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So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




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So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.





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So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




expe

So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




expe

So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




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So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




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Massa expects 'big fight' with Ferrari

Felipe Massa expects a tough fight from Ferrari in Melbourne for the final spot on the podium and says it would be foolish to write off Red Bull after one tricky weekend




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Ferrari stronger than Williams expected - Bottas

Valtteri Bottas is keeping a close eye on Ferrari after it showed much more Friday pace than Williams expected to see in Malaysia




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Lauda expects Ferrari 'pasting'

Former three-time world champion Niki Lauda believes Ferrari will "get a pasting" when they face the sport's governing body next month over allegations of race fixing




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So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




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So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




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MP4-30 exceeds Alonso's expectations

Fernando Alonso said the McLaren felt much better than he expected during his first run in the MP4-30 since pre-season testing




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So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




expe

So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




expe

So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




expe

So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




expe

So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




expe

So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




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Alonso not expecting to fight for win

Fernando Alonso says he is not expecting to be in a position to challenge for victory at his home grand prix after Red Bull dominated qualifying




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Foreign policy experts call for end to hate crimes against Asian American community

Recent hate crimes and violent assaults against people of Asian descent should sound an alarm for America. Within the past couple of weeks alone, ac acid attack against a woman in Brooklyn caused her to suffer severe burns, and a man in Texas has been charged with attempted murder after attacking an Asian American family. Such stories have become disturbingly frequent since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the FBI has warned that this trend may continue.

We, the undersigned, are alarmed by the severity of such hate crimes and race-based harassment against people of Asian descent in the United States - assaults that endanger the safety, well-being, dignity and livelihoods of all those targeted.




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So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




expe

So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




expe

So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




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COVID-19 is triggering a massive experiment in algorithmic content moderation

Major social media companies are having to adjust to a difficult reality: Due to social distancing requirements, much of their human workforce that moderates content has been sent home.  The timing is challenging, as platforms are fighting to contain an epidemic of misinformation, with user traffic hitting all-time records. To make up for the absence…

       




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Perez expects to learn on job in Australia

Sergio Perez says Force India will be learning on the job at the Australian Grand Prix but feels confident the team knows the areas it needs to improve on the VJM08




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So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




expe

So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




expe

So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




expe

So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




expe

So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




expe

So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




expe

So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




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Peace with justice: The Colombian experience with transitional justice

Executive summaryTo wind down a 50-year war, the Colombian state and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército Popular (FARC-EP) agreed in November 2016 to stop the fighting and start addressing the underlying causes of the conflict—rural poverty, marginalization, insecurity, and lawlessness. Central to their pact is an ambitious effort to address the conflict’s nearly 8…

       




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Life expectancy and the Republican candidates' Social Security proposals


In last Thursday’s GOP debate, Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, Jeb Bush and Chris Christie managed to avoid mentioning their common proposal to “reform entitlements” by raising the Social Security retirement age from 67 to 70. That was probably a good idea. Their proposal only demonstrates their lack of understanding about the demographics of older Americans, especially the dramatic disparities in their life expectancy associated with education and race. Recent research on life expectancy indicates that their proposed change would effectively nullify Social Security for millions of Americans and sharply limit benefits for many millions more.. While many people in their 30s and 40s today can look forward to living into their 80s, the average life expectancy for the majority of Americans who do not hold a college degree hovers closer to 70, or the average life expectancy for all Americans in 1950.

The Widening Inequalities in the Life Spans of Americans

This research, summarized recently in a study published in Health Affairs, found that life expectancy for various age cohorts of Americans is closely associated with both educational achievement and race. For example, the average life expectancy for college-educated American men who were age 25 in 2008, or age 33 today, is 81.7 years for whites and 78.2 years for blacks. (Table 1, below) By contrast, the projected, average life span of high-school educated males, also age 25 in 2008 or 33 today, is 73.2 years for whites and 69.3 years for blacks. Women on average live longer than men; but similar disparities based on education and race are evident. The average life expectancy of women age 25 in 2008, or 33 years old today, was 79 years for whites and 75.4 years for blacks for those with a high school diploma, and 84.7 years for whites and 81.6 years for blacks with college degrees. Most disturbing, the average life expectancy of Americans age 25 in 2008 without a high school diploma is just 68.6 years for white men, 68.2 years for black men, 74.2 years for white women, and 74.9 years for black women. Surprisingly, the researchers found that Hispanics in this age group have the longest life expectancies, even though they also have the lowest average levels of education. Since these data are anomalous and may reflect sampling problems, we will focus mainly on the life-expectancy gaps between African American and white Americans.

