Editor's Note: This piece originally appeared in Foreign Policy.

The killing of Nasir al-Wuhayshi, reportedly via U.S. drone strike, is not just another notch in the belt of America’s long campaign against al-Qaida and its allies. Wuhayshi was one of al-Qaida’s top remaining leaders, and he is the highest-level death the organization has suffered since Osama bin Laden was killed in 2011. Wuhayshi headed al-Qaida’s most active affiliate, the Yemen-based al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and was the designated successor of al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. His killing adds one more element of uncertainty to the turbulence in Yemen and may set AQAP on a new path. Which path, however, remains an open question.

Wuhayshi helped transform AQAP from a fractious organization on the edge of defeat to one that menaces both Yemen and the United States. A decade ago, Yemen’s jihadi movement seemed near defeat. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Yemeni government rounded up jihadis and imprisoned Wuhayshi, and it was Saudi Arabia, not Yemen, that was the focus of jihadis in the Arabian Peninsula. In 2003, al-Qaida sponsored the original AQAP’s uprising against the Saudi government. Several years later, most of AQAP’s Saudi members were dead or in jail, and its remnants had fled to Yemen. There, they mixed with Yemeni jihadis, including important figures like Wuhayshi, who had escaped from Yemen’s jails in 2006. In 2009, two regional Islamist groups merged and formally anointed themselves AQAP, basing their operations in Yemen and trying to unseat the government. As Osama bin Laden’s former secretary, Wuhayshi became the group’s leader and embraced al-Qaida’s emphasis on attacking Western targets.

The group made fitful progress, at times taking territory but often losing it quickly after alienating locals and proving vulnerable to government counterattacks. But when the government of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh fell in 2012 during the Arab Spring, AQAP tried to step into the void. Saleh’s successor, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, pursued AQAP vigorously, but his weak government was unable to score any lasting successes.

In addition to its prowess in Yemen, AQAP has long been al-Qaida’s most active affiliate when it comes to taking on the West. The organization was behind the 2009 Christmas Day attempt to down a U.S. airliner over Detroit, a near-miss only foiled by the bomber’s incompetence and the quick thinking of the plane’s passengers. AQAP tried again in 2010, this time attempting to down U.S. cargo planes. The organization also attacked Western targets in Yemen, and puts out Inspire, a stylish English-language online publication that is one of al-Qaida’s more effective attempts to influence Western jihadis.

These AQAP efforts to attack the United States and the West, in general, led to a greater U.S. focus on Yemen and more drone attacks there. In 2011, the United States killed Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen and AQAP member who helped lead the terrorist group’s campaign against targets in the United States and Europe. Awlaki has continued to inspire terrorists after his death, with Boston Marathon plotters downloading his sermons before their attack. Awlaki also inspired the Fort Hood shooter in 2009 and the attacks on the Charlie Hebdo office in 2015.

Wuhayshi’s death, however, comes as Yemen is falling apart. Earlier this year, Hadi’s government fell to the Houthi rebels, Yemeni Shiites who oppose both Yemen’s traditional order and the Sunni fanatics of AQAP who see Shiites as apostates. Alarmed by Houthi ties to Iran, Saudi Arabia has led an intervention in Yemen on Hadi’s behalf, bombing the Houthis and trying to reverse their gains. AQAP seems to be flourishing amid the chaos, as its enemies turn on one another.

But with Wuhayshi’s death, AQAP may find it difficult to further exploit the Yemeni civil war. Personal connections, reputation, and charisma play a bigger role in leadership in the jihadi cause than do formal rank, and it is not clear if Qasim al-Raimi, the designated new leader, can retain the support of the AQAP rank and file. There is always a chance, of course, that Raimi proves an even more effective leader than Wuhayshi, and some observers see him as “more dangerous and aggressive.” (Lest we forget: In 1992, the Israelis killed Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Abbas al-Musawi, one of the group’s most competent leaders. Musawi was replaced by Hassan Nasrallah, who has proven one of the most effective terrorist and guerrilla leaders in modern times.)

The bad news is that Raimi and AQAP may seek revenge, both out of genuine anger and to score points within the jihadi community. Al-Qaida’s chief bomb-maker, Ibrahim al-Asiri, may still be out there and has likely passed his sophisticated techniques on to others in Yemen.

The bad news is that Raimi and AQAP may seek revenge, both out of genuine anger and to score points within the jihadi community.

Over time, however, Wuhayshi’s death may push AQAP to focus even more on Yemen and less on the West. His close, personal ties to the al-Qaidacore may have been part of why AQAP was a steadfast ally of Zawahiri in his power struggle with the Islamic State. The opportunities and risks in the civil war are both tempting and frightening for AQAP. On the one hand, by taking up arms against the hated Shiites, AQAP can position itself as the defender of Yemen’s Sunnis, a strategy that has worked well for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. AQAP might gain more recruits and local support, while drawing foreign fighters and money from Sunnis eager to find yet another Shiite-Iran axis to oppose. Not surprisingly, AQAP has stepped up its operations against the Houthis in recent months.

AQAP also has an opportunity to govern. And the bad news for the West is that it has learned from its own many mistakes on this front. In the past when AQAP made gains, it tried to impose a strict version of Islamic law that alienated local communities. Now when its fighters seize territory, theywork with local tribal figures and other elites, avoiding the most controversial measures and trying to portray themselves as guardians, not overlords.

Wuhayshi’s death also comes at a time when the broader jihadi movement is split between backers of al-Qaida and supporters of the Islamic State, a struggle in which AQAP has long played an important role. As al-Qaida’s most active anti-Western affiliate, AQAP was important to Zawahiri’s claim that he was leading the struggle against the United States. Its strength in Yemen, moreover, also expanded al-Qaida’s presence and prestige to an important part of the Arab world. Islamic State supporters have already conducted attacks in Yemen, and the death of Wuhayshi offers them a chance to expand their influence there. The core leadership of AQAP is not likely to join the Islamic State, but some of its cells and supporters could break off if Raimi proves a weak leader.

For now, Wuhayshi’s death means the United States has another point in the struggle against the jihadi movement. In the long term, successful disruption is more likely if the United States and its allies can keep the pressure on AQAP, forcing its leaders to go on the run and hindering their ability to communicate — particularly difficult challenges for a group in transition under new leadership. Wuhayshi’s death also comes on the heels of the deaths of several other AQAP members, including its top ideologue and spokesman. Having to hide also makes it difficult for the group to govern, as its exposed leaders run the risk of being killed. But AQAP has lost many leaders before, yet remains a force to be reckoned with. So at best, this should be seen as winning a battle, not the war.

