She becomes the second in the family to enroll at TSU.

Westend Properties shared an update on the ongoing renovations at the Fairmont Southampton. A spokesperson said, “Work at the site is proceeding as planned – for instance, demolition within the building has begun in anticipation of the extensive overhaul of the hotel interior. The initial shipments of containers of construction materials and equipment have arrived […]

Over the past two days, multiple dead birds were found along South Shore beaches, with officers from Department of Environment and Natural Resources collecting ”over 95 birds within several hours.” A Government spokesperson said, “The Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR] can advise that between the 5 -6th June 2022, the Bermuda Aquarium, Museum and Zoo received reports […]

Police are investigating a confirmed firearms incident which occurred in Southampton today [Feb 25] with detectives “looking for two suspects who rode away from the scene on a dark coloured motorcycle which did not have license plates.” A police spokesperson said, “Police are investigating a confirmed firearms incident which occurred in the Southampton area on […]

Bermudian goalkeeper Coleridge Fubler kept a clean sheet in Binfield’s 2-0 win at home to South Park in the Pitching In Isthmian League South Central Division One today [November 2]. Fellow Bermudians Reese Jones and Razhir Smith-Jones also started the match for the Berkshire outfit; meanwhile, Riley Robinson and Malachi Henry came on as second-half […]

Four Bermuda Cricket Board Umpires are officiating in Brazil. Oscar Andrade, Alex Knights, Wendy Woodley, and Linnell Williams are umpiring in the South American T20 Championships. Related Stories Kamau Leverock Plays For Gujarat Greats Leverock’s Gujarat Defeated By Manipal Tigers Results: Premier & First Division Cricket Interns Launch Survey On Popularity Of Cricket Results: Premier […]

Westend Properties said they would like to clarify points about the Fairmont Southampton redevelopment; noting that there are two parts to the redevelopment, one is the renovation of the hotel and beach club and the other is the construction of the new tourism and residential units. A spokesperson said, “Westend Properties would like to clarify […]

The Bermuda Economic Development Corporation [BEDC] announced the “expansion of the Economic Empowerment Zones [EEZ] with the newly established South East Hamilton Economic Empowerment Zone [SEHEEZ], with the aim of aiding business growth and economic development in Bermuda.” A spokesperson said, “This expansion opens up a realm of opportunities, not only for new businesses and […]

Tyler James earned a first place and a third place finish while competing at the Bruce’s Field II Horse Show in South Carolina. A spokesperson said, “The Bermuda Equestrian Federation extends its congratulations to Tyler James on his recent achievements at the October at Bruce’s Field II Horse Show held from October 24 to October […]

Last night’s lightning storm appears to have damaged the Seventh-Day Adventist Church in Southampton, with the Church’s roof sustaining damage overnight. The Bermuda Fire & Rescue Service are presently on scene assessing the situation. Dr. Sydney Gibbons, the Church’s Pastor, confirmed that is no internal damage to the church and added that they are looking […]

[Updated with video] Police responded to a report of an armed robbery at Henry’s Pantry and Liquor Store in Southampton this evening [Jan 7] and confirmed that “early reports suggest that two men, one armed with a knife, entered the store and made demands for money.” A police spokesperson said, “Shortly before 6:15pm on Saturday […]

A car driver was injured after crashing into a wall in Southampton last night. A police spokesperson said, “Around 9pm on Friday, August 2 2024, police and other emergency services were dispatched to a report of a single vehicle collision on Middle Road near the junction with Lighthouse Road, Southampton. “Details are limited at this […]

[Updated] A motorcyclist was injured in a collision in Southampton this morning. A police spokesperson said, “Around 9am Monday, 23rd September 2024, police officers responded to a reported two vehicle collision at the junction of Middle Road and South Road in Southampton. “Early information indicates that a tractor trailer truck driven in the eastbound lane […]

There has been a two vehicle road traffic collision involving a motorcar and a motorcycle in the area of Barnes Corner in Southampton Parish. A police spokesperson said, “There has been a two vehicle road traffic collision involving a motorcar and a motorcycle in the area of Barnes Corner, Southampton Parish. “Details are limited at […]

“This is exciting news,” stated Clarence Hofheins, President of the Bermuda Hotel Association [BHA]. “We are delighted to hear that our largest member property, The Fairmont Southampton, will begin its planned redevelopment this October. “The hotel has long been a cornerstone of our destination’s offerings, particularly in providing essential convention and meeting spaces. Its redevelopment […]

1. Car crashes with another outside pub during police chase in Sydney’s southwest  7NEWS
2. ‘Flying past me’: Two hurt as car smashes into fence after police chase  Daily Telegraph
3. Critical incident investigation into crash following police pursuit  Sydney Morning Herald
4. Violent carjacking linked to Sydney crash that split car in two, police say  9News
5. Update on crash after police chase  news.com.au

The Advocacy Project works with older people and other groups across Glasgow and Lanarkshire to ensure their voice is heard, their needs met and their legal rights safeguarded. The organisation identified a low take up of their own service by older people from BME communities, which was generally held to reflect the wider picture in Glasgow in relation to health and social work services. This report was commissioned by them to examine barriers to access to services specifically for older people from BME communities in Glasgow South, where there is a high concentration of people from BME communities.