Tallying How Many People Are Adversely Affected

Census data on the distribution by education of people age 25 to 34 in 2010 (ages 30 to 39 in 2015) provide a good estimate of how many Americans are adversely affected by these growing differences. Overall, 56.3 percent of all Americans currently in their 30s fall are high school graduates or left school without a high school diploma, educational groups with much lower average life expectancies. (Table 2, below) More precisely, 10.1 percent or almost 4.8 million Americans in their 30s today lack a high school diploma, and 46.2 percent or 18.9 million thirty-somethings have high school diplomas and no further degrees. All told, they account for 23,702,000 Americans in their 30s; and among older Americans, the numbers and percentages are even higher.

Since race as well as education are major factors associated with differences in life expectancy, we turn next to education by race (Table 3, below). The totals differ modestly from Table 2, because Census data on education by race cover ages 30-39 in 2014, while Table 2 covers age 30-39 in 2015 (ages 25-34 in 2010).

  • Among people in their 30s today, 45.4 percent of whites or 10,613,000 Americans have a high school degree or less – and their average life expectancy is 9.4 years less than whites in their 30s with a college or associate degree.
  • Among people in their 30s todays, 64.4 percent of blacks or 3,436,000 Americans have a high school degree or less – and their life expectancy is 8.6 years less than blacks in their 30s with an B.A. or associate degree, and 11.6 years less than whites with a college or associate degree..
  • Among people in their 30s today, 75.6 percent of Hispanics or 6,243,000 Americans have a high school degree or less – and their life expectancy is 5.0 years less than Hispanics in their 30s with a college or associate degree.

As a policy matter, these data tell us that across all communities—white, black, Hispanic—improvements in secondary education to prepare everyone for higher education, and lower-cost access to higher education, can add years to the lives of millions of Americans.

Preserving Meaningful Access to Social Security Benefits

The widening inequalities in average life expectancy associated with race and education have more direct policy implications for Social Security, because the number of years that people can claim its benefits depends on their life spans. The growing inequalities in life expectancy translate directly into growing disparities in the years people can claim Social Security benefits, based on their education and race. Assuming that Americans in their 30s today retire at age 67 (the age for full benefits for this age group), they can expect to claim retirement benefits, on average, ranging from 1.2 years to 19.3 years, based on their education and race. (Table 4, below)

The most pressing issues of life expectancy and Social Security involve white males, black males, and black females without college degrees: Among Americans age 33 today, white and black men without high school diplomas and black males with high school degrees, on average, can expect to live long enough to collect benefits for less than three years. Similarly, white and black women without high school diplomas and black women with high school degrees, on average, can expect to collect benefits for less than eight years. Together, they account for 25.2 percent of whites and 64.4 percent of blacks in their 30s today. By contrast, male and female white college graduates age 33 today, on average, can expect to collect Social Security for between 14.7 and 17.7 years, respectively; and 33-year old black men and women with college degrees, on average, will claim benefits for 11.2 to 14.6 years, respectively.

These findings dictate that proposals to raise the Social Security retirement age should be rejected as a matter of basic fairness. Among this year’s presidential hopefuls, as noted earlier, Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio, Jeb Bush and Chris Christie all have called for raising the retirement age to 70 years. Under this policy, black men in their 30s today without a college degree and white men now in their 30s without a high school diploma, on average, would not live long enough to collect any Social Security. The change would reduce the average number of years of Social Security for Americans in their 30s today,

  • From 1.6 years to -1.4 years for white men with no high school diploma,
  • From 1.2 years to -1.8 years for black men with no high school diploma, and
  • From 2.3 years to – 0.7 years for black, male high-school graduates.

Furthermore, among Americans in their 30s today, white and black women without a high school diploma, white male high school graduates, and black female high school graduates, would live long enough, on average, to collect Social Security for just 3.2 to 5.4 years. The GOP change reduce the average number of years of Social Security for Americans in their 30s today,

  • From 6.2 years to 3.2 years for white, male high school graduates,
  • From 7.2 years to 4.2 years for white women with no high school diploma,
  • From 7.9 years to 4.9 years for black women with no high school diploma, and
  • From 8.4 years to 5.4 years for black, female high-school graduates.

All told, proposals to raise the retirement age to 70 years old would mean, based on the average life expectancy of Americans in their 30s today, that 25.2 percent of whites in their 30s and 64.4 percent of blacks of comparable age, after working for 35 years or more, would receive Social Security benefits for 5.4 years or less.

Authors

  • Robert Shapiro
Image Source: © Jim Young / Reuters
     
 
 




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What growing life expectancy gaps mean for the promise of Social Security


     
 
 




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The rich-poor life expectancy gap


Gary Burtless, a senior fellow in Economic Studies, explains new research on the growing longevity gap between high-income and low-income Americans, especially among the aged.

