Republican primary opponents like Ron DeSantis said that every time they announced another indictment, his poll numbers got better. They should have known better. But they were blinded by hate.

The post BOOM: Trump Prosecutors React To New Post-Election Realities… Here’s Their Plan appeared first on Clash Daily.

Evidence Makgopa wore a sheepish smile when Bafana Bafana coach Hugo Broos showered him with praise before literally patting the forward on the back, making him blush at Dobsonville Stadium.

June 22, 2022 (New York, NY) – Will Apple’s entry into the buy now, pay later (BNPL) space upend the already competitive industry? That’s the question many are trying to […]

Climate justice with Chinese characteristics? Expert comment NCapeling 7 November 2022

China’s latest grand concept, the Global Development Initiative (GDI), claims to be making sustainability a key feature of the programme.

Since joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China has regularly unveiled a grand new strategic concept every four years or so.

Each has been deeply rooted in the Chinese political system and communicated via ambitious slogans, such as A Harmonious World, or New Types of Great Power Relations. And all have reliably generated both excitement and confusion abroad and within China.

China’s latest grand concept, the Global Development Initiative (GDI), is no exception. When Chinese president Xi Jinping introduced it at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2021, it made hardly any splash in the West, perhaps because China has already signalled its determination to shape international development in the post-COVID era.

But the GDI is more than just a new label for an ongoing project. One of its core political functions is to deflect some of the fierce criticism directed at its older sibling, the gigantic Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has a tarnished reputation for being neither transparent nor sufficiently ‘green’.

Focus on grants and capacity-building

According to the Chinese government’s initial description of the GDI, sustainability is a key feature of the programme. Unlike the BRI, the GDI will focus less on physical infrastructure projects – such as roads, bridges, digital networks, and coal-fired power plants – and more on sustainable-development grants and capacity-building.

In his remarks about GDI in 2021, Xi placed special emphasis on advancing the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and helping developing countries manage the transition to a low-carbon economy.

On paper, then, the GDI appears a laudable initiative. While ongoing geopolitical tensions have deepened divisions between China and the US, derailing collaboration on combatting climate change, China at least is adjusting its diplomacy and aid programmes to position itself as a more attractive partner for those seeking climate security.

Since launching the GDI, it has already created the China-Pacific Island Countries Climate Action Cooperation Centre to help some of the world’s most vulnerable countries mitigate the damage from climate change.

But the GDI is still very much in line with China’s past grand initiatives. Its implementation is opaque and there is considerable flexibility in how it will deliver projects and offer grants. This approach is well understood and frequently practiced by Chinese political elites, following Deng Xiaoping’s famous reform ethos of ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’.

Xi has clearly adopted this approach in introducing the GDI. But whereas Deng was steering China’s domestic economy during a period of isolation after the Cultural Revolution, Xi needs to involve many other countries in his vision. That will not be easy now that Russia’s war in Ukraine and other recent developments have complicated many of China’s international relationships.

China’s leaders recognize the BRI was not warmly received in global development circles, owing partly to its role in increasing both climate and financial risks. In implementing the GDI, they need to rethink some basic assumptions. Although gigantic infrastructure investments drove China’s own economic miracle, the same approach is not necessarily applicable everywhere.

Nor should China’s development aid be relentlessly used to seek diplomatic endorsement from other countries. Instead, producing a clear, concrete action plan with specific regional and thematic points of focus would enhance the GDI’s clarity and credibility.

Consider Xi’s recent pledge to add $1 billion to the $3.1 billion South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund, which will be renamed the Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund. If China is serious about the GDI’s green credentials, this money should go towards supporting the clean-energy transition in response to the current oil and gas price crunch.

But the GDI’s success ultimately depends on how China deploys not just financial but political capital. It needs to show it can cooperate constructively with countries in the ‘GDI Friends Group’ launched at the UN in January 2022.

For many group members, the pandemic showed that existing development assistance programs urgently need to be updated to account for their recipients’ specific interests and priorities. After years of hollow diplomatic rhetoric, there is a craving for more meaningful assistance to help countries build resilience against climate-driven natural disasters and other growing threats.

China could help meet this demand, but it also will need to manage expectations. Many in the Global South assume a grand-concept policy such as the GDI will be meticulously planned from within Xi’s cabinet and thus executed to deliver large-scale, rapid results. But the GDI will require broad coordination across a wide range of ministries, agencies, and state-owned banks.

One party but not one voice

China may be ruled by one party, but that doesn’t mean its central administration system can always speak with one voice in supporting sustainable development abroad.

Since launching the BRI in 2013, China has showered the Global South with hundreds of billions of dollars in physical infrastructure investment. With the global climate debate increasingly focusing on the need to mobilize international financing for climate mitigation and adaptation in low and middle-income countries, many will be looking to both China and the advanced economies to provide the necessary support.

China is attempting a precarious balancing act Expert comment NCapeling 9 March 2023

In its efforts to maintain ties with both Russia and Europe, China is having to wade through conflicting interests and rapidly changing sentiments.

Precisely how far China will go in supporting Russia has been one of the most important questions of the war in Ukraine.

On 20 February, US secretary of state Antony Blinken warned China may soon provide arms (‘lethal support’) to Moscow. But then, on 24 February – the anniversary of Russia’s invasion – China released a position paper calling for a political settlement to end the conflict, tellingly omitting any mention of its ‘no-limits partnership’ with Russia.

China’s goal was to present itself as a neutral mediator. In fact, Beijing’s ties with Russia remain unchanged, even if this relationship has grown more exasperating for Chinese diplomats over the past year.

Their job is to continue striking a delicate balance, a task that is becoming increasingly difficult as Russian president Vladimir Putin doubles down on nuclear brinkmanship and reckless rhetoric.

Staying out of the Ukraine war

With Putin extolling the law of the jungle in its most brutal form, China must be careful not to involve itself too much in the conflict. After all, Russia is clearly losing, and China has high hopes of repairing ties with major European economies.

But Putin is of course keen to signal that China has his back. That is why he recently rolled out the red carpet for China’s top diplomat Wang Yi and then alluded to an (unconfirmed) upcoming visit by Chinese president Xi Jinping.

Such diplomatic developments allow him to present China’s ambivalent position as, in fact, an endorsement of the invasion. While the costs of aligning with Russia could easily outweigh the benefits for China, one must remember that China’s reasons for maintaining good relations with the Kremlin go beyond the war in Ukraine.

For starters, the two countries share a 2,672-mile (4,300-kilometer) border – roughly equivalent to the width of Europe – and the frontier’s exact location was not even finally settled until the beginning of this century, after generations of negotiations that included some 2,000 meetings.

Yet to this day, the spectre of the Sino-Soviet split in the 1950s and 1960s looms large on both sides and it is not likely to be exorcised anytime soon. With China focused on moves by the US and its allies in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific, it simply cannot afford sabre-rattling or unrest on its other borders.

