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As Turkey prepares for highly-contested elections on November 1, concerns are growing about the country’s politics, economy, security, and foreign policy. Just a few years ago Turkey was recognized as a model of democracy and beacon of stability and economic growth in a challenging region. However, more recently, Turkey’s economy has lost its dynamism, its leaders’ commitment to democratic principles seems to be eroding, and doubts are emerging about the country’s interests and engagement in the region. Even more disturbing, as the conflicts in Syria and Iraq continue unabated and massive refugee flows spill over into Europe, violent Islamic extremism has now surfaced in Turkey. With the government and opposition trading accusations, the horrific, recent bombing attack in Ankara has further polarized an already deeply-divided and anxious country.

On November 2, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings will host a discussion on the Turkish elections. Panelists will discuss how recent events might influence voters what the election results might portend for Turkey’s strategic orientation. Panelists will include Ömer Taşpınar of the National War College and Brookings; Gönül Tol of the Middle East Institute; Kadir Üstün of the SETA Foundation; and Robert Wexler of S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace. Brookings Turkey Project Director and TÜSİAD Senior Fellow Kemal Kirişci will moderate the discussion.

After the program, panelists will take questions from the audience.

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Abstract

An individual-based computational model of smallpox epidemics in a two-town county is presented and used to develop strategies for bioterror containment. A powerful and feasible combination of preemptive and reactive vaccination and isolation strategies is developed which achieves epidemic quenching while minimizing risks of adverse side effects. Calibration of the model to historical data is described. Various model extensions and applications to other public health problems are noted.

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The decision by the Federal Election Commission to defer action on new rules to constrain the activities of so-called 527 political organizations is being portrayed as an utter collapse of the new McCain-Feingold campaign finance law. In fact, nothing could be further from reality.

The dispute over whether several new Democratic-leaning independent political groups should be required to register with the FEC and abide by contribution limits is a legitimate one, and there is merit in the regulatory proposal — rejected by the full commission — that was offered by Commissioners Scott Thomas and Michael Toner. But this argument largely concerns unresolved questions stemming from judicial and FEC interpretations of the 1974 law that governs federal election law — not McCain-Feingold.

Had the Thomas-Toner proposal been adopted, the Media Fund and America Coming Together would have faced tougher requirements on the sources and amounts of contributions they receive. But supporters of the Media Fund and ACT still would have had legal options to continue their campaign activities. ACT would have had to raise more hard money to match its soft-money contributions, but it had already been moving in that direction, as had Moveon.org, which is now focusing its campaign activities on hard-money fundraising and expenditures.

Millionaire contributors to the Media Fund could have separately made independent expenditures in the form of television ads that expressly advocated the defeat of President Bush. Unions could have financed their own "issue ads" supporting Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.) and attacking Bush until 30 days before the party convention or 60 days before the general election. Corporations would have retained the option to sponsor similar ads. Thereafter, even without FEC action, a key provision of McCain-Feingold kicks in. As the election nears, no 527 organization can use corporate or union money to finance broadcast ads that feature federal candidates.

McCain-Feingold was not written to bring every source of unregulated federal campaign funding within the scope of the law. Rather, it was designed to end the corrupting nexus of soft money that ties together officeholders, party officials and large donors. The law's principal goal was to prohibit elected officials and party leaders from extracting unregulated gifts from corporations, unions and individual donors in exchange for access to and influence with policymakers.

Indeed, the law has accomplished this objective. Members of Congress and national party officials are no longer soliciting unlimited contributions for the party committees, nor are they involved in the independent fundraising efforts of the leading 527 groups. The FEC's decision to defer action, therefore, does not pose the same risk of corruption as did the soft-money decisions of the past.

One of the fundamental concerns raised by the activities of 527s is that these groups, with their ability to receive unlimited contributions, would overshadow the candidates and weaken the role of parties in the electoral process. The new law, however, increased contribution limits to candidates and parties, to offset the effects of inflation and to ensure that parties remain major players in federal elections. Here, the evidence is overwhelming that the law's objective is being realized.

Bush and Kerry have both registered extraordinary fundraising success. Kerry has already raised more than $110 million, while the president has raised more than $200 million. In raising these sums, the presidential nominees have attracted the support of more than 500,000 donors who did not give money during the 2000 campaign. Congressional candidates, too, are also reaching out to new donors, with fundraising up 35 percent over the last cycle.

