After President Trump decided to halt a missile attack on Iran in response to the downing of a US drone, it was revealed that the US had conducted cyberattacks on Iranian weapons systems to prevent Iran launching missiles against US assets in the region.

This ‘left-of-launch’ strategy – the pre-emptive action to prevent an adversary launch missiles – has been part of the US missile defence strategy for some time now. President George W Bush asked the US military and intelligence community to infiltrate the supply chain of North Korean missiles. It was claimed that the US hacked the North Korean ballistic missile programme, causing a failed ballistic missile test, in 2012.

It was not clear then – or now – whether these ‘left-of-launch’ cyberattacks aimed at North Korea were successful as described or whether they were primarily a bluff. But that is somewhat irrelevant; the belief in the possibility and the understanding of the potential impact of such cyber capabilities undermines North Korean or Iranian confidence in their abilities to launch their missiles. In times of conflict, loss of confidence in weapons systems may lead to escalation.

In other words, the adversary may be left with no option but to take the chance to use these missiles or to lose them in a conflict setting. ‘Left of launch’ is a dangerous game. If it is based on a bluff, it could be called upon and lead to deterrence failure. If it is based on real action, then it could create an asymmetrical power struggle. If the attacker establishes false confidence in the power of a cyber weapon, then it might lead to false signalling and messaging.

This is the new normal. The cat-and-mouse game has to be taken seriously, not least because missile systems are so vulnerable.

There are several ways an offensive cyber operation against missile systems might work. These include exploiting missile designs, altering software or hardware, or creating clandestine pathways to the missile command and control systems.

They can also be attacked in space, targeting space assets and their link to strategic systems.

Most missile systems rely, at least in part, on digital information that comes from or via space-based or space-dependent assets such as: communication satellites; satellites that provide position, navigation and timing (PNT) information (for example GPS or Galileo); weather satellites to help predict flight paths, accurate targeting and launch conditions; and remote imagery satellites to assist with information and intelligence for the planning and targeting.

Missile launches themselves depend on 1) the command and control systems of the missiles, 2) the way in which information is transmitted to the missile launch facilities and 3) the way in which information is transmitted to the missiles themselves in flight. All these aspects rely on space technology.

In addition, the ground stations that transmit and receive data to and from satellites are also vulnerable to cyberattack – either through their known and unknown internet connectivity or through malicious use of flash drives that contain a deliberate cyber infection.

Non-space-based communications systems that use cable and ground-to-air-to-ground masts are likewise under threat from cyberattacks that find their way in via internet connectivity, proximity interference or memory sticks. Human error in introducing connectivity via phones, laptops and external drives, and in clicking on malicious links in sophisticated phishing lures, is common in facilitating inadvertent connectivity and malware infection.

All of these can create a military capacity able to interfere with missile launches. Malware might have been sitting on the missile command and control system for months or even years, remaining inactivated until a chosen time or by a trigger that sets in motion a disruption either to the launch or to the flight path of the missile. The country that launches the missile that either fails to launch or fails to reach the target may never know if this was the result of a design flaw, a common malfunction or a deliberate cyberattack.

States with these capabilities must exercise caution: cyber offence manoeuvres may prevent the launch of missile attacks against US assets in the Middle East or in the Pacific regions, but they may also interfere with US missile launches in the future. Even, as has recently been revealed, US cyber weapons targeting an adversary may blow back and inadvertently infect US systems. Nobody is invulnerable.

As new cases of COVID-19 continue to surge, countries around the world struggle to mitigate the public health and economic effects of the virus. It is becoming increasingly clear that an effective pandemic response requires a whole-of-government, whole-of-society approach. In the Arab world, where health systems are already strained by armed conflicts and displaced populations, a whole-of-society response to the pandemic is particularly critical as countries have become increasingly dependent on non-state actors, notably the private sector, for healthcare provision and any response that includes the state alone may not be sufficient to address the pandemic.

In a recent article, Fadi El-Jardali, argued that while the pandemic will have grave health and economic consequences for years to come, it brings with it a valuable opportunity to re-envision the role of state and non-state actors in strengthening health systems. The article addressed the need for increased collaboration between state and non-state actors, and the rethinking of existing cooperation models to provide quality healthcare services for all.  

