The interconnected impacts of the Iraq war Expert comment LJefferson 22 March 2023

Relying on weak intelligence for invading Iraq has had a negative impact on US and UK credibility with several consequences that persist to this day.

20 years on from the fateful decision to invade Iraq, it is generally accepted that the US and UK governments overstated the evidence available for them to justify military action. The central claim to defend invading Iraq was that the country had continued its illicit nuclear weapons programme and had retained illegal stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons. None of these claims supported an imminent threat justification nor could any hidden caches of WMD be found by the US Iraq Survey Group after the invasion.  

In the US, President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney hinted at additional evidence which could not be shared publicly to suggest that if only people knew what the government knew, they would agree that Iraq posed a significant threat to the West and needed to be disarmed.

In the UK, the Blair government acted similarly, focusing on a narrow interpretation of the evidence provided by the intelligence services and ignoring many of the dire warnings offered by academics and other experts. The Chilcot Inquiry found that the Blair government greatly exaggerated the threat Iraq posed to the UK, and that government arguments were based on the prime minister’s personal beliefs, as well as his promise to President Bush to support the US invasion. 

Relying on inadequate information and a biased analysis for invading Iraq has had a negative impact on US and UK credibility in the international security policy environment and domestically with ramifications that persist to this day.  

Impacts on soft power and trust

The invasion had an impact on US and UK soft power due to negative perceptions of the decision to go to war and the competence of the UK and US: public opinion polling by the Pew Center showed that perceptions of the US declined significantly as a result of the invasion of Iraq, especially in the Middle East and Central Asia.

This is undoubtedly a challenge for the US, but arguably an even bigger challenge for the UK, which due to its size and power relies much more on diplomacy and coalition-building in order to achieve its goals within various international treaty frameworks.   

Over nearly two decades, the US and the UK no longer seemed to enjoy the same foundation of trust, even with close allies, as they did previously. This changed in February 2022.

Towards the end of 2021, both the US and the UK were sounding the alarm about an impending Russian invasion of Ukraine based on information and analysis from their intelligence services. Despite the amassing of Russian troops, tanks and artillery on the border clearly visible from the air and by satellite imagery, several allies remained unconvinced until the invasion happened.  

This was in part due to their own assessments which indicated that Russia would stop short of an invasion, and in part because allies were unwilling to take US and UK statements on faith, without being able to assess the information themselves.

US officials found this frustrating as it meant that NATO and the EU were slower off the mark with support for Ukraine than they might otherwise have been. However, the accuracy of the US/UK intelligence on Russia’s invasion, coupled with their sharing it openly, may well have restored faith in their capabilities and analysis.  

A more open approach to intelligence  

Over the last few years, there seems to have been a change in accepted practice regarding sharing and using intelligence. The UK Ministry of Defence has taken a much more open approach to intelligence in the war in Ukraine, sharing the most recent defence information publicly in order to counter Russian disinformation.  

This is a positive step to ensure that intelligence can be discussed and assessed critically. Being more open about secret intelligence may also be linked to the increasing capabilities of open-source intelligence (OSINT). Non-governmental and international organizations and the media all now have access to data from, for example, imaging satellites and can independently verify information coming from governments. 

Perceived double standards 

A reduction of trust in US and UK intelligence was not the only impact of the invasion of Iraq. Russia and China have repeatedly called out the US and UK for acting without a second UN Security Council mandate. Putin uses the decision to invade Iraq, as well as the NATO humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, to justify Russia’s actions in Crimea. He invokes parallel language to spread disinformation about a ‘responsibility to protect life’ of the (‘ethnically Russian’) Crimean population. Russia has also repeatedly used the WMD trope to create false narratives around Ukrainian biosecurity laboratories to justify Russian military actions against Ukraine.  

Deciding to invade Iraq under what turned out to be a false pretext has weakened the application of the international rule of law and has led to a perceived double standard whereby powerful states can use UN processes in their favour, or completely disregard them if they do not deliver their goals.

As the Chilcot Inquiry found, there was very little preparation for the post-invasion period either in the US or the UK. Confirmation bias led not only to trusting shaky intelligence but also to believing in a best-case scenario and a ‘relatively benign security environment’ once the invasion had prevailed. Mismanaging the country’s occupation afterwards also led to the perception that the UK and US are less competent than projected. 

Problems for the international order  

The Iraq War has left many smaller and medium-sized states outside Europe and North America with the impression that powerful states are not committed to an equitable international system and instead will bend the rules to suit them while nonetheless holding other states to account. This dynamic poses a serious problem for the international system. 

It opens the door to ‘whataboutism’ in Russia’s false justifications for invading Ukraine and undermines faith in international law, destabilizing the international order in the longer term. Beyond the immediate challenges of dealing with the war in Ukraine, reforming and strengthening the international order to make it more equitable will be one of the most significant challenges the US and UK will face over the next decade. 

A trust deficit  

Domestically, for already disappointed citizens, the deceit over intelligence it is yet another piece of evidence which suggests that their government is not trustworthy and may not have their best interests at heart. This has profound implications for US and UK democracies, making it harder for governments to counter citizens’ susceptibilities to disinformation campaigns. 

Ethics of dealing with authoritarians 28 March 2023 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 20 March 2023 Chatham House

How can democracies simultaneously defend human rights and promote open societies while still engaging with leaders from non-democratic states as strategic allies?

In 2022, the Biden administration called upon the world’s democracies to unite against a rising tide of autocracy. Through its messaging, conferences, and op-eds, the US and its allies presented the public with a binary choice: democracy or autocracy.

But in today’s world, and in the practice of international relations, the choice is rarely this simple.  

Joel Rosenthal, president of Carnegie Council, joins Chatham House to discuss how democracies and multilateral institutions can leverage ethics as a tool to assess concerns and trade-offs when engaging with illiberal actors.

Can democracies afford to be adversarial with certain countries or overly selective in cooperation when facing global-scale challenges such as climate change and the emergence of AI?

How can democracies simultaneously defend human rights and promote open societies while still engaging with leaders from non-democratic states as strategic allies?

SVB collapse shows interest rate financial stability threat Expert comment LJefferson 15 March 2023

Governments must resist pressure to relax post-financial crisis regulation, while central banks should moderate their attack on inflation if financial stability is at risk.

The collapse of California’s Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) on 10 March has triggered a wave of volatility in global bank equity prices, raised questions about whether US bank regulation and its tech industry funding model are fit for purpose, and forced a rethink on the extent and pace of monetary policy tightening appropriate for the US and other advanced economies.

SVB was the US’s 16th largest bank with total assets of $212bn at the end of 2022 and a presence in eight countries around the world, including the UK. Since it was founded 40 years ago, it has maintained a strong focus on the technology sector, claiming recently that nearly half of all US venture-backed technology and life science companies banked with it. Partly as a consequence, some 95 per cent of its deposits came from corporates and hedge funds, far higher than the one-third typical of similarly sized banks.

What led to SVB’s collapse?

Ironically, SVB’s failure did not result from its core business model of serving a relatively high-risk and fast-growing sector, but rather from a dramatic failure in liquidity management. During the pandemic, SVB saw a very large inflow of corporate deposits. But rather than disincentivizing depositors or investing the funds attracted in assets of matching maturity, it chose to invest them in low credit risk, but long maturity bonds attracted by a small pick-up in return over shorter-term assets. 

When US interest rates began to rise rapidly in 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the value of SVB’s long-term bond portfolio declined sharply. It was left facing a large capital loss of some $15bn, roughly equivalent to its total shareholder funds. The management attempted to repair SVB’s balance sheet last week by crystalizing some of the loss and raising new capital.

But when this failed, the US supervisory authorities had no choice but to step in and close the institution.  This action was quickly followed by emergency action from other regulators vis-a-vis SVB subsidiaries and offices around the world.

The US entity has formally been taken over by the FDIC and a bridge bank established. All depositors have had their funds guaranteed, going beyond the normal federal deposit insurance limit of $250,000 per customer. However, bond holders and equity holders have been wiped out. The authorities have said that any loss will be covered by the industry as a whole via the FDIC.

In the UK, the Bank of England was able to sell the ring-fenced UK subsidiary of SVB to HSBC for £1 over the weekend, so that all its depositors and other liability holders have effectively had their funds guaranteed. In contrast to previous Bank of England rescues (such as Johnson Matthey Bank in 1984, the ‘small banks’ crisis in 1991 and the global financial crisis in 2008-9) no public money has been put at risk.

Four key questions

SVB’s rapid collapse raises four central questions:

First, how was it that the bank was able to take on such a risky interest rate maturity mismatch in its US operations? Maturity transformation is standard banking industry practice, but it is usually closely monitored by regulators who place limits on the extent of interest rate maturity mismatch and require liquidity buffers to offset the risk of deposit flight and forced asset sales.

SVB’s very high concentration of corporate deposits as compared to ‘sticky’ retail deposits, means that the risk of deposit flight was unusually high and so the bank should have been more, not less, cautious in its liquidity policy. SVB was classed as a regional bank in the US which means that it did not have to meet international regulatory standards under Basle III. And in 2018, the Trump administration approved legislation removing the post-financial crisis requirement that banks with assets under $250bn submit to stress testing and relaxing liquidity buffer requirements.

But it is still hard to understand why regulators allowed SVB to commit such a classic banking error. On Monday, the Federal Reserve ordered an inquiry into what it has correctly described as a regulatory failure. This should look at the role played by all the elements of the oversight system including the auditors, KPMG.

Second, does SVB’s failure reflect a much bigger underlying risk in the US banking sector, and potentially other banking systems around the world, built up over the prolonged period of ultra-low interest rates? SVB’s collapse was followed by the failure of the $110bn Signature Bank in New York, as well as sharp falls in US regional bank stock prices – by close of play on 14 March, the S&P Regional Bank Index was down 22 per cent on a week before, with some individual bank stocks seeing much sharper falls.  

To the extent that banks have been covered by international bank regulatory requirements, the risk of a much broader problem should be limited because stress testing and other regulatory tests would have looked at precisely the scenario that has happened. Even where large market losses have been incurred, capital buffers should be sufficient to cover them. But as SVB has shown, there are some large banks that are seemingly not required to follow international rules, while the latest developments at Credit Suisse indicate that market concerns may still arise when other factors are in play.

Third, how far, in the light of the potential vulnerability in banking systems, should central banks in advanced countries moderate their efforts to squeeze out inflationary pressures? While inflation already appears to have peaked in many economies and the pace of interest rate rises was expected to slow, inflation is far from vanquished, as recent data in the US has demonstrated.

Fourth, does the failure of SVB tell us something new about the financial risks facing the high technology sector?  It was remarkable that a single (and not particularly large, by international standards) financial institution could have played such a central role in the tech sector in both the US and UK. 

Why was this the case and does it reflect special features of the tech/start-up sector (e.g. the need for substantial cash deposits to cover relatively large negative cash flows in the early years of operation, or the need for highly specialized lending expertise). If so, should governments take steps to mitigate such risks, given the outsized importance of this sector in many national economic strategies? 

Europe's response to the US Inflation Reduction Act 27 March 2023 — 2:00PM TO 3:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

This event explores the implications of the US Inflation Reduction Act, how Europe can respond and what options the UK has.

While the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) has led to an outcry in the EU, member states have different concerns and preferences for how to respond. The European Commission’s proposed ‘Green Deal Industrial Plan’ includes the relaxation of state aid rules to drive funding. But will this lead to a ‘subsidies race’ between the US and EU and is a ‘green trade war’ brewing?  
 
The UK’s response to the IRA has been much more muted than the EU’s. But caught between US subsidies and EU subsidies, can the UK compete and create an independent response to the IRA? And what steps can be taken to facilitate global cooperation and to make trade work for the green transition?

Dr Martin Porter, Executive Chair at the Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership, will kick off the discussion with short remarks followed by an interactive discussion among all participants

This discussion is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum. We would like to take this opportunity to thank our founding partner and supporting partners for their generous support of the forum.  

US and Europe Strategic Security Cooperation: The View from Washington 27 March 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 March 2023 Chatham House

As the US prepares to enter the next presidential election cycle, can the transatlantic alliance stay the course, especially against a deepening Russia-China partnership?

Thank you for your interest in joining our event. Please plan to arrive at Chatham House from 08:45 GMT as the event will begin promptly at 09:00.

The Biden administration’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine and the rise of a globally assertive China, as articulated in the 2022 US national strategy, is to ‘constrain Russia and out-compete China’. It needs Europe as a partner and ally for both – yet Europe is also an object and a battleground in this era of strategic competition.

As the US prepares to enter the next presidential election cycle, can the transatlantic alliance stay the course, especially against a deepening Russia-China partnership? Can Europeans, in particular, move from deepening dependency to greater agency and self-reliance? What is the role for Germany – and for the UK?

Offsetting the North Korean strategic challenge 16 March 2023 — 9:30AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 8 March 2023 Online

This event explores what balance between pressure and dialogue is most likely to incentivise North Korea to limit its provocations.

With North Korea having steadily increased its nuclear and conventional security capabilities over the course of recent months, the speakers explore practical options for lowering tensions on the Korean peninsula.

They consider how best to re-engage diplomatically with North Korea, including the role of key actors such as the US, South Korea, Japan, and European states, in advancing a constructive resolution of current tensions.

The discussion explores finding a balance between pressure and dialogue which is most likely to incentivise North Korea to limit its provocations, assess the risks of a possible seventh nuclear test, and consider the viability of multilateral cooperation in enhancing regional security in north-east Asia.

This event forms part of the Korea Foundation Korea Fellowship, funded by the Korea Foundation and Taejae Academy.

Nuclear stability for all put at risk by Putin's speech Explainer NCapeling 22 February 2023

Explaining the risks of Russia’s decision to suspend the New START nuclear treaty with the US, and the wider implications for international relations.

Why is New START important?

Following the collapse of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty (INF), New START is the only remaining nuclear arms control treaty between the US and Russia.

This means that without it there would be no limits on numbers or the type of Russian and US deployed nuclear warheads. The limits set under New START are lower than those set under its predecessor, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

It is also important for maintaining some form of strategic arms control between Russia and the US. The treaty provides the US and Russia with mechanisms for transparency and confidence-building, for instance through regular biannual data exchanges, as well as measures for verification.

What is Russia able to do next after suspending participation?

President Vladimir Putin’s decision to suspend its participation could pave the way for Russia to increase the number of deployed warheads, delivery vehicles and launchers, potentially exceeding the limits placed on numbers under the new START.

Putin stated he would resume testing of nuclear weapons if the US resumed – Russia is a full state party to the nuclear Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiated in 1996, as is the UK and France. The US has signed, as has China, but neither state has yet ratified the treaty.

Other countries required to ratify the treaty for it to enter into force include Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan.

Although the US is modernizing its nuclear weapons forces, there is no need – or plan – for the US to test nuclear warheads, and it is the same for the UK and France.

Concerns are now rising that Russia could point to no-fissionable yield experiments – which are allowed under the treaty and which the US and other nuclear weapons possessors conduct primarily for safety purposes – and then falsely declare those to be nuclear weapons tests, thus paving the way for a narrative to justify the resumption of nuclear testing by Russia.

Conducting a nuclear weapons test would be seen clearly as a further step on the escalation scale towards nuclear use for Russia.

While inspections of nuclear weapons sites had not resumed since COVID-19, Russia’s suspension of its participation could result in the further halting of other transparency and verification measures under New START, including the regular mutual data exchanges between the US and Russia – for example on warhead numbers, locations, and technical information on weapons systems and their sites – which are conducted through the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).

What is the difference between withdrawing from New START and ‘suspending’ participation?