Report 68 published by the Social Care Institute for Excellence (SCIE) in November 2014. This report will help readers to understand the Learning Together methodology.

In the hours and days since Trump was re-elected president of the United States, there’s been a surge of interest in the US for 4B. Via Yahoo News:

Young liberal women across TikTok and Instagram are discussing and sharing information about the South Korean feminist movement, in which straight women refuse to marry, have children, date or have sex with men.

These women say they are enraged and fed up after a majority of their male counterparts voted for a candidate who was found liable for sexual abuse and whose appointment of three conservative Supreme Court justices led to the overturning of national abortion rights protections.

In response, they say they’re swearing off men — and they’re encouraging others around the country to join them.

By Keegan Kelly Published: November 11th, 2024

Meta has been fined 21.62 billion won ($15.67 million) by South Korea's data privacy watchdog for illegally collecting sensitive personal information from Facebook users, including data about their political views and sexual orientation, and sharing it with advertisers without their consent. The country's Personal Information Protection Commission (PIPC) said Meta gathered information such as

“Chigumadzi argues that within the liberal international order, it is “reasonable” and “workable” to struggle to end apartheid and racial segregation, while it is “unreasonable” and “unworkable” to struggle to end settler colonialism and indigenous land dispossession. In arguing that apartheid is overrepresented in the International Left’s racial discourse and historiography, Chigumadzi draws from generations of Black South African political activists, philosophers, and historians—most notably from the Pan Africanist-Black Consciousness Tradition. These traditions critique apartheid’s relatively short 54 years of institutionalized racial segregation as the paradigmatic historical framework for analyzing South Africa’s three centuries of settler colonialism and land dispossession. Drawing from this black radical critique, Chigumadzi rejects the liberal notion that apartheid’s end is the object of liberation struggle, and, instead asserts the centrality of the struggle for the return of indigenous lands.” Dr. Panashe Chigumadzi is an award-winning writer and Assistant Professor of African History at Brandeis University. Chigumadzi holds a doctorate from Harvard University’s Department of African and African American Studies, and a masters in African Literature from the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa.

World Cup finalists South Africa rest all-rounder Marizanne Kapp for their upcoming T20 series with England.

Sanju Samson blasts a 47-ball century as India clinch an emphatic win over South Africa in the first T20 international in Durban.

What is behind the exodus of Economic Freedom Fighters members to ex-President Jacob Zuma's party?

1. Song Jae Rim Passes Away: South Korean Star's Last Post Goes Viral, His Cryptic Insta Bio Grabs Eyeballs  News18
2. Song Jae Rim death: South Korean actor's last Instagram post sparks concern among fans  The Economic Times
3. South Korea’s popular actor Song Jae Rim found dead in Seoul apartment  Mint
4. Song Jae Rim's recent Instagram bio update was about 'starting a long journey'  Moneycontrol
5. 'My Military Valentine' fame South Korean actor Song Jae-rim dies 39  India TV News

The South African Artificial Intelligence Association wants LinkedIn to be investigated, as it claims the social networking platforms new data use practice violates local personal information protection law.

The World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) has raised the alarm over climate change, reporting 2024 is the world's hottest year yet.

Member’s question time: Is Russia losing the South Caucasus? 22 October 2024 — 1:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 September 2024 Online

Join us and ask Chatham House Senior Research Fellow, Natalie Sabanadze anything about the situation in the Caucasus. Submit your questions in advance.

Whilst Russia focuses on its illegal invasion of Ukraine, the situation at its southern border is evolving. Relations between the three states in the South Caucasus and Moscow have never been easy as Russia tried to maintain its dominance by leveraging vulnerabilities, playing one side against another to keep conflicts simmering and even engaging in open military aggression.  Although the violence seen in the 1990s and early 2000s has abated, the war in Ukraine has had an indirect impact on the region, bringing a change to the status quo.

Russia abandoned its long-standing support for Armenia, allowing for the collapse of Nagorny-Karabakh and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan with the backing of Turkey. As a result, Azerbaijan has emerged as a dominant regional player with Baku recently declaring its interest to join BRICS.  Turkey’s influence has grown, while Armenia frustrated by Russia’s change of heart has been turning cautiously towards the EU and the US.

