Editor's Note: This piece originally appeared in Foreign Policy.

The killing of Nasir al-Wuhayshi, reportedly via U.S. drone strike, is not just another notch in the belt of America’s long campaign against al-Qaida and its allies. Wuhayshi was one of al-Qaida’s top remaining leaders, and he is the highest-level death the organization has suffered since Osama bin Laden was killed in 2011. Wuhayshi headed al-Qaida’s most active affiliate, the Yemen-based al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and was the designated successor of al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. His killing adds one more element of uncertainty to the turbulence in Yemen and may set AQAP on a new path. Which path, however, remains an open question.

Wuhayshi helped transform AQAP from a fractious organization on the edge of defeat to one that menaces both Yemen and the United States. A decade ago, Yemen’s jihadi movement seemed near defeat. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Yemeni government rounded up jihadis and imprisoned Wuhayshi, and it was Saudi Arabia, not Yemen, that was the focus of jihadis in the Arabian Peninsula. In 2003, al-Qaida sponsored the original AQAP’s uprising against the Saudi government. Several years later, most of AQAP’s Saudi members were dead or in jail, and its remnants had fled to Yemen. There, they mixed with Yemeni jihadis, including important figures like Wuhayshi, who had escaped from Yemen’s jails in 2006. In 2009, two regional Islamist groups merged and formally anointed themselves AQAP, basing their operations in Yemen and trying to unseat the government. As Osama bin Laden’s former secretary, Wuhayshi became the group’s leader and embraced al-Qaida’s emphasis on attacking Western targets.

The group made fitful progress, at times taking territory but often losing it quickly after alienating locals and proving vulnerable to government counterattacks. But when the government of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh fell in 2012 during the Arab Spring, AQAP tried to step into the void. Saleh’s successor, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, pursued AQAP vigorously, but his weak government was unable to score any lasting successes.

In addition to its prowess in Yemen, AQAP has long been al-Qaida’s most active affiliate when it comes to taking on the West. The organization was behind the 2009 Christmas Day attempt to down a U.S. airliner over Detroit, a near-miss only foiled by the bomber’s incompetence and the quick thinking of the plane’s passengers. AQAP tried again in 2010, this time attempting to down U.S. cargo planes. The organization also attacked Western targets in Yemen, and puts out Inspire, a stylish English-language online publication that is one of al-Qaida’s more effective attempts to influence Western jihadis.

These AQAP efforts to attack the United States and the West, in general, led to a greater U.S. focus on Yemen and more drone attacks there. In 2011, the United States killed Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen and AQAP member who helped lead the terrorist group’s campaign against targets in the United States and Europe. Awlaki has continued to inspire terrorists after his death, with Boston Marathon plotters downloading his sermons before their attack. Awlaki also inspired the Fort Hood shooter in 2009 and the attacks on the Charlie Hebdo office in 2015.

Wuhayshi’s death, however, comes as Yemen is falling apart. Earlier this year, Hadi’s government fell to the Houthi rebels, Yemeni Shiites who oppose both Yemen’s traditional order and the Sunni fanatics of AQAP who see Shiites as apostates. Alarmed by Houthi ties to Iran, Saudi Arabia has led an intervention in Yemen on Hadi’s behalf, bombing the Houthis and trying to reverse their gains. AQAP seems to be flourishing amid the chaos, as its enemies turn on one another.

But with Wuhayshi’s death, AQAP may find it difficult to further exploit the Yemeni civil war. Personal connections, reputation, and charisma play a bigger role in leadership in the jihadi cause than do formal rank, and it is not clear if Qasim al-Raimi, the designated new leader, can retain the support of the AQAP rank and file. There is always a chance, of course, that Raimi proves an even more effective leader than Wuhayshi, and some observers see him as “more dangerous and aggressive.” (Lest we forget: In 1992, the Israelis killed Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Abbas al-Musawi, one of the group’s most competent leaders. Musawi was replaced by Hassan Nasrallah, who has proven one of the most effective terrorist and guerrilla leaders in modern times.)

The bad news is that Raimi and AQAP may seek revenge, both out of genuine anger and to score points within the jihadi community. Al-Qaida’s chief bomb-maker, Ibrahim al-Asiri, may still be out there and has likely passed his sophisticated techniques on to others in Yemen.

The bad news is that Raimi and AQAP may seek revenge, both out of genuine anger and to score points within the jihadi community.

Over time, however, Wuhayshi’s death may push AQAP to focus even more on Yemen and less on the West. His close, personal ties to the al-Qaidacore may have been part of why AQAP was a steadfast ally of Zawahiri in his power struggle with the Islamic State. The opportunities and risks in the civil war are both tempting and frightening for AQAP. On the one hand, by taking up arms against the hated Shiites, AQAP can position itself as the defender of Yemen’s Sunnis, a strategy that has worked well for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. AQAP might gain more recruits and local support, while drawing foreign fighters and money from Sunnis eager to find yet another Shiite-Iran axis to oppose. Not surprisingly, AQAP has stepped up its operations against the Houthis in recent months.

