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Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy Priorities




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Young and Male: Identity and Politics in Saudi Arabia




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A Conversation With: Steven T Mnuchin, Secretary, US Treasury




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Britain’s Soft Power Potential: In Conversation with Penny Mordaunt




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The Use of Sanctions to Protect Journalists




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Undercurrents: Episode 52 - Defining Pandemics, and Mikheil Saakashvili's Ukrainian Comeback




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Regulation of stearoyl-CoA desaturase by polyunsaturated fatty acids and cholesterol

James M. Ntambi
Sep 1, 1999; 40:1549-1558
Reviews




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A spectrophotometric assay for lipid peroxides in serum lipoproteins using a commercially available reagent

M el-Saadani
Apr 1, 1989; 30:627-630
Articles




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Bile salt biotransformations by human intestinal bacteria

Jason M. Ridlon
Feb 1, 2006; 47:241-259
Reviews




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The UK's new Online Safety Bill

The UK's new Online Safety Bill 10 February 2021 — 3:00PM TO 3:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 January 2021 Online

Discussing the new proposals which include the establishment of a new ‘duty of care’ on companies to ensure they have robust systems in place to keep their users safe.

Governments, regulators and tech companies are currently grappling with the challenge of how to promote an open and vibrant internet at the same time as tackling harmful activity online, including the spread of hateful content, terrorist propaganda, and the conduct of cyberbullying, child sexual exploitation and abuse.

The UK government’s Online Harms proposals include the establishment of a new ‘duty of care’ on companies to ensure they have robust systems in place to keep their users safe. Compliance with this new duty will be overseen by an independent regulator.

On 15 December 2020, DCMS and the Home Office published the full UK government response, setting out the intended policy positions for the regulatory framework, and confirming Ofcom as the regulator.

With the legislation likely to be introduced early this year, the panel will discuss questions including:

  • How to strike the balance between freedom of expression and protecting adults from harmful material?

  • How to ensure the legislation’s approach to harm is sufficiently future-proofed so new trends and harms are covered as they emerge?

  • What additional responsibilities will tech companies have under the new regulation?

  • Will the regulator have sufficient powers to tackle the wide range of harms in question?

This event is invite-only for participants, but you can watch the livestream of the discussion on this page at 15.00 GMT on Wednesday 10 February.




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Strengthening Transatlantic Digital Cooperation

Strengthening Transatlantic Digital Cooperation

This project explores opportunities for increased cooperation via the transatlantic ‘tech triangle’ of the European Union, United Kingdom and United States.

jon.wallace 2 July 2021

This project serves as a cross-house initiative (involving the US and Americas Programme, the Europe Programme, the International Law Programme, the Digital Society Initiative and the International Security Programme).

Its long-term goal is to support the emergence of a global vision for technology governance: a vision drawing on democratic values and human rights principles. The project aims to extend the application of these principles to the digital space.

The first phase centres around a knowledge-exchange series, with findings and recommendations disseminated around targeted multilateral events such as G7, the United Nations General Assembly and the 2021 Internet Governance Forum.

Building on this exchange, the second phase will shift its focus to other democratic states and broaden digital cooperation dialogues from like-minded countries in the OECD, in addition to non-Western democracies and under-represented stakeholders from developing countries.

 




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Counter-terrorism measures and sanctions: How to avoid negative consequences for humanitarian action?

Counter-terrorism measures and sanctions: How to avoid negative consequences for humanitarian action? 9 September 2021 — 2:00PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 July 2021 Online

Exploring current endeavours to address the tensions between counter-terrorism measures, sanctions and humanitarian action.

Counter-terrorism measures  address broad forms of support to terrorist acts. Their expansion, internationally and domestically, has given rise to new points of friction with international humanitarian law. Unless the measures include adequate safeguards, they  can impede humanitarian action. Country-specific sanctions imposed for other objectives, such as ending conflicts or protecting civilians, raise similar challenges for humanitarian action. 

These problems are not new, but solutions at international and national level remain elusive. 

At this panel event, which marks the launch of a new Chatham House research paper, panellists explore current endeavours to address the tensions between counter-terrorism measures, sanctions and humanitarian action.

  • What are the current dynamics and developments at Security Council level?  
  • What are the opportunities now that the UK is developing its independent sanctions strategy? 
  • What challenges do counter-terrorism requirements in funding agreements for humanitarian action  pose? 
  • What is necessary to make progress?




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Protecting universal human rights: Imagine a better world

Protecting universal human rights: Imagine a better world Explainer Video NCapeling 19 November 2021

Short animation examining why protecting and defending human rights ensures an equitable response to humanitarian crises and addresses economic inequality.

Human rights are not policies that can be overturned, they are not granted by governments. They belong to everyone as human beings.

For the most part, states are meeting their commitments to defend and protect universal human rights. But increasingly some governments are beginning to shy away from their obligations, and some are even actively seeking to subvert human rights.

And the regional and international bodies created and charged with defending these rights are being challenged by the rise of new powers and political movements.

Chatham House is built on big ideas. Help us imagine a better world.

Our researchers develop positive solutions to global challenges, working with governments, charities, businesses and society to build a better future.

SNF CoLab is our project supported by the Stavros Niarchos Foundation (SNF) to share our ideas in experimental, collaborative ways – and to learn about designing a better future.




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Transatlantic Tech Talks: Cooperation or sovereignty?

Transatlantic Tech Talks: Cooperation or sovereignty? Audio bhorton.drupal 15 December 2021

A new mini-series from Undercurrents explores international cooperation on regulating the tech sector.

Transatlantic Tech Talks is a three part mini-series on the Undercurrents podcast feed, produced with the support of Microsoft, which explores the state of international cooperation on digital governance between the United States, the UK and Europe.

As technological innovation accelerates, and new digital tools and business models arise, governments are working to develop a framework of regulations to safeguard the rights and interests of their citizens. Not all stakeholders agree, however, on the best way to achieve this. While some advocate a ‘digital cooperation’ approach based on transparency and data-sharing, others are more concerned with maintaining ‘digital sovereignty’.

In the first episode of this series, Ben is joined by Casper Klynge, Harriet Moynihan and Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, who set out the broad context for these debates. They assess where the major government, private sector and civil society actors stand on the question of digital governance, and how they are approaching the international negotiations.




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Sanctions must not prevent humanitarian work in Ukraine

Sanctions must not prevent humanitarian work in Ukraine Expert comment NCapeling 30 May 2022

Restrictions on supply of certain items and financial sanctions can impede vital relief unless adequate safeguards are put in place such as exceptions or general licences.

Sanctions play a major role in the response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The United Nations (UN) has not imposed sanctions, but an important number of states have done so. They have imposed a wide array of restrictions and the number of targeted – or ‘designated’ – persons is unprecedented.

The public has been captivated by the freezing of oligarchs’ assets. There is ongoing discussion about seizing them to provide compensation for war damage. Debate continues about how far to ban oil and gas imports.

