Independent Thinking: China protests, North Korea missile tests Audio NCapeling 1 December 2022

Episode seven of our new weekly podcast examines the civil unrest in China and the ongoing development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme.

Anti-lockdown protests are sweeping the cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. What does the unrest say about China’s response to COVID-19? How serious a challenge is it to Xi Jinping’s legitimacy so soon after the Party Congress?

Meanwhile, 2022 has been a record year for Pyongyang’s ballistic missile launches. How far has North Korea’s nuclear programme and its missile systems developed, and what does it mean for the country’s neighbours?

Joining Bronwen Maddox in the studio this week from the Chatham House Asia-Pacific programme are its director Ben Bland and senior research fellow Dr Yu Jie. Joining the panel is special guest Ankit Panda, the Stanton senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and editor-at-large for The Diplomat magazine.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Reporting Putin’s wars Audio NCapeling 8 December 2022

Episode eight of our new weekly podcast reflects on almost one year of war in Ukraine, and 12 years of war in Syria.

In the studio with Bronwen Maddox is special guest Oz Katerji, a war correspondent and freelance journalist who in the early stages of the Syrian uprising reported on the brutality of the regime of Bashar al-Assad and its impact on neighbouring Lebanon and Turkey.

Having written extensively on Syria and the Middle East, in January 2022 he journeyed to Ukraine and was in Kyiv on 24 February as Russia began its invasion. He has reported extensively on the battle for Ukraine’s capital, and later the Donbas, in Foreign Policy magazine, the New Statesman and Rolling Stone.

Joining Bronwen and Oz to discuss the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria from Chatham House are James Nixey, director of the Russia and Eurasia programme, and Lina Khatib, director of the Middle East and North Africa programme.

Independent Thinking: The UK tilts to the Indo-Pacific Audio NCapeling 14 December 2022

Episode nine discusses the UK’s foreign policy ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific and whether its desire to be a strategic player in the region is sustainable.

The past 18 months has seen the deployment of a Royal Navy carrier strike group to the Indo-Pacific, the emergence of the AUKUS partnership, talk of closer diplomatic ties with India and ASEAN and, in the context of Brexit, the UK potentially joining the CPTPP pan-Pacific trade deal.

But just how sustainable is a UK presence in the Indo-Pacific? And what are the UK’s strategic objectives in the region?

Joining Bronwen Maddox to discuss the UK’s high ambitions in the Indo-Pacific are Shashank Joshi, defence editor at The Economist, and Veerle Nouwens, senior research fellow at RUSI and the co-author of a recent Chatham House report on transatlantic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

Independent Thinking: Insurrections and elections in Brazil and the US Audio NCapeling 20 January 2023

Episode 11 examines disinformation in the US and Brazil, the role played by social media platforms, and how conspiracy theories percolate online.

The storming in Brasilia of government institutions by supporters of former president Jair Bolsonaro echoed the events seen at the US Capitol building on 6 January 2021. This week’s guests discuss the impact on Brazil.

The panel also examines the state of politics in the US going into 2023. How are things shaping up for Joe Biden’s presidency after the mid-terms now that a new Congress has been sworn in? And what are the challenges being faced more broadly by the American body politic two years on from the insurrection at Capitol Hill.

Joining guest host Leslie Vinjamuri this week from Chatham House is Christopher Sabatini, senior research fellow for Latin America, Serusha Govender, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation academy fellow, and Alex Krasodomski, senior research associate at the Digital Society Initiative.

Independent Thinking: Western tanks head for Ukraine Audio NCapeling 26 January 2023

Episode 12 of our weekly podcast analyses the deployment of international battle tanks to Ukraine and the contentious diplomacy putting pressure on Germany.

The panel examines what kind of capabilities will new weapons give to Ukraine amid fears of a new Russian offensive looming in the spring, and the intense pressure Olaf Scholz’s German government has been under since the invasion of Ukraine started.

How has Germany’s standing changed over the past 12 months, and what are the challenges facing the country in its relations with Russia as a long and cold winter sets in?   

Joining Bronwen Maddox this week from Chatham House are Orysia Lutsevych, head of the Ukraine Forum, and Marion Messmer, senior research fellow in the International Security programme, along with Jeremy Cliffe, writer-at-large for The New Statesman magazine, and Ed Arnold, research fellow for European security at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Myanmar, the coup two years on Audio NCapeling 2 February 2023

Episode 13 of our weekly podcast focuses on the ongoing crisis in Myanmar, marking the two-year anniversary of the coup there by the Tatmadaw armed forces.

In February 2021 the Tatmadaw overthrew the democratically-elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar and, since then, the country has descended into a brutal and complex civil war.

Our panel analyses the state of the country and its people two years on. Can Myanmar hold together, can democracy ever be restored? And is the world ignoring a major humanitarian crisis in the making?

With Bronwen Maddox to discuss the issues are two journalists who have both covered Myanmar extensively. Sebastian Strangio is an author and the Southeast Asia editor at The Diplomat, and Ali Fowle is a freelance journalist with Al Jazeera and the BBC.

Joining them in the studio from Chatham House are Ben Bland, director of our Asia-Pacific programme, and Rashmin Sagoo, director of our International Law programme.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Biden and the Republicans, AUKUS Audio NCapeling 9 February 2023

Episode 14 of our weekly podcast examines the Chinese balloon saga, the State of the Union address, and updates on the AUKUS deal 18 months after it was signed.

This week saw US president Joe Biden address an unruly joint session of Congress, during which he discussed America’s place in the world, China, Ukraine, and the state of the US economy.

As a new presidential cycle begins at the mid-point of Biden’s presidency, the panel analyses how Biden is doing and the challenges that lie ahead for him.

Also it is now 18 months since the announcement of the AUKUS partnership between the UK, US and Australia to develop nuclear hunter killer submarines. What does AUKUS mean for Australia, non-proliferation, and the Indo-Pacific more broadly?

Finally, the panel discusses China’s balloon over Montana in the US. Was it a signal from Beijing and what was it trying to photograph?

Joining guest host John Kampfner this week from Chatham House are Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, director of the US and the Americas programme and Dr Patricia Lewis, director of the International Security programme. They are joined by Dr Euan Graham, Shangri-La Dialogue senior fellow for defence and strategy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Health not independence is focus for Sturgeon successor Expert comment NCapeling 15 February 2023

Nicola Sturgeon’s star may have been fading, but Rishi Sunak and Keir Starmer will be relieved at the exit of one of the UK’s most influential politicians.

Nicola Sturgeon has left at the right time, maybe even a bit late. Although one of the most influential politicians the UK has seen in recent times, she was also one of the most divisive.

Her ability to fan Scotland’s sense of difference from England brought new hope to the independence movement, but this cause – by which she measured herself above all others – has been losing ground and for now, looks to be in abeyance.

Neat and disciplined, Sturgeon could not have presented a greater contrast to Boris Johnson in the first months of the pandemic. That was one of her finest moments.

She used the powers of the devolved government to make different lockdown decisions for Scotland – never all that different from those in England but often announced just a few hours earlier.

Although analysts surmise that these made little difference to the death rate – although poverty and other health support factors make comparisons hard – she used the platform, with the cameras on her, to ram home the point that Scotland could set its own rules.

Rallying young voters to independence

Her second greatest moment was in the aftermath of Brexit. Scots voted overwhelmingly to stay in the European Union (EU) and so, she argued, they should have the right to leave the UK to join that other union. Younger voters in particular responded, rallying to the independence cause.

But two recent setbacks showed her star was fading. She lost the Supreme Court battle to hold a second independence referendum in November, when she was told Scotland simply did not have the powers to hold one on its own if Westminster said no – and the UK government did just that. It was hard to see how her campaign for independence could move forwards.

And her planned reforms to the gender recognition process in Scotland have been blocked by the UK government – but unease about her reforms within Scotland meant this rebuff did not win her the support at home she hoped for. She was also accused of playing politics by pressing ahead with unpopular reforms simply because of their potential to discomfit the UK government.

Health, education, and public services need attention

Other challenges were also building up and, even if less eye-catching, her successor is likely to focus on health and education above the birth of a new nation. Sturgeon’s critics have long argued that under Scottish National Party rule, health, education, and other public services have declined.

In elections, these factors can be eclipsed by passions about independence but it is rare in political life for a leader to be insulated from public anger on this front. This is almost certainly where her successor will want to focus first.

Independent Thinking: Humanitarian disaster in Syria and Turkey Audio NCapeling 16 February 2023

Episode 15 of our weekly podcast examines the far-reaching consequences of the earthquakes which struck Turkey and Syria on the region’s fragile geopolitics.

With thousands killed and international aid flooding in, what hope is there for the many thousands of people in Syria and Turkey caught between the groups and governments involved in conflict for more than a decade.

The panel aslo discusses the political impact within Turkey, as fears grow that President Recep Tyap Erdogan may postpone the upcoming election amid outcries over corruption and the devastating loss of life.

Joining Bronwen this week is Lina Sinjab, Syrian filmmaker and BBC journalist covering the Middle East, Charles Lister, senior fellow and director of the Syria programme at the Middle East Institute, and Ziya Meral, senior associate fellow on Turkey at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Russia’s invasion one year on Audio NCapeling 23 February 2023

Episode 16 of our weekly podcast examines the global impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine one year on from when Vladimir Putin launched his all-out assault.

Following a decision which unleashed the largest war seen in Europe since 1945, with hundreds of thousands of casualties on all sides, the panel examines the impact of the invasion for Ukraine and its people, but also the world.

Also under discussion are key insights from the recent Munich Security Conference, and the announcement this week by Russian president Vladimir Putin to susend his country’s participation in the vital New START nuclear weapons treaty.