AQAP also has an opportunity to govern. And the bad news for the West is that it has learned from its own many mistakes on this front. In the past when AQAP made gains, it tried to impose a strict version of Islamic law that alienated local communities. Now when its fighters seize territory, theywork with local tribal figures and other elites, avoiding the most controversial measures and trying to portray themselves as guardians, not overlords.

Wuhayshi’s death also comes at a time when the broader jihadi movement is split between backers of al-Qaida and supporters of the Islamic State, a struggle in which AQAP has long played an important role. As al-Qaida’s most active anti-Western affiliate, AQAP was important to Zawahiri’s claim that he was leading the struggle against the United States. Its strength in Yemen, moreover, also expanded al-Qaida’s presence and prestige to an important part of the Arab world. Islamic State supporters have already conducted attacks in Yemen, and the death of Wuhayshi offers them a chance to expand their influence there. The core leadership of AQAP is not likely to join the Islamic State, but some of its cells and supporters could break off if Raimi proves a weak leader.

For now, Wuhayshi’s death means the United States has another point in the struggle against the jihadi movement. In the long term, successful disruption is more likely if the United States and its allies can keep the pressure on AQAP, forcing its leaders to go on the run and hindering their ability to communicate — particularly difficult challenges for a group in transition under new leadership. Wuhayshi’s death also comes on the heels of the deaths of several other AQAP members, including its top ideologue and spokesman. Having to hide also makes it difficult for the group to govern, as its exposed leaders run the risk of being killed. But AQAP has lost many leaders before, yet remains a force to be reckoned with. So at best, this should be seen as winning a battle, not the war.

This election cycle, what will separate Democrats from Republicans on energy policy and their approach to climate change? Republicans tend to be fairly strong supporters of the fossil fuel industry, and to various degrees deny that climate change is occurring. Democratic candidates emphasize the importance of further expanding the share of renewable energy at the expense of fossil fuels, and agree that climate change is a real problem—with some saying the challenge trumps most, if not all, other U.S. security concerns.

Now that there are presumptive nominees for both major political parties, it’s an important moment to outline, in broad strokes, the positions of Secretary Hillary Clinton and businessman Donald Trump. We realize that Democratic Presidential candidate Bernie Sanders has not dropped out of the race, but note that it is fairly unlikely at this point that he would clinch the nomination.

Clinton: Building on the Obama legacy 

Secretary Clinton has laid out the most comprehensive and detailed energy and climate policy proposals of the candidates to date. They are in essence a continuation, and in some cases a further expansion, of existing White House policies under President Obama. The Secretary has stated that she wants the United States to be the “clean energy superpower of the 21st century.”

This starts with the notion that climate change is an existential threat, which the global community has to address as soon as possible. In order to do that, in her view, the United States needs to continue to show leadership on the international stage, as the Obama administration sought to do surrounding the Paris agreement in December 2015. This will require substantial reforms to expand low-carbon options, including nuclear energy to some degree, while tightly regulating fossil fuels (and gradually phasing them out). 

[S]he wants the United States to be the “clean energy superpower of the 21st century.”

The first casualty of this transformation is the coal industry, which Clinton has explicitly acknowledged. She presented a $30 billion plan to revitalize communities where coal production is currently an important industry and job creator, for example, and has campaigned with this message in various state primaries. Implicitly, Secretary Clinton does not seem to believe in the economic viability of carbon capture and sequestration in the United States—this is despite the fact that most analyses, including those of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), suggest that this technology could be a cost-efficient tool in a wider carbon emission mitigation portfolio. 

Clinton sees natural gas as a bridge fuel, though at this point it’s not clear how long that bridge is. Questions remain about the role that natural gas can play in scenarios of deep decarbonization in 2030 and beyond. At the moment, the gas industry is rather nervous of the Secretary’s statement that she’d increase regulations on, in particular, the fracking industry—if her conditions came to fruition, there would very few places where fracking would continue. 

Secretary Clinton believes that oil consumption has to be cut substantially in the coming years, and she has suggested that new drilling in places like the Arctic, off the Atlantic Coast, and on federal lands would be discouraged or banned. She has previously opposed crude oil exports, though we would not anticipate a roll-back of existing policies (in December 2015, the Obama administration lifted the decades-old ban). 

Clinton foresees a new energy economy built on rapidly increasing shares of renewable energy, which should comprise 25 percent of the U.S. fuel mix by 2025 according to her plan (solar energy would be a key focus, with half a billion panels to be installed by the end of her first term). To facilitate this transition, she presented an elaborate energy infrastructure plan to modernize the U.S. grid and improve efficiency in reviewing and approving projects. 