One aspect of the sanctions has received far less attention, even though it can exacerbate the effect of the conflict on civilians. Some of the trade restrictions and financial sanctions pose immediate and concrete challenges to the capacity of humanitarian organizations to work in Ukraine and in neighbouring states.

Trade sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU) and UK prohibit the export or supply of certain goods and technology in the transport, telecommunications, energy, and oil or mineral exploration sectors to non-government-controlled areas of the Donetsk or Luhansk oblasts, or for use there.

Experience shows that the due diligence measures adopted by humanitarian organizations do not always allay concerns of risk-averse sectors such as banks

Restricted items include technical equipment which is necessary for humanitarian operations, such as water pumps and refrigerating equipment, but also far more mundane items such as vehicles for transport of persons and goods, and office equipment that are necessary for humanitarian organizations trying to work in the region.

Designations can reduce options for support

Financial sanctions also raise problems. Some are immediately apparent. Significantly for humanitarian operations, the two de facto republics of Donetsk and Luhansk are designated by the EU, the UK, and the US. Consequently, it is prohibited to make funds or assets available to them directly or indirectly.

This prohibition covers the payment of any taxes, licences, and other fees to these authorities, as well as the provision of assets to ministries under their control in the course of humanitarian operations, such as ministries of health and education.

Designations of other entities may also be relevant, such as Russian ‘state enterprises’ which operate in these areas and are the sole providers of commodities necessary for humanitarian response, such as heating fuel.

These are the designations which most obviously impact humanitarian response. However, more than 1,000 persons and entities have been designated and humanitarian organizations must avoid purchasing goods and services from them.

Risk-averse commercial partners

Commercial actors – such as banks, insurers, freight companies and commodity providers – whose services are required by humanitarian organizations must also comply with the sanctions. Experience shows that the due diligence measures adopted by humanitarian organizations do not always allay concerns of risk-averse sectors such as banks.

Fears of violating the sanctions, coupled with the fact humanitarian organizations are rarely profitable clients, have led them to severely restrict the services they provide.

This is not the first occasion the problem has arisen. What is different in relation to Ukraine is the number of designated persons and the ‘sanctions packages’ adopted in quick succession. As compliance officers struggle to keep abreast, their institutions become even more risk-averse.

For UK banks, the situation is exacerbated by the adoption of the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022. This amends existing rules by removing the requirement for the UK Treasury to prove knowledge or reasonable cause to suspect that a transaction violated sanctions, imposing strict liability for sanctions violations.

Time for the UK to follow others

The EU, the US, Switzerland, and other states which have imposed sanctions have sought to mitigate their adverse effects by including safeguards for humanitarian action. Although the UK has largely replicated the measures adopted by the EU in terms of restrictions and designations, it lags behind in including such safeguards.

The UK trade restrictions and financial sanctions do not include exceptions for humanitarian action. While several general licences have been issued, none relate to humanitarian operations.

If the UK is to show it is serious about responding to the immense needs caused by the invasion it must introduce appropriate safeguards in its sanctions

Instead, the UK measures foresee only the possibility of applying for specific licences – from the Treasury in the case of financial sanctions and the Department of International Trade for trade restrictions. But obtaining specific licences is a time-consuming process which is simply not appropriate for emergency response.

If the UK is to show it is serious about responding to the immense needs caused by the invasion it must introduce appropriate safeguards in its sanctions – either in the form of exceptions or general licences.

What matters is they cover all key humanitarian organizations responding to the Ukraine crisis that are subject to UK sanctions – either because they are UK persons or because their funding agreements with the UK government require them to comply with UK measures.

These include UN agencies, funds and programmes, components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) responding to the crisis in Ukraine and neighbouring states. The provision must also clearly extend to commercial entities which provide necessary services for humanitarian operations.

Given the UK recently adopted an exception along similar lines in relation to the Afghanistan sanctions, there is a valuable precedent for Ukraine.




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Humanitarian exceptions: A turning point in UN sanctions

Humanitarian exceptions: A turning point in UN sanctions Expert comment LJefferson 20 December 2022

The UN Security Council has adopted a cross-cutting exception for humanitarian action in UN sanctions. What does it cover? What must happen next?

The UN Security Council has removed an obstacle to humanitarian work. On 9 December 2022, it adopted a resolution establishing a cross-cutting exception to existing – and future – UN financial sanctions for funds or assets necessary for humanitarian assistance and activities to meet basic human needs. In a coup for multilateralism, the council has been able to act, even when the Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused paralysis in other areas.

Whilst sanctions are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for civilian populations, aid agencies have argued for years that they do just this.

Resolution 2664 – introduced by Ireland and the US, co-sponsored by 53 states, and adopted by 14 votes in favour, with India abstaining – is the culmination of a decade of engagement between humanitarian organizations and states to find ways of avoiding the adverse impact of sanctions on the most vulnerable: people relying on humanitarian action for survival.

A reminder of the problem

Whilst sanctions are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for civilian populations, aid agencies have argued for years that they do just this. UN financial sanctions prohibit making funds or other assets available directly or indirectly to designated persons or entities. Without adequate safeguards, incidental payments made during humanitarian operations, or relief consignments that are diverted and end up in the hands of such persons or entities can violate this prohibition.

Exceptions in Afghanistan and Haiti sanctions pave the way

Humanitarian actors have been decrying and documenting the impact of sanctions on their operations for years. Ensuring that sanctions did not hinder the COVID-19 response was a turning point in states’ willingness to address the issue.

The return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan called for a more radical approach.

Movement at Security Council level was gradual, starting off with demands in the renewals of certain country-specific sanctions that measures taken by member states to give effect to them comply with international law. The return to power of the Taliban called for a more radical approach.

In December 2021, the Council adopted a broad exception to the Afghanistan financial sanctions, covering the provision, payment and processing of funds and assets necessary for humanitarian action and for activities to meet basic human needs. A similar exception was adopted – almost unnoticed – in October 2022 in the newly-established Haiti sanctions.

These developments, coupled with the determination of elected Council member Ireland to find solutions, paved the way for the adoption of SCR 2664.

The scope of the humanitarian exception

SCR 2664 introduces a clear and broad exception that addresses the key challenges financial sanctions pose to humanitarian action. The exception expressly refers to the different ways in which funds or assets are allowed to reach designated persons or entities: by the provision of goods or payment of funds by humanitarian actors themselves; by the processing of funds by financial institutions; and by the provision of goods and services by other commercial actors whose services are necessary for humanitarian action such as insurers and freight companies.

SCR 2664 introduces a clear and broad exception that addresses the key challenges financial sanctions pose to humanitarian action.

The exception is broad in terms of the excluded activities: the provision of funds and assets necessary for humanitarian assistance and activities to meet basic human needs. The UN Somalia sanctions – the first, and for a decade the only, regime to include an express exception – exclude funds necessary for ‘humanitarian assistance’.

SCR 2615 on Afghanistan added the expression ‘activities to meet basic human needs’.  These go beyond humanitarian assistance, and have been interpreted as including activities necessary to sustain essential social services such as health and education, preserve essential community systems, and promote livelihoods and social cohesion.  These are essentially development programmes.  ‘Activities that support basic needs’ should be understood in a similar manner in SCR 2664.

