cold war

Basic Black: A Thaw in the Cold War?

April 17, 2015 It was more than just a handshake at the Summit of the Americas last week as President Barack Obama greeted Cuba’s President Raul Castro. It has been widely described as the beginnings of a thaw in US-Latin American relations. It’s been welcomed in some quarters as a mark of progress in American foreign policy while condemned by others as a capitulation to a long-standing communist enemy.

This week, Basic Black looks at the changes in US-Latin American relations and what impact this could have on Latinos living in the United States, immigration reform and economic development for Latin America. Panelists:
- Latoyia Edwards, anchor, NECN
- Peniel Joseph, Professor of History, Tufts University
- Devyn Spence Benson, Assistant Professor of History & African American Studies, Louisiana State University, current Fellow at The Hutchins Center, Harvard University
- Marcela Garcia, Contributor to the Editorial and Opinion Pages, The Boston Globe
- Julio Varela, Digital Media Director, Futuro Media Group Photo: US President Barack Obama and Cuban President Raul Castro shake hands at the Summit of the Americas in Panama City, Panama, Saturday, April 11, 2015. AP Photo/Pablo Martinez Monsivais)




cold war

Cold War bomber enhances China’s ability to strike U.S. bases




cold war

Visions of Nuclear-Powered Cars Captivated Cold War America, but the Technology Never Really Worked

From the Ford Nucleon to the Studebaker-Packard Astral, these vehicles failed to progress past the prototype stage in the 1950s and 1960s




cold war

Cold War-era H-6 bomber enhances China’s ability to strike U.S. bases

The H-6 long-range bomber was used in China’s October war games around Taiwan; it flew close to the U.S. mainland for first time in June




cold war

Meghan Markle to put an end to cold war with Royal family: ‘Needs to swallow pride'

Meghan Markle to put an end to cold war with Royal family: ‘Needs to swallow pride’

Meghan Markle has realized that in order to build a reputation in the US, she needs to rebuild relationships with the members of the Royal family.

According to Closer Magazine, the...




cold war

Meghan Markle planning silent sacrifice for Prince Harry's cold war this Christmas

Meghan Markle planning silent sacrifice for Prince Harry's cold war this Christmas

Insights into what Meghan Markle has planned for the Uk this Christmas have just been brought to light.

Information about this plan has been brought to light by an inside source that is close to...




cold war

The U.S. Strategic Miscalculation with India in the 2nd Cold War

The current Sinophobia in the 2nd Cold War between the U. S. and China has contributed to the 2nd strategic mistake that the U. S. is making by allying with India against China (without examining thoroughly its long-term consequences) -- just as the U. S. made the 1st strategic mistake by aligning with China against the U. S. S.R. in the 1st Cold War (also without examining thoroughly its long-term consequences). In global geopolitics, a friend of today can become an enemy of tomorrow. Therefore, is it too late for the U. S. to correct this 2nd strategic mistake by handling India with great care, due to the latter's hegemonic ambition as a new world power, which will then lead to the coming of what I call "Indophobia” in the next decade(s)? 1. Introduction: Historical Background In my 1999 book titled "The Future of Human Civilization” (published in 1999), I had already untimely predicted the emergence of China as the dominant global power on Earth in the following decades, as it was based on the untimely prediction made in my 1995 doctoral dissertation at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.). In my 2007 book titled "Beyond the World of Titans, and the Remaking of World Order” (published in 2007), I had already untimely predicted the emergence of China and India as the two "hyper-empires” in the top (1st) tier of global politics, with the U. S. and the EU falling to the 2nd tier (as the two "meso-empires”).




cold war

Cold War Chemical Tests Over American Cities Were Far Below Dangerous Levels

A series of secret tests conducted by the U.S. Army in the 1950s and 1960s did not expose residents of the United States and Canada to chemical levels considered harmful, according to a new report from a committee of the National Research Council.




cold war

Tradecraft: KILLING EVE Spawns a Cold War Spin-off

On the eve of Killing Eve's series finale (airing this weekend), Deadline reports that "producer Sid Gentle Films is in early stage development on [a] spin-off, though it hasn’t got a greenlight yet." The spin-off (for BBC America and AMC Networks) would focus on Fiona Shaw's character, Carolyn Martens... but not as the cool, commanding spymaster we met in the show's first season. Instead, the potential spin-off would focus on her early days with MI6. From what we know of her history on the show, that could be incredibly compelling! Presumably such a series would focus on her time on Russia Desk and in Moscow during the waning days of the Cold War, when she recruited a crucial asset. I'm not so interested in this potential series because of its Killing Eve connection (though I do love that show's wit and tone and performances, and it would be nice to see them continue), but because of its setting. We don't see many Cold War era series, and when they do come along, I'll always be watching! It would be particularly cool to see one set in the late 80s with that focus. The Americans of course reveled in its 80s setting, but that was focused on Soviet agents undercover in America. A show about a British agent operating in Moscow at that time would be very different! 




cold war

The Cold War and Poetry: The Case of Czeslaw Milosz

Lecture Series | Overcoming Bipolarity: New Approaches to the Cold War




cold war

Egypt’s purchase of a Chinese fighter jet is a reminder Cold War tactics are back in the Middle East

Egypt’s purchase of a Chinese fighter jet is a reminder Cold War tactics are back in the Middle East Expert comment LJefferson

The Egyptian army is a formidable force lacking air superiority capabilities to match its size and ambitions. China understood this predicament and offered to help.