Tax credits to support renewables would be continued under a Clinton White House, whereas fossil fuel subsidies would be phased out. Increased energy efficiency, including harmonization of vehicle efficiency and fuel standards, are high on her agenda as well. The Secretary also supports the Clean Power Plan that the Environmental Protection Agency under the Obama administration has launched, and which is currently on hold in the Supreme Court. 

On the international stage, Clinton supports the Paris agreement on climate change. Should she win the presidency in November, she would make an effort to take this Treaty to the next step, thus continuing U.S. leadership. That would mean reinforcing U.S. leadership along the lines described above, while helping address current uncertainties about finance, transparency, and accountability, to name only a few challenges that remain.

Trump: Drill, baby, drill

Although Donald Trump’s candidacy remains highly controversial, he is now the presumptive Republican nominee for president. To the extent that we know any detailed plans, quod non, it is safe to say that his views on energy and climate change are diametrically opposed to most of Clinton’s. Broadly speaking, Mr. Trump has come out as a fervent supporter of the fossil fuel industry, and has expressed skepticism about the economic viability of renewable energy.

Mr. Trump’s views start with the belief that climate change is not man-made. In the past, the controversial businessman has suggested that climate change might be a hoax invention from China, in order to undermine U.S. industrial interests and job creation. This starting point allows Mr. Trump to be extremely supportive of existing industrial interests (if carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions are not a problem, the thinking goes, then business as usual is the way to go). 

In a speech in North Dakota in late May, Mr. Trump laid out some broad initial ideas for his energy policy. He declared that under his presidency the United States would “accomplish complete American energy independence,” leaving unaddressed arguments about what that would mean for existing international energy trade. 

It is probably safe to say that Mr. Trump would like to further expand oil, gas, and coal production in the country. The latter, in particular, is remarkable: even coal executives have declared that market forces (particularly very competitive natural gas) have been the primary threat to the coal industry. Since Mr. Trump is also a strong supporter of the natural gas industry—and considering the challenges of building new bulk terminals for exports—it is unclear how a revitalization of the coal industry would occur. 

If climate change is a hoax, it will come as no surprise that Mr. Trump will not support efforts to mitigate carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions.

Contrary to his opponent, Mr. Trump would also like to revoke restrictions on drilling for oil and gas, and would permit production on federal lands. He also supports further expansion of energy infrastructure, and would, if elected, ask Trans Canada to resubmit a permit application for the Keystone pipeline, which he’d approve. He has caveated his support for projects like these by demanding that a portion of the revenues from oil and gas flows be redistributed to local communities, to compensate them for intrusion on their private property. Mr. Trump has also indicated that he wants to use revenues from oil and gas production to rebuild U.S. infrastructure more broadly.

If climate change is a hoax, it will come as no surprise that Mr. Trump will not support efforts to mitigate carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions. The candidate has called the Obama administration’s Clean Power Plan “stupid,” and when asked what he would do about the Paris agreement on climate change, he said he’d cancel it. 

Though Trump says the United States must pursue all forms of energy—including renewables—he has expressed skepticism about their economic viability, calling solar energy “very expensive.” Wind energy received similar pejorative feedback, since Trump says it kills eagles and is noisy. During one of the few debates about renewable energy during the Iowa primary, he voiced his support for blending biofuels in vehicles. 

To the polls

The 2016 U.S. presidential election will have a profound impact on global affairs. Not only will it affect a range of security and economic issues in important ways, it also means a lot for global energy and climate policy. Will the United States continue on the trajectory that President Obama has started and continue a major energy transition strategy? Or will it shift course, potentially undermining existing domestic policies and investments, as well as international obligations? In November 2016, the American people will decide.

International jihad has undergone a wholesale internal revolution in recent years. The dramatic emergence of the Islamic State (IS) and its proclamation of a Caliphate means that the world no longer faces one Sunni jihadi threat, but two, as IS and al-Qaida compete on the global stage. What is the relationship between the groups and how do their models differ? Is IS’s rapid organizational expansion sustainable? Can al-Qaida adapt and respond?

Read "Jihadi Rivalry: The Islamic State Challenges al-Qaida"

In a new Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, Charles Lister explores al-Qaida and IS’s respective evolutions and strategies. He argues that al-Qaida and its affiliates are now playing a long game by seeking to build alliances and develop deep roots within unstable and repressed societies. IS, on the other hand, looks to destabilize local dynamics so it can quickly seize control over territory.

Lister finds that the competition between IS and al-Qaida for jihadi supremacy will continue, and will likely include more terrorist attacks on the West. Accordingly, he calls for the continued targeting of al-Qaida leaders, the disruption of jihadi financial activities, and greater domestic intelligence and counter-radicalization efforts. Lister concludes, however, that state instability across the Muslim world must be addressed or jihadis will continue to thrive.