In his speech, Putin announced the suspension of Russian participation in New START. While this does not mean Russia has formally withdrawn from the treaty, the suspension could enable Russia to continue preventing the US from inspecting its nuclear weapons sites and halt Russia’s participation in other obligations, such as the routine reporting and data exchanges on nuclear weapons as well as meetings of the BCC.

The decision to suspend participation rather than withdraw from the treaty means Russia retains the option to return to compliance at a later point. However, it is not yet clear under what conditions Russia would opt to return to compliance with the treaty, or whether this means the US will, in turn, suspend their own obligations.

The treaty text itself does not provide for a suspension of participation by parties to the treaty. However, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does address the mechanisms for suspension of participation in a treaty. Russia is a full state party to the Vienna Convention, but the US has remained a signatory without ratification since 1970.

There is a precedent of Russia suspending its membership in arms control treaties rather than withdrawing, which is when Russia suspended its participation in the original Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in 2007.

The US does not recognize Russia’s suspension of its participation in the CFE treaty, but this does not make a material difference to Russian actions.

What does the suspension mean for the wider international treaty regime?

Russia’s suspension of the New START could signal the end of strategic arms control between the two countries. There is now virtually no regular scheduled arms control communication between the two countries bilaterally – this is a dangerous position to be in, especially in times of crisis.

The suspension of New START further erodes limited recourse for communication between the two countries, by suspending information exchange and meetings of the BCC under the treaty.

This is likely to have wider implications for progress on nuclear non-proliferation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as the wider international security treaty regime.

Will this increase the nuclear threat or the likelihood of nuclear use?

New START provides both the US and Russia with a degree of transparency surrounding nuclear weapons systems. Without an avenue for regular data exchange and notification, and mechanisms for verification through mutual nuclear weapons site inspections, the risk of misperception or misunderstanding could increase and fuel uncertainty which could increases the perception of threat between Russia and the US.

What are Putin’s reasons for suspending Russia’s participation?

Putin and various members of his government have been linking the future of New START to the war in Ukraine rhetorically for several months now, threatening that Russia may not be willing to negotiate a follow-on treaty for when New START expires in Feb 2026 because of US support for Ukraine.

By announcing Russia’s suspension of the treaty in his main address on the anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine, Putin is sending a signal about Russia’s intent for the future.

Russia’s new hypersonic glide vehicle Avangard was already counted under New START and it is likely follow-on negotiations would have focused on some of Russia’s other hypersonic capabilities or other new nuclear systems.

Without the treaty, Russia might be less inhibited in its development of new nuclear systems.

Have both the US and Russia been compliant with the treaty until now?

Both the US and Russia have remained within the central limits of the treaty since its entry into force in 2011. Following the outbreak of COVID-19, both sides agreed to suspend in-person inspections due to restrictions on travel, and attempts to recommence in-person inspections in 2022 were unsuccessful.

In August 2022, Russia prevented US on-site inspections under New START and a November 2022 meeting of the BCC was called off by Russian officials. Russia has blamed both the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the sanctions burden on Russia as reasons for not wanting to resume inspections.

Reflections on Iraq since 2003 6 March 2023 — 11:00AM TO 12:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 20 February 2023 Chatham House

This event reflects on the legacy of the invasion and occupation for Iraq, the Middle East, and the West.

When a US-led coalition invaded Iraq and overthrew the Saddam Hussein regime 20 years ago, many Iraqis hoped that a more democratic, prosperous future lay ahead.

But in reality, their lives have been marred by different forms of violent conflict, fuelled by a corrupt system through which a new class of leaders gutted state finances and enriched themselves at the expense of the people.

Today, almost two-thirds of the Iraqi population are under 25 and have no memory of life under Saddam Hussein. For many, the legacy of the war is only a failed political system that kills every day by means of corruption and neglect.

At this roundtable, part of the Iraq Initiative, Chatham House welcomes journalist and author Ghaith Abdul-Ahad to discuss his book on this subject, called A Stranger in Your Own City: Travels in the Middle East’s Long War, alongside a panel of experts who will explore the profound legacy of the war for the Iraqi people.

This marks the first in a series of Chatham House Iraq Initiative events and analysis reflecting on the legacy of the invasion and occupation for Iraq, the Middle East and the West.

Japan’s G7 leadership: Defending the liberal order amid crisis 28 February 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 20 February 2023 Online

How G7 countries should best respond to global economic and security challenges in order to defend the liberal international order.

In May 2023 Japan hosts the G7 summit in Hiroshima, where leaders of the US, UK, Canada, France, Germany and Italy come to discuss the most urgent challenges facing the world.

This year’s summit takes place against a backdrop of continued global economic and political instability from the war in Ukraine to intensifying competition between China and the West.

The speakers discuss Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s priorities at the summit and consider how G7 countries should best respond to global economic and security challenges in order to defend the liberal international order.

This event is the third of a three-part series held in partnership with Japan House London.

Watch the first event which looked at Africa-Japan relations here, and the second event, on the UK and Japan’s engagement with Southeast Asia, here.

Divided US support shows time is not on Ukraine’s side Expert comment LJefferson 17 February 2023

Growing public opinion evidence and uncertainty about the future of the war suggests that continued American support for aiding Ukraine should not be assumed.

One year into Russia’s war on Ukraine, fears that American support for Kyiv would rapidly wane have proven demonstrably wrong. Western financial and military backing has been robust thanks to allied unity and an unexpectedly mild winter. But, as financial analysts constantly remind us, past performance is no guarantee of future results.

People like to back winners. If the anticipated Russian spring offensive looks successful or the counterpart Ukrainian offensive is uninspiring, expect louder US voices calling for a negotiated settlement. The warning signs are already here.

American officials privately express growing apprehension that there will be an early resolution of the conflict. As one White House official recently observed to me, by the end of the year the war could well be about where it is today. And a plurality of Americans intuitively grasp this: 46 per cent believe neither Russia nor Ukraine currently has the advantage in the conflict.

Momentum matters  

In public opinion, perception of momentum matters. Americans’ support for the Vietnam War waned as the conflict persisted, falling from six-in-ten Americans in 1965 to four-in-ten in 1973.

Similarly, backing for the Iraq war fell from more than seven-in-ten in 2003 to barely four-in-ten in 2008. And with Afghanistan, as the war dragged on, support for US involvement fell from more than nine-in-ten in 2002 to less than five-in-ten in 2021. Notably, once the American public turned on these wars, support never returned.

Of course, Americans were fighting and dying in those wars, which is not the case in the Ukraine conflict. But initially the Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan war support was buoyed by the belief that continued US engagement was justified, otherwise American sons and daughters had died in vain. With no American lives at stake in Ukraine, only financial and military resources, there is a growing wariness of throwing good money after bad.

In the last year, the share of Americans who say the United States is doing too much for Ukraine has nearly quadrupled, from seven to 26 per cent. And the portion that believe Washington has not done enough has halved, from 49 per cent to 17 per cent.

Sentiment about Ukraine support has become increasingly partisan. In March 2022, nine per cent of Republicans and five per cent of Democrats said the US was doing too much for Ukraine. By January 2023, 40 per cent of Republicans but just 15 per cent of Democrats complained Washington was doing too much.

This erosion of Americans’ support for Ukraine does not bode well for the future. Less than half (48 per cent) of the public in November, compared to 58 per cent in July, believed Washington should support Ukraine for as long as it takes, even if it means American households have to pay higher gas and food prices as a consequence.

A similar share, 47 per cent – up from 38 per cent in July – said the United States should urge Ukraine to settle for peace as soon as possible so the costs aren’t so great for American households, even if that means Ukraine will lose some territory.

A partisan divide

The partisan divide over Ukraine is largely driven by Republican political rhetoric during and after the 2022 midterm elections. Current Republican Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy observed last October: ‘I think people are going to be sitting in a recession and they’re not going to write a blank cheque to Ukraine.’

More recently, in the wake of Ukrainian president Zelenskyy’s December speech to Congress, Florida Republican Representative Matt Gaetz, whose vote was pivotal in making McCarthy Speaker, tweeted: ‘Hemorrhaging billions in taxpayer dollars for Ukraine while our country is in crisis is the definition of America last.’

In January, newly-elected Ohio Republican Senator J.D. Vance told a Cleveland radio station that it was ‘ultimately not in our national security interest’ to send M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine, despite the fact that they will be built by his constituents in Ohio.

In addition, ten Republican members of the House of Representatives have introduced legislation asserting ‘that the United States must end its military and financial aid to Ukraine, and urges all combatants to reach a peace agreement.’ 

And this month former President Donald Trump said: ‘That war has to stop, and it has to stop now, and it’s easy to do’ and it ‘can be negotiated within 24 hours’. Why worry about continued support for the war if it’s about to be over?

The road to 2024

With the 2024 US presidential election already revving up, Americans’ appetite for continued backing for Ukraine may hinge on how voters judge the Biden administration’s handling of the conflict.

Democrats are more than twice as likely as Republicans (61 per cent versus 27 per cent) to approve of the Biden administration’s response to the Russia invasion, suggesting Ukraine will be yet another partisan talking point as the campaign heats up. Notably, men are much more likely than women to approve of Biden’s efforts, as are older Americans compared with younger Americans.

State of the Union has lessons for transatlantic unity Expert comment NCapeling 8 February 2023

Analysing key foreign policy aspects of President Joe Biden’s annual address, and what it means for the upcoming Munich Security Conference and the year ahead.

Trade and economics are key areas to watch

Daniel W. Drezner

Russia’s absence from the Munich Security Conference will allow US and European policymakers to brag about their flourishing partnership. The past year has seen repeated predictions of a fracturing transatlantic relationship – only to see repeated agreement on how to sanction Russia and which arms to ship to Ukraine.

Putin invaded because he thought the West was divided. Events have proven him wrong. When one takes a step back, however, and examines the Biden administration’s embrace of geoeconomics, Putin’s assumption becomes easier to comprehend.

The strongest throughline between the Trump and Biden administrations has been their shared mindset on weaponized interdependence. Both administrations have been wary of US interdependence with an increasingly autocratic China.

The primary difference has been that, while the Trump administration talked a good game, the Biden administration has passed laws and issued executive orders making the pivot away from trade liberalization a reality.

The passage of the CHIPS and Science Act, Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) amount to the most ambitious US attempt at industrial policy in decades, accompanied by multiple executive orders examining US supply chain resilience and imposing unprecedented export controls targeting China.

The Biden administration’s restrictions on exchange with China’s semiconductors includes the use of the ‘foreign direct product rule’, essentially a means of applying US export controls in an extraterritorial manner.

The Biden administration’s angry response to the WTO panel ruling against US steel and aluminum tariffs makes it clear the US will apply an expanded definition of national security to restrict trade. In many ways, the sanctions on Russia are a continuation of a US foreign economic policy grounded in geoeconomics.

Several of these measures have rankled European officials. The IRA massively subsidizes the North American production of environmentally-friendly cars, discriminating against European producers. And continued US hostility to the WTO leaves European officials wondering if they are the last bastion of multilateralism left in the world. In Washington and Davos last month, European policymakers made their displeasure clear.

The sanctions against Russia and export controls against China threaten to be additional sore subjects. During the strategic embargo of the Soviet Union, US officials wanted to maximize restrictions while European allies wanted more trade opportunities. Since then, Europeans have suspected that the US uses multilateral export controls regimes to advance its commercial interests, while Americans worry Europe underestimates the risks of business-as-usual with China.

The Biden administration has tried to finesse these trade tensions, and was successful at persuading the Netherlands to join the US in the export controls on China. More generally, Biden officials talk about ‘friendshoring’ and propose mechanisms for greater policy coordination, such as the US-EU Trade and Technology Council. But even in these gestures, US officials have taken greater market access off the table.

In the State of the Union address, Biden bragged about how the US ‘came together to defend a stronger and safer Europe’ as well as defending his ‘buy American’ plans and pledging to make sure the ‘supply chain for America begins in America’. At the upcoming Munich Security Conference, attention should be on how much officials talk about trade and economic issues. The more that topic comes up, the clearer it will be that both sides are subtweeting each other about the future of the transatlantic economic relationship.

Division on China now would bring a high price

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

President Biden has made unity his guiding principle and chief objective, but it is a tall order. His State of the Union address touted past bipartisan backing for investments in infrastructure, climate-friendly technologies, and semiconductor chips, along with a focus on creating jobs for working-class Americans, especially in manufacturing.

Little was said that was explicitly about China, but the Biden administration has said that China is its pacing challenge, and competing with China has shaped the ambition behind these legislative successes.

In fact, the hallmark of the address was its foreign policy minimalism. Biden hailed unity in the US defence of democracy in Ukraine in the face of Russia’s aggression. And in defending US sovereignty in the face of China’s violations, this time with a balloon.

But the presidents temporary minimalism on foreign policy will be short-lived. And unity with America’s partners and allies will continue to be at the centre of Biden’s strategy. In the past 12 months, it is the yardstick by which he has measured America’s success with respect to Ukraine.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has so far served as a lubricant for the NATO alliance, and for the US relationship with its non-NATO allies.

This has not automatically sprung from the well of Russia’s aggression. NATO’s success, and transatlantic unity, has been achieved through the sheer force of diplomatic effort, not least by the US.

Now Biden is looking for unity on China. His administration has identified China as its pacing threat. While Ukraine will continue to demand and deserve attention, the US will be looking beyond the urgent to focus on other less urgent but crucially important challenges. That means China.

China’s balloon helps ensure unity will be an easy victory at home. For several days, the balloon floated across the US, captivating the American public, seizing the headlines, and hardening US attitudes towards its only peer competitor.

Republican leaders in Congress are determined to scrutinize US policy to ensure it is tough on China, especially on technology and deterrence. This intense domestic focus on China could put Biden in a bind as he seeks to resume diplomacy. It also explains why he was careful not to inflate the China threat in his address. Secretary Blinken’s visit to Beijing has already been postponed.

As the Munich Security Conference approaches, the president’s unity agenda will turn to Europe, but the timing is difficult. China is opening and a charm offensive across Europe is likely. Europe is vulnerable as it seeks to recover its economies, continue to hold Russia back, and inhibit greater alignment between Russia and China.

The risk for the US is that domestic pressure to take a harder line on China escalates and Europe refuses to keep up. But dividing on China would come at a high price, both for Europe and the US, so to avoid this, they should take a pragmatic and sequenced approach to cooperation.

The goal for now should be policy coordination, as success is vital to momentum and managing expectations in the current environment is critical. Alignment may be possible with discrete partners on specific topics. But the perfect should not be the enemy of the good.

The US has postponed, not cancelled, Blinken’s trip while Europe is preparing to ramp up its diplomacy with China. A collective but temporary and shared transatlantic pause on diplomacy would offer low hanging fruit to give momentum to transatlantic cooperation.

It would also signal to China a unity that has a power of its own. A clear and coordinated signal, soon, that Europe and the US are moving forward with diplomacy is essential.

Munich can move the talk into action on Ukraine

James Nixey

Russia’s excommunication from this year’s Munich Security Conference is an opportunity. The principle of inclusivity may have pros and cons, but the cons have been evident since at least 2007 – its use as a platform for Russia’s leadership to launch broadsides about ‘western injustice’ and a reflexive default to increasingly inappropriate and harmful diplomatic courtesies and allowances.

Without the distraction of listening to Russian lies, there is at least now the remote possibility of a more unified West agreeing to specific action beyond the talk. As at the recent Ramstein talks, it is unlikely Munich will result in an agreement to send F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. That may prove a step too far for the West or it will need further Russian atrocities inflicted upon Ukrainians on a scale horrendous enough to prick consciences once again.

However, although President Biden’s State of the Union address has promised nothing new or innovative regarding Ukraine or Russia, it did re-establish the fundamentals of US support and so can serve as a ‘pre-read’ for a newfound resolve.