The reported agreement for Egypt to buy the Chinese Chengdu J-10C 4.5 generation fighter jets is part of a broader shift from focusing on modernizing ground troops to bolstering the air force. The details of the deal have not yet been published. Nonetheless, it reveals Egypt has two motivations beyond backing its arsenal with another fighter jet.

Elusive Western technology

The most important motivation for Egypt’s military diversification strategy (and the biggest source of frustration) is the perceived Western technology starvation.
   
A quick examination of the map around Egypt shows that the most significant perceived threats to its national security are located in remote places where Egypt doesn’t traditionally enjoy ground troops’ presence. These include Ethiopia, the Southern Red Sea, Libya and the vulnerability a potential Israel–Iran regional war would create. From the generals’ perspective in Cairo, this list is more than a catalyst to build a modern and capable long arm.

The race started in 2015 after the Obama administration paused an arms transfer to Cairo in 2013 that included four F-16C Block 52 fighter jets amid toppling the Muslim Brotherhood government. The psychological effect of Washington’s decision in Cairo increased Egypt’s risk tolerance towards challenging its military ties with the US by diversifying away from it. 

Egypt ordered the MiG-29M2 fighter jets from Russia and the French Rafales this same year. In 2018, Egypt negotiated a $2 billion deal with Russia to purchase the Su-35 fighter jet, seen in Washington as crossing a red line and triggering a warning to Egypt that it would impose sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). This caused the deal to collapse.

The main factor of the US military sales in the Middle East is the upholding of the Israel Military Qualitative Edge principle over its neighbours. This principle requires the US to ensure Israel is superior over other regional countries’ strategic military capabilities, especially in air power.

For Egypt, this has long been a strategic vulnerability. The US turned down multiple requests by Egypt to purchase the active radar long-range AIM-120 AMRAAM fire-and-forget missile that can be launched from the F-16 fighter jets, the main striking force in Egypt’s arsenal. 

Unlike the Gulf and other states (such as Jordan and Turkey), Egypt was only allowed the old AIM-7 Sparrow and the AIM-9 Sidewinders, which are shorter in range and technologically inferior. Israel also allegedly pressured the Trump administration to refuse Egypt’s request to buy the F-35 stealth fight jets in 2019.

The US and Israel reportedly pressured France to not sell to Egypt the MBDA’s Meteor 100 km air-to-air missile with the Rafale fighters. Instead, Egypt received the 80 km MICA missile as part of the deal to buy 30 Rafales in 2021. Acquiring this advanced radar system and long-range missiles was likely behind Cairo’s deal to purchase 24 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft from Italy in 2022. However, it is unlikely that they will come with the full package.

Egypt thought the Chinese J-10C Vigorous Dragon fighter may solve this predicament. The Chinese fighter has a beyond-visual range AESA radar and can carry the PL-15 200 km air-to-air missile, similar to the Rafale’s Meteor. The J-10C’s price tag is attractive for Egypt at $40-50 million, much less than the F-16 and Rafales.

The Chinese fighters are also a hedge against Russia’s sanctioned fighter jets, traditionally a second choice for the Egyptian air force.

Risky manoeuvres 

This doesn’t mean Egypt is on a path to abandon its weapons purchases from its Western partners. Egyptian weapons procurement policy is not only motivated by technical considerations. It also serves political objectives. Egypt still receives $1.3 billion every year in military and economic aid from Washington. Regime security and backing are two objectives that will likely encourage Cairo to rely on Western weapons systems for decades. 

However, from Egypt’s military perspective, the time may have come to resort to the Cold War tactics of diversification and counterbalancing. Being forced to accept old technology during the significant modernization of its air force creates a technical and operational necessity to seek this technology elsewhere. 

Egyptian weapons procurement policy is not only motivated by technical considerations. It also serves political objectives.

The regional uncertainty since Hamas’s 7 October attack on Israel and the war that followed in Gaza, southern Lebanon, and Israel’s intermittent confrontations with Iran makes make it imperative for the Egyptian strategic planners to take risky manoeuvres while targeting specific capabilities they seem desperate to acquire. 