“Life expectancy difference of low income workers, middle income workers, and high income workers has been increasing over time,” Burtless says. “For people born in 1920 their life expectancy was not as long typically as the life expectancy of people who were born in 1940. But those gains between those two birth years were very unequally distributed if we compare people with low mid-career earnings and people with high mid-career earnings.” Burtless also discusses retirement trends among the educated and non-educated, income inequality among different age groups, and how these trends affect early or late retirement rates.

Also stay tuned for our regular economic update with David Wessel, who also looks at the new research and offers his thoughts on what it means for Social Security.

Show Notes

Later retirement, inequality and old age, and the growing gap in longevity between rich and poor

Disparity in Life Spans of the Rich and the Poor Is Growing

Subscribe to the Brookings Cafeteria on iTunes, listen on Stitcher, and send feedback email to BCP@Brookings.edu.

Authors

Image Source: © Scott Morgan / Reuters
     
 
 




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The growing life-expectancy gap between rich and poor


Researchers have long known that the rich live longer than the poor. Evidence now suggests that the life expectancy gap is increasing, at least here the United States, which raises troubling questions about the fairness of current efforts to protect Social Security.

There's nothing particularly mysterious about the life expectancy gap. People in ill health, who are at risk of dying relatively young, face limits on the kind and amount of work they can do. By contrast, the rich can afford to live in better and safer neighborhoods, can eat more nutritious diets and can obtain access to first-rate healthcare. People who have higher incomes, moreover, tend to have more schooling, which means they may also have better information about the benefits of exercise and good diet.

Although none of the above should come as a surprise, it's still disturbing that, just as income inequality is growing, so is life-span inequality. Over the last three decades, Americans with a high perch in the income distribution have enjoyed outsized gains.

Using two large-scale surveys, my Brookings colleagues and I calculated the average mid-career earnings of each interviewed family; then we estimated the statistical relationship between respondents' age at death and their incomes when they were in their 40s. We found a startling spreading out of mortality differences between older people at the top and bottom of the income distribution.

For example, we estimated that a woman who turned 50 in 1970 and whose mid-career income placed her in the bottom one-tenth of earners had a life expectancy of about 80.4. A woman born in the same year but with income in the top tenth of earners had a life expectancy of 84.1. The gap in life expectancy was about 3½ years. For women who reached age 50 two decades later, in 1990, we found no improvement at all in the life expectancy of low earners. Among women in the top tenth of earners, however, life expectancy rose 6.4 years, from 84.1 to 90.5. In those two decades, the gap in life expectancy between women in the bottom tenth and the top tenth of earners increased from a little over 3½ years to more than 10 years.

Our findings for men were similar. The gap in life expectancy between men in the bottom tenth and top tenth of the income distribution increased from 5 years to 12 years over the same two decades.

Rising longevity inequality has important implications for reforming Social Security. Currently, the program takes in too little money to pay for all benefits promised after 2030. A common proposal to eliminate the funding shortfall is to increase the full retirement age, currently 66. Increasing the age for full benefits by one year has the effect of lowering workers' monthly checks by 6% to 7.5%, depending on the age when a worker first claims a pension.

For affluent workers, any benefit cut will be partially offset by gains in life expectancy. Additional years of life after age 65 increase the number years these workers collect pensions. Workers at the bottom of the wage distribution, however, are not living much longer, so the percentage cut in their lifetime pensions will be about the same as the percentage reduction in their monthly benefit check.

Our results and other researchers' findings suggest that low-income workers have not shared in the improvements in life expectancy that have contributed to Social Security's funding problem.

It therefore seems unfair to preserve Social Security by cutting future benefits across the board. Any reform in the program to keep it affordable should make special provision to protect the benefits of low-wage workers.

Editor's note: This piece originally appeared in The Los Angeles Times

Authors

Publication: The Los Angeles Times
Image Source: © Brian Snyder / Reuters
     
 
 




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Expectations for the Pope’s visit to Myanmar

      
 
 




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What can we expect from the Seventh Summit of the Americas?


In advance of President Obama’s trip to Panama later this week, Brookings experts Richard Feinberg, Ted Piccone, and Harold Trinkunas discuss expectations for the Seventh Summit of the Americas. Obama will arrive holding a strong hand given recent policy changes that have addressed historic obstacles, such as relations with Cuba. However, a slowing regional economy and U.S.-Venezuela tensions may yet cast a shadow over the proceedings.

Read the transcript » (PDF)

Improved United States-Latin America relations

“The United States is going into this next Summit of the Americas in a somewhat improved position compared to the summits in both Cartagena in 2012 and in Trinidad in 2009, where there was a considerable amount of friction among the countries on issues related to Cuba, to counter narcotics policy, to immigration policy. Broadly speaking, I think the Obama administration has done something incredible on each of these fronts, which the countries will recognize and which will help clear the air.”  —Harold Trinkunas

Friction with Venezuela?