Although some European countries are a lost cause, others – Germany for example – have proved able to be guilted into action. The key lesson for everyone to understand is that Ukraine is sovereign. Or at least ‘nothing about Ukraine, without Ukraine’. The difference is moot but, from these simple precepts, all else flows.

Ukrainians will be their impassioned selves at Munich. But although publicly gracious and thankful, privately they are distraught at the West’s collective failure to affirm these principles and back them with the necessary support, not just to force a stalemate or a ‘frozen conflict’ but to engineer victory.

Most Ukrainian officials would privately argue that the danger to their country comes more from the West and forums such as the Munich Security Conference than it does from Russia, which can be defeated with the requisite tangible assistance. In Munich, beyond fine words of support – watertight from some, ambiguous from others – there lurks the ever-present danger of the politician who simply wants it all to go away by offering Putin an off-ramp.

The irony of the host city of this forum is that many times over the past year compromise ‘solutions’ have been described as having ‘a whiff of Munich’ about them – a reference of course to appeasement in 1938, which still haunts.

As it should, because the failure to ensure Ukraine’s victory with an outcome the Ukrainian government and people are content with and which convinces Russia it was a disastrous mistake to escalate, will lead to a global security collapse too catastrophic to contemplate.

Middle East security challenges must be dealt with

Dr Sanam Vakil

A trifecta of security concerns – Iran’s advancing nuclear programme, the export of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to support Russia in the war in Ukraine, and a heavy-handed response towards protests in Iran – has raised alarm bells in Washington, Europe and the UK. These intersecting challenges lay bare the lack of a broader Iran strategy and the deprioritization of Middle East security among transatlantic partners.

This downgrading of the Middle East was evident in President Biden’s State of the Union speech as, for the first time in decades, the region was not even mentioned. The upcoming Munich Security conference provides a much needed opportunity for the transatlantic community to align on next steps and multilateral policy responses.

Transatlantic partners have long relied on the prism of the JCPOA negotiations as the pathway to both separate and manage nuclear tensions from broader regional challenges associated with Iran’s export of lethal aid and sponsorship of proxy groups.

Despite repeated negotiation efforts led by the Biden administration since April 2021, the JCPOA has languished due to Tehran’s fears over another US retreat. The promise of sanctions relief has also failed to incentivise Iran’s return to the deal. Tehran’s nuclear programme has accelerated without the consistent IAEA oversight which was part of the initial deal and is now at a level where it can produce enough uranium enrichment for four nuclear weapons.

Tehran’s decision to send drones to support Moscow’s war effort has further elevated transatlantic concerns, and reports have circulated that Tehran may also export its missile capabilities and build a drone factory in Russia. In tandem, the two sanctioned states have begun to strengthen their economic arrangements.

World economy is fracturing, not deglobalizing Expert comment LJefferson 8 February 2023

Geopolitics are creating a more uncertain economic environment as the global economy splinters into competing blocs.

There is now broad agreement among economists and commentators that the world has reached peak globalization, but there is little consensus about what comes next. One view is that we are entering a period of ‘deglobalization’, in which global trade volumes decline and cross-border capital flows recede. An alternative and more likely outcome is that the global economy starts to splinter into competing blocs.

This would result in an altogether more volatile macroeconomic and market environment which would pose a formidable challenge to some countries and companies operating in vulnerable sectors. But this process needn’t involve any significant shrinkage of international flows of goods, services and capital, nor a broad reversal of other gains of globalization.

This most recent era of globalization was underpinned by a belief that economic integration would lead to China and the former Eastern Bloc countries becoming what former World Bank Chief Robert Zoellick termed ‘responsible stakeholders’ within the global system.

But China has instead emerged as a strategic rival to the US. This strategic rivalry is already forcing others to pick sides as the world splinters into two blocs: one that aligns primarily with the US and another that aligns primarily with China.

Increasingly, policy choices within these blocs will be shaped by geopolitical considerations. This process can be thought of as ‘global fracturing’. Whereas the period of globalization was driven by governments and companies working in unison, fracturing is being driven by governments alone. 

The effects of fracturing

Viewed this way, ‘deglobalization’ is by no means inevitable. There are few compelling geopolitical reasons why the US or Europe should stop importing the majority of consumer goods from China. Roll the clock forward ten years and it is likely that the West will still be buying toys and furniture from China. Instead, fracturing between the blocs will take place along fault lines that are geopolitically important.

In some aspects, the effects of fracturing will be profound. But in other areas, warnings of a seismic reordering of the global economy and financial system will prove wide of the mark.

For example, the politically-driven nature of fracturing will have a significant impact on the operating environment for US and European firms in those sectors that are most exposed to restrictions on trade, such as technology and pharmaceuticals. And all firms and investors will be operating in a different environment in which geopolitical considerations play a greater role in decisions over the allocation of resources.

But where production is moved to alternative locations, this is likely to only involve the manufacture of goods that are deemed to be strategically significant. This may include those with substantial technological and/or intellectual property components: think iPhones, pharmaceuticals, or high-end engineering products.

What’s more, in cases where production does shift location, it is likely to be to other low-cost centres that align more clearly with the US. There will be no great ‘reshoring’ of manufacturing jobs.

Within this process, trade linkages will be reordered, rather than severed. This will result in trade’s share of global GDP flatlining in the coming years, rather than shrinking outright, as is being forecast under many attempts to quantify deglobalization’s potential impact.

Finances of global fracturing

There will be a substantial financial component to global fracturing, but once again the implications are likely to be more nuanced than the current debate suggests. Cross-border financial links are likely to grow more slowly, and the overall stock of cross-border claims will plateau relative to global GDP. But whereas the first era of globalization in the 1870s was followed by a broad retreat in global capital flows during the interwar years, the same is unlikely to happen today.

Similarly, while financial fracturing will fuel growing speculation about the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency, reports of its impending demise are exaggerated. Beijing will increasingly push its partners to settle trade in renminbi but three factors suggest that this is unlikely to seriously challenge the dollar’s position.

First, while trade between China and its partners is growing, it still accounts for only six per cent of global trade. Most trade still happens between US-aligned countries, and will continue to be denominated in US dollars (see chart).

Second, China runs a large current account surplus, which will make it harder for the renminbi to supplant the dollar. High demand for reserve assets means that reserve countries tend to run current account deficits. 

Finally, the dollar still has several things working in its favour. For a currency to be widely used as an international medium of exchange, it must be readily and cheaply available around the world. In turn, that depends on foreigners being willing to hold it in large volumes: in other words, it must function as a store of value. 

Directors Briefing: Constraints on US foreign policy 20 February 2023 — 8:00AM TO 9:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 8 February 2023 Chatham House

In conversation with Dr Richard Haass.

The US is facing external threats from foreign actors including Russia, China and North Korea. Alongside geopolitical challenges, the US is also experiencing threats from within. Though the US has a long history of enshrining civic rights and democratic freedoms, the institutions of democracy are being weakened through polarization and disinformation. To combat this challenge, the idea of citizenship must be revised and expanded to allow for a functioning, and even a flourishing, democracy.

• What are the implications of a weakening democracy at home for US foreign policy?
• How can civic rights in the US be reimagined to reduce divisions within America and protect the future of democracy?

National security and transatlantic unity top Biden’s agenda Expert comment NCapeling 1 February 2023

The timing of the State of the Union address is significant as Joe Biden tries to maintain focus on Ukraine and China while navigating partisanship at home.

Although primarily a domestic affair, the president’s remarks in the annual State of the Union (SOTU) telegraph the US’s foreign policy priorities to the rest of the world. They reveal the prism through which the US understands its national security and its role in the world.

The 2023 address comes as the first anniversary of the Ukraine invasion rapidly approaches, and the US is also trying to build international support for tough economic measures towards China. Domestically, Republican control of the House of Representatives will exert new pressure on US foreign policy choices. Electoral pressures are also around the corner and Joe Biden should announce soon whether he plans to run for president in 2024.

Alliances and partnerships are a driving force for Biden. As pressure to end the war in Ukraine intensifies, maintaining transatlantic unity on Ukraine will be a key priority for the president. And as US electoral politics rise to the fore, ensuring the visibility of Europe’s role as a security provider in its own backyard will be essential.

For a US president who sees China and the Indo-Pacific as America’s most significant long-term geopolitical challenge – and the only peer competitor to the US – transatlantic unity on China will also come under pressure.

Ukraine, China, and controlling domestic division

Republican leaders who now chair key committees in the House of Representatives continue to signal support for Ukraine, and polling shows a majority of US public opinion (54 per cent) favours sending either weapons or air defence systems.

But recent polls also reveal a growing gap between Democrat and Republican supporters with a slight majority of Republicans (52 per cent) now opposing further support for Ukraine.

Biden’s ability to demonstrate that America and its European partners remain unified in their policy towards Ukraine and Russia will help him ward off partisanship at home. Congressional approval of $45 billion for Ukraine in its end of year spending budget will help the president remain above the fray of partisan politics for now. But if there is an absence of clear signs Ukraine is succeeding in its war aims, the challenge of maintaining domestic support could become more difficult.

A greater US focus on China, India, and on the Indo-Pacific in 2023 is also likely. Bipartisanship is strong on China, Republicans are more singular and hawkish in their approach to China than the US president, and the public support tough measures. At a time of war in Europe, the president will place great emphasis on the need to maintain transatlantic unity and to work with a broader coalition of partners in the Indo-Pacific.

The groundwork for focus on China has already been laid. Throughout 2022, the Biden administration worked steadily, but quietly, to set out its China policy. Just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the US released its new US-Indo Pacific Strategy stressing regional partnerships – especially the Quad and ASEAN – and it’s determination to shape essential norms for the region.

It stated boldly – albeit in a document which was largely unnoticed – that the objective is not to change China but to ‘shape the strategic environment in which it operates’, a policy which signifies a clear departure from the more ideological approach pursued by the US during Donald Trump’s final year in office. And in May, the US announced its economic strategy for the region, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.

Now the terrain for competition with China and alignment with US partners and allies is heavily focused on technology and the daylight between national security and economic strategy in US China policy is rapidly disappearing. Biden’s policy focus of ‘invest (at home), align (with allies and partners), and compete (with China)’ has overshadowed earlier talk of cooperation between the US and China.

But as China opens its doors and Europe looks to bolster its economies, the US will have to work far harder to maintain transatlantic unity. Japan and the Netherlands embracing the US adoption of export controls on semiconductor chips is a positive sign, but the US’s economic strategy towards China may present harder choices to come for Europe. If China leans into its diplomacy, the pressure on transatlantic unity will also grow.

The new US Congress will only sharpen the president’s tough stance on China. Some Republican leaders still deny climate change and have demonstrated little interest in cooperating with China on debt relief for developing countries. The prospects for addressing critical global challenges appear dim without China’s collaboration, and the UK and Europe should work with the US president and Congress to correct this.

President Biden has clearly recognized that diplomacy will be critical in the months ahead. At a time of growing tensions, the potential for misperceptions or misunderstandings to create conflict will also increase, and so a US – and also European – commitment to broadening and deepening diplomacy with China is urgent but it also needs to be patient and sustained.

A new American industrial policy?

Those listening carefully to the State of the Union and who have followed US policy will also note the unchallenged hegemony of neoliberalism is rapidly vanishing. The American state appeared to be disturbingly absent in the early months of the US pandemic response – but now it is back and, in a surprising turn of events, is being cast as a solution not a problem.

Digital politics threatens democracy and must change Expert comment NCapeling 13 January 2023

Violence in Brazil has again brought into focus the need for technology platforms to prioritize social responsibility to help prevent anti-democratic action.

Immediately following the violent storming of Brazil’s congressional building, supreme court, and presidential palace, comparisons to the infamous events of 6 January 2021 in the US came quickly and easily – and with good reason.

Both Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro built a fervent – albeit inchoate – political base of grievance which included Christian evangelicals, gun enthusiasts, and the disenfranchised. Both cynically spread doubts about the election victories of their successors without evidence. And it has been claimed both incited their supporters to overturn these results.

But this list of similarities extend beyond mere politics. The attack on democracy in Brazil was recorded, amplified, coordinated, and funded by exactly the same technologies used by the protesters in the US on 6 January.

In Brazil, the main engines of misinformation and insurrection planning were Telegram, Facebook, and WhatsApp, although some election-denying diehards also shifted to Twitter.

Tactical use of social media to mobilize and fundraise

When Bolsonaro was originally elected in 2018, these platforms were already a medium for promoting disinformation, conspiracy, and fear. But in the lead-up to the violence of 8 January, they became a means by which ‘Bolsonaristas’ raised funding for an attack and mobilized supporters to come to Brasilia – advertising the availability of buses and even free food for marchers – using the Festa da Selma hashtag.

To avoid detection by authorities, organizers used a simple switch of the letter ‘v’ to ‘m’ so that Selva, meaning ‘jungle’, became Selma – which means ‘party in the jungle’ to those in the know. But the authorities in the Brasilia state of Distrito Federal appeared to care little about preventing the attack anyway.

Civil society organizations have warned for decades that policies made in a Silicon Valley boardroom fit poorly to the realities of countries such as Brazil, Somalia, or Myanmar. Content moderation is a near-impossible task at the scale demanded by platforms as vast as those operated by big tech, and automated solutions are far from being a silver bullet as they create as many problems as they solve.

Extremism has found an unfettered enabler on mainstream platforms, and an increasingly sprawling network of alternative tech has made such voices resilient to challenge. Platforms such as Gettr, Gab, and Telegram have become go-to platforms for extremist networks when fringe voices find themselves blocked by mainstream platforms.

Telegram has come under significant scrutiny for the role it played in the storming of Congress in Brasilia but any number of tools and platforms – each with millions of users – could have achieved similar results.

The sordid events in Brasilia are just the latest chapter in digital extremism and conspiracy- mongering which often erupts into anti-democratic violence, and should serve as a reminder of the urgent risks of disinformation and the role digital technology plays in inciting, coordinating, fundraising, and amplifying such events.

But the checks on the power of private social media companies are still few and splintered. In Brazil, Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes, head of the elections tribunal, attempted to crack down on social media, banning users for spreading misinformation in a move which sparked complaints of censorship from Bolsonaro supporters.

Following the elections, Moraes has advocated for greater judicial authority to regulate social media – but the justice is only one person and his impartiality is already being challenged given his aggressive pursuit of Bolsonaro supporters posting inflammatory messages.

And one justice doing it alone only inflames an already volatile situation. Effective regulation of social media requires an independent body vested with multiparty support and operating under clearly-defined rules and authority.

A global movement to find solutions

Brazil is not alone in an increasingly frantic search for checks on digital power as dozens of regulatory regimes are springing up around the world. All are premised on platforms being responsible for their own fiefdoms, but few tackle the threat posed to democracy by unchecked corporate power over digital commons.

Well-intentioned regulation will fall short so long as it is narrowly focused on a never-ending game of ‘content whack-a-mole’ and is hamstrung by powerful voices who see any rules as an attack on freedoms of expression or corporate decision-making.

Democracies are traditionally cautious in managing speech, in separating good information from bad information, or in defining acceptable politics. The steady watering down of the UK’s Online Safety Bill, now so thin on disinformation as to be essentially homeopathic, shows that democratic regulation is willing to go only so far in tackling challenges posed by digital politics.

The near death and uncertain future of the US National Security Council 27 January 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 January 2023 Chatham House

What role should the US National Security Council play in an era of great power competition?

Please plan to arrive at Chatham House from 08:45 GMT as the event will begin promptly at 09:00 GMT

Over the last three years, the US National Security Council (NSC) has gone from being neglected to necessary again, in Washington.