In Georgia, meanwhile, the ruling party has been consolidating its grasp on power, rolling back democratic reforms and pivoting away from the West. Georgia’s long-awaited European integration process has been suspended, following the adoption of the Russian-style foreign agents legislation.

Join us as our Senior Research Fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Programme answers your questions in this quick-fire session assessing the extent to which the Russian influence has changed since the start of the invasion of Ukraine and who is there to fill the vacuum; how geopolitical contestation in the region is going to impact aspirations of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia; and much more.

Submit your questions to Natalie Sabanadze in advance of the event. Your questions will drive the conversation.

Water, Ecosystems and Energy in South Asia: Making Cross-Border Collaboration Work Research paper sysadmin 29 June 2016

A new paper sets out the factors that have made previous cross-border projects in South Asia successful, arguing that cooperation around water is feasible despite the region’s political differences and economic assymetries.

• The countries of South Asia share some of the world’s major river basins – the Ganga (or Ganges), the Brahmaputra and the Indus. These rivers and their tributaries flow through seven countries, support more than 1 billion people, irrigate millions of hectares of land and are of cultural importance to many of those who rely on them.
• River management presents common challenges across the region. These include physical factors such as droughts, flooding, cyclones and climate change, as well political and institutional factors impeding the development of solutions and policies to improve resource management and reduce vulnerability. Water is increasingly seen as a source of competition, with population growth, industrialization and urbanization exacerbating the pressures on supply.
• Although South Asian examples of regional cooperation in general are limited, there is a clear positive trend. In areas such as disaster response and cross-border power trading, regional and bilateral engagement is beginning to take place. Multilateral official arrangements exist for trade and other economic issues, but there is none on water or ecosystems. However, as the benefits from cooperation become proven, its desirability is likely to gradually enter mainstream policy thinking on water issues.
• This research paper sets out the factors that have enabled cooperation, and the processes adopted, in previous successful cross-border projects. It focuses on four categories of cooperation: development of early-warning systems for natural disasters, in particular floods; protection of cross-border ecosystems; sharing of learning, through the showcasing of innovative approaches in one country that can be adopted by others; and power trading, in particular the development of hydropower in Bhutan and its export to India.
• The paper argues that cooperation around water in South Asia is feasible despite political differences and economic asymmetries. Different forms of collective action, and common understanding of both the threats and the shared benefits from cooperation, are required to foster more partnerships within the river basin states.

How Beijing is closing surveillance gaps in the South China Sea The World Today iallan.drupal 15 October 2024

The discovery of a new radar system on China’s Triton Island military base shows that Beijing is rapidly developing its intelligence capacities in contested waters, write John Pollock and Damien Symon.

New satellite images reveal how the Chinese military is dramatically expanding its capabilities on Triton Island, which looks set to become a one of Beijing’s key signal intelligence bases in the South China Sea.

Once completed, the radar system would significantly increase China’s signals intercept and electronic warfare capabilities across the disputed Paracel Islands archipelago and add to a wider surveillance network spanning much of the South China Sea.

The enhanced facility on Triton is likely to offer a challenge to China’s competitors in the region and internationally.

China seized control of the Paracels from Vietnam in a 1974 naval battle, and competition for access to it waters has intensified since the recent discovery of oil and gas reserves. Chinese and Vietnamese maritime militia clashed off the coast of Triton in 2014.

In addition, American, British and Australian naval forces have for the past decade patrolled the waters to collectively challenge China’s contested ‘nine-dash-line’ claim to large stretches of the South China Sea. 

Overlapping anti-stealth network

A year after work was first identified on Triton, satellite images from Maxar have helped build a clearer picture of Beijing’s efforts to defend this strategic waterway.

The most striking development is the construction of a new radar system, known as SIAR – synthetic impulse and aperture radar – which purportedly detects stealth aircraft. The counter-stealth radar on Triton is characterized by its distinctive octagonal structure, which resembles another SIAR system built by China on Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands, south of the Paracels, in 2017. A half-completed tower also sits near the SIAR radar on Triton, which is likely to be the operations centre.

Once completed, the radar on Triton will form what is believed to be a wider network of at least three overlapping counter-stealth radars built across Chinese bases in the South China Sea over the past decade, including on Hainan Island, home to several Chinese naval bases. 

The positioning of the radar on Triton, 320km south of Hainan, is telling, says J. Michael Dahm, Senior Resident Fellow for Aerospace and China Studies at the Mitchell Institute. 

‘SIAR radars cannot see over the curve of the Earth, which means there is a gap in China’s air surveillance coverage between Subi Reef and Hainan Island. The Triton Island site will help close that gap’, said Dahm.

The aim, he suggests, is to give China contiguous counter-stealth radar coverage of the South China Sea.

More construction underway

The satellite images reveal other building projects on Triton. One is a large pad at the end of the road network which will probably be used as a launching point for a mobile anti-ship missile battery. The building at the northeast end of the road is probably a storage building for missile transport vehicles. 