Event Information

On September 30, 2011, the U.S.-born radical Islamic cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, was killed by an American drone strike in Yemen, marking the first extra-judicial killing by the United States government against a U.S. citizen. Placed at the top of a CIA kill list in 2010 by the Obama administration, al-Awlaki was known for his intimate involvement in multiple al-Qaida terrorist plots against U.S. citizens, including the 2009 Christmas Day airline bombing attempt in Detroit and the 2010 plot to blow up U.S.-bound cargo planes. His calls for violent jihad remain prominent on the Internet, and his influence has turned up in many cases since his death, including the Boston Marathon bombing of 2013 and the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris early this year. In a new book, “Objective Troy: A Terrorist, A President, and the Rise of the Drone” (Crown, 2015), The New York Times national security reporter Scott Shane, drawing on in-depth field research in Yemen and interviews with U.S. government officials, charts the intimate details of the life and death of al-Awlaki, including his radicalization, his recruiting efforts for al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and the use of drone strikes by the United States to prosecute its counterterrorism goals.

On September 17, the Intelligence Project hosted Shane to examine the roles played by al-Awlaki in al-Qaida plots against the United States, al-Awlaki’s continued influence on terrorism, and the current state of al-Qaida today. Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel, director of the Intelligence Project, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

Audio

• Anwar al-Awlaki, Yemen, and American counterterrorism policy

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20150917_awlaki_yemen_transcript

An American drone strike that killed leader of the Afghan Taliban Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Mansour may seem like a fillip for the United States’ ally, the embattled government of Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani. But as Vanda Felbab-Brown writes in a new op-ed for The New York Times, it is unlikely to improve Kabul’s immediate national security problems—and may create more difficulties than it solves.

The White House has argued that because Mansour became opposed to peace talks with the Afghan government, removing him became necessary to facilitate new talks. Yet, as Vanda writes in the op-ed, “the notion that the United States can drone-strike its way through the leadership of the Afghan Taliban until it finds an acceptable interlocutor seems optimistic, at best.”

[T]he notion that the United States can drone-strike its way through the leadership of the Afghan Taliban until it finds an acceptable interlocutor seems optimistic, at best.

Mullah Mansour's death does not inevitably translate into substantial weakening of the Taliban's operational capacity or a reprieve from what is shaping up to be a bloody summer in Afghanistan. Any fragmentation of the Taliban to come does not ipso facto imply stronger Afghan security forces or a reduction of violent conflict. Even if Mansour's demise eventually turns out to be an inflection point in the conflict and the Taliban does seriously fragment, such an outcome may only add complexity to the conflict. A lot of other factors, including crucially Afghan politics, influence the capacity of the Afghan security forces and their battlefield performance.

Nor will Mansour’s death motivate the Taliban to start negotiating. That did not happen when it was revealed last July’s the group’s previous leader and founder, Mullah Mohammad Omar, had died in 2013. To the contrary, the Taliban’s subsequent military push has been its strongest in a decade—with its most violent faction, the Haqqani network, striking the heart of Kabul. Mansour had empowered the violent Haqqanis following Omar’s death as a means to reconsolidate the Taliban, and their continued presence portends future violence. Mansour's successor, Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada, the Taliban’s former minister of justice who loved to issue execution orders, is unlikely to be in a position to negotiate (if he even wants to) for a considerable time as he seeks to gain control and create legitimacy within the movement.

The United States has sent a strong signal to Pakistan, which continues to deny the presence of the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network within its borders. Motivated by a fear of provoking the groups against itself, Pakistan continues to show no willingness to take them on, despite the conditions on U.S. aid.

Disrupting the group’s leadership by drone-strike decapitation is tempting militarily. But it can be too blunt an instrument, since negotiations and reconciliation ultimately depend on political processes. In decapitation targeting, the U.S. leadership must think critically about whether the likely successor will be better or worse for the counterinsurgency endgame.

Rooftop solar is booming in U.S. cities.

One of the most exciting infrastructure developments within metropolitan America, the installation of over a million solar photovoltaic (PV) systems in recent years, represents nothing less than a breakthrough for urban sustainability — and the climate.

Prices for solar panels have fallen dramatically. Residential solar installations surged by 66 percent between 2014 and 2015 helping to ensure that solar accounted for 30 percent of all new U.S. electric generating capacity. And for that matter, recent analyses conclude that the cost of residential solar is often comparable to the average price of power on the utility grid, a threshold known as grid parity.

So, what’s not to like? Rooftop solar is a total winner, right?

Well, not quite: The spread of rooftop solar has raised tricky issues for utilities and the public utilities commissions (PUCs) that regulate them. 

Specifically, the proliferation of rooftop solar installations is challenging the traditional utility business model by altering the relationship of household and utility—and not just by reducing electricity sales. In this respect, the solar boom has prompted significant debates in states like New York and California about the best rates and policies to ensure that state utility rules and rates provide a way for distributed solar to flourish even as utilities are rewarded for meeting customer demands. Increasingly, this ferment is leading to thoughtful dialogues aimed at devising new forms of policy and rate design that can—as in New York—encourage distributed energy resources (DERs) while allowing for distribution utilities to adapt to the new era.

However, in some states, the ferment has prompted a cruder set of backlashes. Most pointedly, some utilities contend that the “net-metering” fees paid to homeowners with rooftop installations for excess solar power they send back to the grid unfairly transfer costs to the utilities and their non-solar customers.

And so in a number of states, utility interests have sought to persuade state regulators to roll back net-metering provisions, arguing they are a net cost to the overall electricity system.  Most glaringly, the local utility in Nevada successfully wielded the cost-shift theory last winter to get the Nevada Public Utilities Commission to drastically curtail the state’s net-metering payments, prompting Solar City, Sunrun, and Vivint Solar—the state’s three largest providers of rooftop panels—to leave the Nevada market entirely. The result: New residential solar installation permits plunged 92 percent in Nevada in the first quarter of 2016.

All of which highlights a burning question for the present and future of rooftop solar: Does net metering really represent a net cost shift from solar-owning households to others? Or does it in fact contribute net benefits to the grid, utilities, and other ratepayer groups when all costs and benefits are factored in? As to the answer, it’s getting clearer (even if it’s not unanimous). Net metering — contra the Nevada decision — frequently benefits all ratepayers when all costs and benefits are accounted for, which is a finding state public utility commissions, or PUCs, need to take seriously as the fight over net metering rages in states like Arizona, California, and Nevada.  Regulators everywhere need to put in place processes that fairly consider the full range of benefits (as well as costs) of net metering as well as other policies as they set and update the policies, regulations, and tariffs that will play a critical role in determining the extent to which the distributed solar industry continues to grow.

Fortunately, such cost-benefit analyses have become an important feature of state rate-setting processes and offer important guidance to states like Nevada.  So what does the accumulating national literature on costs and benefits of net metering say?  Increasingly it concludes— whether conducted by PUCs, national labs, or academics — that the economic benefits of net metering actually outweigh the costs and impose no significant cost increase for non-solar customers.  Far from a net cost, net metering is in most cases a net benefit—for the utility and for non-solar rate-payers.