After former US President Donald Trump ignored and then tried to dismantle the NSC, current US President Joe Biden has restored the body but chosen not to reform it.

Born in the days before the Cold War and empowered during the War on Terror, what role should the NSC play in an era of great power competition?

Plus, how must it, and the rest of Washington, evolve to meet the challenges and opportunities that remain in the 21st century?

Reflections at 100: Women in international affairs Audio MVieira 19 December 2022

How have women contributed to international relations?

The last episode of Reflections at 100, marking the centenary of International Affairs, looks at women’s contributions to international thought.

Isabel and Krisztina speak to Dr Katharina Rietzler about women’s contributions to the journal and international relations, especially in the UK. Then, Krisztina speaks to Professor Barbara Savage about Black women’s contributions to international relations in the US. To wrap up this episode, Leah de Haan sheds light on Chatham House’s Equality, Diversity and Inclusion (EDI) initiative and Jo Hills shares their thoughts about putting together the archive collections.   

Reflections at 100 is a mini-series accompanying the journal’s centenary Archive Collections. The collections bring together articles from our archive which speak to the past, present and future of current affairs issues. In each podcast episode, we speak to contributors from a specific collection and explore what the research tells us about policy-making today. 

Explore the Archive Collection freely until the end of December 2022, including Katharina’s introduction: 100 years of women in International Affairs.

International Affairs was started at Chatham House in 1922 to communicate research to members who could not attend in person. Over the last 100 years it has transformed into a journal that publishes academically rigorous and policy relevant research. It is published for Chatham House by Oxford University Press. Read the latest issue here. 

Critical elections and the future of American politics 14 December 2022 — 9:00AM TO 10:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 8 December 2022 Chatham House

This event explores whether the United States is undergoing a critical change in the composition of the Republican and Democratic parties.

Drawing on current and historical events, Paul E. Peterson joins us to examine whether the United States is undergoing a critical change in the composition of the Republican and Democratic parties.

Key questions to consider include:

• What factors might be driving such an evolution within both parties?

• How could these dynamics affect the balance of power in Washington and in states?

This event is co-hosted with the Centre on US Politics at UCL, and the US and Americas programme at Chatham House would like to thank the British Association for American Studies for their generous support of this event.

World in brief: Biden seeks to win over African leaders The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 November 2022

At the US-Africa Leaders Summit, Washington will need to go beyond strategic geopolitical interest to compete with China’s offer, says James Orr.

African heads of state will join President Joe Biden in Washington in mid-December to take part in the second United States-Africa Leaders Summit. Some 50 African leaders will travel to the US capital for the two-day conference, which starts on December 13. 

Senior policymakers say  talks will focus on economic engagement, human rights, food security and climate, with an emphasis on partnerships that demonstrate an intention to go beyond strategic geo-political interest. President Biden has said he hopes to ‘reinforce the US-Africa commitment to democracy; mitigate the impact of Covid, respond to the climate crisis and amplify diaspora ties’. The White House will seek to offer reassurance to African governments concerned by a perceived cooling in relations with the US.

Africa’s cooling relations with the US 

‘As trite as it might sound, the key objective of this conference should really be to enhance trust between African leaders and the United States,’ said Gilbert Kaplan, a former under-secretary at the US Department of Commerce.  ‘I was in Africa in 2018 leading the President’s Advisory Council on Doing Business in Africa and the foreign minister of Ethiopia said to me: “Well you’re here but are you really here?” What he meant was: is the United States really committed to a long-term, strong relationship with the African continent or is it just a drive-through and a hello without making major commitments?’

The first summit was held by President Barack Obama in 2014. Addressing the inaugural conference, he spoke of the ‘blood of Africa’ that ran through his veins and how ‘the bonds between our countries are deeply personal’. Today, however, a succession of abstentions or no votes from African states over United Nations resolutions on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine points to a growing misalignment in the relationship. This is indicative of expanding Chinese and Russian influence on the continent, say analysts.

‘Africa is faced with some of the biggest governance challenges on the globe,’ said Kah Walla, president of the Cameroon People’s Party and the first woman in the nation’s history to run as a presidential candidate in 2011. ‘We need government that is functional, competent and innovative, and what we are getting instead is the US and a global international system that is supporting [via financial aid] autocratic and dysfunctional governments. We can’t continue in this way.’

Africa’s 54 nation states span six time zones and the continent’s population of 1.4 billion is on course to make up a quarter of the global population by 2050. It boasts the youngest demographic in the world, a potentially huge labour resource for private sector investors seeking to expand in manufacturing and processing, for example. The current median age in Africa is 18.8 years, compared with a global median age of 30.

In July this year, the US provided nearly $1.3 billion in humanitarian assistance to help stave off hunger due to drought in the Horn of Africa. Since June 2019, the US, under its Prosper Africa programme, has also helped close some 800 export and investment deals across 45 African nations with an estimated value of $50 billion.

The US is losing out to China in Africa

Meanwhile, China surpassed the US as Africa’s largest trade partner in 2009, with total bilateral trade reaching more than $254 billion in 2021, a 35 per cent rise on 2020.

‘Despite Africa’s tremendous economic potential, the US has lost substantial ground to traditional and emerging partners, especially China,’ Landry Signé, a member of the World Economic Forum’s Regional Action Group for Africa, told a Senate subcommittee on Africa last year. ‘While recent trends indicate that the US engagement with the region has fallen, it has not and should not cede its relationship with the region to other powers.’

Why technology does not make easy wars Interview LJefferson 28 November 2022

Stephanie Carvin explains why technology does not overcome the challenges of war.

The invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated that many of the assumptions held about the role of technology in contemporary warfare are flawed. The lesson that technology cannot overcome the challenges of warfare is one that the West has also yet to learn, despite a series of failed interventions since the end of the Cold War.

In a wide-ranging conversation, Isabel Muttreja sat down with Stephanie Carvin to talk about her contribution to the September 2022 issue of International Affairs on ‘how not to war’. They discuss the US’ over-reliance on technology and why ‘easy wars’ become ‘forever wars.’

You argue in your article that the US overly relies on technology in war. When did this start?

I don’t necessarily think the US is exceptional. I think all states have tried in some ways to use technologies. One of the key arguments in the article is that the US is an enlightenment country, and part of the enlightenment is a belief in rationality and science and that you can better things through the application of science.

I think that there is this particular scientific approach or embracing of technology, in the American and in fact larger Western tradition on technology as a way to save lives. There is a strange humanitarian impulse that often underlies this use of technology.

We are seeing a quest to try and get perfect information. The idea is that if you have perfect information, you are going to be able to dominate the battlefield, and that’s proven itself to be false. I’m not even sure you can ever get perfect information.

But it underlines this modern approach, that if you can have all the information that’s out there, crunch it into some kind of algorithm, that you can then target discriminately, proportionately, reduce the level of casualties, and reduce the level of unnecessary damage. And that’s a kind of liberal tradition. You are trying to have your cake and eat it too.

You talk about the US being an ultimately liberal state, but they have been involved in a lot of wars over the last 10–20 years. Is that a contradiction?

I hope it is. But I think it goes back to the enlightenment nature of the United States, which is that the US sees itself as a shining city on a hill that has to protect itself at all costs. Liberals abhor tyranny, and they abhor unnecessary deaths. But I think that the idea is that if you threaten us, we see ourselves as embodying these values, therefore, we have to protect ourselves.

There’s a tendency to not really recognize the kind of insurgencies that we’ve seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, or even Vietnam, as war. We don’t really see that as a kind of armed conflict, even though, arguably, that has been the dominant mode of conflict for some time. They even used to call it ‘military operations other than warfare’. We tend to still think of war as great power competition or as the Second World War.

My first book was on prisoners of war in the American tradition. What often determined the treatment of people as prisoners of war was if the United States recognized their form of warfare. There’s a racial element here too that I don’t want to dismiss.

So, for example, the US war in the Philippines at the start of the 20th century: They went in, won a very quick victory over the Spanish and effectively took over the Philippines. And then they had a long insurgency for two years with the native Filipinos who didn’t want US domination. While they gave the Spanish all the prisoner of war rights, they didn’t give them to the Filipinos.

This is because they recognized the form of conflict that the Spanish engaged in, but the Indigenous way of warfare was not recognized. The West has struggled to culturally understand the way other people fight. And that’s when the laws of war conventions have broken down between, say, the United States, the West, and other states.

You talk in your article about the US entering ‘easy wars’ and ending up with ‘forever wars’ – what does this mean?

There’s an allure to this high-tech version of warfare, that it can solve a lot of problems, but it’s an illusion. It is ultimately a bit of a false promise.

The idea that machines are going to replace humans is fundamentally untrue. We are seeing this to a certain extent right now, even in the Russia/Ukraine war. This is very much a battle of machines and soldiers. One of the themes of this issue of International Affairs is hubris. The idea that things that appear to be quick wins often tend to be long-term losses. And that’s exactly what this article is talking about.

‘Forever wars’ is not my favourite term, but it’s this concept that what was promised to be an easy war, a high technology-driven conflict, where you can go in, use some surgically precise weapons, take care of the problem, eliminate your opponent and then extract yourself from a situation, has actually turned into a quagmire.

The limits of technology become apparent within a few months as well as the fact of the messy business of state-building, or the fact that insurgencies and political movements don’t just disintegrate at the show of some high-tech, sophisticated weaponry. It just tends to mean that these wars do go on for a long time, and you have to eventually extricate yourself, but there’s no clean way to do this. We saw this of course with Afghanistan, and to a large extent Iraq.

We get distracted by the shiny object. We see this promise, we see this vision of a kind of warfare that for some may have great appeal.  There are new super weapons, whether it be cyber information warfare or artificial intelligence. Everyone wants to be ahead of the curve, right?

Are these lessons on technology and ‘easy wars’ applicable to other countries?

I think what we’ve learned about the Russian military is that there’s a lot more at the heart of it. Part of the problem Russia is experiencing is that its capabilities were not what it thought they were. It’s clear that Vladimir Putin was enamoured with a lot of the ideas, like that the Russian military was increasingly high-tech and that they had these hypersonic missiles.

They also had very powerful cyber weapons amongst other things. Putin, too, seems to have been caught up in this idea that he could have had a 72-hour special military operation, which would have taken Kyiv. Clearly, that hasn’t happened. Once again, we see the underestimation of the human factor.

Next steps for EU-US cooperation on trade and technology 8 December 2022 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 November 2022 Online

How can the EU and US increase cooperation on AI, semi-conductors and funding information communication technology services?

On trade and technology policy, the EU and the US are making meaningful progress towards cooperation while at the same time navigating tensions. As senior officials meet on 5 December for the third meeting of the Trade and Technology Council (TTC), both sides have vowed to move towards concrete results. But can the US and EU increase cooperation on artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and funding information communication technology services? 

This event draws on insights from a forthcoming Briefing Paper by Marianne Schneider-Petsinger that explores next steps for US-EU cooperation on trade and technology, which is part of a project supported by the Hanns Seidel Foundation. 

America’s vote shows a desire for stability and calm Expert comment NCapeling 11 November 2022

Joe Biden has presided over the best midterm election results by a party in power in two decades, but the future for the Republican Party leadership is now uncertain.

For a president continually struggling with low approval ratings, the midterms provided a stunning result as the widely anticipated Republican red wave failed to materialize.

Although Democrats look set to lose their majority in the House, it is by a much smaller margin than either history or today’s pollsters anticipated. Democrats have maintained their majority in the Senate, a result that was confirmed four days after election day when Senator Catherine Cortez Masto won reelection. The final Senate seat will be decided by a 6 December run-off in the state of Georgia. 

The midterm elections were not good for the Republican party but were especially bad for Donald Trump who has until now managed to defy expectations and maintain his grip on the party even after his 2020 defeat at the polls.

Trump managed to win the presidency once but he lost the popular vote twice and at no stage during his time in office did his approval ratings go above 40 per cent. Now, after six years of the most divisive and disruptive leadership the US has ever seen, he has presided over the worst midterm results a party out of power has suffered in two decades.

Trump’s influence is on the wane

Many of the candidates endorsed by the former president – including in battleground states such as Pennsylvania and Arizona – lost. In Georgia, the Republican governor and Trump GOP rival won, despite Trump’s opposition, and the candidate he endorsed for the US Senate has come up short of the 50 per cent needed to get over the line in the first round.

Trump’s nemesis, Ron DeSantis, the Republican governor of Florida, won a second four-year term in a landslide. Trump is suffering attacks from his own party and many loyal media supporters, such as Fox News, the New York Post, and the Wall Street Journal. None of this bodes well for the prospect of Trump leading the party through the 2024 presidential election.

After six years of chaos, this upset has been delivered with remarkably little chaos and, so far, no violence in a win for democracy and stability in the US which will reverberate beyond the US shores.

The system has worked, with multiple elections held across all 50 states. Hotly contested seats were decided peacefully even when the margins were thin. The midterm elections were also a win for democracy. In every battleground state, election deniers that were nominated to run for offices that would control state election systems, including in the 2024 presidential elections, have been defeated.

For a country with a polarized electorate and a radical Republican leader who has continued to spread disinformation and sought to rile his base, this election has been surprisingly normal.

This means the debate about the future of America’s international leadership is postponed. Biden is still in the saddle and, instead of a battle for control inside the Democratic party, it is the Republicans who look set to descend into internal conflict and recrimination.

The unofficial contest to win the Republican nomination for president has already begun. Donald Trump has signalled loudly that he plans to run. If he does, it could impact Republican prospects in the 6 December runoff for the final seat in the Senate. DeSantis may also run and could be followed by several aspiring Republican candidates. A disrupted party facing a period of significant change seems likely. 

Inflation and the economy proved key factors

As always, foreign policy barely featured in the elections but the result promises a period of continuity. Instead of facing dangerous sniping on Ukraine from an emboldened Republican House leadership, the Biden administration looks set to hold to its Ukraine policy.

Biden’s increasingly hard-line policy on China will continue to be qualified by a clear-headed determination – however hard – to cooperate on climate. Trade policy will remain stuck, as will US policy in the developing world.

Exit polls show Democrats were motivated to vote by the reversal of Roe vs Wade and the restrictions on abortion rights that followed, while Republicans voted against inflation.

But Democrats at the national level continually failed to effectively communicate the positive impacts of Biden’s legislative agenda for ordinary Americans, or to deliver a clear economic message.

The national leadership veered from abortion rights to the Inflation Reduction Act, to the future of democracy in the US – all of which proved too complicated to cut through.

The state level shows a more complex picture because inflation and the economy – which could have swept Republicans to victory – were blunted by dogged local campaigning from Democrats who knew their voters and spoke to the cost-of-living concerns which were top of their minds.

Director's briefing: What next for America? 17 November 2022 — 8:00AM TO 9:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 7 November 2022 Chatham House

Chatham House’s Director of the US and America’s Programme discusses what is next for America following one of the most contentious midterms races to date.

Hosted by Bronwen Maddox, Director, Chatham House, this Director’s Briefing is an opportunity to digest the outcomes of the US Midterm elections with Chatham House’s Director of the US and Americas Programme, Dr Leslie Vinjamuri. 

Arguably one of the most contentious midterm races to date, this election has key implications for the rest of the world also. At this event, Dr Leslie Vinjamuri and Bronwen Maddox will discuss the crucial themes coming out of the election and the key issues on voters’ minds. What impact will the results have on US foreign policy more broadly? What might the outcome of the election signal about Trumpism? And how confident can we be about the strength of US democracy?

This event is only open to Chatham House Partners and Major Corporate Members as well as selected giving circles of Chatham House. If you would like to attend, please RSVP to Linda Bedford at RSVP@chathamhouse.org.

US midterms: What to expect? Expert comment LJefferson 4 November 2022

The 2022 midterms have a heightened importance with long-term implications for the future of American democracy.

