On May 9, Filipinos elected a new president, Rodrigo Duterte. The long-time mayor of Davao City is the first Philippine president to hail from the southern islands of the archipelago. There, he established a “can-do” reputation on the back of brutal crackdown on crime, which won him the sobriquet “the Punisher.” During his controversial, profanity-laced campaign (his comments on rape, for instance, are truly regrettable), the tough-talking, cavalier eventual winner was described as the “Donald Trump of the Philippines.” He established that his priorities would be to confront crime, drugs, and corruption with a firm hand. Indeed, during a televised debate, Duterte claimed he was even prepared to kill his own children if they were involved in drugs.

Getting the Philippines out of its funk

Duterte’s success reflects a mood in Philippine society today. The Philippines has been a beacon of democracy in Southeast Asia for some time. Long before the Arab Spring or “Reformasi” (the massive social movement that brought down Suharto’s 32-year rule in Indonesia in 1998), the “People’s Revolution” against the Marcos regime in 1986 fired the imagination. 

Yet until very recently, the Philippines had not reaped any economic dividends from democratization. For many years following the “People’s Revolution,” the Philippine economy lurched along, plagued by endemic corruption and incompetent leadership. So deep was the malaise, the country became known as the new “sick man of Asia.” The lack of economic opportunity drove its women—among the most highly educated in the world—to seek employment abroad as housemaids and domestic helpers (remittances from these sources account for 10 percent of GDP). The issue is in fact a larger one, as there is a growing educated class frustrated with the lack of opportunity and upward social mobility. It is this mood that Duterte has tapped into.

[T]here is a growing educated class frustrated with the lack of opportunity and upward social mobility.

It remains to be seen though, now that he has won, if Duterte can “walk the talk.” The fact is that Duterte’s anti-establishment credentials and populist positions on poverty and corruption run sharply athwart an oligarchy that has long been an entrenched part of Philippine society. 

Despite impressive economic growth rates over the last few years under the Benigno Aquino III administration, the Philippines has been beset by a growing wealth disparity. To get at this problem, Duterte will have to have to leave behind his provincial mindset to govern at the national level, where these problems are amplified. Specifically, he will have to deal with a rent-seeking culture and a powerful aristocracy that controls huge chunks of the economy. It will take more than tough talk and populism to create a more equitable distribution of wealth and opportunity.

In the neighborhood

It is still too early to say, but indications are that foreign policy issues will probably not be a priority for Duterte, with two exceptions (neither of which are of his own choosing). Given his unpredictability, few would venture to say with any certainty how he might act on them. 

First, Duterte will have to handle the fallout from the arbitration tribunal rulings on the Philippine case against China’s massive claims in the South China Sea. Most observers agree that from the 15 items awaiting the tribunal’s decision, the majority will be ruled in favour of the Philippines. This would constitute a moral victory for Manila, but would also pose potential problems for the new government in terms of relations with China. Probably mindful of this, Duterte has already spoken of his readiness to engage in dialogue with China on the South China Sea. More to the point, given his likely emphasis on domestic economic issues, it is quite possible that Duterte will pursue a more pragmatic policy towards Beijing with an eye to Chinese investments in infrastructure development. On the other hand, true to character, Duterte also declared that he would set out on his own jet ski to the South China Sea to plant the Philippine flag. Populist posturing aside, at issue is whether Duterte’s unpredictability will jeopardize Manila’s current alignment with fellow ASEAN claimant, Vietnam, or its ongoing support for American efforts to exercise freedom of navigation rights in the South China Sea in response to China’s expansive claims.

Second, Duterte will be in office when the Philippines assumes the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2017. On the occasion of its 50th anniversary (ASEAN was formed in 1967), the Association would be looking to the Philippines, a founder-member, to demonstrate much-needed regional leadership. At stake is nothing less than the unity of ASEAN, which of late has come under increasing strain because of the South China Sea disputes. Duterte said very little about ASEAN during his campaign. Yet one thing should be clear. Given the complex challenges that the region is likely to face in the coming year, Duterte would be well-advised that the imperative of ASEAN unity will require more diplomatic nous and less saber-rattling bravado.

Editors’ Note: One week after this post was originally published, President Benigno Aquino of the Philippines said that the United States must take action in the South China Sea if China takes steps towards reclaiming the Scarborough Shoal. Michael O’Hanlon updated this post on May 23 with a brief response, below. The original post appears in full after the break.

Predictably, some experts—as well as now the Philippines' leader, President Benigno Aquino—are arguing that the United States should militarily prevent China from seizing the Scarborough Shoal, a disputed but basically worthless land formation in the open waters between the Philippines and China. The formation is admittedly three times closer to the Philippines than to China, but it is not important—and it is definitely not worth fighting China over. Loose talk of red lines and of the supposed need for the United States to "take military action" makes the problem sound far too antiseptic and easily manageable. In fact, any direct use of military power that resulted in the deaths of Chinese (or American) military personnel would raise serious dangers of escalation. 

The United States does need to ensure access to the sea lanes of the South China Sea. And it should help protect the populated areas of any allied country, including the Philippines. It should not recognize Chinese territorial or economic claims to areas surrounding disputed (or reclaimed) land formations, even if China occupies some of these islets and other features. And it should consider proportionate responses in the economic realm to any Chinese aggression over the Scarborough Shoal, as well as the possibility of expanded and permanent U.S. military presence in the area. But it should not shoot at Chinese ships, planes, or troops over this issue. It's just not worth it, and we have more appropriate and measured options for response if needed.