Joining Bronwen on the show this week from the Russia and Eurasia programme at Chatham House is programme director James Nixey and associate fellow Samantha de Bendern, alongside Patricia Lewis, director of our International Security programme. They are joined on the panel by Mariya Ionova, a Ukrainian opposition MP.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Nigeria votes, Northern Ireland deal Audio NCapeling 2 March 2023

Episode 17 of our weekly podcast examines the outcome of Nigeria’s presidential election and the new deal for Northern Ireland negotiated by the UK and EU.

On 24 February, millions of Nigerians went to the polls in an election widely seen as crucial for the direction of the country, with the winner Bola Ahmed Tinubu declared the new president-elect. The panel discusses the state of Nigeria’s democracy and what lies ahead for the new administration.

In addition, UK prime minister Rishi Sunak and European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen announced a new deal for Northern Ireland with implications for all the UK. Three years after the UK formally left the European Union (EU), has Rishi Sunak now got Brexit done?

Joining Bronwen Maddox are Leena Koni Hoffman, associate fellow with the Chatham House Africa programme, Aanu Adeoye, West African correspondent for the Financial Times and an academy associate at Chatham House, and Charles Grant, director of the Centre for European Reform.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: India, International Women's Day Audio NCapeling 9 March 2023

Episode 18 of our weekly podcast examines issues for women working in international affairs, and tackles India’s domestic politics and international standing.

Our panel this week discuss their experiences working professionally in global affairs and what advice they have for other women wanting to work in public policy.

India is also under discussion as Chatham House hosted Rahul Gandhi, leading Indian politician and former president of the Indian National Congress (INC). The panel considers his remarks about India’s internal quandaries and international perceptions of the country, almost a decade on from the 2014 election which brought Narendra Modi and the BJP to power.

Joining Bronwen Maddox from Chatham House are Rashmin Sagoo, director of the International Law programme, Anna Aberg from the Environment and Society programme, Armida van Rij from the International Security programme, and Isabella Wilkinson, research associate on cybersecurity. They are joined by Dr Mukulika Banerjee, who was until recently the director of the LSE South Asia Centre.

Independent Thinking: UK Integrated Review, Georgia protests Audio NCapeling 16 March 2023

Episode 19 of our weekly podcast examines the AUKUS deal, UK defence priorities, and the state of Georgia’s democracy following anti-government protests.

The UK and Australia will soon be building nuclear submarines together, but is the UK’s tilt to the Indo-Pacific sustainable? Two years on from the last Integrated Review, has the UK finally clarified its foreign policy priorities on Russia, China, and on defence? And is the money there to do it all?

Also on the show, the panel discusses Georgia following recent anti-government protests in Tbilisi. Following the Rose revolution in 2003, Georgia seemed to be on a path towards closer ties with NATO and the European Union (EU). But the country’s government has recently moved closer to Russia and Vladimir Putin. What is the state of Georgia’s democracy and where is the country heading?

Joining Bronwen Maddox from Chatham House is Creon Butler, director of our Global Economy and Finance programme, Professor Andrew Dorman, editor of the International Affairs journal, and Alice Billon-Galland, research fellow in our Europe Programme.

They are joined by Natia Seskuria, associate fellow with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and Arthur Snell, former diplomat and host of the podcast Doomsday Watch.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Consequences of the Iraq war Audio NCapeling 23 March 2023

Episode 20 of our weekly podcast marks 20 years since the invasion of Iraq, with special guest Clare Short who resigned from the UK government over the issue.

Launched amid fears that Saddam Hussein was acquiring weapons of mass destruction, the Iraq war changed the Middle East and inflicted huge damage with effects that persist today.

This week’s panel examines the war from the perspective of those in power in London when the decision was made to commit UK forces to the invasion, and with those in Iraq who lived with the consequences.   

Joining Bronwen Maddox is special guest Clare Short, former Secretary of State for International Development, who served in the UK cabinet and resigned after the invasion began, becoming one of the best-known critics of prime minister Tony Blair’s approach to the war.

On the panel from Chatham House is Dr Patricia Lewis, director of the International Security programme, and three members of the Middle East and North Africa programme; the director Dr Lina Khatib, senior research fellow Dr Renad Mansour who is also project director of the Iraq Initiative, and research associate Hayder Al-Shakeri.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Accumulation of the microtubule-associated protein tau is associated with Alzheimer's disease (AD). In AD brain, tau is abnormally phosphorylated at many sites, and phosphorylation at Ser-262 and Ser-356 plays critical roles in tau accumulation and toxicity. Microtubule affinity–regulating kinase 4 (MARK4) phosphorylates tau at those sites, and a double de novo mutation in the linker region of MARK4, ΔG316E317D, is associated with an elevated risk of AD. However, it remains unclear how this mutation affects phosphorylation, aggregation, and accumulation of tau and tau-induced neurodegeneration. Here, we report that MARK4ΔG316E317D increases the abundance of highly phosphorylated, insoluble tau species and exacerbates neurodegeneration via Ser-262/356–dependent and –independent mechanisms. Using transgenic Drosophila expressing human MARK4 (MARK4wt) or a mutant version of MARK4 (MARK4ΔG316E317D), we found that coexpression of MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D increased total tau levels and enhanced tau-induced neurodegeneration and that MARK4ΔG316E317D had more potent effects than MARK4wt. Interestingly, the in vitro kinase activities of MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D were similar. When tau phosphorylation at Ser-262 and Ser-356 was blocked by alanine substitutions, MARK4wt did not promote tau accumulation or exacerbate neurodegeneration, whereas coexpression of MARK4ΔG316E317D did. Both MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D increased the levels of oligomeric forms of tau; however, only MARK4ΔG316E317D further increased the detergent insolubility of tau in vivo. Together, these findings suggest that MARK4ΔG316E317D increases tau levels and exacerbates tau toxicity via a novel gain-of-function mechanism and that modification in this region of MARK4 may affect disease pathogenesis.

Synapse loss is associated with motor and cognitive decline in multiple neurodegenerative disorders, and the cellular redistribution of tau is related to synaptic impairment in tauopathies, such as Alzheimer's disease and frontotemporal dementia. Here, we examined the cellular distribution of tau protein species in human tau overexpressing line 66 mice, a transgenic mouse model akin to genetic variants of frontotemporal dementia. Line 66 mice express intracellular tau aggregates in multiple brain regions and exhibit sensorimotor and motor learning deficiencies. Using a series of anti-tau antibodies, we observed, histologically, that nonphosphorylated transgenic human tau is enriched in synapses, whereas phosphorylated tau accumulates predominantly in cell bodies and axons. Subcellular fractionation confirmed that human tau is highly enriched in insoluble cytosolic and synaptosomal fractions, whereas endogenous mouse tau is virtually absent from synapses. Cytosolic tau was resistant to solubilization with urea and Triton X-100, indicating the formation of larger tau aggregates. By contrast, synaptic tau was partially soluble after Triton X-100 treatment and most likely represents aggregates of smaller size. MS corroborated that synaptosomal tau is nonphosphorylated. Tau enriched in the synapse of line 66 mice, therefore, appears to be in an oligomeric and nonphosphorylated state, and one that could have a direct impact on cognitive function.

What the US election means for trade policy Expert comment LJefferson 10 October 2024

Kamala Harris and Donald Trump could not be more different when it comes to trade, despite a changed economic landscape.

Trade policy is playing a relatively subdued role in this autumn’s US election. Yes, former president Trump has proposed tariffs of anywhere from 20 per cent to 100 per cent, asserting the revenue could fund policy areas from deficit reduction to childcare, all while growing US employment and promoting world peace.
  
But unlike 2020, or even more 2016, the international trade architecture has not been a lively part of this year’s campaign. The two parties now start from a shared expectation of an international economic landscape shaped more by competition and industrial policy than by continued liberalization. However, the two presidential candidates’ views of which trade tools to use, and whether to proceed with allies and partners or unilaterally, could not be more different.

New set of trade expectations

A large part of the relative calm has to do with the emergence of a new set of expectations on trade that are shared across Republicans and Democrats, and that are unlikely to shift in the next four years regardless of who occupies the White House.

First, neither party can field the support to pass a traditional comprehensive free trade agreement through Congress. While each party still has a wing of elected officials who would like to see the US return to negotiating deals like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or attempt expansive new deals with Europe or in the Western Hemisphere, they are unlikely to reach critical mass in the immediate future, regardless of who holds the White House – or who controls Congress.

This shift in perception of the relative value of such deals – and their potential to cause political blowback for legislators – also means that the cost to any administration that wanted to propose such a deal would be high.

Second, there is broad bipartisan support to continue measures aimed at promoting US security in the face of high-technology challenges from Beijing that have both military and security applications. This means continued US activism in export controls and other more innovative measures.

Less divergence on clean energy

While there is also cross-party enthusiasm for approaches to building up US manufacturing that fall under the rubric of industrial policy, the parties diverge significantly when it comes to specific content. However, around clean energy that divergence will be less than the campaign trail rhetoric suggests.

Because clean energy generation is spread so broadly across the United States – with a great deal of wind and solar generation in Republican-governed ‘red states,’ and investment from the Inflation Reduction Act flowing to red states as much or more than blue ones – such incentives, and their effects on trade policy, are here to stay. Despite this, a Republican presidency or Congress will certainly seek to water down or eliminate parts of the Inflation Reduction Act that focus specifically on transition away from fossil fuels.
 
Coupled with this commitment to making America a clean energy superpower, there is considerable cross-party interest in trade initiatives that promote clean energy and manufacturing – whether from a climate perspective or a pure economic competitiveness perspective. A wide range of creative proposals are buzzing around Congress and think-tanks – from a carbon border measure, to resuscitating the Global Steel Arrangement, to critical mineral-focused deals. Though the topic is often overlooked in overviews of trade policy, it is the one where we are most likely to see classic trade tools used.