The threat to deploy CAATSA sanctions against Egypt in 2019 makes the J-10C deal with China an interesting case study for all Middle Eastern allies of the West. It shows an uptick in Egypt’s risk tolerance to overcome its technological dilemma. It allows other countries considering the Chinese fighters (mainly Saudi Arabia) to gauge Washington’s reaction and design their future approach accordingly.   

Another motivation is to pressure the US, UK, and their allies to reconsider their implicit embargo on certain advanced technology by showing that Cairo now has alternatives. This tactic seems to work. General Frank McKenzie, the former head of US Central Command, said during a congressional hearing in 2022 that Washington will finally provide Egypt with the F-15 heavy-weight air superiority fighter, a longstanding demand by Cairo.

Building favours

The J-10C fighter jet ticks all the boxes: It satisfies Cairo’s diversity strategy and technological needs. It is under the sanctions threshold since it is less technologically savvy than the most controversial J-20 5th generation fighters, the equivalent to Russia’s SU-35. And it takes Egypt’s military partnership with China to a new level.

A heavyweight military power like Egypt relying on Chinese fighters would almost certainly boost China’s share in the regional weapons market.

The rumour that the Chinese fighters are bought to replace the ageing versions of Egypt’s significant F-16 fleet is a source of pride for Beijing since its military technology started to be seen as a competitor to Western technology. A heavyweight military power like Egypt relying on Chinese fighters would almost certainly boost China’s share in the regional weapons market, just like Cairo’s purchase of the Rafale boosted its popularity globally.




cold war

Scientists Use Cold War-Era Spy Plane to Find Unexpected Gamma Rays in Thunderstorms

The new findings bring storm researchers one step closer to solving the mystery of how lightning forms




cold war

In This Country, Cold War Relics Are Coming Back To Life. Here's How

Albania is seeing a rebirth of its communist-era military structures. No, not to prepare for a war. The country has turned old bunkers and barracks into tourist destinations.




cold war

Cold war spy satellites and AI detect ancient underground aqueducts

Archaeologists are using AI and US spy satellite imagery from the cold war to find ancient underground aqueducts that helped humans survive in the desert




cold war

The Odd Arctic Military Projects Spawned by the Cold War

Many offbeat research efforts were doomed to fail, from atomic subways to a city under the ice.




cold war

'China Marching with India': India's Cold War Advocacy for the People's Republic of China at the United Nations, 1949–1971

Recent scholarship on Sino-Indian relations in the 1950s has emphasized cooperation, revising previous narratives of an inexorable march towards the 1962 border war. This article reassesses that cooperation by focusing on India's role as an intermediary between the unrecognized government in Beijing and the United Nations (UN). Chinese sources reveal that Sino-Indian cooperation over UN affairs was complicated by competing conceptions of how the decolonizing world should fit into the international system and who should be at the helm. Despite such disagreements, the Cold War UN provided a setting where divergent post-colonial visions could be sublimated into meaningful international cooperation.




cold war

"The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan, the Cold War, and the World on the Brink"

A conversation hosted by the Woodrow Wilson Center featuring Ambassador Paula J. Dobriansky and Dr. Melvyn Leffler for a discussion on the role that U.S. President Ronald Reagan played in the peaceful end of the Cold War. 




cold war

We All Fall Down: The Dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the End of the Cold War in Eastern Europe

The non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact contributed to the end of the Cold War along with the superpowers. These Eastern European states recognized that their relationship with the Soviet Union would impede their success in the post–Cold War world, so they ended the Pact.




cold war

The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of a post-Cold War European security [Electronic book] / ed. by Martin A Smith, Paul Latawski.

Manchester : Manchester University Press, [2018]




cold war

Celluloid Democracy : Cinema and Politics in Cold War South Korea [Electronic book] / Hieyoon Kim.

Berkeley, CA : University of California Press, [2023]




cold war

Former CIA Chief of Disguise Breaks Down Cold War Spy Gadgets

During the Cold War, surveillance in Moscow was the most difficult kind of surveillance that the US had encountered around the globe. Moscow had its own set of rules since it was such a difficult place to work. Former CIA Chief of Disguise Jonna Mendez talks about some of the tactics, gadgets and disguises CIA operatives used in the field during the Cold War. Check out Jonna Mendez’s most recent book The Moscow Rules or find more information about her on her website on https://www.themasterofdisguise.com/ Moscow Rules: https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1541762185/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_hsch_vapi_tpbk_p1_i0 Archival images courtesy of the International Spy Museum (SPY) in Washington, DC, a Guinness World Record recognized nonprofit with the largest collection of spy artifacts in the world. At the Museum, you can see firsthand some of these spy gadgets: www.spymuseum.org/ Additional Archival Images Courtesy of: Clint Emerson’s Five Second Mask, also courtesy of International Spy Museum Image of Trigon courtesy of the CIA who does not endorse the contents of this production Crypto Museum: www.cryptomuseum.com Getty Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division