[Original post, from May 12]

President-elect Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, known for his Trump-like rhetoric and supra-legal methods of reducing crime while mayor of Davao City on the island of Mindanao, is already causing consternation in many parts of the world. His previous tolerance for vigilantes as a crime-fighting tool, for example, is cause for concern.

But in other cases, we should relax and keep an open mind. For example, while The Washington Post editorial page has lamented that he appears willing to do a deal with Beijing—accepting Chinese investment in the Philippines while allowing China to enforce its claims to the uninhabited Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea—that particular outcome may actually be good for the United States. 

Provocateurs in Beijing

Let’s situate the Scarborough Shoal issue in broader context. In recent days, the United States sailed a major Navy vessel, the William P. Lawrence, within 12 miles of the Fiery Cross Reef, a land formation in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea that China has transformed into a 700-acre artificial island. China objected strenuously. Meanwhile, everyone awaits the ruling of an international arbitration panel, expected later this spring, on whether China or the Philippines (or neither) is the rightful claimant to the Scarborough Shoal.

To be sure, the broad problem starts in Beijing; The Washington Post is not wrong on that basic point. Incredulously, invoking fishing histories from many centuries ago, China claims not only most of the shoals and sand bars and small islands of the South China Sea, and not only the surrounding fisheries and seabed resources, but the water itself. Its so-called nine-dash line, which encompasses almost all of the South China Sea—including areas much closer to the Philippines and Indonesia and other key countries than to China’s own territory—can be interpreted as a claim to sovereign ownership. Fears that it will declare an associated air defense identification zone further complicate the picture.

Map of the South China Sea locating China's nine-dash line claim on the South China Sea, and the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). Note: The Spratleys, Parcels, and other islands in the South China Sea are disputed to various degrees by different parties. Photo credit: Reuters.

America’s aims are far less disruptive to the status quo. But of course, for America, the region is also much further away. In Chinese eyes, we already have our Caribbean Sea, and Gulf of Mexico—not to mention our extensive east and west seacoasts and other maritime domains. By contrast, China is largely hemmed in by land on three sides and Japan together with the U.S. Navy on the fourth. For Washington to deny China even a modest version of its own special waters strikes many in Beijing as haughty and hegemonic. 

America’s aims are far less disruptive to the status quo.

Choosing our historical analogies wisely

Of course, the United States is making no claims of its own in the region. Nor is Washington trying to dictate outcomes on all disputes. Washington does not take a position on who owns the land features of the South China Sea. Nor does it oppose any plan for joint exploitation of the area’s resources that regional states can agree on. Nor can the United States, or any other country, be expected to let China restrict naval and commercial shipping maneuvers through this region, through which at least one-third of the world’s commerce traverses. Nor should Washington abandon treaty allies—most notably in this case, the Philippines—if they come under fire from Chinese warships (as has happened before). And in fairness to Filipinos, the Scarborough Shoal is much closer to their country than to China, by a distance factor of more than three to one.

Yet there is a problem in Washington’s thinking, too. Given the way rising powers have behaved throughout history, it is unrealistic to think that China wouldn’t seek to translate its greater economic and military strength into some type of strategic benefit. Yet Washington expects China to stop building artificial islands, to abstain from deploying military assets to the region, and to accept adjudication of disputes over territory by an international panel.

... it is unrealistic to think that China wouldn’t seek to translate its greater economic and military strength into some type of strategic benefit.

Many Americans would view any bending of the rules in Beijing’s favor as appeasement and thus an invitation to further imperialistic behavior by China. We have learned the lessons of World War II and the Cold War very well. 

But it is also important to bear in mind the lessons of World War I, when great powers competed over relatively minor issues and wound up in a terrible conflict. Just as Germany had been largely shut out of the colonialism competition prior to 1914, making its leaders anxious to right what they saw as historical wrongs in advancing their own interests once they had the capacity, it is possible that China will refuse to accept the status quo going forward. By this alternative reading of history, our job should be to persuade China to be content with very minor adjustments to the existing global order—and to remind Chinese that they have benefited greatly from that order—rather than to oppose each and every small act of Chinese assertiveness as if it portended the first of many dominoes to fall. The good news in this case is that China is not challenging existing state borders, threatening established population centers, or using lethal force as a default instrument of state power. Its behavior is worrying, to be sure—but not particularly surprising, and by the standards of history, relatively benign to date.

Walk the line

With this perspective in mind, the United States should continue to insist on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and sail its ships wherever it wants, including within 12 miles of reclaimed islands. It should punish China for any future, limited use of military violence against a country like the Philippines by shoring up alliances, increasing forward U.S. military deployments, and imposing economic sanctions in concert with allies. But it should not itself use lethal force to directly respond to most small possible Chinese provocations or to evict People’s Liberation Army forces from disputed islands and shoals. It should tolerate some modest degree of expanded Chinese military presence in the area. And it should encourage regional friends to accept deals on joint economic exploitation of the region’s resources in which China would in effect be first among equals—though of course the exact meaning of that phrase would require careful delineation. 

Its behavior is worrying, to be sure—but not particularly surprising, and by the standards of history, relatively benign to date.

Duterte’s willingness to do a deal with China would seem to fit with these criteria, without surrounding any substantial claims to Beijing, and without suggesting any weakening in its ties to the United States either. The Philippines shouldn’t concede meaningful economic resources in the waters and seabeds surrounding the Scarborough Shoal. But ownership and control of the land features themselves are a minor matter about which Manila might well usefully compromise.

The United States and China are likely to be jostling for position in the South China Sea for years. That is probably inevitable. It is also tolerable, if we keep our cool while also maintaining our resolve—and if we patiently look for an ultimate compromise on the issues that currently divide America and its regional friends from Beijing. Ironically, the strongman from Mindanao may help us along with this process.