In this webinar, part of the Chatham House project on the future of the state in the Middle East and North Africa, Dr El-Jardali will discuss how state and non-state actors can collaborate more effectively to address the shortcomings of national health care systems amidst the pandemic and beyond. The article’s author will share insights on the different capacities available in Arab societies that governments can draw upon to ensure that Universal Health Coverage, equity considerations and social justice are at the core of health systems.

You can express your interest in attending by following this link. You will receive a Zoom confirmation email should your registration be successful. Alternatively, you can watch the event live on the MENA Programme Facebook page.

 

In the past 12 months, a series of highly-anticipated elections throughout Latin America have demonstrated that deep political shifts are underway.  This has occurred at a time when economic growth across the region is slowing and a number of countries face growing social crises.  How will these political shifts and social challenges affect growth and foreign direct investment (FDI)?

Christopher Sabatini will outline how the shifting political dynamics across the region have, and will, continue to influence trade and investment in the coming months and years across the continent and what regional developments mean for the international community in light of Brexit, global trade tensions and the rise of China and other emerging powers. How can businesses and governments provide a platform to overcome mutual obstacles faced by Latin American investors? What impact have Chinese development projects had in Latin America? And are medium and small economies in Latin America vulnerable to a global trade war?

This event is only open to Major Corporate Member and Partner organizations of Chatham House. If you would like to register your interest, please RSVP to Linda Bedford. We will contact you to confirm your attendance.

To enable as open a debate as possible, this event will be held under the Chatham House Rule.

The social impact of the global financial crisis brought global and domestic financial systems into public focus. While over the last ten years governments have introduced a range of regulatory reforms, there are still low levels of public trust in financial sectors, and academics continue to express their concerns about financial systems and their desire for more influence. This is particularly the case for those framing their evaluation of the quality of financial systems in terms of social values. This article offers those seeking more influence over the social values of financial systems, a fresh perspective on their available strategic options for influencing outcomes. It argues that they should consider strategies aimed at making allies of financial sectors and regulators in influencing change. The main advantage of these alliance strategies is that they address key constraints to influence, as identified in existing scholarship, which are difficult to relax because they are tied to features inherent in financial systems. By addressing these constraints, alliance strategies could increase the likelihood that financial system outcomes align more closely with their preferred social values.

The outbreak of COVID-19 has demonstrated the wide-ranging and immediate impact a systemic shock can have on the global economy including the financial loss caused by the emergency shutdown of many retail operations, the loss of income for individuals who are forced to stay indoors and the major disruption to supply chains. The longer term impacts are still being realized and depend heavily on the ability of industry and the government to respond effectively to the direct economic shock caused by the pandemic.

Systemic shocks like the COVID-19 pandemic demand immediate responses, but should also encourage governments and industries to re-examine their recovery processes, their resilience and their forward planning. In this webinar, the panellists will discuss the short and long-term impacts of the current crisis and explore how industry can help ensure that the global economy is able to recover from, and build resilience to, future systemic shocks. How do business leaders move from making decisions to reimagining a ‘new normal’ and reforming their practices? What are the critical decisions that businesses should consider when planning for this 'new normal'? And how far can these decisions be based on expected changes to governmental or intergovernmental regulation of different sectors?   

This event is part of a fortnightly series of 'Business in Focus' webinars reflecting on the impact of COVID-19 on areas of particular professional interest for our corporate members and giving circles.

Not a corporate member? Find out more.

As the COVID-19 pandemic presents the greatest threat to human health in over a century, people turn to their states to resolve the crisis and protect their health, their livelihoods and their future well-being.

How leaders perform and respond to the pandemic is likely to define their premiership - and this therefore presents a tremendous opportunity to write themselves into the history books as a great leader, rescuing their people from a crisis. Just as Winston Churchill did in World War Two.

Following Churchill’s advice to “never let a good crisis go to waste”, if leaders take decisive action now, they may emerge from the COVID-19 crisis as a national hero. What leaders must do quickly is to mitigate the crisis in a way which has a demonstrable impact on people’s lives.