US voters will head to the polls on 8 November 2022 to cast their ballots for the midterm elections, which will see 35 of 100 Senate seats and all 435 seats in the House of Representatives up for re-election.

Midterm elections serve as a benchmark on voter’s approval of the sitting president’s party, but following a turbulent 2020 presidential election, with claims of a stolen election and voter fraud, the midterms have taken on a heightened importance with the processes and results having long-term implications for the future of democracy in the US.

When will we see results?

While many US voters expect to see results the night of an election, the complex voting process in the US often makes it difficult to ascertain the success of candidates in certain states after the polls close.

In Arizona, state laws allow 20 days for election officials to certify results while Nevada allows for additional time to count mail-in ballots following election day. Pennsylvania state laws prevent mail-in ballots from being counted before 7am on election day and the combined effect of counting in-person and mail-in ballots simultaneously, as well as the need to present votes to a state canvassing board could delay official results for weeks, and votes will not be officially certified by the state until 28 November.

In Georgia, the presence of a third-party candidate may lead to a run-off election if neither the Democrat or Republican contender receives over 50 per cent of the vote, which would take place on 6 December with results expected soon after.

Delays in determining election results may bolster claims made by Republican candidates that election results were fraudulent, especially if races are tight, as delays  counting mail-in ballots might cause results to differ over time. Early results favouring Republican candidates may also differ from the final tally as more mail-in ballots get counted, creating a ‘red mirage’, as the majority of Republican voters are expected to vote in-person, as seen in 2020.

In the vast majority of elections since World War II, the president’s party has often lost seats in the first midterm elections after taking office. While there have been exceptions and instances of the sitting party avoiding major losses during wartime, such as after the Gulf War and the 9/11 attacks, it’s unlikely Russia’s war in Ukraine will create the same rally around the flag effect.

Issues influencing voters

There are signs that US support for Ukraine on both sides of the aisle is starting to waver, as evidenced by the now recalled letter by the House Democratic Progressive Caucus pushing for a ceasefire and Republican House Leader, Kevin McCarthy’s recent comments about limiting US financial support for Ukraine.

US voters in general are more concerned with domestic issues rather than foreign policy, and both Democrats and Republicans have shaped their messaging around issues that will resonate with voters in key battleground states, with Democrats focusing heavily on abortion and reproductive rights and Republicans pushing the issues of crime and safety.

Democrats are hoping their focus on reproductive rights will motivate a higher turnout at the polls and have likely been encouraged by a recent referendum in Kansas where voters chose to protect abortion rights in the traditionally conservative state. In 2020, 52 per cent of the electorate in the swing state of Pennsylvania were female, and while not a huge majority, the difference could be enough to push the Democrats ahead.

Though the issue of abortion has gained more focus among Democratic voters, with 75 per cent of registered Democrats saying the issue was very important, 92 per cent of Republican voters rank the economy as their top issue.

The Senate race in Wisconsin, for example, was initially considered one of the Democrat’s most likely prospects for unseating an incumbent Republican senator, following US President Joe Biden’s win in the state in 2020.

Despite heavy fundraising from the Democratic party and a campaign visit by former US president Barack Obama, incumbent Senator Ron Johnson is now four points ahead of Democrat contender, Lieutenant Governor Mandela Barnes. A potential victory by Johnson, who has accused Barnes of being soft on crime and has shaped his messaging around growing the economy, may indicate whether  Democrats need to reshape their messaging ahead of the 2024 presidential election.

Threats of political violence

The risk of political violence in the US has increased in recent years, with many key officials under threat, as evidenced by the recent attack on US Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi’s, husband. A bulletin sent out by US agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI, warned of attacks against not only political figures in the US, but also of attacks at locations like polling places, ballot box locations and voter registration sites.

The myth of a stolen election

Electoral integrity in 2022 has become especially significant, with over 300 candidates who believe the 2020 election was stolen up for election in various races across the United States.

The role of governors, secretaries of states and attorneys general (state officials charged with approving election results) has become a key issue in 2022. Proposals to give state legislatures the ability to certify election results, a role typically occupied by state officials, have already been made in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Arizona, all of which have Republican legislature majorities.

While these measures have not been successful thus far, a number of election deniers who would have the ability to influence how election results are certified are on the ballot for 2022. In Arizona, for example, Republican candidate for governor, Kari Lakes, and for attorney general, Abe Hamadeh have both been endorsed by Trump and have also supported his claims that the 2020 elections were fraudulent.

The Republican candidate for Arizona secretary of state, Mark Finchem publicly made calls to decertify Arizona’s electors, and was placed at receiving 49 per cent of votes in a poll conducted by CNN in early October. If Republicans are successful in both the state governor and secretary of state races, the role of the attorney general in certifying the election results in a state Biden closely won in 2020 becomes ever more crucial given their ability to govern how elections are run in the state, as well as their ability to challenge certification in court.

Transatlantic Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

This project aims to recommend ways for the US, UK and EU member-states to work together more effectively to achieve shared aims in the Indo-Pacific.

This project is Phase II of a wider research collaboration with the Royal United Services Institute: “An Evolving Transatlantic Agenda to Meet the Challenge of China in the Indo-Pacific”. The work is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Through interviews with policymakers and workshops, the project will:

• Identify specific areas of policy convergence and divergence;
• Establish practical recommendations for how the US, UK and EU member-states can better align and coordinate their activities in the Indo-Pacific.

The project is led at Chatham House by the Asia-Pacific Programme, working with the Global Economy and Finance Programme and the Europe Programme.

The researchers are Ben Bland (project lead), Dr Yu Jie, Dr Gareth Price, Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, and Alice Billon-Galland.

The project builds on research from Phase I, a Transatlantic Dialogue on China, which explored how transatlantic partners are responding to China’s rise and its effects in the Indo-Pacific.

Why burning biomass is not zero-carbon Explainer Video NCapeling 17 October 2022

Short animation explaining why burning biomass produces more carbon dioxide per unit of energy generated than almost all fossil fuels.

The climate emergency requires countries to transition away from fossil fuels, but it is important to be careful about the alternative energy sources chosen.

In particular, concern is growing over the use of biomass for energy, which is generated when wood or other plant material is burnt to generate heat and electricity. Many governments treat biomass energy as zero-carbon at the point of combustion, and subsidize it in the same way as renewables such as solar or wind, resulting in a large increase in the use of biomass for energy in the UK and the European Union (EU) over the past 15 years.

The treatment of biomass as zero-carbon in policy frameworks rests on the argument that biomass emissions will be reabsorbed by forest growth, particularly from trees planted to replace those cut down to burn.

But growing trees to maturity takes many years and, depending on the feedstock used, biomass burning increases global warming for decades to centuries. This is called the ‘carbon payback period’ – the time it takes for carbon dioxide levels to return to what they would have been if biomass had not been used.

New research from Chatham House and the Woodwell Climate Research Center calculated the real climate impact of burning US wood pellets in the UK and EU. In 2019, according to this analysis, US-sourced pellets burned for energy in the UK were responsible for between 13 million and 16 million tonnes of carbon dioxide, equivalent to the annual greenhouse gas emissions from 6-7 million passenger vehicles.

But because biomass is treated as zero-carbon, almost none of these emissions were included in the UK’s national greenhouse gas reports. And the removal of forest carbon from US forests is not included accurately in US reports, either.

International relations: The ‘how not to’ guide Expert comment NCapeling 11 October 2022

A centenary special issue of International Affairs explores past foreign policy failures to help policymakers avoid future catastrophes.

Policy decisions in international relations frequently have a long-lasting effect on the world order, shaping the lives of millions. Often acting under pressure and severe time constraints, decision-makers must rely on their own experience and the best expertise available. And so, despite many striving for a more peaceful and prosperous world, policy failures are all too common.

The second of International Affairs’ centenary special issues – devised and guest-edited by Amrita Narlikar and Daniel W. Drezner – is a ‘how not to guide’ for international relations. Focusing on historic failures, 14 experts examine what went wrong, and how policy practitioners and researchers can get it right together.

Between theory and outcome fall two ‘shadows’: one of decision-makers not taking advantage of sound academic policy advice – in some cases ignoring it because they think they already know best – and a second of bias in academic analyses and researchers simply erring, or erring on the side of their own self-importance. Between these two, there lies a joint path toward better policies.

The special issue provides policymakers with cautionary lessons, transforming well-known cases into a guide of what not to do in international politics. Building on that, the collection also suggests ways forward, including borrowing the medical Hippocratic Oath of ‘do no harm’, which in international relations serves as a cautionary warning against action merely for action’s sake, and then going decidedly beyond this minimum requirement.

A series of comics also accompanies the articles, produced in collaboration with Sequential Potential comics.

In their introduction, Drezner and Narlikar draw out four overarching factors which increase the likelihood of foreign policy failure – these are a focus on short-term successes, underestimating the power of narratives, hubris, and technocratic bubbles. If academics and policymakers can work together with these careful considerations, perhaps mistakes can avoid being repeated.

Richard Toye examines three pivotal moments in the UK’s history – the Munich crisis of 1938, the Suez crisis and war of 1956, and the Iraq war of 2003. He finds that in these cases the failures were over-determined, a consequence of Britain’s relative decline rather than its cause.

Daniel W. Drezner reviews two high profile failures of sanction use – United Nations (UN) sanctions on Iraq during the two Gulf wars, and the US re-imposition of sanctions on Iran in 2018. In both cases the main goals were not achieved and the costs were great. Drezner highlights ten ‘do’s and don’ts’ for sanctions as a result.

Amrita Narlikar shows how the World Trade Organization (WTO) has become an almost perfect example of how not to negotiate, even when taking into account recent limited successes. She identifies three broad categories of bargaining failures and explores the impact of narratives on the course of events, giving a clear list of do’s and don’ts for international negotiation.

Harold James also looks at three historic moments, the financial crises in 1931, 1997, and 2008. While responses to the crises initially looked successful, ironically in each case the drive to avoid past mistakes opened the door for the next crisis.

Cecilia Emma Sottilotta considers recent disasters in the European Union (EU) – the eurozone crisis and COVID-19 pandemic – and recommends for policymakers to find a middle ground between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism in crisis situations.

The growth of Chinese influence is a key issue in international relations today. Various articles in the special issue explain how not to deal with a rising China, coming from different angles. Exploring the US-China relationship, Janice Gross Stein is critical of the narrative around US decline and Chinese growth. The world should look beyond GDP as an indicator of a country’s growth and pay attention to strategic choices made by leaders in both states.

Joseph S. Nye Jr also provides a US perspective, arguing that while some historic analogies are misleading, the US should contemplate the cautionary narrative of sleepwalking into World War One when thinking about its relationship with China.

Amitabh Mattoo gives a south Asian view, asserting there is a need to understand Chinese policies in the region. Through examining China’s relations with India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka he concludes that because China is adopting aggressive policies in the region, states must start cooperating with like-minded allies.

Yuen Foong Khong answers two questions in his paper tackling which ‘how not to’s’ are relevant when learning from history, and whether policymakers are aware of them. His research points to four things to avoid, which he then applies to how the Cold War analogy is used to understand contemporary US-China relations.

On the theme of foreign interference, Igor Istomin looks at the Soviet support for Mao Zedong’s Communist Party in the 1920s to 1940s. He argues strongly against interfering with major powers, as short-term gains cannot last.

From Iraq and Afghanistan to Somalia and the Balkans, there have been many failed interventions by the West since the end of the Cold War. Stephanie Carvin asserts the overreliance on automated weaponry has allowed supposedly ‘easy wars’ to turn into ‘forever wars’ – and this is not likely to stop.

Why America’s midterm elections matter for the world The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 September 2022

The outcome could threaten the fight against climate change and the future of democracy itself, warns Leslie Vinjamuri.

As the November 8 midterm elections in the United States approach, the sense of urgency among the Democrats and Republicans is escalating. Early voter turnout is on track to surpass the 2018 midterms, when a record 122 million Americans voted ahead of election day. The midterms – when congressional, state and local seats are determined – used to pass almost unnoticed, especially outside the US.

Since 2018, though, they have become a matter of global concern. The 2022 midterm elections will be the first major elections in the US since the January 6 insurrection at the US Capitol. As such, they will be the first real litmus test for the continued relevance of Donald Trump and Trumpism.

For both parties, winning is more important than ever and it is not only a matter of policy. Today, a majority of members of both parties – 72 per cent of Republicans and 63 per cent of Democrats – see those belonging to the opposing party as immoral, according to a Pew Research Center poll in September, representing a significant rise since 2016.

In many states, the midterms will have a direct impact on the 2024 presidential elections, influencing who decides how voting takes place, how votes are counted and, especially, who controls the certification of election results.

Given this context, the stakes in elections are especially high. The winners will have the upper hand not only in defining many procedural rules but also the values that constitute the nation, such as on abortion rights, education and healthcare.

Republicans and Democrats align on most key foreign policy

Though foreign policy will bear a strong resemblance to its former self even if Republicans gain a majority in the House of Representatives, as many anticipate, the outcome of the elections on US global influence could impact efforts to combat climate change and to support the defence of Ukraine.

The Republican Party has become known for its embrace of climate deniers and the radicalized anti-immigrant rhetoric of many of its party’s most established figures. The failure to address rampant gun violence – and, instead, to defend a historically suspect interpretation of the right to bear arms – and the push for a national abortion ban mean that the party is imposing a version of America onto itself that is out-of-step with virtually all other rich democratic countries.

The choices voters make in November are likely to shape the values that come to the fore in the US, and with this the affinity that America’s closest partners feel for it.

Domestic policy is likely to be more heavily affected by the elections. A Republican majority in the House would stall progress on President Joe Biden’s domestic agenda and undercut his ability to raise the taxes he needs to pay for his spending plans. The drive to hold the former President Trump accountable will also be affected by the choices voters make in November.

A Republican majority in the House would spell an end to congressional investigations of Donald Trump. Instead, Republicans would use their electoral gains to launch their investigations into the Democrats.

One anti-Trump Republican on the January 6 committee investigating the storming of the Capitol building last year warned of a vengeful and obstructive turn against Biden from his Republican colleagues if they took the House. ‘They’re going to demand an impeachment vote on President Biden every week,’ said congressman Adam Kinzinger. It is under this shadow that the January 6 Committee is pressing ahead to finish its proceedings and publish its report.

On foreign policy, the parties are more aligned than divided on most of the key issues. Their differences are a matter of diplomacy, which matters, and degree. Support for Ukraine has had bipartisan backing, but in recent weeks the issue has become politicized. Some congressional Republicans are more hawkish than their Democratic counterparts in their ambition to support Ukraine. Yet, the congressman set to be Speaker of the House if Republicans gain a majority, Kevin McCarthy, is leading an effort to exercise far stronger oversight of any additional funds for Ukraine.

Ultimately, though, the president and his advisers maintain considerable control over foreign policy.  

Bipartisan support for a tougher stance on China was consolidated under Trump. He mobilized US voters by blaming China for the loss of manufacturing jobs. Later he held China responsible for the outbreak of Covid and for covering it up. China’s crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong, its assertiveness in the South China Seas, tensions over Taiwan and reports of human rights abuse against the Uighur in Xinjiang have cemented a bipartisan consensus on America’s China policy. But a more empowered Republican base looks likely to lead to a more ideologically driven anti-China rhetoric. 

The ground has also shifted over Russia. During President Trump’s tenure, Republican attitudes towards Vladimir Putin softened. But the Russian president’s aggressive invasion of Ukraine has entrenched American opposition to him and bolstered support for NATO.

