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How can companies defend civic space? 2 February 2021 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 January 2021 Online

Panellists discuss how companies can go beyond corporate social responsibility and philanthropy initiatives to protect and support civic freedoms around the world.

Please click on the below link to confirm your participation and receive your individual joining details from Zoom for this event. You will receive a confirmation email from Zoom, which contains the option to add the event to your calendar if you so wish.

There is increasing pressure on companies to use their power and profits to engage with social and political causes. In doing so, companies can help to support the ‘shared civic space’ that enables the private sector and civil society organizations to benefit from a society that respects the rule of law and human rights, at a time when many of these rights are under threat around the world.

Many companies have introduced CSR initiatives, due diligence mechanisms and corporate philanthropy. Over 11,000 companies are now signatories to the UN’s Global Compact for sustainable and socially responsible business worldwide.

But as demonstrated by misguided corporate responses to the Black Lives Matter protests this year, there is a danger of corporate activism being perceived as ‘lip service’ rather than genuinely addressing the negative impacts of business operations on civic space.

Recent Chatham House research indicates that meaningful engagement by businesses on such issues must be timely, contextually sensitive and industry-relevant. For example, in 2015, Tiffany & Co. worked with other companies to intervene on behalf of Rafael Marques after he was arrested for reporting on widespread human rights abuses in the Angolan diamond industry. During COVID-19, Microsoft offered free cybersecurity software to healthcare and human rights organizations at increased risk of hacking attacks.

This panel event will draw upon practical examples of private sector support for civic space across different sectors, geographies and political environments.

Why might companies step up to defend freedom of association, expression or political participation even where this comes at a financial or political cost? How can companies resist complicity with governments or regulation that threaten civic space? And what forums exist, or should exist, for developing tactical alliances between companies and civil society actors?

This event is also the launch of a new Chatham House resource, The Role of the Private Sector in Protecting Civic Space.

What are the priorities for the new UK prime minister? Expert comment GBhardwaj 2 September 2022

Experts from across Chatham House examine the range of domestic and foreign policy issues facing Rishi Sunak as he prepares to lead the UK government.

Experts from across Chatham House’s research programmes give their insights on a range of issues facing Rishi Sunak as he becomes UK prime minister, covering energy prices, the climate change agenda, war in Ukraine, China and the Indo-Pacific, Africa, the US, global health, international law and security, science and technology, trade, and the global economic crisis.

Rising energy prices

Antony Froggatt, Senior Research Fellow and Deputy Director, Environment and Society Programme, Chatham House

The social and economic impact of high energy prices this winter may be greater than that of COVID-19. However, in contrast to the pandemic, there has been ample warning of the expected scale of this crisis.

The European Union (EU) gets much more of its energy from Russia than the UK does, but all are part of a largely informal European price zone which is why UK consumers are now facing, what would have been to many, unimaginable bills despite no longer importing energy from Russia.   

The cost of energy will continue to be a major concern for households and businesses and, given the cost of interventions, will significantly affect government finance.

The current policy of capping the unit price for six months increases affordability but will only offer some relief for this winter. The new government urgently needs to look at what happens to bills in the spring and next winter which, from a gas supply perspective, may be even worse than this one.

The EU has reacted with much greater purpose, proposing new legislative packages to diversify supply, accelerate the deployment of renewable energy, make adjustments to markets, and put in place energy saving measures. While these are unlikely to be enough they will make a difference and can become a benchmark for UK policy.

The role that government plays in assisting public and private sectors to save energy will be important. This is where past administrations have wasted the last eight months, where public information campaigns and small technology changes, such as refurbishing and resetting boilers and larger energy consuming products or insulating homes, would have made a difference.

Action needs to be taken across all levels, including co-ordination with the devolved administrations and local government.

Support for new supply needs to be immediately given to new low-carbon technologies which can deliver both cheaply and rapidly, primarily onshore wind and solar, which also help to decarbonize the sector.

The UK will need to maintain, and more likely increase, its relationship with the EU on energy as it continues to trade gas and electricity which is likely to require the resolution of tricky issues such as the Northern Ireland Protocol.

However, the discussions at the European Political Community in early October on greater co-operation on North Sea grids, creating an important opportunity for the accelerated deployment of offshore wind, needs to be taken forward.

Other supply options and market restructuring will be needed and they all must balance affordability, security of supply, and environmental considerations.

The agenda on climate change

Professor Tim Benton, Director, Environment and Society Programme, Chatham House

The record temperatures this summer show how the changing climate is impacting the daily lives of UK citizens. Climate change remains the most important challenge of this century and one that the prime minister will rapidly need to get a grip of ahead of COP27.

Hosting COP26 in 2021, along with Italy, was seen as an important post-Brexit opportunity for the UK in the climate space and ensured the development of many new multilateral sectorial initiatives, such as on climate finance, the Global Methane Pledge and on electric vehicles, while further supporting other emerging initiatives, such as on loss and damage. It will be important for the new prime minister, and the UK’s credibility, to continue to deliver on these.

Concrete things that are needed are a fast roll-out of renewable energy rather than fast-tracking more fossil fuel production, driving ahead the net-zero agenda particularly around land use and food and considering how to restructure markets to better deliver the long-term goals.

