Margrit Schwarz
Sep 1, 1998; 39:1833-1843
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Linda J. Pike
Jul 1, 2006; 47:1597-1598
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Weerapan Khovidhunkit
Jul 1, 2004; 45:1169-1196
Thematic Reviews

George H. Rothblat
May 1, 1999; 40:781-796
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RK Tangirala
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K Schoonjans
May 1, 1996; 37:907-925
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Nov 1, 2005; 46:2347-2355
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New Chatham House History Examines our Defining Moments News Release NCapeling 18 January 2021

'A History of Chatham House: its People and Influence from the 1920s to the 2020s' will examine the impact on policymaking of our first 100 years.

How can companies defend civic space? 2 February 2021 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 January 2021 Online

Panellists discuss how companies can go beyond corporate social responsibility and philanthropy initiatives to protect and support civic freedoms around the world.

Please click on the below link to confirm your participation and receive your individual joining details from Zoom for this event. You will receive a confirmation email from Zoom, which contains the option to add the event to your calendar if you so wish.

There is increasing pressure on companies to use their power and profits to engage with social and political causes. In doing so, companies can help to support the ‘shared civic space’ that enables the private sector and civil society organizations to benefit from a society that respects the rule of law and human rights, at a time when many of these rights are under threat around the world.

Many companies have introduced CSR initiatives, due diligence mechanisms and corporate philanthropy. Over 11,000 companies are now signatories to the UN’s Global Compact for sustainable and socially responsible business worldwide.

But as demonstrated by misguided corporate responses to the Black Lives Matter protests this year, there is a danger of corporate activism being perceived as ‘lip service’ rather than genuinely addressing the negative impacts of business operations on civic space.

Recent Chatham House research indicates that meaningful engagement by businesses on such issues must be timely, contextually sensitive and industry-relevant. For example, in 2015, Tiffany & Co. worked with other companies to intervene on behalf of Rafael Marques after he was arrested for reporting on widespread human rights abuses in the Angolan diamond industry. During COVID-19, Microsoft offered free cybersecurity software to healthcare and human rights organizations at increased risk of hacking attacks.

This panel event will draw upon practical examples of private sector support for civic space across different sectors, geographies and political environments.

Why might companies step up to defend freedom of association, expression or political participation even where this comes at a financial or political cost? How can companies resist complicity with governments or regulation that threaten civic space? And what forums exist, or should exist, for developing tactical alliances between companies and civil society actors?

This event is also the launch of a new Chatham House resource, The Role of the Private Sector in Protecting Civic Space.

The trickle-up effect of rights-based climate litigation Expert comment NCapeling 16 November 2021

With governments failing in their pledges and companies accused of ‘green-washing’, human rights-based litigation is increasingly important for accountability.

Tuvalu’s foreign minister addressing COP26 while standing knee-deep in seawater was a stark illustration of how the climate emergency directly and imminently threatens the most basic human rights protected under international law – including to the right to life, self-determination and cultural rights.

Human rights are now a fundamental component of more than 90 per cent of the climate litigation currently taking place outside the US, highlighting the international reach of human rights law and how its emphasis on protecting the most vulnerable helps diverse communities find common arguments for shared goals.

Cases are set to continue and to evolve but three types of claim are emerging, each of which is examined in a new Chatham House briefing paper.

1. Enforcing commitments

One category of cases seeks to hold states accountable for pledges they have made on climate change, such as emission reduction targets made under the framework of the 2015 Paris Agreement. Drawing on human rights obligations, governments can be charged with not taking sufficient steps to implement these pledges.

The case of Leghari v Pakistan (2015) concerned the government’s failure to carry out the National Climate Change Policy of 2012 and the Framework for Implementation of Climate Change Policy (2014-2030). The Lahore High Court held that several of the human rights enshrined in Pakistan’s constitution cover climate change and ‘provide the necessary judicial toolkit to address the government’s response to climate change’.