Democrats and Republicans are also more aligned on policy towards Iran today than they were before Trump abandoned the Iran Deal negotiating the Middle Eastern country’s nuclear programme. On some contentious issues, such as immigration reform, progress is already stalled and that is unlikely to change.

US climate change policy may depend on the results

The upshot of all this is that the president is unlikely to make radical changes to US foreign policy regardless of the results of the midterms. The most important exception to this is climate change, which continues to be the unwanted stepchild of the Republican Party. Domestic infighting in the US would inevitably detract even further from the bold policy that is needed.

Republicans are unlikely to get the two-thirds majority needed to pass legislation that would undermine President Biden’s climate bill. Republican control of House committees, however, would add more politically driven oversight of any climate spending, including what has already been authorized by the Inflation Reduction Act. 

Policy convergence and clear executive authority cannot mitigate the sheer disruption that would be unleashed if the Republicans were to gain majorities in both the Senate and the House, however. For the rest of the world, and especially within Europe, this would send warning signs about the future trajectory of US foreign policy commitments and set off alarm bells that an ‘America First’ president might return to the White House after 2024.

A Republican majority in the House with a Democratic majority in the Senate would be disruptive, if less so, but would probably spell the end of business as usual, unsettling people, states and markets. All of this is unfolding at a time when many of the world’s rich democracies face internal divisions, rising inequality and populist challenges at home and so are ill-equipped to lead.

Democracies face a trust deficit. This is especially apparent in the US where only 43 per cent of Americans have trust in US institutions, according to the 2022 Edelman Trust Barometer.

Internal threats to democracy also unsettle the promise of US global leadership at a time when concerted and determined leadership is needed to maintain a strong and united response to Russia, and to tackle global food insecurity and the energy, climate and debt crises. In addition, the failure to lead a global response that can help developing countries is feeding a trust deficit between rich and poor countries.

The midterms will reveal a greater truth about the future of the Republican Party. Even more so, it will reveal the values held by the American electorate. In the run-up to the 2020 US presidential elections, Europeans frequently said that they would not give Americans a pass if they voted for Donald Trump twice – and indeed only 17 per cent of those in European Union countries would have cast a vote for Trump if they could.

A Republican midterm victory in both the Senate and the House of Representatives would have ripple effects across the Atlantic at a time when the threat from Russia has intensified.

The US is judged around the world for what it does, but also for who it is. The perception that democracy is failing in America creates a permissive environment for aspiring autocrats. At a time when democracy has been in decline around the world for more than 15 years, it is essential that the US fix its own democracy and that it demonstrates to the rest of the world that democracy can deliver.

The midterms will signal to the world what Americans value, sending a message about what it can expect from the US.

This article was updated on October 31, 2022 to reflect developments such as early voting turnout, and the impact of the midterms on the 2024 presidential election, support for Ukraine and climate change spending.

Interview: Nicole Hemmer The World Today rescobales.drupal 27 September 2022

The political historian talks to Mike Higgins about how Donald Trump has transformed the US midterm elections and the Republican party’s lurch further right.

Partisans: The Conservative Revolutionaries Who Remade American Politics in the 1990s
Nicole Hemmer, Basic Books, $18.99

In Partisans, you argue that the American political far right had been preparing the conditions for Donald Trump for 25 years and ‘the puzzle pieces snapped into place’ when he was nominated in 2016. What did you mean by that?

There were changes happening in plain sight over a quarter of a century. Such as the rise of presidential candidates who had never held elected office but who had a following in conservative media and cable news more broadly. There was also a turn towards pessimism, to connections with extreme groups and to procedural extremism in the Republican Party, such as the impeachment of Bill Clinton over what most Americans agreed was a small indiscretion.

All that accelerates in the 2000s and 2010s to the point where if you look back from Trump’s election, he suddenly seems eligible in a way that I don’t think he was in 2015 during his ascendancy.

 How did the end of the Cold War open the door for the hard right in the early 1990s?

The Cold War is so important to making sense of conservative politics in the United States because it sat at the core of American conservatism for 50 years. Opposition to Soviet communism held together the conservative coalition. It brought together religious conservatives who talked about the atheistic Soviet Union with the libertarians who were fearful of a big state.

The Cold War forced conservatives to talk in a language of freedom and democracy because that was the way that the US was different from the Soviet Union. Ronald Reagan, in particular, was a master of this. It had real implications for domestic policy. Reagan embraced free trade and talked about immigration and diversity as things that were great for America.

And then the Cold War ends, and you have politicians like Pat Buchanan [a former White House Communications Director] who had been beating the Reagan line for years, coming out and saying: ‘You know what? Immigration is bad and immigrants are bad. They are harmful for the United States. Free Trade is bad. We need to have more protectionist economy and build Fortress America. And, by the way, democracy might not actually be the best form of government for our country. The Marine Corps and IBM are better run than the federal government, and those are autocratic governed institutions.’

It allowed a resurgence of a right-wing politics that the US hadn’t seen since the 1930s and 1940s. It would become a powerful political movement within conservatism that we ultimately see taking over the Republican Party by the 2010s.

 What was it that allowed far-right figures such as Rush Limbaugh to take advantage of the transformation of the media in the 1990s?

Part of what they saw in it was interactivity. We tend to associate that with the internet and with the rise of social media, but call-in national radio and cable TV gave people an opportunity to have their voices heard.

The most popular TV show on CNN was Larry King Live, a call-in show. That interactivity fed into this idea that a frustrated populace suddenly had a voice, and it was easy to play on that sense of frustration. Also, the right was innovative because they had been focused on alternative media for decades.

So, as you get new formats in the 1990s like political talk radio and cable news, conservatives were already in that space looking for ways to get their message across.

Also, journalistic objectivity in the 1990s became getting a voice from the right and a voice from the left, which opened the door for a new generation of conservative pundits such as TV hosts Laura Ingraham and Ann Coulter. You have these incentives drawing the right into this new media and all of these conservatives in the base who are looking for right-wing voices.

There are hearings into the January 6, 2021, Capitol invasion and an FBI investigation into the alleged presence of confidential papers at Trump’s residence Mar-a-Lago. Are we about to witness the insurgent far right within the Republican Party being brought to account legally?

There has been more accountability than I anticipated at the beginning of the Trump presidency. Some innovative legal techniques are being used successfully, such as sedition and conspiracy charges against some of the Capitol rioters.

Steve Bannon, one of Trump’s chief advisers in the 2016 campaign, has been charged with money laundering, conspiracy and fraud during the Trump presidency. Will that accountability lead to a fundamental transformation of right-wing politics in the US? I wouldn’t bet on that.

How is the radicalism of the Republican party shaping the upcoming mid-term elections?

The real radicalism in the Republican Party now is its willingness to use both procedural mechanisms but also mob violence to get the electoral outcomes that it wants – something that we saw with the insurrection on January 6, 2021.

That makes the mid-terms an existential election if Republicans are able to vote in candidates who are running on a platform of throwing out election results if Republicans don’t win. That is a real challenge to the future of American democracy.

As long as the political system is organized around one party that respects the rules of democracy and one party that fights against them, each election is going to be existential. It will make mid-term elections have the weight that the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections had.

Did the far right misunderstand the electorate when it comes to abortion, considering the strong reaction to the Dobbs ruling?

I think that is exactly right, and it’s fascinating. A major turn happens in American politics between the 1980s and the 1990s, especially on the right. Ronald Reagan built these broad coalitions. He was winning landslide elections, and building this ‘big tent’ party that would bring in people who didn’t identify as Republicans or conservatives.

By the time you get to the 1990s, you have this idea of the Rino – politicians who are ‘Republican in name only’. You had to be purer and purer when it came to your right-wing politics. And the Republican Party grew a lot more unpopular. It has lost elections because of the extremism of its candidates, but it has still been able to win democratic elections without majorities, something we saw in 2000 and 2016.

The outcome of it all is exactly what you are seeing right now, that in many ways the conservative movement has got something it wanted for half a century, which is the overturning of Roe v Wade – something that energized its space for a very long time. Now that the dog has caught the fire truck, it is looking around and saying: ‘Oh, people do not like this.’

August’s referendum in Kansas that upheld the right to abortion mobilized lots of voters who normally wouldn’t have come out for an off-year election.

As you get more stories of 10-year-old rape victims who have to go to a different state to get an abortion, or stories of women who have high-risk pregnancies not able to get medical care because of these new extremist laws, that really does mobilize a population who understand what is at stake.

It is not just their access to abortion, but to reproductive healthcare more broadly. Not everywhere, but in some places that is going to change the dynamics of these mid-term races.

In conversation with Ursula Burns 27 September 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 September 2022 Chatham House and Online

Ursula Burns and Fred P. Hochberg share insights on American business and corporate life.

In the next of our conversations with CEOs, Ursula Burns, former CEO of the Xerox corporation, joins Fred P. Hochberg, former chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, to share her insights on American business and corporate life.

Drawing from her recent book, Where You Are is not Who You Are, Burns will offer her reflections on the challenges leadership faces in a corporate world with rapidly changing technology and creating a diverse work environment. Hochberg and Burns will also discuss her views on racial and economic justice, as well as prospects for future business and economic growth.

Why the UN matters for Britain Interview LJefferson 6 September 2022

In the fourth of a series of interviews with Queen Elizabeth II Academy faculty, Jeremy Greenstock argues that the UN is still important in a polarized world.

For many people looking at the United Nations (UN) today, the institution (and the world) appears to be at an inflection point and the UN seems ill-equipped to meet these challenges. From your vantage point, how does this period look in relative terms? 

I think for an institution like the UN founded on principles and compromises laid down in 1945, the passage of time is bound to be difficult because society changes quicker than an institution can reform. We can talk about reform later, but the UN has challenges. Where do these challenges come from? I see them coming from a crisis in governance, in governments around the world.

The UN is a forum of member states, and the member states carry their national labels at the UN and follow their national interests at the UN. And almost all governments are suffering huge challenges, not just from the circumstances of geopolitics, but from the expectations of their own people, which they find difficult to meet.

The UN is a servant in that sense, of governments, and so what happens at the UN reflects what is happening in and between governments. We need to keep that in perspective. The UN still retains a tremendous value as a forum. It is a natural forum for governments to talk before they shoot, which was not there in previous eras, and that has had a significant effect since 1945 in reducing the incidence of war between states, particularly between the largest states.

It has obviously been more difficult to deal with local and regional conflicts, but the kind of confrontation that threatens to escalate into a global war has been severely restricted by the UN. The habit of talking at the UN General Assembly (UNGA), artificial as it may seem, is an extremely important part of the avoidance of conflict in the modern age.  

There is a deep scepticism about the UN. Many people think there is a lot of talking but that the real action takes place elsewhere. What is the value of the UN?  

Well, there are two aspects to this. One is the fact that leaders must give their reasons for their policymaking to an international public. This has a force in today’s digital world where most people have access to a megaphone of some kind. The legitimacy of what governments do is exposed at the UNGA.

Secondly, alongside the open meetings and the publicized speeches, there are countless side meetings that go on, and it is an opportunity for leaders to test each other out, and to have private words that may differ from the public words they have to produce for their own followers in their own capitals.

It is an opportunity for personal diplomacy which is highly valuable, and which might not otherwise happen, particularly between leaders who have very serious differences. And I think that the testing of the legitimacy of policy in both the public and the private spheres is an important aspect of international diplomacy that the UNGA provides an opportunity for.  

At the UNGA, states are called to account before the UN, and this can expose hypocrisies. But sometimes there are fundamental clashes over interests and also over values. How would you characterize the UN’s handling of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?

It is a different audience at the UN from the audience that they have back in their capitals or in their own groups of like-minded people. They must justify themselves in different ways, and there are a whole host of inconsistencies in foreign policy that get exposed at the UN when people must explain themselves in public.

A lot of member states around the world have not condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine; yet underneath their non-condemnation is a general regret because Russia has broken a huge taboo of the UN Charter, which is the sacrosanctity of independent sovereign territories in Article 2.7.

And that article is valuable to member states who feel threatened by more powerful member states. Russia, as a permanent member, has ridden roughshod over sovereign independence. China and India will have equivocal feelings about that, but they can’t say so in public because they want some of the West’s hypocrisies and inconsistencies exposed, and because they find the approach of sanctions very unpalatable.

Sanctions are unpopular, and the use of sanctions has become a major weapon of non-war by the United States in particular. So, the Russian invasion is unpopular, but the approach of the West is also unpopular for not better looking after the interests of emerging economies and lower-income states, particularly on climate change, but also on economic development.

So, a whole host of different considerations come into play over Ukraine at the UNGA.

How do you think the UN could be best repurposed or reformed?  

It is terribly difficult, because if you open the UN Charter for one reason, you are opening it up to a host of demands from member states for other reforms. And remember that no reform of the Charter can happen without a 2/3 majority at the General Assembly, and that is an effective blocker, because you will always find more people opposing a particular reform that supporting it.

So, I think formal reform remains a bit of a dream in the circumstances of a polarized world. I want to divert discussions about UN reform into areas where the Secretary General has a competence without needing a vote from member states.

I am talking about improvement in methodologies, in the meritocracy of appointments, in the day-to-day workings of the UN. It looks unambitious on a large-scale basis, but just improving the competence of the UN and its agencies will ensure the relevance of the UN to people’s material interests in terms of human rights, refugees, food distribution, and children, and all the other things that the agencies look after.

So, I would prefer to concentrate reform energy into competence reforms, management reforms, rather than reforms of the Charter. 

This takes us to the question of the permanent members of the Security Council, and especially the US and the UK. You have experienced first-hand America’s ambivalence towards the UN. How much has this undercut the UN’s relevance?

I was frequently disappointed by the approach of the US to issues of policy at the UN. The US finds it very difficult as a nation to move beyond the primacy of its own domestic public opinion.

That perspective – that we have democracy at home, but we will not, as Americans, allow international democracy – is regarded around the world as an untenable position for the superpower. And I think it is more than untenable, it is against the US’s long-term interests to demand such national exceptionalism.

That exceptionalism is extremely unpopular, and the US’s extraterritorial reach is very unpopular. That loss of legitimacy around the world is affecting American interests, in the Middle East, over Afghanistan, over the reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine; America losing the argument with international public opinion has a material effect on American power, influence and interests.

Has America paid the price for asserting its exceptionalism? From your perspective, representing the UK, arguably the closest ally of the US and one with a permanent seat on the Security Council, how did you manage this?

Well, I had a long experience of that in my job in Baghdad. Yes, the UK normally supports the US in international forums because our interests coincide. In foreign policy, interests are more important than values, and sometimes you have to make compromises and shade your values in order to get results and to avoid conflict.

I found myself taking up the US’ arguments and trying to deliver them as the UK, because the US was more unpopular than the UK and we could act more subtly. The US was more unpopular than the UK because the UK – and a lot of the time France – tried a lot harder than other permanent members to work for the common interest of UN members.

There were times I argued publicly against the US at the Security Council because their logic was incompatible with a multilateral approach, over the International Criminal Court for instance, or over some approaches to the Middle East. I would take a different view, not just because I didn’t want to seem like a constant puppet of the US, but because I thought the logic that they were following was constraining for them, and the counter-productiveness washed off on us.

Here, I want to make an important point. You won’t get governments coming together to form a multilateral approach with all the compromises that this entails unless they are confident of their position at home. They can’t otherwise explain those compromises to their domestic public opinion. If governments are insecure at home, they won’t pursue a multilateral approach because of that insecurity.

The UK is seeking to define a new global role for itself. It has been one of the most influential states at the UN. Do you see this changing?

I don’t think the change of leader makes a terrific difference for the UK in the UN because there is cross-party parliamentary agreement that the UN is important.

I was disappointed that the UK did not take the UN more seriously at a political level except when it badly needed it at a particular moment. At an official level, there was plenty of support from London, but I don’t think that politicians ever gave much priority to the health of the UN.