SCR 2664 is not, however, a ‘blanket’ exception.  It only applies to financial sanctions.  These are not the only type of restriction in UN sanctions that can hinder humanitarian action. For example, organizations that send commodities into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea must still go through the notoriously slow procedure of authorization by the sanctions committee.  Similarly, authorizations are still required for import of demining materials that fall within the scope of arms embargoes.

Opportunities for further engagement and additional safeguards

Recognizing that additional challenges remain, SCR 2664 requests the UN Secretary-General to draft a report on unintended adverse humanitarian consequences of all types of restrictions in UN sanctions. He is asked to include recommendations for minimizing and such unintended consequences, including by the adoption of additional cross-cutting exceptions.

Humanitarian organizations have played a pivotal role in advancing the agenda. SCR 2664 is the result of their relentless engagement with the Security Council. It is not the end of the road. Other restrictions raise problems, and the Council has left the door open to finding ways of addressing them.

Humanitarian organizations have played a pivotal role in advancing the agenda. SCR 2664 is the result of their relentless engagement with the Security Council.

Humanitarian actors should seize this opportunity to provide information, identifying the problematic types of restrictions and their consequences on their operations as specifically as possible.

What happens next?

It is UN member states that implement UN sanctions. For SCR 2664 to be truly effective, it is imperative that states give effect to it in domestic law and practice. In doing so, they must not narrow the scope of the exception.

Recent experience in Afghanistan has shown that even in situations when significant safeguards exist, key actors may be unaware of them or unclear as to their precise scope. Financial institutions in particular are fast to de-risk when sanctions are imposed, and remain wary of conducting transactions that they perceive as high-risk even though exceptions permit this.

For SCR 2664 to be truly effective, it is imperative that states give effect to it in domestic law and practice. In doing so, they must not narrow the scope of the exception.

OFAC – the Office of Foreign Assets Control in the US Treasury – has issued extensive guidance on the Afghanistan sanctions in the form of frequently asked questions.  These have played an extremely important role in ensuring full advantage is taken of the exceptions.

States should follow this example, and adopt guidance to raise awareness of the exception in SCR 2664 and to clarify its scope.

A valuable precedent for autonomous sanctions

SCR 2664 only applies to sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council. It does not extend to autonomous sanctions adopted by states or relevant international organizations such as the EU.







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Assad’s extortion fails to ease Syria’s financial crisis

Source

Arab News

Release date

10 February 2020

Expert

Haid Haid

In the news type

Op-ed

Hide date on homepage






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Identification of compounds that bind the centriolar protein SAS-6 and inhibit its oligomerization [Computational Biology]

Centrioles are key eukaryotic organelles that are responsible for the formation of cilia and flagella, and for organizing the microtubule network and the mitotic spindle in animals. Centriole assembly requires oligomerization of the essential protein spindle assembly abnormal 6 (SAS-6), which forms a structural scaffold templating the organization of further organelle components. A dimerization interaction between SAS-6 N-terminal “head” domains was previously shown to be essential for protein oligomerization in vitro and for function in centriole assembly. Here, we developed a pharmacophore model allowing us to assemble a library of low-molecular-weight ligands predicted to bind the SAS-6 head domain and inhibit protein oligomerization. We demonstrate using NMR spectroscopy that a ligand from this family binds at the head domain dimerization site of algae, nematode, and human SAS-6 variants, but also that another ligand specifically recognizes human SAS-6. Atomistic molecular dynamics simulations starting from SAS-6 head domain crystallographic structures, including that of the human head domain which we now resolve, suggest that ligand specificity derives from favorable Van der Waals interactions with a hydrophobic cavity at the dimerization site.




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Driven to Extraction: Can Sand Mining be Sustainable?

Driven to Extraction: Can Sand Mining be Sustainable? 5 June 2019 — 1:30PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 April 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Sand is the most consumed raw material in the world after water and is a critical building block of the modern world. When bound with cement, it becomes concrete; when mixed with bitumen, it becomes asphalt; and when heated, it becomes glass.
According to a recent UN Environment Programme report, the world extracts over 40 billion tonnes of sand and aggregates every year. This is the equivalent of 18 kilograms per day per person – or enough to build a wall of sand 27 metres wide and 27 metres high around the entire globe each year. Sand extraction on this scale, particularly when taken from riverine or coastal locations, can have serious environmental impacts on ecosystems, biodiversity and erosion. Control of sand resources has also proved a source of tension between countries and violence within them.
With demand for sand set to increase dramatically in line with population growth and urbanization, and with growing policy attention on the decarbonization of cement and other industrial inputs, better understanding of these impacts is needed. Yet with limited data on sand extraction, trade and consumption, and little in the way of governance frameworks, developing policies and practices that help ensure sustainable sand supply chains is challenging. This roundtable will examine the environmental, economic and political implications of sand supply chains and discuss opportunities to help integrate sustainable policy and practice.




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Sand: Monitoring and management for a sustainable future

Sand: Monitoring and management for a sustainable future 2 March 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 February 2021 Online

In partnership with the Global Sand Observatory Initiative, this event outlines the sand challenge, what actions are currently underway to address it, and what else needs to be done.

Please complete your registration on Zoom:

After water, sand is the raw material that the world consumes in the greatest quantity. It is no exaggeration to say that fine sand and coarser materials – the medium-to-coarse-grained pebbles, gravel and rock fragments used in construction – are the building blocks of the modern world.

When bound with cement, sand becomes concrete; when mixed with bitumen, it becomes asphalt; and when heated, it becomes glass. Without sand, we would have no highways, high-rises or high-speed trains. Yet sand – which is used here as shorthand for sand, gravel and crushed rock together – is a resource that is both abundant and finite.

In global terms, it is abundant, especially when compared with many other raw materials, albeit often not available close to where it is needed. It is finite in that the rate at which we are using it far exceeds the natural rate at which it is being replenished by the weathering of rocks by wind and water.

Industrialization, population growth and urbanization have fuelled explosive growth in the demand for sand. Precise data on sand extraction are hard to come by and the lack of data compounds the challenge of managing the resource sustainably.

However, the UN estimates that overall extraction could be in the region of 40 billion tonnes per year, driven primarily by construction sector demand. That equates to 18 kilograms of sand each day for every person on the planet and signals how strategically important these resources are for future sustainable development. Post-COVID-19 recovery investment in infrastructure, digital technologies, tourism and other economic activities are dependent on sand resources.

Current efforts to improve the management of sand resources at local, national and global levels are uneven. This is partly due to unique geological features and geography, but also differences in local manifestations of the ‘sand challenge’, national and regional demand for sand resources, as well as capacities to enforce or implement best practice assessment procedures, extractive practices, environmental management and restoration requirements.

We must put stronger conditions in place for a rapid, just and scaled transition to sustainable sand management. But where to focus our efforts for the greatest positive impact?




