Nearly a week after the death of 18 year-old Michael Brown in Ferguson, Mo., protests continue in the 21,000-person suburban community on St. Louis’ north side and around the nation.

Amid the social media and news coverage of the community’s response to the police shooting of the unarmed teenager, a picture of Ferguson and its history has emerged.

The New York Times and others have described the deep-seated racial tensions and inequalities that have long plagued the St. Louis region, as well as the dramatic demographic transformation of Ferguson from a largely white suburban enclave (it was 85 percent white as recently as 1980) to a predominantly black community (it was 67 percent black by 2008-2012).

But Ferguson has also been home to dramatic economic changes in recent years. The city’s unemployment rate rose from roughly 7 percent in 2000 to over 13 percent in 2010-12. For those residents who were employed, inflation-adjusted average earnings fell by one-third. The number of households using federal Housing Choice Vouchers climbed from roughly 300 in 2000 to more than 800 by the end of the decade.

Amid these changes, poverty skyrocketed. Between 2000 and 2010-2012, Ferguson’s poor population doubled. By the end of that period, roughly one in four residents lived below the federal poverty line ($23,492 for a family of four in 2012), and 44 percent fell below twice that level.

These changes affected neighborhoods throughout Ferguson. At the start of the 2000s, the five census tracts that fall within Ferguson’s border registered poverty rates ranging between 4 and 16 percent. However, by 2008-2012 almost all of Ferguson’s neighborhoods had poverty rates at or above the 20 percent threshold at which the negative effects of concentrated poverty begin to emerge. (One Ferguson tract had a poverty rate of 13.1 percent in 2008-2012, while the remaining tracts fell between 19.8 and 33.3 percent.)

Census Tract-Level Poverty Rates in St. Louis County, 2000

Census Tract-Level Poverty Rates in St. Louis County, 2008-2012

As dramatic as the growth in economic disadvantage has been in this community, Ferguson is not alone.

Within the nation’s 100 largest metro areas, the number of suburban neighborhoods where more than 20 percent of residents live below the federal poverty line more than doubled between 2000 and 2008-2012. Almost every major metro area saw suburban poverty not only grow during the 2000s but also become more concentrated in high-poverty neighborhoods. By 2008-2012, 38 percent of poor residents in the suburbs lived in neighborhoods with poverty rates of 20 percent or higher. For poor black residents in those communities, the figure was 53 percent.

Like Ferguson, many of these changing suburban communities are home to out-of-step power structures, where the leadership class, including the police force, does not reflect the rapid demographic changes that have reshaped these places.

Suburban areas with growing poverty are also frequently characterized by many small, fragmented municipalities; Ferguson is just one of 91 jurisdictions in St. Louis County. This often translates into inadequate resources and capacity to respond to growing needs and can complicate efforts to connect residents with economic opportunities that offer a path out of poverty.

And as concentrated poverty climbs in communities like Ferguson, they find themselves especially ill-equipped to deal with impacts such as poorer education and health outcomes, and higher crime rates. In an article for Salon, Brittney Cooper writes about the outpouring of anger from the community, “Violence is the effect, not the cause of the concentrated poverty that locks that many poor people up together with no conceivable way out and no productive way to channel their rage at having an existence that is adjacent to the American dream.” 

None of this means that there are 1,000 Fergusons-in-waiting, but it should underscore the fact that there are a growing number of communities across the country facing similar, if quieter, deep challenges every day.

A previous version of this post misstated the Ferguson unemployment rate in 2000. It has since been corrected.

       

Editor's note: This article appears in the April 2015 issue of Global Forum. Click here to view the full publication.

Since passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010, the last several years have seen a groundswell in physician payment and delivery reforms designed to achieve higher value health care through incentivizing higher quality care and lower overall costs. Accountable care models, for example, are achieving marked progress by realigning provider incentives toward greater risk-sharing and increased payments and shared savings with measured improvements in quality and cost containment. Medical homes are introducing greater care coordination and team-based care management, while the use of episode-based or bundled payments is removing perverse incentives that reward volume and intensity.

These reforms are coming just as the number of highly targeted, highly priced treatments continues to expand. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved a decade-high 41 novel new drugs in 2014, many of them targeted therapies approved on the basis of increasingly sophisticated progress in genomics and the understanding of disease progression. In areas like oncology, such targeted treatments have grown as a percentage of global oncology market size from 11% in 2003 to 46% in 2013. New brand specialty drug spending in the U.S. is estimated to have been $7.5 billion in 2013, or 69% of total new drug spending. The growing prevalence of these drugs and their cost to the health system are setting the stage for significant flashpoints between industry, payers, and providers, seen most clearly in the debate over hepatitis C treatment costs that roiled stakeholder interactions for most of the past year. 

More of these targeted treatments are in the development pipeline, and a growing number of public policy efforts taking shape in 2015 are focused on accelerating their availability. The House of Representatives' 21st Century Cures Initiative, for example, has released a slew of legislative proposals aimed at promoting breakthrough innovation by increasing the efficiency of drug development and regulatory review. These efforts have significant downstream implications for the pace at which targeted and specialty therapies will become available, their associated costs, and the growing importance of demonstrating value in the postmarket setting.

As payers and providers continue their push toward increased value-based care, more innovative models for connecting such reforms to drug development are needed. Earlier collaboration with industry could enable more efficient identification of unmet need, opportunities to add value through drug development, and clearer input on the value proposition and evidentiary thresholds needed for coverage. Equally important will be unique public-private collaborations that invest in developing a better postmarket data infrastructure that can more effectively identify high value uses of new treatments and support achieving value through new payment reforms.

Stronger collaboration could also improve evidence development and the coverage determination process after a targeted  treatment has gained regulatory approval. Facilitated drug access programs like those proposed by the Medicare Administrative Contractor Palmetto GBA create access points for patients to receive targeted anti-cancer agents off-label while payers and industry gather important additional outcomes data in patient registries. More systematic and efficient use of policies like Medicare's Coverage with Evidence Development (CED), which allows for provisional coverage for promising technologies or treatments while evidence continues to be collected, could enable industry and payers to work together to learn about a medical product's performance in patient populations not typically represented in clinical studies. A CED-type model could be especially useful for certain specialty drugs: data collected as a condition of payment could help payers and providers develop evidence from actual practice to improve treatment algorithms, increase adherence, and improve outcomes. 

Finally, collaborations that support stronger postmarket data collection can also support novel drug payment models that further reward value. Bundled payments that include physician-administered drugs, for example, could encourage providers to increase quality while also incentivizing manufacturers to help promote evidence-based drug use and lower costs for uses that generate low value. Outcomes-based purchasing contracts that tie price paid to a medical product's performance could be another promising approach for high-expense treatment with clearly defined and feasibly measured outcomes.

Many of these ideas are not new, but as manufacturers, payers, providers, and patients move into an increasingly value-focused era of health care, it is clear that they must work together to find new ways to both promote development of promising new treatments while also making good on the promise of value-based health care reforms.

      

Ghana attained middle-income status after rebasing its National Accounts, pushing per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of the country above $1,000 in 2007. After recovering from economic recession in 1984 on account of the Bretton Woods sponsored economic reform introduced at that time, Ghana’s growth has been remarkably strong, with its lowest economic growth of 3.3 percent recorded in 1994. The country’s growth rate reached its peak of 15 percent in 2011 on the back of the commencement of commercial production of oil, making it one of the fastest growing economies globally during that year. This has translated into increased per capita income, which reached a high of about $1,900 in 2013.

The concern, however, has been the ability of the country to sustain this growth momentum given the level and quality of education and skills, and, more importantly, the failure of this strong growth performance to be translated into the creation of productive and decent jobs, improved incomes and livelihoods. The structure of the economy remains highly informal, with a shift in the country’s national output composition from agriculture to low-value service activities in the informal sector. The commencement of commercial production of oil raised the share of the industrial sector in national output. However, the continuous decline in manufacturing value added undermines Ghana’s economic transformation effort to promote high and secure incomes and improve the livelihoods of the people.

Structural change towards higher value added sectors, and upgrading of technologies in existing sectors, is expected to allow for better conditions of work, better jobs, and higher wages. But the low level and quality of human resources not only diverts the economy from its structural transformation path of development but also makes it difficult for the benefits of growth to be spread through the creation of gainful and productive employment. Thus, productive structural economic transformation hinges on the level and quality of education and labor skills. A highly skilled, innovative and knowledgeable workforce constitutes a key ingredient in the process of structural economic transformation, and as productive sectors apply more complex production technologies and research and development activities increase the demand for education and skills. However, the observed weak human capital base does not provide a strong foundation for structural economic transformation of Ghana.

Ghana’s employment growth lags behind economic growth, with an estimated employment elasticity of output of 0.47, suggesting that every 1 percent of annual economic growth yields 0.47 percent growth of total employment.

There is also widespread concern about the quality of the country’s growth in terms of employment and inequality, as well as general improvement in the livelihood of the people (see Alagidede et al. 2013; Aryeetey et al. 2014; Baah-Boateng 2013). A key indicator for measuring the extent to which macroeconomic growth results in gains in the welfare of the citizenry is the quality of jobs that the economy generates. Ghana’s employment growth lags behind economic growth, with an estimated employment elasticity of output of 0.47 (see Baah-Boateng 2013), suggesting that every 1 percent of annual economic growth yields 0.47 percent growth of total employment. Besides the slow rate of job creation is the dominance of vulnerable employment and the working poverty rate in the labor market. In 2010, 7 out of 10 jobs were estimated to be vulnerable while only 1 out of 5 jobs could be considered as productive jobs that meet the standard of decent work (Baah-Boateng and Ewusi 2013). Workers in vulnerable employment tend to lack formal work arrangements as well as elements associated with decent employment such as adequate social security and recourse to effective social dialogue mechanisms (Sparreboom and Baah-Boateng 2011). The working poverty rate remains a challenge with one out of every five persons employed belonging to poor households.

The article seeks to provide an analytical assessment of Ghana’s economic growth as one of Africa’s growth giants over a period of more than two decades and the implication for labour market and livelihood outcomes. Growth of labor productivity at the national and sectoral level is examined, as well as the sectoral contribution to aggregate productivity growth. The article also analyses the effect of growth on employment and the employment-poverty linkage in terms of elasticity within the growth-employment-poverty nexus in Ghana. It also delves into a discussion of the constraints on growth and productive employment from both demand and supply perspectives, and identifies skills gaps and the opportunities offered in the country, which has experienced strong growth performance. The article has five sections, with an overview of Ghana’s economic growth performance in Section 2, after this introductory section. This is followed by an overview of the developments in the labor market, specifically in the area of employment, unemployment, poverty, and inequality in Ghana in Section 3. The growth-employment-poverty linkage analysis is carried out in Section 4 followed by a discussion of constraints to growth and employment generation in Section 5. Section 6 provides a summary and conclusion, with some policy suggestions for the future.

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We can all breathe a big sigh of relief – the job market does not appear to be dramatically slowing.

After a very weak jobs report for the month of May – when only 11,000 jobs were created – the employment numbers bounced back strongly in June, with 287,000 payroll jobs created this month.

This represents the strongest monthly rate of new job creation this year, and is well above economist expectations of about 170,000 jobs created. The return of Verizon workers to their jobs after a strike last month accounted for only about 35,000 of these jobs. Employment growth over the past 3 months now averages 147,000 – a bit below last year’s rate but quite good in a labor market where there is now less slack than before.