Moreover, unlike the collective West, China’s foreign policy has always been shaped by interests rather than by values. Even with respect to Russia, the two countries’ bond is based mainly on shared resentment of US hegemony. By deepening their bilateral cooperation in recent years, they have been able to achieve a level of great-power status with which to counterbalance America.

But Putin’s misadventure in Ukraine has forced Xi and China’s newly minted Politburo to manage a new set of economic, financial, and political risks.

Russia’s war has left the West more firmly united than it has been in years. As China’s relations with the US have reached new lows, Chinese leaders want to avoid also alienating the European Union (EU), which is one of the country’s biggest trading partners.

This is why Xi and Chinese diplomats have been so careful not to accept the Kremlin’s talking points in full. Being isolated from the ‘collective West’ is not an attractive option for China, given its hopes of achieving a robust economic rebound after years of the zero-COVID policy.

Balancing Europe with the Global South

In seeking to keep diplomatic and trade channels open, China’s main tactic has been to reassure European countries that it will use its own ties with Russia to restrain Putin from deploying nuclear weapons.

At the same time, China is making a renewed push to strengthen its ties with the Global South where many countries do not see the war in Ukraine in the same stark moral terms as the West does.

The emphasis on energy and food security in China’s recent position paper may have struck a chord with developing countries that have been reeling from the war’s negative knock-on effects on their economies.

An important mechanism of resistance to β-lactam antibiotics is via their β-lactamase–catalyzed hydrolysis. Recent work has shown that, in addition to the established hydrolysis products, the reaction of the class D nucleophilic serine β-lactamases (SBLs) with carbapenems also produces β-lactones. We report studies on the factors determining β-lactone formation by class D SBLs. We show that variations in hydrophobic residues at the active site of class D SBLs (i.e. Trp105, Val120, and Leu158, using OXA-48 numbering) impact on the relative levels of β-lactones and hydrolysis products formed. Some variants, i.e. the OXA-48 V120L and OXA-23 V128L variants, catalyze increased β-lactone formation compared with the WT enzymes. The results of kinetic and product studies reveal that variations of residues other than those directly involved in catalysis, including those arising from clinically observed mutations, can alter the reaction outcome of class D SBL catalysis. NMR studies show that some class D SBL variants catalyze formation of β-lactones from all clinically relevant carbapenems regardless of the presence or absence of a 1β-methyl substituent. Analysis of reported crystal structures for carbapenem-derived acyl-enzyme complexes reveals preferred conformations for hydrolysis and β-lactone formation. The observation of increased β-lactone formation by class D SBL variants, including the clinically observed carbapenemase OXA-48 V120L, supports the proposal that class D SBL-catalyzed rearrangement of β-lactams to β-lactones is important as a resistance mechanism.

What are MENA countries’ priorities for climate action and COP? 24 October 2024 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 October 2024 Online

Experts discuss the impacts of COP27 and 28 on the region and priorities for COP29.

In November this year, all eyes will be on Azerbaijan as Baku hosts the 29th UN Climate Conference (COP). Hosting COP offers an opportunity to push for climate action that reflects the host country’s unique circumstances, as well as regional interests. COP28 in the United Arab Emirates and COP27 in Egypt highlighted the climate priorities for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), one of the world’s most vulnerable regions to the impacts of climate change.

From rising temperatures and deadly heatwaves, to extreme weather events such as heavy rainstorms, sandstorms, and cyclones, climate change exacerbates existing vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities include water scarcity, food security, and the preservation of livelihoods increasingly threatening the region’s social and economic stability.

While there has been some progress in advancing formal negotiations on key issues, the gap between COP agreements and tangible actions to address the increasingly severe effects of climate change in the MENA region remains vast. 

This webinar aims to assess:

• What are the key tangible impacts of COP27 and COP28 in Egypt and the UAE respectively on driving climate action in the region?
• How do MENA countries balance COP28’s landmark agreement to transition away from fossil fuels with their unique national circumstances?
• How will the region benefit from COP28 breakthrough in integrating the issues of climate, peace and security in climate action through the ‘Declaration of Climate, Relief, Recovery and Peace’?
• What are the priorities for COP29 and how do they align with the climate agenda in the MENA region?

The human cardiovascular system has adapted to function optimally in Earth's 1G gravity, and microgravity conditions cause myocardial abnormalities, including atrophy and dysfunction. However, the underlying mechanisms linking microgravity and cardiac anomalies are incompletely understood. In this study, we investigated whether and how calpain activation promotes myocardial abnormalities under simulated microgravity conditions. Simulated microgravity was induced by tail suspension in mice with cardiomyocyte-specific deletion of Capns1, which disrupts activity and stability of calpain-1 and calpain-2, and their WT littermates. Tail suspension time-dependently reduced cardiomyocyte size, heart weight, and myocardial function in WT mice, and these changes were accompanied by calpain activation, NADPH oxidase activation, and oxidative stress in heart tissues. The effects of tail suspension were attenuated by deletion of Capns1. Notably, the protective effects of Capns1 deletion were associated with the prevention of phosphorylation of Ser-345 on p47phox and attenuation of ERK1/2 and p38 activation in hearts of tail-suspended mice. Using a rotary cell culture system, we simulated microgravity in cultured neonatal mouse cardiomyocytes and observed decreased total protein/DNA ratio and induced calpain activation, phosphorylation of Ser-345 on p47phox, and activation of ERK1/2 and p38, all of which were prevented by calpain inhibitor-III. Furthermore, inhibition of ERK1/2 or p38 attenuated phosphorylation of Ser-345 on p47phox in cardiomyocytes under simulated microgravity. This study demonstrates for the first time that calpain promotes NADPH oxidase activation and myocardial abnormalities under microgravity by facilitating p47phox phosphorylation via ERK1/2 and p38 pathways. Thus, calpain inhibition may be an effective therapeutic approach to reduce microgravity-induced myocardial abnormalities.

Dilated cardiomyopathy (DCM) is associated with mutations in cardiomyocyte sarcomeric proteins, including α-tropomyosin. In conjunction with troponin, tropomyosin shifts to regulate actomyosin interactions. Tropomyosin molecules overlap via tropomyosin–tropomyosin head-to-tail associations, forming a continuous strand along the thin filament. These associations are critical for propagation of tropomyosin's reconfiguration along the thin filament and key for the cooperative switching between heart muscle contraction and relaxation. Here, we tested perturbations in tropomyosin structure, biochemistry, and function caused by the DCM-linked mutation, M8R, which is located at the overlap junction. Localized and nonlocalized structural effects of the mutation were found in tropomyosin that ultimately perturb its thin filament regulatory function. Comparison of mutant and WT α-tropomyosin was carried out using in vitro motility assays, CD, actin co-sedimentation, and molecular dynamics simulations. Regulated thin filament velocity measurements showed that the presence of M8R tropomyosin decreased calcium sensitivity and thin filament cooperativity. The co-sedimentation of actin and tropomyosin showed weakening of actin-mutant tropomyosin binding. The binding of troponin T's N terminus to the actin-mutant tropomyosin complex was also weakened. CD and molecular dynamics indicate that the M8R mutation disrupts the four-helix bundle at the head-to-tail junction, leading to weaker tropomyosin–tropomyosin binding and weaker tropomyosin–actin binding. Molecular dynamics revealed that altered end-to-end bond formation has effects extending toward the central region of the tropomyosin molecule, which alter the azimuthal position of tropomyosin, likely disrupting the mutant thin filament response to calcium. These results demonstrate that mutation-induced alterations in tropomyosin–thin filament interactions underlie the altered regulatory phenotype and ultimately the pathogenesis of DCM.