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There's a little more than a week to go before the Democratic National Convention begins in Boston. Senator John Kerry is both raising and spending money at a furious pace. The Kerry campaign raised about $182 million from March through June. Senator Kerry also outspent President George Bush in advertising throughout most of the summer. But the president still has more cash on hand, reportedly $63 million at the end of May. That's the latest figure available. The president also has more time to spend that money before accepting his Republican nomination on September 2. Anthony Corrado is an expert on campaign finance.

Listen to the entire interview

After his first place finish in Iowa, which was supposed to propel him to a New Hampshire victory, “change” is probably a word Barack Obama does not like as much anymore. But, his support did not really change much between these two elections. He won 38 percent of Iowa’s delegates and 36 percent of New Hampshire’s vote. It was Hillary Clinton and John McCain who were the big change candidates.

What happens when a presidential candidate that does well in a primary or caucus state, does not do so well in the next? The dynamic of the presidential election can swiftly and stunningly change, as it did in New Hampshire on Tuesday.

How Barack Obama wishes John Edwards showed up in New Hampshire.

Edwards was awarded 30 percent of Iowa’s delegates, barely denying Clinton a second place finish. He finished a distant third in New Hampshire, receiving only 17 percent of the vote. There are strong indications that a shift among his supporters helped propel Hillary Clinton to her New Hampshire victory.

According to the exit polls, Edwards did 8 percentage points worse in New Hampshire among women, while Clinton did 16 percent better. Obama’s support was virtually identical, dropping a statistically insignificant 1 percentage point.

Obama’s support among young people remained strong, if slightly increasing among 18-24 and 30-39 year olds. Clinton’s support remained strong and slightly increased among those 65 and older. Edwards won Iowa’s middle-aged voters, age 40-64, but it was Clinton who decisively won this coveted age demographic in New Hampshire. And where these people were 38 percent Iowa caucus attendees, they were 54 percent of New Hampshire voters. (To understand why their turnout increased, see my analysis of Iowa’s turnout .)

Moving forward, the generational war is still a strong dynamic in the Democratic race, as evident in the candidates’ speech styles following the election results. In Iowa, Clinton was flanked by the ghosts of the Clinton administration. In New Hampshire, she shared the stage with a sea of young voters. In Iowa, Obama spoke of change, a message that resonates with younger people who are not part of the establishment. In New Hampshire his slogan was a message that echoes the can-do spirit of the greatest generation, “Yes, we can!”

In the days between Iowa and New Hampshire, Edwards spoke about how he wanted the election to become a two-way race. One should be careful with what one wishes for. Edwards and Clinton are vying for the same support base, that when united can defeat Obama, at least in New Hampshire. In the short-term, Obama most needs Edwards to do better so that support can continue to be divided.

Among Republicans, John McCain recreated his magic of eight years ago and bounced back strong from a poor Iowa showing to win New Hampshire.

The Iowa and New Hampshire electorates are so different it is difficult to compare them. In Iowa, Evangelical Christians were 60 percent of the electorate, while in New Hampshire, they were only 23 percent. Mike Huckabee’s move from first in Iowa to third in New Hampshire can be clearly attributed to the shrinking of his base. His collapse paved the way for a new winner to emerge.

It is thus tempting to attribute McCain’s victory solely to the different electorates, but he still had to defeat Mitt Romney to win New Hampshire.

According to the exit polls, the battle between McCain and Romney is a referendum on the Bush administration. Surprisingly, McCain, who has tried to rebuild bridges with the Bush establishment since his defeat in the 2000 presidential election, is still seen as the outsider and agent of change by voters participating in the Republican nomination process.

In both Iowa and New Hampshire, McCain drew his support from those who said they are angry or dissatisfied with the Bush administration. Romney drew his support from those who said they are enthusiastic or satisfied. Not surprisingly, McCain is also drawing more support from self-described Independents and Romney from Republicans.

The candidates seem to understand this dynamic, too, as they gave their speeches following the election results. In a contrived bit of acting, Romney showed up on stage without a podium and shoved a prepared speech back into his pocket (if he had needed a podium, his advance team would have provided it). He appeared relaxed, delivering his speech in a personable style reminiscent of Huckabee, who is competing with Romney for those who support Bush. But he also seemed to be reaching out to Independents with a message of change. In stark contrast, McCain delivered a carefully written, almost sedate speech designed to reassure Republicans of his conservative credentials.

This three-way dynamic between Huckabee, McCain, and Romney should prove fascinating as the Republican nomination process moves forward. Where Evangelicals are strong, Huckabee should do well. Where they are not, the rules governing if Independents can or cannot participate will dictate how McCain and Romney do. And we have yet to see regional candidates like Fred Thompson have their day in the sun. And then there is Rudy Giuliani, who is lying in wait in the larger states where his name recognition should give him a significant boost over the other candidates. All of this points to an extended campaign among Republicans.