The court ordered the government to carry out measures such as publishing an adaptation action plan realizable within a few months of the order and establishing a Climate Change Commission to monitor progress.

2. Positive duties to mitigate risks

Many rights-based climate cases are being brought to clarify the scope of states’ positive duties under human rights law to take meaningful steps to protect their citizens against foreseeable risks to life and other rights.

This ‘trickle-up’ effect of human rights was prominent in the case of State of the Netherlands vs the Urgenda Foundation (2019) where the Dutch Supreme Court held that reducing emissions with the highest possible level of ambition amounts to a ‘due diligence standard’ for states to comply with their positive duties to adopt adequate measures to address climate change. Human rights law was also used by the court to fill in the content of the due diligence standards.

There is also a growing trend for rights-based actions to be brought against corporations, such as a recent case which drew on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to define the parameters of Shell’s duty of care and due diligence obligations in relation to carbon emissions under Dutch law. The court ordered Shell to reduce emissions by a net rate of 45 per cent by the end of 2030 – relative to 2019 figures – through its group corporate policy.

3. Avoiding harm in climate action

The global human rights regime is also increasingly invoked in litigation concerning states’ negative obligations to ensure that their climate mitigation and adaptation activities do not themselves contribute to human rights violations (including discrimination) and that states prioritize adaptation measures for those most at risk in a just and equitable way.

As Chatham House’s paper makes clear, this kind of litigation ‘puts pressure on governments to expand their approach to tackling climate change beyond purely a regulatory one to a more holistic strategy’.

Closing the climate justice gap

Climate and environmental litigation grounded in human rights is set to continue given the overwhelming scientific evidence of risks associated with human-induced climate change and the limited confidence in pledges made by states and corporations alike – including those made recently at COP26.

A growing collaboration between civil society organizations and vulnerable communities in relation to both the protection of nature and the enjoyment of their land and cultural rights was evident at COP26, and this alliance will add further momentum to the trend for rights-based climate litigation based on the rights of indigenous and other vulnerable communities, especially on issues such as deforestation.

But more challenges are coming. International human rights law recognizes a duty of international cooperation but there remain significant hurdles for climate-vulnerable communities in developing countries to compel action by richer nations despite the vast debts of ‘carbon colonialism.’

One big issue is the problem of extraterritoriality, as the extent to which states owe obligations to individuals outside their territory is contested. Courts in both Germany and the Netherlands have rejected claimants from developing countries in domestic class actions on this basis. But a recent decision of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on a complaint brought by Greta Thunberg and other youth activists against five countries opens the door for further litigation.

One of a number of cases being brought by youth claimants across the world, the committee concluded that a state’s human rights duties can – in some instances – extend to children in other countries. This includes any activities on the territory that host states have the power to prevent from causing ‘transboundary harm’ – such as emissions from the territory – where these activities ‘significantly’ impact the enjoyment of human rights of persons outside the territory.

To date, high-profile rights-based cases have argued for policy change and stronger targets underpinned by binding legislation responsive to the science. Claims are set to become more complex and contested. Building on scientific developments in climate attribution, rights-based litigation is now tackling other difficult questions such as apportioning responsibility and remedial action.

These cases examine both historically high emitters and the public and private actors who either continue specific activities or refrains from action in the face of the overwhelming science linking human activities such as extraction and burning of fossil fuels to deforestation and climatic consequences.

Courts are also likely to explore the duties that states and corporations owe to deliver a ‘just transition’ away from carbon-intensive industries, given the benefits of growth and climate action are already unevenly distributed.

A holistic human-rights based approach

Several states together with civil society are leading the charge for global recognition of the right to a healthy, clean, and sustainable environment in the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, and multi-stakeholder processes are defining what effective corporate due diligence looks like.

In addition, UN-appointed special rapporteurs are delivering practical guidance on how to devise solutions which are fair, non-discriminatory, participatory, and climate-resilient without exacerbating inequality – including difficult issues of planned relocation – and UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies are unpacking the duty of international cooperation to act in good faith to address loss and damage.