Grasping the need to address the demand-side of consumption growth, and not just supply, is key. The UK has prided itself on being a global leader on the climate over the last 15 years but let’s hope that is now not in peril.

Russia and the war in Ukraine

James Nixey, Director, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

Supporting Ukraine and confronting Russia are indisputable foreign policy priorities so it is highly likely the new prime minister will look to continue on this path and go with both popular and expert consensus in assisting Ukraine generously and standing up to Russia.

The other question, though, is to what extent the UK’s position can continue to make a difference to the outcome of the war.

Bringing the waverers of western Europe more firmly on board is surely beyond any UK prime minister’s ability considering the UK’s post-Brexit behaviour where the UK still has its own questions to answer including over the failure to tackle the problems of Russian influence at home.

That said, Brexit may not always be relevant to shared hard security challenges. Other countries do see the difference training, money and weapons are making and, if these continue to bring success, it is possible even the waverers can be guilted into providing more aid and economic support.

However, supporting Ukraine is one thing. Truly understanding Russia and devising a coherent Russia strategy is another. What needs to be learned is that Russia, in its present incarnation, cannot be reasoned with whatever the state of the war.

Therefore, given the threat Russia poses to the UK and other democracies, Britain now needs to consider how it can assist with engendering change in Russia. This should not be confused with engineering ‘regime change’ as the Kremlin accuses the UK of doing already.

But it does suggest a more proactive, less defensive Russia policy is required, rather than waiting for the Russian people to instigate change from within. That will take a degree of leadership and political will rarely seen in UK politics.

China and the Indo-Pacific tilt

Ben Bland, Director, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House

Both candidates in the last Conservative leadership contest argued during their campaigns that China was the biggest long-term threat to the UK’s national security. They both promised to call out China’s violations of human rights and international law and extend curbs on China’s access to sensitive technology.

However, to successfully respond to the scale of the challenge, the next prime minister will need to do much more than say what they do not want from Beijing. There needs to be a convincing, positive vision for how the UK can navigate a world where the centre of global economic and geopolitical gravity is moving eastwards.

The Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’ which Liz Truss oversaw as UK foreign secretary was a good start. But tilting isn’t a strategy. So what comes next?

At a time when its in-tray is full of problems closer to home, the UK government needs to sustain enhanced levels of engagement in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in Southeast Asia, while investing at home in the UK’s Asia literacy.

That should include more support for research and education about China as well as the rest of this dynamic region. Labelling China a threat does not make it go away. The UK needs to learn how to live in a world where Chinese power and influence will continue to grow from Asia to Latin America and across the UN and other multilateral organizations.

Investing in the UK’s knowledge of, and relationships in, Asia will also support British businesses as they look for new opportunities in fast-growing but challenging emerging markets such as India, Indonesia, and Vietnam.

The UK’s Middle East policy

Dr Lina Khatib, Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House

The UK government must restore a distinct cabinet position for the Middle East and North Africa and reorient to give Iran’s regional role greater focus.

The Middle East portfolio remains hefty and complex and requires diplomatic engagement to match. No sooner had the UK merged the ministerial Middle East portfolio into the broader one of minister of state for Asia and the Middle East than the war on Ukraine began, directing Western attention to Gulf Arab countries as one potential energy source to offset the loss of Russian oil and gas. Yet Gulf Arab countries are hesitating to fully heed Western calls to increase energy production. 

One key cause is Gulf Arab perceptions that the UK and other Western countries have overlooked their concerns of the threats that Iran poses to their security and political clout.

Despite the UK’s characterization of Iraq as ‘post-conflict’, and of the situation in Syria as a ‘crisis’, recent clashes in Baghdad’s Green Zone and American and Israeli bombing of Iran-linked targets in Syria, as well as recurring attacks by Iran-backed groups on targets in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, underline Iran’s role in ongoing instability in the Middle East, which threatens the interests of the UK and its allies in the region.

Although the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office resources have been recently redistributed to further support response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the UK can, and must, use existing resources earmarked for the Middle East to engage more effectively.

The two are not wholly distinct: Russia is using Iranian drones to attack Ukraine and Iranian military personnel are active on the ground in Ukraine in aid of the Russian military. Iran and Russia’s ongoing military intervention in Syria paved the way for their cooperation in the invasion of Ukraine.

The UK must restore diplomatic cabinet distribution to give the Middle East the attention it requires, but also revising its approach, putting Iran’s regional and international interventions high on the agenda and in parallel to efforts on the Iran nuclear deal.

The UK sees GCC countries as a potential alternative source of energy to Russian oil and gas specifically and as important trade partners more broadly. UK foreign policy must not compartmentalize its approach to the Middle East.

Diplomatic engagement on Iran’s regional role is a key factor in strengthening trust between the UK and its Middle Eastern allies, including in the GCC, which in turn supports the UK’s economic and security priorities. This means UK policy must approach Iran not just more comprehensively, and coherently, but also as a component of the broader strategy of dealing with the geopolitical and economic threats presented by Russia. 

