disaster recovery HKBNES to distribute Information2 Software disaster recovery services in Hong Kong By www.telecompaper.com Published On :: Wed, 13 Nov 2024 10:50:00 +0100 (Telecompaper) HKBN Enterprise Solutions (HKBNES) has signed a partnership agreement with disaster recovery vendor Information2 Software. HKBNES becomes Information2 Software's general distributor in Hong Kong... Full Article
disaster recovery Leveraging Federal Nutrition Resources for Disaster Recovery By ifp.nyu.edu Published On :: Mon, 04 Nov 2024 23:39:57 +0000 Disaster SNAP (D-SNAP) and other federal nutrition programs play a critical role in mitigating spikes in food insecurity during such challenging times. This is due to their ability to expedite and strengthen the response to disasters of various types. The post Leveraging Federal Nutrition Resources for Disaster Recovery was curated by information for practice. Full Article Grey Literature
disaster recovery 4 tips for creating a disaster recovery plan for a small business By www.mnn.com Published On :: Thu, 13 Mar 2014 15:18:35 +0000 Like any other aspect of running a business, the key to survival is preparation. Full Article Protection & Safety
disaster recovery Hosted VMware environments and recovery solutions in IBM PureApplication Platform, Part 3: Building a disaster recovery solution with PureApplication Software By www.ibm.com Published On :: 09 Sep 2018 04:00:00 +0000 With the release of IBM PureApplication Platform and PureApplication System firmware V2.2.3, you can create automatically configured hosted VMware environments for more flexibility on how you run and manage your workloads. This series of articles provides a step-by-step guide for users of the PureApplication Platform W1500, W2500, W3500, and W3550 models to work with these advanced capabilities. In Part 3, you set up disaster recovery and learn how to perform three different disaster recovery procedures. Full Article Middleware cloud
disaster recovery No-Failure Design and Disaster Recovery: Lessons from Fukushima By decisions-and-info-gaps.blogspot.com Published On :: Tue, 09 Aug 2011 10:21:00 +0000 One of the striking aspects of the early stages of the nuclear accident at Fukushima-Daiichi last March was the nearly total absence of disaster recovery capability. For instance, while Japan is a super-power of robotic technology, the nuclear authorities had to import robots from France for probing the damaged nuclear plants. Fukushima can teach us an important lesson about technology.The failure of critical technologies can be disastrous. The crash of a civilian airliner can cause hundreds of deaths. The meltdown of a nuclear reactor can release highly toxic isotopes. Failure of flood protection systems can result in vast death and damage. Society therefore insists that critical technologies be designed, operated and maintained to extremely high levels of reliability. We benefit from technology, but we also insist that the designers and operators "do their best" to protect us from their dangers.Industries and government agencies who provide critical technologies almost invariably act in good faith for a range of reasons. Morality dictates responsible behavior, liability legislation establishes sanctions for irresponsible behavior, and economic or political self-interest makes continuous safe operation desirable.The language of performance-optimization − not only doing our best, but also achieving the best − may tend to undermine the successful management of technological danger. A probability of severe failure of one in a million per device per year is exceedingly − and very reassuringly − small. When we honestly believe that we have designed and implemented a technology to have vanishingly small probability of catastrophe, we can honestly ignore the need for disaster recovery.Or can we?Let's contrast this with an ethos that is consistent with a thorough awareness of the potential for adverse surprise. We now acknowledge that our predictions are uncertain, perhaps highly uncertain on some specific points. We attempt to achieve very demanding outcomes − for instance vanishingly small probabilities of catastrophe − but we recognize that our ability to reliably calculate such small probabilities is compromised by the deficiency of our knowledge and understanding. We robustify ourselves against those deficiencies by choosing a design which would be acceptable over a wide range of deviations from our current best understanding. (This is called "robust-satisficing".) Not only does "vanishingly small probability of failure" still entail the possibility of failure, but our predictions of that probability may err.Acknowledging the need for disaster recovery capability (DRC) is awkward and uncomfortable for designers and advocates of a technology. We would much rather believe that DRC is not needed, that we have in fact made catastrophe negligible. But let's not conflate good-faith attempts to deal with complex uncertainties, with guaranteed outcomes based on full knowledge. Our best models are in part wrong, so we robustify against the designer's bounded rationality. But robustness cannot guarantee success. The design and implementation of DRC is a necessary part of the design of any critical technology, and is consistent with the strategy of robust satisficing.One final point: moral hazard and its dilemma. The design of any critical technology entails two distinct and essential elements: failure prevention and disaster recovery. What economists call a `moral hazard' exists since the failure prevention team might rely on the disaster-recovery team, and vice versa. Each team might, at least implicitly, depend on the capabilities of the other team, and thereby relinquish some of its own responsibility. Institutional provisions are needed to manage this conflict.The alleviation of this moral hazard entails a dilemma. Considerations of failure prevention and disaster recovery must be combined in the design process. The design teams must be aware of each other, and even collaborate, because a single coherent system must emerge. But we don't want either team to relinquish any responsibility. On the one hand we want the failure prevention team to work as though there is no disaster recovery, and the disaster recovery team should presume that failures will occur. On the other hand, we want these teams to collaborate on the design.This moral hazard and its dilemma do not obviate the need for both elements of the design. Fukushima has taught us an important lesson by highlighting the special challenge of high-risk critical technologies: design so failure cannot occur, and prepare to respond to the unanticipated. Full Article
disaster recovery Microfinance can be a powerful force in disaster recovery -- by Mayumi Ozaki By blogs.adb.org Published On :: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 14:14:45 +0800 The cost of disasters far outweighs the resources available for recovery. Microfinance could be one way to fill the funding gap. Full Article
disaster recovery Race, religion, and ethnicity in disaster recovery By digital.lib.usf.edu Published On :: Sun, 26 Jan 2014 14:10:40 -0400 Full Article