Of course, there are legitimate cost-recovery issues associated with net metering, and they vary from market to market. Moreover, getting to a good rate design, which is essential for both utility revenues and the growth of distributed generation, is undeniably complicated.  If rates go too far in the direction of “volumetric energy charges”—charging customers based on energy use—utilities could have trouble recovering costs when distributed energy sources reach higher levels of penetration. On the other hand, if rates lean more towards fixed charges—not dependent on usage—it may reduce incentives for customers to consider solar and other distributed generation technologies.  

Moreover, cost-benefit assessments can vary due to differences in valuation approach and methodology, leading to inconsistent outcomes. For instance, a Louisiana Public Utility Commission study last year found that that state’s net-metering customers do not pay the full cost of service and are subsidized by other ratepayers. How that squares with other states’ analyses is hard to parse.

Nevertheless, by the end of 2015, regulators in at least 10 states had conducted studies to develop methodologies to value distributed generation and net metering, while other states conducted less formal inquiries, ranging from direct rate design or net-metering policy changes to general education of decisionmakers and the public. And there is a degree of consensus.  What do the commission-sponsored analyses show? A growing number show that net metering benefits all utility customers:

• In 2013 Vermont’s Public Service Department conducted a study that concluded that “net-metered systems do not impose a significant net cost to ratepayers who are not net-metering participants.” The legislatively mandated analysis deemed the policy a successful component of the state’s overall energy strategy that is cost effectively advancing Vermont’s renewable energy goals.

• In 2014 a study commissioned by the Nevada Public Utility Commission itself concluded that net metering provided $36 million in benefits to all NV Energy customers, confirming that solar energy can provide cost savings for both solar and non-solar customers alike. What’s more, solar installations will make fewer costly grid upgrades necessary, leading to additional savings. The study estimated a net benefit of $166 million over the lifetime of solar systems installed through 2016. Furthermore, due to changes to utility incentives and net-metering policies in Nevada starting in 2014, solar customers would not be significantly shifting costs to other ratepayers.

• A 2014 study commissioned by the Mississippi Public Services Commission concluded that the benefits of implementing net metering for solar PV in Mississippi outweigh the costs in all but one scenario. The study found that distributed solar can help avoid significant infrastructure investments, take pressure off the state's oil and gas generation at peak demand times, and lower rates. (However, the study also warned that increased penetrations of distributed solar could lead to lower revenues for utilities and suggested that the state investigate Value of Solar Tariffs, or VOST, and other alternative valuations to calculate the true cost of solar.)

• In 2014 Minnesota’s Public Utility Commission approved a first-ever statewide “value of solar” methodology which affirmed that distributed solar generation is worth more than its retail price and concluded that net metering undervalues rooftop solar. The “value of solar” methodology is designed to capture the societal value of PV-generated electricity. The PUC found that the value of solar was at 14.5 cents per kilowatt hour (kWh)—which was 3 to 3.5 cents more per kilowatt than Xcel's retail rates—when other metrics such as the social cost of carbon, the avoided construction of new power stations, and the displacement of more expensive power sources were factored in.

• Another study commissioned by the Maine Public Utility Commission in 2015 put a value of $0.33 per kWh on energy generated by distributed solar, compared to the average retail price of $0.13 per kWh — the rate at which electricity is sold to residential customers as well as the rate at which distributed solar is compensated. The study concludes that solar power provides a substantial public benefit because it reduces electricity prices due to the displacement of more expensive power sources, reduces air and climate pollution, reduces costs for the electric grid system, reduces the need to build more power plants to meet peak demand, stabilizes prices, and promotes energy security. These avoided costs represent a net benefit for non-solar ratepayers.

These generally positive PUC conclusions about the benefits of net metering have been supported by research done by a national lab and several think tanks. Important lab research has examined how substantially higher adoption of distributed resources might look.

In a forward-looking analysis of the financial impacts of net-metered energy on utilities and ratepayers, Lawrence Berkeley National Lab found that while high use of net-metered solar generation may decrease utility shareholders' earnings, it will have a "relatively modest" impact on ratepayers. The report examined solar penetration levels that are "substantially higher than [those that] exist today" — 10 percent compared to today's 0.2 percent — and concluded that “even at penetration levels significantly higher than today, the impacts of customer-sited PV on average retail rates may be relatively modest." The report further said that utilities and regulators "may have sufficient time to address concerns about the rate impacts of PV in a measured and deliberate manner"

Similarly, a growing number of academic and think tank studies have found that solar energy is being undervalued and that it delivers benefits far beyond what solar customers are receiving in net-metering credits:

• For instance, a review of 11 net metering studies by Environment America Research and Policy Center has found that distributed solar offers net benefits to the entire electric grid through reduced capital investment costs, avoided energy costs, and reduced environmental compliance costs. Eight of the 11 studies found the value of solar energy to be higher than the average local residential retail electricity rate: The median value of solar power across all 11 studies was nearly 17 cents per unit, compared to the nation’s average retail electricity rate of about 12 cents per unit.

• A 2015 cost-benefit study of net metering in Missouri by the Missouri Energy Initiative found that even accounting for increased utility administrative costs and the shifting of some fixed expenses, net metering is a net benefit for all customers regardless of whether they have rooftop solar. The study used values for two kinds of costs and two benefits and concluded that net metering’s “net effect” is positive. The typical solar owner pays only 20 percent less in fixed grid costs and costs the utility an estimated $187 per interconnection. Meanwhile, solar owners benefit the system through reduced emissions and energy costs.

• Likewise, a study by Acadia Center found the value of solar to exceed 22 cents per kWh of value for Massachusetts ratepayers through reduced energy and infrastructure costs, lower fuel prices, and lowering the cost of compliance with the Commonwealth's greenhouse gas requirements. This value was estimated to exceed the retail rate provided through net metering.

• In yet another study, researchers at the University at Albany, George Washington University, and Clean Power Research have found that solar installations in New York deliver between 15 and 40 cents per kWh to ratepayers. The study noted that these numbers provide economic justification for the existence of incentives that transfer value from those who benefit from solar electric generation to those who invest in solar electric generation.

In short, while the conclusions vary, a significant body of cost-benefit research conducted by PUCs, consultants, and research organizations provides substantial evidence that net metering is more often than not a net benefit to the grid and all ratepayers.

As to the takeaways, they are quite clear: Regulators and utilities need to engage in a broader and more honest conversation about how to integrate distributed-generation technologies into the grid nationwide, with an eye toward instituting a fair utility-cost recovery strategy that does not pose significant challenges to solar adoption.