cold war

Former CIA Chief of Disguise Breaks Down Cold War Spy Photography

During the Cold War, surveillance in Moscow was the most difficult kind of surveillance that the US had encountered around the globe. There are lots of was to collect intelligence, and cameras were former CIA Chief of Disguise Jonna Mendez's favorite. Jonna talks about all the different photography methods US spies used during the Cold War, from carrier pigeons holding tiny cameras to a variety of different spy cameras that could be hidden in pens, ties and pocketbooks. Check out Jonna Mendez’s most recent book The Moscow Rules or find more information about her on her website on https://www.themasterofdisguise.com/ Moscow Rules: https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1541762185/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_hsch_vapi_tpbk_p1_i0 Archival images courtesy of the International Spy Museum (SPY) in Washington, DC, a Guinness World Record recognized nonprofit with the largest collection of spy artifacts in the world. At the Museum, you can see firsthand some of these spy gadgets: http://www.spymuseum.org/ Additional Archival Images Courtesy of: Images of Tolkachev are courtesy of a family friend, from The Billion Dollar Spy. You can find out more about the book here: https://www.davidehoffman.com/ Image of Matchbox Camera courtesy of the CIA, who does not endorse the contents of this production Interspectral: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCoG3unoSTVcR64o8vGb1SEQ Getty Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division




cold war

Chess battles: How India-China face-off in 2024 is like the US-USSR Cold War face-off





cold war

Cold War Chemical Tests Over American Cities Were Far Below Dangerous Levels

A series of secret tests conducted by the U.S. Army in the 1950s and 1960s did not expose residents of the United States and Canada to chemical levels considered harmful, according to a new report from a committee of the National Research Council.




cold war

Melting ice could expose Cold War toxic waste

Climate change is revealing the waste buried long ago at Camp Century in northwest Greenland.



  • Climate & Weather

cold war

The U.S. and China are sliding into a Cold War nobody needs


The high-temperature argument over blame for the coronavirus is rapidly pushing the United States and China into a potentially dangerous new Cold War. President Donald Trump and other administration officials claim that the virus, which many scientists say originally came from a bat, emerged from a Chinese government laboratory in Wuhan. They have offered no […]




cold war

The Cold War and 1989

In January 1989, East German leader Erich Honecker declared that the Berlin Wall would still be standing in 50 or even 100 years. By November that same year the Wall was down and the Cold War was over. 1989 was a year that no-one saw coming. Head back to 1989 and learn about the luck that led to the collapse of the Soviet empire.




cold war

Avoiding a Virus-Induced Cold War with China

17 April 2020

Robin Niblett

Director and Chief Executive, Chatham House
Managing relations with China once the COVID-19 crisis abates will be one of the biggest challenges facing political leaders in the United States and Europe – two of the areas worst-hit by the virus that originated in China.

2020-04-17-Trump-Xi

Chinese president Xi Jinping and US president Donald Trump in Beijing, China. Photo by Thomas Peter-Pool/Getty Images.

So far, there has been a noticeable worsening of relations that had already soured in recent years – the latest step being President Donald Trump’s suspension of US funding for the World Health Organization (WHO) in response to accusations of Chinese interference in its operations.

Should the world now simply prepare for a period of intense and extended hostility? As director of a policy institute founded 100 years ago in the shadow of the First World War, I believe we must do all in our power to avoid a return of the global strategic rivalries that blighted the 20th century.

Deepening suspicions

Of course, the outcome does not lie only in the hands of the US and Europe. In the 1930s, as much as they wanted to avoid another great war, British and French leaders were forced to respond to Germany’s aggression in central Europe. In the late 1940s, America’s instinct to disentangle itself from war-ravaged Europe was quickly tempered by the realization that the Soviet Union would impose or infiltrate Communist control as far into Europe as possible.

Today, those who warned that China - a one-party, surveillance state with a power-centralising leader - could never be treated as a global stakeholder feel vindicated. They see in COVID-19 an opportunity to harden policies towards China, starting by blocking all Chinese investment into 5G infrastructure and breaking international dependence on Chinese supply chains.

They can point to the fact that Chinese Communist Party officials in Wuhan initially prioritised sustaining economic growth and supressed reports about COVID-19’s capacity for human-to-human transmission, epitomised by their treatment of Dr Li Wenliang. They can highlight how Beijing’s obsession with denying Taiwan a voice in the WHO prevented Taiwanese input into the early analysis of the crisis. They can highlight the ways in which Beijing has instrumentalised its medical support for coronavirus-afflicted countries for diplomatic gain.

For their part, those in China who believed the US and Europe would never allow China’s return as a regional and world power see this criticism as further evidence. They can point to comments about this being the ‘Chinese virus’, a leaked biological weapon or China’s ‘Chernobyl moment’. ‘Wolf warrior’ Chinese diplomats have sought to outdo each other by challenging narratives about COVID-19, while propagating disinformation about the origins of the virus.