And in the first 15 months of this cycle, the national party committees have raised more than $430 million in hard money alone — $60 million more than they had raised in hard and soft money combined at the comparable point in the previous presidential cycle. This financial strength reflects the parties' success at adding more than 2 million new donors to their party rolls. For all the attention they are garnering, these 527 groups — both Democratic-leaning and Republican-leaning — pale when compared to the activities of the parties and candidates.

The 2004 elections have enormously high stakes. Supporters of Bush and Kerry are highly motivated to boost the election prospects of their favored candidate. All signs point to a vibrant get-out-the-vote effort by both parties and a rough equality in funding by and on behalf of the two major presidential campaigns. This reflects the 50/50 partisan division in the country and suggests that a disparity in resources is unlikely to determine the outcome of the presidential election.

The FEC has cheered some and disappointed others with its decision to defer new rulemaking on independent political organizations. While we empathize with the critics' concerns, we nonetheless take satisfaction that the major objectives of the new campaign-finance law are being realized.

The Supreme Court’s recent McCutcheon decision has reinvigorated the discussion on how campaign finance affects American democracy. Seeking to dissect the complex relationship between political parties, partisan polarization, and campaign finance, Tom Mann and Anthony Corrado’s new paper on Party Polarization and Campaign Finance reviews the landscape of hard and soft money in federal elections and asks whether campaign finance reform can abate polarization and strengthen governing capacity in the United States. The paper tackles two popular contentions within the campaign finance debate: First, has campaign finance reform altered the role of political parties as election financiers and therefore undermined deal making and pragmatism? Second, would a change in the composition of small and large individual donors decrease polarization in the parties?

The Role of Political Parties in Campaign Finance

Political parties have witnessed a number of shifts in their campaign finance role, including McCain-Feingold’s ban on party soft money in 2002. This has led many to ask if the breakdown in compromise and governance and the rise of polarization has come about because parties have lost the power to finance elections. To assess that claim, the authors track the amount of money crossing national and state party books as an indicator of party strength. The empirical evidence shows no significant decrease in party strength post 2002 and holds that “both parties have compensated for the loss of soft money with hard money receipts.” In fact, the parties have upped their spending on congressional candidates more than six-fold since 1980. Despite the ban on soft money, the parties remain major players in federal elections.

Large and Small Donors in National Campaigns

Mann and Corrado turn to non-party money and survey the universe of individual donors to evaluate “whether small, large or mega-donors are most likely to fuel or diminish the polarization that increasingly defines the political landscape.” The authors map the size and shape of individual giving and confront the concern that Super PACs, politically active nonprofits, and the super-wealthy are buying out American democracy. They ask: would a healthier mix of small and large donors reduce radicalization and balance out asymmetric polarization between the parties? The evidence suggests that increasing the role of small donors would have little effect on partisan polarization in either direction because small donors tend to be highly polarized. Although Mann and Corrado note that a healthier mix would champion democratic ideals like civic participation and equality of voice.

Taking both points together, Mann and Corrado find that campaign finance reform is insufficient for depolarizing the parties and improving governing capacity. They argue forcefully that polarization emerges from a broader political and partisan problem. Ultimately, they assert that, “some break in the party wars is probably a prerequisite to any serious pushback to the broader deregulation of campaign finance now underway.”

Click to read Mann and Corrado’s full paper, Party Polarization and Campaign Finance.

After his first place finish in Iowa, which was supposed to propel him to a New Hampshire victory, “change” is probably a word Barack Obama does not like as much anymore. But, his support did not really change much between these two elections. He won 38 percent of Iowa’s delegates and 36 percent of New Hampshire’s vote. It was Hillary Clinton and John McCain who were the big change candidates.

What happens when a presidential candidate that does well in a primary or caucus state, does not do so well in the next? The dynamic of the presidential election can swiftly and stunningly change, as it did in New Hampshire on Tuesday.

How Barack Obama wishes John Edwards showed up in New Hampshire.

Edwards was awarded 30 percent of Iowa’s delegates, barely denying Clinton a second place finish. He finished a distant third in New Hampshire, receiving only 17 percent of the vote. There are strong indications that a shift among his supporters helped propel Hillary Clinton to her New Hampshire victory.

