south caucasus Provision of Conducting a Survey on the Well-being and Security of Women in South East Europe, Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus By feeds.osce.org Published On :: Wed, 13 Jul 2016 07:49:03 +0000 Secretariat RFP/SEC/10/2016 Request for Proposal (RFP) balazs.fule@osce.org Wed, 2016-07-13 (All day) 23 September 2016 Western Europe and North America The main objective of this OSCE project is to create evidence including in the context of conflict/crisis to be used in the long term for improved programming and policy-making. The contractor will be expected to undertake all aspects of work relating to the survey and additional qualitative research, including: • pre-test/pilot study of the new conflict module; • development of country/area specific research tools; • qualitative key expert interviews and focus group discussions; • interviewer selection (female interviewers only); • interviewer training; • random selection of respondents; • questionnaire finalisation and translation of fieldwork and interviewer training materials; • all fieldwork/data collection; • data entry and processing; • data analysis and drafting several thematic and regional reports. The data will be collected through the use of structured, quantitative survey interviews and additional key expert interviews and focus group discussions. The survey interviews will be carried out face-to-face in each country/area by female interviewers who have completed in-depth, in-person training dedicated to the topic of the survey. The interviews will be conducted using a standardised questionnaire already developed. Part of the contract will be testing revisions on this questionnaire and finalizing it. The required net sample size is a minimum of 1500 women per country/area using a strict random (probability) sample. The Contractor will be responsible for ensuring the quality, consistency and timeliness of work carried out in each country/area selected to take part in the study. The consistency of the methods and procedures applied in the various countries/areas and strict compliance with the detailed methodology of the survey needs to be ensured by the Contractor. The foreseen total duration of the assignment is 15 months.Related StoriesImplementation of the Project “Promoting awareness-raising tools on combating sexual exploitation through internet (social theatre) (2016)”Provision of Printing and related Services for the OSCEProvision of IT Security Consulting Services on IT Information Security Incident Response Full Article Secretariat Western Europe and North America Request for Proposal (RFP) One-off purchase
south caucasus Member’s question time: Is Russia losing the South Caucasus? By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Mon, 02 Sep 2024 16:12:14 +0000 Member’s question time: Is Russia losing the South Caucasus? 22 October 2024 — 1:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 September 2024 Online Join us and ask Chatham House Senior Research Fellow, Natalie Sabanadze anything about the situation in the Caucasus. Submit your questions in advance. Whilst Russia focuses on its illegal invasion of Ukraine, the situation at its southern border is evolving. Relations between the three states in the South Caucasus and Moscow have never been easy as Russia tried to maintain its dominance by leveraging vulnerabilities, playing one side against another to keep conflicts simmering and even engaging in open military aggression. Although the violence seen in the 1990s and early 2000s has abated, the war in Ukraine has had an indirect impact on the region, bringing a change to the status quo.Russia abandoned its long-standing support for Armenia, allowing for the collapse of Nagorny-Karabakh and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan with the backing of Turkey. As a result, Azerbaijan has emerged as a dominant regional player with Baku recently declaring its interest to join BRICS. Turkey’s influence has grown, while Armenia frustrated by Russia’s change of heart has been turning cautiously towards the EU and the US.In Georgia, meanwhile, the ruling party has been consolidating its grasp on power, rolling back democratic reforms and pivoting away from the West. Georgia’s long-awaited European integration process has been suspended, following the adoption of the Russian-style foreign agents legislation.Join us as our Senior Research Fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Programme answers your questions in this quick-fire session assessing the extent to which the Russian influence has changed since the start of the invasion of Ukraine and who is there to fill the vacuum; how geopolitical contestation in the region is going to impact aspirations of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia; and much more.Submit your questions to Natalie Sabanadze in advance of the event. Your questions will drive the conversation. Full Article
south caucasus CBD Press Release: Georgian Bank Supports Biodiversity in the South Caucasus in Association with the Lifeweb Initiative. By www.cbd.int Published On :: Mon, 27 Sep 2010 00:00:00 GMT Full Article