Job growth was strong in a range of sectors, including leisure and hospitality, health care and information technology. Growth was also notable in professional and business services, retail trade and finance. Even manufacturing showed a small uptick in employment (of 14,000), after having fallen in previous months (due to the rising value of the dollar and economic slowdowns overseas). But construction jobs this month were flat and mining employment fell again, but only slightly.

On the household side of the ledger, unemployment edged up a bit, from 4.7 to 4.9 percent. But much of this was due to a small bounce back in the labor force participation rate, which had dipped in the previous two months. Other concerns, such as rising part-time employment among those preferring full-time work, were also eased as such employment declined this month.

If there was any disappointment in the report, it was in wage growth. Hourly wages rose by just 2 cents this month, or about 1 percent on an annualized basis. Wage growth had been stronger in the two previous months, suggesting that some labor markets were perhaps tightening up. Over the past year, wage growth has averaged 2.6 percent – above the inflation rate and a modest improvement over previous years in which we were slowly recovering from the Great Recession.

Overall, the June jobs report should ease concerns of a coming economic slowdown, which grew stronger after the “Brexit” vote in Britain. Indeed, this report restores the view that prevailed a few months before, of a slowly but steadily improving labor market.

       

       

I have been coming to Charlotte for 25 years, consulting for the likes of Crosland and Faison Enterprises, and have observed in Charlotte one of the most remarkable metropolitan transformations in the country. The economy has obviously changed, becoming one of the largest concentrations of U.S. financial institutions, thanks to the likes of Hugh McColl, Bank of America and Wachovia.

Your town has seen the metropolitan edge grow into South Carolina and up past Davidson. This sprawl is balanced by the splendor of uptown, or Center City, partially a benefit of McColl's focus on your downtown.

I returned to Charlotte two weeks ago, courtesy of the Charlotte Region Civic By Design Forum, sponsored by AIA Charlotte, to see what has happened since my last visit and to give a speech about the structural shift in how the country is building its built environment. As I mentioned in a column in the Observer before I came (March 8, "Charlotte, walk this way"), the metro areas are changing from just offering the Ozzie and Harriet version of the American Dream and adding a "walkable urban" Seinfeld version as well.

So what did I see in Charlotte?

First, I saw the beginning of the end of sprawl. Like much of the rest of the country, the over-production of automobile-driven suburban development at the fringe of your metropolitan area has reached its limits. The combination of outrageous commutes, high gas prices, and the increasing number of consumers preferring a walkable urban way of life have combined to end the geometric increase in land consumption.

The sub-prime crisis has just accelerated an underlying trend. That trend demonstrates that a lifestyle predicated on cheap gas, subsidized infrastructure and long commutes could not last.

Walkable, urban places

But what is emerging to take its place?Metro Charlotte seems to be following a national trend in creating and growing high-density, walkable urban places. The opening of the Lynx light rail line to the south is showing the way. It starts in a re-energized Center City with the one-of-a-kind performing arts center, museums, high-rise temples of commerce, sports venues, a convention center, high-end hotels, the central library, among other regionally significant treasures. There is now a "there there" in Center City.

However, housing is the true sign that a downtown is viable. For years, the few urbanites in Charlotte found refuge in the Fourth Ward, one of the special places in the South. However, resilient, safe and racially and socially integrated housing districts have emerged in the First, Second and Third Wards, as well as the beginning of luxury high-rise living in the heart of Center City. There even are small grocery stores and some of the best dining in the region. You are seeing the emergence of a Big City.

But it definitely is not confined to Center City.

Downtown-adjacent places such as Southend, arts-focused places like NoDa, and emerging Elizabeth Avenue and Midtown all are providing rich options. Each of these places has its own character. These places offer a somewhat lower density, but still walkable urban, alternative to Center City.

There is going to be a major hurdle to transforming SouthPark into what it wants to be, an upscale walkable urban place like Winter Park in Orlando or Bethesda near Washington, D.C. It was built for the easy movement and storage of the car, and a decision will have to be made as to whether it wants to be a drivable place -- or a walkable place. Right now, it is trying to be both, is neither fish nor fowl, and this will fail. The fact that there are no plans for rail transit nearby is just one of many signs that it is a very confused area.

Metro Charlotte's future

Regardless of whether SouthPark figures out what it wants to be when it grows up, there will be 8-10 regionally significant, walkable urban places to develop in Metro Charlotte over the next two decades. Each will have a unique character and different density. What they will have in common is that they are walkable (also bikable) for most residents' everyday needs and maybe even employment.

Only four or five have begun to germinate so far. SouthPark should be on that list but won't be until it solves its identity crisis. Where will the others emerge? Best bet is to follow the rails. Most will be anchored by a transit station.

I think I have seen the future of Charlotte. Continue to build out the light-rail system and encourage mixed-use, high-density zoning around the stations. You will find that your extraordinary growth of the past generation will continue but in a new and different manner since the market demands different options. You will also find that this new kind of growth will be economically, financially and environmentally more sustainable.

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

There will always be winners and losers as the global economy shifts and evolves. For a long period in the mid- to late 20th century, those losers were cities. Across the developed world, suburbanization shrank inner-city populations just as the industrial base that had once fueled growth succumbed to globalization.

At the end of the 20th century, as global cities such as New York and London pulled themselves out of the malaise of the 1970s, economic growth still eluded many smaller, formerly industrial cities across the United States and Europe. Catalyzing recovery in those older industrial areas was the focus of a decade-long effort of the London School of Economics and the Brookings Institution. As is clear in Cities for a Small Continent, a new book from Anne Power at LSE, the potential in these cities is greater now than ever. In our contribution to the volume, we examine the why and the how of economic transformation in several U.S. cities. 

There has been a lot of focus on the shift in location preferences that is bringing people back to cities. Significant shares of millennials as well as empty nesters are voting for urban communities where they can live, work, and play. At least as important is the restructuring of the U.S. economy—from a closed innovation system where corporations operated isolated research facilities, to an open, networked economy where corporations innovate in collaboration with universities, researchers, entrepreneurs, and investors. Innovation is critical, because as Antoine van Agtmael and Fred Bakker assert in The Smartest Places on Earth, “the era of cheap [in manufacturing] is over; the era of smart has begun.”

These shifts in social preferences and market forces revalue cities and “cityness”—proximity, density, vibrancy, authenticity, and diversity. In particular, population and employment growth is occurring in downtowns and midtowns that have key institutions and assets: universities, medical campuses, cultural venues, historic buildings, walkable streets, and transit connectivity.

This regeneration is being delivered through a new localism in U.S. governance. Every day brings new bottom-up, city-led approaches to the training of workers, the education of children, the mitigation of climate change, the financing of infrastructure, and the development of affordable housing for our workers and quality places for our young and elderly populations.

Across this wide range of activity are some common characteristics.

Cities are harnessing the power of networks of government, business, civic, philanthropic, university, and community institutions and leaders rather than relying on public-sector solutions alone. The focus of the new American localism on unlocking the latent capacity and creativity of public, private, and civic networks differs markedly from the focus of traditional federalism on relationships between levels of government, particularly the federal government and the states.

Cities and metropolitan areas are also deploying capital from an array of public, private, and civic sources at the local, national, and even global levels. With federal investment dwindling, financing of critical projects will increasingly come from public-private collaboration and require experimentation around new forms of innovative finance.

Our chapter highlights four cities in the United States—Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Cleveland, and Detroit—where this new localism has delivered tangible results. Though each city is at a different point of recovery, all have experienced growth in their cores that has been enabled and co-led by anchor institutions, major philanthropies, private-sector leaders, and civic groups. The biggest investments and decisions in these places have been the results of collaborative processes—proof that cities and the institutions that invest in them can be a source of long-term, strategic thinking that ultimately leads to healthier and more prosperous urban economies.

Similar efforts are spreading across the United Kingdom and Europe, though the systems there tend more toward public-sector leadership. In Sheffield, England, a concerted effort by business and academic institutions to “upskill” the manufacturing base, enabled by the flexibility of a “city deal” from the central government, has made the city a global center of advanced manufacturing. Bilbao, Spain evolved from a manufacturing base to a vibrant urban cultural hub by leveraging the value of publicly owned land and other assets for regeneration purposes. Stories such as these are featured throughout Cities for a Small Continent, as well as in a new series of seven case studies from LSE.

We are still in the early stages of this rebalancing of growth. Cities and metropolitan areas experienced decades of population and employment decentralization, poverty concentration, racial separation, and de-industrialization. Such patterns do not get changed overnight. But they are changing. As cities innovate, those solutions must be captured and codified and then replicated across the world.

Watch the May 24, 2016 LSE launch event for Cities for a Small Continent here: 

      

      

As the G-20 Summit concluded in Brisbane, Australia on November 16th, it set a target to achieve an incremental jump in global GDP growth of 2 percent by 2018 and made commitments to creating a Global Infrastructure Investment Initiative (GIII) to address an estimated $5 trillion per year in infrastructure needs around the world. 

It is a valid policy idea to expose the gap between current and potential rates of economic growth to the public. That the Australians put the spotlight on this growth gap was the central achievement of their G-20 Summit in Brisbane. It is a contribution to the global effort to energize the global economy and generate both greater and smarter growth. The question is, will it work? 

The gap between potential and actual growth has more to do with the patterns and sources of growth than the rates of growth. It is certainly necessary to continue to use monetary and fiscal policy to stimulate aggregate, demand-driven growth, but it will not be not sufficient.  

The people-problem in global growth has to do with structural obstacles: market dynamics of globalization tend to increase income inequality; technologies can be labor displacing rather than labor absorbing; and the knowledge-economy requires technical skills that are more sophisticated than investment-driven industrialization.  

As a result, the focus is now on structural policies and reforms, an issue on which the OECD has been an international leader. OECD Secretary General Angel Gurria jointly released an OECD report with Australia Minister of Finance Joseph Hockey in February of this year. At the G-20 Summit in Brisbane, Gurria said that it was possible that the global growth effort by the G-20, which the OECD and IMF are monitoring, could “overshoot” the 2 percent target.  

Discussing structural reforms tends to “get in the weeds” quickly, since the details vary by each country’s circumstances—as made clear by Brisbane’s G-20 Action Plan. Going from the Brisbane G-20 Summit to regional, ministerial, and national agendas and actions becomes the next phase in this effort to boost global growth by shifting the patterns and sources of growth. 

A key component in closing the growth gap will be the aforementioned Global Infrastructure Investment Initiative. The GIII is the culmination of a long discussion involving the G-20, the World Bank, the regional development banks, the private sector and others on how to accelerate much-needed investment in infrastructure—globally, and on a scale that can make a difference, especially in an era of fiscal policy constraints.  

The relationship between private and public investment in global infrastructure and other global growth projects is tricky. Just because many governments face reduced flexibility with fiscal policy at the moment does not mean that the responsibility for infrastructure investment can or will or should be picked up by private investors, much less private financial institutions and markets. The public and private sector each have a vital role. One will not work without the other.

Yet rules and norms do have to be worked out to incentivize private investment in infrastructure. This work is well underway and embodied in the Brisbane GIII. Incremental investment in global infrastructure adds up over time, and prudent direction of financing toward the most impactful projects can be a big boost to global growth and directly have an impact on peoples' lives. This is the kind of people-oriented action G-20 leaders were looking for in Brisbane.