There are major risks if this blame game escalates, as it could in the lead-up to a fraught US presidential election. First, consciously uncoupling the US economically from China will make the post-coronavirus recovery that much harder. China already accounts for nearly 20% of world GDP but, unlike after the global financial crisis in 2008, it is fast becoming the world’s leading consumer market. Its financial stimulus measures need to be closely coordinated with the G7 and through the G20.

Second, Chinese scientists were the first to uncover the genetic code of the virus and shared it with the WHO as early as January 12, enabling the roll-out of effective testing around the world. They are now involved in the global search for a vaccine alongside American and European counterparts. While the Chinese government will remain a legitimate target for criticism, Chinese citizens and companies will contribute to many of the most important technical breakthroughs this century.

Third, if COVID-19 creates a long-term schism between China and the US, with Europeans caught on its edge, this could do deep damage to world order. China may become a less willing partner in lowering global greenhouse gas emissions and sharing renewable energy technologies; in helping African and other developing countries grow sustainably; and in helping to build a more resilient global health infrastructure.

Getting the balance right

But the COVID-19 crisis can also be the hinge point to a more coherent and self-interested transatlantic approach to China, one whose motto should be ‘beware but engage’. There should indeed be limits on state-backed Chinese investment in strategic US and European economic sectors, just as China limits Western access to its market. But the goal should be to lower barriers to trade and investment over time on a mutually beneficial and transparent basis, not to recreate an economic Cold War.

Chinese human rights violations, at home and abroad, should be called out. The dissemination of Chinese systems of citizen surveillance, which will be more popular in a post-coronavirus world, should be monitored and contested with US and European alternatives. And the extent of Chinese exports’ access to international markets should be conditional on China improving its phytosanitary standards - which protect humans, animals, and plants from diseases, pests, or contaminants - and strictly regulating unhygienic wet markets.

But to go further and try to make disengagement the dominant transatlantic policy as COVID-19 subsides will not only divide Europe and America. It will also contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy; in which a resentful China grows apart from the US and Europe during a period where they must work together.

Given that it will likely be the world’s largest economy in 2030, how the US and Europe manage their relations with China after this crisis is a question at least as seminal as the one they faced after 1945 with the Soviet Union. In the ensuing years, the Soviet Union became a military superpower and competitor, but not an economic one. Containment was a viable, correct and, ultimately, successful strategy. The same options are not available this time. There will be no winners from a new Cold War with China.




cold war

Avoiding a Virus-Induced Cold War with China

17 April 2020

Robin Niblett

Director and Chief Executive, Chatham House
Managing relations with China once the COVID-19 crisis abates will be one of the biggest challenges facing political leaders in the United States and Europe – two of the areas worst-hit by the virus that originated in China.

2020-04-17-Trump-Xi

Chinese president Xi Jinping and US president Donald Trump in Beijing, China. Photo by Thomas Peter-Pool/Getty Images.

So far, there has been a noticeable worsening of relations that had already soured in recent years – the latest step being President Donald Trump’s suspension of US funding for the World Health Organization (WHO) in response to accusations of Chinese interference in its operations.

Should the world now simply prepare for a period of intense and extended hostility? As director of a policy institute founded 100 years ago in the shadow of the First World War, I believe we must do all in our power to avoid a return of the global strategic rivalries that blighted the 20th century.

Deepening suspicions

Of course, the outcome does not lie only in the hands of the US and Europe. In the 1930s, as much as they wanted to avoid another great war, British and French leaders were forced to respond to Germany’s aggression in central Europe. In the late 1940s, America’s instinct to disentangle itself from war-ravaged Europe was quickly tempered by the realization that the Soviet Union would impose or infiltrate Communist control as far into Europe as possible.

Today, those who warned that China - a one-party, surveillance state with a power-centralising leader - could never be treated as a global stakeholder feel vindicated. They see in COVID-19 an opportunity to harden policies towards China, starting by blocking all Chinese investment into 5G infrastructure and breaking international dependence on Chinese supply chains.

They can point to the fact that Chinese Communist Party officials in Wuhan initially prioritised sustaining economic growth and supressed reports about COVID-19’s capacity for human-to-human transmission, epitomised by their treatment of Dr Li Wenliang. They can highlight how Beijing’s obsession with denying Taiwan a voice in the WHO prevented Taiwanese input into the early analysis of the crisis. They can highlight the ways in which Beijing has instrumentalised its medical support for coronavirus-afflicted countries for diplomatic gain.