According to the exit polls, Edwards did 8 percentage points worse in New Hampshire among women, while Clinton did 16 percent better. Obama’s support was virtually identical, dropping a statistically insignificant 1 percentage point.

Obama’s support among young people remained strong, if slightly increasing among 18-24 and 30-39 year olds. Clinton’s support remained strong and slightly increased among those 65 and older. Edwards won Iowa’s middle-aged voters, age 40-64, but it was Clinton who decisively won this coveted age demographic in New Hampshire. And where these people were 38 percent Iowa caucus attendees, they were 54 percent of New Hampshire voters. (To understand why their turnout increased, see my analysis of Iowa’s turnout .)

Moving forward, the generational war is still a strong dynamic in the Democratic race, as evident in the candidates’ speech styles following the election results. In Iowa, Clinton was flanked by the ghosts of the Clinton administration. In New Hampshire, she shared the stage with a sea of young voters. In Iowa, Obama spoke of change, a message that resonates with younger people who are not part of the establishment. In New Hampshire his slogan was a message that echoes the can-do spirit of the greatest generation, “Yes, we can!”

In the days between Iowa and New Hampshire, Edwards spoke about how he wanted the election to become a two-way race. One should be careful with what one wishes for. Edwards and Clinton are vying for the same support base, that when united can defeat Obama, at least in New Hampshire. In the short-term, Obama most needs Edwards to do better so that support can continue to be divided.

Among Republicans, John McCain recreated his magic of eight years ago and bounced back strong from a poor Iowa showing to win New Hampshire.

The Iowa and New Hampshire electorates are so different it is difficult to compare them. In Iowa, Evangelical Christians were 60 percent of the electorate, while in New Hampshire, they were only 23 percent. Mike Huckabee’s move from first in Iowa to third in New Hampshire can be clearly attributed to the shrinking of his base. His collapse paved the way for a new winner to emerge.

It is thus tempting to attribute McCain’s victory solely to the different electorates, but he still had to defeat Mitt Romney to win New Hampshire.

According to the exit polls, the battle between McCain and Romney is a referendum on the Bush administration. Surprisingly, McCain, who has tried to rebuild bridges with the Bush establishment since his defeat in the 2000 presidential election, is still seen as the outsider and agent of change by voters participating in the Republican nomination process.

In both Iowa and New Hampshire, McCain drew his support from those who said they are angry or dissatisfied with the Bush administration. Romney drew his support from those who said they are enthusiastic or satisfied. Not surprisingly, McCain is also drawing more support from self-described Independents and Romney from Republicans.

The candidates seem to understand this dynamic, too, as they gave their speeches following the election results. In a contrived bit of acting, Romney showed up on stage without a podium and shoved a prepared speech back into his pocket (if he had needed a podium, his advance team would have provided it). He appeared relaxed, delivering his speech in a personable style reminiscent of Huckabee, who is competing with Romney for those who support Bush. But he also seemed to be reaching out to Independents with a message of change. In stark contrast, McCain delivered a carefully written, almost sedate speech designed to reassure Republicans of his conservative credentials.

This three-way dynamic between Huckabee, McCain, and Romney should prove fascinating as the Republican nomination process moves forward. Where Evangelicals are strong, Huckabee should do well. Where they are not, the rules governing if Independents can or cannot participate will dictate how McCain and Romney do. And we have yet to see regional candidates like Fred Thompson have their day in the sun. And then there is Rudy Giuliani, who is lying in wait in the larger states where his name recognition should give him a significant boost over the other candidates. All of this points to an extended campaign among Republicans.

Michael P. McDonald is an Associate Professor at George Mason University and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He studies voter turnout and is a consultant to the national exit poll organization.

Analysis of dozens of publicly created redistricting plans shows that map-making technology can improve political representation and detect a gerrymander.  In 2012, President Obama won the vote in Ohio by three percentage points, while Republicans held a 13-to-5 majority in Ohio’s delegation to the U.S. House. After redistricting in 2013, Republicans held 12 of Ohio’s House seats while Democrats held four. As is typical in these races, few were competitive; the average margin of victory was 32 points. Is this simply a result of demography, the need to create a majority-minority district, and the constraints traditional redistricting principles impose on election lines—or did the legislature intend to create a gerrymander?