Setting incremental “reach goals” is not just a word game or publicity play. It has proven to be a means of mobilizing resources, policies and efforts by diverse actors to stimulate higher-order results than might otherwise have happened. Just engaging in projecting likely growth outcomes can set the bar too low. In fact, all global goal setting is meant to motivate and mobilize momentum for just such incremental efforts. 

Taken together, a combination of structural reforms, infrastructure investment and continued growth-oriented monetary and fiscal policies can make a real difference in boosting global growth. This combination makes the Brisbane target of an additional 2 percent of global GDP growth by 2018 a feasible, even if ambitious, goal.

       

       

       

       

In a new paper, William Galston and Elaine Kamarck argue that the laws and rules that shape corporate and investor behavior today must be changed. They argue that Wall Street today is trapped in an incentive system that results in delivering quarterly profits and earnings at the expense of long-term investment.

As Galston and Kamarck see it, there’s nothing wrong with paying investors handsome returns, and a vibrant stock market is something to strive for. But when the very few can move stock prices in the short term and simultaneously reap handsome rewards for themselves, not their companies, and when this cycle becomes standard operating procedure, crowding out investments that boost productivity and wage increases that boost consumption, the long-term consequences for the economy are debilitating.

Galston and Kamarck argue that a set of incentives has evolved that favors short-term gains over long-term growth. These damaging incentives include:

• The proliferation of stock buybacks and dividends
• The increase in non-cash compensation
• The fixation on quarterly earnings
• The rise of activist Investors

These micro-incentives are so powerful that once they became pervasive in the private sector, they have broad effects, Galston and Kamarck write. Taken together, they have contributed significantly to economy-wide problems such as: (1) Rising inequality, (2) A shrinking middle class, (3) An increasing wedge between productivity & compensation, (4) Less business investment, and (5) Excessive financialization of the U.S. economy.

So what should be done? Galston and Kamarck propose reining in both share repurchases and the use of stock awards and options to compensate managers as well as refocusing corporate reporting on the long term. To this end, these scholars recommend the following policy steps:

• Repeal SEC Rule 10-B-18 and the 25% exemption
• Improve corporate disclosure practices
• Strengthen sustainability standards in 10-K reporting
• Toughen executive compensation rules
• Reform the taxation of executive compensation

Galston and Kamarck state that the American economy would work better if public corporations behaved more like private and family-held firms—if they made long-term investments, retained and trained their workers, grew organically, and offered reasonable but not excessive compensation to their top managers, based on long-term performance rather than quarterly earnings. To make these significant changes happen, the incentives that shape the decisions of CEOs and board of directors must be restructured. Reining in stock buybacks, reducing short-term equity gains from compensation packages, and shifting managers’ focus toward long-term objectives, Galston and Kamarck argue, will help address the most significant challenges facing America’s workers and corporations.  

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Editor's Note: In the coming decade, China’s economic growth is projected to slow from its long-run average annual rate of 10 percent, sustained over the past three decades. The imminent slowdown also reflects a variety of specific structural challenges. Arthur Kroeber argues that responding effectively to these challenges requires a broad set of reforms in the financial sector, fiscal policy, pricing of key factors such as land and energy which are now subject to extensive government manipulation, and the structure of markets.

In the coming decade, China’s economic growth will certainly slow from the long-run average annual rate of 10% sustained over the past three decades. In part this is a natural slowdown in an economy that is now quite large (around US$7 trillion at market exchange rates) and solidly middle-income (per capita GDP of about US$7,500, at purchasing power parity). Despite the certainty of this slowdown, China’s potential growth rate remains high: per-capita income is still far below the level at which incomes in the other major northeast Asian economies (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) stopped converging with the US level; the per-capita capital stock remains low, suggesting the need for substantial more investment; and the supply of low-cost labor from the traditional agricultural sector has not yet been exhausted. All these factors suggest it should be quite possible for China to achieve average annual real GDP growth of at least 7% a year through 2020.[1]

But the imminent slowdown also reflects a variety of specific structural challenges which require active policy response. Inadequate policies could result in a failure of China to achieve its potential growth rate. Three of the most prominent structural challenges are a reversal of demographic trends from positive to negative; a substantial secular decline in the contribution of exports to growth; and the very rapid increase in credit created by the 2009-10 stimulus program, which almost certainly led to a substantial reduction of the return on capital. Responding effectively to these challenges requires a broad set of reforms in the financial sector, fiscal policy, pricing of key factors such as land and energy which are now subject to extensive government manipulation, and the structure of markets. This paper will argue that financial sector reform is the best and most direct way to overcome these three major structural challenges.

1. China’s growth potential

There are several strong reasons to believe that China has the potential to sustain a fairly rapid rate of GDP growth for at least another decade. We define “fairly rapid” as real growth of 7% a year, which is a very high rate for an economy of China’s size (US$7 trillion), but substantially below the average growth rate since 1980, which has been approximately 10%.

The most general reason for this belief is that China’s economic growth model most closely approximates the successful “catch-up” growth model employed by its northeast Asian neighbors Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in the decades after World War II. The theory behind “catch-up” growth is simply that poor countries whose technological level is far from the global technological frontier can achieve substantial convergence with rich-country income levels by copying and diffusing imported technology. Achieving this catch-up growth requires extensive investments in enabling infrastructure and basic industry, and an industrial policy that focuses on promoting exports. The latter condition is important because a disciplined focus on exports forces companies to keep up with improvements in global technology; in effect, a vibrant export sector is one (and probably the most efficient) mechanism for importing technology.

A survey of 96 major economies from 1970 to 2008 shows that 14 achieved significant convergence growth, defined as an increase of at least 10 percentage points in per capita GDP relative to the United States (at purchasing power parity). Eight of these countries were on the periphery of Europe and so presumably benefited from the spillover effects of western Europe’s rapid growth after World War II, and from the integration of eastern and western Europe after 1990. The other six were Asian export-oriented economies: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand and China. Most of these countries experienced a period of very rapid convergence with US income levels and then a sharp slowdown or leveling off. On average, rapid convergence growth ended when the country’s per capita GDP reached 55% of the US level. The northeast Asian economies that China most closely resembles were among the most successful: convergence growth in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea slowed at 90%, 60% and 50% of US per capita income respectively. In 2010 China’s per capita income was only 20% of the US level. Based on this comparative historical experience, it seems plausible that China could enjoy at least one more decade of relatively rapid growth, until its per capita income reaches 40% or more of the US level.[2]

So China’s growth potential is fairly clear. But realizing this potential is not automatic: it requires a constant process of structural reform to unlock labor productivity gains and improve the return on capital. The urgency of structural reform is particularly acute now. To understand why, we now examine three structural factors that are likely to exert a substantially negative effect on economic growth in coming years.

2. Challenges to growth

When considering China’s structural growth prospects, it is necessary to take account of at least three major challenges to growth. Over the past three decades, rapid economic growth has been supported by favorable demographics, a very strong contribution from exports, and a large increase in the stock of credit. The demographic trend is now starting to go into reverse, the export contribution to growth has slowed dramatically in the last few years, and the expansion of credit cannot be safely sustained for more than another year or two at most.

Demographics. From 1975 to 2010, China’s “dependency ratio”—the ratio of the presumably non-working (young people under the age of 15 and old people above the age of 64) to the presumably working (those aged 15-64) fell from approximately 0.8 to 0.4. Over the same period the “prime worker ratio”—the ratio of people aged 20-59 to those 60 and above—stayed roughly stable at above 5. Both of these ratios indicate that China’s economy enjoyed a very high ratio of workers to non-workers. This situation is favorable for economic growth, because it implies that with a relatively small number of dependent mouths to feed, workers can save a higher proportion of their incomes, and the resulting increase in aggregate national saving becomes available for investment in infrastructure and basic industry.

Over the next two decades, however, these demographic trends will reverse. The dependency ratio will rise, albeit slowly at first, and the prime worker ratio will decline sharply from 5 today to 2 in the early 2030s. These demographic shifts are likely to exert a drag on economic growth, for two reasons.

The first impact, which is already being felt, is a reduction in the supply of new entrants into the labor force—those aged 15-24. This cohort has fluctuated between 200m and 230m since the early 1990s, and in 2010 it stood at the upper end of that range. By 2023 it will have fallen by one-third, to 150m, a far lower figure than at any point since China began economic reforms in 1978. Because the supply of new workers is falling relative to demand for labor, wage growth is likely to accelerate above the rate of labor productivity growth, which appears to be in decline from the very high levels achieved in 2000-2010. As a result, unit labor costs will start to rise (a trend already in evidence in the manufacturing sector since 2004) and inflationary pressures will build. In order to keep inflation at a socially acceptable level, the government will be forced to tighten monetary policy and reduce the trend rate of economic growth.

The second impact will be the large increase in the population of retirees relative to the number of workers available to support them. This is the effect described by the prime worker ratio, which currently shows that there are five people of prime working age for every person of likely retirement age. As this ratio declines, the overall productivity of the economy slows, and the health and pension costs of supporting an aging population rise. The combination of these two effects can contribute to a dramatic slowdown in economic growth: during the period when Japan’s prime worker ratio fell from 5 to 2 (1970-2005), the trend GDP growth rate fell from 8% to under 2% (though demographics, of course, does not explain all of this decline). Over the next 20 years China’s prime worker ratio will decline by exactly the same amount as Japan’s did from 1970-2005.

Export challenge. Another element of China’s extraordinary growth was its rapidly growing export sector. Exports are a crucial component of catch-up growth in poor economies because, as explained above, they act as a vector of technology transfer: in order to remain globally competitive, exporters must continually upgrade their technology (including their processes and management systems) to keep up with the continuous advance of the global technological frontier.

Precisely measuring the impact of exports on economic growth is tricky, because what matters is not headline export value (which contains contributions from imported components and materials), but the domestic value added content of exports. In addition, a dynamic export sector is likely to have indirect impacts on the domestic economy through the wages paid to workers, the long-run effect of technological upgrading and so on. If we ignore these second-round impacts and focus simply on the direct contribution to GDP growth of domestic value added in exports, we find that exports contributed 4.6 percentage points to GDP growth on average in 2003-07. In other words, exports accounted for about 40% of economic growth during that period.[3]

Such a high export contribution to growth is on its face unsustainable for a large continental economy like China’s, and in fact the export contribution has slowed substantially since the 2008 global financial crisis. In 2008-11 the average contribution of export value added to GDP growth was just 1.5 percentage points – about one-third the 2003-07 average. It is likely that the export contribution to growth will fall even further in coming years.

Credit challenge. China responded to the global financial crisis with a very large economic stimulus program which was financed by a large increase in the credit stock. The ratio of non-financial credit (borrowing by government, households and non-financial corporations) rose from 160% in 2008 to over 200% in 2011. While the overall credit/GDP ratio remains lower than the 250% that is typical for OECD nations, a rapid increase in the credit stock in a short period of time, regardless of the level, is frequently associated with financial crisis. In China’s case, it is evident that the majority of the increase in the credit stock reflects borrowing by local governments to finance infrastructure projects which are likely to produce economic benefit in the long run but which in many cases will result in immediate financial losses.[4] To avert a potential banking sector crisis, therefore, it would be prudent for government policy to target first a stabilization and then a decline in the credit/GDP ratio.