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JOEPIE ON HIS WAY TO SAFE PETER FROM THE BAD BIRD || JOEPIE OP WEG OM PETER TE REDDEN VAN DE BOZE VOGEL

Anne-Miek Bibbe posted a photo:

JOEPIE: I'm almost there! I wish Uncle Jeroen was here, I'm a little, really just a little bit afraid of the dark.
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JOEPIE: Ik ben bijna bij Peter! Ik wou dat oom Jeroen hier was, ik ben een beetje, echt maar een héél klein beetje bang in het donker.




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On Lamperti transformation and AR(1) type characterisations of discrete random fields

Marko Voutilainen, Lauri Viitasaari and Pauliina Ilmonen
Theor. Probability and Math. Statist. 111 (), 181-197.
Abstract, references and article information





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Caraiani to Receive 2025 AMS Satter Prize

Ana Caraiani, Royal Society University Research Fellow and professor of pure mathematics, Imperial College London, has been awarded the 2025 Ruth Lyttle Satter Prize in Mathematics by the American Mathematical Society (AMS). She has been honored for contributions to arithmetic geometry and number theory: in particular, the Langlands program.

Ana Caraiani
Louise Rose Photography

From the citation

Ana Caraiani’s work is characterized by a combination of novel ideas and a fearlessness in the face of technical obstacles that would daunt almost any other researcher. This has enabled her to prove several fundamental theorems in the Langlands program.

In the joint paper with Scholze, titled “On the generic part of the cohomology of non-compact unitary Shimura varieties” (Annals of Math., 2024), Caraiani proved very general results about the torsion cohomology classes in non-compact Shimura varieties, strengthening the early results in their 2017 paper in the compact case. The proof is a tour de force, combining perfectoid spaces, a mastery of the trace formula, and a new theory of perverse sheaves in p-adic geometry. These results are of intrinsic interest (for example, they give the first indications of a characteristic p version of Arthur’s conjectures), but they also have many applications throughout the Langlands program. One spectacular application of these results is in her joint paper, “Potential automorphy over CM fields” (with Allen, Calegari, Gee, Helm, Le Hung, Newton, Scholze, Taylor, and Thorne, Annals of Math., 2023), which among other results proves the Ramanujan conjecture for Bianchi modular forms, a problem that had been thought of as being completely out of reach.

The Ramanujan conjecture is of analytic nature, asserting a bound on the eigenvalue of a certain differential operator, but the only way in which cases of it have been proved is via algebraic geometry. In particular, the original Ramanujan conjecture for modular forms was proved by Deligne in the 1970s, as a consequence of his proof of the Weil conjectures. However, in the case of Bianchi modular forms there is no direct relationship with algebraic geometry, and it seems to be impossible to make any direct deductions from the Weil conjectures. Langlands (also in the 1970s) suggested a strategy for proving the Ramanujan conjecture as a consequence of his functoriality conjecture. Caraiani and her coauthors’ proof of the Ramanujan conjecture for Bianchi modular forms proceeds via a variant of Langlands’ strategy, and in particular does not use the Weil conjectures.

Most recently with James Newton, in the paper “On the modularity of elliptic curves over imaginary quadratic fields” (arXiv: 2301.10509), Caraiani has improved upon these results and applied them to the modularity of elliptic curves over imaginary quadratic fields. They come close to completely solving it, with only a small number of exceptions (which constitute 0% of cases).

Response of Ana Caraiani

First, I would like to thank Joan Birman and the AMS for establishing an award that recognizes research contributions by women mathematicians. This is particularly meaningful to me because I looked to many of the previous recipients of the Satter Prize for inspiration at challenging moments in my career. It is a great honour to be selected as a recipient!

I am indebted to my many collaborators, mentors and colleagues who have generously shared their mathematical ideas with me over the years and supported me in different but crucial ways. Special thanks go to Peter Scholze for the wonderful opportunity to collaborate with him on understanding a part of the geometry and cohomology of Shimura varieties, to Richard Taylor for initiating the "ten author" collaboration, which was much more successful than we had originally expected, and to James Newton for our joyful exploration of elliptic curves over imaginary quadratic fields. I also particularly want to acknowledge Jessica Fintzen and Toby Gee for their longstanding friendship and moral support.

Finally, I want to thank my family, especially my husband, Steven, my mother, Zoe, and my daughter, Nadia.

Biographical sketch of Ana Caraiani

Ana Caraiani was born in Bucharest, Romania, in 1984. She received a bachelor's degree in mathematics from Princeton University in 2007 and completed her PhD at Harvard University in 2012. After temporary positions at the University of Chicago, Princeton and the Institute for Advanced Study (IAS), and the University of Bonn, she moved to Imperial College London in 2017, where she is currently a Royal Society University Research Fellow and Professor of Pure Mathematics. She is a Fellow of the AMS, a recipient of an EMS Prize and a New Horizons Prize in Mathematics and was an invited speaker at the 2022 ICM. 

About the prize

Awarded every two years, the Ruth Lyttle Satter Prize in Mathematics recognizes an outstanding contribution to mathematics research by a woman in the previous six years. The prize was established by Joan Birman in honor of her sister, Ruth. The 2025 prize will be recognized during the 2025 Joint Mathematics Meetings in January in Seattle.

Read more and see the list of past recipients.

Contact: AMS Communications

* * * * *

The American Mathematical Society is dedicated to advancing research and connecting the diverse global mathematical community through our publications, meetings and conferences, MathSciNet, professional services, advocacy, and awareness programs.

 




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Up to US to decide what to do with decommissioned HAWK missiles, Taiwan says




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COMAC says Air China is the first customer for C929 widebody jet




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Woman, 23, had a 'burning sensation' in her stomach. It was the first sign of a rare cancer




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Trump says he will nominate anti-'woke' Fox News host Pete Hegseth for defense secretary




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Sarah Palin, NY Times have explored settlement, as judge sets defamation retrial




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China reveals reusable cargo shuttle design for Tiangong space station (video)




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Toyota, A Company With Almost No EVs, Says California's EV Mandates Are 'Impossible' To Meet




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Driver rams his car into crowd in China, killing 35. Police say he was upset about his divorce




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Thousands rally in Georgia to question the vote and demand a new election




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Policeman's murder won't deter fight against crime says Superintendent Nicholson

A police sergeant who was shot and injured at his home in Portmore, St Catherine, on Thursday night succumbed to his injuries on Monday morning.