Nuclear proliferation in a fragmenting world 13 September 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 September 2022 Online

Where does the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) stand in 2022?

With the war in Ukraine and China–US tensions rising, the threat of a nuclear arms race has never been as high since the Cold War.

Global efforts to control the appropriation and use of nuclear weapons are strained with the war in Ukraine, US–Russia and US–China tension, Iran on the nuclear threshold, instability in Pakistan and the ongoing threat from North Korea.

The Review Conference of the NPT that took place in New York this August sought to deal with the multiple nuclear threats, but new missile technology such as hypersonic glide vehicles and torpedoes are not covered by a treaty.

Russia and the US are in a development phase for a host of new technologies and delivery systems, especially after both withdrew from various arms-control treaties in the 2000s and 2010s. Now the nuclear stockpile is growing again and major superpowers are adopting confrontational geostrategic positions.

As the world’s established orders and system fragment, there is a possibility the nine countries with confirmed nuclear weapons could grow. Events in Ukraine highlight the need for a new, modern agreement on nuclear weapons control, needed today more than ever.

The panel of experts discuss key questions including:

• What did ‘RevCon’ in New York tell us about the adoption or update to the NPT?

• Will the war in Ukraine deter or prevent any agreement between nations or does nuclear weapons control represent an area of potential multilateral harmony?

• Are we likely to see a new arms race akin to the Cold War? Where does China fit into this race?

• How has technology changed the arms control landscape?

 As with all Chatham House member events, questions from members drive the conversation.

What are the lasting impacts of the AUKUS agreement? Interview LJefferson 15 August 2022

Drawing on their International Affairs article, Jamal Barnes and Samuel Makinda outline the effect of AUKUS on Australia-France relations and the liberal order.

Almost a year after the surprise announcement of the AUKUS treaty, its full diplomatic implications are still being understood. The security cooperation agreement between Australia, the US and the UK caused outrage in France and was a notable source of discord between states that see themselves as defenders of the liberal international order.

In this interview Jamal Barnes and Samuel Makinda discuss their recent article in International Affairs and assess the effect of the agreement on relationships between its signatories and France and the EU, the potential for reconciliation in the treaty’s aftermath, as well as the implications it has for trust in world politics.  

What was the AUKUS treaty and why did Australia sign it?

The AUKUS treaty is an agreement between Australia, the US and the UK. Signed in 2021, it facilitates cooperation on security issues in the Indo-Pacific between the three countries – specifically, it concerns the sharing of ‘military capabilities and critical technologies, such as cyber, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and undersea domains’.

A key aspect is that Australia will purchase nuclear-fuelled submarines from either the US or UK. Australia decided to purchase nuclear-powered submarines – and reneged on its 2016 agreement to purchase French-built diesel-propelled submarines – because it believed that the French-made submarines were no longer fit for purpose.

However, the agreement is about more than submarines. Although Australia, the UK and US argue that AUKUS is designed to defend the rules-based international order and help ‘preserve security and stability in the Indo-Pacific’, AUKUS has been largely seen as a response to the rise of China and its military activities in the region. The AUKUS agreement reflects the increased attention that the US, UK and Australia are paying to the Indo-Pacific and their commitment to constraining China’s exercise of power in the region.

What were the effects of the AUKUS treaty on relations between Australia and France?

It led to a serious diplomatic rift. Australian officials, including former Prime Minister Morrison, had visited President Macron in France and told him nothing about AUKUS. Morrison had assured Macron in June 2021 while former Australian foreign and defence ministers had assured their French counterparts that Australia was fully committed to the purchase of French submarines just two weeks before the announcement of AUKUS.

When French officials found out about AUKUS on the day it was announced on 15 September 2021, they declared publicly that they had been betrayed and stabbed in the back. Not only had France built its relationship with Australia on trust, but its relationship was more than just about submarines. It was designed to be central to France’s 50-year engagement strategy in the Indo-Pacific. However, France was not only left out of talks but was also betrayed by a country it considered a close ally.

France responded by temporarily recalling its ambassador and stated that it would ‘redefine’ its relationship with Australia. It did not say that it would not work with Australia, but rather downgraded its relationship to one where it would only do so on a case-by-case basis.

In your article you mention that the AUKUS treaty was seen as a betrayal of trust by France in particular. Why use the word ‘betrayal’?

The word betrayal is accurate because Australia’s actions went beyond simply cancelling a business contract. Australia breached France’s trust. Not all agreements involve trust. Some are driven by self-interest while others are simply legal contracts. When these agreements are broken, the usual response is feelings of disappointment and a belief that one party is unreliable and has not lived up to its end of the agreement.

However, when diplomatic partnerships involve trust, they often contain an emotional element. A key element of trust is that one party makes itself vulnerable to another in the expectation that neither party will take advantage. When that trust is breached, the response is different from a breach of contract.

It involves feelings of betrayal as deeper emotional factors are involved. This could be seen in President Macron’s anger, and his and other French officials’ willingness to publicly call Prime Minister Morrison a liar who had stabbed France in the back. If the previous France-Australia agreement was simply a legal contract, it would have been difficult to explain the emotional element of this diplomatic fallout.

How did the signing of the AUKUS treaty affect wider relations between members of AUKUS and EU member states?

The EU, like France, felt betrayed by the AUKUS announcement. Despite being a key ally of the US, Australia, and the UK, it was left out of AUKUS discussions, and was not aware of the agreement until it was announced in the media.

What made this worse was that the EU was in the process of announcing its Indo-Pacific strategy, which was characterized as ‘maybe one of the [EU’s] most important geopolitical documents’ by High Representative for Foreign and Security Affairs, Josep Borrell. For the EU, this was the latest in a long line of recent policy betrayals that had left it uncertain if it could trust key allies on important issues. The result was greater calls from within the EU to more forcefully pursue ‘strategic autonomy’, meaning a more assertive and independent EU foreign policy.

Do betrayals of trust affect the health of the liberal international order?

Yes, they can. While it is common for leaders in liberal democracies to lie to their own people, lying to the leaders of other countries can have serious repercussions for the norms, rules and institutions of international society. A key aspect of international society is the ‘presumption of trust’ that facilitates legal compliance and diplomatic cooperation.

Without this presumption it is difficult for states to engage in long term partnerships or have confidence that diplomatic agreements will be upheld. In our article, we highlight how Australia’s violation of a particular norm, that agreements must be kept, has undermined this presumption of trust. This norm not only helps build trust between states, but also contributes to the maintenance of international order by helping to support the presumption of trust in international society.

Nancy Pelosi in Taiwan: What lies ahead for China and the US? Expert comment GBhardwaj 3 August 2022

Chatham House experts examine the implications for Taiwan, China and the United States of Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island.

China’s fading ties with Washington?

Dr Yu Jie

US House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi’s, visit to Taiwan has plunged China-US relations into a new low as the reservoir of trust forged between the two sides over the last 40 years appears to be almost exhausted.

However, her move will likely not result in the full-scale crisis across the Taiwan strait that some hawkish voices in both Beijing and Washington believe. Instead, Beijing will most likely offer a combination of military posturing toward the US navy and economic sanctions on Taiwanese agricultural and manufacturing products in order to send a clear bellwether to any future potential visits by high-level Western political figures.

Neither Beijing nor Washington has declared a willingness to change the current status quo as the present impasse benefits both governments – but for different reasons. For China, the best approach is to reach a military and economic capability that prevents US engagement with Taiwan without the use of force. For the US, the strategic ambiguity under the Taiwan Relations Act remains an effective card to counter China’s growing military influence in the Indo-Pacific and keep itself relevant within the region as a security guarantor. Yet, both sides have decided to kick the issue of Taiwan’s status down the road, believing that time is ultimately on their side.

Despite a chorus of nationalistic rhetoric, China will be careful not to stumble into an accidental conflict which risks colossal damage on all fronts. Chinese President, Xi Jinping, must weigh all of the options before him as Beijing cannot afford to be perceived as unilaterally seeking to change what it agreed with the US back in 1979 when ties were re-established. If that happens, it will provoke the US political establishment to reach a unanimous agreement to change its ‘One China Policy’ and, ahead of the 20th Communist Party Congress where Xi is expected to be crowned for a historic third term, the last thing he wants is an unnecessary conflict with Taiwan.

The road to escalation?

Dr Bill Hayton

Beijing has chosen to take issue over Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in a way that it did not do for other recent US Congressional visits to the island. Several high-ranking US senators visited in April and May this year yet none of these visits triggered the prospect of a cross-strait crisis. So why has Beijing chosen to turn Pelosi’s visit into a stand-off?

Pelosi’s visit is part of a performance in which both actors – the US and China – are playing primarily for their domestic audiences. This comes at a time when ruling circles in Beijing are preparing for the five-yearly Communist Party Congress. Amid a slowing economy and successive COVID-19 variants, Xi Jinping cannot afford to look weak as he prepares the ground for his third term of office. Meanwhile, the US, represented either by President Joe Biden or House Speaker Pelosi, cannot back down at this point without looking weak itself.

Both sides have moved military assets into strategic positions near Taiwan to demonstrate their resolve. Neither side wants confrontation yet neither wishes to be humiliated. Currently, Pelosi’s visit, amid posturing by China, will make the US appear strong, but the consequences are likely to play out over a longer period. Xi Jinping will need to appear to have recaptured the initiative between now and the congress in the autumn when the risk of an incident will be at its greatest.

Taiwan controls several isolated islands that could be pressured by Chinese forces in the event of a future crisis. The Kinmen and Matsu archipelagos lie just a few miles off the coast of the mainland and have been at the centre of previous confrontations. There are also two other points of concern. Pratas Island – known as Dongsha – sits halfway between Taiwan and Hong Kong. Itu Aba – known as Taiping – is the largest of the Spratly Islands in the centre of the South China Sea. All would be vulnerable to an attack by the People’s Liberation Army, the principal military force of China, and the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party.

A military confrontation between China and the US over Taiwan, or further south in the South China Sea, would have major impacts on regional and global trade. An estimated $300 billion worth of trade passes through the area every month. Japan and South Korea depend heavily on flows of oil and gas through the sea. Exports from Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines would also be heavily affected by disruptions to shipping, increased insurance costs and interruptions in inflows of raw materials. The impact on a world economy already suffering major disruption because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the lingering effects of COVID-19 would indeed be stark.

Is a shift in US policy on the cards?

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan will undoubtedly be seen as a provocation by Beijing – even if it should not be. Pelosi’s trip to the Indo-Pacific, which also includes visits to Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea and Japan, comes at a time of growing tension between the US and China in the region.

It also comes at a time when the divide among Washington’s foreign policy elite is growing, with some arguing that it is time to abandon the country’s policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’, where it refrains from stating how it would react were China to openly and deliberately attack Taiwan. Indeed, recent statements by President Joe Biden have raised questions about whether the US is set to make a policy change. But, since both its ‘One China Policy’ and policy of strategic ambiguity have been largely successful, it would be wise for the US to maintain them.

During her visit, Pelosi is likely to reaffirm the US’ high regard for Taiwan’s democracy and embrace the language of shared values. She has embraced Biden’s framing of international relations as a contest between democracies and autocracies. This alone will continue to exacerbate tensions. It would be a mistake, though, to signal a major policy change away from strategic ambiguity and towards strategic clarity on Taiwan’s status. Even if the US decides later to embrace a policy shift of this size, such a message should be carefully considered and communicated clearly, and not by chance.

Congress has an important role to play but President Joe Biden and his national security team should make the final decision on US policy towards Taiwan. Getting the signals right in international politics is a key part of deterrence and, especially in East Asia, deterring both China and Taiwan’s ambitions is essential. 

Increasing insecurity in the region?

Dr John Nilsson-Wright and Ben Bland

Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan has provoked mixed responses from US allies across Asia.

For Japanese policymakers, the Taiwan issue is connected to the wider issue of regional security. Fears that a military conflict over the island will inevitably draw Japanese self-defense forces into a shooting war with China – a development that is neither formally mandated under the terms of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty nor necessarily constitutionally sanctioned – explains the concerns in Tokyo.

While the Japanese government of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is increasingly worried about China’s growing military presence in the East and South China Seas, Japan’s heavy trade dependence on China and the country’s economic and security vulnerabilities make it imperative to avoid any further escalation of tensions.

Given Tokyo’s non-recognition policy towards Taiwan, Japanese ties with Taipei are handled informally by politicians of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), rather than at cabinet or foreign ministry level, and in recent weeks and months there has been an increase in visits by cross party delegations from Japan.

The death of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as removed from public life a vocal advocate in support of enhanced ties between Tokyo and Taipei, but with public opinion in Japan increasingly tilting in an anti-Chinese direction, and with younger politicians favouring a more combative approach towards Beijing, there is a risk that the government will face pressure at home to toughen its language on Taiwan. Bolstering deterrence through increased military cooperation among allies, along with a graduated increase in defence spending, is the best way of limiting risk over Taiwan.

Nevertheless, privately, many officials in Tokyo are likely to have viewed the Pelosi visit as an unhelpful intervention and will be puzzled and perhaps frustrated by the apparent inability of the Biden administration to persuade the US Speaker of the House of Representatives to cancel her visit.

In South Korea, the government of President Yoon Suk-yeol, faces similar pressures to Japan, given the heavy dependence of the South Korean economy on China for trade and investment opportunities.

Pelosi’s visit to the region will strikingly not include meetings with either the president or Foreign Minister Park Jin. With Yoon on vacation and Park attending the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Cambodia, the absence of high profile engagements for Pelosi might seem to be a purely practical matter, but Seoul may also be seeking to avoid antagonizing Beijing at a time when the Chinese government is seeking to pressure South Korea not to enhance alliance coordination with the United States and Japan or to expand its commitment to the controversial Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile defence system.

As in Japan, public opinion in South Korea is increasingly anti-Chinese, but the logic of regional economic and security uncertainty, requires the Yoon government to avoid getting trapped in a worsening stand-off with Beijing.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives until 2024 – Japanese perceptions 24 February 2020 — 9:00AM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 March 2021 Chatham House

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within Japan’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Japanese perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable took place in Tokyo and was organized in partnership with the Indo-Pacific Studies Group.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Hiroki Sekine, Visiting Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House.

Read a summary and essay

Policy for Recovery in Africa: Rethinking Energy Solutions for Universal Electricity Access 10 December 2020 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 20 November 2020 Online

Approximately three quarters of Africa’s population do not have access to clean cooking fuel and face costs to their health. Speakers explore policy opportunities to bridge this gap, the key barriers that remain and the transformative potential of energy transition in delivering sustainable access for all.

Speakers explore policy opportunities to bridge the energy access gap, the key barriers that remain and the transformative potential of energy transition in delivering sustainable access for all.

African countries face an uphill battle as they confront the shocks of the coronavirus pandemic, seeking recovery in the context of global socio-economic difficulty and fragmented geopolitics.

With deficits in terms of governance, public health systems, social protection, and basic service delivery presenting challenges even before the outbreak, careful analysis and creative evidence-based policy solutions, as well as emphasis on implementation, will be crucial if Africa is to progress towards the SDGs and Agenda 2063.

The Policy for Recovery in Africa series brings together expert speakers and decision makers to examine and exchange on key challenges, potential solutions, and approaches for implementation.

The energy access gap in Africa presents one of the most serious obstacles to the long-term pandemic recovery effort, with almost half of the continent’s population estimated to still lack access to electricity, creating a negative annual GDP impact estimated to be over 25 billion USD.

China's Evolving Economic Relations with North Africa: Before and After COVID-19 10 September 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 20 August 2020 Online

China’s economic presence across North Africa has grown in recent years. The global power has forged close economic relationships with Egypt and Algeria, while also continuing to develop ties with Morocco and Tunisia.