Recently the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women recommended the Marshall Islands, in order to meet its duty to its citizens, should actively seek international cooperation and assistance – including climate change financing – from other countries but in particular the US, whose ‘extraterritorial nuclear testing activities have exacerbated the adverse effects of climate change and natural disasters’ in the islands.

Expert

Expert

Duterte’s Victory Is Cry for Help From Those Left Behind in Philippines Expert comment sysadmin 12 May 2016

But large support for mainstream parties and a mature democratic system should keep the country from slipping back towards authoritarianism.

The victory of political outsider Rodrigo Duterte in the 2016 Philippines’ elections is proof that a significant minority of the country’s population feels left behind by its recent economic success and estranged from its political elite. However the results of the elections as a whole suggest that most voters opted for a continuation of the current government’s policies.

Duterte looks almost certain to be inaugurated as the next president of the Philippines on 30 June. The country’s presidential voting system – a single round, first-past-the-post election – delivered victory to a populist outsider with 39 per cent support. Two candidates advocating a continuation of the current government’s policies − the Liberal Party’s Mar Roxas and independent Grace Poe − polled a combined 45 per cent. The long-standing factionalism within Philippines elite politics split the ‘anti-Duterte’ vote.

Changing the conversation

The contrast between Duterte and Roxas could hardly be greater. Mar Roxas is the grandson of the first president of an independent Philippines, a graduate of Wharton Business School and a former investment banker in the US. Rodrigo Duterte is a political outsider with an electoral base geographically almost as far from Manila as is possible to get in the Philippines: the city of Davao on the island of Mindanao.

The story of Duterte’s victory is the story of how ‘Duterte managed to change the national conversation from poverty towards crime and corruption,’ says Marites Vitug, editor-at-large of one of the Philippines’ most popular online news sites, Rappler. In January, Duterte was running fourth in opinion polls but a strategy that positioned him as the only opponent to the Manila elite gave him victory. This is the first time a provincial official has made it to the top job.

The headline figures tell us that the Philippines’ economy has done very well under President Benigno Aquino. Between 2010 and 2014, growth averaged 6.3 per cent per year. That fell to a still-impressive 5.8 per cent last year but is expected to pick up this year and next, according to the Asian Development Bank. Growth in agriculture, however, is significantly slower and rural areas feel left behind. While economic growth is benefiting the majority, inequality is worsening and resentment rising in poor villages. The contrast between the metropolitan sophistication of the Makati district in Manila and life in faraway provinces such as Duterte’s Mindanao is widening.

Ironically the Philippines’ economic success is a part of the explanation for the defeat of the ‘mainstream’ presidential candidates. Crime and corruption may have become more important issues simply because more voters have become better off and therefore more likely to be concerned about crime and corruption than before. It’s also undeniable that Duterte has a record for getting things done. Human rights groups rightly criticize his (at best) tolerance of the extra-judicial killing of alleged criminals but his repeated re-election as mayor demonstrates that many citizens are prepared to accept that in exchange for improved personal security. A surprising number of Manila residents have actually moved to Davao because of its better quality of life.

Traditional power bases

However, the results as a whole suggest a narrow majority in favour of current policies. In the vice-presidential race, the Liberal Party candidate Leni Robredo is narrowly ahead of Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos, the son of the eponymous former president. Like Duterte she is regarded as a successful mayor of a well-run city, Albay. Duterte’s running mate Alan Cayetano received just 14 per cent of the vote.

In the senate election, Liberals won five of the 12 seats being contested, with a party- backed independent winning a sixth. The opposition, even with boxing champion and national idol Manny Pacquiao running for the United Nationalist Alliance, won four.

Taken as a whole, the results show the enduring nature of traditional Philippines power bases. The country’s many islands and distinct linguistic and cultural regions are virtual fiefs in which families and big bosses can wield almost total power through control of local authorities, businesses, the courts and security forces.