For their part, those in China who believed the US and Europe would never allow China’s return as a regional and world power see this criticism as further evidence. They can point to comments about this being the ‘Chinese virus’, a leaked biological weapon or China’s ‘Chernobyl moment’. ‘Wolf warrior’ Chinese diplomats have sought to outdo each other by challenging narratives about COVID-19, while propagating disinformation about the origins of the virus.

There are major risks if this blame game escalates, as it could in the lead-up to a fraught US presidential election. First, consciously uncoupling the US economically from China will make the post-coronavirus recovery that much harder. China already accounts for nearly 20% of world GDP but, unlike after the global financial crisis in 2008, it is fast becoming the world’s leading consumer market. Its financial stimulus measures need to be closely coordinated with the G7 and through the G20.

Second, Chinese scientists were the first to uncover the genetic code of the virus and shared it with the WHO as early as January 12, enabling the roll-out of effective testing around the world. They are now involved in the global search for a vaccine alongside American and European counterparts. While the Chinese government will remain a legitimate target for criticism, Chinese citizens and companies will contribute to many of the most important technical breakthroughs this century.

Third, if COVID-19 creates a long-term schism between China and the US, with Europeans caught on its edge, this could do deep damage to world order. China may become a less willing partner in lowering global greenhouse gas emissions and sharing renewable energy technologies; in helping African and other developing countries grow sustainably; and in helping to build a more resilient global health infrastructure.

Getting the balance right

But the COVID-19 crisis can also be the hinge point to a more coherent and self-interested transatlantic approach to China, one whose motto should be ‘beware but engage’. There should indeed be limits on state-backed Chinese investment in strategic US and European economic sectors, just as China limits Western access to its market. But the goal should be to lower barriers to trade and investment over time on a mutually beneficial and transparent basis, not to recreate an economic Cold War.

Chinese human rights violations, at home and abroad, should be called out. The dissemination of Chinese systems of citizen surveillance, which will be more popular in a post-coronavirus world, should be monitored and contested with US and European alternatives. And the extent of Chinese exports’ access to international markets should be conditional on China improving its phytosanitary standards - which protect humans, animals, and plants from diseases, pests, or contaminants - and strictly regulating unhygienic wet markets.

But to go further and try to make disengagement the dominant transatlantic policy as COVID-19 subsides will not only divide Europe and America. It will also contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy; in which a resentful China grows apart from the US and Europe during a period where they must work together.

Given that it will likely be the world’s largest economy in 2030, how the US and Europe manage their relations with China after this crisis is a question at least as seminal as the one they faced after 1945 with the Soviet Union. In the ensuing years, the Soviet Union became a military superpower and competitor, but not an economic one. Containment was a viable, correct and, ultimately, successful strategy. The same options are not available this time. There will be no winners from a new Cold War with China.




cold war

Avoiding a Virus-Induced Cold War with China

17 April 2020

Robin Niblett

Director and Chief Executive, Chatham House
Managing relations with China once the COVID-19 crisis abates will be one of the biggest challenges facing political leaders in the United States and Europe – two of the areas worst-hit by the virus that originated in China.

2020-04-17-Trump-Xi

Chinese president Xi Jinping and US president Donald Trump in Beijing, China. Photo by Thomas Peter-Pool/Getty Images.

So far, there has been a noticeable worsening of relations that had already soured in recent years – the latest step being President Donald Trump’s suspension of US funding for the World Health Organization (WHO) in response to accusations of Chinese interference in its operations.

Should the world now simply prepare for a period of intense and extended hostility? As director of a policy institute founded 100 years ago in the shadow of the First World War, I believe we must do all in our power to avoid a return of the global strategic rivalries that blighted the 20th century.

Deepening suspicions

Of course, the outcome does not lie only in the hands of the US and Europe. In the 1930s, as much as they wanted to avoid another great war, British and French leaders were forced to respond to Germany’s aggression in central Europe. In the late 1940s, America’s instinct to disentangle itself from war-ravaged Europe was quickly tempered by the realization that the Soviet Union would impose or infiltrate Communist control as far into Europe as possible.

Today, those who warned that China - a one-party, surveillance state with a power-centralising leader - could never be treated as a global stakeholder feel vindicated. They see in COVID-19 an opportunity to harden policies towards China, starting by blocking all Chinese investment into 5G infrastructure and breaking international dependence on Chinese supply chains.

They can point to the fact that Chinese Communist Party officials in Wuhan initially prioritised sustaining economic growth and supressed reports about COVID-19’s capacity for human-to-human transmission, epitomised by their treatment of Dr Li Wenliang. They can highlight how Beijing’s obsession with denying Taiwan a voice in the WHO prevented Taiwanese input into the early analysis of the crisis. They can highlight the ways in which Beijing has instrumentalised its medical support for coronavirus-afflicted countries for diplomatic gain.

