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E3 Cooperation Beyond Brexit: Challenging but Necessary

2 September 2020

Alice Billon-Galland

Research Associate, Europe Programme

Professor Richard G Whitman

Associate Fellow, Europe Programme
In the current uncertain strategic context for Europe, the E3 is establishing itself as a go-to format for diplomatic cooperation for Europe’s ‘big three’.

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British Prime Minister Boris Johnson (R), French President Emmanuel Macron (C) and German Chancellor Angela Merkel (L) speak upon their arrival for a round table meeting as part of an EU summit in Brussels on 17 October 2019. Photo by Olivier Matthys/Pool/AFP via Getty Images.

As the UK’s post-Brexit foreign policy takes shape, it is increasingly clear that joint cooperation with France and Germany will be of key importance. The current dispute with the US over imposing further sanctions on Iran shows that the UK values continuing strong cooperation with its European partners on key international issues, even at the cost of a major transatlantic dispute. Moreover, the recent first meeting of the German, French and British defence ministers in an E3 (European/EU 3) format signalled political commitment by all three partners to double down on joint diplomatic cooperation despite troubled UK-EU Brexit negotiations.

The UK working with France and Germany as part of the E3 has evolved in recent years from a shared approach to diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear programme to include a broader range of international security issues, such as the conflict in Syria and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. E3 cooperation has so far been largely low-key, marked by close relationships and daily contacts between officials rather than high-profile summits between the leaders of the three countries. In the absence of any EU-UK negotiations on a future foreign, security and defence policy relationship, the E3 represents a key arrangement for aligning and mobilizing Europe’s ‘big three’ states. In a recent Chatham House research paper, we argue that Germany, France and the UK could and should maintain the E3 as a platform for flexible diplomatic coordination and crisis response, and expand its focus to address a new set of thematic, regional or multilateral topics. These could range from further cooperation on arms control to a reform agenda for multilateral institutions or a joint approach to the broader European neighbourhood.

The E3 countries have complementary reasons for wanting to make the format work. France and Germany recognize that the high degree of shared foreign and security policy interests with the UK require a pragmatic format for close cooperation, to provide insurance against an underdeveloped EU-UK relationship, help efficiently combine European forces and bring added value to the EU and NATO – but also to see the UK aligned with Europe on major international issues. Close foreign and security policy relationships with France and Germany will remain of interest to the UK as well, in order for it to keep playing an effective role in European security and to work with like-minded partners on key international issues.

Brexit presents both a major challenge for the E3 relationship and a major rationale for developing the format further. Neither France nor Germany see E3 cooperation as a substitute for a deal on a future EU-UK relationship or for the development of the EU’s own foreign, security and defence policy. Failure to reach a Brexit deal and a collapse of the EU-UK relationship into hostility and antagonism could make E3 cooperation politically difficult in the short term. In the longer term, were the UK and the EU to adopt very different foreign and security policies, E3 cooperation would also make less sense.

Even if an agreement is reached on the future EU-UK relationship by the end of this year, for France and Germany the challenge will be to reconcile their work with the UK through the E3 with their commitment to the EU. France and Germany have different rationales for favouring E3 cooperation. While France is more relaxed about its intergovernmental approach and prioritizes deliverables, Germany is worried about the perceived competition between the E3 and the EU. However, they both share the view that E3 cooperation should complement rather than undermine EU foreign, security and defence policy cooperation, while acting to bridge or smooth cooperation between the EU and the UK. If E3 cooperation were to conflict with broader EU policy by generating hostility from excluded member states (such as Poland or Italy) and therefore distract from building consensus for broader EU initiatives, such as post-COVID economic recovery, E3 cooperation may falter.

Another key factor for the E3 will be the evolution of transatlantic relations, and whether the next US administration presents Europe with the dilemma of choosing between broad alignment with the US or open confrontation, as in the case of the Iran nuclear deal’s ‘snapback’ mechanism. As a non-EU state, the UK may have more autonomy to set its own policies but it will not be able to escape a choice between either a broad alliance with European states or a more ambivalent and ad-hoc relationship with the continent, while also creating new formats for cooperation with other democracies such as the Five Eyes states. This type of diplomatic ‘venue shopping’ could create tensions with European partners, especially Germany and France who hope to anchor London into a broad European approach. The UK’s ongoing Integrated Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review should provide clarity as to the UK’s future European ambitions and what that means for the E3.

Given the growing instability surrounding Europe, reinforced by an eventful summer 2020– with the Iran nuclear deal in limbo, renewed tensions between Turkey and Greece in the Mediterranean, protests in Belarus, increasing US-China rivalry and further instability in the Sahel – the E3 has recently been developing a more visible profile. By convening the first meeting of E3 defence ministers in August, Germany showed leadership and a commitment to the format despite its fears of hostility from other EU member states towards increased E3 cooperation. Officially widening E3 cooperation to include defence, while mostly symbolic for now, satisfies Berlin by marking a step towards institutionalization, appeases Paris by putting on the joint agenda issues such as the recent coup in Mali and the crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean, and shows some political commitment by London at a time of tense UK-EU Brexit negotiations.