From the state PUCs’ perspective, until broad changes are made to the increasingly outdated and ineffective standard utility business model, which is built largely around selling increasing amounts of electricity, net-metering policies should be viewed as an important tool for encouraging the integration of renewable energy into states’ energy portfolios as part of the transition beyond fossil fuels. To that end, progressive regulators should explore and implement reforms that arrive at more beneficial and equitable rate designs that do not prevent solar expansion in their states. The following reforms range from the simplest to the hardest:

• Adopt a rigorous and transparent methodology for identifying, assessing, and quantifying the full range of benefits and costs of distributed generation technologies. While it is not always possible to quantify or assess sources of benefits and costs comprehensively, PUCs must ensure that all cost-benefit studies explicitly decide how to account for each source of value and state which ones are included and which are not. Currently methodological differences in evaluating the full value of distributed generation technologies make comparisons challenging. States start from different sets of questions and assumptions and use different data. For instance, while there is consensus on the basic approach to energy value estimation (avoided energy and energy losses via the transmission and distribution system), differences arise in calculating other costs and benefits, especially unmonetized values such as financial risks, environmental benefits, and social values. In this regard, the Interstate Renewable Energy Council’s “A Regulator’s Guidebook: Calculating the Benefits and Costs of Distributed Solar Generation” and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s “Methods for Analyzing the Benefits and Costs of Distributed Photovoltaic Generation to the U.S. Electric Utility System” represent helpful resources for identifying norms in the selection of categories, definitions, and  methodologies to measure various benefits and costs.

• Undertake and implement a rigorous, transparent, and precise “value of solar” analytic and rate-setting approach that would compensate rooftop solar customers based on the benefit that they provide to the grid. Seen as an alternative to ‘traditional’ net-metering rate design, a “value of solar” approach would credit solar owners for (1) avoiding the purchase of energy from other, polluting sources; (2) avoiding the need to build additional power plant capacity to meet peak energy needs; (3) providing energy for decades at a fixed prices; and (4) reducing wear and tear on the electric grid. While calculating the “value of solar” is very complex and highly location-dependent, ultimately PUCs may want to head toward an approach that accurately reflects all benefits and costs from all energy sources. Value of solar tariffs are being used in Austin, Texas (active use) and Minnesota (under development).

• Implement a well-designed decoupling mechanism that will encourage utilities to promote energy efficiency and distributed generation technologies like solar PV, without seeing them as an automatic threat to their revenues. As of January 2016, 15 states have implemented electric decoupling and eight more are considering it. Not surprisingly, it is states that have not decoupled electricity (such as Nevada) that are fighting net metering the hardest. Typically, decoupling has been used as a mechanism to encourage regulated utilities to promote energy efficiency for their customers. However, it can also be used as a tool to incentivize net metering by breaking the link between utility profits and utility sales and encouraging maximum solar penetration. Advocates of decoupling note that it is even more effective when paired with time-of-use pricing and minimum monthly billing.

• Move towards a rate design structure that can meet the needs of a distributed resource future. A sizable disconnect is opening between the rapidly evolving new world of distributed energy technologies and an old world of electricity pricing. In this new world, bundled, block, “volumetric” pricing—the most common rate structure for both residential and small commercial customers—can no longer meet the needs of all stakeholders. The changing grid calls, instead, for new rate structures that respond better to the deployment of new grid technologies and the proliferation of myriad distributed energy resources, whether solar, geothermal, or other.  A more sophisticated rate design structure, in this regard, would take into consideration three things: (1) the unbundling of rates to specifically price energy, capacity, ancillary services,  and so on; (2) moving from volumetric bloc rates to pricing structures that recognize the  variable time-based value of electricity generation and consumption (moving beyond just peak versus off-peak pricing to  fully real-time pricing); and (3) moving from pricing that treats all customers equally to a pricing structure that more accurately compensates for unique, location-specific and technology specific values.

• Move towards a performance-based utility rate-making model for the modern era. Performance based regulation (PBR) is a different way of structuring utility regulation designed to align a utility’s financial success with its ability to deliver what customers and society want. Moving to a model that pays the utility based on whether it achieves quantitatively defined outcomes (like system resilience, affordability, or distributed generation integration) can make it profitable for them to pursue optimal grid solutions to meet those outcomes. The new business model would require the PUC and utilities to make a number of changes, including overhauling the regulatory framework, removing utility incentives for increasing capital assets and kilowatt hours sold, and replacing those incentives with a new set of performance standard metrics such as reliability, safety, and demand-side management. New York’s Reforming the Energy Vision  proceeding is the most high-profile attempt in the country to implement a PBR model.

Options also exist for utilities to address the challenges posed by net metering:

• Utilities, most notably, have the opportunity to adjust their existing business models by themselves owning and operating distributed PV assets (though not to the exclusion of other providers).  On this front, utilities could move to assemble distributed generation systems, such as for rooftop solar, and sell or lease them to homeowners. In this regard, utilities have an advantage over third-party installers currently dominating the residential rooftop solar industry due to their proprietary system knowledge, brand recognition, and an existing relationship with their customers. Utilities in several states such as Arizona, California, and New York are investigating or have already invested in the opportunity.

• Furthermore, utilities can also push the envelope on grid modernization by investing in a more digital and distributed power grid that enables interaction with thousands of distributed energy resources and devices.

Ultimately, distributed solar is here to stay at increasing scale, and so state policies to support it have entered an important new transitional phase. More and more states will now likely move to update their net-metering policies as the cost of solar continues to drop and more homeowners opt to install solar panels on their homes.

As they do that, states need to rigorously and fairly evaluate the costs and benefits posed by net metering, grid fees, and other policies to shape a smart, progressive regulatory system that works for all of the stakeholders touched by distributed solar.

Utilities should have a shot at fair revenues and adequate ratepayers. Solar customers and providers have a right to cost-effective, reliable access to the grid. And the broader public should be able to expect a continued solar power boom in U.S. regions as well as accelerated decarbonization of state economies. All of which matters intensely. As observes the North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center and Meister Consultants Group: “How key state policies and rates are adapted will play a significant role in determining the extent to which the [solar PV] industry will continue to grow and in what markets.”

On December 12, 2015, 195 countries adopted the Paris Agreement, the most ambitious climate change pact to date. The document lays out a plan to curb greenhouse gas emissions, among other climate-related initiatives. Participating countries must now find ways to translate those ambitions into policy, and answer important questions about financing, transparency and accountability, national implementation, and accelerated emissions reduction goals, to name but a few. But one issue looms large: coal.

Coal-fired electricity is responsible for producing 40 percent of the world’s power and about 70 percent of its steel. The coal industry employs millions worldwide and provides billions of people with electricity. Analysts estimate that the world has hundreds of years of coal reserves in the ground, at current consumption levels. Its abundance, low price, and global availability make it a difficult fuel source to give up. But despite coal’s advantages, it poses significant environmental and health risks. Ten percent of coal consists of ash, which contains radioactive and toxic elements. It is responsible for over $50 billion in medical costs annually in the European Union alone. The environmental consequences of coal use, such as water contamination and habitat destruction, are common. Burning coal adds millions of tons of dangerous particulates and greenhouse gases, including carbon, to the atmosphere.

