Image encryption is a critical and attractive issue in digital image processing that has gained approval and interest of many researchers in the world. A proposed hybrid encryption method was implemented by using the combination of the Nahrain chaotic map with a well-known optimised algorithm namely the grey wolf optimisation (GWO). It was noted from analysing the results of the experiments conducted on the new hybrid algorithm, that it gave strong resistance against expected statistical invasion as well as brute force. Several statistical analyses were carried out and showed that the average entropy of the encrypted images is near to its ideal information entropy.

With the continuous growth and importance of data, the need for strong data protection becomes crucial. Encryption plays a vital role in preserving the confidentiality of data, and attribute-based encryption (ABE) offers a meticulous access control system based on attributes. This study investigates the integration of Fernet encryption with initialisation vector (IV) and ABE, resulting in a hybrid encryption approach that enhances both security and flexibility. By combining the advantages of Fernet encryption and IV-based encryption, the hybrid encryption scheme establishes an effective and robust mechanism for safeguarding data. Fernet encryption, renowned for its simplicity and efficiency, provides authenticated encryption, guaranteeing both the confidentiality and integrity of the data. The incorporation of an initialisation vector (IV) introduces an element of randomness into the encryption process, thereby strengthening the overall security measures. This research paper discusses the advantages and drawbacks of the hybrid encryption of Fernet and IV with ABE.

With AXIS OS 11.8, MACsec is enabled by default. Data is encrypted at the Ethernet Layer 2 network level, safeguarding the integrity of data being transferred between Axis devices and MACsec-enabled Ethernet switches.

A new report by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine proposes a framework for evaluating proposals to provide authorized government agencies with access to unencrypted versions of encrypted communications and other data.

The universally used Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption can now be dramatically upgraded and customized by a patented technology called the Finite Lab-Transform (FLT).

The universally used Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption can now be dramatically upgraded and customized by a patented technology called the Finite Lab-Transform (FLT)

This innovative offering sets a new standard for secure digital storing, document preservation, and evidence archiving and management

Péter Budai and Kim Carter discuss End to End Encryption (E2EE), backdoors, the scenarios where E2EE can be and should be used. IM, VoIP, Email scenarios, interservice communication scenarios such as securing data in use.

QSTR-USSD - Low resource requirement, quantum resistant, encryption of USSD messages for use in financial services

Windows 11 includes a full-disk encryption feature called Device encryption that protects the data on your system drive. Device encryption uses Microsoft BitLocker technologies, and it's enabled automatically the first time you sign in to Windows 11 using a Microsoft account (or Microsoft Work or school account).
Technically speaking, Device encryption does not encrypt your entire system disk, which is divided into different logical volumes or partitions. Instead, it encrypts the C: drive, which is the volume that contains Windows and other system files. (This drive is often referred to as the system disk.) Any other volumes on this disk will not be encrypted (nor visible normally while using Windows 11).
If you sign in to Windows 11 with a local account, Device encryption will be enabled automatically but not activated (or, fully enabled). If you are using Windows 11 Home, you can only activate Device encryption by signing in to Windows (at least once) with a Microsoft account.
With Windows 11 Pro, you can use the BitLocker control panel, described later in this chapter, to activate Device encryption.
For the most part, Device encryption is seamless and not something you will notice. But it is important to understand that any files that you copy or move to an encrypted disk are encrypted during the copy/move process. Likewise, any files that you copy or move from an encrypted disk are decrypted during that process as well. Decrypted files can be read or used by anyone, on any PC.
When enabled, Device encryption also provides some additional functionality to the system disk on which Windows is installed. For example, when the PC boots, it will examine the integrity of the system to ensure that nothing suspicious has happened to the PC's firmware or startup files. If an issue is found, you'll be prompted to provide the recovery key, which was saved to your Microsoft account (or Work and school account) in the form of a very lengthy text-based password. (This is discussed below.)
Manage device encryption
Device encryption doesn't offer much in the way of management: This feature is enabled for you automatically when you sign in to Windows 11 using a Microsoft account. However, you can ensure that device encryption is enabled and even disable this feature--which we do not recommend--using the Settings app.

To do so, open Settings (WINKEY + I) and navigate to Privacy & security > Device encryption.