The novel severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) has emerged to a pandemic and caused global public health crisis. Human angiotensin-converting enzyme 2(ACE2) was identified as the entry receptor for SARS-CoV-2. As a carboxypeptidase, ACE2 cleaves many biological substrates besides angiotensin II to control vasodilatation and vascular permeability. Given the nanomolar high affinity between ACE2 and SARS-CoV-2 spike protein, we investigated how this interaction would affect the enzymatic activity of ACE2. Surprisingly, SARS-CoV-2 trimeric spike protein increased ACE2 proteolytic activity ∼3-10 fold against model peptide substrates, such as caspase-1 substrate and Bradykinin-analog. The enhancement in ACE2 enzymatic function was mediated by the binding of SARS-CoV-2 spike RBD domain. These results highlighted the potential for SARS-CoV-2 infection to enhance ACE2 activity, which may be relevant to the cardiovascular symptoms associated with COVID-19.

G protein–coupled receptors (GPCRs) initiate signaling cascades via G-proteins and beta-arrestins (βarr). βarr-dependent actions begin with recruitment of βarr to the phosphorylated receptor tail and are followed by engagement with the receptor core. βarrs are known to act as adaptor proteins binding receptors and various effectors, but it is unclear whether in addition to the scaffolding role βarrs can allosterically activate their downstream targets. Here we demonstrate the direct allosteric activation of proto-oncogene kinase Src by GPCR–βarr complexes in vitro and establish the conformational basis of the activation. Whereas free βarr1 had no effect on Src activity, βarr1 in complex with M2 muscarinic or β2-adrenergic receptors reconstituted in lipid nanodiscs activate Src by reducing the lag phase in Src autophosphorylation. Interestingly, receptor–βarr1 complexes formed with a βarr1 mutant, in which the finger-loop, required to interact with the receptor core, has been deleted, fully retain the ability to activate Src. Similarly, βarr1 in complex with only a phosphorylated C-terminal tail of the vasopressin 2 receptor activates Src as efficiently as GPCR–βarr complexes. In contrast, βarr1 and chimeric M2 receptor with nonphosphorylated C-terminal tail failed to activate Src. Taken together, these data demonstrate that the phosphorylated GPCR tail interaction with βarr1 is necessary and sufficient to empower it to allosterically activate Src. Our findings may have implications for understanding more broadly the mechanisms of allosteric activation of downstream targets by βarrs.

What are the lasting impacts of the AUKUS agreement? Interview LJefferson 15 August 2022

Drawing on their International Affairs article, Jamal Barnes and Samuel Makinda outline the effect of AUKUS on Australia-France relations and the liberal order.

Almost a year after the surprise announcement of the AUKUS treaty, its full diplomatic implications are still being understood. The security cooperation agreement between Australia, the US and the UK caused outrage in France and was a notable source of discord between states that see themselves as defenders of the liberal international order.

In this interview Jamal Barnes and Samuel Makinda discuss their recent article in International Affairs and assess the effect of the agreement on relationships between its signatories and France and the EU, the potential for reconciliation in the treaty’s aftermath, as well as the implications it has for trust in world politics.  

What was the AUKUS treaty and why did Australia sign it?

The AUKUS treaty is an agreement between Australia, the US and the UK. Signed in 2021, it facilitates cooperation on security issues in the Indo-Pacific between the three countries – specifically, it concerns the sharing of ‘military capabilities and critical technologies, such as cyber, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and undersea domains’.

A key aspect is that Australia will purchase nuclear-fuelled submarines from either the US or UK. Australia decided to purchase nuclear-powered submarines – and reneged on its 2016 agreement to purchase French-built diesel-propelled submarines – because it believed that the French-made submarines were no longer fit for purpose.

However, the agreement is about more than submarines. Although Australia, the UK and US argue that AUKUS is designed to defend the rules-based international order and help ‘preserve security and stability in the Indo-Pacific’, AUKUS has been largely seen as a response to the rise of China and its military activities in the region. The AUKUS agreement reflects the increased attention that the US, UK and Australia are paying to the Indo-Pacific and their commitment to constraining China’s exercise of power in the region.

What were the effects of the AUKUS treaty on relations between Australia and France?

It led to a serious diplomatic rift. Australian officials, including former Prime Minister Morrison, had visited President Macron in France and told him nothing about AUKUS. Morrison had assured Macron in June 2021 while former Australian foreign and defence ministers had assured their French counterparts that Australia was fully committed to the purchase of French submarines just two weeks before the announcement of AUKUS.

When French officials found out about AUKUS on the day it was announced on 15 September 2021, they declared publicly that they had been betrayed and stabbed in the back. Not only had France built its relationship with Australia on trust, but its relationship was more than just about submarines. It was designed to be central to France’s 50-year engagement strategy in the Indo-Pacific. However, France was not only left out of talks but was also betrayed by a country it considered a close ally.

France responded by temporarily recalling its ambassador and stated that it would ‘redefine’ its relationship with Australia. It did not say that it would not work with Australia, but rather downgraded its relationship to one where it would only do so on a case-by-case basis.

In your article you mention that the AUKUS treaty was seen as a betrayal of trust by France in particular. Why use the word ‘betrayal’?

The word betrayal is accurate because Australia’s actions went beyond simply cancelling a business contract. Australia breached France’s trust. Not all agreements involve trust. Some are driven by self-interest while others are simply legal contracts. When these agreements are broken, the usual response is feelings of disappointment and a belief that one party is unreliable and has not lived up to its end of the agreement.

However, when diplomatic partnerships involve trust, they often contain an emotional element. A key element of trust is that one party makes itself vulnerable to another in the expectation that neither party will take advantage. When that trust is breached, the response is different from a breach of contract.

It involves feelings of betrayal as deeper emotional factors are involved. This could be seen in President Macron’s anger, and his and other French officials’ willingness to publicly call Prime Minister Morrison a liar who had stabbed France in the back. If the previous France-Australia agreement was simply a legal contract, it would have been difficult to explain the emotional element of this diplomatic fallout.