Threat to democracy?

It’s easy to forget that the election of Ferdinand Marcos in 1965 was originally welcomed as a challenge to the traditional elites of Philippine politics. The same accolades are currently greeting Duterte. Could they presage a return to the Philippines’ bad old days?

This seems less likely. Philippine democracy has matured considerably since Marcos declared martial law in 1972. There is a substantial, and vocal, middle class with experience of mobilizing against ‘bad’ presidents. There will also be pressures from international investors and the Philippines’ treaty ally, the United States, for better governance.

The Philippines will chair the Association of Southeast Asian Nations next year. That will put Duterte in the international spotlight as host of several international meetings – including the East Asia Summit attended by, among others, the presidents of China, Russia and the US. Since his victory Duterte has promised to act with decorum in office and declared that his election campaign antics were just a ploy to attract attention. Some leaders in Southeast Asia will use his victory to buttress their arguments against allowing their people to freely vote. It’s up to Duterte to decide whether he wants to be an advertisement for – or an argument against – democracy.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

What to Know About Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Election Expert comment sysadmin 27 March 2017

Tim Summers looks at what we know about Carrie Lam, the territory’s new leader, and where Hong Kong politics goes from here.

Carrie Lam, formerly number two in the Hong Kong government, was selected as the Special Administrative Region’s new chief executive on 26 March. What does the process and her selection say about Hong Kong’s political future?

1. Elections for Hong Kong’s top job are still within Beijing’s control. Due to the failure of political reform proposals in 2015, Lam was elected on the basis of 777 votes from the 1,194 members of the Chief Executive Election Committee. This ‘small-circle’ process was essentially the same as that used since 1997 (the only change being the expansion of the committee from its initial size of 800). The design of the process favours Beijing, and indeed Lam was the favoured candidate of the central government and many of its supporters in Hong Kong.
2. But the influence of the central government has limits. The second-ranked candidate, former finance minister John Tsang (365 votes), had not been encouraged to stand by Beijing, and a fourth candidate, Regina Ip (who did not obtain enough nominations to join the vote), reportedly also rejected suggestions from Beijing that she should not put herself forward. The Committee itself contained 325 individuals affiliated to or sympathetic to opposition parties and around 100 establishment figures who did not support Lam – most of whom voted for Tsang. Although Lam gained more votes than her predecessor, CY Leung, in 2012 (he obtained 689 votes after a controversial campaign when scandals undermined his main opponent), Beijing appears to have expended substantial political capital in securing her victory.
3. Despite the closed process, public opinion matters. The campaign saw all the candidates actively seek not only the votes of committee members, but also wider popular support. This highlights the need for broader legitimacy, and the fact that public participation and media debate are central factors in Hong Kong’s open political culture. A number of opinion polls showed Lam to have notably lower levels of popular support than Tsang. This will constrain her ability to govern effectively and she will not be cut much slack by the Hong Kong population. There were protests at the election venue calling for ‘genuine universal suffrage’.
4. The new chief executive is an economic interventionist. The two main candidates – Lam and Tsang – have different policy approaches. Tsang’s was a more liberal ‘laissez faire’ one. Lam is likely to continue the somewhat more interventionist approach of CY Leung, who intervened more than previous governments to try to stabilize property prices and make more land available for housing, as well as reinstating policies targeting poverty and agreeing measures to limit the social impact of rising numbers of visitors and money from mainland China.
5. Political reform seems very far off. The third candidate, former judge Woo Kwok-hing, had the clearest position on the thorny issue of political reform. Many of the government’s critics see less prospect for progress here under Lam, who fronted the government’s consultation processes during the 2013–15 debates over political reform. Lam gave some conflicting signals during the campaign, and it remains to be seen whether she tries to restart the process. But given rising populism, the growing fragmentation and polarization of Hong Kong politics, and entrenched positions from both Beijing and the opposition, it will be even more difficult to obtain consensus on a way forward than when the last failed attempt at reform took place – a key indicator will be whether all political parties are willing to discuss compromises.
6. July’s anniversary will be contentious. Following formal appointment by the central government, Lam’s term will begin on 1 July. This will also mark the 20th anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, which will coincide with a planned visit by President Xi Jinping. This will no doubt spark protests; for many, the 20th anniversary of the handover will therefore be less a time for celebration than an opportunity for many to highlight concerns about the future of the former British colony.