“There are 35 countries. At any given time, there's going to be some friction. At the last summit, the Argentines raised the Malvinas issue.  At previous summits, the Bolivians raised the outlets of the sea issue. So there's always a little bit of this. But whether or not [Venezuela] dominates the summit is an issue largely for the Latin Americans to decide. And my guess is the Latin Americans in general will not want to follow Maduro over the cliff. I don't even think that the Cubans will want Maduro to take the summit over the cliff. So therefore, I think we have this sort of tremendous irony in which the country that adds -- that dampens the dissident voices of ALBA will actually be Cuba, because Cuba wanted to demonstrate that it can be a constructive voice in regional diplomacy, that they're not just the force of disruption and therefore, the U.S. all these years was right to keep them out because they would just be disruptive if you let them in. They've already demonstrated they're a mature country that can engage constructively.”  —Richard Feinberg

Dialogue with Cuba

“It's in our interest, U.S. national interest, to have this dialogue process with our close neighbor, Cuba. And to, frankly, bring them back towards the inter-American community, where they've been missing for all these years. [The U.S. rapprochement with Cuba] is also going to raise the question of shifting attention to the role of the rest of the region vis-à-vis Cuba; that it's not just the United States. It's actually the other countries in the hemisphere that could help Cuba come along, as I said, modernize, update its economy, and hopefully at some point, engage more formally in the inter-American system.”  —Ted Piccone

Sub-regional groupings

“This is a much more diverse hemisphere than we saw 20 years ago... In fact, we may see that there's sort of a broad agreement on general themes and then much more sub-regional groupings that work on issues like the Northern Triangle, for example, or Caribbean Energy Security, which was an initiative of the vice president last year.”  —Harold Trinkunas

Summit side events with the private sector and civil society

“You have the leaders representing the executive branches of their governments, but you also have the CEO Summit. Seven hundred corporate executives will be there. There will be interaction between the leaders and the corporate executives...It's indicative of the rise of the private sector and the corporate sector in Latin America as part of a dynamic growing region economically.

Throughout the hemisphere, the acceptance of Civil Society as a concept, as an actor, adds depth to democracy. Democracy is not just elections or that's important, but an active, vibrant Civil Society. And that's what you'll see at the Civil Society meeting. And President Obama personally we're told will interact with Civil Society leaders, as will other leaders present there.”  —Richard Feinberg

Downloads

Audio

Image Source: © Jonathan Ernst / Reuters
      
 
 




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Presidential Summit on Entrepreneurship: Experts Volunteer Abroad


Over 200 delegates from 50 countries gather this week in Washington for the Presidential Summit on Entrepreneurship. The summit hosts entrepreneurs to teach and learn innovative ways to strengthen professional and social relationships between the U.S. and the Islamic world. During his first major address to the Muslim world, delivered in Cairo last June, President Obama pledged to increase engagement through entrepreneurship, exchange programs and multilateral service initiatives.

Volunteer-led development initiatives have begun to act on Obama’s call for citizen diplomacy and private-sector engagement. The Initiative on International Volunteering and Service at Brookings and the Building Bridges Coalition have fueled an emerging legislative initiative that calls for increasing the role of international volunteers in the U.S. diplomatic agenda and development programs. This Service World Initiative has drawn from Brookings research outlining options to advance the president’s call for multilateral service.

As seen last year, for the first time in history, the majority of the world’s population lived in urban areas. And this trend is accelerating at an unprecedented rate. By 2050, urban dwellers are expected to make up about 70 percent of Earth’s total population. These informed 21st century urban citizens demand 24-7 connectivity, smart electric grids, efficient transportation networks, safe food and water, and transparent social services. All these demands place a huge strain on existing city infrastructures and the global environment. Most affected by this rapid urban boom, are the emerging markets. So how do we tackle this development dilemma?

One way is for highly-skilled experts, from a range of countries, to volunteer their time in emerging markets to help improve economic development, government services and stimulate job growth. This type of pro-bono program has many benefits. It benefits the urban areas in these emerging markets by leveraging intelligence, connecting systems and providing near-term impact on critical issues such as transportation, water, food safety, education and healthcare. It benefits the expert volunteers by fostering their teamwork skills, providing a cultural learning experience, and broadening their expertise in emerging markets.

IBM, which chairs the Building Bridges Coalition’s corporate sector, hosts a range of volunteer-led global entrepreneurship programs that improve economic stability for small- and medium-sized businesses, increase technology in emerging markets and open doors for the next generation of business and social leaders. This program connects high-talent employees with growing urban centers around the world and fosters the type of leadership to help IBM in the 21st century.