Crowd-Sourced Redistricting Maps

In the Ohio elections, we have a new source of information that opens a window into the legislature’s choice: Large numbers of publicly created redistricting plans.

During the last round of redistricting, across the country thousands of people in over a dozen states created hundreds of legal redistricting plans. Advances in information technology and the engagement of grassroots reform groups made these changes possible. To promote these efforts we created the DistrictBuilder open redistricting platform and many of these groups used this tool to create their plans.

Over the last several years, we have used the trove of information produced by public redistricting to gain insight into the politics of representation. In previous work that analyzed public redistricting in Virginia^[1], and in Florida^[2], we discovered that members of the public are capable of creating legal redistricting plans that outperform those maps created by legislatures in a number of ways.

Public redistricting in Ohio shows something new—the likely motives of the legislature. This can be seen through using information visualization methods to show the ways in which redistricting goals can be balanced (or traded-off) in Ohio , revealing the particular trade-offs made by the legislature.

The figure below, from our new research paper^[3], shows 21 plots—each of which compares legislative and publicly-created plans using a pair of scores—altogether covering seven different traditional and representational criteria. A tiny ‘A’ shows the adopted plan. The top-right corner of each mini-plot shows the best theoretically possible score. When examined by itself, the legislative plan meets a few criteria: it minimizes population deviation, creates an expected majority-minority seat, and creates a substantial majority of districts that would theoretically be competitive in an open-seat race in which the statewide vote was evenly split.

Figure 1: Pairwise Congressional Score Comparisons (Scatterplots) - Standardized Scores

In previous rounds of redistricting, empirical analysis would stop here—unless experts were called in to draw alternative plans in litigation. However, the large number of public plans now available allows us to see other options, plans the legislature could readily have created had it desired to do so. Comparison of the adopted plans and public plans reveal the weakness of the legislature’s choice. Members of the public were able to find plans that soundly beat the legislative plan on almost every pair of criteria, including competitive districts.

So why was the adopted plan chosen? Information visualization can help here, as well, but we need to add another criterion—partisan advantage:

Pareto Frontier: Standard Criteria vs. Democratic Surplus

When we visualize the number of expected Democratic seats that was likely to result from each plan, and compare this to the other score, we can see that the adopted plan is the best at something— producing Republican seats.

Was Ohio gerrymandered? Applying our proposed gerrymandering detection method, the adopted plans stands in high contrast to the public sample of plans, even if the overall competition scoring formula is slightly biased towards the Democrats, as strongly biased towards the Republicans on any measure of partisan fairness. Moreover analyzing the tradeoffs among redistricting criteria illuminate empirically demonstrates what is often suspected, but is typically impossible to demonstrate—that had the legislature desired to improve any good-government criterion—it could have done so, simply by sacrificing some partisan advantage. In light of this new body of evidence, the political intent of the legislature is clearly displayed.

However, when politics and technology mix, beware of Kranzberg’s first law: “Technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral.”^[4] Indeed there is an unexpected and hopeful lesson on reform revealed by the public participation that was enabled by new technology. The public plans show that, in Ohio, it is possible to improve the expected competitiveness, and to improve compliance with traditional districting principles such as county integrity, without threatening majority-minority districts simply by reducing partisan advantage—this is a tradeoff we should gladly accept.

What are the greatest dangers to citizens of the world's cities, as well as its towns, villages, and rural areas? This is an important issue to understand as we approach the general election season in the United States, when candidates for the highest office in the land will have to help voters make sense of the state of violence around the world—and tell us what they would do about it.

Headlines can be deceiving. We hear about China's rise, Russia's adventures, North Korea's nuclear misbehavior, the Iran nuclear deal, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and of course ISIS and civil war in the Middle East all the time. But it is also worth taking a step back to understand the broader state of violence on the planet today. Do so, and you might be surprised.

