Next week, Americans will be looking westward to the Tuesday Democratic primary in California. Meanwhile, in Washington, President Obama and then the U.S. Congress will host someone very familiar with electoral politics: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

This will be the third Modi-Obama summit since the Indian prime minister took office two years ago. Since their first phone call on May 16, 2014, the two leaders have also met multiple times at regional and global gatherings or on the sidelines of those summits. This frequency has been a departure from the past and has even led some—particularly in the Indian media—to ask: why is Modi visiting the United States again? A simple answer would be “because he was invited,” and there are a few reasons why the White House extended that invitation and why Modi accepted.

At a time when [Obama] is being criticized for not having done enough or for doing the wrong thing on foreign policy, he can point to the U.S.-India relationship as a success.

Achievements logged

For President Obama, there’s the legacy issue. At a time when he is being criticized for not having done enough or for doing the wrong thing on foreign policy, he can point to the U.S.-India relationship as a success, particularly in the context of the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. U.S. popularity is up in India according to polls and three-quarters of those surveyed in India last year expressed confidence in Obama on world affairs. 

President George W. Bush left office after having signed the historic civil nuclear deal with India. Obama can claim to have put quite a few more runs on the board. At a recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Nisha Biswal indeed laid out some key developments in the relationship in the Obama era: 

Strengthening friendships

For Prime Minister Modi and the Indian government, the visit represents another chance to strengthen India’s partnership with a country that Modi has called “a principal partner in the realization of India’s rise as a responsible, influential world power.” The United States is India’s largest trading partner and a crucial source of capital, technology, knowledge, resources, remittances, and military equipment. It can also help ensure multi-polarity in Asia, which is a crucial goal for Indian policymakers. 

The visit is also an opportunity for Modi to engage with legislators and the American private sector—two key constituencies that can help determine the pace of progress in the relationship. House Speaker Paul Ryan has invited the Indian leaders to address a joint session of the U.S. Congress, and Modi will be the fifth Indian prime minister to do so (India’s first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru gave back-to-back speeches to the House and Senate separately in 1949). But it’ll likely hold special significance for the prime minister and his supporters, given that from 2005 to 2014, then Gujarat Chief Minister Modi was denied entry into the United States. 

A busy calendar

Modi’s has a packed schedule in Washington. On June 6, he’ll visit Arlington National Cemetery, meet with the heads of think tanks, and participate in an event involving the recovery and return of stolen Indian antiquities. On June 7, he’ll meet with President Obama, who will also host a lunch for him, and then Defense Secretary Ashton Carter. That will be followed by meetings with business leaders and an address to the U.S.-India Business Council. Expect to see Modi highlight and defend his government’s two-year record on the economy and make a pitch for U.S. businesses to increase their involvement in India—and particularly some of Modi’s flagship initiatives such as Make in India and Digital India.

Expect to see Modi highlight and defend his government’s two-year record on the economy and make a pitch for U.S. businesses to increase their involvement in India.

June 8 will be devoted to Congressional engagement, including the joint address, a lunch hosted by Speaker Ryan, and a reception hosted by the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees, as well as the India Caucus. Modi will acknowledge the legislature’s role and significance in developing the U.S.-India relationship, and will likely highlight the democratic values the two countries share, as well as how India and Indians have contributed to the United States, global growth, and the international order. Importantly, in an election year, Modi will likely note the bipartisan nature of the relationship—there’s no indication yet that he will or wants to meet any of the presidential candidates on this visit, though the sessions potentially offer opportunities for him to do so. Republican members of Congress will also seek to highlight their role in the development of the partnership. The interactions on Capitol Hill will also be a chance for Modi to address some Congressional concerns—such as human rights, Iran, non-proliferation, the investment climate—and for Modi to call for the two countries to “accommodat[e] each other’s concerns.”