south caucasus Three Challenges for UK Peacebuilding Policy in the South Caucasus After Brexit By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 21 Jan 2020 09:24:44 +0000 21 January 2020 Laurence Broers Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme @LaurenceBroers Building on the legacies of a long-term British investment in a peace strategy for the South Caucasus is a realistic and attainable goal. 2020-01-21-NK.jpg A building in Nagorny Karabakh flies the flag of the self-proclaimed republic. 'Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh have evolved into examples of what scholars call "de facto states" that, to differing degrees, control territory, provide governance and exercise internal sovereignty,' writes Laurence Broers. Photo: Getty Images. What does Britain’s departure from the EU mean for the country’s policy towards the South Caucasus, a small region on the periphery of Europe, fractured by conflict? Although Britain is not directly involved in any of the region’s peace processes (except in the case of the Geneva International Discussions on conflicts involving Georgia, as an EU member state), it has been a significant stakeholder in South Caucasian stability since the mid-1990s.Most obviously, Britain has been the single largest foreign investor in Caspian oil and gas. Yet beyond pipelines, Britain also has been a significant investor in long-term civil society-led strategies to build peace in the South Caucasus.Through what was then the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, in the early 2000s the Department for International Development (DfID) pioneered large-scale peacebuilding interventions, such as the Consortium Initiative, addressing Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, in 2003-09. These built civic networks in the South Caucasus and partnerships with British-based NGOs.This experience left a strong intellectual legacy. British expertise on the South Caucasus, including specific expertise on its conflicts, is highly regarded in the region and across the world.There is also a strong tradition of British scholarship on the Caucasus, and several British universities offer Caucasus-related courses. Through schemes such as the John Smith Fellowship Trust, the Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellowship at Chatham House and Chevening Scholarships, significant numbers of young leaders from the South Caucasus have spent time in British institutions and built effective relationships within them.Three challengesThis niche as a champion of long-term, strategic peacebuilding and repository of area-specific knowledge should not be lost as Britain’s relationship with the EU and regional actors evolves. This can be ensured through awareness of three challenges confronting a post-Brexit Caucasus policy.The first challenge for London is to avoid framing a regional policy in the South Caucasus as an extension of a wider ‘Russia policy’. Deteriorating Russian-British relations in recent years strengthen a tendency to view policies in the European neighbourhood through the traditional prisms of Cold War and Russian-Western rivalries.Yet an overwhelming focus on Russia fails to capture other important aspects of political developments in South Caucasus conflicts. Although often referred to as ‘breakaway’ or ‘occupied’ territories, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh are not ungoverned spaces. They have evolved into examples of what scholars call ‘de facto states’ that, to differing degrees, control territory, provide governance and exercise internal sovereignty.Few disagree that these entities would not survive without external patronage. But neither does that patronage explain their sustainability on its own. Russia-centricity diminishes Britain’s latitude to engage on the full range of local drivers sustaining these entities, contributing instead to less effective policies predicated on competition and containment.A second and related challenge is to maintain and develop Britain’s position on the issue of engaging populations in these entities. De facto states appear to stand outside of the international rules-based system. Yet in many cases, their civil societies are peopled by skilled and motivated activists who want their leaders to be held accountable according to international rules.Strategies of isolation ignore these voices and contribute instead to fearful and demoralized communities less likely to engage in a transformation of adversarial relationships. Making this case with the wider international community, and facilitating the funding of local civil societies in contested territories, would be important steps in sustaining an effective British policy on the resolution of conflicts. The third challenge for Britain is to maintain a long-term approach to the conflicts of the South Caucasus alongside potential short-term imperatives in other policy fields, as relationships shift post-Brexit.In this fluid international environment, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has a role to play both as an internal champion of a long-term peacebuilding strategy and a coordinator of British efforts with those of multilateral actors engaged in the South Caucasus. These include the United Nations, the EU’s Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia and OSCE’s Special Representative for the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus, all of which have built relationships with relevant actors on the ground.RecommendationsBritain’s niche as a champion and advocate of a strategic approach to peaceful change can be secured post-Brexit in the following ways. First, in-house expertise is crucial to effective peacebuilding programming. The Foreign Office’s research analysts play a vital role in generating independent internal advice and liaising with academic and NGO communities. Their role could be supplemented by the reinstatement of a regional conflict adviser post, based in Tbilisi, tasked with strengthening Britain’s regional presence on conflict issues and coordinating policy at a regional level.This post, with a remit to cover conflicts and build up area knowledge and relationships can contribute significantly to working closely with local civil societies, where so much expertise and knowledge resides, as well as other stakeholders.Second, programming should build in conflict sensitivity by dissociating eligibility from contested political status. This can encourage local populations to take advantage of opportunities for funding, study, comparative learning and professional development irrespective of the status of the entity where they reside.The Chevening Scholarships are an excellent example, whereby applicants can select ‘South Caucasus’ as their affiliated identity from a drop-down menu. This enables citizens from across the region to apply