As part of a Brookings-JPMorgan Chase project that we call Securing Global Cities, we have attempted to map these trends in violence, benefiting greatly from ongoing work at European think tanks like the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the University of Maryland, and the United Nations. Here are some of the most salient facts and figures:

• Even with Russian President Vladimir Putin's activities from Ukraine to Syria in recent years, interstate conflict remains low and mild in intensity by historical standards, thankfully. China's activities in the South China Sea, however concerning, do not presently broach the threshold of interstate war.
• Unfortunately, the picture is more muddled for civil war. It remains less prevalent and less deadly than in the worst periods of the Cold War and the 1990s. But it has ticked up considerably since the beginning of the Arab spring in 2011, especially in the broad arc from the Sahel in Africa through the Middle East and to South Asia. Worldwide, perhaps 100,000 people a year are dying in civil wars.
• Yet war and terrorism are not the primary security threats to most people on the planet today. Notably, each year, more than 400,000 people are murdered around the globe, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
• Murder rates are highest in the Americas and in Africa, at least twice the global average. They are greatest in central and southern Africa, and from Brazil and Venezuela/Colombia to Central America and the Caribbean and Mexico.
• The least violent parts of the world include most of East Asia and Western Europe, despite the terrorism threat afflicting the latter region of late. 
• The “most improved” regions in recent decades include Colombia, former war-torn African states like Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, as well as parts of Southeast Asia and a number major U.S. cities.
• If one broadens the lens on the definition of violence, motor vehicle accidents constitute an even bigger threat. The World Health Organization estimates that 1.2 million people a year die in such accidents worldwide.
• As cities and countries think about future security, they must bear in mind not just these current realities but the potential for catastrophe—from earthquakes, droughts, pandemics, nuclear reactor disasters, and massive infrastructural failures. In a worst case, tens of millions could suddenly be put at acute risk.

There is much to celebrate about the human condition today. Despite the headlines, life has actually never been safer or more prosperous for a higher fraction of the world's population. But our progress is fragile, and it is of course incomplete. 

The next U.S. president needs a plan for Syria, Libya, and Yemen, to be sure. But he or she also needs to address the broader challenges of urban and global security for a planet that is getting healthier and more secure but which still has a very long ways to go. A good first step is to collect and study what works in key cities and countries around the world so that we can all learn from each other, on topics ranging from breaking up gangs to corralling drug traffickers to stopping terrorism. A great deal has been learned; it is time to spread the knowledge, and emulate the best practices worldwide.

The U.S.-Japan alliance continues to struggle with the issue of reducing and relocating the U.S. Marine Corps presence on Okinawa.  In a new op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, Mike Mochizuki (of The George Washington University) and I—recognizing the potential seriousness of this problem for the alliance, as well as the fact that the current plan to reduce and/or relocate has been straitjacketed by Japanese and Okinawan politics—propose a more significant set of changes. Our proposal would scale back the peacetime presence of the Marines on Okinawa even further than now planned, but it would preserve or even improve U.S. military responsiveness throughout the Western Pacific region in times of crisis or conflict.

In 2015 the international community agreed on a set of ambitious sustainable development goals (SDGs) for the global society, to be achieved by 2030. One of the lessons that the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG s) has highlighted is the importance of a systematic approach to identify and sequence development interventions—policies, programs, and projects—to achieve such goals at a meaningful scale. The Chinese approach to development, which consists of identifying a problem and long-term goal, testing alternative solutions, and then implementing those that are promising in a sustained manner, learning and adapting as one proceeds—Deng Xiaoping’s “crossing the river by feeling the stones”—is an approach that holds promise for successful achievement of the SDGs.

Having observed the Chinese way, then World Bank Group President James Wolfensohn in 2004, together with the Chinese government, convened a major international conference in Shanghai on scaling up successful development interventions, and in 2005 the World Bank Group (WBG ) published the results of the conference, including an assessment of the Chinese approach. (Moreno-Dodson 2005). Some ten years later, the WBG once again is addressing the question of how to support scaling up of successful development interventions, at a time when the challenge and opportunity of scaling up have become a widely recognized issue for many development institutions and experts.

Since traditional private and public service providers frequently do not reach the poorest people in developing countries, social enterprises can play an important role in providing key services to those at the “base of the pyramid.”