France, the UK and Germany all agree that the E3 is a necessary cooperation format that needs to be developed further. Recent events seem to show willingness on the part of the three countries to make it work, both in spite of and because of upcoming Brexit tensions. Longer-term challenges – relating to intra-EU tensions over the role of the E3, the future EU-UK relationship and transatlantic divergences – are still to be addressed and managed for the format to reach its full potential. Nevertheless, in today’s uncertain strategic context for Europe, the E3 is establishing itself as a go-to format for cooperation for Europe’s ‘big three’.




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Saudi Leadership Must Focus on Innovation for the Future

16 September 2020

Dr Neil Quilliam

Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme
A glorious year beckoned for Saudi Arabia, in leading the G20 and hosting the G20 Leaders' Summit in Riyadh in November. Instead, empowering its people and capitalizing on its youth should become the focus for an embattled leadership.

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Meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors of the G20 nations in the Saudi capital Riyadh on February 23, 2020. Photo by FAYEZ NURELDINE/AFP via Getty Images.

The G20 summit in November was to be a moment when the world focused its attention on Saudi Arabia. As the leaders of the world's 20 largest economies came together for the first time in an Arab capital and presided over the world’s greatest challenges and opportunities, King Salman would have taken centre stage with his son and crown prince Mohammed bin Salman not far behind in the spotlight.

However this will now be a virtual summit, and that is probably a blessing in disguise for the kingdom and its leadership which has not enjoyed a good year. It shares responsibility for crashing the price of oil, which, in conjunction with COVID-19, has brought the global economy to its knees. And it continues to be mired in the Yemen conflict, whereas its ally the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has, by and large, managed to extract itself while also seeking to rescue its reputation by signing a ‘peace deal’ with Israel.

More recently, it has been forced to push back plans to host the next instalment of ‘Davos in Desert’ until 2021 and the crown prince’s flagship charity Misk is currently under review. The Public Investment Fund (PIF) made a wholly unsuccessful bid to secure a major stake in Newcastle United Football Club which brought an unfavourable ruling at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and a heap of damaging media attention.

Squandered opportunity

Nothing washes away the stain of Jamal Khashoggi’s murder or the continuing imprisonment of women and men charged with being traitors. But in many ways, leading the G20 offered the Saudi leadership, especially Mohammed bin Salman, a chance to press reset and atone for some of the excesses of his more controversial policies, such as the war in Yemen and blockade of Qatar. But he appears to have squandered the opportunity so far and there are no signs that is about to change.

Hosting the summit in Riyadh would have given Mohammed bin Salman an opportunity to try and recapture the heady days of 2018, when many of the world's leaders and even the media still viewed him as a force for good. He would have had a captive audience and, instead of staying away from Western capitals which he has chosen to do recently, he could have been feted by world leaders on his home turf. Moreover, the presidency agenda — empowering people, safeguarding the planet, and shaping new frontiers — would have lent itself to meaningful engagement on key policy issues.

Although many analysts and commentators quite rightly argue that Riyadh’s focus on empowerment and safeguarding the planet is widely hypocritical given the kingdom has lurched further towards quashing any signs of opposition and remains highly dependent upon hydrocarbons, at least the ambitious goals of Vision 2030 ought to align with the G20 agenda. The goals of Vision 2030 remain aspirational and are far from ever being met, but there is synchronicity between the two agendas. In fact, the overview of Saudi Arabia’s G20 Presidency documentation states ‘the G20 agenda has a strong echo in the daily lives of the people in the Kingdom’.

Saudi Arabia really needs to empower its people and capitalize upon its youth dividend but that requires, as so many have argued persuasively, long-term investment in education, training, and skills acquisition, and will not be achieved overnight. It needs strategic thinking, capacity-building, commitment, scope for course correction, and patience. There are no quick wins, no shortcuts.

Safeguarding the planet is common to one and all but breaking a dependency upon hydrocarbons, diversifying its economy, and mitigating against the growing impact of climate change are all pressing issues Saudi Arabia needs to address. A failure to achieve these goals in a time-sensitive fashion poses a threat to the well-being of the kingdom and, in order to do so, it must empower its people and use technology wisely to advance the process. Saudi Arabia should be at the front of the pack, but is being surpassed by its neighbours and is in danger of being left way behind.

With its wealth and youthful population, the kingdom can be at the cutting edge of shaping new frontiers. It can deploy its substantive funds to support its own innovators and — to borrow the jargon — create an ecosystem that not only offers Saudis an environment fostering creativity, but also one that draws talent into the kingdom.