For their part, those in China who believed the US and Europe would never allow China’s return as a regional and world power see this criticism as further evidence. They can point to comments about this being the ‘Chinese virus’, a leaked biological weapon or China’s ‘Chernobyl moment’. ‘Wolf warrior’ Chinese diplomats have sought to outdo each other by challenging narratives about COVID-19, while propagating disinformation about the origins of the virus.

There are major risks if this blame game escalates, as it could in the lead-up to a fraught US presidential election. First, consciously uncoupling the US economically from China will make the post-coronavirus recovery that much harder. China already accounts for nearly 20% of world GDP but, unlike after the global financial crisis in 2008, it is fast becoming the world’s leading consumer market. Its financial stimulus measures need to be closely coordinated with the G7 and through the G20.

Second, Chinese scientists were the first to uncover the genetic code of the virus and shared it with the WHO as early as January 12, enabling the roll-out of effective testing around the world. They are now involved in the global search for a vaccine alongside American and European counterparts. While the Chinese government will remain a legitimate target for criticism, Chinese citizens and companies will contribute to many of the most important technical breakthroughs this century.

Third, if COVID-19 creates a long-term schism between China and the US, with Europeans caught on its edge, this could do deep damage to world order. China may become a less willing partner in lowering global greenhouse gas emissions and sharing renewable energy technologies; in helping African and other developing countries grow sustainably; and in helping to build a more resilient global health infrastructure.

Getting the balance right

But the COVID-19 crisis can also be the hinge point to a more coherent and self-interested transatlantic approach to China, one whose motto should be ‘beware but engage’. There should indeed be limits on state-backed Chinese investment in strategic US and European economic sectors, just as China limits Western access to its market. But the goal should be to lower barriers to trade and investment over time on a mutually beneficial and transparent basis, not to recreate an economic Cold War.

Chinese human rights violations, at home and abroad, should be called out. The dissemination of Chinese systems of citizen surveillance, which will be more popular in a post-coronavirus world, should be monitored and contested with US and European alternatives. And the extent of Chinese exports’ access to international markets should be conditional on China improving its phytosanitary standards - which protect humans, animals, and plants from diseases, pests, or contaminants - and strictly regulating unhygienic wet markets.

But to go further and try to make disengagement the dominant transatlantic policy as COVID-19 subsides will not only divide Europe and America. It will also contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy; in which a resentful China grows apart from the US and Europe during a period where they must work together.

Given that it will likely be the world’s largest economy in 2030, how the US and Europe manage their relations with China after this crisis is a question at least as seminal as the one they faced after 1945 with the Soviet Union. In the ensuing years, the Soviet Union became a military superpower and competitor, but not an economic one. Containment was a viable, correct and, ultimately, successful strategy. The same options are not available this time. There will be no winners from a new Cold War with China.




cold war

Avoiding a Virus-Induced Cold War with China

17 April 2020

Robin Niblett

Director and Chief Executive, Chatham House
Managing relations with China once the COVID-19 crisis abates will be one of the biggest challenges facing political leaders in the United States and Europe – two of the areas worst-hit by the virus that originated in China.

2020-04-17-Trump-Xi

Chinese president Xi Jinping and US president Donald Trump in Beijing, China. Photo by Thomas Peter-Pool/Getty Images.

So far, there has been a noticeable worsening of relations that had already soured in recent years – the latest step being President Donald Trump’s suspension of US funding for the World Health Organization (WHO) in response to accusations of Chinese interference in its operations.

Should the world now simply prepare for a period of intense and extended hostility? As director of a policy institute founded 100 years ago in the shadow of the First World War, I believe we must do all in our power to avoid a return of the global strategic rivalries that blighted the 20th century.

Deepening suspicions

Of course, the outcome does not lie only in the hands of the US and Europe. In the 1930s, as much as they wanted to avoid another great war, British and French leaders were forced to respond to Germany’s aggression in central Europe. In the late 1940s, America’s instinct to disentangle itself from war-ravaged Europe was quickly tempered by the realization that the Soviet Union would impose or infiltrate Communist control as far into Europe as possible.

Today, those who warned that China - a one-party, surveillance state with a power-centralising leader - could never be treated as a global stakeholder feel vindicated. They see in COVID-19 an opportunity to harden policies towards China, starting by blocking all Chinese investment into 5G infrastructure and breaking international dependence on Chinese supply chains.

They can point to the fact that Chinese Communist Party officials in Wuhan initially prioritised sustaining economic growth and supressed reports about COVID-19’s capacity for human-to-human transmission, epitomised by their treatment of Dr Li Wenliang. They can highlight how Beijing’s obsession with denying Taiwan a voice in the WHO prevented Taiwanese input into the early analysis of the crisis. They can highlight the ways in which Beijing has instrumentalised its medical support for coronavirus-afflicted countries for diplomatic gain.