Africa and the UK

Alex Vines, Director, Africa Programme, Chatham House

Senior UK politicians often claim that Africa is a priority but UK prime ministers and foreign secretaries rarely visit the continent. Boris Johnson attending the Commonwealth Heads of Government Summit in Kigali in August was his first as prime minister where he was accompanied by Liz Truss who was then his foreign secretary.

Despite saying she was an Africa enthusiast as secretary of state for international trade and president of the Board of Trade, Truss had never visited the continent. Her focus was consistently on other parts of the world except for defending the UK’s contested partnership with Rwanda to repatriate to Kigali informal migrants to the UK.

Viewing global politics through the lens of great power rivalry has cast African states as second tier players, disrespecting their agency and prided sovereignty and ignoring the preference of many states to remain non-aligned on issues pertaining to great power competition.

This is a mistake as 25 per cent of the UNGA is comprised of African member states and, of them, 21 are Commonwealth members with Gabon and Togo recently joining. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and intensifying competition with China is a reminder that in this era of sharper geopolitics, Africa increasingly matters for UK’s foreign policy objectives.

The new prime minister will need to review the 2021 Integrated Review, which downplayed much of Africa for UK strategy and advocated a pivot focus to East Africa. The war in Ukraine, coupled with democratic reversals in East Africa and worsening stability in West Africa requires a UK priority rethink. With limited resources to support an expanded UK footprint, sharper focus and defined ambition is important.

Continuity is important too. Since 1989, there have been 21 ministers for Africa, an average tenure of just over 18 months. This is not the time to change the UK’s minister responsible for Africa but it is the moment to make once again that post focused just on sub-Saharan Africa rather than also covering the Caribbean and Latin America too.

The UK-US relationship

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, Director, US and Americas Programme, Chatham House

As the US approaches its midterm elections, the new prime minister should think carefully about the UK’s response to potential disruption or challenges to the legitimacy of electoral results.

The US faces a period of unpredictable politics with the possibility of significant disruption, upheaval, and the potential for violence. The UK should be careful to differentiate between being independent with respect to partisan politics, which is essential, from being neutral with respect to democracy and especially the integrity of elections.

It would be a mistake for the UK prime minister or the next foreign secretary to be neutral on the question of free and fair elections and the importance of democracy in the US. Boris Johnson’s administration, especially his foreign secretary, was poorly equipped to respond to questions about the outcome of the 2020 presidential elections and prevaricated more than once. 

On foreign policy, a shared interest in supporting Ukraine and strengthening NATO is the current anchor for this partnership, but its historical foundation is both deeper and wider.

The new UK prime minister should demonstrate to the US, and to the world, that Britain is serious about its existing international commitments, especially in the Euro-Atlantic and through NATO, but also with respect to Northern Ireland and Europe.

The UK should deepen its participation in the new European Political Community and seize any opportunity to strengthen mechanisms for security cooperation with Europe. It should aim to restore Britain’s reputation as a nation committed to international, regional and domestic multilateral and legal frameworks.

These measures strengthen Britain’s attractiveness to the US and so lend it greater influence in this essential partnership. Any move to undermine the Northern Ireland protocol should be carefully measured against its wider impacts, not only with Europe, but also with the US.

Continuing Boris Johnson’s policy of restraint, rather than demanding a US-UK trade deal, is wise given the persistence of anti-trade sentiment in the US Congress and the looming US midterm elections.

The prime minister should also do what they can to lend support and work effectively and pragmatically with this US administration. What comes next could be disruptive so now is the time to leverage US power and lock the US into durable commitments that enhance international stability and prosperity.

US president Joe Biden is determined and pragmatic. He will choose the partners that best enable him to deliver his foreign policy priorities. The UK will be both more attractive, and less supplicant, to the US if it has a strong relationship with Europe.

Global health priorities

Robert Yates, Director, Global Health Programme and Executive Director, Centre for Universal Health, Chatham House and Emma Ross, Senior Research Fellow, Global Health Programme. 

Global health has been one of the areas where the UK has historically been seen as punching above its weight due to the magnitude of its financing for global health programmes and its reputation as a leader in global health initiatives.

However, the UK’s standing has taken a significant hit since the start of the pandemic with it demonstrating a lack of solidarity in combatting COVID-19 when it hoarded vaccines and failed to lead the G7 in raising adequate funding for the COVAX facility and blocked attempts to share vaccine technologies with developing countries.

Slashing the international aid budget and deprioritizing global health within its aid strategy has further tarnished the UK’s reputation as a global health leader.

Rebuilding the UK’s hard-earned status as a leading force in global health by at least restoring the level of official development assistance (ODA) for health, if not enhancing it, should be one of the new prime minister’s top priorities.

This should include support for major initiatives such as the Financial Intermediary Fund for Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response (FIF), the Hub for Pandemic and Epidemic Intelligence in Berlin and the vaccine technology transfer hub in Africa.

There is a risk that the ongoing pandemic treaty negotiations will result in a weak instrument of little value. The UK prime minister should prioritize the successful outcome of the negotiations by championing provisions that ensure the treaty makes a meaningful difference in enhancing global health security.

There is a need for workable mechanisms to ensure countries cooperate next time in preventing, preparing for and responding to a pandemic and supporting countries that need extra resources while, another related priority, should be to engage in efforts to reform the International Health Regulations in a way that strengthens global health security.