The good news is that China has recent experience of deflating a credit bubble. In the five years after the Asian financial crisis (1998-2003), the credit/GDP ratio rose by 40 percentage points (the same amount as in 2008-11) as the government financed infrastructure spending to offset the impact of the crisis. Over the next five years (2003-08), the credit/GDP ratio fell by 20 points, as nominal GDP growth (17% a year on average) outstripped the annual growth in credit (15%). This experience suggests that, in principle, it should be possible to reduce the annual growth in credit significantly without torpedoing economic growth.

The bad news is that the 2003-08 deleveraging occurred within the context of the extremely favorable demographics, and unusually robust export growth that we have just described. Not only are these conditions unlikely to be repeated in the coming decade, both these factors are likely to exert a drag on GDP growth. Given this backdrop, any reduction in the rate of credit growth must be accompanied by extensive measures to ensure that the productivity of each yuan of credit issued is far higher than in the past.

3. The role of financial sector reform

The three growth challenges described above are diverse, but they are reflections of a single broader issue which is that China’s ability to maintain rapid growth mainly through the mobilization of factors (labor and capital) is decreasing. Much of the high-speed growth of the last decade derived from a rapid increase in labor productivity which was in turn a function of an extremely high investment rate: as the amount of capital per worker grew, the potential output of each worker grew correspondingly (“capital deepening”). But the investment rate, at nearly 49% of GDP in 2011, must surely be close to its peak, since it is already 10 percentage points higher than the maximum rates ever reached by Japan or South Korea. So the amount of labor productivity gain that can be achieved in future by simply adding volume to the capital stock must be far less than during the last decade, when the investment/GDP ratio rose by 10 percentage points.

The obvious corollary is that if China’s ability to achieve rapid gains in labor productivity and economic growth through mobilization of capital is declining, these gains must increasingly be achieved by improved capital efficiency. More specifically, the tightening of the labor supply implied by the demographic transition means that unit labor cost growth will accelerate; all things being equal this means that consumer price inflation will be structurally higher in the next decade than it was for most of the last. This in turn means that nominal interest rates will need to be higher. As the cost of capital rises, the average rate of return on capital must also increase; otherwise a larger share of projects will be loss-making and the drag on economic growth will become pronounced.

On the export side, the dramatic slowdown in the contribution to economic growth from exports means the loss of a certain amount of “easy” productivity gains. Greater productivity of domestic capital could help offset the deceleration in productivity growth from the external sector. Finally, as just noted, the need to arrest or reverse the rapid rise in the credit/GDP ratio means that over the next several years, a given amount of economic growth must be achieved with a smaller amount of credit than in the past—in other words, the average return on capital (for which credit here serves as a proxy) must rise.

Conceptually this is all fairly straightforward. The problem for policy makers is that measuring the “productivity of capital” on an economy-wide basis is not at all straightforward. In principle, one could measure the amount of new GDP created for each incremental increase in the capital stock (the incremental capital output ratio or ICOR). But in practice calculating ICOR is cumbersome, and depends heavily on various assumptions, such as the proper depreciation rate. Moreover, in an industrializing economy like China’s, the ratio of capital stock to GDP tends to rise over time and therefore the ICOR falls; this does not mean that the economy misallocates capital but simply that it experiences capital deepening. Sorting out efficiency effects from capital deepening effects is a vexing task.[5]

A more practical approach is simply to examine the ratio of credit to GDP. There is no one “right” level of credit to GDP, since different economies use different proportions of debt and equity finance. But the trends in the credit to GDP ratio in a single country (assuming there is no major shift in the relative importance of debt and equity finance), which are easily measured, can serve as a useful proxy for trends in the productivity of capital, and provide some broad guidelines for policy.

Figure 1 shows the ratio of total non-financial credit to GDP in China since 1998 (all figures are nominal). Total non-financial credit comprises bank loans, bonds, external foreign currency borrowing, and so-called “shadow financing” extended to the government, households and non-financial corporations; it excludes fund-raising by banks and other financial institutions. This measure is similar to the measure of “total social financing” recently introduced by the People’s Bank of China. 

This shows, as noted previously, that the credit to GDP ratio rose sharply from 160% of GDP in 2008 to 200% in 2010. The current ratio is not abnormally high: many OECD countries have credit/GDP ratios of 250% or so, and Japan’s is around 350%. But it is obvious that the trend increase is worrying: if credit/GDP continues to rise at 20 percentage points a year then by 2015 it would hit 300%, a level much higher than is normal in healthy economies. It seems intuitively clear that to ensure financial stability, policy should target a stabilization or decline in the credit/GDP ratio. Success in this policy would imply that the productivity of credit, and capital more generally, improves.

The large increase in the credit/GDP ratio in 2008-10 is not unprecedented. Following the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the total credit stock rose from 143% of GDP in 1998 to 186% in 2003, an increase of 43 percentage points in five years, as a result of government spending on infrastructure and the creation of new consumer lending markets (notably home mortgages). During this period the credit stock grew at an average annual rate of 15.9%, but nominal GDP grew at just 10% a year.

Over the next five years, 2004-08, the average annual growth in total credit decelerated only slightly, to 14.8%. But thanks to a gigantic surge in productivity growth—caused by a combination of the delayed effect of infrastructure spending, deep market reforms (such as the restructuring of the state owned enterprise sector), and a boom in exports—nominal GDP growth surged to an average rate of 18.3%. As a consequence, the credit/GDP ratio declined to 160% in 2008, a decline of 26 percentage points from the peak five years earlier.

This experience shows that, in a developing country like China, it is quite possible to deflate a credit bubble relatively quickly and painlessly. To do so, however, two conditions must be met: the projects financed during the credit bubble must, in the main, be economically productive in the long run even if they cause financial losses in the short run; and structural reforms must accompany or quickly follow the credit expansion, in order to unlock the productivity growth that will enable deleveraging through rapid economic growth rather than through a painful recession. These conditions were clearly met during the 1998-2008 period: the expanded credit of the first five years mainly went to economically useful infrastructure such as highways, telecoms networks and port facilities; and deep structural reforms improved the efficiency of the state sector, expanded opportunities for the private sector, and created a new private housing market. This combination of infrastructure and reforms helped lay the groundwork for the turbo-charged growth of 2004-08.

The credit expansion of 2008-10, following the global financial crisis, was about the same magnitude as the credit expansion of a decade earlier: the credit/GDP ratio rose 40 percentage points, from 160% to 200%. But the expansion was much more rapid (occurring over two years instead of five), and while the bulk of credit probably did finance economically productive infrastructure, there is evidence that the sheer speed of the credit expansion led to far greater financial losses. A large proportion of the new borrowing was done by local government window corporations, often with little or no collateral and in many cases with no likelihood of project cash flows ever being large enough to service the loans. A plausible estimate of eventual losses on these loans to local governments is Rmb2-3 trn, or 4-7% of 2011 GDP.

Furthermore, whereas in the late 1990s restructuring of the state enterprise sector and creation of the private housing market took off at the same time the government began to expand credit, the 2008-10 credit expansion occurred without any significant accompanying structural reforms. In sum we have significantly less reason to be confident about the foundations for economic growth over the next five years than would have been the case in 2003.

On the assumption that the trend rate of nominal GDP growth over the next five years is likely be quite a bit less than in 2003-08, just how difficult will it be for China to stabilize or better yet reduce the credit to GDP ratio? For the purposes of analysis, Figure 1 proposes two scenarios. Both assume that nominal GDP will grow at an average rate of 13% in 2012-2015 (combining real growth of 7.5% a year with economy-wide inflation of 5.5%). The “stabilization” scenario assumes that total credit grows at the same 13% rate, stabilizing the credit/GDP ratio at around 200%. The “deleveraging” scenario assumes that credit growth falls to 9.5% a year, enabling a reduction in the credit/GDP ratio of 25 percentage points to 175%--about the same magnitude as the reduction of 2003-08.

A quick glance suggests that achieving either of these two outcomes will be far more difficult than in the previous deleveraging episode. In 2003-08, the average annual rate of credit growth was just one percentage point lower than during the credit bubble of 1998-2003. In other words, the work of deleveraging was accomplished almost entirely through economic growth, rather than through any material constraint on credit.

In the three years following the global financial crisis, by contrast, total credit expanded by 22.7% a year, generating nominal GDP growth of 14.1% on average. The required drop in average annual credit growth is 10 percentage points under the stabilization scenario and 13 points under the deleveraging scenario, while nominal GDP growth declines by only a point. In other words, this episode is likely to be the reverse of the 2003-08 episode: deleveraging will need to come almost entirely from a constraint on credit, rather than from economic growth.



Another way of looking at this is to examine the relationship between incremental credit and incremental GDP—that is, how many yuan of new GDP arise with each new yuan of credit. This calculation is presented in Figure 2. This shows that in 1998-2003 each Rmb1 of new credit generated Rmb0.39 of new GDP; this figure rose to 0.72 in 2003-08, an 84% increase in the productivity of credit. The GDP payoff from new credit in 2008-10 was far worse than in 1998-2003. Simply to stabilize the credit/GDP ratio at its current level will require a 73% increase in credit productivity. To achieve the deleveraging scenario, a 150% improvement will be required.

The good news is that under the deleveraging scenario, the average productivity of credit in 2011-2015 only needs to be the same as it was in 2003-08. In principle, this should be achievable. But as previously noted, the mechanism of improvement needs to be quite different this time round. In 2003-08, the productivity of credit rose because credit growth remained roughly constant while GDP growth surged, thanks to structural reforms that accelerated returns to both capital and labor. Over the next several years, by contrast, the best that can be hoped for is that GDP growth will remain roughly constant. Consequently any improvement in credit productivity must come from constraining the issuance of new credit, while substantially raising the efficiency of credit allocation and hence the returns to credit.

What are the main mechanisms for improving the efficiency of credit, and of financial capital more generally? Broadly speaking, there are two: diversification of credit channels, and more market-based pricing of credit. Historically most credit has been issued by large state-owned banks, which are subject to political pressure in their lending decisions, and the majority of credit has gone to state-owned enterprises. Diversifying the channels of credit to include a broader range of financial institutions, a more vigorous bond market, and even by encouraging the creation of dedicated small- and medium-size enterprise lending units within the big banks, should improve credit allocation by giving greater credit access to borrowers who were previously shut out simply by virtue of a lack of political connections. Over the past decade government policy has been broadly supportive of the diversification of credit channels: specialized consumer credit, leasing and trust companies have been allowed to flourish, and there is some anecdotal evidence that SME lending at the state owned banks has begun to pick up steam.

The government has been far more reluctant, however, to embrace systematic measures for improving the pricing of credit. Bank interest rates remain captive to the policy of regulated deposit rates. Guaranteed low deposit rates means that banks have little incentive to seek out and properly price riskier assets, and are content to earn a fat spread on relatively conservative loan books. Bond markets, which in more developed economies form the basis for pricing of financial risk, are in China large in primary issuance, but small in trading volumes. The majority of bonds are purchased by banks and other financial institutions and held to maturity, make them indistinguishable from bank loans. Active secondary market trading by a wide range of participants is the essential mechanism by which bond prices become the basis for financial risk pricing.