How did the signing of the AUKUS treaty affect wider relations between members of AUKUS and EU member states?

The EU, like France, felt betrayed by the AUKUS announcement. Despite being a key ally of the US, Australia, and the UK, it was left out of AUKUS discussions, and was not aware of the agreement until it was announced in the media.

What made this worse was that the EU was in the process of announcing its Indo-Pacific strategy, which was characterized as ‘maybe one of the [EU’s] most important geopolitical documents’ by High Representative for Foreign and Security Affairs, Josep Borrell. For the EU, this was the latest in a long line of recent policy betrayals that had left it uncertain if it could trust key allies on important issues. The result was greater calls from within the EU to more forcefully pursue ‘strategic autonomy’, meaning a more assertive and independent EU foreign policy.

Do betrayals of trust affect the health of the liberal international order?

Yes, they can. While it is common for leaders in liberal democracies to lie to their own people, lying to the leaders of other countries can have serious repercussions for the norms, rules and institutions of international society. A key aspect of international society is the ‘presumption of trust’ that facilitates legal compliance and diplomatic cooperation.

Without this presumption it is difficult for states to engage in long term partnerships or have confidence that diplomatic agreements will be upheld. In our article, we highlight how Australia’s violation of a particular norm, that agreements must be kept, has undermined this presumption of trust. This norm not only helps build trust between states, but also contributes to the maintenance of international order by helping to support the presumption of trust in international society.

World economy is fracturing, not deglobalizing Expert comment LJefferson 8 February 2023

Geopolitics are creating a more uncertain economic environment as the global economy splinters into competing blocs.

There is now broad agreement among economists and commentators that the world has reached peak globalization, but there is little consensus about what comes next. One view is that we are entering a period of ‘deglobalization’, in which global trade volumes decline and cross-border capital flows recede. An alternative and more likely outcome is that the global economy starts to splinter into competing blocs.

This would result in an altogether more volatile macroeconomic and market environment which would pose a formidable challenge to some countries and companies operating in vulnerable sectors. But this process needn’t involve any significant shrinkage of international flows of goods, services and capital, nor a broad reversal of other gains of globalization.

This most recent era of globalization was underpinned by a belief that economic integration would lead to China and the former Eastern Bloc countries becoming what former World Bank Chief Robert Zoellick termed ‘responsible stakeholders’ within the global system.

But China has instead emerged as a strategic rival to the US. This strategic rivalry is already forcing others to pick sides as the world splinters into two blocs: one that aligns primarily with the US and another that aligns primarily with China.

Increasingly, policy choices within these blocs will be shaped by geopolitical considerations. This process can be thought of as ‘global fracturing’. Whereas the period of globalization was driven by governments and companies working in unison, fracturing is being driven by governments alone. 

The effects of fracturing

Viewed this way, ‘deglobalization’ is by no means inevitable. There are few compelling geopolitical reasons why the US or Europe should stop importing the majority of consumer goods from China. Roll the clock forward ten years and it is likely that the West will still be buying toys and furniture from China. Instead, fracturing between the blocs will take place along fault lines that are geopolitically important.

In some aspects, the effects of fracturing will be profound. But in other areas, warnings of a seismic reordering of the global economy and financial system will prove wide of the mark.

For example, the politically-driven nature of fracturing will have a significant impact on the operating environment for US and European firms in those sectors that are most exposed to restrictions on trade, such as technology and pharmaceuticals. And all firms and investors will be operating in a different environment in which geopolitical considerations play a greater role in decisions over the allocation of resources.

But where production is moved to alternative locations, this is likely to only involve the manufacture of goods that are deemed to be strategically significant. This may include those with substantial technological and/or intellectual property components: think iPhones, pharmaceuticals, or high-end engineering products.

What’s more, in cases where production does shift location, it is likely to be to other low-cost centres that align more clearly with the US. There will be no great ‘reshoring’ of manufacturing jobs.

Within this process, trade linkages will be reordered, rather than severed. This will result in trade’s share of global GDP flatlining in the coming years, rather than shrinking outright, as is being forecast under many attempts to quantify deglobalization’s potential impact.

Finances of global fracturing

There will be a substantial financial component to global fracturing, but once again the implications are likely to be more nuanced than the current debate suggests. Cross-border financial links are likely to grow more slowly, and the overall stock of cross-border claims will plateau relative to global GDP. But whereas the first era of globalization in the 1870s was followed by a broad retreat in global capital flows during the interwar years, the same is unlikely to happen today.

Similarly, while financial fracturing will fuel growing speculation about the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency, reports of its impending demise are exaggerated. Beijing will increasingly push its partners to settle trade in renminbi but three factors suggest that this is unlikely to seriously challenge the dollar’s position.

First, while trade between China and its partners is growing, it still accounts for only six per cent of global trade. Most trade still happens between US-aligned countries, and will continue to be denominated in US dollars (see chart).

Second, China runs a large current account surplus, which will make it harder for the renminbi to supplant the dollar. High demand for reserve assets means that reserve countries tend to run current account deficits. 

Finally, the dollar still has several things working in its favour. For a currency to be widely used as an international medium of exchange, it must be readily and cheaply available around the world. In turn, that depends on foreigners being willing to hold it in large volumes: in other words, it must function as a store of value. 

Europe's response to the US Inflation Reduction Act 27 March 2023 — 2:00PM TO 3:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

This event explores the implications of the US Inflation Reduction Act, how Europe can respond and what options the UK has.

While the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) has led to an outcry in the EU, member states have different concerns and preferences for how to respond. The European Commission’s proposed ‘Green Deal Industrial Plan’ includes the relaxation of state aid rules to drive funding. But will this lead to a ‘subsidies race’ between the US and EU and is a ‘green trade war’ brewing?  
 
The UK’s response to the IRA has been much more muted than the EU’s. But caught between US subsidies and EU subsidies, can the UK compete and create an independent response to the IRA? And what steps can be taken to facilitate global cooperation and to make trade work for the green transition?

Dr Martin Porter, Executive Chair at the Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership, will kick off the discussion with short remarks followed by an interactive discussion among all participants

This discussion is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum. We would like to take this opportunity to thank our founding partner and supporting partners for their generous support of the forum.  

The interconnected impacts of the Iraq war Expert comment LJefferson 22 March 2023

Relying on weak intelligence for invading Iraq has had a negative impact on US and UK credibility with several consequences that persist to this day.

20 years on from the fateful decision to invade Iraq, it is generally accepted that the US and UK governments overstated the evidence available for them to justify military action. The central claim to defend invading Iraq was that the country had continued its illicit nuclear weapons programme and had retained illegal stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons. None of these claims supported an imminent threat justification nor could any hidden caches of WMD be found by the US Iraq Survey Group after the invasion.  