irrespective of the status of the territory in which they live. Finally, a holistic understanding of peace is crucial. Programming in unrecognized or partially-recognized entities should acknowledge that effective peacebuilding needs to embrace political dynamics and processes beyond cross-conflict contact and confidence building. Local actors in such entities may find peacebuilding funding streams defined exclusively in terms of cross-conflict contact more politically risky and ineffective in addressing domestic blockages to peace.While cross-conflict dynamics remain critical, ‘single-community’ programming framed in terms of civic participation, inclusion, civil society capacity-building, minority and human rights in contested territories, and building the confidence from within to engage in constructive dialogue, are no less important.The ’global Britain’ promised by Brexit remains a fanciful idea. Quiet, painstaking work to build on the legacies of a long-term British investment in a peace strategy for the South Caucasus, on the other hand, is a realistic and attainable goal. Full Article
south caucasus Three Challenges for UK Peacebuilding Policy in the South Caucasus After Brexit By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 21 Jan 2020 09:24:44 +0000 21 January 2020 Laurence Broers Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme @LaurenceBroers Building on the legacies of a long-term British investment in a peace strategy for the South Caucasus is a realistic and attainable goal. 2020-01-21-NK.jpg A building in Nagorny Karabakh flies the flag of the self-proclaimed republic. 'Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh have evolved into examples of what scholars call "de facto states" that, to differing degrees, control territory, provide governance and exercise internal sovereignty,' writes Laurence Broers. Photo: Getty Images. What does Britain’s departure from the EU mean for the country’s policy towards the South Caucasus, a small region on the periphery of Europe, fractured by conflict? Although Britain is not directly involved in any of the region’s peace processes (except in the case of the Geneva International Discussions on conflicts involving Georgia, as an EU member state), it has been a significant stakeholder in South Caucasian stability since the mid-1990s.Most obviously, Britain has been the single largest foreign investor in Caspian oil and gas. Yet beyond pipelines, Britain also has been a significant investor in long-term civil society-led strategies to build peace in the South Caucasus.Through what was then the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, in the early 2000s the Department for International Development (DfID) pioneered large-scale peacebuilding interventions, such as the Consortium Initiative, addressing Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, in 2003-09. These built civic networks in the South Caucasus and partnerships with British-based NGOs.This experience left a strong intellectual legacy. British expertise on the South Caucasus, including specific expertise on its conflicts, is highly regarded in the region and across the world.There is also a strong tradition of British scholarship on the Caucasus, and several British universities offer Caucasus-related courses. Through schemes such as the John Smith Fellowship Trust, the Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellowship at Chatham House and Chevening Scholarships, significant numbers of young leaders from the South Caucasus have spent time in British institutions and built effective relationships within them.Three challengesThis niche as a champion of long-term, strategic peacebuilding and repository of area-specific knowledge should not be lost as Britain’s relationship with the EU and regional actors evolves. This can be ensured through awareness of three challenges confronting a post-Brexit Caucasus policy.The first challenge for London is to avoid framing a regional policy in the South Caucasus as an extension of a wider ‘Russia policy’. Deteriorating Russian-British relations in recent years strengthen a tendency to view policies in the European neighbourhood through the traditional prisms of Cold War and Russian-Western rivalries.Yet an overwhelming focus on Russia fails to capture other important aspects of political developments in South Caucasus conflicts. Although often referred to as ‘breakaway’ or ‘occupied’ territories, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh are not ungoverned spaces. They have evolved into examples of what scholars call ‘de facto states’ that, to differing degrees, control territory, provide governance and exercise internal sovereignty.Few disagree that these entities would not survive without external patronage. But neither does that patronage explain their sustainability on its own. Russia-centricity diminishes Britain’s latitude to engage on the full range of local drivers sustaining these entities, contributing instead to less effective policies predicated on competition and containment.A second and related challenge is to maintain and develop Britain’s position on the issue of engaging populations in these entities. De facto states appear to stand outside of the international rules-based system. Yet in many cases, their civil societies are peopled by skilled and motivated activists who want their leaders to be held accountable according to international rules.Strategies of isolation ignore these voices and contribute instead to fearful and demoralized communities less likely to engage in a transformation of adversarial relationships. Making this case with the wider international community, and facilitating the funding of local civil societies in contested territories, would be important steps in sustaining an effective British policy on the resolution of conflicts. The third challenge for Britain is to maintain a long-term approach to the conflicts of the South Caucasus alongside potential short-term imperatives