The Hard Truth Is Rohingya Refugees Are Not Going Home Expert comment sysadmin 6 October 2017

The only likely outcome of the crisis is the near-permanent presence of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya along the Bangladesh border.

The harrowing scenes of human suffering on the Myanmar–Bangladesh border have provoked outpourings of sympathy and some firm statements by international politicians. At least half a million people have been brutally expelled from their homes and are now living in miserable conditions in muddy refugee camps and storm-drenched shanty towns. As the international community debates how to respond, it needs to take a clear-eyed view of the situation and recognise a brutal truth: the refugees are almost certainly not going home.

Consequently, policymakers must not hide behind the fiction that Bangladesh is only temporarily hosting the refugees in preparation for their rapid return home. Over-optimistic assumptions now will lead to worse misery in the long term. Instead, the world needs to plan on the basis that Bangladesh will be hosting a very large and permanent refugee population.

The expulsion of the Rohingya Muslims from Rakhine State in northwestern Myanmar is the culmination of decades of discriminatory policies enacted by the country’s military rulers since 1962. In 1978, the Burmese military’s ‘Operation Dragon King’ pushed 200,000 Muslims into Bangladesh. International pressure forced the military to allow most of them to return. Then, in 1991–92, the military again expelled a quarter of a million people. Bangladesh forced some of them back over the border and eventually the military agreed to allow the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to manage the repatriation of most of the remainder.

State-sponsored abuses of the Rohingya and ethnic violence perpetrated against them by chauvinists among the ethnic Rakhine population have continued. The abuse became dramatically worse in 2012 when tens of thousands of Rohingya were forced to flee their homes, although most remained inside the country. This year, armed attacks by self-proclaimed defenders of the Rohingya, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, gave the military an excuse to mount what the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called ‘a textbook example of ethnic cleansing’.

It is tempting to believe that, as before, the Myanmar government will allow the expelled Rohingya to return after international pressure. However, recent geopolitical developments in southeast Asia and the election of a democratic government in Myanmar in 2015 make this much less likely.

Southeast Asia is now an arena of geopolitical competition between China and its rivals: mainly the United States, India and Japan. All are battling for influence. Both China and India have made public statements of support for Myanmar’s government in the current crisis. In that context, diplomatic pressure or economic sanctions imposed by Europe or the United States will only have one effect – to push Myanmar towards China.

Moreover, those in the EU and US who want to see democracy survive in Myanmar will be unwilling to push the elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi too far. There is an extraordinary degree of hostility towards the Rohingya among the majority Bamar population. This has broken out into street violence on occasions but even where the situation is calm, anti-Muslim prejudice is easily awoken. The current government is very unlikely to challenge such sentiments at a time when it is trying to preserve its position against the military’s continuing domination of political and economic life.

Myanmar is one of the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations but ASEAN is unlikely to impose any meaningful pressure. Only Malaysia has been publicly critical of Myanmar’s government. Indonesia has attempted to mediate – its foreign minister Retno Marsudi has held face-to-face meetings with Aung San Suu Kyi – but without apparent effect. Both countries have sent aid and volunteers to the Rohingya refugee camps but there is absolutely no talk of sanctions or other overt pressure.