4. Conclusions and recommendations

China still has potential for another decade of relatively high speed growth, but a combination of structural factors means that “high speed” in future likely means a trend GDP growth rate of around 7%, well below the historic average of 10%. Moreover, a combination of negative trends in demographics and the external sector, and the need to constrain credit growth after the enormous credit expansion of 2008-2010, mean the obstacles to realizing this potential growth rate are quite large. In order to overcome these obstacles, the efficiency of credit, and of capital more generally, must be improved. A large increase in credit efficiency was achieved in the previous economic deleveraging episode of 2003-08, but that increase in efficiency resulted mainly from an acceleration in GDP growth due to capital deepening, rather than from a constraint on credit. Over the next several years, the best that can plausibly be achieved is a stabilization of nominal GDP growth at approximately the current level. Any increase in credit efficiency must therefore come from a constraint on credit growth and direct improvements in credit allocation, rather than from capital-intensive economic growth.

In order to achieve this improvement in credit efficiency, three improvements to China’s financial architecture are urgently needed. First, the diversification of financial channels should continue to be expanded, notably through the acceptance and proper regulation of so-called “shadow financing” activities, which reflect market pressure for higher returns to depositors and greater credit availability (at appropriate prices) for riskier borrowers. Second, the ceiling on bank deposit rates should gradually be lifted and ultimately abolished, in order to give banks incentives for increased lending at appropriate prices to riskier borrowers who (it is to be hoped) will deliver a higher risk-adjusted rate of return than current borrowers. Third, steps should be taken to increase secondary trading on bond markets, in order to enable these markets to assume their appropriate role as the basis of financial risk pricing. Particular stress should be laid on diversifying the universe of financial institutions permitted to trade on bond markets, to include pension funds, specialized fixed-income mutual funds and other institutional investors with a vested interest in active trading to maximize both short- and long-term returns.

 

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Time and again, China has defied the skeptics who claimed its unique mixed model—an ever-more market-driven economy dominated by an authoritarian Communist Party and behemoth state-owned enterprises—could not possibly endure. Today, those voices are louder than ever. Michael Pettis, a professor at Peking University's Guanghua School of Management and one of the most persistent and well-regarded skeptics, predicted in March that China's economic growth rate "will average not much more than 3% annually over the rest of the decade." Barry Eichengreen, an economist at the University of California, Berkeley, warned last year that China is nearing a wall hit by many high-speed economies when growth slows or stops altogether—the so-called "middle-income trap."

No question, China has many problems. Years of one-sided investment-driven growth have created obvious excesses and overcapacity. A weaker global economy since the 2008 financial crisis and rapidly rising labor cost at home have slowed China's vaunted export machine. Meanwhile, a massive housing bubble is slowly deflating, and the latest economic data is discouraging. Real growth in GDP slowed to an annualized rate of less than 7 percent in the first quarter of 2012, and April saw a sharp slowdown in industrial output, electricity production, bank lending, and property transactions. Is China's legendary economy in serious trouble?

Not just yet. The odds are that China will navigate these shoals and continue to grow at a fairly rapid pace of around 7 percent a year for the remainder of the decade, overtaking the United States to become the world's biggest economy around 2020. That's a lot slower than the historical average of 10 percent, but still solid. Considerably less certain, however, is whether China's secretive and corrupt Communist Party can make this growth equitable, inclusive, and fair. Rather than economic collapse, it's far more likely that a decade from now China will have a strong economy but a deeply flawed and unstable society.

China's economic model, for all its odd communist trappings, closely resembles the successful strategy for "catch-up growth" pioneered by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan after World War II. The theory behind catch-up growth is that poor countries can achieve substantial convergence with rich-country income levels by simply copying and diffusing imported technology. In the 1950s and 1960s, for instance, Japan reverse-engineered products such as cars, watches, and cameras, enabling the emergence of global firms like Toyota, Nikon, and Sony. Achieving catch-up growth requires an export-focused industrial policy, intensive investment in enabling infrastructure and basic industry, and tight control over the financial system so that it supports infrastructure, basic industries, and exporters, instead of trying to maximize its own profits.

China's catch-up phase is far from over. It has mastered the production of basic industrial materials and consumer products, but its move into sophisticated machinery and high-tech products has only just begun. In 2010, China's per capita income was only 20 percent of the U.S. level. By most measures, China's economy today is comparable to Japan's in the late 1960s and South Korea's and Taiwan's around 1980. Each of those countries subsequently experienced another decade or two of rapid growth. Given the similarity of their economic systems, there is no obvious reason China should differ.

For catch-up countries, growth is mainly about resource mobilization, not resource efficiency, which is the name of the game for lower-growth rich countries. Historically, about two-thirds of China's annual real GDP growth has come from additions of capital and labor. Mainly this means moving workers out of traditional agriculture and into the modern labor force, and increasing the amount of capital inputs (like machinery and software) per worker. Less than a third of growth in China comes from greater efficiency in resource use.

In a rich country like the United States—which already has abundant capital resources and employs all its workers in the modern sector—the reverse is true. About two-thirds of growth comes from efficiency improvements and only one-third from additions to labor or capital. Conditioned by their own experience to believe that economic growth is mainly about efficiency, analysts from rich countries come to China, see widespread waste and inefficiency, and conclude that growth must be unsustainable. They miss the larger picture: The system's immense success in mobilizing capital and labor resources overwhelms marginal efficiency problems.

All developing economies eventually reach the point where they have moved most of their workers into the modern sector and have installed roughly as much capital as they need. At that point, growth tends to slow sharply. In countries that fail to make the tricky transition from a mobilization to an efficiency focus (think Latin America), real growth in per capita GDP can virtually grind to a halt. Such countries also find themselves stuck with high levels of income inequality, which tends to rise during the resource mobilization period and fall during the efficiency phase. Some worry that China—which for the last decade has had by far the highest capital spending boom in history—is already on the edge of this precipice. But the data do not support this pessimistic view. First, much surplus agricultural labor remains. Just over one-third of China's labor force still works in agriculture; the other northeast Asian economies did not see their growth rates slow noticeably until the agricultural share of the workforce fell below 20 percent. It will take about a decade for China to reach this level.

And despite years of breakneck building, China's stock of fixed capital—the total value of infrastructure, housing, and industrial plants—is not all that large relative to either the economy or the population. Rich countries typically have a capital stock a bit more than three times their annual GDP. For China, the figure is about two and a half. And on a per capita basis, China has about as much fixed capital as Japan did in the late 1960s and less than a third of what the United States had as long ago as 1930. Further large-scale investments are still required. So China's economy can continue to grow in part based on capital spending, though a gradual transition to a consumer-led economy does need to begin soon.

One illustration of China's enduring capital deficit is housing. Scarred by the catastrophic U.S. housing bubble, many observers see an even scarier property bubble in China. Robert Z. Aliber, who literally wrote the book on financial manias, called China's housing boom "totally unsustainable" this January. And it's true: Since 2005, land and housing prices have rocketed, and the outskirts of many cities are dotted by blocks of vacant apartment buildings.

But China's housing situation differs dramatically from that of the United States. The U.S. bubble started with too much borrowing (mortgages issued at 95 percent or more of a house's supposed market value), which caused a rise in housing prices far beyond the well-established trend of the previous 40 years and sparked the construction of far more houses than there were families to buy them. In China, mortgage borrowing is modest; price appreciation was mainly a one-off growth spurt in an infant market, rather than a deviation from established trend; and there is a desperate shortage of decent housing.

Since 2000, the average house in China has been bought with around 60 percent cash down, according to research by my firm, GK Dragonomics, and the minimum legal down payment has been something in the range of 20 to 30 percent—a far cry from the subprime excesses of the United States. House prices rose rapidly, but that's partly because they were artificially low before 2000, when state-owned enterprises allocated most of the housing and there was no private market. Much of the home-price appreciation of the last decade was simply a matter of the market catching up with underlying reality. And despite articles about "ghost cities" of empty apartment blocks, the bigger truth is that urban China has a housing shortage—the opposite of what typically happens at the end of a bubble.

Nearly one-third of China's 225 million urban households live in a dwelling without its own kitchen or toilet. That's like the entire country of Indonesia living in factory dormitories, temporary shelters on construction sites, basement air-raid shelters, or shanties on city outskirts. Over the next two decades, if present trends continue, another 300 million people— equivalent to nearly the entire population of the United States—will move from the countryside to China's cities. To accommodate these new migrants, alleviate the present shortage, and replace dilapidated housing, China will need to build 10 million housing units a year every year from now to 2030. Actual average completions from 2000 to 2010 were just 7 million a year, so China still has a lot of building to do. The same goes for much basic infrastructure such as power plants, gas and water supplies, and air cargo facilities.

Yet the housing market also illustrates China's true problem: not that growth is unsustainable, but that it is deeply unfair. The overall housing shortage coexists with an oversupply of luxury housing, built to cater to a new elite. Although most Chinese have benefited from economic growth, the top tier have benefited obscenely—often simply because of their government or party connections, which enable them to profit immensely from land grabs, graft on construction projects, or insider access to lucrative stock market listings. A 2010 study by Chinese economist Wang Xiaolu found that the top 2 percent of households earned a staggering 35 percent of national urban income. A handful of giant state firms, secure in monopoly positions and flush with cheap loans from state banks, has almost unlimited access to moneymaking opportunities. The state-owned banks themselves earned a staggering $165 billion in 2011. Yet private firms, which produce almost all of China's productivity and employment gains, earn thin margins and suffer pervasive discrimination.

At the root lies a political system built on a principle of unfairness. The Communist Party ultimately controls the allocation of all resources; its officials are effectively immune to legal prosecution until they first undergo an opaque internal disciplinary process. Occasionally a high official is brought down on corruption charges, like former Chongqing party secretary Bo Xilai. But such cases reflect elite power struggles, not a determined effort to end corruption. In a few years' time, China will likely surpass the United States as the world's top economy. But until it solves its fairness problem, it will remain a second-rate society.

      

The recent gyrations in the Chinese interbank market underscore that the chief risk to global growth now comes from China. Make no mistake: credit policy will tighten substantially in the coming months, as the government tries to push loan growth from its current rate of 20% down to something much closer to the rate of nominal GDP growth, which is about half that. Moreover, in the last few months of the year the new government will likely start concrete action on some long-deferred structural reforms. These reforms will bolster China’s medium-term growth prospects, but the short-term impact will be tough for the economy and for markets.

The combination of tighter credit and structural reforms means that with the best of luck China could post GDP growth in 2014 of a bit over 6%, its weakest showing in 15 years and well below most current forecasts. A policy mistake such as excessive monetary tightening could easily push growth below the 6% mark. Banks and corporations appear finally to be getting the message that the new government, unlike its predecessor, will not support growth at some arbitrary level through investment stimulus.

The dire performance of China’s stock markets in the past two weeks reflects this growing realization among domestic investors, although we suspect stocks have further to fall before weaker growth is fully discounted.

Slower growth… but no Armageddon

But the China risk is mainly of a negative growth shock, not financial Armageddon as some gloomier commentary suggests. Financial crisis risk remains relatively low because the system is closed and the usual triggers are unavailable. Emerging market financial crises usually erupt for one of two reasons: a sudden departure of foreign creditors or a drying-up of domestic funding sources for banks. China has little net exposure to foreign creditors and runs a large current account surplus, so there is no foreign trigger. And until now, banks have funded themselves mainly from deposits at a loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR) of under 70%, although the increased use of quasi-deposit wealth management products means the true LDR may be a bit higher, especially for smaller banks. The danger arises when banks push up their LDRs and increasingly fund themselves from the wholesale market. So a domestic funding trigger does not exist—yet.