Championing international law

Rashmin Sagoo, Director, International Law Programme, Chatham House

Compliance with international law is in the best interests of the UK, and the new UK government needs to recognize this.  

The UK wants Russia to comply with the UN Charter and stop its aggressive war against Ukraine. It wants China to recognize the rights of its Uighur citizens, for women to be protected from violence in armed conflict, for compliance with nuclear non-proliferation treaties and  negotiate lucrative international trade agreements. 

These are all excellent aims and they should continue to be pursued. But exhortations to the rest of the world to support the international rules-based order ring hollow if they come from a government which itself does not itself adhere to those rules. 

How the UK conducts itself domestically is a mirror of how it conducts itself internationally. What elected UK officials say and do here matters elsewhere. How we treat the rule of law in this country impacts how others treat it – and us.  

The new prime minister has an opportunity to lead by example by ending the slow but dangerous habitualization of the British public becoming numb to government ‘intentions’ to break international law whether or not such threats are ultimately carried out.

There should also be a full public and parliamentary scrutiny of constitutionally significant proposals, such as the Northern Ireland Protocol bill and reform of the Human Rights Act, rather than fast-track them past a public distracted by the cost-of-living crisis. 

International law is founded upon principles of mutual trust, cooperation, good faith and reciprocity. To be a credible global leader, the UK must put the rule of law, including international law, at the heart of both its foreign and domestic policy. They cannot be disaggregated.   

Strengthening international security

Dr Patricia Lewis, Director, International Security Programme, Chatham House

Security and defence will be high on the agenda for the new UK prime minister. Russia’s war in Ukraine and the potential for sudden, wider escalation remains a serious concern.

Threats of nuclear weapons use, possible false flag ‘dirty bomb’ threats, the continuing attacks on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant threats and veiled references to chemical or biological attacks has demonstrated the willingness of Russia to take enormous risks in regard to threatening Europe as a whole in order to achieve its aims.

If Ukraine’s counter-offensive continues to make gains, then NATO countries will likely be threatened again in this manner. These are not just threats to Ukraine but to NATO states. And, most likely, given the significant role it has played in supporting Ukraine militarily, aimed primarily at the UK.

In the longer term, the UK prime minister needs to review the 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. The review came following the decision to increase defence spending and the UK secretary of defence Ben Wallace – continuing in place –has been clear that he has no need to increase his budget further although that may change as the impact of inflation becomes clearer across the board.

The Integrated Review is all about serious investment in the science and technology needed for security and defence in the future. Without such investment the UK will not be able to contribute to international security even in the limited way it can now and certainly not in an ambitious way in decades hence.

There are many long-term security threats that the UK will need to grapple with in addition to Russia’s aggression in Europe, not least of which are China’s rising military capabilities and global ambitions.

In the Arctic and Antarctic, China along with several other major economies, has serious ambitions for exploiting natural resources in terms of minerals, energy, particularly as climate change drives fish stock to the polar seas.

The newly-established AUKUS arrangement which plans to produce a nuclear-powered submarine capability for Australia also provides a mechanism for joint investment by Australia, the UK and the US in science and technologies such as in artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum technology. There are discussions about extending this arrangement to other countries such as Japan and could also include the space sector.    

Meanwhile, at home, in the short-term, there will be increasing calls to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. The prime minister will need to be ahead of that game so that Ukraine is supported and European security is enhanced rather than further stressed.

This will require a new approach to international security – a need that was further highlighted at the end of August in New York with yet another collapse of agreement in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a result of Russia’s veto.

The UK has long played an important diplomatic role in finding creative solutions for international security and the new prime minister would be well advised to lever that reputation.

Supporting science and technology

Marjorie Buchser, Executive Director, Digital Society Initiative, Chatham House, David Lawrence, Research Fellow, UK in the World Initiative Chatham House and Alex Krasodomski, Head of Innovation Partnerships, Chatham House

In science and technology, the UK currently finds itself in a balancing act between the US and the EU: ideologically attached to the light-touch approach of the US while dependent on the EU as an export market and for supply chains.

While Brexit in theory gives Britain more regulatory freedom, UK companies have often ended up abiding by EU regulations they are unable to shape. The new prime minister should explore forms of regulatory cooperation with the EU that prioritize market access while offering incentives to attract scientists and boost technical innovation.

Beyond transatlantic and European partnerships, it is essential for the UK to foster coalitions with a broader group of like-minded democracies which will be crucial to addressing global technology concerns and countering China’s digital model expansion.

Entrenching the UK as a science and technology ‘superpower’ will require a collaborative approach and involve identifying critical areas where the UK can drive international efforts. For example, the UK should build on its recent successes in the sensitive issues of data flows and digital technical standards as well as encourage investment in open-source security and infrastructure.

Finally, it is essential to unblock the skills and talent pipeline. It is difficult and expensive for high-skilled workers to move to the UK and a key source of labour supply has been lost since leaving the EU. The UK should consider introducing a Commonwealth visa scheme and radically reduce the cost for science and technology companies to offer those visas.

Strengthening infrastructure and housing, particularly in areas that need levelling up, will allow talent to move to areas with the most productive opportunities. 