A vast difference between the two candidates

Beyond those broad strokes of an emerging ‘new Washington consensus,’ as former US trade representative and current head of the Council on Foreign Relations Michael Froman describes it: who wins the presidency will make a vast difference in what Washington does on trade – and how it aims to achieve its goals.

A Harris administration will aim to develop shared economic security agendas with allies and partners – quite possibly expanding beyond the Biden Administration’s G7 focus to pursue more deals with a broader range of partners. Trump, on the other hand, has explicitly said he will pursue US economic interests at the expense of allies and partners. ‘Under my leadership,’ he said in a speech in Georgia last month, ‘we’re going to take other countries’ jobs,’ specifically citing allies Germany and South Korea as targets.

While Vice-President Harris has criticized Trump’s tariff proposals, and noted their likely negative effects on consumers, she has not signalled that she would make changes to the tariffs on China first imposed by President Trump and then adjusted by President Biden. 
A Trump administration would use tariffs aggressively, but it remains absolutely unclear how. 

The UK must focus on how the Chagos decision is implemented to gain its benefits and minimize risks Expert comment jon.wallace 11 October 2024

The UK decision was welcomed by India and the US, and shows a capacity for fresh thinking. But the transfer of sovereignty must be handled carefully.

The UK announced on 3 October that it would cede sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius.

There are potential strategic and reputation-related upsides for the UK from the decision – but these can only be realized if the deal is implemented in ways that meet the UK’s stated goals.

First, the UK aims to safeguard the utility and security of the joint US–UK base on Diego Garcia. It also intends for the decision to benefit the Chagossians, who were displaced by the British decision in 1965 to separate the Archipelago from Mauritius as part of a deal to grant Mauritian independence.

The decision has already proved deeply controversial in the UK, provoking sustained criticism from former Conservative government ministers and commentary that has branded it naive, dangerous, and a blow to British prestige.

Part of the reason for the welter of criticism may be the apparent suddenness of the announcement. The impression that this was a hasty decision is likely because it came just three months after the Labour government came to office. But this belies the far longer gestation period around the decision.

World opinion

In fact, the previous Conservative UK government decided to begin negotiations over sovereignty of Chagos – following Mauritius bringing the matter to the International Court of Justice. In 2019, the court issued a non-binding opinion in favour of Mauritius.

The same year the UN General Assembly voted 116 in favour to 6 against, and with 56 abstentions, for a resolution ‘welcoming a 25 February 2019 International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legal consequences of separating the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, demanding that the UK unconditionally withdraw its colonial administration from the area within six months’ to ‘enable Mauritius to complete the decolonization of its territory.’

But returning the islands will not necessarily boost the UK’s international standing. Issues relating to the Archipelago are complex, and it will take work to convince interested international parties that the UK is acting fairly against a colonized and displaced population.

Mauritius has no pre-colonial history of controlling the Chagos islands, which are located some 1,500 miles away from Mauritius across a vast sprawl of the Indian Ocean. It is true that the Chagos Islands were a colonial remnant, but to ensure that UK is seen by global audiences to be acting fairly, the handover of sovereignty must be carefully handled. Perhaps the greatest reputational risk will come from failing to adequately account for the rights of Chagossians.  

The more pertinent historical injustice has been to them. And reporting by the BBC has shown that at least some Chagossians were dismayed by not having been consulted in negotiations between the UK and Mauritius.

The UK government announcement on the deal did state that that ‘the welfare of Chagossians’ will be paramount and that ‘the UK will capitalize a new trust fund, as well as separately provide other support, for the benefit of Chagossians’. But for the Chagossians, there will be a clamour to see this realized in full.

Strategic interests

On the strategic question, the utility of the joint US–UK military base on Diego Garcia has been guaranteed in a 99-year lease. As the UK negotiator Jonathan Powell has explained, this deal was reached in close consultation with US officials and puts the base on legally safe ground for the first time in decades. 

Indeed, Powell has explained that Joe Biden was keen to reach agreement ahead of the US elections so that US military access to Diego Garcia was safeguarded against any possible contrary decision by a possible returning Trump presidency.

There are understandable concerns that, as a result of the decision, China may develop commercial ports in the region and seek to compete with India for economic and strategic relationships. But this is a long-term matter of concern to monitor, regardless of the UK’s decision on Chagos.

Chinese naval influence in the Indian Ocean is currently limited, compared to its assertiveness in the South China Sea, where it is building artificial islands, or in the South Pacific where it is pursuing policing assistance deals like that secured with the Solomon Islands.

And the strategic situations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans are not at all alike. Indeed, the Chagos Islands are far closer to India and its economic influence than they are to any other major economic power. 

The fact that India has welcomed the UK’s decision over Chagos sovereignty is noteworthy, given the UK’s separate attempts to modernize and expand its bilateral relations with New Delhi.

In the long run, it is likely that India will play a leading role in Indian Ocean security, and the UK will want to be well-placed to explore how to play a role as an effectively partner.

The more pertinent immediate concern is the implications for other overseas UK territorial responsibilities. There are legitimate questions to be raised over setting a precedent that could undermine RAF Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus, which remained sovereign UK bases after Cyprus’s independence in 1960.

What are the top economic priorities for the new US President? 19 November 2024 — 8:00AM TO 9:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 15 October 2024 Chatham House

A post-US election discussion on the outlook for US economic policy and implications for the global economy.

A fortnight on from the US Presidential and Congressional elections, this expert panel, organised by Chatham House’s Global Economy and Finance Programme in collaboration with the Society of Professional Economists, will consider the outlook for US economic policy and implications for the global economy.

Questions for discussion will include:

• What will the economic priorities of the new President be? What will be the role of industrial strategy/green transition, regulation, trade, migration and fiscal policy?
• How far will the President be constrained by other branches of the US government, including Congress, the courts and state governments?
• What will the implications be for the global economy broadly and through the specific channels of trade, investment, monetary policy and debt?
• How will the new President handle economic and financial relations with the US’s traditional G7 allies, China and the Global South?

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

Resetting Africa-Europe relations: From self-deception to economic transformation 28 October 2024 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Experts assess the status of ties between Africa and Europe in a rapidly changing world, launching a new book that explores how misconceptions in the relationship can harm Africa’s economic agenda.

The relationship between Africa and Europe has long been shaped by colonial legacies, power imbalance and shifting geopolitical interests.

Almost three years on from the last EU-AU summit in Brussels in February 2022, questions remain over the delivery of headline commitments under the continent-to-continent partnership – ranging from the EU’s Global Gateway infrastructure strategy to wider climate financing promises.

As Africa seeks to strengthen its standing on the global stage, marked by the African Union’s upcoming debut at the G20 summit in November, a critical reassessment of these dynamics is needed to examine whether the continent’s relationship with Europe can overcome stigmatized narratives in search of genuine economic benefit.

At this event, which launches a new book by Professor Carlos Lopes: The Self-Deception Trap: Exploring the Economic Dimensions of Charity Dependency within Africa-Europe Relations, speakers assess the prospects for a transformative shift towards a more equitable and mutually beneficial Africa-Europe partnership.

Evolving Turkey–Iran relations and implications for regional reordering

This project examines the nature of the bilateral relationship between Turkey and Iran in relation to Middle Eastern countries and in the context of broader regional dynamics.

The 2016–21 period in Turkish–Iranian relations, which was marked by both sides’ structured cooperation through the Astana Process and Sochi summits on conflict management in Syria, and their largely shared opposition to US policy in Syria and at the broader regional level, to Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence referendum, and to the blockade of Qatar, has run its course. 

However, the new shape of these bilateral relations remains undefined, and understanding them is essential to effective policymaking in the region. How they will evolve will have direct ramifications for Iraq, Syria, regional Kurdish geopolitics, and the process of regional reordering and connectivity in the Middle East and South Caucasus. They will also have direct implications for US and European policymaking and role in the region. 

This project studies the evolving nature of Turkish–Iranian relations through Iraq, Syria and regional Kurdish politics. It examines how Turkey and Iran approach regional connectivity projects and major regional initiatives, and how ongoing regional developments, including the war in Gaza, have and may impact Turkey–Iran relations and EU, US and UK security considerations and policy towards the two countries.

The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin is funded by Stiftung Mercator and the Federal Foreign Office. CATS is the curator of the CATS Network, an international network of think-tanks and research institutions working on Turkey. 

Evolving Turkey–Iran Relations and Implications for Regional Reordering is a project of the CATS Network.

Will the next US president invest in Middle East stability or walk away? Expert comment LToremark 17 October 2024

Harris and Trump look set to continue US deprioritization of the region, but they would do better to enlist the support of their partners.

When stability in the Middle East feels so distant, it is much to the dismay of America’s partners that conflict management in the region has fallen down the list of US priorities. As Israel’s war in Gaza has reached its tragic one-year milestone, a new front has opened in Lebanon and further direct escalation between Israel and Iran seems imminent, it is hoped that the next US president will take a bolder role.

Namely, leaders in the UK, Europe and the Middle East are looking to whoever is in the White House to do more to restrain Israel, deliver self-determination – if not a peace process – for Palestine, and contain Iran’s interventionist regional role and nuclear programme.

While it is naive to expect either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump to prioritize conflict management in the Middle East above immigration, the economy, the war in Ukraine or competition with China, the past year has shown the danger of ignoring or sidestepping cascading and glaring regional challenges. 

For Harris or Trump to have a more sustainable impact in the region, they must enlist the support of European, British and Middle Eastern partners and work collectively to build multilateral processes that can set a stronger foundation for regional stability.