The question then is: what will happen to the refugees? One option could be resettlement, but neither Bangladesh nor any of the other states in the region are willing to take them in. Malaysia already hosts 60,000 registered Rohingya refugees and probably another 150,000 unregistered ones. Unknown thousands of Rohingya have fled to Thailand and Indonesia by boat but have often fallen victim to unscrupulous human traffickers in cahoots with local officials. Thailand has already said it will refuse to allow new ‘boat people’ to land.

The only likely outcome therefore is the near-permanent presence of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya along the Bangladesh border. Delaying preparations for a permanent refugee population in the hope that they will be allowed to re-cross the border back into Myanmar will only make the situation worse. Seventy years ago, another ‘temporary’ movement of people into refugee camps created decades of instability around the Middle East. The world must remember the Palestinians as it plans for the future of the Rohingya.

Refugees and migration

Examining the humanitarian and policy challenges in dealing with the highest global number of refugees and displaced people since the Second World War.

There are many reasons why people cannot stay in their own countries. Many flee from violence, war, hunger, extreme poverty, because of their sexual or gender orientation, or from the consequences of climate change.

But also many believe they have a better chance of finding work in another country because they have the education or capital to seek opportunities elsewhere, they may want to join relatives or friends, or want to start or finish their education.

Chatham House research helps facilitate dialogue between an increasingly diverse group of actors influencing refugee and migration policy globally, enhancing cooperation and contributing to the identification of practical solutions. 

The Moving Energy Initiative is a ground-breaking international partnership which examines the provision of sustainable energy for refugees and displaced people, giving particular consideration to the context of the displaced communities, such as their cultural traditions, collective capacities, needs, and technology available to them.

Pierre Lairez, Eric Pichon-Pharabod and Pierre Vanhove
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2985-3025.
Abstract, references and article information

Alexandra Kjuchukova, Allison N. Miller, Arunima Ray and Sümeyra Sakallı
Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 5905-5946.
Abstract, references and article information

Ahmed Elshafei, Ana Cristina Ferreira, Miguel Sánchez and Abdelghani Zeghib
Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 5837-5862.
Abstract, references and article information

Daniel Le, Bao V. Le Hung, Stefano Morra, Chol Park and Zicheng Qian
Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 5749-5786.
Abstract, references and article information

firehouse.ie posted a photo:

firehouse.ie posted a photo:

Abdessamad Dehaj and Mohamed Guessous
Theor. Probability and Math. Statist. 111 (), 1-8.
Abstract, references and article information

Naoki Endo and Shiro Goto
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 5007-5011.
Abstract, references and article information

NEW YORK (AP): The Rockefeller Center Christmas tree arrived in New York City on Saturday, signalling the start of the holiday season in the Big Apple. The 74-foot Norway spruce was driven into Manhattan's Center Plaza, where it was hoisted in...

Carnosine (β-alanyl-l-histidine) and anserine (β-alanyl-3-methyl-l-histidine) are abundant peptides in the nervous system and skeletal muscle of many vertebrates. Many in vitro and in vivo studies demonstrated that exogenously added carnosine can improve muscle contraction, has antioxidant activity, and can quench various reactive aldehydes. Some of these functions likely contribute to the proposed anti-aging activity of carnosine. However, the physiological role of carnosine and related histidine-containing dipeptides (HCDs) is not clear. In this study, we generated a mouse line deficient in carnosine synthase (Carns1). HCDs were undetectable in the primary olfactory system and skeletal muscle of Carns1-deficient mice. Skeletal muscle contraction in these mice, however, was unaltered, and there was no evidence for reduced pH-buffering capacity in the skeletal muscle. Olfactory tests did not reveal any deterioration in 8-month-old mice lacking carnosine. In contrast, aging (18–24-month-old) Carns1-deficient mice exhibited olfactory sensitivity impairments that correlated with an age-dependent reduction in the number of olfactory receptor neurons. Whereas we found no evidence for elevated levels of lipoxidation and glycation end products in the primary olfactory system, protein carbonylation was increased in the olfactory bulb of aged Carns1-deficient mice. Taken together, these results suggest that carnosine in the olfactory system is not essential for information processing in the olfactory signaling pathway but does have a role in the long-term protection of olfactory receptor neurons, possibly through its antioxidant activity.