Trade, climate and green supply chains

Bernice Lee, Research Director, Futures; Hoffmann Distinguished Fellow for Sustainability; Chair, Sustainability Accelerator Advisory Board 

The new prime minister will soon find the answers to the UK’s supply security challenges and soaring energy and food prices as well as future growth lie not at home but are global problems.

At a time of crisis, solutions can only come from countries working together. The UK is a perfectly sized state with plenty of heft but it is not so large as to be able to afford to ignore the needs of others.

It should lead the convening of a growing ‘coalition of the willing’ on trade, climate and green supply chains which could include Australia and Canada as well as developing nations with large extractive sectors in Africa and Asia that are pro-trade, pro-climate, pro-development and pro-growth.

Even though working together on trade and green supply chains can reduce unwanted dependencies, support climate action and help businesses unlock the $26 trillion in market opportunities, many governments have yet to take bold steps due to a fear of disguised protectionism.

Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) is fuelling bitter divides on competitiveness and development concerns.

Trade retaliation is likely and most probably will happen in parallel with legal processes at the WTO. These dynamics mean trade will be underused as an instrument but will create challenging dynamics for COP27. 

Although the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade, and Sustainability (ACCTS) was launched in 2019, the UK could fill a leadership gap since no major economies have positioned themselves as leaders at the intersection of trade, climate, and green supply chains.

British International Investment, the UK’s development institution, should support the establishment and scaling of low-carbon, resource-efficient, sustainable and deforestation-free supply chains which could help fuel the next generation of growth in the UK and beyond.

Improve regulation, give priority to trade relations with the EU, and maintain transparency

Creon Butler, Research Director, Trade, Investment and New Governance Models, and Director, Global Economy and Finance Programme

The UK’s new prime minister comes into office with the country facing the most serious set of economic challenges since 2008-09.

But, in contrast to the global financial crisis, the causes of today’s crisis are more multifaceted and to a degree more UK-specific: the Brexit trade shock; increased public spending pressures linked to the backlog in the NHS and potentially serious long-term effects of ‘long COVID’ and disrupted schooling; the unprecedented shock to energy prices following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine linked in part to the UK’s lack of gas storage capacity; and the shock to market confidence in the UK’s economic management resulting from the 44-day Liz Truss administration.

While the new prime minister should not delay addressing the UK’s long-term challenges, there are three critical questions which will help determine the success or failure of the government’s approach.

First, should the priority be less regulation or, in the context of the tech revolution and the need to accelerate the transformation of the economy to net zero, smarter regulation?

Expert

Expert

A. I. Aptekarev and M. L. Yattselev
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 251-268.
Abstract, references and article information

A. V. Domrina
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 201-215.
Abstract, references and article information

Z. A. Kasumov and N. R. Akhmedzade
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 67-74.
Abstract, references and article information

Minerals and Metals for a Low-Carbon Future: Implications for Developing Countries 30 October 2017 — 5:00PM TO 8:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 October 2017 Chatham House, London

This roundtable will explore two sides of minerals and metals for a low-carbon future - the growing demand for metals required for low-carbon technology and the technological and policy innovations that will be required to manage the carbon footprint of the mining sector and its wider energy and industrial linkages. Based around a presentation and scenarios developed by the World Bank, this roundtable discussion will assess which strategic metals will likely rise in demand in order to deliver a low-carbon future, before exploring the possible implications for resource-rich developing countries. In particular, what does a growing demand of minerals for a clean energy future mean for governments and industry, and how might developing countries benefit from this trend? What impact might growth of the mining sector have on a sustainable and climate-smart development? Can renewable energy and other clean tech innovations in the mining industry help reduce the carbon footprint of the sector and related industries, and under what circumstances? And how fit-for-purpose are current donor approaches to the mining sector in an increasingly carbon-constrained world?

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Mining and the Circular Economy: Implications for the Minerals and Metals Industries 6 November 2017 — 4:00PM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 31 October 2017 Chatham House, London

A New Era for China: Implications for the Global Mining and Metals Industries 18 June 2018 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 8 June 2018 Chatham House, London

Since the turn of the century, China’s demand for resources has dominated global headlines. It’s rapid demand growth through the early 2000s sparked the beginning of the commodities ‘super cycle’, and encouraged a growing Chinese presence in international mining, and in global metals and minerals markets. More recently, its transition toward the ‘new normal’ of slower but higher quality growth has underpinned the sudden slowdown in global commodities demand.

Drawing on China’s domestic ambitions, as set out in the 19th party congress, and on its wider strategic ambitions through the Belt and Road Initiative, the speaker will set out his thoughts on China’s next era of growth, and its likely implications for international mining investment and global metals and minerals markets.

Flexible Distribution Systems: New Services, Actors and Technologies 4 September 2018 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 31 July 2018 Chatham House, London

The pace of the energy transition is accelerating. Solar and wind are dramatically falling in cost and displacing fossil fuel generators. Simultaneously, the rapid uptake of electric vehicles and battery storage systems are beginning to send shock-waves through the electricity sector.

As the proportion of distributed energy resources (DERs) connected to the distribution network grows, a significant opportunity is beginning to present itself. What if the concerns of renewable integration and associated costs could be solved by the smart integration of these DERs?