Repercussions of deprioritization

The Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain, led many to believe that a new era of integration was possible in the Middle East. To some, it also vindicated the US decision to deprioritize the region that had started with Barack Obama’s presidency and his drawing down from ‘forever wars’ in Iraq and Afghanistan. Presidents Trump and Biden continued that approach, encouraging America’s partners in the Middle East to assume greater responsibility for regional stability. Notably, neither renewed negotiations with Iran despite both committing to deliver a stronger deal with Tehran.

The shock of the 7 October attacks shattered that view, and the longer overhang of the US decision to deprioritize the region has visibly played out over the past twelve months. 

While the Biden administration marshalled full political and military support for Israel and there is not – yet – a direct regional war with Iran, the US has been unsuccessful in multiple areas: delivering a ceasefire agreement, securing the release of hostages, maintaining regular humanitarian relief and producing a so-called ‘day after’ plan of action.  

Moreover, the US temporary arrangement with Iran to prevent nuclear acceleration in exchange for marginal sanctions relief has also shown the limits of compartmentalization when managing a portfolio of issues with Tehran.  

No new approach

Trump and Harris’s policy approaches to conflict in the region further show their limited intent to change course on the Middle East. Both leaders are aware that Middle East politics, particularly on Israel–Palestine and Iran – the key issues requiring urgent attention – has become a US partisan minefield that could alienate voters. Despite their different plans, with Trump inclined to be more unilateral, they will both continue the trend of gradually deprioritizing conflict management in favour of greater burden sharing by those in the region.  

President Trump has promised a tougher approach aimed at curtailing conflict and advancing US interests. On Iran, Trump has made clear that he would return to a policy of maximum pressure on the Islamic Republic, perhaps to come to new agreement with Tehran or alternatively to constrain Iran even further.  He has championed his administration’s withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal. Trump has argued that this approach put economic strain on Iran and reduced its ability to fund proxy groups. 

His advisers have also indicated that they would extend this pressure campaign and provide maximum support to the Iranian opposition and activists. Yet without clear goals or a willingness to negotiate with Tehran to contain further nuclear advancements, the result may well be another round of instability.  

Should he return to office, Trump has indicated that he would immediately put an end to the war in Gaza, though how remains unclear. More broadly, he would likely double down on the agreements to promote Israeli–Saudi normalization and attempt to bypass the Palestinian leadership, focusing on broader regional normalization. But sidestepping Palestinian self-determination, which since 7 October has been the condition for broader Arab normalization, will be difficult for Saudi Arabia to sell to its broader, now politicized, public.  

Many Middle East leaders, including those from the Arabian peninsula, might welcome the return of a Trump presidency, but Trump’s ‘America First’ policy did not provide Arab Gulf leaders, especially Riyadh, with protection from Iran’s attack on Saudi oil facilities seen in September 2019.  

Trump also promised without success to deliver a bigger, better Iran deal that would extend the JCPOA and include compromises on Tehran’s support for proxy groups and constraints on its missile programme. Rather than imposing his previous strategy, a second Trump presidency would be more effective if it worked collaboratively with transatlantic and regional partners on regional security issues pertaining to Israel–Palestine and Iran.  

Continuation and reinforcement?

Despite her recent tough talk on Iran, it is expected that Harris will reinforce the current wave of diplomatic efforts to deescalate and manage tensions with Tehran, rather than advocate for ‘maximum pressure’.  

Harris would likely build on efforts to revive a new paradigm that could contain Iran’s nuclear programme. She is expected to emphasize a strategy of engagement combined with pressure to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, while addressing its regional activities.   

Now that Iran has provided missiles and drones to Russia, it is clear that Tehran’s transfer of lethal aid needs an urgent response beyond continued reliance on sanctions. Harris’s team would be wise to pursue a multilateral negotiation process bringing together Europe and the UK, who are already discussing these issues, to collectively engage Tehran on a broader deal.

Moreover, winning support from Israel and the Gulf is a necessary condition to build a more sustainable Iranian agreement. 

Independent Thinking: How can France survive its budget crisis? Audio john.pollock 17 October 2024

Sophie Pedder and Shahin Vallée join the podcast to discuss France’s contentious budget and political drama, and the potential impact on Europe and beyond.

On this episode

France is facing political turmoil. The survival of Michel Barnier’s new government rests on whether he can pass a controversial budget intended to rescue the country from its huge fiscal deficit. Bronwen Maddox is joined by Sophie Pedder, the Paris bureau chief of The Economist, Shahin Vallée, a former adviser to Emmanuel Macron and Armida van Rij, the head of our Europe Programme.

About Independent Thinking

Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts, Spotify.

Egypt’s purchase of a Chinese fighter jet is a reminder Cold War tactics are back in the Middle East Expert comment LJefferson 18 October 2024

The Egyptian army is a formidable force lacking air superiority capabilities to match its size and ambitions. China understood this predicament and offered to help.

The reported agreement for Egypt to buy the Chinese Chengdu J-10C 4.5 generation fighter jets is part of a broader shift from focusing on modernizing ground troops to bolstering the air force. The details of the deal have not yet been published. Nonetheless, it reveals Egypt has two motivations beyond backing its arsenal with another fighter jet.

Elusive Western technology

The most important motivation for Egypt’s military diversification strategy (and the biggest source of frustration) is the perceived Western technology starvation.
   
A quick examination of the map around Egypt shows that the most significant perceived threats to its national security are located in remote places where Egypt doesn’t traditionally enjoy ground troops’ presence. These include Ethiopia, the Southern Red Sea, Libya and the vulnerability a potential Israel–Iran regional war would create. From the generals’ perspective in Cairo, this list is more than a catalyst to build a modern and capable long arm.

The race started in 2015 after the Obama administration paused an arms transfer to Cairo in 2013 that included four F-16C Block 52 fighter jets amid toppling the Muslim Brotherhood government. The psychological effect of Washington’s decision in Cairo increased Egypt’s risk tolerance towards challenging its military ties with the US by diversifying away from it. 

Egypt ordered the MiG-29M2 fighter jets from Russia and the French Rafales this same year. In 2018, Egypt negotiated a $2 billion deal with Russia to purchase the Su-35 fighter jet, seen in Washington as crossing a red line and triggering a warning to Egypt that it would impose sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). This caused the deal to collapse.

The main factor of the US military sales in the Middle East is the upholding of the Israel Military Qualitative Edge principle over its neighbours. This principle requires the US to ensure Israel is superior over other regional countries’ strategic military capabilities, especially in air power.

For Egypt, this has long been a strategic vulnerability. The US turned down multiple requests by Egypt to purchase the active radar long-range AIM-120 AMRAAM fire-and-forget missile that can be launched from the F-16 fighter jets, the main striking force in Egypt’s arsenal. 

Unlike the Gulf and other states (such as Jordan and Turkey), Egypt was only allowed the old AIM-7 Sparrow and the AIM-9 Sidewinders, which are shorter in range and technologically inferior. Israel also allegedly pressured the Trump administration to refuse Egypt’s request to buy the F-35 stealth fight jets in 2019.

The US and Israel reportedly pressured France to not sell to Egypt the MBDA’s Meteor 100 km air-to-air missile with the Rafale fighters. Instead, Egypt received the 80 km MICA missile as part of the deal to buy 30 Rafales in 2021. Acquiring this advanced radar system and long-range missiles was likely behind Cairo’s deal to purchase 24 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft from Italy in 2022. However, it is unlikely that they will come with the full package.

Egypt thought the Chinese J-10C Vigorous Dragon fighter may solve this predicament. The Chinese fighter has a beyond-visual range AESA radar and can carry the PL-15 200 km air-to-air missile, similar to the Rafale’s Meteor. The J-10C’s price tag is attractive for Egypt at $40-50 million, much less than the F-16 and Rafales.

The Chinese fighters are also a hedge against Russia’s sanctioned fighter jets, traditionally a second choice for the Egyptian air force.

Risky manoeuvres 

This doesn’t mean Egypt is on a path to abandon its weapons purchases from its Western partners. Egyptian weapons procurement policy is not only motivated by technical considerations. It also serves political objectives. Egypt still receives $1.3 billion every year in military and economic aid from Washington. Regime security and backing are two objectives that will likely encourage Cairo to rely on Western weapons systems for decades. 

However, from Egypt’s military perspective, the time may have come to resort to the Cold War tactics of diversification and counterbalancing. Being forced to accept old technology during the significant modernization of its air force creates a technical and operational necessity to seek this technology elsewhere. 

The regional uncertainty since Hamas’s 7 October attack on Israel and the war that followed in Gaza, southern Lebanon, and Israel’s intermittent confrontations with Iran makes make it imperative for the Egyptian strategic planners to take risky manoeuvres while targeting specific capabilities they seem desperate to acquire. 

The threat to deploy CAATSA sanctions against Egypt in 2019 makes the J-10C deal with China an interesting case study for all Middle Eastern allies of the West. It shows an uptick in Egypt’s risk tolerance to overcome its technological dilemma. It allows other countries considering the Chinese fighters (mainly Saudi Arabia) to gauge Washington’s reaction and design their future approach accordingly.   

Another motivation is to pressure the US, UK, and their allies to reconsider their implicit embargo on certain advanced technology by showing that Cairo now has alternatives. This tactic seems to work. General Frank McKenzie, the former head of US Central Command, said during a congressional hearing in 2022 that Washington will finally provide Egypt with the F-15 heavy-weight air superiority fighter, a longstanding demand by Cairo.

Building favours

The J-10C fighter jet ticks all the boxes: It satisfies Cairo’s diversity strategy and technological needs. It is under the sanctions threshold since it is less technologically savvy than the most controversial J-20 5th generation fighters, the equivalent to Russia’s SU-35. And it takes Egypt’s military partnership with China to a new level.