The People’s Bank of China clearly understands the systemic risk of letting banks run up lending based on fickle wholesale funding. This is why it put its foot down last week and initially refused to pump money into the straitened interbank market. Interbank and repo rates have dropped back from their elevated levels, but remain significantly above the historical average. The message to banks is clear: lend within your means. This stance raises confidence that Beijing will not let the credit bubble get out of control. But it also raises the odds that both credit and economic growth will slow sharply in the coming 6-12 months.

If the economy slows and local stock markets continue to tumble, doesn’t this mean the renminbi will also weaken sharply? Not necessarily. Beijing has a long-term policy interest in increasing the international use of the renminbi, which can only occur if the currency earns a reputation as a reliable store of value in good times and bad. Allowing a sharp devaluation now runs against this interest, and also would be a sharp break from a long-established policy of not resorting to devaluation to stimulate growth, even at moments of severe stress (as in 1997-98 and 2008-09). So while our call on China growth has been marked down, our call on the renminbi has not.

Short-term pain is better than long-term stagnation

From a broader perspective, the biggest China risk is not that the country suffers a year or two of sharply below-trend growth. If that slowdown reflects more rational credit allocation and the early, painful stages of productivity-enhancing reforms, it will be healthy medicine. And even a much slower China will still be growing faster than all developed markets and most emerging ones.

The real risk is rather that the new government will show a lack of nerve or muscle and fail to push through financial sector liberalization, deregulation of markets to favor private firms, and fiscal reforms to curtail local governments’ ability to prop up failing firms, overspend on infrastructure, and inflate property bubbles. The old government wasted the last three years of its term doing none of these things despite the obvious need. The new leaders are talking a better game, but they have a year at most to articulate a clear reform program, begin implementation (liberalizing interest rates and freeing electricity prices would be a good start), and ruthlessly removing senior officials who stand in the way. If they fail to deliver, then the short-term slowdown could become a long and dismal decline.

       

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Despite being a developed and prosperous country, Japan faces a host of basic challenges today and going forward—some of its own creation and others beyond the country’s control. For example, Japan lacks essential natural resources, while also facing overcrowding in cities and depopulation in rural areas. As a result, food and energy self-sufficiency is low. Also, while the dual phenomena of a low birthrate and an ageing population have long been deemed problematic, these issues are rapidly growing more serious. The problems Japan faces today are potentially the same problems the rest of the world will face in the near future. Japan, therefore, may serve as a bellwether for the global community as many nations anticipate similar challenges in the future.  

On October 26, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings and the U.S.-Japan Research Institute co-hosted Hiroshi Komiyama, chairman of the Mitsubishi Research Institute and president emeritus of the University of Tokyo, for a discussion of his recent book, “Beyond the Limits to Growth: New Ideas for Sustainability from Japan.” In this book, Komiyama examines the issues facing Japan—and the world—presenting a number of potential viable solutions and offering insights into Japan’s experiences and the lessons it can provide for a more sustainable future.

 

Audio

• Overcoming the limits to growth: Sustainability lessons from Japan

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20151026_japan_sustainability_transcript
• hiroshi komiyama presentation

       

       

       

Robert Sargent Shriver, Jr. guided the Peace Corps from its inception in 1961 (when it was a nascent vision of service and citizen diplomacy) to establish a renowned track record of success over the past half century, in which more than 200,000 volunteers and trainees have served in 139 countries.

The legacy of Shriver’s leadership with the Peace Corps and later with the Office on Economic Opportunity and Special Olympics has reached and changed millions of lives—of both those empowered and those who served—from impoverished communities across rural and urban America to huts and villages in developing nations throughout the world. Yet one of the greatest gifts he leaves us is the foundation to build on those accomplishments to scale-up service as a direly needed “soft power” alternative to establish international understanding and collaboration in a volatile world. As Sarge put it, so simply but powerfully: “Caring for others is the practice of peace.”

Sarge Shriver’s unquenchable idealism today is being advanced by a new generation of social entrepreneurs such as Dr. Ed O’Neil, founder of OmniMed and chair of the Brookings International Volunteering Project health service policy group. With the help of Peace Corps volunteers and USAID-supported Volunteers for Prosperity, O’Neil has fielded an impressive service initiative in Ugandan villages that has expanded the capacity and reach of local health-service volunteers engaged in malaria prevention and education on basic hygiene. 

Timothy Shriver, who succeeded his parents, Sarge and Eunice, at the helm of the Special Olympics, speaks eloquently on the move of a second generation from politics to building civil society coalitions promoting soft power acts of service and love, one at a time. This impulse is echoed in the Service World policy platform which hundreds of NGOs and faith-based groups, corporations and universities have launched to scale-up the impact of international service initiatives. This ambitious undertaking was first announced by longtime Shriver protégé former Senator Harris Wofford at a Service Nation forum convened on the morning of President Obama’s Cairo speech in which he called for a new wave of global service and interfaith initiatives.

I had the privilege of serving as a national director of the VISTA program inspired by Shriver and  to work alongside Senator Wofford and John Bridgeland, President George W. Bush’s  former White House Freedom Corps director, who have co-chaired the Brookings International Volunteering Project policy team. Along with Tim Shriver, they have ignited the Service World call to action, together with Michelle Nunn of Points of Light Institute, Steve Rosenthal of the Building Bridges Coalition, Kevin Quigley of the National Peace Corps Association and many others.

The Obama administration and Congress would best honor the life and legacy of Sarge Shriver by calling for congressional hearings and fast- tracking agency actions outlined in the Service World platform and naming the global service legislation after him. Coupled with innovative private-sector and federal agency innovations, the legislation would authorize Global Service Fellowships, link volunteer capacity-building to USAID development programs such as  Volunteers for Prosperity, and double the Peace Corps to reach a combined goal of 100,000 global service volunteers annually—a goal first declared by JFK.

Those who promote opportunity and service as vehicles to advance peace and international collaboration will continue to draw inspiration from Sargent Shriver’s indefatigable quest for social justice―from the time he talked then-Senator John F. Kennedy into intervening in the unjust jailing of Martin Luther King, Jr. to his refusal to accept wanton violence and impoverished conditions in any corner of the world.

Information on offering online tributes to the Shriver family and donations in lieu of flowers requested by the family of Sargent Shriver can be found at www.sargentshriver.org .

      

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On December 4 to 6, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted its 12th annual Saban Forum, titled “Israel and the United States: Yesterday, today, and tomorrow.” The 2015 Saban Forum included webcasts featuring remarks by Israel’s Minister of Defense Moshe Ya’alon, Chairman of the Yesh Atid Party Yair Lapid, National Security Adviser to President George W. Bush Stephen Hadley, Secretary of State John Kerry, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (via video), and former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. The forum’s webcast sessions focused on the future for Israelis and Palestinians, Iran’s role in the Middle East, spillover from the war in Syria, and the global threat posed by the Islamic State and other violent jihadi groups.

Over the past twelve years, the Saban Forum has become the premier platform for frank dialogue between American and Israeli leaders from government, civil society, business, and the media. As a result, the Saban Forum is a seminal event, generating new ideas and helping shape the future of the U.S.-Israel relationship.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #Saban15

Video

• A conversation with Moshe Ya’alon, Israel’s minister of defense
• How to restore order in the Middle East
• Keynote address: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry
• Address by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (via video)
• Keynote address: Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton

Audio

• Saturday, December 5, 8:00pm - How to preserve Israel as a Jewish and Democratic state

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript--Keynote address: Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton (.pdf)
• Uncorrected Transcript--Address by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (.pdf)
• Uncorrected Transcript--How to preserve Israel as a Jewish and Democratic state (.pdf)
• U.S. Department of State Release--Remarks by Secretary of State John Kerry (.pdf)
• Uncorrected Transcript--How to restore order in the Middle East (.pdf)
• Uncorrected Transcript--A conversation with Moshe Ya'alon, Israel's minister of defense (.pdf)

Event Materials

• Uncorrected TranscriptKeynote addressFormer Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton
• Uncorrected TranscriptAddress by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
• Uncorrected TranscriptHow to preserve Israel as a Jewish and Democratic state
• US Department of State ReleaseRemarks by Secretary of State John Kerry
• Uncorrected TranscriptHow to restore order in the Middle East 2
• Uncorrected TranscriptA conversation with Moshe Yaalon Israels minister of defense

      

What a way to start the new year. Decades of Saudi-Iranian tensions reached a new high this past week. The cycle of reactions to Riyadh’s execution of prominent Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr on January 2 is a reminder of how the Saudis, and their Iranian rivals, have viewed and used sectarianism throughout the tumultuous period since 2011.

Al-Nimr was arrested in 2012 and subsequently sentenced to death for allegedly "seeking ‘foreign meddling’ in Saudi Arabia, ‘disobeying’ its rulers and taking up arms against the security forces." The arrest was meant not merely as a signal to Tehran, but at least as much to Saudi Arabia’s own Shiite minority. Shiites comprise as much as 20 percent of the Saudi population, and are concentrated in the oil-rich Eastern Province—and the community has regularly erupted in protests against its economic and political marginalization. In 2011, amid the Arab Spring uprisings in majority-Shiite Bahrain, Saudi Shiites also demonstrated for the release of long-held prisoners, and Saudi forces shot and killed several Shia in the streets.

Riyadh’s decision to carry out the death sentence was greeted with demonstrations in Iran and attacks on Saudi diplomatic facilities. This Iranian reaction must have been calculated, as al-Nimr has been on “death row” for a very long time. In response, Saudi Arabia quickly cut ties with its longtime geopolitical foe and urged fellow Sunni governments to follow suit. So far, Bahrain and Sudan have also cut off relations, and both Qatar and the UAE have downgraded them. 

Governments on both sides of the Sunni-Shiite divide found a sectarian narrative useful in rallying their populations and in justifying their actions in response to the 2011 Arab uprisings. The sectarian narrative has helped the parties in this larger regional power struggle mobilize support by playing up the sectarian dimension of protests in Bahrain, the Assad regime’s crackdown in Syria, and the breakdown of inclusive politics in Iraq. Likewise, many Sunni-led countries have found sectarian rhetoric an effective way to rally Sunni citizens, intimidate their own Shiite populations, and to justify crackdowns on dissent. 

Governments on both sides of the Sunni-Shiite divide found a sectarian narrative useful in rallying their populations and in justifying their actions in response to the 2011 Arab uprisings.

Last April, I wrote that Iran was likely to escalate its asymmetric efforts to destabilize Arab politics by exploiting the cracks within Arab societies. They have done so, and it is a form of escalation the Saudis are ill-equipped to match. Last summer, I suggested that the Sunni Arab states could defend best against this Iranian subversion by tamping down sectarian tensions and working to heal the rifts within their own societies through inclusive political and economic policies. So far, I have not seen much effort from the Arab Gulf states in that direction—instead, they have doubled down on divisive sectarianism in Yemen and elsewhere. As this escalatory spiral advances, civilians will pay the price. 