Do not, however, expect to hear the word “Pakistan”—the Indian government wants to avoid hyphenation and get Americans to think of India beyond India-Pakistan terms. Nor should you expect to hear the word “China,” though there might be subtle attempts to note the contrast with that other Asian giant and make the case for the United States to support the rise of a large Asian democracy that can demonstrate that democracy and development aren’t mutually exclusive.

Parting glance between Modi and Obama

And what’s on the agenda for the Modi-Obama meeting? In one sense, the last few years have signaled a regularization of U.S.-India leader-level summits (with bilateral meetings in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016). Over the last two years, high-level meetings have been effective as action-forcing events. This time, officials have been managing expectations, broadly describing the visit as “part of consolidating and celebrating the relationship.” So this is a chance to recognize the steps that the other side has taken to increase the run-rate of the relationship—particularly on defense and security fronts—and tie up some loose ends with an eye towards sustaining momentum into the next administration (without necessarily tying its hands). 

In terms of focus areas, the governments have emphasized (to varying degrees) economic ties, energy and climate change, as well as defense and security cooperation. The Obama administration would like to India ratify the Paris agreement, for instance—unlike in the United States, India doesn’t require legislative approval. Indian officials recognize the importance of this issue to Obama, but are also concerned about U.S. policy continuity given the presumptive Republican nominee’s stand on the issue. Delhi, in turn, is partly using the shared desire for India to meet its clean energy commitments to make the case for an American full-court press to facilitate Indian membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—similar to the Bush administration’s efforts to help India get an NSG waiver in 2008. The U.S. position has been that India is ready for NSG membership and meets requirements for membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and it has supported Indian application and eventual membership of both, as well as two other nonproliferation and export control regimes. Asked if Modi would ask Obama to “go to bat for India” with others on this, the Indian foreign secretary didn’t answer directly but noted: “countries that feel we’re doing the right thing...if they take it upon themselves to…articulate their positions and talk to others, this is what friends do for each other.” Modi himself will visit two other NSG members (Switzerland and Mexico) just before and after the U.S. visit partly to make the case for India’s membership.

The visit will also be a chance to cement and highlight cooperation in and on the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. In addition, observers will be watching to see whether the two countries will sign the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA)—the logistics support agreement that the Indian defense minister said in April that Secretary Carter and he had “agreed in principle to conclude”—or whether there’ll be further announcements with regard to the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative. There’ll also be interest in whether the countries get serious talks restarted on a Bilateral Investment Treaty, and whether Westinghouse and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India can finalize an agreement to set up reactors in India. Overall, there is a desire to take the relationship to the “next level” but not necessarily in terms of a big deal; rather there’s a search for ways to deepen, operationalize, and institutionalize cooperation—such as through arrangements to share information in the counterterrorism space—and facilitate interaction between an increasing number of stakeholders.

While highlighting areas of convergence, both sides will likely also discuss the divergences that remain—perhaps including the east-west divergence related to Pakistan, the north-south divergence related to Russia, the security-economic divergence with more progress in the partnership on the former than the latter, and the potential expectations-reality divergence. And while the direction of the U.S.-India relationship is likely to remain the same in the near future, how the two countries deal with these divergences will determine the trajectory and the pace of the relationship.

In Pennsylvania, the next major presidential primary state, concerns about the economy loom large as global competition, economic restructuring, and an aging workforce threaten the state’s ability to prosper. Thanks to these assets, the six metro areas generate 80 percent of the state’s economic output even though they house 68 percent of its population. A true economic agenda for the state must speak to the core assets of Pennsylvania’s economy and where these assets are located: the state’s many small and large metropolitan areas. In short, this brief finds that:

• To help Pennsylvania prosper, federal leaders must leverage four key assets that matter today—innovation, human capital, infrastructure, and quality places. These assets help increase the productivity of firms and workers, boost the incomes of families and workers, and can help the state and nation grow in more fiscally and environmentally responsible ways.
• These four assets are highly concentrated in the state’s economic engines, its metropolitan areas. There are 16 metro areas in the Commonwealth, ranging from Philadelphia, the most populous, to Williamsport, the smallest. The top six metropolitan areas alone generate the bulk of the state’s innovation (80 percent of all patenting), contain the majority of the state’s educated workforce (77 percent of all adults with a bachelors degree), and serve as the state’s transport hubs.
• Despite these assets, Pennsylvania’s metro areas have yet to achieve their full economic potential. For instance, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh enjoy strengths in innovation, but they both struggle to convert their research investments into commercial products and real jobs. The Scranton metro area is emerging as a satellite of the New York City region, but it’s hampered by the absence of frequent and reliable transportation connections and inadequate broadband coverage.
• Federal leaders must advance an economic agenda that empowers states and metro areas to leverage their assets and help the nation prosper. To that end, they should establish a single federal entity that works with industry, states, and metro areas to ensure that innovation results in jobs and helps businesses small and large modernize. The federal government should strengthen access and success through the entire education pipeline. They should overhaul and create a 21st century transportation system. And they should use housing policy to support quality, mixed-income communities rather than perpetuating distressed neighborhoods with few school and job options.

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Since the Rose Revolution in November 2003, Georgia has grappled with the many challenges of building a modern, Western-oriented state, including implementing political and economic reforms, fighting corruption, and throwing off the vestiges of the Soviet legacy. On the path toward a functioning and reliable democracy, Georgia has pursued these domestic changes in an often difficult international environment, as evidenced by the Russia-Georgia conflict in 2008.

On March 17, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) hosted President Mikheil Saakashvili to discuss Georgia’s approach to these challenges. A leader of Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution, Saakashvili was elected president of Georgia in January 2004 and reelected for a second term in January 2008.

Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, provided introductory remarks and Senior Fellow and CUSE Director Fiona Hill moderated the discussion. After the program, President Saakashvili took audience questions.

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• Georgia Is a Transformed Country
• Georgia Is a Valuable Asset to Europe
• The Key to Effective Change Is Youth

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• From Popular Revolutions to Effective Reforms: The Georgian Experience

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In a recent analysis, I highlighted how employment and disconnection among young people vary by age, race, and place. In this podcast, I dig deeper into the data on the Washington, D.C. region. Although the area generally performs well on employment measures, not all young people are faring equally well.

Listen to the full podcast segment here: 

An economic analysis of a sample of neighborhoods in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area using walkability measures finds that:

• More walkable places perform better economically. For neighborhoods within metropolitan Washington, as the number of environmental features that facilitate walkability and attract pedestrians increase, so do office, residential, and retail rents, retail revenues, and for-sale residential values.

• Walkable places benefit from being near other walkable places. On average, walkable neighborhoods in metropolitan Washington that cluster and form walkable districts exhibit higher rents and home values than stand-alone walkable places.

• Residents of more walkable places have lower transportation costs and higher transit access, but also higher housing costs. Residents of more walkable neighborhoods in metropolitan Washington generally spend around 12 percent of their income on transportation and 30 percent on housing. In comparison, residents of places with fewer environmental features that encourage walkability spend around 15 percent on transportation and 18 percent on housing.

• Residents of places with poor walkability are generally less affluent and have lower educational attainment than places with good walkability. Places with more walkability features have also become more gentrified over the past decade. However, there is no significant difference in terms of transit access to jobs between poor and good walkable places.

The findings of this study offer useful insights for a diverse set of interests. Lenders, for example, should find cause to integrate walkability into their underwriting standards. Developers and investors should consider walkability when assessing prospects for the region and acquiring property. Local and regional planning agencies should incorporate assessments of walkability into their strategic economic development plans and eliminate barriers to walkable development. Finally, private foundations and government agencies that provide funding to further sustainability practices should consider walkability (especially as it relates to social equity) when allocating funds and incorporate such measures into their accountability standards.