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SAS Notes for SAS®9 - 66562: Negative values appear for distinct counts in SAS Visual Analytics reports

When using the distinct count function in SAS Visual Analytics reports, you might find that a negative value is displayed instead of the actual distinct count: imgalt="distinct_count" src="{fusion_66562_1_disti




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SAS Notes for SAS®9 - 66492: FILENAME FTP(FTP/TLS) fails with "ERROR: The connection was reset by a peer" due to using implicit FTP/TLS

If you connect to a FTP/TLS server that is configured to use implicit FTP/TLS, FILENAME FTP/TLS might fail with the following error:


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Biochemical transformation of bacterial lipopolysaccharides by acyloxyacyl hydrolase reduces host injury and promotes recovery [Enzymology]

Animals can sense the presence of microbes in their tissues and mobilize their own defenses by recognizing and responding to conserved microbial structures (often called microbe-associated molecular patterns (MAMPs)). Successful host defenses may kill the invaders, yet the host animal may fail to restore homeostasis if the stimulatory microbial structures are not silenced. Although mice have many mechanisms for limiting their responses to lipopolysaccharide (LPS), a major Gram-negative bacterial MAMP, a highly conserved host lipase is required to extinguish LPS sensing in tissues and restore homeostasis. We review recent progress in understanding how this enzyme, acyloxyacyl hydrolase (AOAH), transforms LPS from stimulus to inhibitor, reduces tissue injury and death from infection, prevents prolonged post-infection immunosuppression, and keeps stimulatory LPS from entering the bloodstream. We also discuss how AOAH may increase sensitivity to pulmonary allergens. Better appreciation of how host enzymes modify LPS and other MAMPs may help prevent tissue injury and hasten recovery from infection.




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N-acetylglucosamine drives myelination by triggering oligodendrocyte precursor cell differentiation [Molecular Bases of Disease]

Myelination plays an important role in cognitive development and in demyelinating diseases like multiple sclerosis (MS), where failure of remyelination promotes permanent neuro-axonal damage. Modification of cell surface receptors with branched N-glycans coordinates cell growth and differentiation by controlling glycoprotein clustering, signaling, and endocytosis. GlcNAc is a rate-limiting metabolite for N-glycan branching. Here we report that GlcNAc and N-glycan branching trigger oligodendrogenesis from precursor cells by inhibiting platelet-derived growth factor receptor-α cell endocytosis. Supplying oral GlcNAc to lactating mice drives primary myelination in newborn pups via secretion in breast milk, whereas genetically blocking N-glycan branching markedly inhibits primary myelination. In adult mice with toxin (cuprizone)-induced demyelination, oral GlcNAc prevents neuro-axonal damage by driving myelin repair. In MS patients, endogenous serum GlcNAc levels inversely correlated with imaging measures of demyelination and microstructural damage. Our data identify N-glycan branching and GlcNAc as critical regulators of primary myelination and myelin repair and suggest that oral GlcNAc may be neuroprotective in demyelinating diseases like MS.




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Molecular architecture and domain arrangement of the placental malaria protein VAR2CSA suggests a model for carbohydrate binding [Glycobiology and Extracellular Matrices]

VAR2CSA is the placental-malaria–specific member of the antigenically variant Plasmodium falciparum erythrocyte membrane protein 1 (PfEMP1) family. It is expressed on the surface of Plasmodium falciparum-infected host red blood cells and binds to specific chondroitin-4-sulfate chains of the placental proteoglycan receptor. The functional ∼310 kDa ectodomain of VAR2CSA is a multidomain protein that requires a minimum 12-mer chondroitin-4-sulfate molecule for specific, high affinity receptor binding. However, it is not known how the individual domains are organized and interact to create the receptor-binding surface, limiting efforts to exploit its potential as an effective vaccine or drug target. Using small angle X-ray scattering and single particle reconstruction from negative-stained electron micrographs of the ectodomain and multidomain constructs, we have determined the structural architecture of VAR2CSA. The relative locations of the domains creates two distinct pores that can each accommodate the 12-mer of chondroitin-4-sulfate, suggesting a model for receptor binding. This model has important implications for understanding cytoadherence of infected red blood cells and potentially provides a starting point for developing novel strategies to prevent and/or treat placental malaria.




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The heptameric structure of the flagellar regulatory protein FlrC is indispensable for ATPase activity and disassembled by cyclic-di-GMP [Protein Structure and Folding]

The bacterial enhancer-binding protein (bEBP) FlrC, controls motility and colonization of Vibrio cholerae by regulating the transcription of class-III flagellar genes in σ54-dependent manner. However, the mechanism by which FlrC regulates transcription is not fully elucidated. Although, most bEBPs require nucleotides to stimulate the oligomerization necessary for function, our previous study showed that the central domain of FlrC (FlrCC) forms heptamer in a nucleotide-independent manner. Furthermore, heptameric FlrCC binds ATP in “cis-mediated” style without any contribution from sensor I motif 285REDXXYR291 of the trans protomer. This atypical ATP binding raises the question of whether heptamerization of FlrC is solely required for transcription regulation, or if it is also critical for ATPase activity. ATPase assays and size exclusion chromatography of the trans-variants FlrCC-Y290A and FlrCC-R291A showed destabilization of heptameric assembly with concomitant abrogation of ATPase activity. Crystal structures showed that in the cis-variant FlrCC-R349A drastic shift of Walker A encroached ATP-binding site, whereas the site remained occupied by ADP in FlrCC-Y290A. We postulated that FlrCC heptamerizes through concentration-dependent cooperativity for maximal ATPase activity and upon heptamerization, packing of trans-acting Tyr290 against cis-acting Arg349 compels Arg349 to maintain proper conformation of Walker A. Finally, a Trp quenching study revealed binding of cyclic-di-GMP with FlrCC. Excess cyclic-di-GMP repressed ATPase activity of FlrCC through destabilization of heptameric assembly, especially at low concentration of protein. Systematic phylogenetic analysis allowed us to propose similar regulatory mechanisms for FlrCs of several Vibrio species and a set of monotrichous Gram-negative bacteria.




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UK Should Focus on Better Defining Objectives in the Sahel

22 July 2020

Dr Alex Vines OBE

Managing Director, Ethics, Risk & Resilience; Director, Africa Programme
The Sahel is one of Africa’s poorest and most fragile regions witnessing an escalation in jihadist activity and illegal migration, writes Alex Vines.

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Pictured is a Nigerian refugee living in the Awaradi settlement that houses some 9,000 displaced people fleeing violence from Boko Haram. Image: Getty Images.

The UK has been redeploying diplomatic, defence and development capabilities towards the Sahel since 2018 – a strategic pivot intended to deliver development impact, address long term security threats to UK interests and support alliances with international partners.

The Sahel is one of Africa’s poorest and most fragile regions and has witnessed an escalation in jihadist activity, illegal migration and trafficking since a security crisis erupted in Mali in 2012.

The crisis spread to Niger and Burkina Faso and may now spill over into Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal. With Nigeria also facing insurgency in the Lake Chad basin, all major regional security and economic anchors in the region are under threat including key UK partners. 

Reviewing the Sahel pivot

This pivot has already resulted in the expanding of UK embassies in Senegal, Mauritania and Mali and public commitments to opening new ones in Chad and Niger.

Back in London, there has also been a large uplift of staff including the setting up of a cross-Whitehall Joint Sahel Department in late 2018 and plans for more UK civil servants to have placements with the French government on the Sahel.

Yet in light of looming economic shocks from Brexit and Covid-19, there has been a lively debate in Whitehall on whether this is stretching UK resources too thin in an area of Africa that does not have close ties with the UK.