Some are portraying the decision to execute al-Nimr as a negative Saudi response to Iranian efforts at rapprochement over the last few weeks. I do not necessarily see it that way, because the Iranians have done as much as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to provoke and exploit tensions between the two in recent times. That notwithstanding, there is no question this execution will inflame sectarian tensions in the Gulf and Iraq, as well as present the Islamic State with new opportunities. 

It has been clear for some time that the U.S. focus on the threat from the so-called Islamic State is simply not matched by the Saudis, who are far more concerned about Iran and Shiite expansionism than by this violent extremist Sunni group in their neighborhood. As such, the execution and ensuing crisis brings the clash of U.S. and Saudi interests into sharp relief and has the potential to become an inflection point in regional affairs – not necessarily because of the way the Saudi and Iranian governments choose to play, but because of how others might react.

For example, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi quickly and publicly condemned the execution. The execution—and the inevitable crackdown on Shiite protests in Qatif—might increase pressure on Abadi from Shiites in Iraq (and from Iran) to demonstrate sectarian preferences in his rhetoric and policy. That could prevent him from moving forward on steps Washington has been pushing to bring Iraqi Sunnis back into the political fold. This easily could threaten the anti-Islamic State campaign in Iraq, since it relies on Sunnis in Ramadi, Mosul, and elsewhere turning away from Islamic State and back toward the Iraqi state. Iraqi counterterrorism forces have taken much of Ramadi, but they cannot hold it without local Sunni support.

Increased Islamic State influence in the Arabian Peninsula would certainly challenge the Saudi government and prompt a renewed securitization of domestic policy.

The Islamic State worked hard to stoke sectarian tensions within the Gulf states over the past year, carrying out attacks on Shiite mosques in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The GCC leaders were not drawn in at that stage, instead expressing solidarity with their Shiite compatriots. But this time, a Sunni Gulf government is taking steps that exacerbate sectarian tensions—and that could very easily push the Islamic State to take up the issue again by attempting more such attacks. Increased Islamic State influence in the Arabian Peninsula would certainly challenge the Saudi government and prompt a renewed securitization of domestic policy. It would be an ironic outcome of a Saudi move—47 executions, mostly of Sunni extremists—that was intended to deter ISIS sympathizers. At a moment when low oil prices and a tightened financial future constrain their capacity to coopt a large, underemployed, youthful populace, this is not a recipe for stability.

The possibility that ISIS will gain from this crisis illustrates the problem with governments self-interestedly wielding that sectarian narrative is that it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, and it actually increases the incentive on both sides of the sectarian divide to escalate their real power competition, both directly and through proxies. Today, that narrative of sectarian conflict is far more than rhetoric in Iraq and Syria, where a true intercommunal conflict is underway. 

More immediately, the ripple effects of al-Nimr’s execution spotlight American policy dilemmas in the region. The escalation in sectarian conflict threatens the nascent Syrian peace process. It increases the Islamic State’s scope for action there, threatens the political dimension of the anti-Islamic State strategy in Iraq, and incentivizes Sunni extremism in the Arabian Peninsula. It pushes the Yemen war further from resolution as well, leaving al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) with room to grow and plan attacks against the American homeland. And it puts the United States into a very tight spot as it continues diplomatic dialogue with Iran in the wake of the nuclear agreement. Given this beginning, 2016 looks to be an even tougher year for the United States in the Middle East than 2015.

      

ABSTRACT

Recent literature has expressed considerable pessimism about the prospects for both productivity and overall economic growth in the U.S. economy, based either on the idea that the pace of innovation has slowed or on concern that innovation today is hurting job creation. While recognizing the problems facing the economy, this paper offers a more optimistic view of both innovation and future growth, a potential return to the innovation and employment-led growth of the 1990s. Technological opportunities remain strong in advanced manufacturing and the energy revolution will spur new investment, not only in energy extraction, but also in the transportation sector and in energy-intensive manufacturing. Education, health care, infrastructure (construction) and government are large sectors of the economy that have lagged behind in productivity growth historically. This is not because of a lack of opportunities for innovation and change but because of a lack of incentives for change and institutional rigidity.

Download the full paper »

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• U.S. Productivity Growth: An Optimistic Perspective

       

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Featuring keynote remarks by Jason Furman, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board

Productivity growth in the United States slowed sharply around 2005, which has contributed to slow growth in wages and downward revisions to estimates of long run economic growth. The global economy has grown incredibly fast since 1950, with global GDP expanding six-fold and average per capita income nearly tripling. A larger workforce and increased productivity spurred this growth. However, the global workforce is expected to grow more slowly over the coming years, and peak in size around 2050. If strong economic growth is to be achieved, in both the United States and globally, productivity must increase strongly.

On Wednesday, April 8, the Initiative on Business and Public Policy hosted an event exploring these and related issues. The event featured keynote remarks by Jason Furman, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. James Manyika and Jaana Remes of the McKinsey Global Institute considered the potential for faster global productivity growth. Marco Annunziata of General Electric will gave his perspective, and Martin Baily looked at explanations for slow growth in the U.S. economy.

Download a McKinsey report on global productivity trends »

Video

• Opening keynote by Jason Furman
• Global growth: Can productivity save the day in an aging world?
• Closing keynote by Alan Greenspan

Audio

• Achieving strong economic growth

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• MGI_Global_growth_Full_report_February_2015pdf (3)
• 20150408_strong_economic_growth_transcript
• BAILY_slides
• GREENSPAN_slides
• REMES_MANYIKA_slides

       

      

Researchers have long known that the rich live longer than the poor. Evidence now suggests that the life expectancy gap is increasing, at least here the United States, which raises troubling questions about the fairness of current efforts to protect Social Security.

There's nothing particularly mysterious about the life expectancy gap. People in ill health, who are at risk of dying relatively young, face limits on the kind and amount of work they can do. By contrast, the rich can afford to live in better and safer neighborhoods, can eat more nutritious diets and can obtain access to first-rate healthcare. People who have higher incomes, moreover, tend to have more schooling, which means they may also have better information about the benefits of exercise and good diet.

Although none of the above should come as a surprise, it's still disturbing that, just as income inequality is growing, so is life-span inequality. Over the last three decades, Americans with a high perch in the income distribution have enjoyed outsized gains.

Using two large-scale surveys, my Brookings colleagues and I calculated the average mid-career earnings of each interviewed family; then we estimated the statistical relationship between respondents' age at death and their incomes when they were in their 40s. We found a startling spreading out of mortality differences between older people at the top and bottom of the income distribution.

For example, we estimated that a woman who turned 50 in 1970 and whose mid-career income placed her in the bottom one-tenth of earners had a life expectancy of about 80.4. A woman born in the same year but with income in the top tenth of earners had a life expectancy of 84.1. The gap in life expectancy was about 3½ years. For women who reached age 50 two decades later, in 1990, we found no improvement at all in the life expectancy of low earners. Among women in the top tenth of earners, however, life expectancy rose 6.4 years, from 84.1 to 90.5. In those two decades, the gap in life expectancy between women in the bottom tenth and the top tenth of earners increased from a little over 3½ years to more than 10 years.

Our findings for men were similar. The gap in life expectancy between men in the bottom tenth and top tenth of the income distribution increased from 5 years to 12 years over the same two decades.

Rising longevity inequality has important implications for reforming Social Security. Currently, the program takes in too little money to pay for all benefits promised after 2030. A common proposal to eliminate the funding shortfall is to increase the full retirement age, currently 66. Increasing the age for full benefits by one year has the effect of lowering workers' monthly checks by 6% to 7.5%, depending on the age when a worker first claims a pension.

For affluent workers, any benefit cut will be partially offset by gains in life expectancy. Additional years of life after age 65 increase the number years these workers collect pensions. Workers at the bottom of the wage distribution, however, are not living much longer, so the percentage cut in their lifetime pensions will be about the same as the percentage reduction in their monthly benefit check.

Our results and other researchers' findings suggest that low-income workers have not shared in the improvements in life expectancy that have contributed to Social Security's funding problem.

It therefore seems unfair to preserve Social Security by cutting future benefits across the board. Any reform in the program to keep it affordable should make special provision to protect the benefits of low-wage workers.

Editor's note: This piece originally appeared in The Los Angeles Times. 

       

Voters and policy makers bemoan our crumbling roads, airports, and public transit systems, but few jurisdictions do much about it. The odd thing is that historically low interest rates now make it cheap to fix or improve our public facilities. The mystery is why decision makers have passed on this opportunity.

The sorry state of the nation’s roads, bridges, and public infrastructure has been widely reported. Every few years the American Society of Civil Engineers draws up a report card on U.S. infrastructure, highlighting its strengths and shortcomings in a variety of areas—drinking water systems, wastewater, dams, roads, bridges, inland waterways, ports. The report card spotlights areas where spending on maintenance falls short of the amount needed to keep our infrastructure functioning efficiently. For many kinds of infrastructure, a bigger population and heavier utilization require us to invest in brand new facilities. In its latest report card, the ASCE awards our public infrastructure a grade of D+.

It’s hard to think of a time more attractive for public investment than years when total demand for goods and services is depressed. The Treasury’s borrowing cost for investment funds is near historical lows. Since 2011, the interest rate on 10-year government bonds has averaged 2.3 percent. Savers buying inflation-protected bonds have been willing to lend funds to the federal government at a real interest rate of just 0.22 percent.

So long as there is excess unemployment, especially in the building trades, the labor resources needed to fix or improve public facilities should be abundant and relatively inexpensive. Employment in the construction industry has rebounded as home building and business investment have improved. Nonetheless, construction employment has recovered only half the loss it experienced between its pre-recession peak in 2006 and its post-recession low in 2011. Skilled labor is not nearly as abundant as it was in 2011, but the trend in wage inflation does not suggest employers are bidding up worker salaries.

The federal government’s failure to use fiscal policy and, in particular, public investment policy to bring the nation closer to full employment represents a notable lapse in policymaking, perhaps the most grievous lapse since the crisis began. It unnecessarily prolonged the suffering of the nation’s long-term unemployed and it wasted a rare opportunity to rebuild the nation’s public infrastructure at relatively low cost.

Why did this failure occur? One reason is that policy makers were too optimistic when the financial crisis took place back in 2008. Most public and private forecasts at the time understated the severity of the economic fallout from the bank meltdown. Decision makers in Congress and the Administration may have believed infrastructure investment would be unhelpful in the recovery. Well-conceived infrastructure projects take many months to design and many years to complete. Policy makers may have believed the economic crisis would be over by the time federally infrastructure spending reached its peak.

When forecasters and Democratic policy makers recognized their error, voters had elected a Congress that supported only one kind of fiscal policy to deal with the crisis—big tax cuts focused on high-income tax payers. Whether or not such a policy could have been effective, it would not make additional funds available for infrastructure projects.

Harvard’s Lawrence Summers and Rachel Lipset recently pointed to another reason voters have failed to back a big program to boost infrastructure investment—government ineptitude. In the Boston Globe they documented the painfully slow progress of the Massachusetts Department of Transportation in overhauling a bridge across the Charles River. The bridge, which was built over 11 months back in 1912, has so far required four years for its reconstruction. No end date is in sight. In addition to the over-budget cost of the project, the overhaul has also caused massive and highly visible inconvenience for drivers, cyclists, and pedestrians trying to move between Boston and Cambridge.