In the US, President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney hinted at additional evidence which could not be shared publicly to suggest that if only people knew what the government knew, they would agree that Iraq posed a significant threat to the West and needed to be disarmed.

In the UK, the Blair government acted similarly, focusing on a narrow interpretation of the evidence provided by the intelligence services and ignoring many of the dire warnings offered by academics and other experts. The Chilcot Inquiry found that the Blair government greatly exaggerated the threat Iraq posed to the UK, and that government arguments were based on the prime minister’s personal beliefs, as well as his promise to President Bush to support the US invasion. 

Relying on inadequate information and a biased analysis for invading Iraq has had a negative impact on US and UK credibility in the international security policy environment and domestically with ramifications that persist to this day.  

Impacts on soft power and trust

The invasion had an impact on US and UK soft power due to negative perceptions of the decision to go to war and the competence of the UK and US: public opinion polling by the Pew Center showed that perceptions of the US declined significantly as a result of the invasion of Iraq, especially in the Middle East and Central Asia.

This is undoubtedly a challenge for the US, but arguably an even bigger challenge for the UK, which due to its size and power relies much more on diplomacy and coalition-building in order to achieve its goals within various international treaty frameworks.   

Over nearly two decades, the US and the UK no longer seemed to enjoy the same foundation of trust, even with close allies, as they did previously. This changed in February 2022.

Towards the end of 2021, both the US and the UK were sounding the alarm about an impending Russian invasion of Ukraine based on information and analysis from their intelligence services. Despite the amassing of Russian troops, tanks and artillery on the border clearly visible from the air and by satellite imagery, several allies remained unconvinced until the invasion happened.  

This was in part due to their own assessments which indicated that Russia would stop short of an invasion, and in part because allies were unwilling to take US and UK statements on faith, without being able to assess the information themselves.

US officials found this frustrating as it meant that NATO and the EU were slower off the mark with support for Ukraine than they might otherwise have been. However, the accuracy of the US/UK intelligence on Russia’s invasion, coupled with their sharing it openly, may well have restored faith in their capabilities and analysis.  

A more open approach to intelligence  

Over the last few years, there seems to have been a change in accepted practice regarding sharing and using intelligence. The UK Ministry of Defence has taken a much more open approach to intelligence in the war in Ukraine, sharing the most recent defence information publicly in order to counter Russian disinformation.  

This is a positive step to ensure that intelligence can be discussed and assessed critically. Being more open about secret intelligence may also be linked to the increasing capabilities of open-source intelligence (OSINT). Non-governmental and international organizations and the media all now have access to data from, for example, imaging satellites and can independently verify information coming from governments. 

Perceived double standards 

A reduction of trust in US and UK intelligence was not the only impact of the invasion of Iraq. Russia and China have repeatedly called out the US and UK for acting without a second UN Security Council mandate. Putin uses the decision to invade Iraq, as well as the NATO humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, to justify Russia’s actions in Crimea. He invokes parallel language to spread disinformation about a ‘responsibility to protect life’ of the (‘ethnically Russian’) Crimean population. Russia has also repeatedly used the WMD trope to create false narratives around Ukrainian biosecurity laboratories to justify Russian military actions against Ukraine.  

Deciding to invade Iraq under what turned out to be a false pretext has weakened the application of the international rule of law and has led to a perceived double standard whereby powerful states can use UN processes in their favour, or completely disregard them if they do not deliver their goals.

As the Chilcot Inquiry found, there was very little preparation for the post-invasion period either in the US or the UK. Confirmation bias led not only to trusting shaky intelligence but also to believing in a best-case scenario and a ‘relatively benign security environment’ once the invasion had prevailed. Mismanaging the country’s occupation afterwards also led to the perception that the UK and US are less competent than projected. 

Problems for the international order  

The Iraq War has left many smaller and medium-sized states outside Europe and North America with the impression that powerful states are not committed to an equitable international system and instead will bend the rules to suit them while nonetheless holding other states to account. This dynamic poses a serious problem for the international system. 

It opens the door to ‘whataboutism’ in Russia’s false justifications for invading Ukraine and undermines faith in international law, destabilizing the international order in the longer term. Beyond the immediate challenges of dealing with the war in Ukraine, reforming and strengthening the international order to make it more equitable will be one of the most significant challenges the US and UK will face over the next decade. 

A trust deficit  

Domestically, for already disappointed citizens, the deceit over intelligence it is yet another piece of evidence which suggests that their government is not trustworthy and may not have their best interests at heart. This has profound implications for US and UK democracies, making it harder for governments to counter citizens’ susceptibilities to disinformation campaigns. 

Boris Macek
Feb 1, 2008; 7:299-307
Research

Steven A. Carr
Mar 1, 2014; 13:907-917
Technological Innovation and Resources

Jonathan C. Trinidad
Aug 1, 2012; 11:215-229
Research

Yi Zhang
Sep 1, 2005; 4:1240-1250
Research

Amelia C. Peterson
Nov 1, 2012; 11:1475-1488
Technological Innovation and Resources

Sean R. Collins
Mar 1, 2007; 6:439-450
Research

Leigh Anderson
Apr 1, 2006; 5:573-588
Research

Ludovic C. Gillet
Jun 1, 2012; 11:O111.016717-O111.016717
Research

N. Leigh Anderson
Nov 1, 2002; 1:845-867
Reviews/Perspectives

Philip L. Ross
Dec 1, 2004; 3:1154-1169
Research

Jürgen Cox
Sep 1, 2014; 13:2513-2526
Technological Innovation and Resources

Despite its major importance in human health, the metabolic potential of the human gut microbiota is still poorly understood. We have recently shown that biosynthesis of Ruminococcin C (RumC), a novel ribosomally synthesized and posttranslationally modified peptide (RiPP) produced by the commensal bacterium Ruminococcus gnavus, requires two radical SAM enzymes (RumMC1 and RumMC2) catalyzing the formation of four Cα-thioether bridges. These bridges, which are essential for RumC's antibiotic properties against human pathogens such as Clostridium perfringens, define two hairpin domains giving this sactipeptide (sulfur-to-α-carbon thioether–containing peptide) an unusual architecture among natural products. We report here the biochemical and spectroscopic characterizations of RumMC2. EPR spectroscopy and mutagenesis data support that RumMC2 is a member of the large family of SPASM domain radical SAM enzymes characterized by the presence of three [4Fe-4S] clusters. We also demonstrate that this enzyme initiates its reaction by Cα H-atom abstraction and is able to catalyze the formation of nonnatural thioether bonds in engineered peptide substrates. Unexpectedly, our data support the formation of a ketoimine rather than an α,β-dehydro-amino acid intermediate during Cα-thioether bridge LC–MS/MS fragmentation. Finally, we explored the roles of the leader peptide and of the RiPP precursor peptide recognition element, present in myriad RiPP-modifying enzymes. Collectively, our data support a more complex role for the peptide recognition element and the core peptide for the installation of posttranslational modifications in RiPPs than previously anticipated and suggest a possible reaction intermediate for thioether bond formation.