The rumour that the Chinese fighters are bought to replace the ageing versions of Egypt’s significant F-16 fleet is a source of pride for Beijing since its military technology started to be seen as a competitor to Western technology. A heavyweight military power like Egypt relying on Chinese fighters would almost certainly boost China’s share in the regional weapons market, just like Cairo’s purchase of the Rafale boosted its popularity globally.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s foreign policy priorities 29 October 2024 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

The DRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs discusses the country’s approach to regional stability and the role of international partnerships in securing economic prosperity.

At this event, HE Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRC, will discuss DRC’s regional diplomatic priorities and international agency, including its ambitions around global critical mineral supply chains.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) faces foreign policy tests as it manages a complex security crisis and regional tensions, alongside global economic and trade partnerships.

Entrenched conflict in eastern DRC continues to have wider regional implications. Troops from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) deployment are tackling a growing mandate as the UN’s peacekeeping mission prepares to withdraw. Tensions with Rwanda also remain high despite mediation efforts under the Luanda process.

As a major producer of critical minerals for the global energy transition, the DRC seeks to benefit from growing international demand without sacrificing value addition. New and existing frameworks with international partners will remain key to this vision, including for the development of regional infrastructure networks such as the Lobito Corridor.

At this event, HE Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRC, will discuss the DRC’s regional diplomacy and international agency, including the country’s positioning in global critical mineral supply chains.

Please note that in-person attendance for this event will be balloted. Guests looking to join in-person must register interest in joining. Full confirmations to successful applicants will be sent on Friday 25 October.

Sinwar’s death does not make Hamas–Fatah reconciliation more likely, whoever his successor may be Expert comment jon.wallace 22 October 2024

The killing may aid Hamas recruitment – but it will not make agreement with Fatah any easier to achieve.

Western political leaders were quick to argue that Israel’s killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar on 17 October presented an opportunity for a ceasefire in Gaza and the return of Israeli hostages.

US President Joe Biden immediately called on Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to seize the moment to negotiate, now that Israel has achieved one of its war aims.

However, that ‘moment’ has already passed. Israel’s military assault on Gaza has intensified since Sinwar was killed, leading UN Peace Process Co-ordinator Tor Wennesland to say that ‘nowhere is safe in Gaza’. It is abundantly clear Netanyahu is intent on further degrading Hamas, resetting a new ‘power balance’ and carving out a buffer zone, no matter the cost in Palestinian lives or Israeli hostages. 

But there are other implications of Sinwar’s assassination beyond the zero-sum analysis of will there or won’t there be a ceasefire.

Hamas’s ability to fight

At present, everyone has an opinion on how Sinwar’s killing will affect Hamas and its ability to resist and respond to Israel’s military. His death will have been a major blow – symbolically, operationally, and psychologically. Hamas has been downgraded and its capacity to respond compromised.

But it will recover, regenerate and retaliate in time – and Sinwar’s death will have been no surprise to Palestinians in Gaza or elsewhere. Hamas is accustomed to seeing its leaders assassinated. Since its formation in 1987, it has been ‘decapitated’ many times, only to continue with its mission to ‘liberate Palestine’.

Hamas’s portrayal of Sinwar dying in his fatigues, head wrapped in a keffiyeh and resisting until the end will persuade many young Palestinians that he died as a martyr serving the Palestinian cause. Many will be inspired to join and fortify the ranks of Hamas as a result.

The IDF’s release of drone footage showing Sinwar’s last moments will have done nothing to undermine his credibility. 

On the contrary, it will serve as a rallying call to disaffected and disenfranchised young Palestinians horrified by Israel’s bombing of civilian targets in Gaza and disaffected with Fatah’s inability to prevent Israeli settler expansion and violence in the West Bank.

Reconciliation

Some hope that if Sinwar is replaced by a more ‘moderate’ leader, his killing may smooth the path to Hamas–Fatah reconciliation – and that this could provide a foundation for a patchwork political solution when Israel and Gaza arrive at the ‘day after.’  

But the idea that a downgraded and ‘leaderless’ Hamas will be susceptible to international pressure to reconcile with Fatah is divorced from reality.  

Prospective new Hamas leaders such as Khaled al Meshaal and Khalil al-Hayya are based in Qatar. 

They may be more pliable to external pressure to reconcile with Fatah in search of a political outcome, but their ability to influence events on the ground in Gaza will be limited. That was demonstrated by the Sinwar-orchestrated attacks on 7 October 2023, which took place without the blessing of the exiled leadership in Doha.

Hamas has long gone to ground in Gaza and become far more decentralized than it was before 7 October. It is now more typical of an insurgency, where Hamas cadres exercise a great degree of operational autonomy.

In other words, the disconnect between Hamas in Gaza and its political leadership in Qatar has only grown wider since this round of conflict started.

International efforts

That will undermine international efforts made by Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China, Russia and others to bring about a reconciliation. Moscow and Beijing already hosted reconciliation talks in February and April early this year but made no progress in closing the chasm between the two parties. Saudi Arabia has also hosted talks.

The three Arab states, none of which have so far commented publicly on Sinwar’s killing, will likely view his death as an opportunity to bolster the political wing of Hamas – backing it with pledges of political, diplomatic and financial support.

Saudi Arabia and Egypt will have next to no influence over the succession process, but Qatar’s long-established relationship with the political wing of Hamas affords it leverage over the organization, albeit limited. They may be able to strengthen the hand of those based in Doha by promising to work harder at securing a ceasefire, guaranteeing the provision of humanitarian relief, and working towards a political solution.

Trust in US democracy is at stake in this election Expert comment rgold.drupal 23 October 2024

A narrow win for either side could make things worse. The rest of the world should be prepared for a disruptive transition.

With less than two weeks to election day in the United States, polls suggest the gap between Harris and Trump has narrowed even further in the swing states where the election will be decided. A fierce contest has ensued as each campaign seeks to drive voter turnout. In such a tight race, this will be decisive. But in an election that many Americans perceive as being existential for the country’s future, a narrow victory by either side will heighten the risk of a contested election.

Many Americans are pessimistic about the ability of democracy to deliver a reliable result. Two thirds of Republican voters continue to believe that the 2020 election was stolen from Donald Trump and for many of these, Biden’s inauguration may have demonstrated the weakness, not the strength, of US democracy. 

This environment has contributed to widespread anticipation of a contested election, as well as preparations for the possibility of a delayed result. Political disinformation and deep polarization across the country could mean that a narrow victory leads to more legal challenges and even political violence.  6 January, the anniversary of the assault on the US Capitol and the day Congress will certify the Electoral College has been designated a National Special Security Event. 

The issue of how quickly and reliably votes are certified has become an arena for argument. In the 2022 midterms, 22 county officials in key states voted to delay certification. Democrats have noted with alarm that this year, around 70 pro-Trump election ‘conspiracists’ are positioned to review the results in swing states.

Those nervous about the possibility of a narrow vote being overturned will be watching to see if Republicans maintain or increase their majority in the House of Representatives, since the newly elected House will shape who holds the gavel when a joint session of Congress returns to certify the US presidential election result. Republican control of the House could give the former president more ability to influence this vote. 

A resilient democracy

But there should be room for optimism. Democracy in America has been remarkably resilient. In 2016, Democrats swallowed their unease with Donald Trump. Despite rumours of Russian interference in the election, they accepted the election result.

Four years later, the US was far more polarized, trust in institutions had decreased, and challenges to the elections reflected this. The Trump campaign filed more than 60 lawsuits in 9 states challenging election processes and voter certification. In every single case, courts confirmed the results.  After the 6 January insurrection on the US Capitol, Congress returned to its chambers and, on the very same day, confirmed the electoral results. 

If fears of another contested election materialise, it will be the third time in recent history that the US has struggled to confirm a result. In 2000, the Supreme Court intervened to decide on a recount in Florida, effectively delivering victory to George W Bush – a memory alongside the 6 January Capitol riots contributing to America’s anxiety ahead of polling day. 

International response

The US’s partners and rivals may be ill-prepared for a contested election. 

If Trump or Harris, or both, claim victory before it is clearly settled, world leaders will need to decide how to react. Diplomatic protocol may dictate that leaders wait until the US confirms the results through official channels but there are concerns that not everyone will play by these rules. 

US election rhetoric on migration undermines Washington’s soft power in Latin America Expert comment jon.wallace 23 October 2024

As US public opinion hardens, the Democratic party takes a tougher stance, and Donald Trump proposes mass deportations, Latin American leaders note a lack of long-term policy.

The US’s broken immigration system has become a central theme of the 2024 election campaign. But the discussion on immigration, undocumented immigrants, and asylum seekers – increasingly lurching into dehumanizing rhetoric – extends beyond US borders. 

As one former senior director of the National Security Council told me, ‘when the president travels or meets with heads of state from Latin America what comes up –regardless of the country – isn’t US–Cuba policy or even trade. It’s immigration’. How the US talks about and treats citizens of Latin American and the Caribbean matters to elected politicians in the region. 

The roots of the US immigration debate go deep and will not be easily resolved, even with a sweeping reform of the system. 

According to a January 2024 Pew survey, 78 per cent of Americans ‘say the large number of migrants seeking to enter the country at the Mexico border is either a crisis (45 per cent) or a major problem (32 per cent)’. Worries about the border are not limited to Republican voters: 73 per cent of Democrats feel that the issue is either a crisis or major problem. 

Despite the heated popular temperature, the numbers of undocumented immigrants encountered at the US–Mexico border has actually dropped in recent months. US Customs and Border Protection (USCBP) reported 301,981 encounters with irregular border crossings in December 2023; by August 2024 this had dropped to 107,473.  

Nevertheless, illegal border crossings have increased under Biden. During his administration USCBP reported 8 million encounters along the Mexico border compared to 2.5 million under Donald Trump. 

Mexico

Any attempt to address the issue promises to affect US relations with Mexico, requiring the cooperation of newly elected president Claudia Sheinbaum. Her predecessor and founder of her Morena party, leftist Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO), proved an unexpectedly cooperative partner for the previous Trump administration and Biden White House. 