Michael P. McDonald is an Associate Professor at George Mason University and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He studies voter turnout and is a consultant to the national exit poll organization.

Will McCants: As we wind down another year in the so-called Long War and begin another, it’s a good time to reflect on where we are in the fight against al-Qaida and its bête noire, the Islamic State. Both organizations have benefited from the chaos unleashed by the Arab Spring uprisings but they have taken different paths. Will those paths converge again or will the two organizations continue to remain at odds? Who has the best strategy at the moment? And what political changes might happen in the coming year that will reconfigure their rivalry for leadership of the global jihad?

To answer these questions, I’ve asked some of the leading experts on the two organizations to weigh in over. The first is Barak Mendelsohn, an associate professor of political science at Haverford College and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). He is author of the brand new The al-Qaeda Franchise: The Expansion of al-Qaeda and Its Consequences.

Barak Mendelsohn: Al-Qaida attacked the U.S. homeland on 9/11, unprepared for what would follow. There was a strong disconnect between al-Qaida’s meager capabilities and its strategic objectives of crippling the United States and of bringing about change in the Middle East. To bridge that gap, Osama bin Laden conveniently and unrealistically assumed that the attack on the United States would lead the Muslim masses and all other armed Islamist forces to join his cause. The collapse of the Taliban regime and the decimation of al-Qaida’s ranks quickly proved him wrong.

Yet over fourteen years later al-Qaida is still around. Despite its unrealistic political vision and considerable setbacks—above all the rise of the Islamic State that upstaged al-Qaida and threatened its survival—it has branches in North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa.

Down, but not out

Two factors explain al-Qaida’s resilience: changes in the environment due to the Arab revolutions and the group’s ability to take advantage of new opportunities by learning from past mistakes. The Arab awakening initially undercut al-Qaida’s original claims that change in Muslim countries cannot come peacefully or without first weakening the United States. Yet, the violence of regimes against their people in Syria, Libya, and elsewhere created new opportunities for al-Qaida to demonstrate its relevance. Furthermore, involved citizens determined to shape their own future presented al-Qaida with a new opportunity to recruit. 

But favorable conditions would be insufficient to explain al-Qaida’s resilience without changes in the way al-Qaida operates. Learning from its bitter experience in Iraq, al-Qaida opted to act with some moderation. It embedded itself among rebel movements in Syria and Yemen, thus showing it could be a constructive actor, attentive to the needs of the people and willing to cooperate with a wide array of groups. As part of a broader movement, al-Qaida’s affiliates in these countries also gained a measure of protection from external enemies reluctant to alienate the group’s new allies. 

[E]ven after showing some moderation, al-Qaida’s project is still too extreme for the overwhelming majority of Muslims.

At present, the greatest threat to al-Qaida is not the United States or the Arab regimes; it’s the group’s former affiliate in Iraq, the Islamic State. ISIS is pressuring al-Qaida’s affiliates to defect—while it has failed so far to shift their allegiance, it has deepened cracks within the branches and persuaded small groups of al-Qaida members to change sides. Even if al-Qaida manages to survive the Islamic State’s challenge, in the long term it still faces a fundamental problem that is unlikely to change: even after showing some moderation, al-Qaida’s project is still too extreme for the overwhelming majority of Muslims.

Up, but not forever

With the United States seeking retrenchment and Middle Eastern regimes weakening, the Islamic State came to prominence under more convenient conditions and pursued a different strategy. Instead of wasting its energy on fighting the United States first, ISIS opted to establish a caliphate on the ruins of disintegrating Middle Eastern states. It has thrived on the chaos of the Arab rebellions. But in contrast to al-Qaida, it went beyond offering protection to oppressed Sunni Muslims by promoting a positive message of hope and pride. It does not merely empower Muslims to fend off attacks on their lives, property, and honor; the Islamic State offers its enthusiastic followers an historic chance to build a utopian order and restore the early Islamic empire or caliphate.

ISIS opted to establish a caliphate on the ruins of disintegrating Middle Eastern states. It has thrived on the chaos of the Arab rebellions.

The Islamic State’s leaders gambled that their impressive warfighting skills, the weakness of their opponents, and the reluctance of the United States to fight another war in the Middle East would allow the group to conquer and then govern territory. The gamble paid off. Not only did ISIS succeed in controlling vast territory, including the cities of Raqqa and Mosul; the slow response to its rise allowed the Islamic State’s propaganda machine to construct a narrative of invincibility and inevitability, which has, in turn, increased its appeal to new recruits and facilitated further expansion.

And yet, the Islamic State’s prospects of success are low. Its miscalculations are threatening to undo much of its success. It prematurely and unnecessarily provoked an American intervention that, through a combination of bombings from the air and skilled Kurdish proxies on the ground, is limiting the Islamic State’s ability to expand and even reversing some of the group’s gains. 