in other policy fields, as relationships shift post-Brexit.In this fluid international environment, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has a role to play both as an internal champion of a long-term peacebuilding strategy and a coordinator of British efforts with those of multilateral actors engaged in the South Caucasus. These include the United Nations, the EU’s Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia and OSCE’s Special Representative for the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus, all of which have built relationships with relevant actors on the ground.RecommendationsBritain’s niche as a champion and advocate of a strategic approach to peaceful change can be secured post-Brexit in the following ways. First, in-house expertise is crucial to effective peacebuilding programming. The Foreign Office’s research analysts play a vital role in generating independent internal advice and liaising with academic and NGO communities. Their role could be supplemented by the reinstatement of a regional conflict adviser post, based in Tbilisi, tasked with strengthening Britain’s regional presence on conflict issues and coordinating policy at a regional level.This post, with a remit to cover conflicts and build up area knowledge and relationships can contribute significantly to working closely with local civil societies, where so much expertise and knowledge resides, as well as other stakeholders.Second, programming should build in conflict sensitivity by dissociating eligibility from contested political status. This can encourage local populations to take advantage of opportunities for funding, study, comparative learning and professional development irrespective of the status of the entity where they reside.The Chevening Scholarships are an excellent example, whereby applicants can select ‘South Caucasus’ as their affiliated identity from a drop-down menu. This enables citizens from across the region to apply irrespective of the status of the territory in which they live. Finally, a holistic understanding of peace is crucial. Programming in unrecognized or partially-recognized entities should acknowledge that effective peacebuilding needs to embrace political dynamics and processes beyond cross-conflict contact and confidence building. Local actors in such entities may find peacebuilding funding streams defined exclusively in terms of cross-conflict contact more politically risky and ineffective in addressing domestic blockages to peace.While cross-conflict dynamics remain critical, ‘single-community’ programming framed in terms of civic participation, inclusion, civil society capacity-building, minority and human rights in contested territories, and building the confidence from within to engage in constructive dialogue, are no less important.The ’global Britain’ promised by Brexit remains a fanciful idea. Quiet, painstaking work to build on the legacies of a long-term British investment in a peace strategy for the South Caucasus, on the other hand, is a realistic and attainable goal. Full Article
south caucasus U.S., EU, and Turkish engagement in the South Caucasus By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 10:15:00 -0400 Harsh geopolitical realities and historic legacies have pushed the South Caucasus states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia back onto the foreign policy agendas of the United States, the European Union (EU), and Turkey, at a time when all three have pulled back from more activist roles in regional affairs. The South Caucasus states have now become, at best, second-tier issues for the West, but they remain closely connected to first-tier problems. To head off the prospect that festering crises in the Caucasus will lead to or feed into broader conflagrations, the United States, EU, and Turkey have to muster sufficient political will to re-engage to some degree in high-level regional diplomacy. In “Retracing the Caucasian Circle Considerations and Constraints for U.S., EU, and Turkish Engagement in the South Caucasus,” authors Fiona Hill, Kemal Kirişci, and Andrew Moffatt explore the rationale and assess the options for Western reengagement with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia given the current challenges and limitations on all sides. Based on a series of study trips to the South Caucasus and Turkey in 2014 and 2015, and numerous other interviews, the authors review some of the current factors that should be considered by Western policymakers and analysts. Constraints and considerations for U.S., EU, and Turkish engagement in the South Caucasus: • Divergent trends in the South Caucasus • Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus • Regional conflicts • The United States’ diminishing role in the South Caucasus • Failure to integrate the South Caucasus into the EU • Foundering relations with Turkey • Dashed expectations in the South Caucasus of Western engagement Despite the challenges that have beset the West’s relations with the South Caucasus and the growing disillusionment in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, giving up on engagement is not an option. Policy options for the future: • The United States, EU, and Turkey must work together, rather than separately • “Under the radar” coordination on creative interim solutions and working with other mediators • Focus on the development of “soft regionalism” • Work with Georgia as the hub for furthering soft regionalism • Devise adaptable policies as relations with Iran and China develop in the region Downloads Retracing the Caucasian Circle: Considerations and constraints for U.S., EU, and Turkish engagement in the South Caucasus Authors Fiona HillKemal KirişciAndrew Moffatt Image Source: © Umit Bektas / Reuters Full Article
south caucasus The EU's neighbourhood policy towards the South Caucasus: expanding the European Security Community / Licínia Simão By library.mit.edu Published On :: Sun, 14 Jul 2019 09:32:17 EDT Online Resource Full Article