In parallel with the recognition that scaling up matters, the development community is now also focusing on social enterprises (SEs), a new set of actors falling between the traditionally recognized public and private sectors. We adopt here the World Bank’s definition of “social enterprises” as a social-mission-led organization that provides sustainable services to Base of the Pyramid (BoP) populations. This is broadly in line with other existing definitions for the sector and reflects the World Bank’s primary interest in social enterprises as a mechanism for supporting service delivery for the poor. Although social enterprises can adopt various organizational forms—business, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and community-based organizations are all forms commonly adopted by social enterprises—they differ from private providers principally by combining three features: operating with a social purpose, adhering to business principles, and aiming for financial sustainability. Since traditional private and public service providers frequently do not reach the poorest people in developing countries, social enterprises can play an important role in providing key services to those at the “base of the pyramid.” (Figure 1)

Figure 1. Role of SE sector in public service provision

Social enterprises often start at the initiative of a visionary entrepreneur who sees a significant social need, whether in education, health, sanitation, or microfinance, and who responds by developing an innovative way to address the perceived need, usually by setting up an NGO, or a for-profit enterprise. Social enterprises and their innovations generally start small. When successful, they face an important challenge: how to expand their operations and innovations to meet the social need at a larger scale. 

Development partner organizations—donors, for short—have recognized the contribution that social enterprises can make to find and implement innovative ways to meet the social service needs of people at the base of the pyramid, and they have started to explore how they can support social enterprises in responding to these needs at a meaningful scale. 

The purpose of this paper is to present a menu of approaches for addressing the challenge of scaling up social enterprise innovations, based on a review of the literature on scaling up and on social enterprises. The paper does not aim to offer specific recommendations for entrepreneurs or blueprints and guidelines for the development agencies. The range of settings, problems, and solutions is too wide to permit that. Rather, the paper provides an overview of ways to think about and approach the scaling up of social enterprise innovations. Where possible, the paper also refers to specific tools that can be helpful in implementing the proposed approaches. 

Note that we talk about scaling up social enterprise innovations, not about social enterprises. This is because it is the innovations and how they are scaled up that matter. An innovation may be scaled up by the social enterprise where it originated, by handoff to a public agency for implementation at a larger scale, or by other private enterprises, small or large. 

This paper is structured in three parts: Part I presents a general approach to scaling up development interventions. This helps establish basic definitions and concepts. Part II considers approaches for the scaling up of social enterprise innovations. Part III provides a summary of the main conclusions and lessons from experience. A postscript draws out implications for external aid donors. Examples from actual practice are used to exemplify the approaches and are summarized in Annex boxes.

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This week marks the release of the 2015 Brown Center Report on American Education, the fourteenth issue of the series.  One of the three studies in the report, “Girls, Boys, and Reading,” examines the gender gap in reading.  Girls consistently outscore boys on reading assessments.  They have for a long time.  A 1942 study in Iowa discovered that girls were superior to boys on tests of reading comprehension, vocabulary, and basic language skills.^[i]  Girls have outscored boys on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) reading assessments since the first NAEP was administered in 1971. 

I hope you’ll read the full study—and the other studies in the report—but allow me to summarize the main findings of the gender gap study here.

Eight assessments generate valid estimates of U.S. national reading performance: the Main NAEP, given at three grades (fourth, eighth, and 12^th grades); the NAEP Long Term Trend (NAEP-LTT), given at three ages (ages nine, 13, and 17); the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), an international assessment given at fourth grade; and the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), an international assessment given to 15-year-olds.  Females outscore males on the most recent administration of all eight tests.  And the gaps are statistically significant.  Expressed in standard deviation units, they range from 0.13 on the NAEP-LTT at age nine to 0.34 on the PISA at age 15.

The gaps are shrinking.  At age nine, the gap on the NAEP-LTT declined from 13 scale score points in 1971 to five points in 2012.  During the same time period, the gap at age 13 shrank from 11 points to eight points, and at age 17, from 12 points to eight points.  Only the decline at age nine is statistically significant, but at ages 13 and 17, declines since the gaps peaked in the 1990s are also statistically significant.  At all three ages, gaps are shrinking because of males making larger gains on NAEP than females.  In 2012, seventeen-year-old females scored the same on the NAEP reading test as they did in 1971.  Otherwise, males and females of all ages registered gains on the NAEP reading test from 1971-2012, with males’ gains outpacing those of females.