The actin cytoskeleton is of profound importance to cell shape, division, and intracellular force generation. Profilins bind to globular (G-)actin and regulate actin filament formation. Although profilins are well-established actin regulators, the distinct roles of the dominant profilin, profilin 1 (PFN1), versus the less abundant profilin 2 (PFN2) remain enigmatic. In this study, we use interaction proteomics to discover that PFN2 is an interaction partner of the actin N-terminal acetyltransferase NAA80, and further confirm this by analytical ultracentrifugation. Enzyme assays with NAA80 and different profilins demonstrate that PFN2 binding specifically increases the intrinsic catalytic activity of NAA80. NAA80 binds PFN2 through a proline-rich loop, deletion of which abrogates PFN2 binding. Small-angle X-ray scattering shows that NAA80, actin, and PFN2 form a ternary complex and that NAA80 has partly disordered regions in the N-terminus and the proline-rich loop, the latter of which is partly ordered upon PFN2 binding. Furthermore, binding of PFN2 to NAA80 via the proline-rich loop promotes binding between the globular domains of actin and NAA80, and thus acetylation of actin. However, the majority of cellular NAA80 is stably bound to PFN2 and not to actin, and we propose that this complex acetylates G-actin before it is incorporated into filaments. In conclusion, we reveal a functionally specific role of PFN2 as a stable interactor and regulator of the actin N-terminal acetyltransferase NAA80, and establish the modus operandi for NAA80-mediated actin N-terminal acetylation, a modification with a major impact on cytoskeletal dynamics.

22 July 2020

21 August 2020

Peptidoglycan (PG) is an essential constituent of the bacterial cell wall. During cell division, the machinery responsible for PG synthesis localizes mid-cell, at the septum, under the control of a multiprotein complex called the divisome. In Escherichia coli, septal PG synthesis and cell constriction rely on the accumulation of FtsN at the division site. Interestingly, a short sequence of FtsN (Leu75–Gln93, known as EFtsN) was shown to be essential and sufficient for its functioning in vivo, but what exactly this sequence is doing remained unknown. Here, we show that EFtsN binds specifically to the major PG synthase PBP1b and is sufficient to stimulate its biosynthetic glycosyltransferase (GTase) activity. We also report the crystal structure of PBP1b in complex with EFtsN, which demonstrates that EFtsN binds at the junction between the GTase and UB2H domains of PBP1b. Interestingly, mutations to two residues (R141A/R397A) within the EFtsN-binding pocket reduced the activation of PBP1b by FtsN but not by the lipoprotein LpoB. This mutant was unable to rescue the ΔponB-ponAts strain, which lacks PBP1b and has a thermosensitive PBP1a, at nonpermissive temperature and induced a mild cell-chaining phenotype and cell lysis. Altogether, the results show that EFtsN interacts with PBP1b and that this interaction plays a role in the activation of its GTase activity by FtsN, which may contribute to the overall septal PG synthesis and regulation during cell division.

Power for refugees: Electricity Audio bhorton.drupal 16 May 2022

A new podcast special explores an often-overlooked aspect of humanitarian assistance: access to energy.

From Afghanistan to Ukraine to Sudan - the world is grappling with the consequences that emerge when people are forced to flee from their homes. One factor that does not usually make the headlines is that many people displaced by conflict or natural disasters lack access to the energy services that are necessary for forging dignified lives and livelihoods. 

This first episode of a two-part Undercurrents special examines efforts to electrify refugee settlements in Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda, shedding light on what has worked and what has not. Approximately 94% of forcibly displaced people living in these settlements do not have access to electricity to heat or cool hospitals, schools and dwellings, or to light streets.