Diminishing Vietnam’s options

The development of a new counter-stealth radar system and other suspected signals intercept structures on Triton represents a notable increase in China’s intelligence capabilities in the Paracels. The Chinese Communist Party has not disclosed the purpose of the building work on Triton, but its effects on regional and global competitors are likely to be wide ranging.

For Vietnam, which is rapidly expanding its own bases in the South China Sea, the intelligence structures on Triton would significantly diminish its capacity to operate undetected in the area. Alongside existing radar on Triton which can detect sea-going vessels, Beijing now has the potential to track Vietnamese air movements and gain forewarning of Hanoi’s manoeuvres in the area, including efforts to access oil and gas deposits.

The desire to strengthen control over these resources may explain why China is fortifying Triton Island, says Bill Hayton, Associate Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House. ‘The developments might be a warning that China is planning to mount another drilling expedition’, he suggests.

COVID-19 and food security in southern Africa 16 July 2021 — 10:00AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 10 June 2021 Online

This event aims to take a deeper look at the interlinking issues of food security, nutrition, climate change and food systems in southern Africa.

Developing climate smart agri-food systems in sub-Saharan Africa is a precondition for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. Over the years household food security has been affected by different shocks including climate change and the recent COVID-19 pandemic.

The impact on rural households in southern Africa, in particular, has been significant due to the structure of food systems in the region.

This event aims to take a deeper look at the interlinking issues of food security, nutrition, climate change and food systems in southern Africa and consider how practitioners and policymakers can build more equitable, resilient and better food systems. 

Populism Comes to South Korea Expert comment sysadmin 20 December 2016

Public disgust with the embattled president reflects not only the unedifying details of her impeachment but a wider distrust of the political system.

For South Korea’s President Park Geun-hye, the jury is quite literally still out. Impeached by the country’s National Assembly on 9 December over claims of corruption, cronyism and influence peddling, she defiantly rejected – in a detailed statement – all of the charges levelled at her by an independent prosecutor. Any resolution of the issue must now await the ruling of the country’s Constitutional Court on the legitimacy of the impeachment vote – a decision that most likely will come early in the new year.

For the special prosecutor’s office, which is due to start its formal investigation on 21 December, the challenge is to find unambiguous evidence of the president’s direct responsibility for any of the corruption that may have taken place. The president, for her part, can claim, with some credibility that so far she has been tried only in the court of public opinion; that in South Korea’s rumour-prone, scandal-hungry media environment in which prosecutors have been known in the past to leak information to skew public debate, she has been denied natural justice and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.

Long shadows

But for the more than three-quarters of the Korean public calling for Park’s resignation, the president is symptomatic of Korean society’s wider flaws, including a pattern of corruption, privilege and hypocrisy endemic to the country’s political, economic and social elites. At a time of anemic economic growth (the country’s growth rate is predicted to slow to 2.1% next year), widening wealth and income disparities and reduced employment opportunities for a highly educated workforce, there is a growing mood of populist disaffection with the entire social and political system – for its lack of fairness and transparency and its perceived regulatory inefficiencies. This has been highlighted dramatically by disasters such as the Sewol ferry sinking that claimed the lives of some 300 school-children in August 2014 – at which time the president was castigated for being absent from her office at the time of a grave national crisis.

Complicating the current stand-off is the long-shadow of identity politics and unresolved disagreements about the country’s postwar historical narrative. As the daughter of the man responsible for the Korean economic ‘miracle’ who protected the country from the external communist threat in the North and radical subversion from within, Park’s political lineage is, for the older generation of voters in their sixties and above, a powerful reason to back the beleaguered president.

Already there are signs that this constituency is beginning to rally behind Park, with 30,000 demonstrating on 17 December against the impeachment decision, and with the governing Saenuri party showing signs of a consolidation of power around pro-Park legislators. The president, who has a reputation for stubbornness, may be calculating that this core support may allow her to defy the much larger calls for her resignation. She may also be hoping that the constitutional court, in which the majority of justices are politically conservative, will rule in her favour, allowing her to see out the remainder of her time in office, set to end in February 2018.

A pro-Park ruling by the court seems unlikely given the weight of the circumstantial evidence. Leading opposition politicians, including Moon Jae-in, former head of the Democratic Party and the current front runner in any post-impeachment presidential contest, has warned of a popular ‘revolution’ if the impeachment vote is not upheld. Moreover, the appetite for street protests against the president remains undimmed, and even conservative politicians appear to be positioning themselves for a post-Park era. Ban Ki-moon, the outgoing UN secretary general and long considered a likely Saenuri party candidate for the presidency, has been publicly distancing himself from Park. With 20.5% support, behind Moon on 23.7%, he has compelling reasons to align himself with the popular mood.