This does not mean investing in ‘white elephant’ projects that fail to spark the imagination of Saudis, or following the crowd to buy football clubs without rhyme or reason. It means gearing up to address everyday issues that preoccupy minds of Saudis, such as employment, housing, healthcare, and the well-being of family members. It is notable how the excitement of ‘bread and circus’ issues has abated and the focus moved once again towards family, faith and finance.

The Saudi presidency of the G20 is in danger of passing by with a whimper and the November summit may now be unremarkable. This does not mean the hard work of the continuously active engagement groups will go unnoticed or to waste, but it does mean the photo-opportunity will be passed up and the joint statement garner less interest than usual.

While it may feel like a lost opportunity for the kingdom and, in particular, Mohammed bin Salman, they should both breathe a sigh of relief. In many ways, they will be let off the hook by avoiding the direct scrutiny of the world’s media and human rights organizations. However, the crown prince could still seize the initiative given the spotlight will be on him, albeit from afar, and take bold steps towards resolving the thorny issues that have come to mar his pathway to power.




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Not the same old African story

Not the same old African story The World Today mhiggins.drupal 2 August 2022

Nollywood studio boss Mo Abudu and author Dipo Faloyin discuss how Africans are redefining how the world sees them.

Mo Abudu
EbonyLife’s latest TV drama series, Blood Sisters, was in Netflix’s global top 10. It’s a thriller and it may be slightly melodramatic because we Nigerians are melodramatic. But it deals with universal themes. Nigerians are no different to anyone else. I want EbonyLife productions increasingly to appeal to anyone in the world, even if it’s in our language. Oloture, one of our films, was about human trafficking. It was all done in pidgin English and subtitled. I watch a lot of Korean dramas and Spanish dramas that are subtitled. A good story is a good story.

Dipo Faloyin
The influence that African countries have had on the West, from music, food and film to literature, science and technology, is something people find difficult to take seriously. So, it’s good to see Netflix and other production companies take it more seriously. How has your discussion with them changed since the early days?

Mo Abudu
I have been going to an entertainment market in Cannes called Mipcom for about 12 years, and at first no one had any interest in African content. So, we focused on doing local content for local markets. Now, different communities around the world want representation in content that speaks to them. Specific countries are also saying to streamers: ‘What’s your local content strategy?’ 

I’m not telling broadcasters to commission original African content as a charity project – they can make money from this

Mo Abudu


Netflix was the first of the streamers to come into Africa, and it now has an Africa office. Amazon has also made inroads recently. Disney is arriving. In the United States and Britain, they just need to maintain subscriber numbers, but real growth for them is going to be in Asia and Africa. 

I’m not telling broadcasters or distributors to commission original African content as a charity project – they can make money from this. Within five days of launch, Blood Sisters registered 11 million hours of viewing on Netflix around the world. It was made on a budget five times smaller than productions outside Africa. But we need to be among the gatekeepers, too. 

Moving beyond Hollywood

Dipo Faloyin
The challenge that many creatives across Africa have is that people [elsewhere] don’t necessarily feel like they relate to this continent. They see ‘Africa’ and its cultures as very distant. Instead of intricate, specific stories, simple stories of simple people have been pushed about the continent. 

I still get asked questions like, ‘But, what should we do about Africa’s problems?’ My response is, ‘Stop seeing Africa as just a problem.’ 

A still from the Nigerian film ‘Oloture’, released in 2022, which deals with issues of human trafficking.

Mo Abudu
I was speaking at the Qatar Economic Forum recently and the panel started off talking about the ‘problems of Africa’ – and I had to jump in and say, ‘I get you guys talking about the problems, I’m not an economist, I’m just an entrepreneur, but from an entrepreneurial perspective, we have resources – like cobalt from the Democratic Republic of Congo that’s in all of our mobile phones.’ 

The problem is, we ship out all our resources and by the time they come back to us, they are 10-times more expensive than we can afford. I keep saying that they need to know they need us as much as we need them.
 
Dipo Faloyin
There are certainly issues within the continent like there are everywhere else; but more accurate stories will help people have a better sense of the context in which so many communities and their lives have been built up. 

Mo Abudu
The West doesn’t seem to have any interest in making films about Africa unless it’s about the worst of Africa: the slave trade, the Rwandan genocide, blood diamonds. That seems to be what has defined us. 

Dipo Faloyin
If you ask most people around the world to close their eyes and picture Africa, two images will come up: safari, and poverty and strife. Until the age of 12, I grew up in Lagos, a metropolis with no wild animals running around. There are slums, of course, but also traffic, shopping centres and overpriced restaurants. 

Writers who pitch ideas to Vice.com where I work often still don’t differentiate African countries. They’ll say, ‘There’s been a coup in Mali. Why can’t Africa get its head around democracy?’, and I remind them a small minority of countries on the continent is under any form of authoritarian rule. 

