical Wnt target gene, Axin2, is also a direct transcriptional target of HNF-1β through binding to negative regulatory elements in the gene promoter. These findings demonstrate that HNF-1β regulates canonical Wnt target genes through long-range effects on histone methylation at Wnt enhancers and reveal a new mode of active transcriptional repression by HNF-1β.