The gap is worldwide.  On the 2012 PISA, 15-year-old females outperformed males in all sixty-five participating countries.  Surprisingly, Finland, a nation known for both equity and excellence because of its performance on PISA, evidenced the widest gap.  Girls scored 556 and boys scored 494, producing an astonishing gap of 62 points (about 0.66 standard deviations—or more than one and a half years of schooling).   Finland also had one of the world’s largest gender gaps on the 2000 PISA, and since then it has widened.  Both girls’ and boys’ reading scores declined, but boys’ declined more (26 points vs. 16 points).  To put the 2012 scores in perspective, consider that the OECD average on the reading test is 496.  Finland’s strong showing on PISA is completely dependent on the superior performance of its young women.

The gap seems to disappear by adulthood.  Tests of adult reading ability show no U.S. gender gap in reading by 25 years of age.  Scores even tilt toward men in later years. 

The words “seems to disappear” are used on purpose.  One must be careful with cross-sectional data not to assume that differences across age groups indicate an age-based trend.  A recent Gallup poll, for example, asked several different age groups how optimistic they were about finding jobs as adults.  Optimism fell from 68% in grade five to 48% in grade 12.  The authors concluded that “optimism about future job pursuits declines over time.”  The data do not support that conclusion.  The data were collected at a single point in time and cannot speak to what optimism may have been before or after that point.  Perhaps today’s 12^th graders were even more pessimistic several years ago when they were in fifth grade.  Perhaps the 12^th-graders are old enough to remember when unemployment spiked during the Great Recession and the fifth-graders are not.   Perhaps 12^th-graders are simply savvier about job prospects and the pitfalls of seeking employment, topics on which fifth-graders are basically clueless.

At least with the data cited above we can track measures of the same cohorts’ gender gap in reading over time.  By analyzing multiple cross-sections—data collected at several different points in time—we can look at real change.  Those cohorts of nine-year-olds in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, are—respectively—today in their 50s, 40s, and 30s.  Girls were better readers than boys when these cohorts were children, but as grown ups, women are not appreciably better readers than men.

Care must be taken nevertheless in drawing firm conclusions.  There exists what are known as cohort effects that can bias measurements.  I mentioned the Great Recession.   Experiencing great historical cataclysms, especially war or economic chaos, may bias a particular cohort’s responses to survey questions or even its performance on tests.  American generations who experienced the Great Depression, World War II, and the Vietnam War—and more recently, the digital revolution, the Great Recession, and the Iraq War—lived through events that uniquely shape their outlook on many aspects of life. 

The gender gap is large, worldwide, and persistent through the K-12 years. What should be done about it?  Maybe nothing.  As just noted, the gap seems to dissipate by adulthood.  Moreover, crafting an effective remedy for the gender gap is made more difficult because we don’t definitely know its cause. Enjoyment of reading is a good example.  Many commentators argue that schools should make a concerted effort to get boys to enjoy reading more.  Enjoyment of reading is statistically correlated with reading performance, and the hope is that making reading more enjoyable would get boys to read more, thereby raising reading skills.

It makes sense, but I’m skeptical.  The fact that better readers enjoy reading more than poor readers—and that the relationship stands up even after boatloads of covariates are poured into a regression equation—is unpersuasive evidence of causality.  As I stated earlier, PISA produces data collected at a single point in time.  It isn’t designed to test causal theories.  Reverse causality is a profound problem.  Getting kids to enjoy reading more may in fact boost reading ability.  But the causal relationship might be flowing in the opposite direction, with enhanced skill leading to enjoyment.   The correlation could simply be indicating that people enjoy activities that they’re good at—a relationship that probably exists in sports, music, and many human endeavors, including reading.

A key question for policymakers is whether boosting boys’ enjoyment of reading would help make boys better readers.  I investigate by analyzing national changes in PISA reading scores from 2000, when the test was first given, to 2102.  PISA creates an Index of Reading Enjoyment based on several responses to a student questionnaire.  Enjoyment of reading has increased among males in some countries and decreased in others.  Is there any relationship between changes in boys’ enjoyment and changes in PISA reading scores? 