Candida albicans and Aspergillus fumigatus are dangerous fungal pathogens with high morbidity and mortality, particularly in immunocompromised patients. Innate immune-mediated programmed cell death (pyroptosis, apoptosis, necroptosis) is an integral part of host defense against pathogens. Inflammasomes, which are canonically formed upstream of pyroptosis, have been characterized as key mediators of fungal sensing and drivers of proinflammatory responses. However, the specific cell death pathways and key upstream sensors activated in the context of Candida and Aspergillus infections are unknown. Here, we report that C. albicans and A. fumigatus infection induced inflammatory programmed cell death in the form of pyroptosis, apoptosis, and necroptosis (PANoptosis). Further, we identified the innate immune sensor Z-DNA binding protein 1 (ZBP1) as the apical sensor of fungal infection responsible for activating the inflammasome/pyroptosis, apoptosis, and necroptosis. The Zα2 domain of ZBP1 was required to promote this inflammasome activation and PANoptosis. Overall, our results demonstrate that C. albicans and A. fumigatus induce PANoptosis and that ZBP1 plays a vital role in inflammasome activation and PANoptosis in response to fungal pathogens.

Lys234 is one of the residues present in class A β-lactamases that is under selective pressure due to antibiotic use. Located adjacent to proton shuttle residue Ser130, it is suggested to play a role in proton transfer during catalysis of the antibiotics. The mechanism underpinning how substitutions in this position modulate inhibitor efficiency and substrate specificity leading to drug resistance is unclear. The K234R substitution identified in several inhibitor-resistant β-lactamase variants is associated with decreased potency of the inhibitor clavulanic acid, which is used in combination with amoxicillin to overcome β-lactamase–mediated antibiotic resistance. Here we show that for CTX-M-14 β-lactamase, whereas Lys234 is required for hydrolysis of cephalosporins such as cefotaxime, either lysine or arginine is sufficient for hydrolysis of ampicillin. Further, by determining the acylation and deacylation rates for cefotaxime hydrolysis, we show that both rates are fast, and neither is rate-limiting. The K234R substitution causes a 1500-fold decrease in the cefotaxime acylation rate but a 5-fold increase in kcat for ampicillin, suggesting that the K234R enzyme is a good penicillinase but a poor cephalosporinase due to slow acylation. Structural results suggest that the slow acylation by the K234R enzyme is due to a conformational change in Ser130, and this change also leads to decreased inhibition potency of clavulanic acid. Because other inhibitor resistance mutations also act through changes at Ser130 and such changes drastically reduce cephalosporin but not penicillin hydrolysis, we suggest that clavulanic acid paired with an oxyimino-cephalosporin rather than penicillin would impede the evolution of resistance.

This article is by Toni Šušnjar.

In Antiquity and early the Middle Ages, the main weapon was the spear. Only a few exceptions appeared: Roman legions, which used javelins instead, and Macedonian pike phalanx with its sarissa. In the later Middle Ages, the main weapon could be a pike or a polearm (such as polehammer, poleaxe, halberd etc.), before the pike made its return in early modernity. Ranged weapons were not used to cause casualties, but rather to inconvenience the enemies and break up their formation.

Weapons and tactics will adapt to each other, as well as to the terrain and the enemies faced – but adaptations will be done within the boundaries of the society. A society without a significant tradition of horse archery will not counter horse archers with their own, but rather with foot archers. Horse archery was important for nomadic societies, because they could not afford the casualties which resulted from the shock and attrition tactics of the settled societies.

Weapons and armour likewise have a relationship, but since armour is the more difficult to produce of the two, it is developments in armour which typically drive the adaptation of weapons, rather than the other way around.

Continue reading Building a Fantasy Army — Weapons & Tactics at Mythic Scribes.

This article is by Emma Lammers.

Author’s note: neurodivergent is term used to refer to people whose neurological functions differ from the norm because of an innate or acquired condition. Examples of these conditions include autism, learning disabilities, mood disorders, traumatic brain injuries, and more. People who do not have any neurodivergent conditions are considered neurotypical.

To the delight of many readers, more characters in fantasy literature reflect aspects of real-world people than ever before. Today’s heroes can be people of colour, people of any gender or sexual identity, people of nearly any age. Writers are answering the call for more diversity in their work, and oftentimes they do it well, portraying realistic, nuanced characters from marginalized communities.

Some people, however, aren’t as likely to see themselves accurately reflected in the pages of a fantasy story. I’ve searched long and hard to find literary characters who experience autism, anxiety, and sensory processing disorder as I do, and very few of these characters show up in fantasy – a detriment to my favourite genre. Villainous characters are often portrayed as neurodivergent because writers think that this will make them scarier, and you will encounter the occasional hero with post-traumatic stress disorder, but  these depictions tend to lack accuracy, diversity, and consideration for the people who actually have the conditions used in the story.

Continue reading Writing Neurodivergent Characters in Fantasy at Mythic Scribes.

Egypt’s purchase of a Chinese fighter jet is a reminder Cold War tactics are back in the Middle East Expert comment LJefferson 18 October 2024

The Egyptian army is a formidable force lacking air superiority capabilities to match its size and ambitions. China understood this predicament and offered to help.

The reported agreement for Egypt to buy the Chinese Chengdu J-10C 4.5 generation fighter jets is part of a broader shift from focusing on modernizing ground troops to bolstering the air force. The details of the deal have not yet been published. Nonetheless, it reveals Egypt has two motivations beyond backing its arsenal with another fighter jet.

Elusive Western technology

The most important motivation for Egypt’s military diversification strategy (and the biggest source of frustration) is the perceived Western technology starvation.
   
A quick examination of the map around Egypt shows that the most significant perceived threats to its national security are located in remote places where Egypt doesn’t traditionally enjoy ground troops’ presence. These include Ethiopia, the Southern Red Sea, Libya and the vulnerability a potential Israel–Iran regional war would create. From the generals’ perspective in Cairo, this list is more than a catalyst to build a modern and capable long arm.

The race started in 2015 after the Obama administration paused an arms transfer to Cairo in 2013 that included four F-16C Block 52 fighter jets amid toppling the Muslim Brotherhood government. The psychological effect of Washington’s decision in Cairo increased Egypt’s risk tolerance towards challenging its military ties with the US by diversifying away from it. 

Egypt ordered the MiG-29M2 fighter jets from Russia and the French Rafales this same year. In 2018, Egypt negotiated a $2 billion deal with Russia to purchase the Su-35 fighter jet, seen in Washington as crossing a red line and triggering a warning to Egypt that it would impose sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). This caused the deal to collapse.