It’s frustrating that this perception hasn’t changed. For us to break through we need big cultural institutions – Hollywood, museums, literature – to allow people from across the regions to tell these stories. We are rarely portrayed as protagonists and forward thinkers. But I’m excited for the future.




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Fighting over ‘white gold’: Sesame in Ethiopia and Sudan

Fighting over ‘white gold’: Sesame in Ethiopia and Sudan Expert comment LJefferson 3 April 2023

The supply chain of a seemingly innocuous cash crop – sesame – has intersected with transnational conflict dynamics, exacerbating tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan.

Late 2020 saw the beginning of the devastating war in Tigray and the occupation of a disputed region on the Ethiopia–Sudan border – Al Fashaga – by the Sudanese army. These shocks disrupted settled patterns of land ownership and control in both Ethiopia’s volatile north and Sudan’s borderlands, historically the heart of the sesame and oilseed production that is economically vital to both countries.

These seemingly harmless cash crops are now embedded in local, subnational and national political contestations in both countries. Sesame value chains are being reshaped, with power and profits being used to entrench the grip of political and armed actors who are reinforcing new patterns of land control and driving informal and illicit trade – impacting the coping mechanisms of local communities and threatening to fuel further conflict.

Regional rivalries drive contestation over the Ethiopia supply chain

Internal borders between most of Ethiopia’s regions are marked by boundary disputes, which often degenerate into violent conflict. The most important is between the Tigray and Amhara regions. Since the war began in 2020, the Amhara region has annexed vast areas of western and southern Tigray, which the Amhara region claims were taken from them by Tigray 30 years ago, after the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) dominated ethnic coalition came to power.

Conflict has exacerbated a steady decline in formal revenues from sesame exports, dropping over $115 million from 2016 to 2021.

Ethiopia’s exports of spices, oilseeds and pulses brought in over half a billion dollars in 2021, roughly a quarter of the country’s total export revenues and second only to coffee. The sector has been rocked by the war in the north, which accounted for much of Ethiopia’s sesame production, with an estimated 500,000 hectares of sesame fields taken out of cultivation during the 2021 growing season. Conflict has exacerbated a steady decline in formal revenues from sesame exports, dropping over $115 million from 2016 to 2021.

Alongside falling production, the previously integrated value chain has been disrupted and decentralized by political fragmentation and land competition between Amharas and Tigrayans. Before the war, the agricultural sector in Western Tigray/Welkait was dominated by Tigrayan business interests, through the TPLF’s regional endowment fund EFFORT, a business conglomerate including subsidiaries such as Guna Trading House, and Hiwot Agricultural Mechanization.

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Two-minute video explainer: Supply chains, land contestation and conflict in the Horn of Africa

The taking of the area by Amhara forces in late 2020 saw the control over agricultural supply chains shift to actors from the Amhara region, amid contestation between regional officials, businessmen and security actors, backed by political elites. Thousands of displaced ethnic Tigrayan inhabitants of the area have been replaced by ethnic Amharas, enticed to settle there by the Amhara regional government’s offer of grants and leases for land which promise better livelihoods. The sesame they farm is now largely exported through informal and illicit channels, with profits used to reinforce de facto regional control.    

But there is also contestation within the Amhara region over the land and sesame supply chain between sub-regional elites from Gojjam, Gondar and indigenous Welkaites. Welkaites, who were marginalized under TPLF rule, believed that by aligning themselves with powerful Amharas they would reclaim land and influence. But this has not been fully realized, with the local administration reliant on Amhara region subsidies, rather than the federal budget. With little support from the federal government, local Welkait officials are strengthening their ties with Eritrea.

The Ethiopian government’s pursuit of peace with Tigray may lead it to turn away from the Amhara region, which could result in a renewed showdown between Amhara and Tigrayan forces.

At the national level, regional contestation over the control over Western Tigray/Welkait feeds into shifting political alliances between the Amhara, Tigrayans and Oromo which threaten the sustainability of the peace agreement struck between the federal government and TPLF in November 2022 – despite efforts by the government to defer the thorny issue.

While the constitutional return of the land to Tigray remains unlikely anytime soon, there is a feeling that Amhara control over Western Tigray/Welkait is no longer certain. The Ethiopian government’s pursuit of peace with Tigray may lead it to turn away from the Amhara region, despite their alliance during and before the war, which could result in a renewed showdown between Amhara and Tigrayan forces.

The prospect of losing territory could also heighten Amhara nationalist claims on Al Fashaga – the loss of which was partly offset by gaining Western Tigray/Welkait – leading to renewed conflagration with Sudan, outside of federal direction. Eritrea’s presence and alliance with Amhara militias remains a concern, given Asmara’s demonstrable ability to inflame tensions.  