Given the massive shock caused by the pandemic to economies across the world, it is not surprising that heads of state and treasury ministers have implemented enormous economic stimulus packages to protect businesses and jobs – this was to be expected and has been welcome.

National heroes can be made

But, in essence, this remains primarily a health crisis. And one obvious area for leaders to act rapidly is strengthening their nation’s health system to stop the spread of the virus and successfully treat those who have fallen sick. It is perhaps here that leaders have the most to gain - or lose - and where national heroes can be made.

This is particularly the case in countries with weak and inequitable health systems, where the poor and vulnerable often fail to access the services they need. One major practical action that leaders can implement immediately is to launch truly universal, publicly-financed health reforms to cover their entire population – not only for COVID-19 services but for all services.

This would cost around 1-2% GDP in the short-term but is perfectly affordable in the current economic climate, given some of the massive fiscal stimuluses already being planned (for example, the UK is spending 15% GDP to tackle COVID-19).

Within one to two years, this financing would enable governments to implement radical supply side reforms including scaling up health workforces, increasing the supply of essential medicines, diagnostics and vaccines and building new infrastructure. It would also enable them to remove health service user fees which currently exclude hundreds of millions of people worldwide from essential healthcare. Worldwide these policies have proven to be effective, efficient, equitable and extremely popular.

And there is plenty of precedent for such a move. Universal health reform is exactly what political leaders did in the UK, France and Japan as post-conflict states emerging from World War Two. It is also the policy President Kagame launched in the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda, as did Prime Minister Thaksin in Thailand after the Asian Financial Crisis in 2002, and the Chinese leadership did following the SARS crisis, also in 2003.

In China’s case, reform involved re-socialising the health financing system using around 2% GDP in tax financing to increase health insurance coverage from a low level of one-third right up to 96% of the population.

All these universal health coverage (UHC) reforms delivered massive health and economic benefits to the people - just what is needed now to tackle COVID-19 - and tremendous political benefits to the leaders that implemented them.

When considering the current COVID-19 crisis, this strategy would be particularly relevant for countries underperforming on health coverage and whose health systems are more likely to be overwhelmed if flooded with a surge of patients, such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Indonesia and most of sub-Saharan Africa, where many governments spend less than 1% of their GDP on health and most people have to buy services over the counter.

But also the two OECD countries without a universal health system – the United States and Ireland – are seeing the threat of COVID-19 already fuelling the debate about the need to create national, publicly-financed health system. And the presidents of South Africa, Kenya and Indonesia have already committed their governments to eventually reach full population coverage anyway, and so may use this crisis to accelerate their own universal reforms. 

Although difficult to predict which leaders are likely to grasp the opportunity, if some of these countries now fast-track nationwide UHC, at least something good will be coming from the crisis, something which will benefit their people forever. And ensuring everyone accesses the services they need, including public health and preventive services, also provides the best protection against any future outbreaks becoming epidemics.

Every night large audiences are tuning in to press briefings fronted by their heads of state hungry for the latest update on the crisis and to get reassurance that their government’s strategy will bring the salvation they desperately need. To truly improve health security for people across the world, becoming UHC heroes could be the best strategic decision political leaders ever make.

Summary

• Russia’s economic management is currently praised for its achievement of macroeconomic stability. Inflation has been brought down; the budget is in surplus; national debt is low; and the reserves are ample. At the same time, there is much criticism of the failure at present to secure more than very slow economic growth.
• The macro-stabilization of 2014–18 was of a conventional, ‘liberal’ kind. Public spending was cut, and a budget rule was introduced that (so far) has weakened the link between increases in oil prices and increases in budgetary expenditure. The austerity campaign was harsh. Pensioners, the military, regional budgets and business all lost out, but in reality put up little resistance. The austerity drive was facilitated by the autocratic nature of the regime.
• The growth slowdown dates from 2012, and cannot simply be blamed on falls in the oil price and sanctions. Rapid growth in 1999–2008 consisted in large part of recovery from the deep recession of the 1990s and the initial development of a services sector. These sources of growth are no longer available; investment is low; and the labour force is declining. The Western world also has a slow growth problem, but at a higher level of per capita output. In Russia, private investment and competition are inhibited by an intrusive and corrupt state. If the rule of law were in place, the economy would perform better in the long run. That would require a profound reform of formal and informal institutions.
• The leadership wants faster growth, but has powerful incentives not to embark on systemic reform. Even the pragmatic ministers of the ‘economic bloc’ of government, who understand the problem, share this interest in maintaining the status quo. Growth is thus being sought through a highly ambitious programme, in 2018–24, of ‘national projects’, state-led and largely state-financed. This is already running into difficulties.
• The contrast between successful stabilization and a (so far) unsuccessful growth strategy illustrates the difference between policymaking within a given system and reform of that system. Systemic reform brings with it more potential unintended consequences than do changes in policy. In the case of Russia, movement towards a rule of law could destabilize the social and political system. It is therefore unlikely to be attempted.