States and societies around the world rely on coal, even though many of its dangers have been known for decades. If the Paris Agreement is to succeed, global leaders must address the reasons why many countries—particularly in the developing world—still rely on coal. Better yet, they must find new ways to provide coal-reliant countries with affordable, alternative energy, and invest in new technologies that could help mitigate coal’s negative consequences.

COAL ACROSS THE WORLD

Globally, coal production and consumption has risen almost continuously for more than 200 years. The International Energy Agency has estimated that the world burned approximately 7,876 million tons of coal in 2013, adding over 14.8 gigatons of carbon to the atmosphere. But global coal statistics do not tell us much about markets and trends. In fact, coal usage varies enormously around the world, with some regions transitioning away from the resource as others have increasingly embraced it.

For example, stringent environmental, health, and safety policies in the United States have put increasing pressure on the coal industry. Well-funded environmental groups have succeeded in closing coal-fired power plants, and many states on the country’s west coast and in its northeast have aimed to create a coal-free power grid. Yet market forces have turned out to be the nail in U.S. coal’s coffin. The rise of natural gas in the United States has gave the country’s electricity producers an incentive to shift away from coal. In fact, U.S. coal consumption declined from a billion tons in 2008, to roughly 850 million tons by 2013. This year, analysts suggest that coal will fuel only 32 percent of all U.S. electricity, and natural gas will become the country’s leading electricity source for the first time. As a result of low prices, low returns, and political controversy, investors have shied away from coal, which has caused major coal companies to struggle to stay afloat. Of all announced new electricity generation capacity in the United States, not a single megawatt is coal-fired. Although change is happening, it will likely be decades before coal is no longer an important fuel source in the U.S. economy. Canada’s coal sector faces similar pressures: weak demand from Asia, public opposition to the construction of new export facilities, domestic environmental legislation, and the shale boom have all taken their toll.

In Europe, stringent air quality controls and climate change regulations have cut the use of coal dramatically in Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. But the EU emissions trading scheme, which relies on carbon offsets and carbon dioxide caps, has proven disappointing. In fact, most European countries still lack an economically competitive and readily available alternative to coal. Plus, the coal industry still has political power in capitals like Berlin and Warsaw, which lowers the European common denominator for energy policy, as well as its policies that fight climate change.

Photo courtesy of REUTERS/James Regan/File Photo. Coal is stockpiled at the Blair Athol mine in the Bowen Basin coalfield near the town of Moranbah, Australia, June 1, 2012.

In Asia, both Japan and South Korea are set to expand their use of coal despite signing the Paris Agreement. After the Fukushima disaster, Japan has implemented ambitious renewables and energy efficiency policies, but those cannot take the place of its nuclear energy production on their own. These countries are entirely import dependent, which makes natural gas prices high. This, in turn, makes natural gas a less likely fuel source as the countries transition to greener electricity. In this context, high-efficiency coal plants appear to be a viable alternative, especially as nuclear power remains highly controversial.

And outside of advanced economies, coal often plays the role it once played in Europe and North America. For over a decade, China was the main engine of global coal consumption, driving booms in coal mining and shipping. China’s domestic coal production skyrocketed, and other countries, such as Australia, experienced coal booms to keep pace with Chinese demand. Although China produced and consumed almost as much coal as the rest of the world combined in 2014, it seems that the country’s consumption has peaked. But China will still rely heavily on coal-fired electricity for decades. The country remains a key player in steel production, and millions of its citizens continue to work in the mining industry, despite recent layoffs.

South Asian countries continue to invest heavily in new coal-fired electricity plants and industrial projects. India may appreciate the risks of climate change, but its chief concern is delivering low-cost power to 350 million of its citizens who lack electricity. Coal is set to play a prominent role in meeting such goals. Countries like Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam have followed suit as they search for low-cost electricity to power their countries.

In short, coal remains a big player in the global fuel mix, even as it faces tough challenges from stringent environmental regulations, competition from other fuel sources, and a lack of new investments.

Photo courtesy of REUTERS/Sheng Li/Files. A labourer carries honeycomb briquettes at a coal processing factory in Shenyang, Liaoning province in this December 2, 2009 file photo.

WHITHER COAL?

Different strategies apply in different parts of the world when it comes to eradicating coal, despite the global agreement in Paris. Just as there is not a global energy grid, there is also no single, global transition to lower-carbon energy. Although some countries are transitioning away from coal, others continue to transition toward it.

Second, pragmatism and persistence—rather than ideological purity—remain key values as countries transition towards low-carbon economies. Natural gas provides North America with a backup fuel as it transitions to green energy. Without major bulk terminals on the west coast, western U.S. coal producers will not find new markets for their products overseas. And in Europe, policymakers will have to make good on long-promised and long-delayed changes to energy policy and infrastructure. If Germany and other EU states are to achieve promised clean energy transitions, coal production must be scaled back substantially across the continent. European leaders must also build an “Energy Union” that will accelerate the flow of cross-border electricity, if they are to achieve the Paris Accord’s climate change goals. Europe must also reform its existing carbon pricing mechanisms. And across China, Europe, and North America, workers will have to be re-educated for new job opportunities as the coal market dries up.

But for now, coal still keeps the light on around the world. It powers new, high-tech economies, as well as a huge share of traditional manufacturing. If hundreds of millions of Africans and Asians are to gain access to electricity, new coal-fired power plants will have to come online in the years ahead. As coal continues to play a prominent role in industrial processes like steel and cement making, technological investments are required to limit its consequences.

To tackle these challenges, coal advocates, as well as some climate experts, suggest that more countries must invest in carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) research. But such investments are lagging, and the world would require several dozen CCS projects in order to make the technology commercially viable in the long term.

If the Paris Accord is to succeed, the earth’s atmosphere cannot remain a free dump for billions of tons of pollution every year. In fact, virtually all greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced. Countries can impose taxes, cap-and-trade schemes, and regulation to make this happen. Governments will have to design unique strategies that are custom fit to their countries, and, in some cases, find opportunities with their neighbors as well. For example, some private and public institutions have chosen to stop financing coal-fired projects, and the Obama administration has indicated it will not give out new leases for coal mining on federal land. Others will choose to build more coal-fired plants until the alternatives are cheaper, or until someone pays them not to.

Globally, coal may indeed be at the beginning of the end. But the energy transition is not strictly global. It is also national, regional, and local. Coal remains economically competitive—attractive even—in many parts of the world. Some countries will wage wars on coal, which will be as much economic and financial as they are political. But some countries, like India, will host coal booms regardless of the consequences. After Paris, there is no point in ignoring coal. It will be powering the world—and the world’s debates—for decades to come.

This piece was originally published by Foreign Affairs.