Lessons

At an individual level, the experience of President Park combines both political failure and personal tragedy. She has demonstrably failed to live up to her early commitments to represent all Koreans and to bridge the deep divisions between left and right in Korean society. She has also remained deeply isolated from the professional politicians and democratic polity she purports to lead. This is perhaps not so surprising given her authoritarian heritage and the experience of seeing both her parents assassinated in space of five years in the 1970s. The trauma of this experience reportedly made her distrustful of government officials and overly inclined to rely on the guidance of personal friends of dubious reliability, the font of her current troubles. There is also a profound irony that a politician who came to power vowing to place ‘trust-politik’ at the heart of her policy towards North Korea has seen her political position undermined, perhaps fatally, by a near complete collapse in public confidence in her administration.

More widely, the Park saga reveals an important and potentially seismic shift in public attitudes in South Korea, perhaps spurred by a growing populist trend evident elsewhere, whether in the US, Europe or parts of Southeast Asia. Koreans appear to have lost patience with their political system. This new climate of dissent – emboldened by the signs that protest can potentially lead to radical political change – is likely to prove a challenge to any future Korean leader hoping to secure the trust and legitimacy needed to govern.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

South Africa Needs a Strategic Vision for Its Continent Expert comment sysadmin 24 November 2017

South Africa has the potential to catalyse growth across its sub-region and the continent, but the government must develop a comprehensive strategy that aligns political, ideological and commercial interests.

South Africa’s status as the ‘gateway to Africa’ is under serious threat. Its companies continue to flourish, but complex relationships at home and abroad constrain government capacity to match its economic dominance with political reach and influence.

South Africa’s policies towards the rest of the continent are often accused of being inconsistent and incoherent. It has been a development partner to the region and to international donors; a moral leader, championing human rights and exporting its own model of transition; and an advocate and representative for the continent in international forums. However, it has simultaneously been accused of exploiting its economic dominance at the expense of its neighbours; handicapped by the political debts owed by the ANC to other liberation movements for their assistance in the struggle; and criticized for its arrogance in seeking to position itself as the ‘legitimate’ voice of Africa.

At the same time, reputational risks, a weakened policy environment and poor growth have taken the shine off South Africa’s ‘Gateway to Africa’ rhetoric. South Africa faces considerable domestic economic issues. Growth forecasts have fallen from 1.3 to 0.7 per cent, State owned enterprises are a huge burden on the treasury, and the forecast budget deficit is R50.8 billion (£2.7 billion), at a time when the cost of borrowing is increasing following downgrades of the country’s credit ratings.

Political risk is high, lowering investor confidence. Corruption, poor service delivery and the government’s under-delivery on citizen’s expectations are exacerbating social tensions in a country with expanded unemployment at 36.4 per cent, and one of the highest rates of inequality in the world. McKinsey, KPMG and HSBC have all become entangled in scandal relating to their dealings with government entities that have become ‘captured’ by private interests.

Despite these concerns, South Africa nonetheless remains the backbone of the regional economy, and its firms are key players across the continent. Johannesburg hosts the deepest and most sophisticated capital market on the continent, and Pretoria has one of the highest numbers of diplomatic missions in the world. ESKOM provides around 75 per cent of the electricity contribution to the Southern Africa SADC Power pool – comprising 12 countries, including those as far north as DRC and Tanzania – and South African ports facilitate over half of sub-Saharan Africa’s non-commodity trade with the rest of the world.

Post-apartheid expansion across the continent by South African companies was initially met with resistance, but these relationships have improved significantly – and South African firms retain significant advantages. South African retailers have the scale to incorporate regional producers into continental supply chains, purchasing fresh produce at a competitive price from regional agri-businesses, then re-selling further afield. For example, Zambeef supplies meat from Zambia to Shoprite stores in west Africa.

African companies in turn rely on South Africa as a significant consumer of goods, services and primary commodities. A South African government agreement with the DRC to import about half of the electricity that will be produced by a new grand-scale hydro-power project guaranteed its bankability. Mozambique is looking to maximize the potential of its world-class natural gas reserves by building a pipeline into South Africa, thus benefitting from the purchasing power of South African parastatal electricity utility firm ESKOM.

But South Africa’s status as an economic hegemon is not mirrored in its political relationships. South Africa’s GDP is five times higher than the six countries with which it shares a border, combined. But successive ANC governments have been unable to fully flex this economic muscle. Partly this is a legacy of history. It is not forgotten that the regional economic body, the Southern African Development Community, originated as the organization of Front Line States coordinating efforts to end apartheid, and ZANU-PF officials in Zimbabwe lecture their ANC counterparts on liberation.