The main factor of the US military sales in the Middle East is the upholding of the Israel Military Qualitative Edge principle over its neighbours. This principle requires the US to ensure Israel is superior over other regional countries’ strategic military capabilities, especially in air power.

For Egypt, this has long been a strategic vulnerability. The US turned down multiple requests by Egypt to purchase the active radar long-range AIM-120 AMRAAM fire-and-forget missile that can be launched from the F-16 fighter jets, the main striking force in Egypt’s arsenal. 

Unlike the Gulf and other states (such as Jordan and Turkey), Egypt was only allowed the old AIM-7 Sparrow and the AIM-9 Sidewinders, which are shorter in range and technologically inferior. Israel also allegedly pressured the Trump administration to refuse Egypt’s request to buy the F-35 stealth fight jets in 2019.

The US and Israel reportedly pressured France to not sell to Egypt the MBDA’s Meteor 100 km air-to-air missile with the Rafale fighters. Instead, Egypt received the 80 km MICA missile as part of the deal to buy 30 Rafales in 2021. Acquiring this advanced radar system and long-range missiles was likely behind Cairo’s deal to purchase 24 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft from Italy in 2022. However, it is unlikely that they will come with the full package.

Egypt thought the Chinese J-10C Vigorous Dragon fighter may solve this predicament. The Chinese fighter has a beyond-visual range AESA radar and can carry the PL-15 200 km air-to-air missile, similar to the Rafale’s Meteor. The J-10C’s price tag is attractive for Egypt at $40-50 million, much less than the F-16 and Rafales.

The Chinese fighters are also a hedge against Russia’s sanctioned fighter jets, traditionally a second choice for the Egyptian air force.

Risky manoeuvres 

This doesn’t mean Egypt is on a path to abandon its weapons purchases from its Western partners. Egyptian weapons procurement policy is not only motivated by technical considerations. It also serves political objectives. Egypt still receives $1.3 billion every year in military and economic aid from Washington. Regime security and backing are two objectives that will likely encourage Cairo to rely on Western weapons systems for decades. 

However, from Egypt’s military perspective, the time may have come to resort to the Cold War tactics of diversification and counterbalancing. Being forced to accept old technology during the significant modernization of its air force creates a technical and operational necessity to seek this technology elsewhere. 

The regional uncertainty since Hamas’s 7 October attack on Israel and the war that followed in Gaza, southern Lebanon, and Israel’s intermittent confrontations with Iran makes make it imperative for the Egyptian strategic planners to take risky manoeuvres while targeting specific capabilities they seem desperate to acquire. 

The threat to deploy CAATSA sanctions against Egypt in 2019 makes the J-10C deal with China an interesting case study for all Middle Eastern allies of the West. It shows an uptick in Egypt’s risk tolerance to overcome its technological dilemma. It allows other countries considering the Chinese fighters (mainly Saudi Arabia) to gauge Washington’s reaction and design their future approach accordingly.   

Another motivation is to pressure the US, UK, and their allies to reconsider their implicit embargo on certain advanced technology by showing that Cairo now has alternatives. This tactic seems to work. General Frank McKenzie, the former head of US Central Command, said during a congressional hearing in 2022 that Washington will finally provide Egypt with the F-15 heavy-weight air superiority fighter, a longstanding demand by Cairo.

Building favours

The J-10C fighter jet ticks all the boxes: It satisfies Cairo’s diversity strategy and technological needs. It is under the sanctions threshold since it is less technologically savvy than the most controversial J-20 5th generation fighters, the equivalent to Russia’s SU-35. And it takes Egypt’s military partnership with China to a new level.

The rumour that the Chinese fighters are bought to replace the ageing versions of Egypt’s significant F-16 fleet is a source of pride for Beijing since its military technology started to be seen as a competitor to Western technology. A heavyweight military power like Egypt relying on Chinese fighters would almost certainly boost China’s share in the regional weapons market, just like Cairo’s purchase of the Rafale boosted its popularity globally.

Mary G. McCoy
Jun 1, 2002; 43:921-929
Research Articles

Jorge H. Capdevila
Feb 1, 2000; 41:163-181
Reviews

Vitali Matyash
May 1, 2008; 49:1137-1146
Methods

K Schoonjans
May 1, 1996; 37:907-925
Reviews

G Lepage
Jan 1, 1986; 27:114-120
Articles

Jason M. Ridlon
Feb 1, 2006; 47:241-259
Reviews

John A. Glomset
Mar 1, 1968; 9:155-167
Reviews

Supporting Civic Space: The Role and Impact of the Private Sector 23 September 2020 — 2:00PM TO 4:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 December 2020 Online

The meeting provides an opportunity to explore the drivers of – and barriers to – corporate activism.

A healthy civic space is vital for an enabling business environment. In recognition of this, a growing number of private sector actors are challenging, publicly or otherwise, the deteriorating environment for civic freedoms.

However, this corporate activism is often limited and largely ad hoc. It remains confined to a small cluster of multinationals leaving potential routes for effective coordination and collaboration with other actors underexplored.

This roundtable brings together a diverse and international group of business actors, civil society actors and foreign policy experts to exchange perspectives and experiences on how the private sector can be involved in issues around civic space.

The meeting provides an opportunity to explore the drivers of – and barriers to – corporate activism, develop a better understanding of existing initiatives, identify good practice and discuss practical strategies for the business community.

This meeting is the first of a series of roundtables at Chatham House in support of initiatives to build broad alliances for the protection of civic space. 

Supporting Civic Space: The Role and Impact of the Tech Sector 13 October 2020 — 2:00PM TO 4:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 December 2020 Online

This event brings together a diverse and international group of stakeholders to exchange perspectives and experiences on the role that tech actors can play in supporting civic space.

In a deteriorating environment for civic freedoms, tech sector actors are increasingly engaging, publicly or otherwise, on issues of civic space.

In the US, for example, a number of tech companies have cancelled contracts with the Pentagon and stopped censoring search results in China as a result of protests by employees. The Asia Internet Coalition recently wrote to Pakistan’s Prime Minister expressing human rights concerns about new rules regulating social media.

While we have recently seen technology companies show support for the social movements, including through substantial pledges, in some cases these have elicited criticism of hypocrisy, and the interventions of social media platforms on freedom of expression and privacy issues have been closely linked to the preservation of their own business models.

The COVID-19 crisis has also posed new dilemmas for the tech sector with the pervasiveness of disinformation, as well as new tools for tracking individuals which raise privacy issues.

This roundtable provides an opportunity to explore the drivers of (and barriers to) corporate activism, develop a better understanding of existing initiatives, identify good practice and routes to effective collaboration with other actors, and discuss practical strategies that could be adopted by the tech community.

It is the second of a series of roundtables at Chatham House in support of initiatives to build broad alliances for the protection of civic space.

Counter-terrorism measures and sanctions: How to avoid negative consequences for humanitarian action? 9 September 2021 — 2:00PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 July 2021 Online

Exploring current endeavours to address the tensions between counter-terrorism measures, sanctions and humanitarian action.