But that came at a cost, particularly for Biden. In return for AMLO’s cooperation, the US soft-pedalled criticism over his failures to disrupt narcotics trafficking and criminal networks and for his steady weakening of checks on executive power. 

Mexico’s borders with other countries are also under pressure. Mexico remains the primary sending country to the US. But political repression and insecurity in countries including Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala and Venezuela has pushed their citizens to travel across Mexico to the US. Economic collapse and humanitarian crises in Cuba and Venezuela have further fuelled the flight.

Rhetoric

The Kamala Harris and Trump campaigns have struck different positions on how to stem the flow of illegal immigration. But as US public opinion shifts, both parties are talking tougher. 

Harris is continuing Biden’s hardening stance, including the controversial move to bar those who cross the border illegally from applying for asylum. 

Biden’s early ‘roots’ strategy, to provide economic and security support in countries from where migrants are travelling, has fallen by the wayside. 

The Trump campaign is taking more extreme positions. The Republican presidential candidate mentions immigration in almost every campaign speech. 

He proposes to carry out the ‘largest deportation in US history’, using ICE personnel, the National Guard and local police forces to round up undocumented immigrants, including in their workplaces. 

The campaign has also pledged to end birth-right citizenship and Biden’s programme of parole for humanitarian reasons. Trump also plans to restore his first term policies including construction of the border wall. 

Trump’s proposals provide little opportunity for a broad, bipartisan consensus on immigration. Should he win in November he is likely, as he did in his first term, to attempt to push his policies via executive action, opening up challenges in federal court. 

A Harris victory would at least create space for the resurrection of the Biden administration’s 2024 immigration enforcement bill, originally supported by moderate Republican leadership in the Senate, but defeated following pressure from Trump. 

The bill would have toughened enforcement at the border – increasing funding for detention centres, asylum hearings and for local governments and border patrols. It would also permit ICE to shut down the border when crossings surpassed an average of 5,000 per day or 8,500 on a single day.

Undermining US influence

But such legislation, while promising to address domestic US perceptions of the crisis, threatens to reduce US soft power in Latin America. That would be counterproductive at a time when the US is attempting to consolidate global support in its competition with China and conflict with Russia. 

For Latin American leaders, US rhetoric on immigration rankles. The priorities of Latin American and Caribbean leaders and their voters are long term: economic growth, improved security, and climate change. These issues require investment and commitment from an engaged and reliable US partner. Sadly, Latin Americans can see such issues are not on the domestic agenda in US politics. 

To improve regional perceptions of US intentions after the election, new policy should seek to address the root causes of migration. That will require a multi-pronged, bipartisan approach that focuses attention and resources on US neighbours south of the border.  

The US’s immigration system will need to broaden paths for legal immigration to meet US labour needs, while delivering increased support for border security, and accelerated (and humane) processes for detaining and repatriating illegal border crossers and asylum claims.  

But any sustainable answer also requires addressing the multifaceted reasons driving migrants north. Any future US administration will need to risk unpopularity with some voters at home and engage with sending countries and their neighbours. 

Safeguarding Europe: how to defeat and deter Russia 10 December 2024 — 10:00AM TO 7:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 October 2024 Chatham House

Threat assessment and practical solutions.

Nearly three years into Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, the security picture for Europe remains uncertain. Questions of European states’ own resilience and ability to counter Russia and support Ukraine have not been adequately answered by key European powers. So how can European states act proactively to support not only Ukraine but also their own security?

Key questions:

• How resilient is Europe to the challenge posed by Russia?
• What more can be done to defend EU candidate states?
• What will be the impact of the US election results?
• What deters Russia? What have we learnt from Russia’s war on Ukraine?
• Are the current approaches sufficient?

This one-day, in-person conference at Chatham House will bring together experts and policymakers from across the UK, EU and US, as well as drawing from the expertise of Russian analysts in exile. Alongside analysis of Russia’s intentions towards Europe and European strategy, there will be opportunity for in-depth conversation with experts on the geopolitical and defence tools available to European states.

This conference will be hosted in-person, with the recording of the keynote address made available on the website following the event.

Participants will be selected based on expertise. Please wait for confirmation before attending.

Corporate organisations who currently do not support the Russia-Eurasia Programme or Ukraine Forum will be subject to a fee. Your registration will be reviewed by a member of our team before it is approved.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

Independent Thinking: Will debt constrain Western foreign policy? Audio john.pollock 24 October 2024

Patrick Wintour and Ranil Dissanayake join the podcast ahead of the UK Budget to discuss the high debt facing G7 economies and its impact on foreign, defence and development policies.

On this episode

Ahead of a crucial Budget by Chancellor Rachel Reeves, UK national debt is at almost 100 per cent of GDP – and it’s not alone. Many G7 economies face massive debt levels, restricting ambitions when it comes to foreign policy and global engagement. 

Bronwen Maddox is joined by Patrick Wintour, the Guardian’s diplomatic editor and Ranil Dissanayake, a senior research fellow at the Centre for Global Development. With them are Olivia O’Sullivan and David Lubin from Chatham House.

About Independent Thinking

Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts, Spotify.

In conversation with James Manyika, Senior Vice President of Research, Technology and Society at Google 12 December 2024 — 11:15AM TO 12:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

A conversation on AI’s global, societal and economic impacts.

2024 has been a landmark year for Artificial Intelligence (AI) development, deployment and use, with significant progress in AI-driven science, governance and cooperation. Looking ahead, AI continues to demonstrate economic promise and potential to expand on scientific breakthroughs in areas such as climate and health. This wave of innovation is occurring against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty and not all countries are fully able to participate. Heading into 2025, there are urgent questions about how best to maximise shared opportunities when it comes to AI and to advance global cooperation.

James Manyika, Senior Vice President of Research, Technology & Society at Google, will unpack what 2025 will bring for AI in science, economics, global governance and international cooperation. 

Key questions include:

• What will be AI’s global societal and economic impact in 2025 and beyond? 
• What are the ways AI could help increase economic growth and economy-wide productivity? What factors must be in place for this to happen?
• How best can we maximise shared opportunities and advance global cooperation when it comes to AI? Where can public-private partnerships unlock scientific breakthroughs for societal progress, combatting shared global challenges such as climate change and global health issues?  
• What are the principles of safe, responsible AI, and how should companies remain responsive to their evolution and integrate them into technology design and implementation? 
• What is the current – and ideal – role of technology companies in emerging mechanisms for global cooperation and national governance on AI?

This event is being held in partnership with Google.

You will receive notice by 13:00 on Wednesday 11 December if you have been successful in securing an in-person place.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

As the ruling party claims victory in Georgia’s disputed election, Western condemnation is no longer enough Expert comment LToremark 29 October 2024

As tens of thousands take to the streets to protest the election results, Georgia faces a familiar crisis – with a few key differences.

As the people of Georgia went to the polls on 26 October, many were hoping not only for a democratic change of government but also for an end to one-party dominance and a return to the path of European integration. The previously weak and divided opposition had grouped itself into four major electoral centres, promising a coalition government and framing these elections as a choice between Europe and Russia. 

Ahead of the election, President Salome Zourabishvili had put forward the Georgian Charter, a blueprint for a stable and democratic transition to a new style of governance and for initiating reforms to fulfil conditions for EU accession. It was signed by all pro-European and pro-Western opposition parties. 

The official election results gave the ruling Georgian Dream party a 54 per cent majority in contrast with exit polls that gave the opposition a 10 per cent lead. President Zourabishvili and the opposition parties refuse to recognize the results, beginning a long process of contestation with allegations of fraud and street protests. As the disappointment sets in and the streets once again replace the ballot box as a conduit for democratic change, there is a sense of déja vu.

Georgia has seen this before. A party sweeps to power on the tide of popular protest, initiates reforms to meet public expectations but, by the end of its second term, it takes an authoritarian turn. As it overstays its welcome, it starts manipulating elections to cling to power. People once again take to the streets and a new party wins by a landslide only to repeat the same cycle. But with each turn, the grip the ruling elites have on power gets stronger and the methods they use become more sophisticated. State security becomes equated with regime stability, leaving no space for normal democratic contestation or expressions of dissent. 

Although what is happening in Georgia fits this familiar pattern, there are some consequential differences. 

First, these were the first fully proportional elections. Previously, a mixed system of representation meant that the incumbency always had an advantage by dominating majoritarian districts. A new electoral system had created a not unreasonable expectation that these elections, if held freely, would result in a coalition government. The hope was this could help break the vicious cycle of Georgian politics, sustained by an extreme form of majoritarianism and a winner-takes-all political culture.

The Georgian Dream party was contesting its fourth consecutive term against a backdrop of falling popularity and growing societal mobilization in opposition to its authoritarian inclinations. Despite all this, it secured – some would insist manufactured – an absolute majority in elections that international observers say were marred by serious irregularities and fell short of democratic standards. 

The second important difference is that these elections were not only about saving Georgia’s democracy but also about rescuing its European perspective. Since Georgia was granted EU candidate status in December 2023, its parliament has adopted Russian-style laws on foreign agents and combating LGBTIQ+ ‘propaganda’. 

It has also adopted a strongly Eurosceptic political discourse, pushing back on international criticism and accusing EU and US officials of interference in domestic affairs and disregard for Georgia’s sovereignty. In response, the EU has suspended accession talks with Georgia indefinitely while the US has imposed targeted sanctions on high-ranking Georgian officials and judges. 

Georgia’s democratic backsliding at home and its pivot away from the West are both simultaneous and interrelated. It was widely hoped these elections would be a course correction and return Georgia to the path of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The election results, if they stick, will prevent this from happening. A Georgian Dream government will not work to fulfil conditions for EU accession, viewed as a challenge to its hold on power. 