Recently, IBM sent a group of experts to Ho Chi Minh City as part of its Corporate Service Corps, a business version of the Peace Corps. This was the first Corporate Service Corps mission to be made up of executives, and the first to help a city in an emerging market analyze its challenges holistically and produce a plan to manage them. As a result, the city has now adopted a 10-year redevelopment plan that includes seven pilot programs in areas ranging from transportation to food safety. IBM will also help the city set up academic programs to prepare young Vietnamese to launch careers in technology services. IBM will continue this program throughout the next couple years to evolve the next set of global business and cultural hubs utilizing the volunteer hours of some of its most seasoned experts.

The Presidential Summit this week will further Obama’s call to “turn dialogue into interfaith service, so bridges between peoples lead to action.” The policy initiative of the Building Bridges Coalition, coupled with entrepreneurial innovations such as IBMs, can foster greater prosperity and service between the U.S. and our global partners.

Authors

Image Source: © STR New / Reuters
     
 
 




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Financial well-being: Measuring financial perceptions and experiences in low- and moderate-income households

Thirty-nine percent of U.S. adults reported lacking sufficient liquidity to cover even a modest $400 emergency without borrowing or selling an asset, and 60 percent reported experiencing a financial shock (e.g., loss of income or car repair) in the prior year. While facing precarious financial situations may leave households unable to manage essential expenses and…

       




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Around the halls: Experts react to the killing of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani

In a drone strike authorized by President Trump early Friday, Iranian commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, who led the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, was killed at Baghdad International Airport. Below, Brookings experts provide their brief analyses on this watershed moment for the Middle East — including what it means for U.S.-Iran…

       




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Congress and Trump have produced four emergency pandemic bills. Don’t expect a fifth anytime soon.

       




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COVID-19 is triggering a massive experiment in algorithmic content moderation

Major social media companies are having to adjust to a difficult reality: Due to social distancing requirements, much of their human workforce that moderates content has been sent home.  The timing is challenging, as platforms are fighting to contain an epidemic of misinformation, with user traffic hitting all-time records. To make up for the absence…

       




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The Iran deal, one year out: What Brookings experts are saying

How has the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—signed between the P5+1 and Iran one year ago—played out in practice? Several Brookings scholars, many of whom participated prominently in debates last year as the deal was reaching its final stages, offered their views.

      
 
 




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The Iran deal, one year out: What Brookings experts are saying

How has the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—signed between the P5+1 and Iran one year ago—played out in practice? Several Brookings scholars, many of whom participated prominently in debates last year as the deal was reaching its final stages, offered their views.

      
 
 




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The Iran deal: Off to an encouraging start, but expect challenges


One year after its conclusion, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) remains controversial in Tehran and Washington, with opponents unreconciled to the deal and determined to derail it. Republican attacks against the deal will keep the controversy alive for most of this election year.

But opponents have had to scale back their criticism, in large part because the JCPOA, at least so far, has delivered on its principal goal—blocking Iran’s path to nuclear weapons for an extended period of time. No one can dispute that Tehran has sharply reduced its capacity to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons and would need at least a year to rebuild enough capacity to produce a single bomb.

Iran’s positive compliance record has not given opponents much ammunition. The IAEA found Iran in compliance in its two quarterly reports issued in 2016. True, Iran temporarily exceeded the agreed ceiling on heavy water but quickly rectified the infraction, which most observers attributed to the practical difficulty of ensuring that production overages are exported in a timely way rather than to an intention to circumvent the limit. Critics have also pounced on a German report that Iran’s illicit attempts to procure nuclear and missile items continued in 2015. But Tehran’s requirement to import all nuclear items for its permitted civil nuclear program through the JCPOA’s procurement channel—and stop procuring items outside the channel—did not kick in until January 2016, and neither Washington nor Berlin has information that illicit efforts continued after that time.

Murky missile issue

Iran’s ballistic missile tests present a more complicated compliance issue. Due to a compromise reached in the negotiations, missile activities are not covered in the JCPOA and Security Council resolution 2231 simply ”calls upon” but does not legally require Iran to cease those activities (as did the U.N. Security Council resolutions replaced by 2231). As a result, Iranians argue they are not legally bound to cease missile testing, and Russia and China essentially support their argument. 

The administration and Congress are right to oppose Iran’s provocative and destabilizing missile activities. But they are not on strong legal or political grounds to treat the issue as a compliance violation. Rather than invoking the Iran nuclear deal, Washington and its partners will need to counter Iran’s missile programs with other policy tools, including interdictions of procurement attempts, Missile Technology Control Regime restrictions, U.S. diplomatic efforts with suppliers, missile defenses, and sanctions.

An uncertain path ahead

So, from the standpoint of Iran implementing and complying with its nuclear commitments, the JCPOA has operated well for its first year. But challenges to the smooth operation and even the longevity of the deal are already apparent.