Sudan’s securocrats battle over resources to entrench political power

The war in northern Ethiopia was also used opportunistically by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to take control of the fertile Al Fashaga borderland. This roughly 250 sq km area had been awarded to Sudan when the boundary was initially demarcated by the British in 1903, a ruling that remained contested by Ethiopia. An uneasy truce had seen Ethiopian farmers cultivate the land under nominal Sudanese administration; a settlement that collapsed in 2020 when thousands of predominantly Amhara farmers were evicted.

Local Sudanese farmers have also lost out – with some not compensated for the loss of lands to their own military, with land given to people from other parts of the country, and through lost relationships with Ethiopian farmers, labourers and investors.

The Sudanese military now allegedly controls more than 90 per cent of the disputed areas and security-linked companies and investors have moved into the lucrative sesame sector, re-routing the supply chain, which used to flow largely through Ethiopian markets. These companies are connected to Sudan’s Military Industrial Corporation, a vast conglomerate of business subsidiaries controlled by SAF – which is headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

Competition between Sudanese security actors fuels volatile political rivalries, and further entrenches military control of economic resources.

The commander of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo (or Hemedti), also has interests in agriculture, through his family business Al-Junaid. Both sit at the top of Sudan’s Sovereign Council. Hemedti’s competition with Burhan has seen him develop relations with Ethiopia’s prime minister – counter-balanced by recent rapprochement between Abiy and Burhan – as well as senior Amhara leaders, including over business activities.

Moreover, competition between Sudanese security actors fuels volatile political rivalries, and further entrenches military control of economic resources, undermining civilians at a time when pro-democracy forces are seeking to restore a reform-minded government. One of the key challenges for a new civilian government will be to quickly build up a domestic revenue base to compete with the economic heft of the country’s prominent security institutions, which will demand taking on military-controlled holdings in civic sectors such as agriculture, including sesame.

Informal and illicit trade reinforces conflict dynamics

This context has driven the informalization of trade, with cash crops such as sesame increasingly exported outside of formal channels and connected to other illicit cross-border activities between Ethiopia and Sudan. Indications are that sesame production in Western Tigray/Welkait has recovered significantly during the current 2022/23 harvest season. However, rather than contributing much needed currency to soften Ethiopia’s forex crisis, the Amhara elite-controlled supply chain is primarily being used to secure a variety of regional interests.




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The Annual Journal Impact Factor Saga




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Intraarterial Administration of Peptide Receptor Radionuclide Therapy in Patients with Advanced Meningioma: Initial Safety and Efficacy

Visual Abstract




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CT Enhancement of a Nasal Leech After Thrombectomy




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Oncologist, Business Leader, and Investor Arie S. Belldegrun Discusses a Career in Innovative Medical Entrepreneurship: A Conversation with Ken Herrmann and Johannes Czernin




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SophosAI team presents three papers on AI applied to cybersecurity at CAMLIS

On October 24 and 25, SophosAI presents ideas on how to use models large and small—and defend against malignant ones.




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Re: Voluntary assisted death: how to ensure access and safety




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Multi-sample mass spectrometry-based approach for discovering injury markers in chronic kidney disease

Ji Eun Kim
Dec 20, 2020; 0:RA120.002159v1-mcp.RA120.002159
Research




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Proteome analysis reveals a significant host-specific response in Rhizobium leguminosarum bv viciae endosymbiotic cells

David Durán
Nov 19, 2020; 0:RA120.002276v1-mcp.RA120.002276
Research




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ReactomeGSA - Efficient Multi-Omics Comparative Pathway Analysis

Johannes Griss
Dec 1, 2020; 19:2115-2124
Technological Innovation and Resources




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Dysregulation of hsa-miR-34a and hsa-miR-449a leads to overexpression of PACS-1 and loss of DNA damage response (DDR) in cervical cancer [Cell Biology]

We have observed overexpression of PACS-1, a cytosolic sorting protein in primary cervical tumors. Absence of exonic mutations and overexpression at the RNA level suggested a transcriptional and/or posttranscriptional regulation. University of California Santa Cruz genome browser analysis of PACS-1 micro RNAs (miR), revealed two 8-base target sequences at the 3' terminus for hsa-miR-34a and hsa-miR-449a. Quantitative RT-PCR and Northern blotting studies showed reduced or loss of expression of the two microRNAs in cervical cancer cell lines and primary tumors, indicating dysregulation of these two microRNAs in cervical cancer. Loss of PACS-1 with siRNA or exogenous expression of hsa-miR-34a or hsa-miR-449a in HeLa and SiHa cervical cancer cell lines resulted in DNA damage response, S-phase cell cycle arrest, and reduction in cell growth. Furthermore, the siRNA studies showed that loss of PACS-1 expression was accompanied by increased nuclear γH2AX expression, Lys382-p53 acetylation, and genomic instability. PACS-1 re-expression through LNA-hsa-anti-miR-34a or -449a or through PACS-1 cDNA transfection led to the reversal of DNA damage response and restoration of cell growth. Release of cells post 24-h serum starvation showed PACS-1 nuclear localization at G1-S phase of the cell cycle. Our results therefore indicate that the loss of hsa-miR-34a and hsa-miR-449a expression in cervical cancer leads to overexpression of PACS-1 and suppression of DNA damage response, resulting in the development of chemo-resistant tumors.