Since 2015, Chatham House has been researching this issue and convening dialogues to spur action by humanitarians, energy companies and others. Our seminal Heat, Light and Power report provided the first ever comprehensive assessment of access to energy in refugee camps and urban areas with high numbers of refugees.

This two-part podcast is part of the Renewable Energy for Refugees project. Led by Practical Action, the project provides access to affordable and sustainable sources of renewable energy, and improves the health, wellbeing and security of refugees and neighbouring communities.

The Climate Briefing: The nexus of water security and climate policy Audio NCapeling 22 August 2022

Examining the crossover between water security and climate change with the next two COPs taking place in regions with a history of being water stressed.

What should policymakers and negotiators from the Middle East and Africa working on water security focus on at COP27?

What does it mean to achieve water security? What are the main barriers or challenges? How is water security relevant to climate change?

This podcast was produced in collaboration with the UK Aid-funded Knowledge, Evidence and Learning for Development (K4D) programme which facilitates the use of evidence and learning in international development policy and programming.

Towards democracy in Sudan: Reflections on the transitional period 20 September 2022 — 2:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 31 August 2022 Online

In this webinar, panellists discuss the key outcomes of the evaluation workshop and reflect on how the experience of the transition to date should inform the realization of Sudan’s democratic aspirations going forward.

The military coup on 25 October 2021 halted Sudan’s transition to democracy and prospects for sustainable peace. Since then, members of the former regime have regained political influence, with many reinstated to senior positions.

The coup has provoked a strong reaction from the country’s pro-democracy movement and youth-led resistance committees who have led continuous peaceful protests demanding civilian democratic transition, despite a brutal crackdown by state security forces.

Those supportive of the coup have blamed the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), a wide coalition of pro-democracy political and civilian groups, for the mistakes of the transitional government.

However, the country’s political, security and economic situation has sharply deteriorated since the military’s action, and the progress achieved by the transitional government has been reversed, leading to an accelerating economic crisis, increased food insecurity and political instability.

The FFC, which played a key role in appointing the transitional government, has acknowledged its errors. In July 2022, it held a workshop in Khartoum, which was broadcast on social media, to evaluate its performance and identify lessons learned, in discussion with civil society actors and activists.

In this webinar, leading pro-democracy movement figures and independent experts discuss the key outcomes of the evaluation workshop and reflect on how the experience of the transition to date should inform the realization of Sudan’s democratic aspirations going forward.

This event is part of a Chatham House Africa programme project on supporting Sudan’s civilian-led democratic transition.

Reflections at 100: Empire and decolonization Audio MVieira 1 November 2022

How did leading academics and policymakers think about and impact imperialism and decolonization from the 1920s to 1970s?

This episode of Reflections at 100, marking the centenary of International Affairs, looks at how empire and decolonization have been discussed in the journal.

Isabel and Krisztina speak to Meera Sabaratnam about how thinkers and policymakers from the 1920s to 1970s understood both empire and then decolonization. Meera highlights four tensions present within the discussions, and how these may impact the international order today.

Inderjeet Parmar delves deeper into the influence of Chatham House at the time and situates these discussions in the broader think-tank and global context.

Reflections at 100 is a mini-series accompanying the journal’s centenary Archive Collections. The collections bring together articles from our archive which speak to the past, present, and future of current affairs issues. In each podcast episode we speak to editors and contributors to the collection and explore what the research tells us about policymaking today. 

Explore the Archive Collection, free to access until mid-November 2022, including Meera’s introduction: 100 years of empire and decolonization.

International Affairs was started at Chatham House in 1922 to communicate research to members who could not attend in person. Over the past 100 years it has transformed into a journal that publishes academically rigorous and policy relevant research. It is published for Chatham House by Oxford University Press. Read the latest issue here. 

Visual Abstract

Sophos X-Ops unveils five-year investigation tracking China-based groups targeting perimeter devices

Madison T Wright
Nov 18, 2020; 0:RA120.002168v1-mcp.RA120.002168
Research