The pan-African vision of former president Thabo Mbeki, and promotion of South Africa’s transition as a model for the continent, reflected the values that have driven ANC policy since the end of apartheid. But the coherence of South Africa’s foreign policy has been undermined by conflict and contradiction within the government. Appetite for engagement in Africa is dwindling. The country’s ability to project military influence across the continent is in critical decline. Jacob Zuma’s use of regional political bodies as a means of removing political rivals from domestic politics has corroded goodwill.

A new Africa Programme research paper argues that a fresh approach to South African engagement on the continent is both possible and necessary. South Africa can use its relative economic weight to play a stronger developmental role, leveraging the strengths of its business sector and its financial agencies. But it must match this with stronger and more cooperative political engagement, particularly through cultivating relationships with pivotal states such as Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia and Angola.

In December, the ANC will elect a new leader to take the party into elections in 2019. Both leading candidates have international experience – Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was the chair of the African Union, and Cyril Ramaphosa has led regional responses to crises in South Sudan, Lesotho and Burundi. South Africa still has considerable foreign policy resources at its disposal. A new strategic vision for Africa that unites the interests of government and business, both domestically and in partner states, can deliver prosperity for both South Africa and the region – and need not contradict the values that have shaped South Africa’s aspirations for the continent in the post-apartheid era.

Tsvangirai Leaves an Important Political Legacy in Southern Africa Expert comment sysadmin 21 February 2018

The story of Zimbabwe’s ‘people’s champion’ offers a powerful example to a region in need of new political compromises.

The death of Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai is a loss for Zimbabwe. In nearly three decades of speaking truth to power, Tsvangirai helped to change his nation and the region.

Southern Africa’s new politics

His death marks a period of transition for regional governments and opposition parties alike. The Zuma era has ended in South Africa while Mozambique, Namibia and Angola have also seen political transitions, pushing modernization agendas to appeal to young citizenries that increasingly see politics in separate terms from the liberationist struggles of the previous generation.

Regional opposition movements also face winds of change: the longstanding opposition leader in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Etienne Tshekedi, passed away in 2017, and Mozambique’s Afonso Dhlakama and Kenya’s Raila Odinga are both aging. These movements similarly need to appeal to a younger audience or risk losing relevance.

From trade unionist to opposition leader

Tsvangirai’s career is an eloquent illustration of these challenges. Born in Buhera in rural eastern Zimbabwe, Tsvangirai worked in textiles and mining before politics – diverse experience which gave him crucial exposure to the lives of ordinary people across the country. In his early years, he also worked for ZANU-PF, before leaving to forge his own political path. He became increasingly active in mining politics, rising to the executive of the National Mineworker’s Union and, in 1989, to secretary-general of the powerful Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions.

In the late 1990’s, Zimbabwe was riven by questions over land, war veterans, the Congo conflict, a shrinking economy and growing doubts about ZANU-PF itself. Opposition leaders of the time could not answer them; those such as Edgar Tekere and Margaret Dongo struggled to win support beyond their local constituencies, and liberation leader Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU had been merged with ZANU-PF in the 1987 Unity Accord.

But in 2000, Zimbabwe’s ‘perfect storm’ of a divisive constitutional referendum, land redistribution and a June election made Tsvangirai and the newly minted MDC, formed in 1999, a national rival to ZANU-PF. Through subsequent national elections in 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2013, Zimbabwe remained polarized between competing visions of Zimbabwe future: ZANU-PF’s powerful black liberationist politics of identity and the opposition’s equally compelling liberal democracy agenda.

Tsvangirai’s achievement was to provide a credible alternative to liberation icon Robert Mugabe. Tsvangirai also resuscitated Zimbabwe’s tradition of urban nationalism, and was a successor to Benjamin Burombo and other mid-century Zimbabwean urban leaders. Tsvangirai would in turn be a touchstone for contemporary urban activists Evans Mawarire, Linda Masarira and others.

From opposition to coalition

The political struggle for Zimbabwe became global, with Mugabe and Tsvangirai both winning support from rival international power blocs. In March 2007, pictures of a beaten and bloodied Tsvangirai helped to galvanize support for the MDC in the 2008 elections. But the disputed result and violent subsequent run-off between Tsvangirai and Mugabe led the regional community to push both men into a coalition government, with Tsvangirai as prime minister.

Despite continuous ructions, the Government of National Unity (GNU) held, and stabilized Zimbabwe’s collapsed economy, until 2013. Although often politically out-manoeuvred by Mugabe, Tsvangirai deserves credit for getting the opposition a share of political power and for holding his nerve against many who wanted to collapse the GNU.

Tsvangirai was no saint; his complicated love life, and tacit approval of violent attacks on party dissenters, do him no credit. More importantly, the MDC neglected its grassroots supporters during the GNU, and paid the price in its comprehensive 2013 electoral defeat. But although diminished, Tsvangirai remained Zimbabwe’s most popular opposition politician, and the MDC’s new leaders will have quite a task ahead of them, even if they have been planning since his courageous 2016 public admission of colon cancer.