A real threat to the JCPOA is that Iran will blame the slow recovery of its economy on U.S. failure to conscientiously fulfill its sanctions relief commitments and, using that as a pretext, will curtail or even end its own implementation of the deal. Iranians are understandably frustrated that the benefits of sanctions relief have not materialized as quickly as expected. But international banks and businesses have been reluctant to engage Iran not because they have been discouraged by the United States but because they have their own business-related reasons to be cautious, including the inadequate regulatory standards of Iran’s financial system, low oil prices in an oil-dependent economy, and fear of running afoul of remaining U.S. sanctions. In an effort to ensure that Iran will reap the economic rewards it deserves, the Obama administration has bent over backwards to inform foreign governments, banks, and businesses of what sanctions relief measures entitle them to do, but Iranian officials continue to complain that it is not doing enough.

[W]e can say the nuclear deal is off to a promising start...[s]till, it is already clear that the path ahead will not always be smooth.

Legislation proposed in Congress could also threaten the nuclear deal. Many proponents of new sanctions legislation genuinely seek to reinforce the deal—for example, by renewing the Iran Sanctions Act without attaching poison pills. But for some other members of Congress, the bills are designed to undercut the JCPOA. In a July 11 statement of policy, the administration threatened to veto three House bills, stating that they “would undermine the ability of the United States to meet our JCPOA commitments by reimposing certain secondary economic and financial sanctions lifted on ‘Implementation Day’ of the JCPOA.” For now, the administration is in a position to block new legislation that it believes would scuttle the nuclear deal.

But developments outside the JCPOA, especially Iran’s regional behavior and its crackdown on dissent at home, could weaken support for the JCPOA within the United States and give proponents of deal-killing legislation a boost. So far, however, there are no clear indications that the JCPOA has contributed either to more moderate or more provocative behavior. Indeed, consistent with statements by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, there have been few changes in Iran’s behavior toward its neighbors in the last year.

A potential wildcard for the future of the JCPOA is upcoming governing transitions in both Washington and Tehran. There will be more continuity in policy toward Iran and the JCPOA if Hillary Clinton becomes president, although she is likely to take a harder line than her predecessor. Donald Trump now says he will re-negotiate rather than scrap the deal, but in practice that could produce the same result because a better deal will not prove negotiable. With President Hassan Rouhani up for re-election next year and the health of the Supreme Leader questionable, Iran’s future policy toward the JCPOA cannot be confidently predicted.

A final verdict on the JCPOA is many years away, not just because of the challenges mentioned above but also because of the crucial uncertainly regarding what Iran will do when key restrictions on its ability to produce weapons-grade nuclear materials expire after 15 years. However, we can say the nuclear deal is off to a promising start, as even some of its early critics now concede. Still, it is already clear that the path ahead will not always be smooth, the longevity of the deal cannot be taken for granted, and keeping it on track will require constant focus in Washington and other interested capitals. 

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The Iran deal, one year out: What Brookings experts are saying


How has the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—signed between the P5+1 and Iran one year ago—played out in practice? Several Brookings scholars, many of whom participated prominently in debates last year surrounding official congressional review, offered their views.

Strobe Talbott, President, Brookings Institution:

At the one-year mark, it’s clear that the nuclear agreement between Iran and the major powers has substantially restricted Tehran’s ability to produce the fissile material necessary to build a bomb. That’s a net positive—for the United States and the broader region.

Robert Einhorn, Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and Senior Fellow, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, Foreign Policy program:

One year after its conclusion, the JCPOA remains controversial in Tehran and Washington (as I describe in more detail here), with opponents unreconciled to the deal and determined to derail it. But opponents have had to scale back their criticism, in large part because the JCPOA, at least so far, has delivered on its principal goal—blocking Iran’s path to nuclear weapons for an extended period of time. Moreover, Iran’s positive compliance record has not given opponents much ammunition. The IAEA found Iran in compliance in its two quarterly reports issued in 2016.

But challenges to the smooth operation and even the longevity of the deal are already apparent.

A real threat to the JCPOA is that Iran will blame the slow recovery of its economy on U.S. failure to conscientiously fulfill its sanctions relief commitments and, using that as a pretext, will curtail or even end its own implementation of the deal. But international banks and businesses have been reluctant to engage Iran not because they have been discouraged by the United States but because they have their own business-related reasons to be cautious. Legislation proposed in Congress could also threaten the nuclear deal. 

For now, the administration is in a position to block new legislation that it believes would scuttle the deal. But developments outside the JCPOA, especially Iran’s regional behavior and its crackdown on dissent at home, could weaken support for the JCPOA within the United States and give proponents of deal-killing legislation a boost. 