ISIS could settle for consolidating its caliphate in the territories it currently controls, but its hubris and messianic zeal do not allow for such limited goals. It is committed to pursuing military expansion alongside its state-building project. This rigid commitment to two incompatible objectives is perhaps the Islamic State’s biggest weakness. 

[T]he slow response to its rise allowed the Islamic State’s propaganda machine to construct a narrative of invincibility and inevitability.

Rather than pursue an economic plan that would guarantee the caliphate’s survival, the Islamic State has linked its economic viability to its military expansion. At present, ISIS relies on taxing its population and oil sales to support its flailing economy. But these financial resources cannot sustain a state, particularly one bent on simultaneously fighting multiple enemies on numerous fronts. Ironically, rather than taming its aspirations, the Islamic State sees conquest as the way to promote its state-building goals. Its plan for growing the economy is based on the extraction of resources through military expansion. While this plan worked well at first—when the Islamic State faced weak enemies—it is not a viable solution any longer, as the self-declared caliphate can no longer expand fast enough to meet its needs. Consequently, this strategy is undermining ISIS rather than strengthening it. 

Unfortunately, even if the Islamic State is bound to fail over the long run, it has had enough time to wreak havoc on other states in the neighborhood. And while its ability to govern is likely to continue diminishing, the terror attacks in Paris, Beirut, and Sinai suggest that the Islamic State will remain capable of causing much pain for a long time.

Will McCants: As we begin another year in the so-called Long War, it’s a good time to reflect on where we are in the fight against al-Qaida and its bête noire, the Islamic State. Both organizations have benefited from the chaos unleashed by the Arab Spring uprisings but they have taken different paths. Will those paths converge again or will the two organizations continue to remain at odds? Who has the best strategy at the moment? And what political changes might happen in the coming year that will reconfigure their rivalry for leadership of the global jihad?

To answer these questions, I’ve asked some of the leading experts on the two organizations to weigh in. First was Barak Mendelsohn, who contrasts al-Qaida’s resilience and emphasis on Sunni oppression with the Islamic State’s focus on building a utopian order and restoring the caliphate.

Next is Clint Watts, a Fox fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He offers ways to avoid the flawed assumptions that have led to mistaken counterterrorism forecasts in recent years. 

Clint Watts: Two years ago today, counterterrorism forecasts focused on a “resurgent” al-Qaida. Debates over whether al-Qaida was again winning the war on terror ensued just a week before the Islamic State invaded Mosul. While Washington’s al-Qaida debates steamed away in 2013, Ayman al-Zawahiri’s al-Qaida suffered unprecedented internal setbacks from a disobedient, rogue affiliate formerly known as al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI). With terror predictions two years ago so far off the mark, should we even attempt to anticipate what the next two years of al-Qaida and ISIS will bring?

Rather than prognosticate about how more than a dozen extremist groups operating on four continents might commit violence in the future, analysts might instead examine flawed assumptions that resulted in the strategic surprise known as the Islamic State. Here are insights from last decade’s jihadi shifts we should consider when making forecasts on al-Qaida and the Islamic State’s future in the coming decade. 

Loyalty is fleeting, self-interest is forever. Analysts that missed the Islamic State’s rise assumed that those who pledged allegiance to al-Qaida would remain loyal indefinitely. But loyalties change despite the oaths that bind them. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State’s leaders used technicalities to slip their commitments to al-Qaida. Boko Haram has rapidly gone from al-Qaida wannabe to Islamic State devotee. 

In short, jihadi pledges of loyalty should not be seen as binding or enduring, but instead temporary. When a group’s fortunes wane or leaders change, allegiance will rapidly shift to whatever strain of jihad proves most advantageous to the group or its leader. Prestige, money, manpower—these drive pledges of allegiance, not ideology. 

Al-Qaida and the Islamic State do not think solely about destroying the United States and its Western allies. Although global jihadi groups always call for attacks on the West, they don’t always deliver. Either they can’t or they have other priorities, like attacking closer to home. So jihadi propaganda alone does not tell us much about how the group is going to behave in the future. 

Zawahiri, for example, has publicly called on al-Qaida’s affiliates to carry out attacks on the West. But privately, he has instructed his affiliate in Syria to hold off. And for most of its history, the Islamic State focused on attacking the near enemy in the Middle East rather than the far enemy overseas, despite repeatedly vowing to hit the United States. Both groups will take advantage of any easy opportunity to strike the United States. However, continuing to frame future forecasts through an America-centric lens will yield analysis that’s off the mark and of questionable utility.

[J]ihadi propaganda alone does not tell us much about how the group is going to behave in the future.