The MDC after Tsvangirai

Nelson Chamisa, one of the three MDC vice presidents, has now been appointed as acting president by the party’s national committee. Chamisa inherits a fractured and fractious party, and one which has also fallen out with the Tsvangirai family. The other two vice presidents, Thokozani Khupe and Elias Mudzuri, have also set their sights on party leadership.

At 40, Chamisa, an orator with grassroots appeal, has a huge task. With general elections due by July, he has to unite the party, counter Zimbabwe’s rising ethno-politics, prove himself as leader of a broader opposition coalition and take on a resurgent President Emmerson Mnangagwa and ZANU-PF.

Electorally, the opposition’s strongest card has always been the urban vote and the economy. But Mnangagwa has fast forwarded a comprehensive economic reform and internationalist agenda. This, and Mugabe’s exit, have forced Chamisa, Joice Mujuru and other opposition leaders to play catch-up. Zimbabwe’s elections, the first since 2000 without Mugabe and Tsvangirai as contenders, will be of global interest as the country navigates the new political dynamics.

The people’s champion

Morgan Tsvangirai’s resilience earned him respect from friends and foes alike, with Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa and Vice President Constantino Chiwenga visiting him at home a few weeks ago. A former nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize, Tsvangirai, popularly known by his totem of ‘Save’ and also called mudhara [the old man] deserves national hero status. He will certainly be remembered as the ‘people’s champion’, and a pioneer in bridging the generational and ideological fissures that have shaped Southern Africa’s politics.

With their leader now gone, the turbulent MDC will undoubtedly be hoping for a ‘remembrance vote’ in his memory to carry them through the elections. But beyond that, his story offers a powerful example to a region in need of new political compromises.

South Africa's Land Reform Quandary: Scenarios and Policy 10 July 2018 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 13 June 2018 Chatham House, London

Slow delivery on expectations of land redistribution in South Africa has once again put the issue at the forefront of political debate in the country. A parliamentary public consultation process will consider whether constitutional change is required to accelerate expropriation without compensation. Policymakers face dual - often opposing - pressures due to investors’ fears of negative economic impacts as well as citizens’ frustrations over persistent inequality and hardship. State land and tribal trust land remain contentious issues for rural economic development, but with two thirds of the population now living in urban areas policy responses must be as cognizant of the country’s future as it is of its past.

At this meeting, Terence Corrigan, project manager at the South African Institute of Race Relations, will discuss the current debates on expropriation and present the institute’s latest research on future scenarios of land reform in South Africa.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Higher Education in South Africa: Demands for Inclusion and the Challenges of Reform 17 October 2018 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 September 2018 Chatham House, London

South Africa’s 2019 Election: Polling Data and Party Prospects 13 March 2019 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 7 March 2019 Chatham House, London

On 8 May 2019, South Africans will vote in their sixth national election. Incumbent President Cyril Ramaphosa is leading his ANC party campaign, which promises inclusive economic growth and social transformation, including through a sustainable land reform programme. However, public frustrations with the party’s record of service delivery and government corruption after 25 years in power could threaten the ANC’s electoral dominance especially in urban areas.

At this meeting, Professor David Everatt, head of the Wits School of Governance and political pollster, will present polling data and discuss the prospects and strategies of the main parties and their leaders ahead of the May election.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

South Africa After the Elections: Balancing Domestic and International Policy Priorities 16 May 2019 — 1:30PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 May 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The government that emerges from the 8 May election in South Africa faces immediate domestic and international foreign policy demands. Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to stimulate job growth, accelerating anti-corruption and good governance efforts are at the forefront of the new government’s agenda.

International ambitions will be upgraded such as UN security council reform, maximizing South Africa’s G20, BRICS and IBSA membership and preparing for South Africa’s chairmanship of the African Union (AU) in 2020.

At this meeting, the speakers – Moeletsi Mbeki, deputy chairman of SAIIA and author with Nobantu Mbeki of A Manifesto for Social Change: How to Save South Africa, and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, chief executive of SAIIA and currently co-editing a volume on A South African Foreign Policy for the 2020s which will be published in 2019 – will reflect on the election and discuss the new government’s domestic and international policy agenda. The meeting will be chaired by Ann Grant, former British High Commissioner to South Africa (2000-05) with past experience working for Oxfam, Standard Chartered Bank and Tullow Oil.

Ramaphosa Must Act Fast With New Mandate in South Africa Expert comment sysadmin 23 May 2019

In the wake of South Africa’s election, political constraints will ebb momentarily. The president should seize the opportunity to deliver meaningful change.