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Murine GFP-Mx1 forms nuclear condensates and associates with cytoplasmic intermediate filaments: Novel antiviral activity against VSV [Immunology]

Type I and III interferons induce expression of the “myxovirus resistance proteins” MxA in human cells and its ortholog Mx1 in murine cells. Human MxA forms cytoplasmic structures, whereas murine Mx1 forms nuclear bodies. Whereas both HuMxA and MuMx1 are antiviral toward influenza A virus (FLUAV) (an orthomyxovirus), only HuMxA is considered antiviral toward vesicular stomatitis virus (VSV) (a rhabdovirus). We previously reported that the cytoplasmic human GFP-MxA structures were phase-separated membraneless organelles (“biomolecular condensates”). In the present study, we investigated whether nuclear murine Mx1 structures might also represent phase-separated biomolecular condensates. The transient expression of murine GFP-Mx1 in human Huh7 hepatoma, human Mich-2H6 melanoma, and murine NIH 3T3 cells led to the appearance of Mx1 nuclear bodies. These GFP-MuMx1 nuclear bodies were rapidly disassembled by exposing cells to 1,6-hexanediol (5%, w/v), or to hypotonic buffer (40–50 mosm), consistent with properties of membraneless phase-separated condensates. Fluorescence recovery after photobleaching (FRAP) assays revealed that the GFP-MuMx1 nuclear bodies upon photobleaching showed a slow partial recovery (mobile fraction: ∼18%) suggestive of a gel-like consistency. Surprisingly, expression of GFP-MuMx1 in Huh7 cells also led to the appearance of GFP-MuMx1 in 20–30% of transfected cells in a novel cytoplasmic giantin-based intermediate filament meshwork and in cytoplasmic bodies. Remarkably, Huh7 cells with cytoplasmic murine GFP-MuMx1 filaments, but not those with only nuclear bodies, showed antiviral activity toward VSV. Thus, GFP-MuMx1 nuclear bodies comprised phase-separated condensates. Unexpectedly, GFP-MuMx1 in Huh7 cells also associated with cytoplasmic giantin-based intermediate filaments, and such cells showed antiviral activity toward VSV.




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Hsa-miRNA-23a-3p promotes atherogenesis in a novel mouse model of atherosclerosis

Jiayan Guo
Dec 1, 2020; 61:1764-1775
Research Articles




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A review of phosphatidate phosphatase assays

Prabuddha Dey
Dec 1, 2020; 61:1556-1564
Reviews




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Human CETP lacks lipopolysaccharide transfer activity, but worsens inflammation and sepsis outcomes in mice

Aloïs Dusuel
Dec 9, 2020; 0:jlr.RA120000704v1-jlr.RA120000704
Research Articles




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66438: You see the message "The informat $ could not be loaded, probably due to insufficient memory" after attempting to insert data into a MySQL database

For data that is being loaded from a SAS Stored Process Server, an insertion process might fail to a MySQL database with a warning, as well as an error message that says "During insert: Incorrect datetime value…"




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66537: SAS Customer Intelligence Studio becomes non-responsive when you delete a calculated variable from the Edit Value dialog box

In SAS Customer Intelligence Studio, you might notice that the user interface becomes unresponsive, as shown below: imgalt="SAS Customer Intelligence Studio UI becomes unresponsive" src="{fusion_66537




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66539: A new calculated variable that you create in the Edit Value dialog box is not available for selection in SAS Customer Intelligence Studio

In SAS Customer Intelligence Studio, you can choose to create a new calculated variable in the Edit Value dialog box when you populate a treatment custom detail. Following creation of the new calculated




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66544: You cannot clear warnings for decision campaign nodes in SAS Customer Intelligence Studio

In SAS Customer Intelligence Studio, you might notice that you cannot clear warnings for decision campaign nodes by selecting either the Clear Warnings  option or the Clear All Warnin




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66527: Updating counts in a Link node in SAS Customer Intelligence Studio produces the error "Link: MAIQService:executeFastPath:"

In SAS Customer Intelligence Studio, the following error is displayed when you update a new Link  node in a diagram:   imgalt="Link: MAIQService:executeFastPath:" src="{fusion_665




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66540: SAS Management Console and SAS Data Integration Studio might return the message "table failed to update" when you use the Update Metadata tool

You encounter this issue when the table metadata matches the data source. In this scenario, no metadata update is required.