To what extent are Russia's actions the product of one man's worldview? What events, ideas, psychologies and emotions have shaped Vladimir Putin and his inner circle over the past two decades? Is Russia headed for more of the same in the decades to come or is meaningful change possible? This event will examine Russia's, the Kremlin's and Putin's visions of the world and ask if they are indeed one and the same.

Since assuming office, President Donald Trump’s many encounters with litigation have exposed significant irregularities of the American legal system as it applies to the president.

These encounters – including but not limited to accusations of defamation, obstruction, perjury and non-disclosure agreements – have shown President Trump to hold a particular interpretation of how the rule of law should apply to someone holding the highest elected office in the United States of America.

However, an analysis of Trump’s legal history prior to his assumption of office reveals a tried and tested method of using litigation – or the threat of it – to quieten criticism and opponents. As Trump faces possible impeachment in the House of Representatives, what – if any – influence might his combative approach towards legal battles have on the political proceedings?

Drawing on New York attorney James Zirin’s new book, Plaintiff in Chief, this event examines the relationship between President Trump’s litigation history and his approach to the presidency.

How has the American legal system facilitated Trump’s attitude towards litigation? How can his litigation toolkit be countered?

And what impact has the president’s approach to litigation had on the domestic and global reputation of the American legal system and the office of the president as accountable and credible institutions?

 

Summary

• Russia’s economic management is currently praised for its achievement of macroeconomic stability. Inflation has been brought down; the budget is in surplus; national debt is low; and the reserves are ample. At the same time, there is much criticism of the failure at present to secure more than very slow economic growth.
• The macro-stabilization of 2014–18 was of a conventional, ‘liberal’ kind. Public spending was cut, and a budget rule was introduced that (so far) has weakened the link between increases in oil prices and increases in budgetary expenditure. The austerity campaign was harsh. Pensioners, the military, regional budgets and business all lost out, but in reality put up little resistance. The austerity drive was facilitated by the autocratic nature of the regime.
• The growth slowdown dates from 2012, and cannot simply be blamed on falls in the oil price and sanctions. Rapid growth in 1999–2008 consisted in large part of recovery from the deep recession of the 1990s and the initial development of a services sector. These sources of growth are no longer available; investment is low; and the labour force is declining. The Western world also has a slow growth problem, but at a higher level of per capita output. In Russia, private investment and competition are inhibited by an intrusive and corrupt state. If the rule of law were in place, the economy would perform better in the long run. That would require a profound reform of formal and informal institutions.
• The leadership wants faster growth, but has powerful incentives not to embark on systemic reform. Even the pragmatic ministers of the ‘economic bloc’ of government, who understand the problem, share this interest in maintaining the status quo. Growth is thus being sought through a highly ambitious programme, in 2018–24, of ‘national projects’, state-led and largely state-financed. This is already running into difficulties.
• The contrast between successful stabilization and a (so far) unsuccessful growth strategy illustrates the difference between policymaking within a given system and reform of that system. Systemic reform brings with it more potential unintended consequences than do changes in policy. In the case of Russia, movement towards a rule of law could destabilize the social and political system. It is therefore unlikely to be attempted.

To what extent are Russia's actions the product of one man's worldview? What events, ideas, psychologies and emotions have shaped Vladimir Putin and his inner circle over the past two decades? Is Russia headed for more of the same in the decades to come or is meaningful change possible? This event will examine Russia's, the Kremlin's and Putin's visions of the world and ask if they are indeed one and the same.