If you just signed in to Windows 11 for the first time, you may see an "Encryption is in progress" message at the top of this Settings page. That message will disappear when Windows 11 finishes encrypting the system disk.
Here, you will find a toggle for device encryption and links to "BitLocker drive encryption" and "Find your BitLocker recovery key," the latter of which launches your default web browser and displays an informational website.
If you are using Windows 11 Pro, the "BitLocker drive encryption" link will open the Bi...

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Cadence PCIe/CXL VIP support for Partial Header Encryption in Integrity and Data Encryption.(read more)

Peripheral Component Interconnect Express (PCIe) is a high-speed interface standard widely used for connecting processors, memory, and peripherals. With the increasing reliance on PCIe to handle sensitive data and critical high-speed data transfer, ensuring data integrity and encryption during verification is the most essential goal. As we know, in the field of verification, randomization is a key technique that drives robust PCIe verification. It introduces unpredictability to simulate real-world conditions and uncover hidden bugs from the design. This blog examines the significance of randomization in PCIe IDE verification, focusing on how it ensures data integrity and encryption reliability, while also highlighting the unique challenges it presents. For more relevant details and understanding on PCIe IDE you can refer to Introducing PCIe's Integrity and Data Encryption Feature . The Importance of Data Integrity and Data Encryption in PCIe Devices Data Integrity : Ensures that the transmitted data arrives unchanged from source to destination. Even minor corruption in data packets can compromise system reliability, making integrity a critical aspect of PCIe verification. Data Encryption : Protects sensitive data from unauthorized access during transmission. Encryption in PCIe follows a standard to secure information while operating at high speeds. Maintaining both data integrity and data encryption at PCIe’s high-speed data transfer rate of 64GT/s in PCIe 6.0 and 128GT/s in PCIe 7.0 is essential for all end point devices. However, validating these mechanisms requires comprehensive testing and verification methodologies, which is where randomization plays a very crucial role. You can refer to Why IDE Security Technology for PCIe and CXL? for more details on this. Randomization in PCIe Verification Randomization refers to the generation of test scenarios with unpredictable inputs and conditions to expose corner cases. In PCIe verification, this technique helps us to ensure that all possible behaviors are tested, including rare or unexpected situations that could cause data corruption or encryption failures that may cause serious hindrances later. So, for PCIe IDE verification, we are considering the randomization that helps us verify behavior more efficiently. Randomization for Data Integrity Verification Here are some approaches of randomized verifications that mimic real-world traffic conditions, uncovering subtle integrity issues that might not surface in normal verification methods. 1. Randomized Packet Injection: This technique randomized data packets and injected into the communication stream between devices. Here we Inject random, malformed, or out-of-sequence packets into the PCIe link and mix valid and invalid IDE-encrypted packets to check the system’s ability to detect and reject unauthorized or invalid packets. Checking if encryption/decryption occurs correctly across packets. On verifying, we check if the system logs proper errors or alerts when encountering invalid packets. It ensures coverage of different data paths and robust protocol check. This technique helps assess the resilience of the IDE feature in PCIe in below terms: (i) Data corruption: Detecting if the system can maintain data integrity. (ii) Encryption failures: Testing the robustness of the encryption under random data injection. (iii) Packet ordering errors: Ensuring reordering does not affect data delivery. 2. Random Errors and Fault Injection: It involves simulating random bit flips, PCRC errors, or protocol violations to help validate the robustness of error detection and correction mechanisms of PCIe. These techniques help assess how well the PCIe IDE implementation: (i) Detects and responds to unexpected errors. (ii) Maintains secure communication under stress. (iii) Follows the PCIe error recovery and reporting mechanisms (AER – Advanced Error Reporting). (iv) Ensures encryption and decryption states stay synchronized across endpoints. 3. Traffic Pattern Randomization: Randomizing the sequence, size, and timing of data packets helps test how the device maintains data integrity under heavy, unpredictable traffic loads. Randomization for Data Encryption Verification Encryption adds complexity to verification, as encrypted data streams are not readable for traditional checks. Randomization becomes essential to test how encryption behaves under different scenarios. Randomization in data encryption verification ensures that vulnerabilities, such as key reuse or predictable patterns, are identified and mitigated. 1. Random Encryption Keys and Payloads: Randomly varying keys and payloads help validate the correctness of encryption without hardcoding assumptions. This ensures that encryption logic behaves correctly across all possible inputs. 