The third and final difference is that these elections took place in the context of heightened geopolitical confrontation. The Georgian Dream ‘victory’ is a win for anti-liberal, conservative forces around the world championed, among others, by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. He was the first to congratulate Georgian Dream for its declared success and even visited Tbilisi in a show of solidarity and ideological alignment. 

The election result is also a win for Russia. It strengthens Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus, which has waned as a result of the war in Ukraine and the fall of Nagorny-Karabakh. Russian officials and propagandist were quick to congratulate Georgian Dream, wishing them success in standing up to Western pressures and offering help in case things got tough. 

From Moscow’s perspective, Georgia’s elections are part of a global hybrid war. They represent a local battle in the ongoing geopolitical contest between Russia and the West, between the rules-based global order and competitive multipolarity. 

As Georgia repeats a familiar pattern, what do the election results mean for its future? While clear predictions are difficult at this stage, it is worth bearing in mind that as the democratic resilience of the Georgian society has strengthened over time, so too has the state capacity to supress and control. 

Independent Thinking: Why is North Korea sending troops to Russia? Audio john.pollock 31 October 2024

Orysia Lutsevych, Edward Howell and Yossi Mekelberg discuss North Korean troops fighting with Russian forces against Ukraine, as well as the issue of military conscription.

On this episode

North Korea is sending troops to Russia, but what is Kim Jong-Un hoping to get from Vladmir Putin for this military assistance against Ukraine? The panel also discuss the role military conscription plays in Israel, South Korea and Ukraine’s defence.

Bronwen Maddox is joined by Edward Howell, the Korea Foundation fellow at Chatham House, Orysia Lutsevych, the head of our Ukraine Forum and Yossi Mekelberg, a senior consulting fellow with our Middle East and North Africa Programme.

About Independent Thinking

Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts, Spotify.

Harris and Trump's shared goal masks a fundamental AI policy divide Expert comment rgold.drupal 3 November 2024

Both presidential candidates will pursue US tech dominance but differ on the means to achieve it.

There remain some differences between the US presidential candidates’ positions on the governance of artificial intelligence and other emerging technology, notably around competition. 

But under either future administration, US decision-making looks set to be heavily influenced by growing securitization, the aims of the US technology industry and broader competition with China. 

‘Safe’ AI development 

Vice President Kamala Harris attended the inaugural Global AI Safety summit in the UK in 2023, where she announced President Joe Biden’s Executive Order on AI. This significant move by the federal government sought to define national and cyber security guidelines for AI developers and outline privacy and transparency guarantees. It also committed the federal government to a review of the National Security implications of this emerging technology, which was published last week.

In her remarks at the summit, Harris was clear that her definitions of safety extended beyond catastrophic risk mitigation to societal and personal harm. She noted the corrosive effects of some algorithmic decision-making and disinformation on democracy, appealing for AI that is developed ‘in the service of the public interest’.

A number of initiatives developed during the Biden administration have attempted to steer emerging technology as it takes root in society. This includes the establishment of the US AI Safety Institute, various schemes on global AI governance and investment in Public AI projects like the National AI Research Resource (NAIRR).

The US public is largely supportive: polling by the AI Policy Institute (AIPI) points to a majority preference for safety standards governing the US effort to lead in AI, rather than pedal-to-the-metal development. Investment in public options on AI and the infrastructure required to develop and sustain it is a bold direction that the incoming administration should consider expanding.

Biden’s Executive Order on AI has come under fire by the Trump campaign. At a rally in Iowa, Trump explained that he would cancel the order ‘on day one’, echoing a Republican platform that described it as imposing ‘Radical Leftwing ideas’ . 

Trump does, however, have his own track record in technology policy. During his first presidency, his administration passed an Executive Order on AI, stressing that ‘continued American leadership in Artificial Intelligence is of paramount importance to maintaining the economic and national security of the United States’. The tools and institutions announced as part of the order – including AI research investment, national AI research institutes and AI regulatory guidance including on federal use of AI – echo those of the current administration. 

Four years is a long time in AI, however. As the power of this technology is revealed, talk of safety may give way to talk of security. While the candidates may disagree on the role of the federal government in setting standards, there will be close alignment on the central need for US supremacy in national security. Neither administration seems likely to erect barriers to securitization of AI should it emerge as a critical strategic asset.

AI regulation at home 

American industry will remain the pivotal force shaping the US AI ecosystem, particularly as America jostles for position as the maker of the global rules governing AI. A notable aspect of Biden’s AI Executive Order was where it staked responsibility. Reports by AI and Cloud companies on the safety of their tools and infrastructure are sent to the Department of Commerce.

Under Secretary Gina Raimondo, whose star continues to rise, the department has become significantly more engaged with technology companies. In the absence of any other legal authority, AI governance has therefore sat under the purview of a secretary who herself has noted that they are ‘not a regulator’. 

The trend of industry leaders driving the government agenda on AI is replicated in other departments. There was an outcry over the composition of the new Department of Homeland Security advisory panel, the Artificial Intelligence and Security Board, with civil society groups concerned about the preponderance of industry voices: the 22-member panel includes the CEOs of OpenAI, Anthropic, NVIDIA, IBM, AWS, Adobe, Microsoft and Alphabet.

Under a Harris presidency, these trends seem likely to continue. Plus with deadlock in Congress probable, establishing new legal authorities for emerging technology will be difficult. That will likely mean emerging tech governance remains heavily influenced by the Department for Commerce. 

Like Harris, Trump has his allies in industry. While the Biden administration has courted the CEOs of AI companies who have historically spoken out in favour of regulation, Trump’s allies tend towards a more deregulatory agenda. 

Silicon Valley billionaires Elon Musk and Marc Andreessen have backed Trump’s plans to minimize AI regulation, lauding his support for ‘little tech’. They have also backed reported plans for so-called ‘Manhattan Projects’ to develop military technology, stewarded by ‘industry-led’ agencies. Trump’s aversion to strong regulatory institutions may mean an end to Biden’s anti-trust efforts, benefitting the biggest voices in the room, though his VP pick may disagree. JD Vance has somewhat surprisingly come out strongly in defence of the current chair of the Federal Trade Commission, Lina Khan, and her anti-trust efforts targeting US big tech.

Regardless, business interests will likely shape either a Harris or Trump administration’s approach as the US grapples with balancing the ambitions of its industry with an increasingly protectionist stance towards its biggest import market, China.

Competition abroad

China looms large in the imaginations of both campaigns. 

The US has signalled to its allies that American AI standards should replace Chinese standards. Export controls on semiconductors were expanded in September this year, with key voices in the industry – notably the Netherlands, Japan and South Korea – describing the restrictions as ‘economically motivated’ despite nominally being tied to national security by the US. 

The UK needs to address growth and debt problems if it is to match resources to ambitions on international priorities Expert comment LJefferson 5 November 2024

The budget marks the lowest amount in decades the country has spent on development, and it is struggling to fund other international priorities too.

The UK’s Chancellor Rachel Reeves unveiled her much-anticipated budget last week, the first of the new Labour government. Labour is in a difficult place. There are numerous calls on the public purse and public services are not performing well. Meanwhile, public debt remains close to 100 per cent of GDP, and there has been a long run of sluggish growth.
 
Reeves argues with some justification that the previous government left her a challenging inheritance – gaps in this year’s spending plans, and persistent debt questions left unresolved. More importantly, there are longer-term concerns about the sustainability of UK public spending – the country’s Office for Budget Responsibility has warned public debt could triple by the 2070s due to an ageing population, the climate crisis, and security risks. The focus has understandably been on kitchen table questions about tax rises and funding public services.
 
But this picture also has longstanding implications for international policy – on whether the UK can afford to invest in its foreign policy. The Chancellor did announce an increase of £2.9bn for defence. But the question of whether the UK can get on a sustainable path to spending 2.5 per cent of GDP on defence is still being worked through in the ongoing Strategic Review, and remains challenging despite increasingly urgent warnings from parliamentary committees about the UK’s defence readiness.

The budget also marks one of the lowest amounts in recent years the UK will spend on development overseas, despite setting an ambition to reset relations with the Global South and recover the UK’s role as a leader in international development.
  
The UK needs to either match resources to ambition, spend much more efficiently, or, in the case of the aid budget, it could seek to focus on priorities that are less dependent on spending. But even this will still require consistent resources, alongside significant diplomatic attention, intellectual leadership, and focus.

Longer-term, the UK may need to consider larger questions: addressing broader problems with its lack of growth and productivity will be critical to fund an expansive international role.

With this budget, UK aid spent overseas is at a historic low

In 2020 the UK government cut its goal for spending on international development to 0.5 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI), ending a longstanding policy of spending 0.7 per cent. Labour have echoed this, promising to only return to previous levels when fiscal circumstances allow.
 
But this masks a bigger issue. Since 2022, significant amounts of the UK’s aid budget have been spent on accommodation for asylum seekers in the UK. This is within the rules governing aid, but reduces the amount spent on reducing poverty overseas. In 2023 this spending was 28 per cent of the £15.4bn aid budget. In 2016, it was 3.2 per cent. 

Previous Chancellor Jeremy Hunt quietly allowed a top-up of aid spending over the last two fiscal years to offset how much is being spent at home on asylum seeker accommodation. That provided an additional £2.5 billion for 2022–23 and 2023–24.

But Rachel Reeves declined to provide extra funding this time, meaning the amount being spent overseas is likely the lowest its been since 2007 – an effective cut – under a Labour government.

The Minister for Development, Anneliese Dodds, speaking at Chatham House last month, said the government is working on clearing the backlog of asylum claims, which should free up more to spend overseas.

But beyond this there has been little clarity on plans to address the issue. And costs for asylum seeker accommodation have increased significantly – the UK appears to spend much more than comparator countries per head, according to the Center for Global Development, raising questions about how this spending is managed.