By properly valuing the services DERs can provide, actively managing the distribution system and creating new market places, might a truly renewable electricity system capable of supporting the electrification of heat and transport be possible?

During this roundtable, Andrew Scobie, CEO of Faraday Grid, will provide an overview of the challenges and opportunities faced within the distribution network and explain why the current system is no longer fit for purpose.

This is the inaugural event in the Energy Transitions Roundtable (ETR) series.

Decarbonizing Heat: A New Frontier for Technologies and Business Models 27 February 2019 — 8:15AM TO 9:45AM Anonymous (not verified) 3 December 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Building space and water heating accounts for over 35 percent of global energy consumption - nearly double that of transport. However, there has been limited progress in decarbonizing the sector to date. International cooperation is required to ensure harmonized policies drag low carbon heating technologies down the cost curve to the extent that low carbon heating is cost competitive and affordable. The initial presentations and discussion focus on:

• Demand reduction technologies and policies that speed up transformation of the sector.
• The different challenges for energy efficiency of retrofitting as opposed to new build.
• The impact of electrification on GHG emissions and the power sector.
• The comparative role of national and city level initiatives.

The meeting concludes by looking at the challenges and risks in accelerating the transformation of heating and the lessons that can be learned from other sectors.

The Electric Vehicle Revolution: Impacts on Oil Economies and Industry 24 January 2019 — 8:15AM TO 9:45AM Anonymous (not verified) 3 December 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Electric vehicle (EV) deployment is gathering pace: the Norwegian government thinks that EV subsidies will be unnecessary by 2025 as they reach parity with diesel and petrol vehicles.

China has stipulated that EVs comprise 12 per cent of vehicle sales by 2020 while more governments are committing to banning diesel and petrol vehicles.

These developments are expected to be replicated as urban air pollution rises up the political agenda while technological developments and falling costs have given rise to ambitious forecasts on the increase in the deployment of EVs and the demise of the internal combustion engine.

Considering this, the presentations and initial discussion focus on:

• The influence of new technologies on the automotive landscape, including autonomous vehicles.
• How the automotive and oil companies are adjusting their business models to accommodate and encourage the rise in EVs.
• The risks and opportunities for the deployment of EVs for incumbents and new market actors.
• The role of government for example in public procurement and infrastructure development.
• The potential for modal shift and its impact on oil demand.

The discussion then seeks to explore the need for benchmarks of change including data and metrics to understand the changing risk landscape and the implications for different actors.

Finally, the discussion focuses on the speed of transformation and what this means for existing and new market actors.

Sino-Russian Gas Cooperation: Power of Siberia I and II and Implications for Global LNG Supplies 27 November 2019 — 8:30AM TO 9:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 19 November 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

In a new event in the Sustainable Transitions series, the speaker will present an update of Sino-Russian gas cooperation.

To give a comprehensive account of their impact on global liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies, he will discuss the following points:

• Gas is scheduled to start flowing from the Power of Siberia I (POS) on 2 December 2019. But what is the background of development of POS 1 and what is its current status and prospects?
• What are the chances of exporting gas through the proposed Altai pipeline? Why is the Mongolia export route so significant? And how will it affect the Central Asian Republics and in particular Turkmenistan’s gas export to China?
• What are the implications of both POS I and Altai gas via Mongolia route in the context of global LNG supply?
• What are the prospects for multilateral pipeline gas cooperation in northeast Asia?
• What are the implications for other Arctic onshore LNG supply, in particular, for Novatek’s Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 1 and 2 to China on top of POS 1 and Altai gas?

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

What's next for environmental peacebuilding? Lessons learned and opportunities from conflict-affected states 17 February 2021 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 February 2021 Online

 This event explores lessons and opportunities from conflict-affected states.

In the field of peacebuilding, scholars and policymakers increasingly recognize the importance of environmental restoration, afforestation and infrastructural renewal for creating the sustainable livelihoods necessary for successful peacebuilding efforts.

Featuring academics writing for International Affairs on environmental peacebuilding in Colombia, Yemen and the Sahel, this webinar discusses the policy implications of the turn to environmental peacebuilding.

This event is part of the Chatham House’s Environment and Society Discussion Series in which the Energy Environment and Resources Programme brings together leading academics and policymakers to discuss key issues in environmental policy.

In particular, this event focuses on the role of environmental peacebuilding in creating sustainable livelihoods. From the impact the destruction of infrastructure can have on poverty as a driver of conflict, to the role environmental peacebuilding can play in bringing communities together by creating sustainable shared spaces of employment, the importance of the environmental livelihood creation is difficult to overstate.

Panellists focus on how policymakers can best encourage inclusive and sustainable livelihood creation and on addressing the key challenges such approaches face in the context of environmental peacebuilding efforts.

Cities as climate leaders: Progress and ambition 1 December 2021 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 November 2021 Online

This panel discusses the progress cities have already made, whether progress at COP26 was enough, and what more needs to be done to scale action and ambition internationally.

Cities are critical to tackling the pressing environmental challenges of our time. While they now account for an estimated 75 per cent of global CO2 emissions, cities also offer a unique opportunity for devolved leadership on climate action. At the recent COP26, some significant progress was made in elevating cities’ position on climate action with a flurry of announcements and commitments.