2. Randomized Initialization Vectors (IVs): Many encryption protocols require a unique IV for each transaction. Randomized IVs ensure that encryption does not repeat patterns. To understand the IDE Key management flow, we can follow the below diagram that illustrates a detailed example key programming flow using the IDE_KM protocol. Figure 1: IDE_KM Example As Figure 1 shows, the functionality of the IDE_KM protocol involves Start of IDE_KM Session, Device Capability Discovery, Key Request from the Host, Key Programming to PCIe Device, and Key Acknowledgment. First, the Host starts the IDE_KM session by detecting the presence of the PCIe devices; if the device supports the IDE protocol, the system continues with the key programming process. Then a query occurs to discover the device’s encryption capabilities; it ensures whether the device supports dynamic key updates or static keys. Then the host sends a request to the Key Management Entity to obtain a key suitable for the devices. Once the key is obtained, the host programs the key into the IDE Controller on the PCIe endpoint. Both the host and the device now share the same key to encrypt and authenticate traffic. The device acknowledges that it has received and successfully installed the encryption key and the acknowledgment message is sent back to the host. Once both the host and the PCIe endpoint are configured with the key, a secure communication channel is established. From this point, all data transmitted over the PCIe link is encrypted to maintain confidentiality and integrity. IDE_KM plays a crucial role in distributing keys in a secure manner and maintaining encryption and integrity for PCIe transactions. This key programming flow ensures that a secure communication channel is established between the host and the PCIe device. Hence, the Randomized key approach ensures that the encryption does not repeat patterns. 3. Randomization PHE: Partial Header Encryption (PHE) is an additional mechanism added to Integrity and Data Encryption (IDE) in PCIe 6.0. PHE validation using a variety of traffic; incorporating randomization in APIs provided for validating PHE feature can add more robust Encryption to the data. Partial Header Encryption in Integrity and Data Encryption for PCIe has more detailed information on this. Figure 2: High-Level Flow for Partial Header Encryption 4. Randomization on IDE Address Association Register values: IDE Address Association Register 1/2/3 are supposed to be configured considering the memory address range of IDE partner ports. The fields of IDE address registers are split multiple values such as Memory Base Lower, Memory Limit Lower, Memory Base Upper, and Memory Limit Upper. IDE implementation can have multiple register blocks considering addresses with 32 or 64, different registers sizes, 0-255 selective streams, 0-15 address blocks, etc. This Randomization verification can help verify all the corner cases. Please refer to Figure 2. Figure 3: IDE Address Association Register 5. Random Faults During Encryption: Injecting random faults (e.g., dropped packets or timing mismatches) ensures the system can handle disruptions and prevent data leakage. Challenges of IDE Randomization and its Solution Randomization introduces a vast number of scenarios, making it computationally intensive to simulate every possibility. Constrained randomization limits random inputs to valid ranges while still covering edge cases. Again, using coverage-driven verification to ensure critical scenarios are tested without excessive redundancy. Verifying encrypted data with random inputs increases complexity. Encryption masks data, making it hard to verify outputs without compromising security. Here we can implement various IDE checks on the IDE callback to analyze encrypted traffic without decrypting it. Randomization can trigger unexpected failures, which are often difficult to reproduce. By using seed-based randomization, a specific seed generates a repeatable random sequence. This helps in reproducing and analyzing the behavior more precisely. Conclusion Randomization is a powerful technique in PCIe verification, ensuring robust validation of both data integrity and data encryption. It helps us to uncover subtle bugs and edge cases that a non-randomized testing might miss. In Cadence PCIe VIP, we support full-fledged IDE Verification with rigorous randomized verification that ensures data integrity. Robust and reliable encryption mechanisms ensure secure and efficient data communication. However, randomization also brings various challenges, and to overcome them we adopt a combination of constrained randomization, seed-based testing, and coverage-driven verification. As PCIe continues to evolve with higher speeds and focuses on high security demands, our Cadence PCIe VIP ensures it is in line with industry demand and verify high-performance systems that safeguard data in real-world environments with excellence. For more information, you can refer to Verification of Integrity and Data Encryption(IDE) for PCIe Devices and Industry's First Adopted VIP for PCIe 7.0 . More Information: For more info on how Cadence PCIe Verification IP and TripleCheck VIP enables users to confidently verify IDE, see our VIP for PCI Express , VIP for Compute Express Link for and TripleCheck for PCI Express For more information on PCIe in general, and on the various PCI standards, see the PCI-SIG website .