The Great Recession highlighted the need to change the prevailing real estate development paradigm, particularly in housing. High-risk financial products and practices, “teaser” underwriting terms, steadily low-interest rates, and speculation in housing were some of the most significant contributors to the housing bubble and burst that catalyzed the recession. But an oversupply of residential housing also fueled the economic crisis.

However, a closer look at the post-recession housing numbers paints a more nuanced picture. While U.S. home values dropped steadily between 2008 and 2011, distant suburbs experienced the starkest price decreases while more close-in neighborhoods either held steady or in some cases saw price increases. This distinction in housing proximity is particularly important since it appears that the United States may be at the beginning of a structural real estate market shift. Emerging evidence points to a preference for mixed-use, compact, amenity-rich, transit-accessible neighborhoods or walkable places.

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With ongoing crises in Ukraine, Syria, and other regions of the world, U.S. global leadership is arguably as critical now as it has ever been. However, many question how the United States should exercise its leadership, what foreign policy agenda it should pursue, and how it should configure its military and security agencies going forward. In a recent speech at West Point, President Obama laid out his foreign policy agenda for the remainder of his presidency. While the Obama Administration will pursue the president’s agenda as laid out at West Point, others in Washington have different views on how best to manage U.S. foreign policy going forward.

On June 11, the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings will host Senator John McCain (R-AZ), former presidential candidate and member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, for an address on the future of U.S. foreign and security policy. The address will be introduced by Brookings Senior Fellow and Director of Research for Foreign Policy Michael O’Hanlon, and the discussion following the Senator’s address will be moderated by Senior Fellow Robert Kagan.

After the program, Senator McCain will take audience questions.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #McCain

It appears that Omar al-Bashir’s regime in Khartoum may be counting down to its demise as internal and external pressures seem poised to boil over and finally wrest the country out of his control. While the international community has imposed painful trade sanctions and the International Criminal Court has sought to bring al-Bashir to justice for his role in the Darfur conflict, Sudan’s own citizens have been increasingly demonstrative of their dissatisfaction and desire for change. During the last few years, al-Bashir has faced growing opposition from restless urban youth who are no longer willing to live with the status quo. There have also been fears within the old guard—the military and hardcore Islamists—that Sudan could fall victim to uprisings like those in Egypt and Tunisia.

In addition to the significant dislocations to the Sudanese economy caused by trade sanctions by Western countries, Khartoum has also lost significant revenues from the sale of oil produced in South Sudan’s oil fields due to ongoing disputes. To deal with these large shortfalls, al-Bashir’s government has imposed severe austerity measures on the economy, including major reductions in government subsidies, most notably on food and fuel. In response, a broad cross-section of the population took to the streets in protest. In September of this year, like their counterparts in Egypt and Tunisia before them, large numbers of unemployed and restless Sudanese youth took to the streets to demand the ouster of al-Bashir and his government. Government security forces responded with a vengeance, arresting large numbers of protesters and either killing or causing the deaths of many of them.

Within the military, which, together with Islamists, has been the base of al-Bashir’s support since the 1989 coup, there is significant discontent. In addition, there is evidence that some members of al-Bashir’s party—the National Congress Party—are not happy with the president for his failure to deal effectively with the country’s multifarious problems. Today, Sudan’s economy is falling apart—there is galloping inflation, high unemployment, especially among urban youth, and many Sudanese live below the poverty level. In addition, Khartoum is still unable to deal properly with the demands of various ethnic minorities, which are waging violent protests to force the government to allow them to rule themselves. Many groups want genuine institutional reforms and a governing process that is truly democratic and characterized by the rule of law.

Added to the litany of problems Sudan faces is the fact that it remains embroiled in conflict with South Sudan over the future of the Abyei region and its rich oil reserves. The scheduled 2011 vote for Abyei citizens to decide between South Sudan and Sudan did not occur and just recently opposing stakeholders in the region have argued over when and how to hold the referendum with one group boycotting the other’s efforts. Thus, the region remains in limbo.