For example, more than 1,000 cities are now committed to the Cities Race to Zero and C40’s Clean Construction Declaration saw multiple cities committing to at least halving emissions from initial construction of buildings by 2030. A raft of financing commitments were also made to improve urban resilience in the face of climate change.

This builds on existing momentum before COP26. Over 50 world cities are now on track to meet Paris Agreement and the Marrakech Partnership is further enabling collaboration between governments and cities within the UNFCCC processes.

Therefore, how we design, build, govern and use our urban places will be a key factor for decarbonization and climate change adaptation.

On the back of COP26, this panel brings together leaders from across urban development sectors to discuss the progress cities have already made, whether progress at COP26 was enough, and what more needs to be done to scale action and ambition internationally. 

Nuclear, gas and green finance taxonomies in the EU and UK 23 February 2022 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 20 January 2022 Online

Experts discuss EU, UK, and international perspectives on green taxonomy.

This event will address the controversial additions to the EU green finance taxonomy, including the labelling of some nuclear and gas power sources as “green”. Hear perspectives from the UK, EU and international experts.

The UK has committed to creating a green taxonomy to provide a shared understanding of which economic activities count as sustainable. It should be robust and evidence-based, taking an objective and science-based approach to assessing sustainability.

Technical Screening Criteria (TSCs) for the climate change mitigation, and climate change adaptation objectives within the UK green taxonomy will be based on those in the EU Taxonomy. The Government is currently reviewing these and expects to consult on UK draft TSCs in the first quarter of 2022, ahead of legislating by the end of 2022.

In recent weeks the European Commission has proposed controversial additional TSCs for the EU taxonomy, most notably the inclusion of nuclear and natural gas in power generation, which are currently being discussed by Member States and the European Parliament.

The inclusion of controversial power sources not only risks affecting investment and deployment patterns in the net-zero transition, but may also be a threat to the authority of the taxonomy as a whole

Key questions for the UK now include whether and how to address these issues in its own taxonomy, and how to promote a science-based ‘race to the top’ between jurisdictions that can lead to robust international standards.

This Environment and Society Discussion Series event brings expert voices together to discuss EU, UK, and international perspectives, and is co-organized with E3G.

Artificial Intelligence Apps Risk Entrenching India’s Socio-economic Inequities Expert comment sysadmin 14 March 2018

Artificial intelligence applications will not be a panacea for addressing India’s grand challenges. Data bias and unequal access to technology gains will entrench existing socio-economic fissures.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is high on the Indian government’s agenda. Some days ago, Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated the Wadhwani Institute for Artificial Intelligence, reportedly India’s first research institute focused on AI solutions for social good. In the same week, Niti Aayog CEO Amitabh Kant argued that AI could potentially add $957 billion to the economy and outlined ways in which AI could be a ‘game changer’.

During his budget speech, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley announced that Niti Aayog would spearhead a national programme on AI; with the near doubling of the Digital India budget, the IT ministry also announced the setting up of four committees for AI-related research. An industrial policy for AI is also in the pipeline, expected to provide incentives to businesses for creating a globally competitive Indian AI industry.

Narratives on the emerging digital economy often suffer from technological determinism — assuming that the march of technological transformation has an inner logic, independent of social choice and capable of automatically delivering positive social change. However, technological trajectories can and must be steered by social choice and aligned with societal objectives. Modi’s address hit all the right notes, as he argued that the ‘road ahead for AI depends on and will be driven by human intentions’. Emphasising the need to direct AI technologies towards solutions for the poor, he called upon students and teachers to identify ‘the grand challenges facing India’ – to ‘Make AI in India and for India’.

To do so, will undoubtedly require substantial investments in R&D, digital infrastructure and education and re-skilling. But, two other critical issues must be simultaneously addressed: data bias and access to technology gains.

While computers have been mimicking human intelligence for some decades now, a massive increase in computational power and the quantity of available data are enabling a process of ‘machine learning.’ Instead of coding software with specific instructions to accomplish a set task, machine learning involves training an algorithm on large quantities of data to enable it to self-learn; refining and improving its results through multiple iterations of the same task. The quality of data sets used to train machines is thus a critical concern in building AI applications.

Much recent research shows that applications based on machine learning reflect existing social biases and prejudice. Such bias can occur if the data set the algorithm is trained on is unrepresentative of the reality it seeks to represent. If for example, a system is trained on photos of people that are predominantly white, it will have a harder time recognizing non-white people. This is what led a recent Google application to tag black people as gorillas.

Alternatively, bias can also occur if the data set itself reflects existing discriminatory or exclusionary practices. A recent study by ProPublica found for example that software that was being used to assess the risk of recidivism in criminals in the United States was twice as likely to mistakenly flag black defendants as being at higher risk of committing future crimes.

The impact of such data bias can be seriously damaging in India, particularly at a time of growing social fragmentation. It can contribute to the entrenchment of social bias and discriminatory practices, while rendering both invisible and pervasive the processes through which discrimination occurs. Women are 34 per cent less likely to own a mobile phone than men – manifested in only 14 per cent of women in rural India owning a mobile phone, while only 30 per cent of India’s internet users are women.