There is not.  The correlation coefficient for the two phenomena is -0.01.  Nations such as Germany raised boys’ enjoyment of reading and increased their reading scores by about 10 points on the PISA scale.  France, on the other hand, also raised boys’ enjoyment of reading, but French males’ reading scores declined by 15 points.  Ireland increased how much boys enjoy reading by a little bit but the boys’ scores fell a whopping 37 points. Poland’s males actually enjoyed reading less in 2012 than in 2000, but their scores went up more than 14 points.  No relationship.

How should policymakers proceed?  Large, cross-sectional assessments are good for measuring academic performance at one point in time.  They are useful for generating hypotheses based on observed relationships, but they are not designed to confirm or reject causality.  To do that, randomized control trials should be conducted of programs purporting to boost reading enjoyment.  Also, consider that it ultimately may not matter whether enjoying reading leads to more proficient readers.  Enjoyment of reading may be an end worthy of attainment irrespective of its relationship to achievement.  In that case, RCTs should carefully evaluate the impact of interventions on both enjoyment of reading and reading achievement, whether the two are related or not.  

The addition of Medicare in 1965 completed a suite of federal programs designed to protect the wealth and health of people reaching older ages in the United States, starting with the Committee on Economic Security of 1934—known today as Social Security. While few would deny Medicare’s important role in improving older and disabled Americans’ financial security and health, many worry about sustaining and strengthening Medicare to finance high-quality, affordable health care for coming generations.

In 1965, average life expectancy for a 65-year-old man and woman was another 13 years and 16 years, respectively. Now, life expectancy for 65-year-olds is 18 years for men and 20 years for women—effectively a four- to five-year increase.

In 2011, the first of 75-million-plus baby boomers became eligible for Medicare. And by 2029, when all of the baby boomers will be 65 or older, the U.S. Census Bureau predicts 20 percent of the U.S. population will be older than 65. Just by virtue of the sheer size of the aging population, Medicare spending growth will accelerate sharply in the coming years.

Tomorrow, President Obama unveils his last budget, and we’re sure to see plenty of proposals for spending on education and skills. In the past, the Administration has focused on investments in early childhood education, community colleges, and infrastructure and research. From a budgetary standpoint, the problem with these investments is how to capture their benefits as well as their costs.

First step: find out what works. The Obama Administration has been emphatic about the need for solid evidence in deciding what to fund. The good news is that we now have quite a lot of it, showing that investing in human capital from early education through college can make a difference. Not all programs are successful, of course, and we are still learning what works and what doesn’t. But we know enough to conclude that investing in a variety of health, education, and mobility programs can positively affect education, employment, and earnings in adulthood.

For example:

1. Young, low-income children whose families move to better neighborhoods using housing vouchers see a 31 percent increase in earnings;

2. Quality early childhood and school reform programs can raise lifetime income per child by an average of about $200,000, for at an upfront cost of about $20,000;

3. Boosting college completion rates, for instance via the Accelerated Study in Associate Programs (ASAP) in the City University of New York, leads to higher earnings.

If such estimates are correct (and we recognize there are uncertainties), policymakers are probably underinvesting in such programs because they are looking at the short-term costs but not at longer-term benefits and budget savings.

First, the CBO’s standard practice is to use a 10-year budget window, which means long-range effects are often ignored. Second, although the CBO does try to take into account behavioral responses, such as increased take-up rates of a program, or improved productivity and earnings, it often lacks the research needed to make such estimates. Third, the usual assumption is that the rate of return on public investments in human capital is less than that for private investment. This is now questionable, especially given low interest rates.

A hot topic in budget politics right now is so-called “dynamic scoring.” This means incorporating macroeconomic effects, such as an increase in the labor force or productivity gains, into cost estimates. In 2015, the House adopted a rule requiring such scoring, when practicable, for major legislation. But appropriations bills are excluded, and quantitative analyses are restricted to the existing 10-year budget window.

The interest in dynamic scoring is currently strongest among politicians pushing major tax bills, on the grounds that tax cuts could boost growth. But the principles behind dynamic scoring apply equally to improvements in productivity that could result from proposals to subsidize college education, for example—as proposed by both Senator Sanders and Secretary Clinton. Of course, it is tough to estimate the value of these potential benefits. But it is worth asking whether current budget rules lead to myopia in our assessments of what such investments might accomplish, and thus to an over-statement of their “true” cost.