Hardcore Islamists, long in the president’s corner, are now warning al-Bashir that he is not likely to successfully solve Sudan’s complex problems by simply cracking down on protesters. The question now is: Will al-Bashir give in to the demands of his protesting fellow citizens and initiate the necessary democratic reforms, or will he continue to resist and eventually suffer a fate similar to the one that befell his counterparts in Egypt and Tunisia?

On January 30, 2011, al-Bashir’s vulnerability to a similar uprising was first made apparent when protesters took to the streets of Khartoum and Al-Ubayyid after using online social networking sites to coordinate demonstrations. The government response was swift and extremely brutal—several students were arrested and one was killed. Sporadic and uncoordinated protests, particularly among university students, were also witnessed in the coming months. Then, on September 23, 2013, riots broke out in response to the removal of state subsidies on fuel and cooking gas in Khartoum. The violence spread first across Khartoum and Omdurman in the heart of the regime’s power base, and then to other cities in the days that followed. Protesters, calling for the removal of al-Bashir, blocked roads and set government buildings on fire. As usual, the regime responded brutally, killing more than 50 protesters according to some witnesses and arresting thousands of Sudanese citizens.

Although the Sudanese situation in 2013 is similar to the 2011 situations of its North African neighbors in terms of social frustration over incumbent regimes, Sudan differs from them in three main ways.

First, the majority of Sudanese do not use social media; hence, it is much more difficult to coordinate protests using tools like Facebook and Twitter.

Second, the government has cracked down on the press and blocked the free flow of information, further disconnecting citizens from potentially valuable information.

Third, Bashir’s regime is much less tolerant of protests and demonstrations and has demonstrated a proclivity for using as much force as quickly as possible to snuff out public uprisings. Such efforts are likely to buy only temporary reprieve for the dying regime as it clutches to power, and such responses cannot force the people to give up their demands for improvements in their standard of living, as well as for respect of their fundamental rights.

Without a credible opposition party to coordinate and peacefully channel the frustrations of restless youth into a peaceful revolution, current events in Sudan are likely to force the country into another bloody civil war. There is, of course, a possibility that, given the fact that Sudan does not have the type of institutional arrangements (free and independent press; independent judiciary; regular, free, credible and fair elections) that can provide citizens with the tools to either change their government or petition the latter for relief from tyranny, Sudan could soon become another failed state, such as Somalia. It would then become, like Somalia, a magnet for terrorists and extremist groups seeking to destabilize the region. In addition, another civil war in Sudan would flood the region with refugees and exacerbate the problems now facing many countries in East Africa. Of course, unrest in Sudan could easily spill over into neighboring countries such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda and create a serious humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa.

Dictators and autocrats can be undone by their inability or unwillingness to learn from history, even if that history is not theirs. Given the fact that Sudan’s neighbors have been embroiled in revolutions initiated and carried out by young people frustrated by their countries’ failure to provide them with jobs and protect their fundamental rights, one wonders why al-Bashir thinks the same fate would not befall him and his regime. It has become apparent that al-Bashir is unwilling or unable to recognize the fact that the world is no longer willing to tolerate his regime’s disregard for basic human rights and that Sudan, if it hopes to regain its standing as an accepted member of the international community, cannot afford to serve as a hiding place for dictators.

At the moment, al-Bashir faces a lot of problems emanating from inside and outside the country. It would be wise for al-Bashir and his government to start constructive dialogue with the people of Sudan in an effort to develop the modalities to peacefully transition to democracy. A credible first step would be for al-Bashir to form a transitional government that includes opposition parties. One of the most important functions of such a government should be to engage all relevant stakeholder groups in democratic constitution making to develop and adopt institutional arrangements that guarantee the rule of law and, hence, provide citizens with a governing process that protects their fundamental rights and provides them with the tools for self-actualization. Of course, while institutional reforms are a long-term project, in the short term, the transitional government must put into place mechanisms to protect the fundamental rights of citizens, as well as improve relations with South Sudan in order to secure the peaceful coexistence that is critical for investment and economic growth.