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66542: The initial loading of a rule set and a rule flow takes significantly longer in SAS Business Rules Manager 3.3 compared with release 3.2

In SAS Business Rules Manager 3.3, the initial loading of a rule set and a rule flow takes significantly longer than it does in release 3.2. When this problem happens, long time gaps are evident in the local




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66524: SAS Visual Data Builder uses the wrong SAS Application Server for previewing and scheduling

If you have configured more than one SAS Application Server, then SAS Visual Data Builder might unexpectedly use the wrong application server when you preview or schedule queries. This problem occurs even though you h




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66487: Authentication to the CAS server fails with the error "Access denied..." when initiated on a SAS/CONNECT server in a Microsoft Windows environment

You might see the following error messages: "ERROR: Connection failed. Server returned: SAS Logon Manager authentication failed: Access denied." and "ERROR: Unable to connect to Cloud Analytic Services host-name on port 5570. Veri




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 55516: Opening the Edit Action Columns dialog box requires that you wait up to a minute to display a window

Editing and/or saving an action column can take up to a minute to display a window. There are no workarounds identified at this time.




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66509: Several procedures in SAS/STAT Software and SAS/QC Software generate incorrect results when an OBSMARGINS= data set is used

If the response variable is in the CLASS statement variable list before the class variables that also appear in the MODEL statement, and an OM-data-set is used, least squares means results for several of the statistical procedures are incorrect.




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66391: Opening a database table returns a Segmentation Violation when you use the Metadata LIBNAME engine (META)

You might receive a Segmentation Violation when opening a database table in SAS. The SAS Log contains the error and traceback:


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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 58465: SAS Life Science Analytics Framework 4.6 - Group membership removal fails with an exception for Process Flows that exist in the Recycle Bin

In SAS Life Science Analytics Framework 4.6, group membership removal fails with an exception if a user is set as assignee, a candidate, or a notification recipient in a user task for a Process Flow . The Process




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 33449: An error might occur when you use SAS 9 BULKLOAD= and BULKEXTRACT= options to load data to or extract data from the HP Neoview database on the HP Itanium platform

An error might occur when you use the SAS 9 BULKLOAD= and BULKEXTRACT= options load data to or extract data from HP Neoview on the HP Itanium platform. The problem occurs because Hewlett-Packard changed the name of one of




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 48028: Custom Time Frame-based data versions do not aggregate correctly when referenced in worksheets with standard hierarchy levels

In SAS Merchandise Financial Planning, custom time frame-based data versions do not aggregate correctly when referenced in worksheets with standard hierarchy levels. The data does not aggregate correctly from l




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 46544: Store layout view has some areas displayed with black fill rather than gray in SAS® Retail Space Management

In SAS Retail Space Management, it should be possible to click on any location object, then Show Properties, and change the location fill color. This can be done on the gray-filled objects. However, w




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 61815: SAS Episode Analytics 3.1 - Audit table is required in order to capture user interactions with the user interface

SAS  Episode Analytics 3.1 requires the ability to capture user interactions with the user interface for auditing purposes. To support the required functionality a new table has been add




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 65782: The PLM procedure incorrectly issues the message "ERROR: No valid observation in the OM= data set"

If the OBSMARGINS= or OM= option is specified in an LSMEANS, LSMESTIMATE, or SLICE statement and a user-defined format is applied to any of the effect variables in the OM-data-set , PROC PLM incorrectly stops proce




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66535: You might intermittently see the error "RangeError: Maximum call stack exceeded..." when viewing a SAS Visual Analytics report

When viewing a SAS Visual Analytics report, you might intermittently see an error that includes content similar to the following:

Error Message:




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66505: The OBS= option does not generate a limit clause when you use SAS/ACCESS Interface to PostgreSQL to access a Yellowbrick database

When you use SAS/ACCESS Interface to PostgreSQL to query a Yellowbrick database, the SAS OBS= option is not generating a limit clause on the query that is passed to the database. Click the



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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66511: A Russian translation shows the same value for two different variables in the Define Value dialog box for the Reply node in SAS Customer Intelligence Studio

In SAS Customer Intelligence Studio,  when you add  Reply- node variable values in the Define Value dialog box, you might notice that two identically labeled data-grid variables are




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66095: The message "ERROR: Could not move and link one or more files to..." occurs while running a job-flow instance

In SAS Infrastructure for Risk Management, the message "ERROR: Could not move and link one or more files to..." occurs while running a job-flow instance if an orphaned folder exists in the persistent area.