Al-Qaida and the Islamic State don’t control all of the actions of their affiliates. News headlines lead casual readers to believe al-Qaida and the Islamic State command and control vast networks operating under a unified strategic plan. But a year ago, the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris caught al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) completely by surprise—despite one of the attackers attributing the assault to the group. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) recent spate of attacks in Mali and Burkina Faso were likely conducted independently of al-Qaida’s central leadership. While the Islamic State has clearly mobilized its network and inspired others to execute a broad range of international attacks, the group’s central leadership in Iraq and Syria closely manages only a small subset of these plots. 

At no time since the birth of al-Qaida have jihadi affiliates and networks operated with such independence. Since Osama bin Laden’s death, al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen, the Sahel, Somalia, and Syria all aggressively sought to form states—a strategy bin Laden advised against. Target selections and the rapid pace of plots by militants in both networks suggest local dynamics rather than a cohesive, global grand strategy drive today’s jihad. Accurately anticipating the competition and cooperation of such a wide array of terrorist affiliates with overlapping allegiances to both groups will require examination by teams of analysts with a range of expertise rather than single pundits. 

At no time since the birth of al-Qaida have jihadi affiliates and networks operated with such independence.

Both groups and their affiliates will be increasingly enticed to align with state sponsors and other non-jihadi, non-state actors. The more money al-Qaida and the Islamic State have, the more leverage they have over their affiliates. But when the money dries up—as it did in al-Qaida’s case and will in the Islamic State’s—the affiliates will look elsewhere to sustain themselves. Distant affiliates will seek new suitors or create new enterprises. 

Inevitably, some of the affiliates will look to states that are willing to fund them in proxy wars against their mutual adversaries. Iran, despite fighting the Islamic State in Syria, might be enticed to support Islamic State terrorism inside Saudi Arabia’s borders. Saudi Arabia could easily use AQAP as an ally against the Iranian backed Houthi in Yemen. African nations may find it easier to pay off jihadi groups threatening their countries than face persistent destabilizing attacks in their cities. When money becomes scarce, the affiliates of al-Qaida and the Islamic State will have fewer qualms about taking money from their ideological enemies if they share common short-term interests. 

If you want to predict the future direction of the Islamic State and al-Qaida, avoid the flawed assumptions noted above. Instead, I offer these three notes: 

1. First, look to regional terrorism forecasts illuminating local nuances routinely overlooked in big global assessments of al-Qaida and the Islamic State. Depending on the region, either the Islamic State or al-Qaida may reign supreme and their ascendance will be driven more by local than global forces. 
2. Second, watch the migration of surviving foreign fighters from the Islamic State’s decline in Iraq and Syria. Their refuge will be our future trouble spot. 
3. Third, don’t try to anticipate too far into the future. Since bin Laden’s death, the terrorist landscape has become more diffuse, a half dozen affiliates have risen and fallen, and the Arab Spring went from great hope for democracies to protracted quagmires across the Middle East. 

Today’s terrorism picture remains complex, volatile, and muddled. There’s no reason to believe tomorrow’s will be anything different.

Will McCants: As we continue onwards in the so-called Long War, it’s a good time to reflect on where we are in the fight against al-Qaida and its bête noire, the Islamic State. Both organizations have benefited from the chaos unleashed by the Arab Spring uprisings but they have taken different paths. Will those paths converge again or will the two organizations continue to remain at odds? Who has the best strategy at the moment? And what political changes might happen in the coming year that will reconfigure their rivalry for leadership of the global jihad?

To answer these questions, I’ve asked some of the leading experts on the two organizations to weigh in. First was Barak Mendelsohn, who analyzed the factors that explain the resilience and weaknesses of both groups. Then Clint Watts offered ways to avoid the flawed assumptions that have led to mistaken counterterrorism forecasts in recent years. 

Next up is Charles Lister, a resident fellow at the Middle East Institute, to examine the respective courses each group has charted to date and whether that's likely to change. 

Charles Lister: The world of international jihad has had a turbulent few years, and only now is the dust beginning to settle. The emergence of the Islamic State as an independent transnational jihadi rival to al-Qaida sparked a competitive dynamic. That has heightened the threat of attacks in the West and intensified the need for both movements to demonstrate their value on local battlefields. Having spent trillions of dollars pushing back al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan and al-Qaida in Iraq, the jihadi threat we face today far eclipses that seen in 2000 and 2001.

As has been the case for some time, al-Qaida is no longer a grand transnational movement, but rather a loose network of semi-independent armed groups dispersed around the world. Although al-Qaida’s central leadership appears to be increasingly cut off from the world, frequently taking many weeks to respond publicly to significant events, its word remains strong within its affiliates. For example, a secret letter from al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri to his Syrian affiliate the Nusra Front in early 2015 promptly caused the group to cease plotting attacks abroad.

Seeking rapid and visible results, ISIS worries little about taking the time to win popular acceptance and instead controls territory through force.