UK ministers are this week reviewing the Sahel pivot and will decide if it continues or grinds to a standstill including whether full embassies are opened in Niger and Chad.

This debate is not new. The UK has opened and closed its diplomatic missions in the Sahel in fits and starts since the early 1960s. More recently, MI6 pushed the re-opening of the embassy in Bamako in 2010 foreseeing Mali’s fragility before the current crisis started.

Partnering with the French

But though the Sahel is likely to dominate the Africa peace and security agenda for decades to come, the UK’s serious engagement in the region is not just about strategic foresight.

It also fulfils two other objectives: of partnership with two key bilateral allies, particularly France, and authority and leverage in multilateral fora such as the United Nations, African Union and the EU.

Partnering with the French in the Sahel has become even more important due to Brexit and the need to reinforce relationships with key European partners.

In 2012, David Cameron concluded that the rapid French response to stop a jihadist advance on the Malian capital Bamako was 'in our interests' and authorized the deployment of 330 UK military personnel, two cargo aircraft and a surveillance plane.

In July 2018, the UK announced further support to French led Opération Barkhane sending three Royal Air Force Chinook helicopters – supported by almost 100 personnel  which remain in theatre to this day.

UN commitment

Demonstrating the UK’s commitment to UN peacekeeping has also resulted in the deployment of 250 troops to join a UN peacekeeping mission to Mali later this year.

Based in Gao, these troops will form a long-range reconnaissance capability providing threat awareness, contributing to the protection of civilians and helping to prevent conflict from spilling over to neighbouring states.

This represents one of the biggest British peacekeeping deployments since Bosnia and it will be the most dangerous mission for British forces since Afghanistan.

The UK is also one of the largest humanitarian donors to the region and has contributed over £500 million in bilateral development and humanitarian assistance since 2015.

With COVID-19 now an additional challenge in the Sahel, a significant part of the UK’s £764 million contribution to the global COVID-19 effort will be channelled to the region.

New embassies are 'global Britain' strategy pillars

Keeping an eye on the impact of these initiatives requires a meaningful UK diplomatic network on the ground.

New embassies in the Sahel cost a fraction of maintaining three Chinook helicopters in the region providing the government real time insight in the post-Brexit absence of a regular supply of country analysis from the European External Action Service and support for the UK’s international relationships.

It also underlines the UK’s commitment to UN peacekeeping and standing as a permanent member of the UN Security Council in light of regular discussions of the Sahel.

The tripartite ministerial review of the Sahel pivot by the secretaries of state for foreign affairs, international development and defence that is underway should not penny pinch by reversing the opening of small embassies in Niger and Chad nor threaten the overall strategic focus on the Sahel – most recently welcomed by the House of Lord’s Select Committee on International Relations and Defence in its July report on UK Africa policy.

Instead, UK ministers should focus on better defining what the UK’s specific objectives are in the Sahel and particularly what the UK plans to do about Burkina Faso whose rapidly deteriorating security threatens to over-spill into key UK partner Ghana.

This article was first published in the Daily Telegraph.




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Why the Corrupt President of Belarus Deserves Sanctions

10 August 2020

Ryhor Astapenia

Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Sanctions would be a wake-up call for those who oversaw this brutal and dirty election campaign.

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People protest at a rally of solidarity with political prisoners in Belarus. Photo by Beata Zawrzel/NurPhoto via Getty Images.

Belarusian president Aliaksandr Lukashenka deserves sanctions. This election campaign in Belarus, which culminated in a vote on Sunday is the most brutal and dirty in its history. But, so far, the EU, the UK and the US have only issued familiar-sounding and futile appeals to the Belarusian authorities condemning their actions. Not imposing sanctions is a de facto licence to continue with repression.

Despite all this, the West is unlikely to impose significant sanctions afterwards. There are several questionable reasons for this. First, Western policymakers fear sanctions against Lukashenko will make him more likely to genuflect to Russia. However, relations with Russia have already deteriorated as Belarus accuses Russia of trying to interfere with its domestic affairs.

Sanctions serve as a wake-up call. The Belarusian authorities then might seek - once again - to repair relations with the West and reduce repression for greater assistance in any direct confrontation with Russia.

Second, the West is reluctant to implement sanctions because it has already invested somewhat in warming relations with Belarusian authorities. Punishing Lukashenko could mean burying the - admittedly modest - achievements of a Belarus-West dialogue that started in 2014 after the conflict in Ukraine began.

Even US secretary of state Mike Pompeo met with Lukashenko in Minsk this year, after which Belarus replaced a small but symbolic amount of Russian oil for American. All the same, the West has its conscience to answer to if dialogue is won but repressions continue.

The third reason why the West may not resort to targeted economic sanctions and visa restrictions is a latent concern whether such measures have any effect on democratization processes at all. They may be appropriate punishment, but there is little evidence they ever change the nature of a regime.

According to this logic, if the West imposes sanctions, the Belarusian authorities will continue to crack down with repression because they will have nothing to lose. That said, in previous years, the Belarusian authorities have released political prisoners in response to sticks and carrots brandished by the West. If Belarusian political prisoners did not have a price tag, the authorities would most likely keep everyone in jail.

To be fair, there are reasonable arguments in favour of and against sanctions. But if the West fails to impose them - be it through lack of political will or out of genuine concern about their effectiveness - at least it should focus on helping ordinary Belarusians withstand Lukashenko’s repressions. After the vote, arrested and jailed Belarusian citizens might lack money for lawyers and arbitrarily imposed fines.

If repression spreads further, independent media and human rights organizations will need funds to keep their structures running in the heat of the crackdown. Many entrepreneurs might lose their companies for openly supporting free elections. Thus, if the West will not sanction Lukashenko, it should at least show solidarity with these Belarusians in peril.

This article was originally published in The Telegraph.




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US-Cuba Sanctions: Are They Working Yet?

20 August 2020

Dr Christopher Sabatini

Senior Research Fellow for Latin America, US and the Americas Programme
The recent spate of sanctions limiting US travel to Cuba announced by the White House and the news that the Cuban regime has re-opened US dollar stores have sharpened the question: do sanctions work and when? Central to that question is how would they work?

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A taxi driver wears a face mask while driving tourists around Havana on 19 March 2020. Photo: Getty Images.

It’s easy to take a look at the array of economic and diplomatic punitive policies that the sanctions-happy Trump administration has slapped on individuals and countries from Argentina to Iran and conclude that they have failed to achieve their objectives. With US oil sanctions on Venezuela, trade sanctions on select Argentine, Brazilian and Canadian exports and the tightening of the US embargo on Cuba, sanctions have become a go-to tool of the current administration.

Have they worked so far? Some have. Some haven’t. All of this leads to a legitimate question: when do they? The most extreme example, the US embargo on Cuba – first imposed by executive order under the Trading with the Enemy Act in 1961 and then codified into law by the Cuba Democracy Act (1992) and Libertad Act (1996) passed by Congress – has failed miserably, but remains an article of faith among its advocates, the bulk of them in southern Florida. The 1992 Democracy Act and 1996 Libertad Act have failed to produce either democracy or liberty in Cuba… yet their potential efficacy persists in the collective imaginations of their supporters. Why?