On 25 May, Cyril Ramaphosa will be inaugurated as president of South Africa, having dragged the African National Congress (ANC) over the line in the 8 May election. The ANC gained a 57 per cent majority, its lowest vote since 1994, its status as national liberator deeply eroded by successive corruption scandals. Only Ramaphosa’s personal popularity stopped it haemorrhaging more support.

His sustained action against corrupt public servants and promises of job-creating economic growth has attracted support from beyond the ANC’s base, including a significant minority of white voters, and generated significant international goodwill. Ramaphosa now has a short window of opportunity to reset social democracy in South Africa before the political cycle of municipal, party and national elections from 2021 to 2024 forces his attention back to party politics.

Defining ‘Ramaphosa-ism’

But personal popularity is fickle, and goodwill alone will not turn around the ailing economy. To attract investment and keep the electorate on side, Ramaphosa’s government needs to move beyond pragmatic crisis responses and articulate a clear, shared vision for how market intervention can allow the economy to grow while simultaneously delivering social transformation.

Growth will be hard to achieve in the short term. The economy is expected to grow 1.2% in 2019 and 1.5% in 2020, according to the IMF. Consumer confidence remains subdued, and a decade of declining GDP per capita and increasing inequality has put a strain on households. A ‘fiscal stimulus’ in 2018 delivered very little new government spending, and over the past 10 years, the government wage bill has increased three times higher than the rate of inflation.

Eskom, the state electricity provider, has debts equating to the GDP of Latvia and is not the only state-owned enterprise (SOE) that has required bailing out by the government. There are plans to break up Eskom into three separate entities but calls for deeper reform – or even privatization – are growing.

The president’s responses to these challenges will go a long way to defining ‘Ramaphosa-ism’ and the role of government in pursuing equitable economy growth.

Economic expectations under Ramaphosa

Ramaphosa was a champion of the introduction of a minimum wage and a proponent of the National Development Plan, which relies on growth to drive job creation. His support for land reform is an individual conviction as much as it is a party line, although his views are softer than many in the party, with state-owned land being the initial target.

Investor uncertainty on land tenure and regulations in mining will need to be addressed through passing key pieces of legislation on land reform and the revised Mining and Petroleum Resources Development Act.

Where Ramaphosa differs from his predecessors is his links with business. Thabo Mbeki enjoyed a relationship of mutual respect with business; this disintegrated under Jacob Zuma. Ramaphosa, however, is part of South Africa’s business community, having founded the Shanduka Group, with investments in multiple sectors including retail, telecoms and extractives, and served as chairman of MTN and Bidvest. As president, he has surrounded himself with close economic advisers from business and banking.

In the short term, anti-corruption measures and competent appointments will ease investor woes. In the long term, there is a need to improve the ease of doing business, including labour market reforms, and to make South Africa a more competitive business environment by reducing the hold of large conglomerates on the economy. Ramaphosa may also make greater use of public-private partnerships for large projects.

Political constraints

Ramaphosa faces few immediate political challenges. The ANC is still deeply divided, but although Ramaphosa does not enjoy the ideological support of the entire party, his opponents are leaderless post-Zuma, and have been unable to offer a coherent alternative. ANC Secretary General Ace Magashule has fallen into the role of interim figurehead of this faction, and allegations of corruption would make it difficult for him to aspire to national leadership.

The need to avoid splits before the election meant Ramaphosa had to make concessions, and his first cabinet in February 2018 included opponents and those accused of corruption or incompetence, such as Malusi Gigaba and Bathabile Dlamini. Such concessions to political opponents are unlikely to continue after the election.

Meanwhile, opposition parties made some advances in the election, but where Zuma was an easy target, they are still grappling with how to confront Ramaphosa. The party with the biggest gains was the Economic Freedom Fighters, whose increase of just over 4 points from the last election gave it 11 per cent of the vote this time. They will likely continue to be an effective disruptor. Ramaphosa may also be challenged by trade unions on his reforms, notably over any break-up of SOEs.

But the biggest and most immediate external political challenge for Ramaphosa will be rebuilding trust between government and society, in a context where social protest has become an alternative form of political participation. A turnout of 65 per cent may be considered normal in Western democracies but is a notable drop for a country as politicized as South Africa, driven by frustration and a sense of exclusion as much as apathy. Turnout by young people was even lower.

Achieving the vision

South Africa has all the platforms it needs to project its renewal and attract vital external investment – it is a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, it will take over as chair of the African Union in 2020, it is a member of BRICS and it is the only African member of the G20. But in the recent past, it has struggled to tell a coherent story about its vision for the future and offer to the world.

In the immediate wake of the election, internal and external political constraints will ebb. Ramaphosa must act fast to deliver results before the election cycle starts again. To attract much needed investment stimulus, he will not only need to articulate and market his vision for South Africa, but also outline how he plans to achieve it.