Counter-terrorism measures  address broad forms of support to terrorist acts. Their expansion, internationally and domestically, has given rise to new points of friction with international humanitarian law. Unless the measures include adequate safeguards, they  can impede humanitarian action. Country-specific sanctions imposed for other objectives, such as ending conflicts or protecting civilians, raise similar challenges for humanitarian action. 

These problems are not new, but solutions at international and national level remain elusive. 

At this panel event, which marks the launch of a new Chatham House research paper, panellists explore current endeavours to address the tensions between counter-terrorism measures, sanctions and humanitarian action.

• What are the current dynamics and developments at Security Council level?  
• What are the opportunities now that the UK is developing its independent sanctions strategy? 
• What challenges do counter-terrorism requirements in funding agreements for humanitarian action  pose? 
• What is necessary to make progress?

Learnings must become practice as the Taliban return Expert comment NCapeling 7 September 2021

There is greater awareness of the adverse impact of counterterrorism measures and sanctions on humanitarian action. It is time to apply lessons learned.

The 9/11 attacks prompted the international community to adopt a wide range of counterterrorism measures. Debate continues over their compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law, and their effectiveness.

What has become clear is that some of these measures have made it difficult for humanitarian assistance to be provided to the millions of people living in areas under the control of armed groups designated as terrorist, or where such groups have a significant presence.

These include Al-Qaeda in Yemen’s Arabian peninsula, ISIL affiliates in Syria, Al Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Hamas in Gaza, and various Al-Qaeda affiliates in the Sahel. The lessons painfully learned need to be applied to Afghanistan under Taliban rule.

Impeding humanitarian work

Traditionally, legal counterterrorism measures criminalized acts of violence but, in recent years, measures adopted by the UN Security Council, the European Union (EU), and some states unilaterally, have expanded to address broader forms of support for terrorist acts and to groups designated as terrorist.

When these measures apply in situations of armed conflict – and in the absence of adequate safeguards – they can impede humanitarian organizations from operating as foreseen by IHL and in accordance with humanitarian principles, which require life-saving assistance to be provided in an impartial manner. Restrictions in sanctions imposed for policy objectives other than counterterrorism create similar tensions.

Prohibitions on making funds or other assets available directly or indirectly to persons or groups designated as terrorist can capture incidental payments made during humanitarian operations and relief consignments which are diverted and end up in the hands of these designated groups.

The most extreme restrictions cover the provision of medical assistance, in violation of the foundational principle of IHL that everyone who is wounded and sick – civilian or fighter – is entitled to medical care without discrimination, and those who provide it must not be punished.

Humanitarian organizations have been highlighting these problems for more than a decade. Recent developments give cause for cautious optimism that a turning point has been reached, as the bodies imposing counterterrorism measures and sanctions internationally and domestically have begun to demand compliance with international law and IHL.

In 2019 the UN Security Council unanimously issued a binding demand to member states to ensure all counterterrorism measures they adopt comply with obligations under international law, including IHL.

Recent renewals of UN country-specific sanctions have included similar demands with regards to measures taken by member states to give effect to them. Although this still falls short of an express exception for humanitarian action, it is a significant development, and a strong encouragement to include appropriate safeguards when implementing UN measures domestically.

Similar encouraging practice is discernible at EU level, and new domestic counterterrorism laws adopted by several states include safeguards for humanitarian action.

Applying lessons learned to Afghanistan

It is too soon to know what policies the Taliban will adopt, and the measures that the international community will take to promote compliance with IHL, human rights, and counterterrorism objectives. Nonetheless, policymakers implementing sanctions – and considering their expansion – cannot ignore their potential adverse impact on humanitarian action. They must bear in mind five key lessons.

First, there must be clarity on current legal restrictions, starting from who is designated under sanctions and counterterrorism measures. The UN Security Council has never designated the Taliban per se. Instead, it has listed ‘individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban’. At present this list includes 135 individuals and five entities, four of which are ‘hawalas’ – money changers – the other being the Haqqani Network, a Sunni Islamist group.

UN financial sanctions require states to freeze the assets of designated persons and groups and ensure no funds, financial assets, or economic resources are made available to them, either directly or indirectly.

EU and UK sanctions simply replicate the restrictions and designations imposed by the UN, but the US has designated the Taliban as a ‘specially designated global terrorist’ which makes the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations applicable. These prohibit US nationals from making any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services to, or for, the benefit of the Taliban.

Second, while listed individuals may play a role in the forthcoming Taliban administration, sanctions do not prohibit providing resources to a government department headed by a designated person.

There is a distinction between an individual and a department, and prohibitions in counterterrorism measures or sanctions on the provision of funds or other assets apply to the designated person, not to the department they may head.

Problems may arise if a designated person appropriates resources for personal benefit or to undermine policy objectives for which the sanctions were imposed. But this does not bring the department within the scope of the designation. Instead, the issue must be addressed from a prevention of diversion perspective.

Third, sanctions and counterterrorism measures must be designed so as to minimize their adverse impact on humanitarian action. One way of doing so is designating leadership figures rather than groups. The new US administration took this approach towards the Houthi in Yemen, with the designation of the group being revoked and new designations focusing on its leaders.

The chilling effect of sanctions is far broader than the actual restrictions they impose. Commercial actors in particular limit their activities in areas they perceive as high risk. In view of this, the effect of expanding existing designations to list the Taliban, now that it is in control of Afghanistan, would be to turn targeted sanctions into comprehensive ones.

In parallel, sanctions or counterterrorism measures should include express safeguards, which exclude funds, assets, and other support provided during humanitarian action from the restrictions – ideally in the form of exceptions or, if an option, general licences.

The adverse impact of the US Global Terrorism Sanctions has been limited until now, as only a small number of humanitarian actors subject to US measures operated in areas under Taliban control. This has now changed, and it is imperative the US issue a broad general licence to exclude assistance provided during humanitarian action from the sanctions.

Fourth, restrictions in funding agreements must not be more onerous than the underlying measures they aim to promote compliance with – in particular, they must not require screening or exclusion of final beneficiaries from the assistance they have been determined as requiring.

Finally, engagement with non-state armed groups for humanitarian purposes is essential for conducting operations effectively and safely, both for humanitarian organizations and the people they are trying to assist. Counterterrorism measures and sanctions do not prohibit such contact even when such groups or their members have been designated.

The past two decades have given states ample time to learn to avoid the adverse impact of sanctions and counterterrorism measures on humanitarian action. The people of Afghanistan deserve that these lessons now be applied.

Our research paper IHL and the humanitarian impact of counterterrorism measures and sanctions identifies the principal points of friction between these bodies of law, clarifies outstanding issues and misunderstandings, and offers practical recommendations for resolving tensions.