A potential wildcard for the future of the JCPOA is coming governing transitions in both Washington and Tehran. Hillary Clinton would maintain the deal but perhaps a harder line than her predecessor. Donald Trump now says he will re-negotiate rather than scrap the deal, but a better deal will not prove negotiable. With President Hassan Rouhani up for re-election next year and the health of the Supreme Leader questionable, Iran’s future policy toward the JCPOA cannot be confidently predicted.

A final verdict on the JCPOA is many years away. But it is off to a promising start, as even some of its early critics now concede. Still, it is already clear that the path ahead will not always be smooth, the longevity of the deal cannot be taken for granted, and keeping it on track will require constant focus in Washington and other interested capitals. 

Suzanne Maloney, Deputy Director, Foreign Policy program and Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program:

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has fulfilled neither the worst fears of its detractors nor the most soaring ambitions of its proponents. All of the concerns that have shaped U.S. policy toward Tehran for more than a generation—terrorism, human rights abuses, weapons of mass destruction, regional destabilization—remain as relevant, and as alarming, as they have ever been. Notably, much the same is true on the Iranian side; the manifold grievances that Tehran has harbored toward Washington since the 1979 revolution continue to smolder.

An important truth about the JCPOA, which has been wielded by both its defenders and its detractors in varying contexts, is that it was transactional, not transformational. As President Barack Obama repeatedly insisted, the accord addressed one specific problem, and in those narrow terms, it can be judged a relative success. The value of that relative success should not be underestimated; a nuclear-armed Iran would magnify risks in a turbulent region in a terrible way. 

But in the United States, in Iran, and across the Middle East, the agreement has always been viewed through a much broader lens—as a waystation toward Iranian-American rapprochement, as an instrument for addressing the vicious cycle of sectarian violence that threatens to consume the region, as a boost to the greater cause of moderation and democratization in Iran. And so the failure of the deal to catalyze greater cooperation from Iran on a range of other priorities—Syria, Yemen, Iraq, to name a few—or to jumpstart improvements in Iran’s domestic dynamics cannot be disregarded simply because it was not its original intent. 

For the “new normal” of regularized diplomatic contact between Washington and Tehran to yield dividends, the United States will need a serious strategy toward Tehran that transcends the JCPOA, building on the efficacy of the hard-won multilateral collaboration on the nuclear issue. Iranians, too, must begin to pivot the focus of their efforts away from endless litigation of the nuclear deal and toward a more constructive approach to addressing the deep challenges facing their country today. 

Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy and Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and Director, Intelligence Project, Foreign Policy program:

As I explain more fully here, one unintended but very important consequence of the Iran nuclear deal has been to aggravate and intensify Saudi Arabia's concerns about Iran's regional goals and intentions. This fueling of Saudi fears has in turn fanned sectarian tensions in the region to unprecedented levels, and the results are likely to haunt the region for years to come.

Riyadh's concerns about Iran have never been primarily focused on the nuclear danger. Rather, the key Saudi concern is that Iran seeks regional hegemony and uses terrorism and subversion to achieve it. The deal deliberately does not deal with this issue. In Saudi eyes, it actually makes the situation worse because lifting sanctions removed Iran's isolation as a rogue state and gives it more income. 

Washington has tried hard to reassure the Saudis, and President Obama has wisely sought to build confidence with King Salman and his young son. The Iran deal is a good one, and I've supported it from its inception. But it has had consequences that are dangerous and alarming. In the end, Riyadh and Tehran are the only players who can deescalate the situation—the Saudis show no sign of interest in that road. 

Norman Eisen, Visiting Fellow, Governance Studies:

The biggest disappointment of the post-deal year has been the failure of Congress to pass legislation complementing the JCPOA. There is a great deal that the legislative branch could do to support the pact. Above all, it could establish criteria putting teeth into U.S. enforcement of Preamble Section III, Iran's pledge never to seek nuclear weapons. Congress could and should make clear what the ramp to seeking nuclear weapons would look like, what the triggers would be for U.S. action, and what kinds of U.S. action would be on the table. If Iran knows that, it will modulate its behavior accordingly. If it does not, it will start to act out, and we have just kicked the can down the road. That delay is of course immensely valuable—but why not extend the road indefinitely? Congress can do that, and much more (e.g. by increasing funding for JCPOA oversight by the administration and the IAEA), with appropriate legislation.

Richard Nephew, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, Foreign Policy program:

Over the past year, much effort has gone into ensuring that the Iran deal is fully implemented. To date, the P5+1 has—not surprisingly—gotten the better end of the bargain, with significant security benefits accruing to them and their partners in the Middle East once the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verified the required changes to Iran's nuclear program. Iran, for its part, has experienced a natural lag in its economic resurgence, held back by the collapse in oil prices in 2014, residual American and European sanctions, and reluctance among banks and businesses to re-engage.