The debate surrounding net energy metering (NEM) and the appropriate way to reform this policy is under scrutiny in many U.S. states. This is highly warranted since NEM policies do indeed need reforming because NEM often results in subsidies to private (rooftop) solar owners and leasing companies. These subsidies are then “paid for” by non-NEM customers (customers without private rooftop solar installations). The fundamental source of the NEM subsidy is the failure of NEM customers (customers with private rooftop solar installations) to pay fully for the grid services that they use 24/7. These subsidies are well-documented and underpin much of the regulatory reform efforts underway across the United States.[1]

In a recent Brookings paper, “Rooftop solar: Net metering is a net benefit,” Mark Muro and Devashree Saha contend that net metering is a net benefit for non-NEM customers.[2] I fundamentally disagree with their findings, and argue that NEM is not a net benefit; it is, in fact, a tariff that much of the time results in a subsidy to NEM customers and a cost shift onto non-NEM customers. As Executive Director of the Institute for Electric Innovation, a non-lobbying organization focused on trends in the electric power industry, I have followed this debate and written about it for several years.

Much of the talk about NEM focuses too often on the “value” of the energy that is sold back to the grid by a NEM customer. In reality, the amount of energy sold back to the grid is relatively small. The real issue is the failure of NEM customers to pay fully for the grid services that they use while connected to the grid 24/7, as shown in Figure 1.[3] Customers need to constantly use the grid to balance supply and demand throughout the day, and the cost of these grid services can be sizeable. In fact, for a typical residential customer in the United States with an average electricity bill of $110 per month, the actual cost of grid services can range from $45 to $70 per month–however, the customer doesn’t see that charge.[4] That means, in the extreme, if a customer’s energy use “nets” to zero in a given month because the customer’s private solar system produced exactly what the customer consumed, that customer would pay $0 even though that customer is connected to the local electric company’s distribution grid and is utilizing grid services on a continuous around-the-clock basis.[5]

Although exactly netting to zero energy in a month is highly unlikely, this example demonstrates the point that the customer would pay nothing, despite using grid services at a cost ranging from $45 to $70 per month. Over the course of one year, this customer could receive a subsidy resulting from NEM of between $540 and $840. Over the life of a private rooftop solar system, which ranges from 20 to 25 years, this is a significant subsidy resulting from NEM.

Granted, this is an extreme example, and most NEM customers will pay for some portion of grid services. However, the fundamental source of the NEM subsidy is the failure of NEM customers to pay fully for the grid services that they use 24/7, and the cost of these services can be quite substantial. When a NEM customer doesn’t pay for the grid, the cost is shifted onto non-NEM customers.[6] It is a zero-sum game; plain and simple. This is the elephant in the room.

This issue was directly addressed by Austin Energy when the company implemented a “buy-sell” arrangement for the private rooftop solar customers in its service territory. The rationale for the buy-sell approach is that the customer buys all of the energy that is consumed on-site through the electric company’s retail tariff and sells all of the energy produced by their private rooftop solar system at the electric company’s avoided cost. This addresses the “elephant in the room” because, by buying all energy consumed at the retail tariff, the customer does pay for grid services that are largely captured through the retail tariff. It is an unfortunate fact that under ratemaking practices today in the United States, the majority of fixed costs (i.e., grid and other costs) are captured through a volumetric charge.

Hence, I fundamentally disagree with the Muro/Saha paper–NEM does need to be reformed. NEM is not a net benefit; it is a tariff that the much of the time results in a cost shift onto non-NEM customers. One of the first studies to quantify the magnitude of the NEM subsidy was conducted by Energy+Environmental Economics (E3) for the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) in 2013. There was no mention of this analysis for the CPUC in the Muro/Saha paper. The E3 study estimated that NEM would result in a cost shift of $1.1 billion annually by 2020 from NEM to non-NEM customers if current NEM policies were not reformed in California.[7] A cost shift of this magnitude–paid for by non-NEM customers–was unacceptable to California regulators. As a result, California regulators set to work to reform rates in their state; many other states followed suit and conducted similar investigations of the magnitude of the NEM subsidy.

In reviewing NEM studies, Muro and Saha chose to focus on a handful of studies that show that net metering results in a benefit to all customers. In this small group of NEM studies, they included a study that E3 conducted for the Nevada Public Utilities Commission (PUC) in 2014–perhaps the most well-known and cited of the five studies included in the Muro/Saha paper. Very soon after the E3 Nevada study was published, the cost assumptions for the base-case scenario which showed a net benefit of $36 million to non-NEM customers (assuming $100 per MWh for utility-scale solar) were found to be incorrect, completely reversing the conclusion. The $36 million benefit associated with NEM for private rooftop solar turned into a $222 million cost to non-NEM customers when utility-scale solar was priced at $80 per MWh.[8] Today, based on the two most recent utility-scale contracts approved by the Nevada PUC, utility-scale solar has an average lifetime (i.e., levelized) cost of $50 per MWh, meaning that the NEM cost shift would be far greater today. In February 2016, the Nevada PUC stated that “the E3 study is already outdated and irrelevant to the discussion of costs and benefits of NEM in Nevada…”[9] Hence, because the E3 study for the Nevada PUC that the Muro/Saha paper included has been declared outdated and irrelevant to the discussion and because costs for utility-scale solar have declined significantly, that study does not show that NEM provides a net benefit.

No doubt there is an intense debate underway about NEM for private rooftop solar, and much has changed in the past two years in terms of both NEM policies and the growth of private solar projects:

• First, several state regulatory commissions now recognize that the NEM cost shift is both real and sizeable and that all customers who use the grid, including NEM customers, need to pay for the cost of the grid. As a result, many electric companies have proposed and state regulatory commissions have approved increases in monthly fixed charges over the past few years; this partially addresses the issue of NEM customers paying for the cost of the grid services that they use.
• Second and related, getting the pricing right for distributed energy resources of all types is important because we expect those resources to grow significantly in the future. Work is underway in this area and it is one focus of the New York Reforming the Energy Vision proceeding; but there is still much to be done.

By focusing on a select group of studies that show that NEM benefits all customers (as stated by the authors); by excluding the E3 study for the CPUC which was fundamental to the NEM cost shift debate; and by not providing an update on the NEM debate today, I believe that the Muro/Saha paper is misleading.