Produced by WIRED Brand Lab with AWS | Data security is top priority when building a product in its early stages, but not all software developers have expertise in it. The team at Evervault sought a solution and used AWS' Nitro Enclaves to create it. The result of this collaboration is Evervault Encryption Engine - or E3 - which provides highly constrained compute environments where sensitive data can be securely decrypted and processed. Since AWS and Nitro Enclaves are globally available on demand, Evervault easily provides affordable and secure encryption tools to developers everywhere, allowing for all software developers to ensure data security. 

A new report by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine proposes a framework for evaluating proposals to provide authorized government agencies with access to unencrypted versions of encrypted communications and other data.

The company is planning to develop tools that will give more controls to meeting hosts and allow users to securely join a meeting.

The company is planning to develop tools that will give more controls to meeting hosts and allow users to securely join a meeting.

Signals that coordinate the rhythms of our heart and lungs offer inspiration for creating 'unbreakable' security codes.

Popular communications platform provider Zoom Video announced on Thursday that it has acquired secure messaging and file-sharing service Keybase for an undisclosed sum. The move is the latest by the company as it attempts to bolster the security of its offerings and build in end-to-end encryption that can scale to the company’s massive user base.

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Public key encryption with equality test (PKEET) allows testing whether two ciphertexts are generated by the same message or not. PKEET is a potential candidate for many practical applications like efficient data management on encrypted databases. Potential applicability of PKEET leads to intensive research from its first instantiation by Yang et al. (CT-RSA 2010). Most of the followup constructions are secure in the random oracle model. Moreover, the security of all the concrete constructions is based on number-theoretic hardness assumptions which are vulnerable in the post-quantum era. Recently, Lee et al. (ePrint 2016) proposed a generic construction of PKEET schemes in the standard model and hence it is possible to yield the first instantiation of PKEET schemes based on lattices. Their method is to use a $2$-level hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) scheme together with a one-time signature scheme. In this paper, we propose, for the first time, a direct construction of a PKEET scheme based on the hardness assumption of lattices in the standard model. More specifically, the security of the proposed scheme is reduces to the hardness of the Learning With Errors problem.

Homomorphic encryption (HE) allows direct computations on encrypted data. Despite numerous research efforts, the practicality of HE schemes remains to be demonstrated. In this regard, the enormous size of ciphertexts involved in HE computations degrades computational efficiency. Near-memory Processing (NMP) and Computing-in-memory (CiM) - paradigms where computation is done within the memory boundaries - represent architectural solutions for reducing latency and energy associated with data transfers in data-intensive applications such as HE. This paper introduces CiM-HE, a Computing-in-memory (CiM) architecture that can support operations for the B/FV scheme, a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme for general computation. CiM-HE hardware consists of customized peripherals such as sense amplifiers, adders, bit-shifters, and sequencing circuits. The peripherals are based on CMOS technology, and could support computations with memory cells of different technologies. Circuit-level simulations are used to evaluate our CiM-HE framework assuming a 6T-SRAM memory. We compare our CiM-HE implementation against (i) two optimized CPU HE implementations, and (ii) an FPGA-based HE accelerator implementation. When compared to a CPU solution, CiM-HE obtains speedups between 4.6x and 9.1x, and energy savings between 266.4x and 532.8x for homomorphic multiplications (the most expensive HE operation). Also, a set of four end-to-end tasks, i.e., mean, variance, linear regression, and inference are up to 1.1x, 7.7x, 7.1x, and 7.5x faster (and 301.1x, 404.6x, 532.3x, and 532.8x more energy efficient). Compared to CPU-based HE in a previous work, CiM-HE obtain 14.3x speed-up and >2600x energy savings. Finally, our design offers 2.2x speed-up with 88.1x energy savings compared to a state-of-the-art FPGA-based accelerator.