Conditions on Cuba

Any policy needs to have an explicit goal and with it an implicit or explicit theory of change. Whether it’s advertising that smoking kills on cigarette packages or trade negotiations, these efforts have behind them an explicit idea of the change they seek to foster and the causal relationships to achieve them. These are testable and, in theory, subject to course correction if they are not meeting their intended goals. Has advertising reduced the incidence of smoking?  Are workers better paid and receiving better health benefits and labour protections under the trade agreement several years on?

None of those has applied on the US’s embargo on Cuba. First, the policy goals have changed. In some cases, it has been stated that the limitations on US commerce and travel to the island is to reduce the regime’s international support for autocratic regimes. But Cuba’s to-the-death support of the Nicolas Maduro government in Venezuela has demonstrated this isn’t working. 

Arguably it has had the opposite effect: by impoverishing the state-centered Cuban economy, the embargo has made the regime more dependent on the decreasing oil that Venezuela supplies the island nation. In other cases, the stated goal has been regime change as the titles of the 1992 and 1996 act titles reveal.

The latter even lays out a set of conditions that must be present in Cuba before the Congress can lift the trade and diplomatic isolation the US has imposed on the island unilaterally. Those include the release of political prisoners, the absence of any Castro family members from decision-making, and credible steps toward free and fair elections. 24 years after the passage of the Libertad Act, Cuba is no closer to achieving not just one but any of those goals despite the putative incentive of a full and complete lifting of the embargo.   

The question here is the implicit theory of change for the embargo. Here, embargo supporters have never been clear about this link. First, there is the implied hope that sanctions will impose such costs and suffering on the general population that the masses will rise up and shake off autocratic rule of their overlords.

There are several problems with this. One is that general sanctions that reduce access to foodstuffs and finances – as has been the case in the US embargo on Cuba and sanctions on Venezuela – lowers the incentives for protest. It concentrates the government’s political and economic control over the population rather than weakening it. More, people who are hungry living under a repressive government simply aren’t that likely to rise up; they are often more concerned with the day-to-day struggles of getting by.

Second, there is a naïve notion that either those in power or those around them will see the light of day and decide to step down. Promoters of sanctions often have a cold-eyed reality of the nature of evil of autocratic governments. So why do they believe in some hidden decency among its inner circles? In truth, the purveyors of this view deny the basic and laudable basis for their hatred of autocrats: their bottomless cruelty and disregard for their own people. 

Do sanctions work? 

There is also a growing body of research on the efficacy of sanctions. Comparative research has revealed a number of conclusions, none of which appear to have been considered by current policymakers in the White House or State Department.  

The first of these is that sanctions work when they are implemented broadly by a wide coalition of governments. Most of the sanctions that have succeeded in their intentions have been along those lines including the UN sanctions on Iran to push the country to a nuclear deal.  

The second is that the goals of sanctions should be narrow and clearly defined. Successful cases, as Daniel Drezner who wrote a book on the topic has detailed, have been tied to specific goals. Regime change is not one of those. It is too broad and amorphous – though as I say above also unrealistic in its logic between intended effect and the targeted individual. 

A third element of successful sanctions is keeping them flexible and credible. As detailed in a Council on Foreign Relations backgrounder ‘the target must believe that sanctions will be increased or reduced based on its behaviour.’ 

That’s never been the case with Cuba sanctions under the Democracy or Libertad acts. Instead, sanctions relief is presented as a binary choice: democracy or nothing. There are no provisions for intermediate steps that could potentially incentivize changes of behaviour toward loosening state control and reducing human rights abuses.  

The recent tightening of the US embargo that included restrictions on US travel to Cuba and financial transactions under the Trump White House has been disconnected from any specific policy changes in the island. In this case, human rights conditions that the changes were linked to or intended to punish had not taken a dramatic turn for the worse. They were instead intended to simply ratchet up pressure for an embargo which advocates felt was too leaky and hope for a collapse that would weaken the Maduro regime.

That is precisely the problem for many of the most strident advocates of the US-Cuba embargo: the policy has become the objective, divorced from on-the-ground realities and incentives to move them forward.  There is the legitimate concern that the sanctions hurt the very people that the policy claims to defend. They also serve as a rallying point for the Castro regime and a way to cover up for its own economic failures.  But the most damning indictment of the embargo is that in its almost 50-year history it has failed to achieve its objectives.

If the matter is the efficacy of sanctions, then the US embargo on Cuba does not meet the test. It’s not limited to Cuba. None of the cases of regime change that many of the embargo advocates love to cite, communist Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and South Africa had embargos as tight or isolating as those imposed on Cuba for nearly half a century. There’s a reason for that. It’s basic logic.

A version of this article will also appear in Spanish in the journal Foro Cubano in September.  




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Market Rally Contains Hopeful Message for the Economy

21 August 2020

Dame DeAnne Julius DCMG CBE

Senior Adviser, Chatham House; Distinguished Fellow, Global Economy and Finance Programme
There are good reasons for soaring stocks, despite a seeming disconnect from the recession.

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Fearless Girl statue outside the New York Stock Exchange. Photo by Noam Galai/Getty Images.

Among the many unusual features of the pandemic-induced downturn is the disconnect between depressed real economies and buoyant financial markets. This is particularly evident in the US, where output fell 9.5% in the second quarter while the S&P 500 index rose by one-fifth.

This may suggest a huge financial bubble is in the making, or at least a highly optimistic view of a COVID-19 vaccine and treatments. Another possibility is that markets have a better grasp of the economic dynamics of a post-pandemic world than most nervous consumers and governments.

Certainly, markets have been helped by central bank largesse. In March, major central banks reacted forcefully to the possibility of a serious credit crunch with lending guarantees and bond purchases. Such liquidity interventions soothe troubled markets, but they also raise asset prices — potentially into bubble territory. This partly explains the markets’ strength. But it may not be the whole story.

A closer look at market performance suggests they may be on to something more interesting. Compare the US’s broad-based S&P 500 equity index with the tech-focused Nasdaq 100. Since the start of the year, the Nasdaq has risen 24% while the S&P is up just 5%. In the S&P itself, it has been the dramatic rise of the so-called Faang companies — Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix and Google/Alphabet — that offset lesser performances by the other 495 companies. This sharp difference reflects two forces.

First, the COVID-19 crisis has had vastly different effects on different sectors. Lockdown brought a sudden increase in demand for the technology services that enable home learning (with school closures), homeworking (especially by office workers), home entertainment (instead of cinemas and theatres), home shopping (instead of physical shops), and home deliveries of almost everything else, including food. The Faang companies benefited disproportionally from this surge in demand as their production is scalable. Much of it could also be delivered by employees who themselves worked from home. The rise in their share prices reflects this.

Meanwhile, other sectors suffered massively. In the UK, the overall drop in gross domestic product of 20% in the second quarter was led by a fall of 87% in the accommodation and food services sector, which was severely affected by government restrictions. About one-quarter of the UK workforce, according to official figures, was also furloughed or temporarily off work without pay during lockdown. The fall in the share prices of hotels, restaurant franchises and airlines reflects such factors. 