Development is not just about money – but money is important

The UK debate about development has often focused on the 0.7 per cent figure, which can distract from larger questions about what development policy is intended to achieve. As many experts have argued, development aid is about more than spending, and the wider, complex process by which the UK contributes to broad-based growth and stability for poorer countries is not about hitting a specific number.
 
There are things the UK can do that aren’t about spending more directly. This might include focusing on priorities like reforming multilateral development banks so they provide more low-cost public finance, and more flexible and agile loans to poorer countries – a priority echoed by Dodds. It might also incorporate focusing more broadly on helping developing countries attract more investment to bolster growth. 

There is also the issue of developing country debt, much of which is held by the private sector. Dodds previously said, when she was shadow chancellor, she might consider changing the law to address this issue. However,  she declined to recommit to this when questioned at Chatham House. 

None of this can be done unilaterally – on debt, for example, the UK has spearheaded some creative policies. Its UK Export Finance body developed climate-resilient debt clauses – agreements that countries can pause debt repayments in the event of a climate shock – but the UK holds limited amounts of developing country debt. Impact will only come by galvanizing and coordinating others to adopt similar approaches.

Independent Thinking: What does Donald Trump’s re-election mean for the world? Audio john.pollock 8 November 2024

Edward Luce, Leslie Vinjamuri and Gerald Seib join the podcast this week to discuss Donald Trump’s victory over Kamala Harris in the US presidential election.

On this episode

Donald Trump has decisively defeated Kamala Harris in the US presidential election. What does his return to the White House mean for America and the world? 

Bronwen Maddox is joined by Edward Luce, the FT’s North America editor, Gerald Seib, the former Washington bureau chief of The Wall Street Journal and Leslie Vinjamuri, the head of our US and Americas programme.

About Independent Thinking

Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts, Spotify.

Can Trump do a deal with Putin on Ukraine? Expert comment jon.wallace 12 November 2024

The Kremlin is signalling that it is ready to talk to the incoming US administration. But Trump may find Russia’s terms make him look unacceptably weak.

The nervousness of Ukrainian leadership is understandable. Since Donald Trump’s re-election, Russian President Vladimir Putin has lost no time in preparing the ground for a direct discussion between the US and Russia about the terms for peace in Ukraine – although reports at the weekend that Trump has recently spoken to Putin by phone were swiftly denied by the Kremlin.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has made determined efforts in recent months to persuade Trump that Ukraine’s future is worth fighting for. But there is no sign that his messages have brought about a change of heart. 

Trump appears to have no sympathy for Ukraine and no interest in the country – beyond preventing further US commitments to its defence. (Since February 2022, the US has provided $175 billion of economic and military aid to Kyiv, around 7 per cent of total allocated defence spending during that time).

Trump clearly regards Ukraine as an opportunity to demonstrate his power to US voters. If he can bring Putin to the table and end a war that in his view serves no purpose for the American people, it will also boost his claim that he can prevent World War 3.

Seen from Kyiv, the power relationship works in reverse. Putin is drawing Trump – said to be susceptible to flattery – into a negotiation to resolve an issue of great personal importance to him. The Russian president knows the issues in intimate detail, whereas Zelenskyy has genuine reason to fear that Trump might agree to terms whose consequences he does not fully understand.

Putin’s objectives

Putin has not deviated from his goals stated at the start of the full-scale invasion. These are the demilitarization of Ukraine and the replacement of Zelenskyy and his government by a leadership that accepts Moscow’s diktat (‘denazification’).

Putin’s highest priority for talks will be to ensure Ukraine’s neutrality. This will require a firm commitment that Ukraine will not join NATO in the foreseeable future. He will also seek to restrict the size of Ukrainian armed forces and prevent the stationing of foreign troops on Ukrainian territory. 

Putin will also hope to consolidate Russia’s grip on the Crimean peninsula by winning recognition of his annexation of Ukrainian territory. He will likely demand control of those parts of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions not yet occupied by Russian forces, perhaps trading occupied territories in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia for Ukrainian-held territory in Russia’s Kursk Region.

Lastly, Putin will want sanctions relief. The Russian economy has managed to adapt to US sanctions and reduce their effect, but they are a significant burden on the country’s development. 

The loss of access to Western technology and equipment has halted several major industrial products. If sanctions remain in place, such effects will become more pronounced.

Trump might readily agree to these terms. But to do so without evidence of reciprocal flexibility by Putin will expose him to accusations of naivety and weakness as a negotiator. 

Trump could easily brush aside claims that he was outsmarted by Putin. But a charge that he was a weak negotiator would offend his vanity and damage his image in the view of Chinese policymakers – who will be watching closely. 

It is fair to assume that Trump will want to avoid this perception since he has worked hard to create the impression that China, Iran and others should continue to fear him in his second term.

Putin may therefore need to offer the US a sufficiently large incentive – an outcome that will allow both Washington and Moscow to claim an advantageous agreement. It is not clear what Putin could propose that would be affordable to him and satisfy Trump’s America First agenda. 

Ukrainian hopes

Shortly before the election, Trump spoke of the need to ‘un-unite’ Russia and China. The idea that Putin could help Washington by turning away from China is fantastical.

The relationship between Beijing and Moscow is far more complex than it appears on the surface. But the two share the common strategic goal of reducing the global influence of the US and its allies and have established much deeper relations since Trump left office in 2020.

It is also hard to see a new arms control proposal coming from Moscow that would interest Trump. The hope in Kyiv is that Trump will quickly recognize that the deal he would like to strike will not materialize because the underlying and connected issues – such as Russia–China relations – are more complex than he imagines. 

The one consolation for Ukrainians is that the Kremlin was disappointed by Trump during his first term, since despite his friendly signals no major results were achieved. The Trump administration supplied anti-tank weapons to Ukraine and fiercely opposed the building of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline connecting Russia and Germany.

Who Trump listens to

While Trump’s approach to negotiating with Moscow is likely to be highly personal and idiosyncratic, the preparation of talks will depend heavily on those he appoints to key positions. At this stage, it is unclear who in the new administration will be responsible for coordinating Russia policy and to what extent they might challenge Trump’s thinking.

The break-up of Scholz’s coalition government signals the end of Germany’s old economic model Expert comment jon.wallace 12 November 2024

The coalition could not agree how to fund new support for Ukraine and failed to fully implement the ‘Zeitenwende’. A new government must push through reform.

As Europeans were still processing Donald Trump’s victory in the 2024 US presidential election, an acrimonious break up occurred 4000 miles east of Washington DC.

Reports had been circulating for weeks about the fragile state of Germany’s ‘traffic light’ coalition government led by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, consisting of the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Green Party, and liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP).

The expectation had been that the coalition would hold on for a few more weeks and might even be given a new lease of life by Trump’s re-election. Instead, it collapsed on the day Trump’s win was confirmed. An unusually angry Scholtz announced in a live address that he had fired FDP Finance Minister Christian Lindner, effectively breaking up the coalition.

At the heart of the dispute was the so-called ‘debt brake’ – a constitutional mechanism which restricts Germany’s annual public deficit to 0.35 per cent of GDP. Lindner proposed a set of reforms which were unpalatable to the SPD and the Greens. 

In response, Scholz suggested declaring an emergency, which would have suspended the debt brake. That in turn was unacceptable to Lindner, leading to his sacking by the Chancellor.

Practically, this means the SPD and the Greens are now in a minority coalition, without agreement on the 2025 budget or the votes in parliament to pass it. They also still face the challenge of the debt brake.

A vote of confidence will take place in December, with elections to be held before the end of February 2025 latest.

The end of Germany’s economic model

At the root of Germany’s political crisis is the country’s economic model. For decades, Germany relied on a system that depended on cheap Russian gas, cheap imports of consumer goods from China, high-value exports – particularly in the automotive sector – and the US security umbrella.

With Russian energy no longer viable, the global economic landscape shifting, and Donald Trump on his way back to the White House, that model is no longer workable. And Germany’s economy is expected to contract by 0.2 per cent in 2024 – a contraction for the second year running.

The ‘Zeitenwende’, announced by Scholz in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, should have signalled a turnaround of both foreign and economic policy, given how much the two are interconnected. Yet on both fronts, too little changed.

Germany’s reliance on Russian gas did come to an abrupt end in 2022. And Germany is Ukraine’s second largest military aid donor after the US, while accepting the most Ukrainian refugees.

But the ‘Zeitenwende’ turnaround ended there. Scholz’s coalition government failed to prepare for long-term investment in defence at the levels required by creating an off-budget defence spending fund which would have run out in 2027. The draft budget for 2025 showed defence spending would have been cut, as would support for Ukraine.

Germany has also struggled to turn around its economic woes, with the car industry particularly affected. Cheap Chinese EVs and new energy technologies are competing with Germany’s most powerful companies. Volkswagen, the country’s largest car manufacturer, has announced plant closures and layoffs due to shrinking profit margins.  

To the west, Trump’s threat to impose 10 to 20 per cent tariffs on all EU imports meant share prices of Volkswagen, BMW, Mercedez-Benz and Porsche all dropped between 4 to 7 per cent following news of his re-election.

To the east, trade tensions between the EU and China are intensifying. Yet rather than choosing to diversify, German companies have doubled down on their bets in China, with German investment in the country rising from €6.5bn for the whole of 2023 to €7.3bn in the first half of 2024 alone – only exposing carmakers further.

Germany’s support for Ukraine

Like French President Emmanuel Macron, Scholz had already been weakened by the results of the European Parliamentary elections in June. With the collapse of his traffic light coalition, the EU’s Franco-German ‘engine’ is now well and truly stalled – until new leadership can be found. This weakness comes at a perilous moment when clear, united European leadership, and much increased funding, is needed to shore up support for Ukraine.