Women’s participation in the labour force, currently at around 27 per cent, is also declining, and is one of the lowest in South Asia. Data sets used for machine learning are thus likely to have a marked gender bias. The same observations are likely to hold true for other marginalized groups as well.

Accorded to a 2014 report, Muslims, Dalits and tribals make up 53 per cent of all prisoners in India; National Crime Records Bureau data from 2016 shows in some states, the percentage of Muslims in the incarcerated population was almost three times the percentage of Muslims in the overall population. If AI applications for law and order are built on this data, it is not unlikely that it will be prejudiced against these groups.

(It is worth pointing out that the recently set-up national AI task force is comprised of mostly Hindu men – only two women are on the task force, and no Muslims or Christians. A recent article in the New York Times talked about AI’s ‘white guy problem’; will India suffer from a ‘Hindu male bias’?)

Yet, improving the quality, or diversity, of data sets may not be able to solve the problem. The processes of machine learning and reasoning involve a quagmire of mathematical functions, variables and permutations, the logic of which are not readily traceable or predictable. The dazzle of AI-enabled efficiency gains must not blind us to the fact that while AI systems are being integrated into key socio-economic systems, their accuracy and logic of reasoning have not been fully understood or studied.

The other big challenge stems from the distribution of AI-led technology gains. Even if estimates of AI contribution to GDP are correct, the adoption of these technologies is likely to be in niches within the organized sector. These industries are likely to be capital- rather than labour-intensive, and thus unlikely to contribute to large-scale job creation.

At the same time, AI applications can most readily replace low- to medium-skilled jobs within the organized sector. This is already being witnessed in the outsourcing sector – where basic call and chat tasks are now automated. Re-skilling will be important, but it is unlikely that those who lose their jobs will also be those who are being re-skilled – the long arch of technological change and societal adaptation is longer than that of people’s lives. The contractualization of work, already on the rise, is likely to further increase as large industries prefer to have a flexible workforce to adapt to technological change. A shift from formal employment to contractual work can imply a loss of access to formal social protection mechanisms, increasing the precariousness of work for workers.

The adoption of AI technologies is also unlikely in the short- to medium-term in the unorganized sector, which engages more than 80 per cent of India’s labor force. The cost of developing and deploying AI applications, particularly in relation to the cost of labour, will inhibit adoption. Moreover, most enterprises within the unorganized sector still have limited access to basic, older technologies – two-thirds of the workforce are employed in enterprises without electricity. Eco-system upgrades will be important but incremental. Given the high costs of developing AI-based applications, most start-ups are unlikely to be working towards creating bottom-of-the-pyramid solutions.

Access to AI-led technology gains is thus likely to be heavily differentiated – a few high-growth industries can be expected, but these will not necessarily result in the welfare of labour. Studies show that labour share of national income, especially routine labour, has been declining steadily across developing countries.

We should be clear that new technological applications themselves are not going to transform or disrupt this trend – rather, without adequate policy steering, these trends will be exacerbated.

Policy debates about AI applications in India need to take these two issues seriously. AI applications will not be a panacea for addressing ‘India’s grand challenges’. Data bias and unequal access to technology gains will entrench existing socio-economic fissures, even making them technologically binding.

In addition to developing AI applications and creating a skilled workforce, the government needs to prioritize research that examines the complex social, ethical and governance challenges associated with the spread of AI-driven technologies. Blind technological optimism might entrench rather than alleviate the grand Indian challenge of inequity and growth.

This article was originally published in the Indian Express.

Martin Ehler and Karlheinz Gröchenig
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Claudio Macci and Barbara Pacchiarotti
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Gabriele Benedetti, Johanna Bimmermann and Kai Zehmisch
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András Kroó
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E. P. Ushakova and K. E. Ushakova
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Zhanqiang Bai, Jia-Jun Ma, Wei Xiao and Xun Xie
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Recent studies have suggested that innate immune responses exhibit characteristics associated with memory linked to modulations in both vertebrates and invertebrates. However, the diverse evolutionary paths taken, particularly within the invertebrate taxa, should lead to similarly diverse innate immunity memory processes. Our understanding of innate immune memory in invertebrates primarily comes from studies of the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster, the generality of which is unclear. Caenorhabditis elegans typically inhabits soil harboring a variety of fatal microbial pathogens; for this invertebrate, the innate immune system and aversive behavior are the major defensive strategies against microbial infection. However, their characteristics of immunological memory remains infantile. Here we discovered an immunological memory that promoted avoidance and suppressed innate immunity during reinfection with bacteria, which we revealed to be specific to the previously exposed pathogens. During this trade-off switch of avoidance and innate immunity, the chemosensory neurons AWB and ADF modulated production of serotonin and dopamine, which in turn decreased expression of the innate immunity-associated genes and led to enhanced avoidance via the downstream insulin-like pathway. Therefore, our current study profiles the immune memories during C. elegans reinfected by pathogenic bacteria and further reveals that the chemosensory neurons, the neurotransmitter(s), and their associated molecular signaling pathways are responsible for a trade-off switch between the two immunological memories.