The second driver of rising markets is that they are forward-looking while economic statistics reflect the past. For example, that UK GDP shrank during the second quarter is less interesting to a financial investor than the fact that during two months (May and June) GDP expanded by 2.4% and 8.7% respectively. In other words, output troughed in April but recovery began in May and accelerated in June as lockdown restrictions were eased. 

It is likely that rapid adaptations by companies and consumers to the pandemic-supercharged trends are already under way. In Britain, the share of retail sales (excluding fuel) made by ecommerce rose from around 7% in 2010 to 20% at the beginning of 2020 — it has since jumped to more than 30%. 

One-third of those officially working from home meanwhile say that they would like to do that permanently, according to the Centre for Economics and Business Research, and many large companies have offered their staff this choice.

Even in labour-intensive sectors such as healthcare and government services there has been a replacement of face-to-face delivery with digital booking and screen-based consultations.

Still, while this may help some companies in certain sectors, it does not imply a smooth recovery for the whole economy. Rather, it augurs a period of disruption as new companies, new business models and new job openings emerge. If the pandemic has ignited a Schumpeterian process of creative destruction, that is likely to continue whether or not effective vaccines and treatments ever come. 

Governments should ease the pain of this disruption with supportive fiscal and monetary policies, but they should not try to slow it down. The hopeful market message is that one lasting consequence of COVID-19 may be the rejuvenation of productivity growth that eventually spreads far beyond tech. 

This article was originally published in the Financial Times.




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Lessons from COVID-19: A Catalyst for Improving Sanctions?

26 August 2020

Emanuela-Chiara Gillard

Associate Fellow, International Law Programme
As the COVID-19 pandemic continues, efforts by states and humanitarian actors to stop its spread and to treat the sick are being hindered by existing sanctions and counterterrorism measures.

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Syrians walk past a mural painted as part of an awareness campaign by UNICEF and WHO, bearing instructions on protection from COVID-19, in the Kurdish-majority city of Qamishli, Syria, on 16 August 2020. Photo by Delil Souleiman/AFP via Getty Images.

If sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, the EU, or states unilaterally, are not sufficiently targeted, and do not include adequate safeguards for humanitarian action, they can adversely affect the very populations for whose well-being they were imposed in the first place.  This is not a new concern, but one brought starkly to the fore by their impact on responses to COVID-19.

The detrimental impact of sanctions, which can prevent the supply of medical or personal protective equipment (PPE), or the provision of technical support or training to local health authorities is evident. Sanctions can also affect remote learning if support cannot be provided to local education authorities, export licences cannot be obtained for the necessary equipment and software, or if the companies providing reliable internet coverage are designated under the sanctions.

A comparison of US and EU sanctions on Syria reveals key challenges, but also opportunities for improving current arrangements for the imposition and implementation of sanctions so as to minimize adverse consequences in Syria and more generally.

The US has imposed broad sanctions, such as restrictions on the provision of funds, goods or services – even charitable contributions – to the Syrian government, including the health and education ministries, now playing a central role in the COVID-19 response.

UN agencies are exempted from these restrictions. A general license authorizes NGOs to conduct activities to meet basic needs, but it excludes those involving the government. So NGOs wishing to provide medical devices, PPE, training or other support to ministry of health staff have to apply for a specific licence.

But procedures for applying for licences are complicated, and the approval process notoriously slow.  No accommodation has been made to facilitate the COVID-19 response: no interpretative guidance – that would be valuable for all NGOs – has been issued, and no procedures established for reviewing applications more quickly.  There is no statement of policy indicating the circumstances under which specific licences might be granted.

Transactions with designated entities other than the government, such as internet providers whose services are necessary for remote learning, remain prohibited, and regulations expressly preclude applying for specific licences.

US sanctions frequently have a broad scope, both in direct and indirect application.  NGOs registered in the US, and staff who are US nationals, are directly bound by them, and grant agreements between the US government and non-US NGOs require the latter to comply with US sanctions.

This leaves the non-US NGOs in a Catch-22 situation – as they are not ‘US persons’ they cannot apply for specific licenses, but if they operate without such licences they may be violating grant requirements. This lack of clarity contributes to banks’ unwillingness to provide services, and may lead NGOs to curtail their activities.  This situation is regrettable in Syria, where the US is the first donor to humanitarian action, and also arises in other contexts where the US has imposed similar sanctions.

The EU’s sanctions for Syria are far more targeted. Of relevance to the COVID-19 response, they do not include prohibitions on the provision of support to the government that could impede assistance in the medical field.  There are, however, restrictions on the provision of certain types of PPE or substances used for disinfection, and also on transactions with designated telecommunications providers that affect continuity of education during lockdowns.  Although not prohibited, these activities must be authorized by member states’ competent authorities. Similar concerns arise about the complexity and delays of the processes.

The EU sanctions framework is complex, so the recent European Commission Guidance Note on Syria providing official clarification of how it applies to humanitarian action is welcome.  Although the note only explains the existing rules rather than amending them to facilitate the COVID-19 response, it does include a number of important elements relevant not just to Syria, but to the interplay between sanctions and humanitarian action more broadly.

First, it notes that ‘in accordance with International Humanitarian Law where no other option is available, the provision of humanitarian aid should not be prevented by EU restrictive measures’.  This recognizes that humanitarian assistance takes priority over any inconsistent restrictions in sanctions, and it also applies both to UN sanctions and unilateral measures. It is a starting premise that is frequently overlooked in discussions of whether sanctions should include exceptions for humanitarian action.  Its reaffirmation is timely, and it must guide states in drawing up future sanctions.

Second, the note states that sanctions do not require the screening of final beneficiaries of humanitarian programmes.  This means that once someone has been identified as an individual in need on the basis of humanitarian principles, no further screening is required.  This is extremely important to COVID-19 responses as it reflects a foundational principle of IHL that, to the fullest extent practicable, everyone is entitled to the medical care required by their condition without distinction.

Third, while responsibility for the implementation of sanctions, including the granting of authorizations, lies with member states, the note nudges them to adopt a number of measures to expedite and streamline such processes.  These include the suggestion that states could issue a single authorization for the provision of humanitarian aid in response to the pandemic.

The European Commission is to be commended for this initiative, which should be replicated for other contexts where the COVID-19 response may be undermined by sanctions.  These include Gaza, where it would be important to highlight that the designation of Hamas under EU counterterrorism sanctions must not prevent the provision of assistance to relevant ministries.

Failing to draw a distinction between the designated political party and the structures of civil administration risks turning targeted financial sanctions into measures akin to comprehensive sanctions.

The pandemic should serve as a catalyst for improving the system for the adoption and implementation of sanctions by the UN, the EU and individual states, including the UK as it elaborates its sanctions policy post-Brexit. The principles are clear: without prejudicing the aims for which sanctions have been imposed, humanitarian needs must always be prioritized, and met.