While the eruption of the Arab Spring in 2010 challenged al-Qaida’s insistence that only violent jihad can secure political change, the subsequent repression and resulting instability provided an opportunity. What followed was a period of extraordinary strategic review. Beginning with Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen (in 2010 and 2011) and then with al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al-Din, and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in Mali (2012), al-Qaida began developing a new strategy focused on slowly nurturing unstable and vulnerable societies into hosts for an al-Qaida Islamic state. Although a premature imposition of harsh Shariah norms caused projects in Yemen and Mali to fail, al-Qaida’s activities in Syria and Yemen today look to have perfected the new “long game” approach.

In Syria and Yemen, al-Qaida has taken advantage of weak states suffering from acute socio-political instability in order to embed itself within popular revolutionary movements. Through a consciously managed process of “controlled pragmatism,” al-Qaida has successfully integrated its fighters into broader dynamics that, with additional manipulation, look all but intractable. Through a temporary renunciation of Islamic hudud (fixed punishments in the Quran and Hadith) and an overt insistence on multilateral populist action, al-Qaida has begun socializing entire communities into accepting its role within their revolutionary societies. With durable roots in these operational zones—“safe bases,” as Zawahiri calls them—al-Qaida hopes one day to proclaim durable Islamic emirates as individual components of an eventual caliphate.

Breadth versus depth

The Islamic State (or ISIS), on the other hand, has emerged as al-Qaida’s obstreperous and brutally rebellious younger sibling. Seeking rapid and visible results, ISIS worries little about taking the time to win popular acceptance and instead controls territory through force and psychological intimidation. As a militarily capable and administratively accomplished organization, ISIS has acquired a strong stranglehold over parts of Iraq and Syria—like Raqqa, Deir el-Zour, and Mosul—but its roots are shallow at best elsewhere in both countries. With effective and representative local partners, the U.S.-led coalition can and will eventually take back much of ISIS’s territory, but evidence thus far suggests progress will be slow.

Meanwhile, ISIS has developed invaluable strategic depth elsewhere in the world, through its acquisition of affiliates—or additional “states” for its Caliphate—in Yemen, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Russia. Although it will struggle to expand much beyond its current geographical reach, the growing importance of ISIS in Libya, Egypt, and Afghanistan-Pakistan in particular will allow the movement to survive pressures it faces in Syria and Iraq. 

As that pressure heightens, ISIS will seek to delegate some level of power to its international affiliates, while actively encouraging retaliatory attacks—both centrally directed and more broadly inspired—against high-profile Western targets. Instability breeds opportunity for groups like ISIS, so we should also expect it to exploit the fact that refugee flows from Syria towards Europe in 2016 look set to dramatically eclipse those seen in 2015.

Instability breeds opportunity for groups like ISIS.

Charting a new course?

That the world now faces threats from two major transnational jihadist movements employing discernibly different strategies makes today’s counterterrorism challenge much more difficult. The dramatic expansion of ISIS and its captivation of the world’s media attention has encouraged a U.S.-led obsession with an organization that has minimal roots into conflict-ridden societies. Meanwhile the West has become distracted from its long-time enemy al-Qaida, which has now grown deep roots in places like Syria and Yemen. Al-Qaida has not disappeared, and neither has it been defeated. We continue this policy imbalance at our peril.

In recent discussions with Islamist sources in Syria, I’ve heard that al-Qaida may be further adapting its long-game strategy. The Nusra Front has been engaged in six weeks of on/off secret talks with at least eight moderate Islamist rebel groups, after proposing a grand merger with any interested party in early January. Although talks briefly came to a close in mid-January over the troublesome issue of the Nusra Front’s allegiance to al-Qaida, the group’s leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani now placed those ties as an issue on the table for negotiation. 

Al-Qaida has not disappeared, and neither has it been defeated.

The fact that this sensitive subject is now reportedly open for discussion is a significant indicator of how far the Nusra Front is willing to stretch its jihadist mores for the sake of integration in Syrian revolutionary dynamics. However, the al-Nusra Front's leader, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, is a long-time Al-Qaeda loyalist and doesn't fit the profile of someone willing to break a religious oath purely for the sake of an opportunistic power play. It is therefore interesting that this secret debate inside Syria comes amid whispers within Salafi-jihadi and pro-al-Qaida circles that Zawahiri is considering “releasing” his affiliates from their loyalty pledges in order to transform al-Qaida into an organic network of locally-inspired movements—led by and loosely tied together by an overarching strategic idea.

Whether al-Qaida and its affiliates ultimately evolve along this path or not, the threat they pose to local, regional, and international security is clear. When compounded by ISIS’s determination to continue expanding and to conduct more frequent and more deadly attacks abroad, jihadist militancy looks well-placed to pose an ever present danger for many years to come.