But, Iran's economy has stabilized and—if the deal holds for its full measure—the security benefits that the P5+1 and their partners have won may fall away while Iran's economy continues to grow. The most important challenge related to the deal for the next U.S. administration (and, presumably, the Rouhani administration in its second term) is therefore: how can it be taken forward, beyond the 10- to 15-year transition period? Iran will face internal pressure to expand its nuclear program, but it also will face pressure to refrain both externally and internally, should other countries in the region seek to create their own matching nuclear capabilities. 

The best next step for all sides is to negotiate a region-wide arrangement to manage nuclear programs –one that constrains all sides, though perhaps not equally. It must ensure—at a minimum—that nuclear developments in the region are predictable, understandable, and credibly civilian (something Bob Einhorn and I addressed in a recent report). The next White House will need to do the hard work of convincing countries in the region—and beyond—not to rest on the victory of the JCPOA. Rather, they must take it for what it is: another step towards a more stable and manageable region.

Tamara Wittes, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program

This week, Washington is awash in events and policy papers taking stock of how the Iran nuclear deal has changed the Middle East in the past year. The narratives presented this week largely track the positions that the authors, speakers, or organizations articulated on the nuclear deal when it was first concluded last summer. Those who opposed the deal have marshaled evidence of how the deal has "emboldened" Iran's destabilizing behavior, while those who supported the deal cite evidence of "moderated" politics in the Islamic Republic. That polarized views on the deal last year produce polarized assessments of the deal's impact this year should surprise no one.

In fact, no matter which side of the nuclear agreement’s worth it presents, much of the analysis out this week ascribes to the nuclear deal Iranian behavior and attitudes in the region that existed before the deal's conclusion and implementation. Iran has been a revisionist state, and a state sponsor of terrorism, since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry predates the revolution; Iran's backing of Houthi militias against Saudi and its allies in Yemen well predates the nuclear agreement. Most notably, the upheavals in the Arab world since 2011 have given Iran wider opportunities than perhaps ever before to exploit the cracks within Arab societies—and to use cash, militias, and other tools to advance its interests and expand its influence. Iran has exploited those opportunities skillfully in the last five years and, as I wrote last summer, was likely to continue to do so regardless of diplomatic success or failure in Vienna. To argue that the nuclear deal somehow created these problems, or could solve them, is ahistorical. 

It is true that Iran's access to global markets might free even more cash for these endeavors, and that is a real issue worth tracking. But since severe sanctions did not prevent Iran from spending hundreds of millions of dollars to support and supply Hezbollah, or marshaling Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and militia fighters to sustain the faltering regime of Bashar Assad in Syria, it's not clear that additional cash will generate a meaningful difference in regional outcomes. Certainly, the nuclear deal's conclusion and implementation did not alter the trajectory of Iranian policy in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, or Lebanon to any noticeable degree—and that means that, no matter what the merits or dangers of the JCPOA, the United States must still confront and work to resolve enduring challenges to regional instability—including Iran's revisionist behavior.

Kenneth M. Pollack, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program: 

When the JCPOA was being debated last year, I felt that the terms of the deal were far less consequential than how the United States responded to Iranian regional behavior after a deal was signed. I see the events of the past 12 months as largely having borne that out. While both sides have accused the other of "cheating," the deal has so far largely held. However, as many of my colleagues have noted, the real frictions have arisen from the U.S. geostrategic response to the deal.

I continue to believe that signing the JCPOA was better than any of the realistic alternatives—though I also continue to believe that a better deal was possible, had the administration handled the negotiations differently. However, the administration’s regional approach since then has been problematic—with officials condemning Riyadh and excusing Tehran in circumstances where both were culpable and ignoring some major Iranian transgressions, for instance (and with President Obama gratuitously insulting the Saudis and other U.S. allies in interviews). 

America's traditional Sunni Arab allies (and to some extent Turkey and Israel) feared that either the United States would use the JCPOA as an excuse to further disengage from the region or to switch sides and join the Iranian coalition. Their reading of events has been that this is precisely what has happened, and it is causing the GCC states to act more aggressively.

I think our traditional allies would enthusiastically welcome a Hillary Clinton presidency. She would likely do all that she could to reassure them that she plans to be more engaged and more willing to commit American resources and energy to Middle Eastern problems. But those allies will eventually look for her to turn words into action. I cannot imagine a Hillary Clinton administration abrogating the JCPOA, imposing significant new economic sanctions on Iran, or otherwise acting in ways that it would fear could provoke Tehran to break the deal. Our allies may see that as Washington trying to remain on the fence, which will infuriate them. 

So there are some important strategic differences between the United States and its regional allies. The second anniversary of the JCPOA could therefore prove even more fraught for America and the Middle East than the first. 


      
 
 




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Around the halls: Brookings experts on what to watch for at the UN Climate Action Summit

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