In the second part of their paper, Muro and Saha suggest some helpful regulatory reforms such as moving toward rate designs that “can meet the needs of a distributed resource future” and moving “toward performance-based rate-making (PBR).” Some electric companies have already implemented PBR or some type of formula rate and PBR is under discussion in several states.[10] Lawrence Berkeley National Labs is looking closely at this and related issues in its Future Electric Utility Regulation series of reports currently underway.[11]

Mura and Saha also suggest decoupling as a way forward–I disagree. In my view, decoupling is a not solution for private rooftop solar. Revenue decoupling is currently used to true-up revenues that would otherwise be lost due to declining electricity sales resulting from electric company investments in energy efficiency (EE). Decoupling explicitly shifts costs from participating EE customers to non-participating EE customers causing the same cost-shifting problem that is created by NEM. However, a fundamental difference is that the magnitude of the cost shifting onto non-NEM customers is on a much larger scale than the cost shifting due to EE. A recent study revealed that decoupling rate adjustments for EE are quite small–about two to three percent of the retail rate.^[12] In contrast, as described earlier in this paper, a NEM customer could shift a significant cost onto non-NEM customers (and the NEM cost shifting is essentially invisible to customers, which is one reason that NEM customers do not believe they are subsidized).[13]

Finally, Muro and Saha suggest that electric companies should invest in a more digital and distributed power grid. In fact, electric companies across the United States are doing just that. In 2015, electric companies invested $20 billion in the distribution system alone and this is expected to continue. Over the past five to six years, electric companies invested in the deployment of nearly 65 million digital smart meters to about 50 percent of U.S. households. In addition, electric companies are investing in thousands of devices to make the power grid smarter and more state-aware. Today, in states such as California, Hawaii, and Arizona, electric companies are investing to enable and integrate the distributed energy resources that are growing exponentially. And, in some states–where regulation allows–electric companies are offering rooftop solar or solar subscriptions to their customers.

No doubt, the electric power industry is undergoing a period of profound transformation–our power generation resource mix is getting cleaner and more distributed; the energy grid is becoming more digital; and customers have different expectations.[14]

Collaboration, good public policy, and appropriate regulatory policies are critical to a successful transformation of the power sector. In the context of this paper, this means reforming NEM so that private rooftop solar customers who use the energy grid pay for the grid. One straightforward approach is to require NEM customers to pay a higher monthly fixed charge thereby reducing the cost shift.[15] Ultimately the challenge is to make the transition of the electric power industry–including the significant growth in private rooftop solar and other distributed energy resources–affordable to all customers.

Lisa Wood is a nonresident senior fellow in the Energy Security and Climate Initiative at Brookings. She is also the executive director of the Institute for Electric Innovation and vice president of The Edison Foundation whose members include electric companies and technology companies.

Following U.S. troop withdrawal in 2014, Afghanistan faces an uncertain future. Its fate could be compromised or even commanded by war lords, terrorists or corrupt government officials. Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown spent time on the ground observing events and talking to a mix of Afghans from high ranking officials to village elders, to merchants to the person on the street. In this four-part video series based on her book, “Aspiration and Ambivalence: Strategies and Realities of Counterinsurgency and State-Building in Afghanistan,” Felbab-Brown offers analysis on an Afghanistan in flux.

Video

• Vanda Felbab-Brown: Counterinsurgency and State-Building in Afghanistan after 2014
• Vanda Felbab-Brown: The Afghan People Simply Want to Live and Thrive
• Vanda Felbab-Brown: Pakistan Plays a Significant Role in Afghanistan's Future
• Vanda Felbab-Brown: The Choices the U.S. Makes Will Largely Determine Afghanistan's Future

Editors’ Note: Terrorist groups don’t emerge out of nowhere, and wars are perhaps the richest soil for seeding and growing violent groups of all stripes, writes Dan Byman. This post originally appeared in the Washington Post.

Study after study has found no common profile of a terrorist. It is hard to explain why, say, almost four times as many recruits leave Sweden to fight with the Islamic State as from neighboring Norway, though Sweden’s population is only twice Norway’s. Pundits and politicians alike speculate on why individuals might embrace terrorism, but such a question risks missing one obvious point: Having a terrorist group around in the first place is one of the most important factors in influencing an individual’s choice to join.

Terrorist groups don’t emerge out of nowhere, and wars are perhaps the richest soil for seeding and growing violent groups of all stripes. Without the wars in the Middle East there would be no Islamic State, and it is not the only one: al-Qaida, Hezbollah, and other extremist groups all emerged out of regional civil wars. The formation of such groups is a political phenomenon, and so, too, is the radicalization of foreign fighters from the West.

Terrorist groups are rarely the cause of civil wars. Iraq’s civil war began in 2003 after the U.S. invasion and occupation; Syria’s civil war began with peaceful protests against a brutal dictator in 2011; and Libya’s strife came after a terrorist-supporting dictator was toppled in the same year.

Rather, such wars beget and foster terrorism in several ways. Terror itself is often a tool in war, used to sow an atmosphere of fear and undermine governments. Assassinations of rival political leaders, bombs for police and military recruits and random violence against civilians—these are all methods learned from Insurgency 101.

Groups such as al-Qaida and now the Islamic State exploit new wars wherever they can. Terrorist groups linked to civil wars seek supporters in the United States, Europe, and other areas outside the theater for reasons both obvious and obscure—and these factors generate more terrorists. This pull is especially strong when identities cross borders—as does a religious identity like Islam—and when local ties are weak or the community as a whole is poorly integrated, as the Muslim community is in many European countries.

Foreigners might join these groups for altruistic reasons, to help the genuinely oppressed (the Syrian people facing Bashar al-Assad, or the Afghans facing the Soviets). Yet often the oppression is a myth, or at least greatly exaggerated: One powerful narrative of the Islamic State is that Sunni Muslims are facing a global Shiite conspiracy led by Iran and Hezbollah.

Still others join because they are true believers and want to live the dream. In different ways, the war takes them out of their humdrum or depressing present, giving them a new life: “I’m the most content I have ever been in my life,” tweeted one young American woman who had gone to live in the Islamic State, ending the tweet with a heart emoji. Many are merely thugs who spent time in jail or otherwise led delinquent lives: Joining the Islamic State or a similar group gives them a license to kill and torture.

Because there is no single profile, terrorist groups such as the Islamic State seek to appeal to many different ones. Propaganda stresses the good life in the caliphate, the glory of fighting for God, the oppression the community is facing, and glorified ultra-violence. Religion matters, but only as a badge of meaning and belonging rather than for its specific ideological content. By professing religious beliefs, a young Muslim male can go from marginalized and alienated in his home country to part of God’s army, defending his people with his own sex slaves to boot. Yet one study of the European foreign fighters found that most were theologically illiterate. Omar Mateen, the Orlando shooter, may not have understood the difference between the theologies espoused by the Islamic State, al-Qaida and Hezbollah.

As long as these wars rage, the problems they generate will not stay confined to the Middle East. Only a fraction of a fraction end up fighting, and even fewer engage in terrorism, but only a small number need to respond for the problem to be serious.

The man who drove a truck through packed crowds celebrating Bastille Day, killing more than 80, may have acted alone, according to the early reports. We don't know if he was inspired by a jihadist ideology or linked to any specific group. In any event, these extremist groups are increasingly embracing a "lone wolf" approach, and the West should prepare for more such attacks.