A method for encrypting data on a disk drive using self encrypting drive is provided. The method includes encryption of data chunks of a computing device. The method further includes associating the encrypted data chunks with encryption key indexes of the computing device. Moreover, the method further includes receiving the encryption key indexes for given logical block addresses of the data chunks. The method further includes determining the encryption keys to be used to encrypt the data chunks based on the encryption key indexes of the data chunks to the disk drive.

Data is secured on a device in communication with a remote location using a password and content protection key. The device stores data encrypted using a content protection key, which itself may be stored in encrypted form using the password and a key encryption key. The remote location receives a public key from the device. The remote location uses the public key and a stored private key to generate a further public key. The further public key is sent to the device. The device uses the further public key to generate a key encryption key, which is then used to decrypt the encrypted content protection key. A new content encryption key may then be created.

A data source may be configured to provide usage data including subscriber identifiers and associated information indicative of subscriber device locations and usage. A data warehouse server may be configured to perform operations including: decrypting subscriber identifiers included in usage data received from the data source using a two-way rolling key groups algorithm; re-encrypting the subscriber identifiers decrypted from the usage data to create secure encrypted identifiers using a one-way secured encryption algorithm; and correlating the subscriber identifiers in the decrypted usage data with the corresponding re-encrypted identifiers.

A system apparatus and method for protecting information are provided. Embodiments of the invention may detect inactivity related to a computing device. Information and encryption key may be removed from a memory. Subsequent activity may be detected. An authentication procedure may be performed, and, contingent on authenticating a relevant entity, a master key may be generated and installed in a memory.

Computationally implemented methods and systems are described herein that are designed to, among other things, receiving a level-one encrypted output of a surveillance device; encrypting at least a part of the level-one encrypted output of the surveillance device with a level-two encryption key whose decryption key is inaccessible by a level-two encryption entity; and transmitting a level-two encrypted output of the surveillance device.

A method and apparatus is disclosed for managing encryption keys in a computer system in which in response to the change of a system key the old key and new key are both maintained for subsequent use.

An enhanced encryption keypad (100) capable of preventing illegal disassembly for an automated teller machine comprises a key panel (101) and a main control board (102). A removal detection protection circuit is disposed inside a main chip of the main control board (102), and at least one pin of the removal detection protection circuit is guided out from a surface (1021) of a side of the main control board (102) near the key panel to form a removal detection point (1022). The removal detection point (1022) has two opened signal contact points. The two opened signal contact points are conducted by a conductive adhesive (103) to activate the removal detection protection circuit. A conductive protection ring (1023) isolated from the removal detection point is disposed at the periphery of the removal detection point. The conductive protection ring (1023) is connected to the removal detection protection circuit inside the main control chip. A protection circle (1024) is disposed at the periphery of the conductive protection ring and the corresponding conductive adhesive. The present application effectively protects the encryption keypad from illegal attacks on the removal detection point from the side.

A semiconductor structure including a device configured to receive an input data-word. The device including a logic structure configured to generate an encrypted data-word by encrypting the input data-word through an encrypting operation. The device further including an eFuse storage device configured to store the encrypted data-word as eFuse data by blowing fuses in accordance with the encrypted data-word.

One of the key points we've been making concerning Attorney General William Barr and his DOJ's eager support for the terrible EARN-IT Act, is that much of it really seems to be to cover up the DOJ's own failings in fighting child porn and child exploitation. The premise behind the EARN IT Act is that there's a lot of child exploitation/child abuse material found on social media... and that social media companies should do more to block that content. Of course, if you step back and think about it, you'd quickly realize that this is a form of sweeping the problem under the rug. Rather than actually tracking down and arresting those exploiting and abusing children, it's demanding private companies just hide the evidence of those horrific acts.

And why might the DOJ and others be so supportive of sweeping evidence under the rug and hiding it? Perhaps because the DOJ and Congress have literally failed to live up to their mandates under existing laws to actually fight child exploitation. Barr's DOJ has been required under law to produce reports showing data about internet crimes against children, and come up with goals to fight those crimes. It has produced only two out of the six reports that were mandated over a decade ago. At the same time, Congress has only allocated a very small budget to state and local law enforcement for fighting internet child abuse. While the laws Congress passed say that Congress should give $60 million to local law enforcement, it has actually allocated only about half of that. Oh, and Homeland Security took nearly half of its "cybercrimes" budget and diverted it to immigration enforcement, rather than fighting internet crimes such as child exploitation.