Beijing, which views the region as a geostrategic intersection between Mediterranean, Middle East, and Africa, has primarily focused its efforts on developing bilateral relations, while also working within the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF).

All countries of the region have agreed to participate in China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI), which has raised concerns among Western powers. As North African countries grapple with fiscal constraints as part of the fallout from COVID-19 (and the oil price drop for hydrocarbon exporters such as Algeria), it is yet to be seen whether China’s ambitions and relations within the region will continue to develop at the same pace going forward.

In this webinar, organized by Chatham House’s MENA and Asia-Pacific Programmes, experts will discuss the evolving economic relationship between China and North African states, and explore the impact of China’s pandemic diplomacy across the region.

How asymmetric are economic relations between China and North African states? Which sectors are most important, and what are the prospects for China to develop the region’s digital and healthcare infrastructure? Will China’s increasing economic interests necessitate an increasing political and security engagement? Should North African states be wary of Chinese loans? What is the public opinion of China’s economic presence in North Africa? Have Chinese ‘soft power’ efforts helped to bolster economic (and political) ties? What will be the likely fallout of COVID-19 on BRI and infrastructure projects in the region?

You can express your interest in attending by following this link. You will receive a Zoom confirmation email should your registration be successful. Alternatively, you can watch the event live on the MENA Programme Facebook page.

Webinar: Is It All Over For Globalization? 15 April 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 April 2020

The coronavirus pandemic has led many to predict the end of globalization. Confronted with unprecedented social and economic challenges, countries are prioritizing their own citizens. Now, more than ever, international cooperation is necessary but, amidst the rise of nationalist-populist governments, global partnerships are absent or faltering. And as economies grind to a halt, so does international commerce — particularly in trade-dependent Asia, a region whose rise drove the period of ‘hyper-globalization’ which preceded the global financial crisis.

Yet there are other possible futures too. The level of scientific collaboration and information-sharing now underway in search of a vaccine is unprecedented, and after a hesitant beginning the major powers have woken up to the importance of concerted economic stimuli. The virus may in some ways have the paradoxical result of bringing countries together, not driving them apart. Rather than causing its demise, it could help begin a new period in which globalization is not as deep, but at least is better managed and more equitable? Could this be the catalyst for a new coming together at home and abroad?

In this webinar, speakers debate what impact the COVID-19 pandemic will have on the future of globalization, both in Asia and around the world.

Virtual Roundtable: The Economic Implications of COVID-19 on Asia 2 April 2020 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 27 March 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The COVID-19 pandemic is likely to have a damaging economic impact on Asia, potentially the most serious since the financial crisis two decades ago. While early estimates suggest that a recession is inevitable, differing countries in Asia are generally deploying modest fiscal and monetary measures. This is true even in China, compared with the ‘whatever it takes’ approach pursued by Europe and America.

How effective will these measures be in reviving growth and in easing the pain, particularly on the poor in developing countries in Asia? Is Asia witnessing a sudden but temporary halt in economic activity rather than a prolonged slowdown? At this virtual roundtable, the speakers will consider the likelihood of a recovery for trade in the region and will explore what lessons can be learned from countries like Singapore, who seem to be successfully managing the health and economic aspects of COVID-19.

This event is online only. After registering, you will receive a follow-up confirmation email with details of how to join the webinar.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Outlook From Now to 2024 - Workshop 5 18 February 2020 — 12:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 February 2020 Langafonua Centre

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within Tonga’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Tongan perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable took place in Nuku’alofa and was co-hosted by the Royal Oceania Institute in Tonga.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Lady Fane Fakafanua, Director of Operations at the Royal Oceania Institute.

Read a summary and essay

Network Power in the Asia-Pacific: Making Sense of the New Regionalism and Opportunities for Cooperation 7 February 2020 — 9:45AM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The Asia-Pacific region continues to increase in geopolitical and geoeconomic importance. The rise of China and tensions with the US are affecting bilateral relationships and traditional alliances in the region. Whether seen from the perspective of the Quad – Australia, India, Japan and the US – or the Indo-Pacific concept embraced by a wide range of countries but with no shared consensus on scope and objectives or with ASEAN who insists on the importance of its own centrality, the region is redefining and reconceptualising itself.

With a diverse range of initiatives – including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) – there are a plethora of regional agreements and institutional groupings that add further complexity.

As the Bretton Woods architecture continues to be dominated by Western powers, China is also spearheading parallel governance initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a means of enhancing its geopolitical and geoeconomic influence.

This one-day conference will focus on how such networks and alliances have been built, and sustained, in the Asia-Pacific region. In order to understand how new regional initiatives might open up opportunities for new forms of international cooperation, the conference will focus on the themes of cyber-technology and innovation, sustainable development and mitigating the impacts of climate change and new infrastructure initiatives. It will assess whether there is a zero-sum conflict between competing networks and agendas or whether a common approach can be developed.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Outlook to 2024 - Workshop 4 26 November 2019 — 9:30AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 January 2020 Gateway House, Stevens Street, Colaba

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within India’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Indian perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable was organized in cooperation with, and was held at, Gateway House in Mumbai.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by the International Security Studies Programme at Gateway House.

Read a summary and essay

International Arbitration: Exploring India’s Potential 15 November 2019 — 9:30AM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 October 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

As India’s economic clout grows, so does its aspiration to become a favoured arbitration destination in a globalized world dominated by foreign investments flows and cross border transactions. India’s bid to enhance its status as an arbitration destination depends largely on the suitability of its legal environment in meeting the demands of an increasingly sophisticated approach to disputed resolution. This conference will assess these, and other related, issues.

To register your interest in attending this event, please contact Nisha Ramdas by phone +91 9650977833 or by e-mail nisha@globaldialoguereview.com.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives to 2024 - Workshop 3 17 October 2019 — 9:30AM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 October 2019 Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, 27 rue de la Procession, 75740 Paris Cedex 15, France

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within the French strategic and policymaking community to explore French perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable was organized in cooperation with, and was held at, the Institut français des relations internationals in Paris.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Céline Pajon, Research Fellow, Center for Asian Studies, Institut français des relations internationals.

Read a summary and essay

Development Prospects in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of the Asian Development Bank 25 September 2019 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 September 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The speaker will discuss development prospects in the Asia-Pacific and their implications for Europe and the UK. He will outline prospects for the region’s growth, the impact of the current US-China trade conflict as well as other challenges faced by the region. He will also discuss the future role of the Asian Development Bank and how it plans to support the further development of the region.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives 2019-20 – Workshop 1 11 September 2019 — 10:00AM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 September 2019 East-West Center, 1819 L St., NW, Suite 600, Washington, DC 20036, USA

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within the US strategic and policymaking communities to explore American perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable was organized in cooperation with, and was held at, the East-West Center in Washington D.C.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Satu Limaye, Vice President and Director of the East-West Center in Washington, DC.

Read a summary report and essay

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives 2019-24 – Workshop 2 24 September 2019 — 9:00AM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 September 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within the UK strategic and policymaking communities to explore British perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024.

The roundtable took place at Chatham House in London. The report below contains a summary of the discussions.

Read a summary

How Women are Transforming Indonesia Interview sysadmin 20 May 2019

In a series exploring women in international affairs, Isabel Dunstan speaks to Gitika Bhardwaj about the rise of the women’s movement in Indonesia.

Southeast Asia has one of the highest records of gender-based violence in the world and Indonesia was recently ranked as the second most dangerous place for women in the Asia-Pacific. What is the state of women’s rights and gender equality in Indonesia?

It is true that Indonesia has high rates of violence against women, however, it’s difficult to know the realities of women’s experiences because in the past the data has been somewhat unreliable. This has been due to reasons such as a lack of reporting mechanisms available to survivors of violence and the fact that discussing sexual violence is a taboo and, if reported, can result in stigmatization which limits the number of survivors who have come forward.

However, the first reliable nationwide survey on gendered violence in Indonesia was conducted in 2017 by the Indonesian Ministry of Women and Child Protection and the United Nations Population Fund. Interestingly, it showed that Indonesia’s rates of violence against women are on par with the global rate which is that 1 in 3 women are affected by sexual violence in their lifetime.

It’s therefore difficult to generalize that Indonesia is an unsafe place for women because it’s an extremely diverse country. There is a growing middle class while there is pervasive poverty. There is religious diversity where the eastern-most province of Aceh is the only province in the country where Sharia law is enforced, whereas in the western-most province of West Papua, the dominant religion is Christianity and the ways of life are completely different.

Nevertheless, violence against women is high in Indonesia and can happen in all places – rich or poor, east or west – and has different manifestations from street harassment and trafficking to domestic violence and workplace harassment.

In some parts of the country there are high rates of child marriage too and, according to UNICEF, 14 per cent of girls in Indonesia are married by the time they turn 18 which is shocking when we think about how child marriage limits girls’ access to education and makes them more vulnerable to sexual violence and therefore restricts their futures.

Child marriage is high in Indonesia in part due to rooted gender norms, low levels of education and discriminating legislation, such as the marriage law, which states that, although it is legal to marry at 21, girls can marry at 16 and boys can marry at 19 with parental consent. But this can be even lower meaning parents could get their daughters married at as young as 13. So the law is fundamentally unfair between girls and boys and the women’s movement in Indonesia has been fighting extremely hard to reform legislation that discriminates against women and girls.

From the country’s first female president, Megawati Sukarnoputri​, to incumbent finance minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati – who was voted ‘Best Minister in the World’ in 2018 – and maritime​ and fisheries minister Susi Pudjiastuti – who has become notorious for her tough stance against illegal fishing activities – how are women progressing in Indonesian politics?

Indonesia has come a long way since becoming a democracy in 1998. Before that, the second president and dictator, Suharto, ruled the country for almost 32 years and increased the inequality gap between men and women during his reign.

Since the fall of Suharto, however, gender equality is explicitly enshrined in Indonesia’s constitution and the country has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.

The country has also been undergoing a process of democratization which has involved slowly decentralizing its power. This means that greater authority has been distributed to the 34 provincial governments outside of the capital of Jakarta.

Furthermore, to aid gender equality, a quota system requiring political parties to be made up of 30 per cent women has been put in place, although remnants of Suharto’s old system of cronyism remain, limiting the impact of the quotas translating to more women in provincial parliaments.

But the defining approach to furthering gender equality in Indonesia has been through gender mainstreaming and gender-responsive budgeting which can be seen throughout provincial administrations in the country.

This means there is the intention to ensure infrastructure, health and education outcomes include results that address specific gender equality gaps. The challenge for effective gender mainstreaming, however, is the political will to translate the approach into well-resourced programmes from one province to another.

Nevertheless, we have just seen Indonesia go through the most incredible presidential and legislative elections last month – won by the current president, Joko Widodo, who has often been called the ‘Barack Obama of Southeast Asia’ and whose existing cabinet has the highest number of women in the country’s history. This is not simply a matter of filling seats in the cabinet with women – such as the wives and sisters of male politicians – because it’s required by law. But, rather, there are some incredible female political figures who are there because they are strong, smart and capable.

You’ve rightly mentioned Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, who is a fabulous role model for a lot of women particularly women who have not had tertiary education because she entered politics through an unorthodox route.

Then there’s Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, who is also the former leader of the World Bank and is such an inspiration to a lot of women who are looking to work in public life because of her experience as well as her work to include gender mainstreaming in state budgets.

There is also Minister of Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection, Yohana Susana Yembise, who is a Papuan woman, as well as many more female public figures.

China Needs to Make the Belt and Road Initiative More Transparent and Predictable Expert comment sysadmin 29 April 2019

The global infrastructure project must move beyond mish-mash of opaque bilateral deals

As China welcomes dozens of world leaders to Beijing for its second Belt and Road forum, it has one simple aim: relaunching President Xi Jinping’s controversial global infrastructure drive.

Since it began five years ago, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has sunk hundreds of billions into port, railway and power projects stretching from south-east Asia to central Europe. But its path has been bumpy, drawing sharp criticism over the ruinous debts that some countries have racked up amid Chinese largesse.

Xi will stress sustainable financing and transparency this week, amid the usual talk of ‘win win’ cooperation. Yet BRI’s problems are structural, not presentational. For any pledges to be meaningful, China must move beyond its present mish-mash of opaque, bilateral deals.

After bad headlines last year, BRI has in fact enjoyed a good run in recent weeks. Malaysia announced it would resume a previously cancelled high-speed rail project, while Italy’s decision to join up last month marked a further European incursion. Indeed, if attendance is any guide to success, BRI looks in fine fettle. The first forum in 2017 attracted 29 world leaders. China says 37 will turn up this week. Phillip Hammond, UK chancellor, arrives hunting deals too, just a day after news that Chinese technology group Huawei will be allowed to help build 5G networks in Britain.

Even so, three interlinked problems remain at the heart of President Xi’s pet project, all of which must be addressed if BRI is to move beyond the pitfalls that have damaged its reputation.

The first and most obvious is debt. Critics allege that China ‘traps’ its BRI partners financially, often pointing to a debt-for-equity deal that handed China control of a port in Sri Lanka. These claims are exaggerated — few other projects have ended up this way. Yet poorer nations from Laos to Tajikistan are still signing up to vastly expensive Chinese schemes that offer poor value for money while straining their public finances.

The second problem is transparency. Despite its grand scale there is still no reliable list of BRI projects, no disclosure of the lending standards China follows, nor even the amount China has invested. Beijing claims more than $1 trillion; independent estimates suggest perhaps a few hundred billion. Either way, it will be hard for China to convince doubters on debts until it is open about the criteria it uses in deciding who to lend to and why.

BRI’s third and most important challenge is its muddled organization. Despite BRI’s image as a centrally run mega-project, China has allowed many deals to be struck locally, via a mix of state-backed companies, public sector banks and freewheeling regional governments. And it is here that the problems began.

Infrastructure deals are notoriously complex, especially for transnational projects like high-speed rail. Renegotiations are common, even for experienced bodies like the World Bank. Yet BRI has repeatedly seen terms negotiated behind closed doors, in countries such as Malaysia and Pakistan, come unstuck in the face of public outcry.

Rather than seeking to trap others with debt, China’s central government more often has to step in to fix dubious projects agreed by underlings lower down the chain.

These negotiations go one of two ways. Either China’s partners complain and win terms, as was true in Malaysia and in Myanmar over a multibillion-dollar deep-sea port. Or, as in the case of Sri Lanka, the renegotiations go in China’s favour, but at the cost of accusations of debt trickery. In both cases China looks bad.

Speaking last year, Xi responded to criticism of BRI by describing it as ‘an open platform for cooperation’. Yet, so far, he has proved resistant to the step that would deliver on that vision — namely turning BRI into an institution with open standards and international partners.

The reasons for his reluctance are obvious. Ending BRI’s reliance on loose bilateral deals would limit Beijing’s room for geopolitical manoeuvre. Yet what might be lost in political flexibility could easily be gained in economic credibility, while avoiding some of the painful renegotiations that have dogged many BRI projects.

At a time when China’s economy is slowing and its current account surplus is shrinking, formalising and institutionalising, BRI could also help avoid wasting scarce public resources on white elephant projects. China even has an easy template in the form of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Beijing-based institution that has won plaudits for its project quality and openness since it started in 2016.

Whichever model is chosen, a dose of Chinese-style central planning is called for, along with more openness. Without it, the oddly chaotic and decentralised model pioneered in BRI’s first five years is unlikely to help the project thrive over the next five.

This article was originally published in the Financial Times.

Mobile Ecosystems as a Driver of Innovation and Growth in the Asia-Pacific 19 September 2018 — 12:30PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 September 2018 Chatham House, London