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66507: The “RegisterFontTask" install task fails during out-of-the-box, add-on, or upgrade-in-place deployments if Hot Fix D7G004 is applied

The SAS 9.4M4 (TS1M4) Hot Fix D7G004 for ODS Templates installs national language support (NLS) content regardless of whether the languages were installed during the initial deployment. Having sparse




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66494: A SAS Real-Time Decision Manager flow cannot be opened

In SAS Customer Intelligence, a decision campaign can become corrupted and impossible to open. When you try to open the campaign, an error message is displayed that asks you to check the SAS Customer Intel




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66401: Using SAS Model Manager to publish a model to SAS Metadata Repository fails and generates an error

When you publish a model to SAS Metadata Repository by using SAS Model Manager, the publishing process fails and the following error is generated: "The model model-name has a function of ';Transformation';, which is not supported for




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66504: Clicking a link to pass a group break value to a SAS Web Report Studio report returns an HTTP 400 error

SAS Web Report Studio enables you to link reports based on a group break value. However, when you click the link, it might fail with an HTTP 400 error. The exact message you see depends on which browser you are u




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66496: Titles and footnotes do not span the full width of a page when you use the COLUMNS= option with the TAGSETS.RTF_SAMPLE tagset

Titles and footnotes do not span the entire width of the page when you use the COLUMNS= option with a value that is greater than 1 with the TAGSETS.RTF_SAMPLE tagset. When a value that is greater than 1 is specified for th




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66500: A content release on the SAS Risk Governance Framework fails to load when you use SAS 9.4M7 (TS1M7) on the Microsoft Windows operating system

When you log on to the SAS Risk Governance Framework and choose a solution, the web application might fail to load the solution content. When the problem occurs, you continue to see "Loading..." on the screen, an




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66294: The SAS Federation Server SPD driver fails to create a table that has a column name in UTF-8 encoding that also contains Latin5 characters

Certain tables that are created in SAS Scalable Performance Data (SPD) Server might not be displayed correctly by SAS Federation Server Manager. Tables that have Latin5 characters in column names encounter this




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Docosanoid signaling modulates corneal nerve regeneration: effect on tear secretion, wound healing, and neuropathic pain [Thematic Reviews]

The cornea is densely innervated, mainly by sensory nerves of the ophthalmic branch of the trigeminal ganglia (TG). These nerves  are important to maintain corneal homeostasis, and nerve damage can lead to a decrease in wound healing, an increase in corneal ulceration and dry eye disease (DED), and neuropathic pain. Pathologies, such as diabetes, aging, viral and bacterial infection, as well as  prolonged use of contact lenses and surgeries to correct vision can produce nerve damage. There are no effective therapies to alleviate DED (a multifunctional disease) and several clinical trials using -3 supplementation show unclear and sometimes negative results. Using animal models of corneal nerve damage, we show that treating corneas with pigment epithelium-derived factor (PEDF) plus docosahexaenoic acid (DHA) increases nerve regeneration, wound healing, and tear secretion. The mechanism involves the activation of a calcium-independent phospholipase A2 (iPLA2) that releases the incorporated DHA from phospholipids and enhances the synthesis of docosanoids neuroprotectin D1 (NPD1) and a new resolvin stereoisomer  RvD6i. NPD1 stimulates the synthesis of brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF), nerve growth factor (NGF), and of semaphorin 7A (Sema7A).  RvD6i treatment of injured corneas modulates gene expression in the TG resulting in enhanced neurogenesis; decreased neuropathic pain and increased sensitivity. Taken together, these results represent a promising therapeutic option to re-establish the homeostasis of the cornea.




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Human CETP lacks lipopolysaccharide transfer activity, but worsens inflammation and sepsis outcomes in mice [Research Articles]

Bacterial lipopolysaccharides (LPSs or endotoxins) can bind most proteins of the lipid transfer/LPS-binding protein (LT/LBP) family in host organisms. The LPS-bound LT/LBP proteins then trigger either an LPS-induced proinflammatory cascade or LPS binding to lipoproteins that are involved in endotoxin inactivation and detoxification. Cholesteryl ester transfer protein (CETP) is an LT/LBP member, but its impact on LPS metabolism and sepsis outcome is unclear. Here, we performed fluorescent LPS transfer assays to assess the ability of CETP to bind and transfer LPS. The effects of intravenous (iv) infusion of purified LPS or polymicrobial infection (cecal ligation and puncture [CLP]) were compared in transgenic mice expressing human CETP and wild-type mice naturally having no CETP activity. CETP displayed no LPS transfer activity in vitro, but it tended to reduce biliary excretion of LPS in vivo. The CETP expression in mice was associated with significantly lower basal plasma lipid levels and with higher mortality rates in both models of endotoxemia and sepsis. Furthermore, CETPTg plasma modified cytokine production of macrophages in vitro. In conclusion, despite having no direct LPS binding and transfer property, human CETP worsens sepsis outcomes in mice by altering the protective effects of plasma lipoproteins against endotoxemia, inflammation, and infection.




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How changes to drug prohibition could be good for the UK—an essay by Molly Meacher and Nick Clegg