So... maybe we should recognize that the problem isn't social media platforms, but the fact that Congress and law enforcement -- from local and state up to the DOJ -- have literally failed to do their job.

At least some elected officials have decided to call the DOJ's bluff on why we need the EARN IT Act. Led by Senator Ron Wyden (of course), Senators Kirsten Gillbrand, Bob Casey, Sherrod Brown and Rep. Anna Eshoo have introduced a new bill to actually fight child sex abuse online. Called the Invest in Child Safety Act, it would basically make law enforcement do its job regarding this stuff.

The Invest in Child Safety Act would direct $5 billion in mandatory funding to investigate and target the pedophiles and abusers who create and share child sexual abuse material online. And it would create a new White House office to coordinate efforts across federal agencies, after DOJ refused to comply with a 2008 law requiring coordination and reporting of those efforts. It also directs substantial new funding for community-based efforts to prevent children from becoming victims in the first place.

Basically, the bill would do a bunch of things to make sure that law enforcement is actually dealing with the very real problem of child exploitation, rather than demanding that internet companies (1) sweep evidence under the rug, and (2) break encryption:

• Quadruple the number of prosecutors and agents in DOJ’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section from 30 FTEs to 120 FTEs;
• Add 100 new agents and investigators for the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Innocent Images National Initiative, Crimes Against Children Unit, Child Abduction Rapid Deployment Teams, and Child Exploitation and Human Trafficking Task Forces;
• Fund 65 new NCMEC analysts, engineers, and mental health counselors, as well as a major upgrade to NCMEC’s technology platform to enable the organization to more effectively evaluate and process CSAM reports from tech companies;
• Double funding for the state Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Forces;
• Double funding for the National Criminal Justice Training Center, to administer crucial Internet Crimes Against Children and Missing and Exploited Children training programs;
• Increase funding for evidence-based programs, local governments and non-federal entities to detect, prevent and support victims of child sexual abuse, including school-based mental health services and prevention programs like the Children’s Advocacy Centers and the HHS’ Street Outreach Program;
• Require tech companies to increase the time that they hold evidence of CSAM, in a secure database, to enable law enforcement agencies to prosecute older cases;
• Establish an Office to Enforce and Protect Against Child Sexual Exploitation, within the Executive Office of the President, to direct and streamline the federal government’s efforts to prevent, investigate and prosecute the scourge of child exploitation;
• Require the Office to develop an enforcement and protection strategy, in coordination with HHS and GAO; and
• Require the Office to submit annual monitoring reports, subject to mandatory Congressional testimony to ensure timely execution.

As there have been countless cases of Zoombombing in the recent weeks, the security in the video conferencing platform Zoom has been doubted by its users. In response to this, Zoom finally announced on Thursday that they will be implementing and offering end-to-end encryption.

With the acquisition of Keybase, a New York-based startup specializing in encrypted messaging and cloud services, Zoom will finally be able to make good on its claims of offering end-to-end encryption.

“We are excited to integrate Keybase’s team into the Zoom family to help us build end-to-end encryption that can reach current Zoom scalability,” CEO Eric Yuan said in a Zoom blog post on Thursday.

Unfortunately, not all Zoom users will benefit from the company’s new move, as the end-to-end encryption feature will only be available to users who have paid plans (which start at $14.99/month, by the way) on the video conferencing platform.

If a meeting’s host has enabled this feature, participants will be barred from joining by phone and cloud-based recording will be disabled. In Thursday’s blog post, Yuan emphasized that the feature will not store the encryption key on Zoom’s servers, so the company will not be able to see any part of the call.

What are your thoughts about this one?

(Image Credit: Zoom/ Wikimedia Commons)

Here's a ransomware story with a difference. Some of your files can be recovered without paying, while others get wiped out forever.

Attorney General William Barr has a completely wrong-headed take on encryption, and he's not the only one. Adding backdoors to secure services is a terrible idea, despite its popularity with law enforcement.

I'm sending encrypted HDL to a customer who will use Cadence IES for simulation and was wondering how I should go about the encryption.

Does IES support the IEEE's P1735 and if so, where can I find Cadence's public key for performing the encryption?

Or is there an alternative solution that I can use for encryption?