I've argued that such lone wolf" attacks are deadly but often fail in the long-term. Part of the reason is that historically many are poorly prepared and incompetent, bungling the attack or at least not killing as many as a more skilled and trained individual might.

Yet the horrific body count in Nice, along with the 49 dead in recent Orlando nightclub shooting, shows how deadly even an unskilled loser like Omar Mateen can be.

This deadliness is not new – Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, largely acting alone, killed 168 people when they bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 – but it suggests the potential lethality of lone wolves.

A Weaker Islamic State

The Islamic State is putting more emphasis on lone wolves out of desperation.

In the past, it urged its sympathizers to go to Syria to help the fledgling state defend itself and expand. However, the United States, France, and other countries and local fighters hitting hard at the Islamic State's core in Iraq and Syria. Other major areas of operations, like the Islamic State's "province" in Libya, are also under siege. The self-proclaimed state is short of funds, and the number of foreign recruits is declining.

Like all terrorist groups, the Islamic State needs victories to inspire new recruits and prevent existing members from losing hope. CIA Director John Brennan foresaw this in testimony and warned, "as the pressure mounts on [ISIS], we judge that it will intensify its global terror campaign to maintain its dominance of the global terrorism agenda."

A silver lining is that lone wolf terrorism, even if lethal, usually fails in a strategic sense. As one IRA terrorist said, "you don't bloody well kill people for the sake of killing them."

Violence with no strategy behind it terrifies, but it can backfire against a group and the cause it embraces. McVeigh and Nichols, for example, discredited other far right movements. McVeigh claimed he was dealing a blow against a tyrannical government, but the death of 19 children and three pregnant women in the bombing made it hard even for anti-government zealots to defend him.

In Nice, the driver killed children out to watch the fireworks, and the dead included innocent Muslims, like the grieving young man asking Allah to accept his mother into heaven may (and should) become the face of the attack, hardly a heroic move in a holy war that would inspire others.

Although the Islamic State's moves smack of desperation, that is no comfort to anyone concerned about terrorism.

Difficult To Prevent

Terrorist groups that draw on foreign fighters or otherwise are organized tend to be more deadly and dangerous in the long-term, but lone wolves are exceptionally hard to stop. The very organizational connections that give most terrorism direction are by definition lacking, and thus it is harder to find and disrupt the attacks. So more attempts, and likely some successful ones, seem inevitable.

One clear recommendation – and the one least likely to be heeded in the aftermath of a terrorist attack – is to ensure community support. If a community has good relations with the police and society in general, it has fewer grievances for terrorists to exploit and is more likely to point out malefactors in their midst.

Even though he was never arrested, Mateen came to the FBI's attention because a local Muslim found him worrisome. In France in particular, however, relations between the Muslim community and the government are often poisonous, and a terrorist attack will probably make this worse as France's already popular far-right movement becomes strong. And this will only mean more lone wolves will slip through in the future.

This piece originally appeared on NPR's Parallels.

The terrible attack in Nice on July 14—Bastille Day—saddened us all. For a country that has done so much historically to promote democracy and human rights at home and abroad, France is paying a terrible and unfair price, even more than most countries. My colleagues Will McCants and Chris Meserole have carefully documented the toll that France, and certain other Francophone countries like Belgium, have suffered in recent years from global terrorism. It is heart wrenching.

From what we know so far, the attack was carried out by a deeply distraught, potentially deranged, and in any case extremely brutal local man from Nice of Tunisian descent and French nationality. Marital problems, the recent loss of his job, and a general sense of personal unhappiness seem to have contributed to the state of mind that led him to commit this heinous atrocity. Perhaps we will soon learn that ISIS, directly or indirectly, inspired the attack in one way or another as well. My colleague Dan Byman has already tapped into his deep expertise about terrorism to remind us that ISIS had in fact encouraged ramming attacks with vehicles before, even if the actual manifestation of such tactics in this case was mostly new. 

This attack will again raise the question: Why France? On this point, I do have a somewhat different take than some of my colleagues. The argument that France has partly brought these tragedies upon itself—perhaps because of its policies of secularism and in particular its limitations on when and where women can wear the veil in France—strikes me as unpersuasive. Its logical policy implications are also potentially disturbing, because if interpreted wrongly, it could lead to a debate on whether France should modify such policies so as to make itself less vulnerable to terrorism. That outcome, even if unintended, could dance very close to the line of encouraging appeasement of heinous acts of violence with policy changes that run counter to much of what French culture and society would otherwise favor. So I feel the need to push back.

Here are some of the arguments, as I see them, against blaming French culture or policy for this recent string of horrible attacks including the Charlie Hebdo massacre, the November 2015 mass shootings in Paris, and the Nice tragedy (as well as recent attacks in Belgium):

• Starting with the simplest point, we still do not know much about the perpetrator of the Nice killings. From what we do surmise so far, personal problems appear to be largely at the root of the violence—different from, but not entirely unlike, the case with the Orlando shooter, Omar Mateen.
• We need to be careful about drawing implications from a small number of major attacks. Since 2000, there have also been major attacks in the Western world by extremist jihadis or takfiris in New York, Washington, Spain, London, San Bernardino, Orlando, and Russia. None of these are Francophone. Even Belgium is itself a mixed country, linguistically and culturally.
• Partly for reasons of geography, as well as history, France does face a larger problem than some other European countries of individuals leaving its country to go to Syria or Iraq to fight for ISIS, and then returning. But it is hardly unique in the scale of this problem.
• Continental Europe has a specific additional problem that is not as widely shared in the United Kingdom or the United States: Its criminal networks largely overlap with its extremist and/or terrorist networks. This point may be irrelevant to the Nice attack, but more widely, extremists in France or Belgium can make use of illicit channels for moving people, money, and weapons that are less available to would-be jihadis in places like the U.K. (where the criminal networks have more of a Caribbean and sub-Saharan African character, meaning they overlap less with extremist networks).
• Of course, the greatest numbers of terrorist attacks by Muslim extremists occur in the broader Muslim world, with Muslims as the primary victims—from Iraq and Syria to Libya and Yemen and Somalia to South Asia. French domestic policies have no bearing on these, of course.

There is no doubt that good work by counterterrorism and intelligence forces is crucial to preventing future attacks. France has done well in this regard—though it surely can do better, and it is surely trying to get better. There is also no doubt that promoting social cohesion in a broad sense is a worthy goal. But I would hesitate, personally, to attribute any apparent trend line in major attacks in the West to a particular policy of a country like France—especially when the latter is in fact doing much to seek to build bridges, as a matter of national policy, with Muslims at home and abroad. 

There is much more to do in promoting social cohesion, to be sure, even here in America (though our own problems probably center more on race than on religion at the moment). But the Nice attacker almost assuredly didn’t attack because his estranged wife couldn’t wear a veil in the manner and/or places she wanted. At a moment like this in particular, I disagree with insinuations to the contrary.