Few readers can be under the illusion Boston’s experience is exceptional. Many of us pass near or use public facilities that are being rebuilt or repaired. We often see bafflingly little progress over a span of months or even years. As Summers and Lipset note, the conspicuous failure of public managers to complete capital projects speedily and on budget undermines voters’ confidence that infrastructure projects can be worthwhile.

Despite wide agreement the nation’s infrastructure needs to be modernized, we have made little progress toward that goal. On the contrary, government capital spending has shrunk significantly as a share of the economy. In 2014, net government investment spending on items other than defense dipped to a 60-year low when spending is measured as a percent of GDP. Using this indicator, net government investment has shrunk almost half compared with its level in the first decade of the century. For many reasons this is a good time to fix our public infrastructure. It is also an excellent time to overhaul public management of government capital projects.

Editor's note: This piece originally appeared in Inside Sources.

       

Alert voters everywhere realize the economy is neither as strong as claimed by the party in power nor the disaster described by the opposition. The election season will bring many passionate but dubious claims about economic trends. People running for office know that voters rank the economy near the top of their concerns. Of course, perceptions of the economy differ from one voter to the next. A few of us are soaring, more are treading water, and too many are struggling just to stay afloat.

Since reaching a low point in 2009, total U.S. output—as measured by real GDP—has climbed 15 percent, or about 2.1 percent a year. The recovery has been long-lived and steady, a tribute to the stewardship of the Administration and Federal Reserve. The economic rebound has also been disappointingly slow in view of the depth of the recession. GOP office seekers will mention this fact a number of times before November.

Compared with the worst months of the Great Recession, the unemployment rate has dropped by half. It now stands at a respectable 4.9 percent, almost 3 points lower than the rate when President Obama took office and far below the rate in fall 2009 when it reached 10 percent. Payroll employment has increased for 77 consecutive months. Since hitting a low in January 2010, the number of workers on employer payrolls has surged 14.6 million, or about 190,000 a month. While the job gains are encouraging, they have not been fast enough to bring the employment-to-population ratio back to its pre-recession level. June’s job numbers showed that slightly less than 80 percent of adults between 25 and 54 were employed. That’s almost 2 percentage points below the employment-to-population rate on the eve of the Great Recession.

One of the most disappointing numbers from the recovery has been the growth rate of wages. In the first 5 years of the recovery, hourly wages edged up just 2 percent a year. After factoring in the effect of consumer price inflation, this translates into a gain of exactly 0 percent. The pace of wage gain has recently improved. Workers saw their real hourly pay climb 1.7 percent a year in the two years ending in June.

The economic bottom line for most of us is the rate of improvement in our family income after accounting for changes in consumer prices. No matter how household income is measured, income gains have been slower since 2007 than they were in earlier decades. The main reason is that incomes produced in the market—in the form of wages, self-employment income, interest, dividends, rental income, and realized capital gains—fell sharply in the Great Recession and have recovered very slowly since then. That a steep recession would cause a big drop in income is hardly a surprise. Employment, company profits, interest rates, and rents plunged in 2008 and 2009, pushing down the incomes Americans earn in the market. The bigger surprise has been the slow recovery of market income once the recession was behind us.

Some critics of the recovery argue that the income gains in the recovery have been highly skewed, with a disproportionate share obtained by Americans at the top of the income ladder. Economist Emmanuel Saez tabulates U.S. income tax statistics to track market income gains at the top of the distribution. His latest estimates show that between 2009 and 2015 income recipients in the top 1 percent enjoyed real income gains of 24 percent. Among Americans in the bottom nine-tenths of the income distribution, average market incomes climbed only 4 percent.

URL = http://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/TabFig2015prel.xls.

However, Saez’s estimates also show that top income recipients experienced much bigger income losses in the Great Recession. Between 2007 and 2009 they saw their inflation-adjusted incomes drop 36 percent (see Chart 1). In comparison, the average market income of Americans in the bottom nine-tenths of the distribution fell just 12 percent. These numbers mean that top income recipients have not yet recovered the income losses they suffered in the Great Recession. In 2015 their average market income was still 13 percent below its pre-recession level. For families in the bottom nine-tenths of the distribution, market income was “only” 8 percent below its level in 2007.

Only about half of households rely solely on market income to support themselves. The other half receives income from government transfers. What is more, this fraction tends to increase in bad times. Many retirees rely mainly on Social Security to pay their bills; they depend on Medicare or Medicaid to pay for health care. Low-income Americans often have little income from the market, and they may rely heavily on public assistance, food stamps, or government-provided health insurance. When joblessness soars the percentage of families receiving government benefits rises, largely because of increases in the number of workers who collect unemployment insurance.

Government benefits, which are not counted in Saez’s calculations, replace part of the market income losses families experience in a weak economy. As a result, the net income losses of most families are much smaller than their market income losses. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) recently published statistics on market income and before-tax and after-tax income that shed light on the size and distribution of household income losses in the Great Recession and ensuing recovery. The tabulations show that, except for households at the top of the distribution, net income losses were far smaller than the losses indicated in Saez’s income tax data.

URL = https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51361-SupplementalData-2.xlsx.

For example, among households in the middle fifth of the before-tax income distribution, average market income fell more than 10 percent in the Great Recession (see Chart 2). If we include government transfers in the income definition, average income fell 4.4 percent. If we account for the federal taxes families pay, average net income fell just 1 percent. In contrast, among households in the top 1 percent of the distribution, average market income fell 36 percent, average income including government transfers fell 36 percent, and average income net of federal taxes fell 37 percent. Government transfers provided little if any protection to top-income households.

The CBO income statistics end in 2013, so they do not tell us how net income gains have been distributed in the last couple of years. Nonetheless, based on Saez’s income tax tabulations it is very unlikely top income recipients have recovered the net income losses they experienced in the Great Recession. All the available statistics show household income gains since 2007 have been negligible or small, and this is true across the income distribution.

It is popular to say slow income gains in the middle and at the bottom of the distribution are due to outsize income gains among families at the top. While this story is at least partly true for the three decades ending in 2007, it does not fit the facts for the years since 2007. CBO’s latest net income tabulations show that inequality was almost 5 percent lower in 2013 than it was in 2007. The Great Recession hurt the incomes of Americans up and down the income distribution, but the biggest proportional income losses were at the very top. To be sure, income gains in the recovery after 2009 have been concentrated among top income recipients. Even so, their income losses over the recession and recovery have been proportionately bigger than the losses suffered by middle- and low-income families.

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Editor's note: This piece originally appeared in Real Clear Markets.

       

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The financial sector has undergone major changes in response to the Great Recession and post-crisis regulatory reform, as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III. These changes have created serious questions about the sector’s role in supporting economic growth and how it affects financial and overall economic stability.

On June 8, the Initiative on Business and Public Policy at Brookings explored the intersection of the financial system and economic growth with the goal of informing the public policy debate. The event featured a keynote address by Richard Berner, director of the Office of Financial Research and other participants with a wide range of views from a variety of backgrounds. Among other issues, the experts considered the changing landscape of the financial sector; growth-promoting allocation and investment decisions; credit availability for low- and moderate-income households; the ideal balance between growth and stability; and the impact of the 2014 midterm elections on regulatory reform.

 Follow the conversation at @BrookingsEcon or #Finance.

Video

• Keynote remarks by Richard Berner
• The financial sector: How has it changed?
• The view from the trenches
• The future of the U.S. financial sector

Audio

• Can the financial sector promote growth and stability?

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• Aaron Kleins presentation
• 20150608 BAER slides
• 20150608 MEHTA slides
• 20150608_financial_sector_stability_transcript

      

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

Analysis of dozens of publicly created redistricting plans shows that map-making technology can improve political representation and detect a gerrymander.  In 2012, President Obama won the vote in Ohio by three percentage points, while Republicans held a 13-to-5 majority in Ohio’s delegation to the U.S. House. After redistricting in 2013, Republicans held 12 of Ohio’s House seats while Democrats held four. As is typical in these races, few were competitive; the average margin of victory was 32 points. Is this simply a result of demography, the need to create a majority-minority district, and the constraints traditional redistricting principles impose on election lines—or did the legislature intend to create a gerrymander?

Crowd-Sourced Redistricting Maps

In the Ohio elections, we have a new source of information that opens a window into the legislature’s choice: Large numbers of publicly created redistricting plans.

During the last round of redistricting, across the country thousands of people in over a dozen states created hundreds of legal redistricting plans. Advances in information technology and the engagement of grassroots reform groups made these changes possible. To promote these efforts we created the DistrictBuilder open redistricting platform and many of these groups used this tool to create their plans.

Over the last several years, we have used the trove of information produced by public redistricting to gain insight into the politics of representation. In previous work that analyzed public redistricting in Virginia^[1], and in Florida^[2], we discovered that members of the public are capable of creating legal redistricting plans that outperform those maps created by legislatures in a number of ways.

Public redistricting in Ohio shows something new—the likely motives of the legislature. This can be seen through using information visualization methods to show the ways in which redistricting goals can be balanced (or traded-off) in Ohio , revealing the particular trade-offs made by the legislature.

The figure below, from our new research paper^[3], shows 21 plots—each of which compares legislative and publicly-created plans using a pair of scores—altogether covering seven different traditional and representational criteria. A tiny ‘A’ shows the adopted plan. The top-right corner of each mini-plot shows the best theoretically possible score. When examined by itself, the legislative plan meets a few criteria: it minimizes population deviation, creates an expected majority-minority seat, and creates a substantial majority of districts that would theoretically be competitive in an open-seat race in which the statewide vote was evenly split.

Figure 1: Pairwise Congressional Score Comparisons (Scatterplots) - Standardized Scores

In previous rounds of redistricting, empirical analysis would stop here—unless experts were called in to draw alternative plans in litigation. However, the large number of public plans now available allows us to see other options, plans the legislature could readily have created had it desired to do so. Comparison of the adopted plans and public plans reveal the weakness of the legislature’s choice. Members of the public were able to find plans that soundly beat the legislative plan on almost every pair of criteria, including competitive districts.

So why was the adopted plan chosen? Information visualization can help here, as well, but we need to add another criterion—partisan advantage:

Pareto Frontier: Standard Criteria vs. Democratic Surplus

When we visualize the number of expected Democratic seats that was likely to result from each plan, and compare this to the other score, we can see that the adopted plan is the best at something— producing Republican seats.

Was Ohio gerrymandered? Applying our proposed gerrymandering detection method, the adopted plans stands in high contrast to the public sample of plans, even if the overall competition scoring formula is slightly biased towards the Democrats, as strongly biased towards the Republicans on any measure of partisan fairness. Moreover analyzing the tradeoffs among redistricting criteria illuminate empirically demonstrates what is often suspected, but is typically impossible to demonstrate—that had the legislature desired to improve any good-government criterion—it could have done so, simply by sacrificing some partisan advantage. In light of this new body of evidence, the political intent of the legislature is clearly displayed.

However, when politics and technology mix, beware of Kranzberg’s first law: “Technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral.”^[4] Indeed there is an unexpected and hopeful lesson on reform revealed by the public participation that was enabled by new technology. The public plans show that, in Ohio, it is possible to improve the expected competitiveness, and to improve compliance with traditional districting principles such as county integrity, without threatening majority-minority districts simply by reducing partisan advantage—this is a tradeoff we should gladly accept.