For their part, those in China who believed the US and Europe would never allow China’s return as a regional and world power see this criticism as further evidence. They can point to comments about this being the ‘Chinese virus’, a leaked biological weapon or China’s ‘Chernobyl moment’. ‘Wolf warrior’ Chinese diplomats have sought to outdo each other by challenging narratives about COVID-19, while propagating disinformation about the origins of the virus.

There are major risks if this blame game escalates, as it could in the lead-up to a fraught US presidential election. First, consciously uncoupling the US economically from China will make the post-coronavirus recovery that much harder. China already accounts for nearly 20% of world GDP but, unlike after the global financial crisis in 2008, it is fast becoming the world’s leading consumer market. Its financial stimulus measures need to be closely coordinated with the G7 and through the G20.

Second, Chinese scientists were the first to uncover the genetic code of the virus and shared it with the WHO as early as January 12, enabling the roll-out of effective testing around the world. They are now involved in the global search for a vaccine alongside American and European counterparts. While the Chinese government will remain a legitimate target for criticism, Chinese citizens and companies will contribute to many of the most important technical breakthroughs this century.

Third, if COVID-19 creates a long-term schism between China and the US, with Europeans caught on its edge, this could do deep damage to world order. China may become a less willing partner in lowering global greenhouse gas emissions and sharing renewable energy technologies; in helping African and other developing countries grow sustainably; and in helping to build a more resilient global health infrastructure.

Getting the balance right

But the COVID-19 crisis can also be the hinge point to a more coherent and self-interested transatlantic approach to China, one whose motto should be ‘beware but engage’. There should indeed be limits on state-backed Chinese investment in strategic US and European economic sectors, just as China limits Western access to its market. But the goal should be to lower barriers to trade and investment over time on a mutually beneficial and transparent basis, not to recreate an economic Cold War.

Chinese human rights violations, at home and abroad, should be called out. The dissemination of Chinese systems of citizen surveillance, which will be more popular in a post-coronavirus world, should be monitored and contested with US and European alternatives. And the extent of Chinese exports’ access to international markets should be conditional on China improving its phytosanitary standards - which protect humans, animals, and plants from diseases, pests, or contaminants - and strictly regulating unhygienic wet markets.

But to go further and try to make disengagement the dominant transatlantic policy as COVID-19 subsides will not only divide Europe and America. It will also contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy; in which a resentful China grows apart from the US and Europe during a period where they must work together.

Given that it will likely be the world’s largest economy in 2030, how the US and Europe manage their relations with China after this crisis is a question at least as seminal as the one they faced after 1945 with the Soviet Union. In the ensuing years, the Soviet Union became a military superpower and competitor, but not an economic one. Containment was a viable, correct and, ultimately, successful strategy. The same options are not available this time. There will be no winners from a new Cold War with China.




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Nathaniel Moir reviews Maxwell Taylor's Cold War: From Berlin to Vietnam by Ingo Trauschweizer.




cold war

The United States Forgot Its Strategy for Winning Cold Wars

Stephen Walt writes that arguments against U.S. offshore balancing misunderstand history. The strategy that worked against the Soviet Union can work against China.




cold war

The United States Forgot Its Strategy for Winning Cold Wars

Stephen Walt writes that arguments against U.S. offshore balancing misunderstand history. The strategy that worked against the Soviet Union can work against China.




cold war

Romney's Reckless China Rhetoric Risks New Cold War

Rachel Esplin Odell argues for a wiser and more conservative strategy that resists the temptation to exaggerate the challenge posed by China.




cold war

The United States Forgot Its Strategy for Winning Cold Wars

Stephen Walt writes that arguments against U.S. offshore balancing misunderstand history. The strategy that worked against the Soviet Union can work against China.




cold war

Maxwell Taylor's Cold War: From Berlin to Vietnam

Nathaniel Moir reviews Maxwell Taylor's Cold War: From Berlin to Vietnam by Ingo Trauschweizer.




cold war

Romney's Reckless China Rhetoric Risks New Cold War

Rachel Esplin Odell argues for a wiser and more conservative strategy that resists the temptation to exaggerate the challenge posed by China.




cold war

The United States Forgot Its Strategy for Winning Cold Wars

Stephen Walt writes that arguments against U.S. offshore balancing misunderstand history. The strategy that worked against the Soviet Union can work against China.




cold war

Maxwell Taylor's Cold War: From Berlin to Vietnam

Nathaniel Moir reviews Maxwell Taylor's Cold War: From Berlin to Vietnam by Ingo Trauschweizer.




cold war

Romney's Reckless China Rhetoric Risks New Cold War

Rachel Esplin Odell argues for a wiser and more conservative strategy that resists the temptation to exaggerate the challenge posed by China.




cold war

The United States Forgot Its Strategy for Winning Cold Wars

Stephen Walt writes that arguments against U.S. offshore balancing misunderstand history. The strategy that worked against the Soviet Union can work against China.